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Epistemic Evil


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Epistemic Evil:

A Third Problem of Evil

By

Joel Thomas Tierno

CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PRESS


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This volume is dedicated to my parents,

JOSEPH,

DOLORES

AND JAMES,

with gratitude and love for too much to name.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................xi

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1

PART I: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

CHAPTER ONE: ON GOD...............................................................................121. On the Concept ofGod ............................................................................ 12

2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power ................................................13

3. Gods Character and the Character of the Creation...................................14

4. God and Good...........................................................................................15

CHAPTER TWO: THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

OF EVIL ............................................................................................................17

1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil ......................................17

2. The Evidential Formulation of the Problem of Evil..................................203. A Third Formulation of the Problem of Evil.............................................21

CHAPTER THREE: THE BEST-OF-ALL-POSSIBLE-WORLDS

HYPOTHESIS...................................................................................................24

1. A Modified Form of the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis...........24

A. The Problem of Free Agents Other Than God......................................24

B. The Pluralistic Hypothesis....................................................................25

C. The Argument from the Universe as a Part of a Larger Whole ............25

D. The Argument from Gods Omnipotence.............................................25E. Summation............................................................................................26

2. Robert Adams on the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis ...............273. Evaluating Adams Arguments .................................................................29

A. About Condition 3' ...............................................................................30

B. About Conditions 1 and 2.....................................................................31

C. About the Value of Grace.....................................................................33

4. Adams Argument in Application to This World......................................36

5. The Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis and the Problem of Evil...37


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Table of Contentsviii

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTENSION AND EXTENSION

OFMORAL EVIL.............................................................................................. 39

1. Difficulties with Definitions of Moral Evil...............................................39

2. Toward a Definition of Moral Evil ...........................................................45

PART II: EPISTEMIC EVIL

CHAPTER FIVE: THE CLASSICAL LOCUS.................................................48

1. Descartes Formulation of the Problem of Erroneous Judgment ..............48

2. A Critique of Descartes Formulation of the Problem ..............................49

CHAPTER SIX: PARADIGMATIC CASES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ..............52

CHAPTER SEVEN: EXAMPLES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL...............................59

1. The Cases

Case I: The Headmaster and the Pupil .......................................................59

Case II: The Graduate Student...................................................................61

Case III: The Couple and Their Automobile..............................................62

Case IV: The Doctor and His Patient.........................................................64Case V: The Marriage Proposal.................................................................65

Case VI: Choosing a Career.......................................................................66

2. The Significance of the Cases ...................................................................67

CHAPTER EIGHT: NATURAL EVIL AND EPISTEMIC EVIL ....................69

1. About Natural Evil....................................................................................69

2. The Analogy of Epistemic Evil to Natural Evil ........................................69

CHAPTER NINE: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 1 ..........71

CHAPTER TEN: MOTIVATION AND RESPONSIBILITY...........................77

1. Regarding Compulsory Theoretical Judgments ........................................77A. Natural Desires.....................................................................................77

B. Learned Desires....................................................................................81

C. Practical Circumstances........................................................................86

2. Regarding Compulsory Practical Judgments ............................................87

3. An Important Qualification Concerning Practical Judgments...................894. The Strength of Motivation.......................................................................92

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 2 ....94

CHAPTER TWELVE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ........97


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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil ix

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: DESCARTES APOLOGETICS.............................101

1. The Epistemological Argument ..............................................................103

2. Critical Analysis of the Epistemological Argument................................103

3. The Metaphysical Argument...................................................................1084. Critical Analysis of the Metaphysical Argument....................................109

5. A Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique.....................................110

6. The Psychological Argument..................................................................111

7. Descartes on the Source of Human Errors of Judgment

and How Such Errors May Be Avoided .................................................113

A. The Source of Human Errors of Judgment.........................................113

B. Descartes Method of Avoiding Error ................................................113

8. Critical Analysis of the Psychological Argument ...................................114

9. The Argument From Freedom of the Will ..............................................116

10. Critical Analysis of the Argument from the Freedom of the Will...........118

11. Another Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique...........................118

12. The Argument From Divine Liberty .......................................................120

13. Critical Analysis of the Argument from Divine Liberty .........................121

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONTEMPORARY APOLOGETICSAND EPISTEMIC EVIL .................................................................................125

1. Alvin Plantinga .......................................................................................125

2. Marilyn McCord Adams .........................................................................1323. Richard Swinburne..................................................................................143

4. John Hick ................................................................................................148

5. Bruce Reichenbach .................................................................................151

6. Summation ..............................................................................................157

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE THEODICEAN CONSEQUENCES

OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................158

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS.................................1611. Epistemic Evil Is Necessarily Associated with Future-Oriented

Judgments ...............................................................................................161

2. Epistemic Evil and Gods Obligation to Optimize Good........................164

3. Epistemic Evil and the Wrongful Actions of Others...............................165

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: THE RELATIVE INTRACTABILITY

OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................166

1. Moral Evil and Epistemic Evil................................................................166

2. Natural Evil and Epistemic Evil..............................................................167


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Table of Contentsx

EPILOGUE......................................................................................................169

1. Is Epistemic Evil Logically Necessary?..................................................169

2. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Existence of a Greater Good? ..............170

3. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Nonexistence of a Greater Evil? ..........1704. Is Epistemic Evil a Consequence of the Defective Actions of Agents

Agents Other Than God? .........................................................................171

5. Summation ..............................................................................................171

NOTES.............................................................................................................172

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................176

INDEX.............................................................................................................179


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to recognize a debt of gratitude to several individuals who have

participated, at one point or another, in the extended process that has issued in this

essay: Thomas J. Donahue, Georges Dicker, Peter H. Hare, Richard T. Hull, the

late Richard R. LaCroix. Most especially, I would like to express my gratitude to

Gina M. Sully, who twice read earlier drafts of this manuscript and made

innumerable judicious suggestions.


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INTRODUCTION

The first question is: What is a problem of evil? There has been some

disagreement about this. For the purposes of this inquiry, problems of evil arise

from apparent incongruities between the character of the alleged creator of the

universe and the observed character of the universe itself. The universe is purported

to be the work of a being without defect. The universe is observed to have certain

apparently defective features. It would seem that the universe ought not to havethese features if it is the work of such a being. Thus arise the problems of evil.

As used by moral and social philosophers, evilis opposed to morally good.The meaning of the term is slightly different in the context of the discussion of

the problem of evil. In that context, evil consists in the suffering of sentient

beings. Thus natural phenomena may be properly associated with evil in this

sense, though such phenomena are clearly not evil in the moral sense.

The features of the universe that are associated with problems of evil cause

the relevantly innocent to suffer. Who are the relevantly innocent? Individuals

are relevantly innocent with respect to a specific evil when there is no defect in

their conduct that accounts for their suffering that evil.

It might be objected that evils may be warranted by defects in agentsconduct that have no direct connection to those evils. It is not necessary that

there be some defect in our conduct which makes us liable to a specific evil for

that evil to be justified. This claim implies that our actions do not have to be

relevantly defective. My suffering in one context may be warranted by a wrong

that I have committed in some other context.

If God punishes in this way, he either does not intend punishment to serve an

educative function or does not understand punishment very well. If

transgressions and their punishments are thus uncoupled, people are unlikely to

associate them. The punishment is unlikely to be perceived as punishment. Thepossibility of learning anything specific from the punishment is thus effectively

eliminated.

The dominant analogy concerning the relation of God to human beings is that

of a profoundly concerned and caring parent to a somewhat wayward child. Do

loving parents administer painful punishments that are designed such that their

children are unable to learn from those punishments? No. To knowingly do sowould have to be considered cruel and abusive. It follows that administering

such punishments would signal either profound ignorance or a defect in the

character of the punisher. Profound ignorance is incompatible with Gods

omniscience. Defective character is incompatible with Gods omnibenevolence.


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Introduction2

In short, Gods cardinal attributes would be a barrier to his administering

punishments of this type.

A second difficulty arises for those who insist that the relevantly innocent do

not suffer unjustly. If no one who is relevantly innocent suffers unjustly thenevery specific instance of suffering is related to some failing of the sufferer.

Further, the suffering and the failing from which it arises are somehow

commensurate. This implies that the sum total of evil that individuals endure in

their lives is quantitatively proportionate to the sum total of the wrongs they

perpetrate. This notion is ludicrous. Experience refutes it. Profoundly evil

people often suffer relatively little. Joseph Stalin, one of the twentieth centurys

greatest butchers, basically had things the way the he wanted them throughout

his life. He suffered little physically and endured little frustration in the

execution of his political objectives. Other people perpetrate so much evil that

the claim that their suffering is quantitatively proportionate to the suffering they

cause is absurd. Adolph Hitler undoubtedly suffered in his life, but it cannot be

seriously supposed that the suffering he endured was proportionate to the

suffering he caused. The list of such persons is undoubtedly long. So is the list

of good people who have suffered greatly. Noted examples include Sir Thomas

More, Galileo, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr.Finally, the claim that the relevantly innocent do not suffer violates the core

of Christian doctrine. Jesus is said to have been the innocent lamb who suffered

so that our sins may be forgiven. Here is a manson of God or otherwisewhosuffered greatly and did very little, if anything, wrong.

Gods willingness to permit the relevantly innocent to suffer requires

explanation. We would hardly select divine or Godlike as the appropriate

adjectives to characterize the behavior of parents who consistently fail to protect

their relevantly innocent children from easily avoided harms. Abusive, or at best

negligent, seem more fitting characterizations. Yet Gods creatures, even when

their behavior is relevantly unimpeachable, are frequently made to suffer harms

that God could easily prevent. Why does God not protect the relevantly innocent

from suffering? This is no merely theoretical question. Human history is atapestry heavily dappled with the blood, tears, and anguished cries of the

relevantly innocent. This demands explanation.

In addressing the existence of evil within the creation, philosophers and

theologians have traditionally distinguished between evil that has its source in

human action and evil that has its source in the natural world. The evil that hasits source in human action is called moral evil. It is said to be consequent upon

the intentional actions of free agents. Natural evil has its source within the

natural domain. It is said to follow from naturally occurring objects and

phenomena through the inevitable operation of natural laws.


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Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil 3

The classification of evils into moral and natural is widely regarded as

exhaustive. One aim of this essay is to demonstrate that this is not so. A third

form of evil will be discussed in detail below. I call this third form of evil

epistemic evil. It surfaces in the context of our effort to make correct judgments.It is ultimately rooted in our unavoidable ignorance of information we require to

make truthful judgments about the world in which we live and the best choices

about our own actions. Epistemic evil is associated with human action, but it

cannot be properly regarded as moral evil.

In Part I of this essay, various preliminary points of clarification and

foundational considerations are addressed that are relevant to the argument

regarding epistemic evil presented in Part II. Chapter 1 is devoted to discussion

of the concept ofGod. It is necessary to identify and briefly clarify the attributes

of God that provide the basis for problems of evil. This is the business of the

first section of Chapter 1. In the second section, I take a closer look at Gods

omnipotence and offer a clarification of what it means to say that God can do

whatever is logically possible. Finally, I consider the notion that Gods character

would be reflected in his creation. This notion is a presupposition of all

problems of evil and therefore deserves some consideration.

In Chapter 2, I begin by outlining and critiquing what is known as the logicalformulation of the problem of evil. Next, I consider a proposed reformulation of

the problem known as the evidential formulation of the problem of evil. I argue

that whereas the logical formulation of the problem is too strong, the evidentialformulation is unnecessarily weak. I defend an alternative conception of the

nature of problems of evil. I argue that problems of evil are best understood as

problems ofontological incompatibility. The hypothesis of an infinitely perfect

creator has existential implications. It has implications about the character of the

creation. Certain forms of evil in the creation cannot cohere existentially with an

infinitely perfect creator. Those who advance problems of evil contend that such

forms of evil actually exist.

Chapter 3 focuses on Robert Adams argument regarding the best-of-all-

possible-worlds hypothesis. I defend an importantly modified variant of thebest-of-all-possible-worlds hypothesis. I agree with Adams in rejecting the view

that God can create only one universe, that is, the best of all possible universes. I

nonetheless maintain that there are definite limitations upon the character of

Gods creation. Among these is a limitation regarding imperfections in the

universe insofar as God determines its character. In the final section of thischapter, I argue that the best-of-all-worlds hypothesis is not actually central to

those who advance problems of evil. Their arguments do not presuppose that

hypothesis.

In Chapter 4, the intension and the extension of the concept ofmoral evilarediscussed. I begin by noting that there are many definitions of moral evil in the


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Introduction4

literature. These definitions are shown to be extensionally as well as

intensionally divergent. In other words, these definitions are shown to diverge in

their comparative assessments of what count as moral evils. I then consider a

number of different specific actions in an effort to sufficiently sharpen theintension of the concept for the purposes of this inquiry. I close by arguing that,

contrary to the traditional view, there is evil within the human domain of the

universe that is not moral evil. More specifically, I argue that not all of the evil

consequent upon the intentional actions of free agents is moral evil. These

arguments set the stage for Part II of the essay.

In Part II, I formulate and defend the problem of epistemic evil. In Chapter 5,

the problematic of Descartes Fourth Meditation is outlined. This is the classical

locus for the inquiry into the theodicean significance of human errors of

judgment. I begin by briefly explaining how the problematic of the FourthMeditation emerges from the conclusions of the Third Meditation. I then explain

Descartes formulation of the problem of epistemic evil. Finally, I argue that

Descartes formulation of the problem is deficient in two related ways. The first

defect is that he treats all errors of judgment as if they are relevantly similar in

the context of this problem. That is a serious mistake. The second defect, which

follows from the first, is that Descartes formulates the problem of epistemic evil

universally. He wants to know why we should ever judge erroneously. The real

problem is why we should err under certain specifiable conditions. I try to

correct these deficiencies.In Chapter 6, I outline the character of paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil.

My objective is to give a detailed characterization of the errors of judgment thatlie at the heart of this problem. In this context, five variables are considered. The

first is the conditions that motivate the judgment. The second is the

consequences of the agents previous judgments and actions. The third is the

deliberative procedure the agent employs in arriving at the judgment. The fourth

is the quality of the agents judgmentit must be substantively incorrect. The

fifth is the impact of the judgmentit must have significant adverse

consequences for the human beings that are affected by it. Through thisdiscussion, the essential nature of epistemic evil is brought to light. The

judgments associated with epistemic evil concern matters that agents cannot bereasonably criticized for judging. These judgments are made through procedures

that agents cannot be reasonably criticized for employing. These judgments are

substantively incorrect. The errors involved in these judgments lead to human

suffering.

In Chapter 7, several examples of epistemic evil are discussed in

considerable detail. The aim here is to give the reader a sense of the sorts of

judgments that are connected with this form of evil. Though the examples aretied to particular cultural and historical institutions, circumstances, and artifacts,


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similar examples can surely be found from every age and every culture. The

essential point is that these judgments are commonplace. There is nothing

extraordinary about them. Everyone has suffered, at one time or another, from

epistemic evil. This form of evil is more pervasive than either moral evil ornatural evil, and that is no small claim.

In Chapter 8, epistemic evil is compared to natural evil. The aim is to show

that these two forms of evil are analogous in certain important ways. I begin by

briefly characterizing natural evil. I define natural evil as suffering consequent

upon natural objects and phenomena and the inevitable operations of natural

laws. I then argue that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and the most

disturbing cases of natural evil are alike in that the people involved cannot be

reasonably blamed for bringing about the suffering that they endure. The

relevant instances of natural evil and epistemic evil seem to be connected with

the world as we find it. There is no clearly identifiable means available to those

involved through which they could reliably circumvent the evil.

Chapter 9 addresses the issue of where the responsibility for epistemic evil

lies. I begin by distinguishing two forms of responsibility for acts of erroneous

judgment: motivational responsibility and methodological responsibility.

Motivational responsibility focuses on the reasons the agent passes judgmentupon the subject of the error. Methodological responsibility focuses on the

reasons the agents judgment is erroneous. Factoring these two forms of

responsibility together, we arrive at a four-category classification of erroneousjudgments. In the first category are acts of judgment such that the agent is

neither motivationally responsible for the act of judgment nor methodologically

responsible for the error of judgment. In the second category are acts of

judgment such that the agent is motivationally responsible for the act of

judgment but not methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. In the

third category are acts of judgment such that the agent is not motivationally

responsible for the act of judgment, but is methodologically responsible for the

error of judgment. In the final category are acts of judgment such that the agent

is motivationally responsible for the act of judgment and methodologicallyresponsible for the error of judgment.

This discussion of responsibility carries through Chapters 10 and 11. Chapter

10 carefully examines different types of judgments, different forms of

motivation, and different degrees of motivation. First, I discuss theoretical

judgments, and then I discuss practical judgments. Under each of theseheadings, judgments motivated by natural desires, by learned desires, and by

practical circumstances are considered in detail. In the third section of the

chapter, I offer an important qualification regarding practical judgments based

on the fact that human beings enter into relations of opposition in which it isimpossible for everyone to succeed. The chapter ends with a discussion of


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Introduction6

different strengths of motivation. Here I deal with the significance of the

distinction between judgments we are compelled to make by the forms of

motivation that have been discussed earlier in the chapter and judgments that we

are merely disposedto make by those forms of motivation.In Chapter 11, I argue that the hypothetical nature of the relation between the

creator and the creation that is characteristic of Judaeo-Christian theism entails

that God shares a measure of the responsibility for some of the errors of

judgment discussed in Chapter 10. God has created the world in which the

agents who make these errors live and judge. He has created the agents

themselves. He bears a measure of responsibility for their motivations. He bears

a measure of responsibility for the information that is available to them. He

bears a measure of responsibility for limits in their powers to organize and

utilize that information in the process of arriving at their judgments. The finalresult is that people are motivated to judge when they cannot judge both rightly

(employing a reliable procedure) and correctly (making the substantively correct

judgment).

In Chapter 12, I discuss the consequences of epistemic evil for human

beings. My aim is to show that epistemic evil has seriously harmful effects. This

discussion anticipates the objection that erroneous judgments which cannot be

systematically avoided do not lead to significant human suffering and, therefore,

are normatively insignificant. In the course of this discussion, I identify six

categories of judgment that differ from one another in terms of their objects.First, there are judgments regarding the natures of the entities that populate the

world in which we live and act. Second, there are judgments concerning self-regarding ends. In other words, judgments regarding what, if it is procured, will

promote our welfare or happiness. Third, there are judgments concerning self-

regarding means. In other words, judgments regarding how to get what we want.

Fourth, there are judgments concerning what will be beneficial to othersother-

regarding ends. Fifth, there are judgments concerning how to realize other-

regarding ends. Finally, there are purely theoretical judgments. I argue that

every one of these forms of erroneous judgment often has significant adverseconsequences for the human beings that are affected by them.

In Chapter 13, Descartes apologetics regarding human errors of judgmentare considered. Descartes offers five arguments regarding such errors. The first

is the epistemological argument. According to this argument, our finite powers

of comprehension are insufficient to properly understand human errors of

judgment. The second is the metaphysical argument. This argument is related to

the epistemological argument, but differs from it by specifying the exact nature

of the limitation in human reason that accounts for our inability to understand

human error. The problem is that understanding human error requires aperspective that comprehends the totality of Gods creation. Human reason,


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being finite and limited, cannot gain such a perspective. The third argument is

thepsychological argument. According to this argument, the human capacity for

error is a contingent consequence of the relations between two human faculties:

the will and the understanding. The important point, according to Descartes, isthat both of these faculties are perfectly adequate to their proper purpose. We

have received no faculty from God that is inherently defective. The fourth

argument is the argument from free will. According to this argument, human

errors of judgment, insofar as they depend upon God, are consequent upon a

perfection in our nature. It follows that human error is actually evidence of

Gods perfection. He empowers us to err through a misuse of our capacity to

judge freely. Human errors of judgment result from the abuse of a faculty which

was bestowed so that we might judge both freely and aright concerning those

matters that fall within the range of our comprehension. God cannot make us

free and simultaneously withhold from us the capacity for error. By giving us

the power to judge freely he makes us more rather than less perfect creatures.

The fifth argument is the argument from divine liberty. According to this

reasoning, Gods control over the creation is absolute and free. It follows that

God can have no obligations in relation to the creation. Consequently, evil,

including epistemic evil, requires no specific explanation. When an agentspower within a given domain is absolute and free, that agent never has to

explain anything he or she does within that domain. In the course of Chapter 13

all of these arguments are critically evaluated and found to be wanting.In Chapter 14, I outline the positions of some the leading contemporary

apologists. Because I have argued that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and

the most troubling instances of natural evil are importantly analogous, I focus on

apologetics concerning natural evil. Specifically, I consider arguments offered

by Alvin Plantinga, Marilyn McCord Adams, Richard Swinburne, John Hick,

and Bruce Reichenbach. After thorough, and I hope faithful, expositions of their

arguments, I carefully critique each argument as an explanation of natural evil.

Finally, I consider how these apologetics apply to epistemic evil. In each case, I

find serious problems with the arguments of these apologists in relation tonatural evil. I also find that these arguments have little, if any, force in relation

to epistemic evil.

Chapter 15 focuses on the theodicean consequences of the inquiry. What

follows from the arguments that I have made regarding erroneous judgments

that cannot be systematically avoided in terms of the plausibility of the claimthat the universe issues from the creative activity of a being without defect? In

other words, what does this inquiry indicate concerning the Judaeo-Christian

creation hypothesis? I conclude that cases of erroneous judgment that cannot be

systematically avoided, and the suffering consequent upon those cases, providestrong prima facie evidence against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis.


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Introduction8

The burden of proof falls to the theists. If the errors of judgment involved in

paradigmatic instances of epistemic evil are compatible with theism, it is

incumbent upon theists to show this. I can imagine no way that this might be

done.In Chapter 16, I anticipate several objections that may be raised against my

argument. The first objection is that epistemic evil is inevitably associated with

future-oriented judgments. If this is true, it is beyond Gods power to do

anything about such evil. The second objection is that the world is better off

containing epistemic evil than it would be if it did not contain epistemic evil.

This is the familiar gambit of asserting that what appears evil from a limited

perspective, is actually good for a perspective that comprehends the totality of

being and all of the relations between its parts. The third objection is that the

conditions which lead to epistemic evil actually result from the decisions and

subsequent actions of agents other than God.

The argument of Chapter 17 is that the epistemic problem of evil is the most

intractable of the three major problems of evil. Though I think that there are

serious problems with apologetics regarding both natural evil and moral evil,

there are at least initially plausible explanations of both of these forms of evil.

There does not appear to be any comparably plausible explanation of epistemicevil. It is very difficult to understand what can be gained by the existence of

errors of judgment that cannot be systematically avoided and that lead to

significant impoverishment of the human condition.In the Epilogue, I apply the conception of problems of evil developed in

Chapter 2 to the problem of epistemic evil. I argue that epistemic evil is not

logically necessary. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the existence of a

greater good. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the non-existence of a

greater evil. I close by arguing that human beings have a legitimate right to

complain about the inadequacy of their received faculties in relation to the

judgments that are necessary or warranted given the character of their received

situations.

The ultimate aim of this essay is to demonstrate that the supposition that Godhas created the universe leads to a serious problem. It produces a form of

inconsistency. The inconsistency emerges when we compare the character of the

universe as it is revealed through observation and personal experience to what

we would expect the universe to be like if it were the handiwork of an infinitely

perfect creator. It turns out that the universe has surprising defects. Suppose itcan be established that there are harms human beings endure that cannot be

properly related to defects in their actions. It would follow, on the Judaeo-

Christian creation hypothesis, that there are defects within the creation that

cannot be adequately explained without reference to the actions of God. Thisleads to a problem of evil. Justifying the claim that there are such defects within


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the creation is the burden you inherit when you attempt to establish a problem of

evil. Meeting that burden is the central business of this essay.


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PART I

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS


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CHAPTERONE

ON GOD

The first section of this chapter is devoted to clarification of the concept of

Godas far as such clarification is necessary for the purposes of this inquiry. Inthe second section, I devote special attention to the practical implications of

Gods omnipotence. In the third section, I discuss the notion that Gods nature is

reflected in the creation. In the final section, I consider a possible objection to

the argument of the third section.

1. On the Concept ofGod

As the use of the proper name Godimplies, the line of reasoning developed

below is directed against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis. Some points

of clarification are in order before the argument proceeds. First, my

understanding of the relevant features of the Judaeo-Christian concept of God

should be specified. Second, the basis for the assumption that God's characterwould be revealed in his creative works should be supplied.

The proper name Godis generally used to refer to an infinitely perfect being

that has created the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo). Gods infinite perfection

is taken to imply that he lacks no consistently conceivable perfection compatible

with his spiritual nature. Stated positively, God possesses infinitely, completely,

or in the most perfect form possible, all those perfections that can apply to aspiritual being. This abstract notion of infinite perfection is somewhat slippery.

Attributing specific characteristics to God concretizes it. Three of these

characteristics are considered his cardinal attributes. These characteristics are

omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

God's omnipotence implies that he can do anything that can be consistently

conceived. The only states of affairs that God cannot make actual involvecontradictions in their conception. Such states of affairs could never truly be

states of affairs. They are impossible states of affairs. Power is limited by

possibility. What is beyond possibility is not potentially actual. Gods inability

to actualize what is not potentially actual is no real inability at all. When it is

said that God cannot do the impossible, it does not follow that there is

something that God cannot do. Practically, this conception of Gods power

implies that God can do whatever he wills as long as it does not involve acontradiction. All logically possible states of affairs are actually possible for


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God. This is an extreme claim. It may be open to serious challenges. Still, it is

characteristic of Judaeo-Christians to make this claim.

God's omniscience implies that he has actual knowledge of every potential

object of knowledge. God knows everything that can be known. Morespecifically, Gods omniscience implies that he possesses: (i) perfect and

complete knowledge of physical reality or what exists, (ii) perfect and complete

knowledge of normative reality or what is good and right and what is evil and

wrong, (iii) perfect and complete practical or instrumental knowledge; that is,

knowledge of how to achieve what he intends, (iv) perfect and complete

theoretical knowledge or knowledge of mathematical, logical, and scientific

truth, and (v) perfect knowledge of every immediate or direct consequence of

each action he takes. It follows, from a practical point of view, that God knows

how to do whatever he wills without doing anything that he does not will, unless

doing the former without the latter would involve a contradiction.

It might be suggested that the qualification, unless it would involve a

contradiction, is superfluous. The argument would be that God never wills the

contradictory. But this is not at all obvious. On the contrary, it seems that there

might be cases in which, in a certain sense, God unwillingly brings about certain

states of affairs. There might be evils that God brings about because those evilsare associated with the minimally defective means to procuring greater goods or

averting greater evils. God does not positively will these evils. He would prefer

to bring about the greater goods or avert the greater evils without bringing aboutthese evils. He simply cannot do so. If there are such evils, it is perfectly natural

to say that there is a sense in which they are against Gods will. God would

prefer that these evils not exist. He simply cannot bring it about that they do not

exist without also bringing it about that the greater goods to which they are

connected do not exist.

God's omnibenevolence implies that his will is free from defect or perfectly

good. The will to do evil is wholly absent in God. God always aims at good and

seeks to avoid evil. He always acts with the intention of bringing about as much

good relative to evil as he can in the specific situation. It is contrary to Godsnature to opt for an alternative that is inferior to another alternative open to him.

God is a good optimizer.

2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power

Some complications arise concerning Gods power. There are states of affairs

that are logically possible in one sense that God cannot bring about. Consider

the existence of Mount Everest. There is no contradiction involved in the notion

of a universe without this mountain. God could bring about a universe just likethis one except that it lacks Mount Everest. Mount Everest is a contingent being.


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Chapter One14

The claim Mount Everest does not exist is not a logically contradictory claim.

We cannot be sure that it is false without having knowledge of the world. The

claim Mount Everest never existed is also not logically contradictory. There is

surely something strange about this proposition, but it is not logicallyincoherent. Again, knowing this claim is false requires information about the

world. Once Everest is actual, however, God cannot subsequently bring about

the state of affairs that it never existed. The propositions Everest once existed

and Everest never existedare inconsistent. These propositions cannot both be

true. The first proposition is, as a matter of contingent fact, true. It follows that

no one is in the position of being able to make the second proposition true. That

is not logically possible. The claim that God can bring it about that what now

exists never existed, implies that God can do the logically impossible. We can

know that this claim is incorrect without knowing anything about the world. So,

then, the claim What now exists cannot be made to have never existed is a

logical truth. One does not need to know anything about the world to know that

this claim is true. So, God cannot bring it about that a contingent state of affairs

that has become actual should subsequently cease to have ever been actual.

Mount Everest falls within the extension of the class of things that now exist.

Adding the factual premiseEverest exists to our logical truth, we can derive theconclusion that it is false Mount Everest never existed. So there are many states

of affairs that do not involve a contradiction in their conceptionfor example,

that Mount Everest never existedthat God cannot bring about. These are statesof affairs such that, as a matter of contingent fact, bringing them about would

involve doing what cannot be consistently conceived. Thus, there are many

states of affairs that are consistently conceivable when considered in and of

themselves that, as a matter of contingent fact, would imply the inconceivable if

they were to be made actual. God cannot make these perfectly conceivable

states of affairs actual.

3. Gods Character and the Character of Gods Creation

Epistemic evil has its foundation in the recognition of an apparent incongruity

between the alleged character of the creator and the observable character of the

creation. All problems of evil presuppose that the character of the creator should be

reflected in the character of the creation. Is this presupposition justified? It is.

From God's omnipotence, it follows that God has the power to achieve

whatever he wills as long as he does not will the inconceivable. From God's

omniscience, it follows that God knows how to achieve whatever he wills and,

unless it would involve a contradiction, only what he wills. From the former fact

about God's power coupled with the latter fact about God's knowledge, itfollows that whenever God acts he achieves what he wills and only what he


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wills unless he wills the inconceivable. Within the boundaries of logical

possibility, there is a perfect alignmenta one-to-one correspondence

between what God intends and the consequences of his actions. This

correspondence supplies the basis for the contention that God's character wouldbe reflected in the created universe. That the universe is, as far as possible, free

of contingent evil not logically connected to Gods good purposes follows from

this fact coupled with God's omnibenevolence. Gods omnibenevolence implies

that, all other things being equal, he never prefers an act that issues in a greater

evil to an act that issues in a lesser evil.

4. God and Good

It is possible to object to the claim that Gods omnibenevolence has

existential implications for the creation. The suggestion that Gods actions could

have significant theodicean implications presupposes that there is a basis for

moral value independent of God. This basis provides an independent standard

for judgments of moral value. This standard can therefore be employed in

evaluating the moral quality of Gods acts.

The argument that the character of the creator does not create constraints on

the character of the creation could be premised upon the notion that there is no

basis for moral value independent of God. It would follow that there is no

standard for judgments of moral value that can be meaningfully applied to

Gods actions. If there is no such standard, then it is nonsense to claim that any

act of God's, regardless of its impact upon the character of the creation, is

morally defective. Ruling out such evaluative judgments implies that God's

character places no limits upon the character of the creation. Any claim to the

effect that some feature of the creation entailed a defect in the creator would be

groundless.This result follows if good is defined in terms of what God wills. It also

follows if the qualities good and bad cannot be properly applied to the actions of

God. On the first view, the sole necessary and sufficient condition in light ofwhich states of affairs are good and actions are right is that they accord with

Gods will. The claim that some feature of the creation is good would therefore

reduce to the claim that God willed it. Since God is omnipotent he cannot be

coerced. It would follow that Gods acts are right in virtue of the fact that they

are Gods acts. It would also follow that the states of affairs that God brings into

being are good in virtue of the fact that God has brought them into being.

If, as the second view implies, the notions of good and bad do not apply to

the actions of God, then God is outside the moral domain. Applying evaluative

terms to his actions would therefore involve a category mistake. The claims thatresult from such mistakes are literally nonsense.


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Chapter One16

Both of these views imply that nothing can be inferred about Gods character

from the existence of needless and pointless suffering in the creation. On the

first view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent, although it sounds significant,

is practically and existentially vacuous. Gods omnibenevolence collapses intoGods omnipotence. It adds nothing substantive to the concept of God. God

remains absolutely unconstrained in terms of what he can will and what he can

do. On the second view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent involves a

category mistake. Referring to Gods actions as good is like referring to dreams

as green or theories as aerodynamic.

I think neither of these views is tenable. For the purposes of the present

inquiry, full-blown critical discussions of these views are not required. I

presuppose they are both false. The plain fact is that the vast majority of Judaeo-

Christians do contend that their god is omnibenevolent. When they claim that

their god is omnibenevolent, they do take themselves to saying something about

God that is both meaningful and important. If they are right, then these two

views are wrong. If they are wrong, then their god is not the true god.


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CHAPTERTWO

THE PROPERFORMULATION

OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Two conceptions of the problem of evil are critically examined in this chapter.

They are the logical formulation of the problem and the evidential formulation of

the problem. I ultimately offer a third formulation of the problem that I think is

preferable to either of these formulations.

1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil1

In the logical formulation, the problem of evil is treated as a problem of

internal inconsistency. As J. L. Mackie put it:

God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be

some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them

were true the third would have to be false. But at the same time all three areessential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once

must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.2

The problematic claims are God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, andEvil

exists. Mackie argues that these claims form an inconsistent triad. He contends

that this inconsistency can be demonstrated if we add a few additional

premises or quasi-logical rules regarding the proper meaning and use of the

termsgood, evil, and omnipotence.One difficulty with Mackies formulation is that he does not appreciate the

relevance of Gods omniscience to the problem of evil. God must have completeand perfect factual knowledge to ensure that he is aware of all the features of

existence. Without such knowledge he might be wholly unaware of some evils.

God must also have complete and perfect normative knowledge so that he will

recognize evils (events that involve suffering) as evil (states of affairs that are

disvaluable). Without such knowledge he might not know that some contingent

feature of what exists ought to be eliminated. Finally, God must have complete

and perfect practical or instrumental knowledge. He must know how to bring

about any logically possible state of affairs. Without such knowledge God may

both recognize an evil and have the power to eliminate it but lack knowledge ofhow to do so. Gods infinite perfection, understood as implying his three


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Chapter Two18

cardinal attributes, is crucial to the proper formulation of the problem. Mackies

version of the problem might be reformulated such that the following set of

propositions is said to be inconsistent:

1. God is omnipotent.

2. God is omniscient.

3. God is omnibenevolent.

4. There is evil in the universe.

The unstated presupposition that permits the inference of Gods non-existence

from 1 through 4 above is as follows:

5. No evil can exist in the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-

benevolent being.

This presupposition is problematic. Even an infinitely perfect being is limited

by the laws of logic. It seems that a number of forms of evil can exist in the

creation of an infinitely perfect being as a result of this limitation. Before

delineating these forms of evil, it is best to clarify the logical terrain. We areraising a logical question when we inquire into the forms of evil that are

possible in the creation of an infinitely perfect being. We are seeking logically

possible forms of evil. The question of whether or not there are any instances ofthese forms of evil is irrelevant. Raising this factual question demonstrates a

failure to grasp the logical geography. Those who advance the logical problem

of evil contend that the claims Evil exists and God is infinitely perfect are

logically inconsistent. To refute this claim, it is sufficient to point out that there

are forms of evil that could exist under the supposition that the creator is

infinitely perfect.

Among the evils that can exist in the creation of an infinitely perfect being

are evils that are:

a. logically necessary such that the act of creating a universe withoutthem could not be consistently conceived.

To create any universe without these evils would involve a contradiction. God

cannot accomplish the contradictory. Therefore, God cannot eliminate such evilsfrom the universe. Again, the claim is not that there are any such evils. The

point is that such evils could exist in the universe even if it were the creation of

an infinitely perfect being. As long as the universe was at least potentially good

on the whole, it could contain such evils and be the work of God.

epistemic evil -sample

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