Quickscanofpost9/11nationalcounter-terrorismpolicymaking

andimplementationinselectedEuropeancountries

ResearchprojectfortheNetherlandsMinistryofJustice

MR-1590

May2002

ErikvandeLinde,KevinOBrien,GustavLindstrom,

StephandeSpiegeleire,MikkoVayrynenandHandeVries

2

AcknowledgementsWewouldliketothanktheDutchMinistryofJusticefortheopportunitytoperformthisquick

scan.Also,wewouldliketothankgovernmentofficialsinTheNetherlands,Belgium,Finland,

France,Germany,SpainandtheUnitedKingdomfortakingthetimetotalktousandto

provideuswithdocumentationwhereappropriate.

WealsothankIanLesserandDavidGompertofRANDandRANDEuropeforthevaluable

advisetheygaveusconcerningthemethodologyandthecontentofthequickscan.

Finally,MichaelWermuthofRANDisacknowledgedforhisqualityassessmentofthereport.

Furtherinformationaboutthisprojectcanbeobtainedfromtheauthors.

RANDEurope

Phone +31715245151

Fax +31715245199

e-mail reinfo@rand.org

Leiden,May2002

3

PrefaceA comparative analysis ofTheNetherlands,Belgium,Finland,France,Germany,Spain and

theUnitedKingdomwasperformedwith respect to their counter-terrorismpolicymaking and

implementation following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the New YorkWorld

TradeCentreandthePentagonandthecrashofthehijackedairplaneinPennsylvania.

Thegoalof thecomparativeanalysiswas tomakeacontributionto improvingcoordinationof

counter-terrorism among European UnionMember States. At the request of the client, the

Dutch Ministry of Justice, the analysis was done in a short timeframe and with limited

resources;hencethephrasequickscaninthetitleofthereport.

Thequickscancoversaqualitativedescriptionofthe initialreactionoftheselectedcountries

to the9/11events,characteristicsof theirnational institutional framework regarding the fight

against terrorism,andselectedelementsof theirspecificcounter-terrorismpoliciesandpolicy

implementations. These descriptions are based on desk research and brief interviewswith

government officials. An analytic framework was designed to guide the approach and the

analysisaswellastoputtheresultsinperspective.

The quick scan should be regarded as proof of concept. For definitive analysis and

comprehensivefilling-outoftheanalyticframework,additionalresearchisneeded.

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SummaryThe initialpost9/11reactionsoftheselectedcountriesshownosignificantdifferencesamong

thecountriesanalysed.Topministerialsteeringcommitteesand task forceswerequicklyput

together inallcountries toprovide leadershipanda focalpoint in theconfusion that followed

the attacks. In particular the security and surveillance of commercial aviation, designated

objectsandcomponentsofcritical infrastructures,dignitariesand, toa lesserextent,country

borderswere immediately strengthened. Intelligence gathering and intelligence sharingwere

increased, both domestically and internationally. All countries engaged in and adhered to

international negotiations,most notably within the EU, but alsowith theUN, theUSA and

NATO, except Finland,which is not aNATOmember. In fact, itmight be inferred that the

international coordination has created a productive atmosphere of harmonising countries

initial responses to theattacks.This isan importantobservation,bearing inmind that in the

EuropeanUnion,securityisthesovereignresponsibilityofindividualMemberStates.

In line with international resolutions, all countries have particularly stepped up their

investment in thepreventionof terrorismby increasing thecapacityof intelligence, increasing

the capacity topreventmoney laundering,and strengthening the legal and lawenforcement

structure todeter terrorismand tobring terrorists to justicequickly,with increasingEuropean

harmonisation regarding thepenalcode.The rapidrealisationof theEuropeanarrestwarrant

isacase inpoint.Thepointcanbemadehowever that it is tooearly toshow theeffectsof

suchinvestments.

Differences among countries largely stem from previous national experienceswith domestic

terrorism and the (often associated) national institutional structures.Spain,TheUK,France

andGermanyhavemoresignificantandmorerecentexperiencewithdomesticterrorism than

Belgium and The Netherlands, and the experience of Finland in this respect could be

classifiedasnegligible.Somecountries(Spain,France,Belgium,GermanyandFinland)have

a federal police chief or local police chiefs in large part in charge of preparing for or

responding toterrorism. Inothercountries(BelgiumandTheNetherlands)theresponsibility is

shared amongmanygovernmentagenciesand localagencies,although inprinciple it is still

possibleto identifyleadinstitutionsatthelocalandnationallevel.Somecountries(Spain,The

UK,FranceandGermany)havespecific lawson terrorismorhaveat leastdefined terrorism

in their criminal code. Other countries (The Netherlands, Belgium and Finland) rely on

criminalcode tocrackdownon terroristswithoutaspecificdefinition,buildingontheprinciple

thateveryterroristactionwillalsobepunishablebycriminal law.However,thatmeansthatin

thesecountriesmembership in terroristorganisationsassuch isnot illegaland thereforenot

punishable. Since also the associated punishment in criminal code ismore tolerant than in

terrorist code, the countries in question (Belgium, The Netherlands and Finland) may be

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perceivedby terroristsassaferheavens thanothercountries.Thissituation isrecognisedby

thecountriesinquestionandwillpresumablybeaddressedinthenearfuture.

Noneof theanalysedcountriesspecifically trackgovernmentspendingoncounter-terrorism1.

As a result, it is difficult to compare or analyse expenditures. On the other hand, most

countrieshave identified theneed tocreatebudgets foradditionalcounter-terrorism following

9/11.Mostly, these budgets are created through savings in other areas.Germany, on the

otherhand,has increased the tax levyoncigarettesand increased insurance taxes toobtain

thebudget resources. Increasedaviationsecurity ispartlybeingpaid forbya levyonairline

tickets inallcountries.Fromthelimiteddatathatwecollected inthisquickscan,weconclude

thatcounter-terrorismexpenditures inFrance,Germany,TheUKandSpainarehigherthanin

TheNetherlands, Belgium and Finland; the same is truewhen normalised on a per capita

basis.

Noneof thecountrieshavea centralizednationalbody toorganiseandorchestratecounter-

terrorism, althoughFrance ismoving towards it.By and large, their institutional frameworks

consist ofmany playerswithwell-defined partial responsibilities and partial authorities, plus

coordinating bodies tomake sure that information is shared timely and that rapid decision-

making is facilitated.As terrorist attacks, according to all national perspectives on counter-

terrorism, always strike locally, the first response will therefore also have to be local.

Therefore, the authority for local response is clearly identified, althoughpositionsmaydiffer

between countries as towho actually has the authority (ChiefConstable (THEUK),Mayor

(The Netherlands) or Prefect (France), as examples). Also, the events of 9/11 have not

generally changed countries visions regarding the national institutional framework, including

the role of themilitary.All countries have the impression that their existing framework and

theirexistingcapabilitiesplusthealterationsandadditionsthatweremadepost9/11,arewell

matchedwith the perceived threat.Capabilities inmost countries however are notmatched

withactualvulnerability, itseems2.Allcountriesrate the likelihoodofadomesticattack lower

than is indicated by the events of 9/11, or earlier attempts that have been prevented by

intelligence.Also,basedonour interviewsandvariousmediareports,the levelofurgencysix

monthsafter9/11,seemsremarkably lower than immediatelyfollowingtheattacks.Thiscould

lead to theconclusion thatat leastadditional trainingbasedonscenariosof terroristattacks

shouldtestwhethercountriesarewellpreparedinactuality.

The transparencyofpost9/11counter-terrorismpolicymakingvariedamongcountries.InThe

Netherlands, a counter-terrorism action plan was quickly put together and continuously

communicatedwithCongress, themedia and the public at large, even on the Internet.The1AsopposedtoforinstancetheUSA,wheretheGeneralAccountingOffice(GAO)andtheOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB)trackcounter-terrorismspending2Thereisaninterestingdebatewhethercapabilitiesshouldprimarilybeestablishedonthebasisofvulnerabilities,oronapriorityrankingofrisksthatfollowfromvulnerabilitiesandthreats.ManyanalystsatRANDstronglyadheretothelatterapproach.Inanycase,systematicthreatanalysesandvulnerabilityanalyses(e.g.,riskanalysis)oftendonotformthebasisofcounter-terrorismmeasures.

6

plan was subsequently updated every few months. The plan includes budgets and

responsible actors and is still evolving. Other countries had less transparent policymaking

processes, or if they had, theywere discontinuedwithin a periodof6months following the

attacks.Belgiumdidnot inform thepublicverywell.Nevertheless,mostothercountriesmade

surethatthereactionswerecommunicatedinsomeform,albeitnotasopenlyanddetailedas

TheNetherlands.

In all countries, coordination between relevant authorities and agencies has increased,

although it proved difficult to verify this independently. In the future, this increase may

attribute to improved levels of prevention and preparedness. However, some interviewees

indicated thateffective coordinationdepends toagreatextenton thesenseofurgencyand

that improvedcoordination in itself isnotalways thekey topreventionandpreparedness.As

an example, intelligence sharing in practice has been proven in the past to be resistant

againstthebesttheoreticalintentions.

With respect to preparedness for attacks with non-conventional weapons of mass

destruction, nuclear, biological, chemical, radiologicalweaponsaswellasand informational

orcyberweapons (collectively NBCRI),we have the impression thatallcountries rate the

associated threat low, in any casemuch lower than the threat of attackswith conventional

weapons.Nevertheless, countries have taken someprecautionarymeasures in the realm of

NBCRI terrorist threats, ranging from only formal arrangements with nationalmilitary R&D

research and response units (Finland), to actually stocking up on vaccines, antibiotics and

prophylaxes and outfitting local responders with decontamination units and personal

protective gear (The Netherlands, France, Germany, The UK). Also, measures are being

takento improve theearlydetectionofnon-conventionalweapons(Netherlands,France,THE

UK,Germany,Spain),includingbothsurfacemobileandairborneunits.

Although intelligence is generally considered to be paramount in countering terrorism, the

natureof intelligenceprecludes indepthstudyofcountrycharacteristics, letalonecomparison

among countries. Associatedwith intelligence is the content and accessibility of databases

related to counter-terrorism.Germany seemswelladvanced indata-mining3 suchdatabases

(Rasterfahndung). This practicemay lend itself to further international cooperation, butwe

should point out that althoughwe are unaware of similar activities in other countries, such

activitiesmight well exist. Also, it is a sensitive issue, that call for careful approach. In a

related issue,TheNetherlandsandGermanyhavesuggestedways to improvebiometrics in

the futureand focuscurrentlyon thequalityandaccessibilityof fingerprintdatabasesand the

linkwith visas.Wemust however again emphasize thatmost data regarding intelligence in

3Data-miningistheabilitytodiscoverknowledge(inthiscaseintelligence)fromadvancedsearchtechnologydirectedat(combinationsof)databases.

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general and this issue in particular is confidential and that therefore further and dedicated

researchiscalledfor.

Although not part of the survey of the quick scan, we may observe that some countries

infrastructures are more vulnerable to attacks than others4. In particular, those countries

economies that rely heavily on large volumes of throughput of goods, persons and certain

intangibles such as money, data and electricity, have associated interdependent critical

networksandnetworknodes thatmake themvulnerable to terroristattacks.TheNetherlands

and Belgium are such countries. It is therefore understandable that The Netherlands next

agenda item incounter-terrorism iscritical infrastructureprotectionand that it isexpected to

becomeamajor issueon thenationalsecurityagenda.Oneparticularaspect thatseemsnot

to have received balanced and worldwide security attention yet is container transport --

certainlynot in the countrieswesurveyed.This issuemaybeof relativelyhigh relevance to

small countries with large harbours, such as Belgium and The Netherlands, although of

courseallothersurveyedcountrieshaveimportantharboursthatcouldbeattacked.

Althoughallcountries, includingnon-NATOmemberFinland,offeredanddeliveredsupportto

the military component of the international fight against the Al Queda network, The UK,

France and Germany were actually and most significantly involved in aerial and ground

combat in Afghanistan. (An in-depth assessment of military operational responses to and

preparednessinlightof9/11howeverwasnotperformed).

Theconclusions in thisreportarenotdefinitiveorcomprehensive.That,afterall,comeswith

thenatureofaquickscan.However, this reportcanbe regardedas indicativeofpotentially

important differences and commonalities.We therefore recommend that any specific issues

thatariseshouldberesearchedfurtherbeforedetermininganyspecificaction.

The Table on the next page summarises the resultof thisquick scan. Itprovides a colour-

codedmatrixofprogress thatcountrieshavemadewithrespect tomeasures incertainareas

of counter-terrorism. The counter-terrorism areas follow the descriptions identified in the

resultsof thequickscan. Itshouldbeemphasised that thecolourcodesarenotdefinitive in

anyway, both as a resultof the limitednatureof thequickscanaswellasof thedynamic

natureofdomesticpost9/11counter-terrorismpolicymaking.

4Seealsowww.ddsi.org

8

Broadareaofcounter-terrorismmeasures Finland France Germany

Nether-lands Spain

UnitedKingdom

Toplevelresponsibilityassigned Protectpotentialtargets Aviationsecurity Increasedintelligence Actupon&createlistsofsuspects Internationalcooperation Financialsurveillance&intervention Institutionalchange Legalharmonisation NBCRIpreparedness Cybersecurity Infrastructureprotection Increasepolicytransparency Identifylevelsofdomesticvigilance Militaryactionabroad BiometricsData/visa Privatesectorinvolvement

Colorcoding

Nospecificpost9/11measuresneeded

Needidentified,noaction

Someaction WellunderwayAccom-plished

Legend:Toplevelresponsibilityassigned Setupoftoplevelcommitteesandtaskforcesdirectlyfollowing9/11Protectpotentialtargets Protectingembassies,bridges,tunnels,dignitariesAviationsecurity Implementing100%luggageandpassengerchecksallflightsIncreasedintelligence IncreasecapacityforcooperationandcoordinationActupon&createlistsofsuspects SeizeandidentifysuspectslinkedwithterrorismInternationalcooperation ContributeactivelyininternationalbodiesforCTpolicymakingFinancialsurveillance&intervention Freezeassets,monitormoneyflowsandtransactionsInstitutionalchange ChangeinstitutionaldomesticframeworkregardingCTpreventionand

responseLegalharmonisation HarmonisepenalcodeandidentifyterrorisminlegalcodeNBCRIpreparedness Monitoring,prevention,decontaminationprophylaxisregardingvariousWMDCyber-security ImplementstrategicmeasuresinprotectionagainstcyberterroristsInfrastructureprotection ComeupwithintegratedplansforcriticalinfrastructureprotectionIncreasepolicytransparency Detailedinformationofpublicatlarge,interdepartmental,inter-institutionalIdentifylevelsofdomesticvigilance identify levels of domestic vigilance linked to increased activity of allstakeholdersMilitaryactionabroad ParticipateinactivemilitaryoperationsandcombatBiometricsdata/visa CreatedatabaseandrealiseaccessregardingvisaPrivatesectorinvolvement Seekclearroleandcommitmentfromprivatesector;senseofurgency

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TableofContentsAcknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 2Preface..................................................................................................................................... 3Summary ................................................................................................................................. 4Section1:Mainreport .......................................................................................................... 11Introduction........................................................................................................................... 12Background ........................................................................................................................ 12Problemdefinition............................................................................................................... 13

Approach ............................................................................................................................... 15Countryselection................................................................................................................ 15Researchteam............................................................................................................... 15Initialdeskresearch ....................................................................................................... 16

Analyticframework ............................................................................................................. 16Applyingtheanalyticframeworkinthisquickscan............................................................. 18

Results................................................................................................................................... 24Section2:Countrychapters ............................................................................................... 32Finland ................................................................................................................................... 33Generaloverview................................................................................................................ 33Background .................................................................................................................... 33

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework .............................................. 35Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation....................................... 38MatrixofFinlandschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress ............................ 48

France .................................................................................................................................... 50Generaloverview................................................................................................................ 50Background .................................................................................................................... 50Reactionsto9/11 ........................................................................................................... 51

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework .............................................. 53Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation....................................... 56MatrixofFranceschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress ............................. 59

Germany ................................................................................................................................ 61Generaloverview................................................................................................................ 61Background .................................................................................................................... 61Reactionsto9/11 ........................................................................................................... 61

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework .............................................. 63Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation....................................... 63MatrixofGermanyschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress ......................... 73

Netherlands ........................................................................................................................... 76Generaloverview................................................................................................................ 76Background .................................................................................................................... 76Reactionsto9/11 ........................................................................................................... 78

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework .............................................. 80Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation....................................... 83MatrixofTheNetherlandschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress ............... 90

Spain ...................................................................................................................................... 94Generaloverview................................................................................................................ 94Background .................................................................................................................... 94Reactionsto9/11 ........................................................................................................... 95

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework .............................................. 96Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation....................................... 97MatrixofSpainschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress ............................. 101

UnitedKingdom .................................................................................................................. 103Generaloverview.............................................................................................................. 103Background .................................................................................................................. 103Reactionsto9/11 ......................................................................................................... 103

Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework ............................................ 105Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation..................................... 117MatrixofTheUnitedKingdomschallenges,measures,actors,stagesandprogress...... 130

Belgium................................................................................................................................ 135Generaloverview.............................................................................................................. 135Background .................................................................................................................. 135

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Reactionsto9/11 ......................................................................................................... 135Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework ............................................ 137

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Section1:Mainreport

12

Introduction

BackgroundThe terroristattacksof11September2001haveshowndramatically that thenew terrorism

isdifferentfromtheold5.Itisglobal,itisdecentralised,itusesnewstrategiesandtactics,and

it is increasingly focuseduponbuilding the capacity formasscasualtyandmassdestruction

attacks, inaneffort todestabiliseentiresocietalsystems.Attackscouldentail theuseofany

imaginableweapon:conventional,chemical,biological,nuclear, radiologicaland informational

individually or in combination.Consequently, it threatens all sectorsand infrastructuresof

society. Increasingly, terrorists are loosely organised in networked structures. Europes

democratic, open societies, its globalised transportation systems, its concentrated cities, its

highlydeveloped infrastructuresand itspermeablebordersprovideaharbour,access routes

and targets to thenewnetworked terrorists.The fact thatEurope isanoutspokenmemberof

thecoalitionagainstterrorismputsEuropeon thefront-lineofthecampaignagainstterrorism,

andpotentially increases its profileasa target.AnattackonEuropeorEuropesalliesmay

wellbeplannedandpreparedwithEuropeanresourcesandinfrastructures.

In reality, directly following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, many governments,

including European governments, rapidly reviewed anti- and counter-terrorism6 capabilities

and terrorism-preparedness on a national basis, giving priority to domestic policies and

measures and looking at strengthsandweaknesseswithin theirownborders.Supranational

and internationalguidancewasprovidedby theEuropeanUnions JusticeandHomeAffairs

CouncilandbyUNaswellasbyNATO.Byandlarge,however,governmentsweresobusyin

the firstmonthsafter theattacks formulatingand implementingcounter-terrorismpolicies that

therewas not enough time to coordinate internationally these policiesatall levelsof detail.

But now that the national responses to 9/11 are entering the implementation phase, the

questionariseswhethernationsworldwideandEuropeanMemberStates inparticular,should

take further steps with regard to coordination and cooperation regarding the fight against

terrorism. This is the background againstwhich theDutchMinistry of Justice askedRAND

Europe to conduct a quick scan of post 9/11 national counter-terrorism policymaking and

policyimplementationofselectedEuropeanMemberStates.

5Thenewterrorismhasdifferentmotives,differentactors,differentsponsorsand demonstrablygreaterlethality.Terroristsarealsoorganisingthemselvesinnew,leshierarchicalstructuresandmakinguseofamateurstoafargreaterextentthaninthepast.Allofthisrendersmuchpreviousanalysisofterrorism obsolete,andcomplicatesthetaskofintelligencegatheringandcounterterrorism.In:Lesser,I.O.,BruceHoffman,JohnArquila,DavidRonfeldtandMicheleZanini(1999)CounteringtheNewTerrorism.RAND,SantaMonica.6Anti-terrorismcomprisesdefensivemeasuresinthefightagainstterrorism.Counter-terrorismdescribesoffensivemeasures.Preparednessisthecapabilitytorespondtoterroristthreatsandattacks.Intheremainderofthisreportwewillusethetermcounter-terrorismtocoverbothantiandcounter-terrorism.

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ProblemdefinitionSince 9/11, governmentsworldwide haveworked hard toupdate theirnationalagendas for

the improvement of capabilities to fight terrorism and to initiate the implementation of such

updatesat theshortestpossiblenotice.Whiledoing this, theyhavegenerally tried tooperate

against thebackgroundofperceived threatsandexistingnationalstrengthsandweaknesses.

For instance,asa largepercentageofTheNetherlandssurfacearea isbelowsea level, the

vulnerability to flooding isaspecificDutchweakness that requiredextraattention.Therefore,

itwasconsiderednecessary topayextraattention to thedependabilityofwatermanagement

systems. On the other hand, a specific strength of The Netherlands regarding the fight

against terrorism is the capability to monitor financial flows in detail. The Dutch banking

system is quite transparent. This element therefore required no drastic extra measures.

Comparable aspectsmay be different in other countries. In otherwords, policymaking and

implementation inonecountrymaydiffer largely fromanotherdependingonspecificnational

characteristics.But itmayalsodifferasa resultofother factors,suchasperceivedurgency,

availablebudgets,and the intricaciesofeachcountrysnationalsecuritysystem, includingthe

division of responsibilities and authority between government institutions and the focus on

preventionversuspreparednessandresponse.

In light of the above, the Dutch Ministry of Justice, which carried the responsibility of

operational oversight of the Dutch governments response to the 11 September attacks,

became interested in rapidly gaining more insight into these differences in order to get a

comparative impression of the characteristics and appropriateness of its own policymaking

and implementation. This is onemajor consideration in support of the quick scan that this

reportdescribes.

Achain isasstrongas theweakest link.For instance, failingairplanesecurityprocedures in

one country affect the security of another country. Thus, global security depends on the

complex interdependence of the myriad of national measures at all levels. To know the

strengths and weaknesses of the counter-terrorism policies and policy implementations of

allies or at least of neighbouring countries would therefore provide useful insight into the

overall situation regarding the fightagainst terrorism.As thisaspecthasso farnot received

adequateattention in consideringanationalagenda to combat terrorism, there isnowsome

urgency to consider other countries positions. This is a second consideration in support of

thisquickscan.

Combining these two considerations, there is a double need to know more about other

countries policymaking and policy implementation for combating terrorism after 11

September 2001. As threat analysis shows that critical infrastructures (such as surface

transport and aviation, energy, financial and communication systems aswell as health and

foodsystems)ofmodern societiesaremostvulnerable tonew terroristattacks,andas the

14

DutchMinistryofJusticeperceivesacertain levelofurgency, itseemedwise tostartquickly

togain insight intoothercountriescapabilitiesby lookingspecificallyatselectedneighbouring

countries. After all, these neighbouring countriesmost often share or use parts of common

infrastructures, such as transportation. For broader comparison however, some non-

neighbouringcountrieswere included in theanalysisaswell.Ofcourse,since theproblem is

global,onlyananalysisofallcountriesof theworldwouldprovide the totalcoverageneeded.

However,suchanapproachwouldnotbepracticalatthispoint.

These considerations can be summarized into the followingproblemdefinition for thisquick

scan:

What national policy initiatives were taken after 11 September 2001 to prevent andrespond to future terrorist attacks and how were these initiatives implemented inselected Member States of the European Union? How do these policies andimplementationscomparewiththeonesinTheNetherlands?

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Approach

CountryselectionChoosingtheneighbouringcountriesofTheNetherlandswasself-evident.

! Germany

! Belgium

! France

! TheUnitedKingdom

Inrelative terms,Belgium isasmallercountry,economically,politicallyandmilitarily,than the

others.FranceandtheUKareofcoursenotneighbours inthepurelygeographicalsense,but

areconsideredsuchforallpracticalpurposes.

Forbroadercomparison,wechose to includeonlyacoupleofnon-neighbouringcountriesas

more would negatively affect the speed with which this quick scan could be executed.

Needless to say, including all member states of the European Union, or other relevant

countries,suchas theUSA,wouldhaveprovidedabetteroverviewononehand,butwould

havedemandedmuchmore resourceson theotherhand.We thereforechooseas thenon-

neighboursthefollowingtwocountries:

! Finland

! Spain

Finland is known to have had relatively little experience with terrorism, whereas Spain is

known to having been continuously exposed to terrorism. Therefore, these two non-

neighbouringcountrieswereexpected tosignificantlyadd to thecomparativespectrumwhile

keepingthetotalnumberofcountrieslow.

ResearchteamWe put together a research team consisting of six researchers, plus two advisors. The

researcherswere selected so that interviews could be heldwith country authorities in their

native language and against the background of shared knowledge of national systems and

culture.Theadvisorsarebothhighlyregarded for theirgeneralknowledgeaboutsecurityand

specific knowledge about combating terrorism. InaccordancewithRANDEuropepolicy, the

quickscanunderwentanindependentqualityassessment.

AuthorsErikJ.G.vandeLinde,ProjectLeader,RandEurope,Leiden,TheNetherlands

StephanDeSpiegeleire,RANDEurope,Leiden,TheNetherlands

16

HandeVries,RANDEurope,Leiden,TheNetherlands

KevinOBrien,RANDEurope,Cambridge,THEUK

GustavLindstrom,RANDGraduateSchool,SantaMonica,California,USA

MikkoVayrynen,FIIA,FinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairs,Helsinki,Finland

AdvisorsDavidGompert,President,RANDEurope,Leiden,TheNetherlands

IanLesser,TerrorismExpert,RAND,Washington,DC,USA

QualityAssessmentMichaelWermuth,TerrorismExpert,RAND,Washington,DC,USA

InitialdeskresearchIndividual researchers were assigned to a country to collect preliminary data. Mostly,

government websites were used for this purpose, in some cases supplemented with short

phone calls to appropriate authorities. This preliminary information was then compared to

makeadecisionabouttheanalyticframeworktobeappliedforthisstudy.

AnalyticframeworkAcommon reference framework isessential.While this isgenerally true forall researchand

analysis, it isespecially true in thecaseofcomparativeanalysis,andevenmorestronglyso

inhighlycomplexcaseswheremany factorsare interdependent.Counter-terrorism issucha

case.Butnotonlywilla solidanalytic frameworkprovideanecessary tool for thisparticular

study, itwill also provide perspective and overview regarding the complex area of counter-

terrorism ingeneral.Assuch,theanalyticframeworkmayalsoberegardedasausefulresult

ofthisstudythatcanbeappliedinotherfuturecounter-terrorismanalysis.Asweareunaware

of other analytic frameworks for comparative analyses in the area of counter-terrorism,we

hopetoprovideafirststeptofillthatgap.

After having decided on the analytic framework, the teammembers set out to collect data

more systematically, among others by approaching a small number of government officials

withdetailedquestions.

Theframeworkthatwehaveconstructedforthisstudyconsistsoffourmajordimensions:

! Challenges

! Measures

! Actors

! Stage

Allfourdimensionsconsistofseveralsub-dimensionsthatwewilldescribedowntoarelevant

andusefullevelofdetail.Butfirstwewillbrieflydiscussthefourmajordimensions.

17

Dimension1:Challenges'Challenges' are the issues that countries need to address to prevent, deter, respond to,

mitigate and recover from terrorist threats or terrorist attacks effectively. These threats and

attacksmaybehypotheticalorreal.Theymayhaveoccurredinthepast,theymayplayinthe

presentor theymayplay in the future.Whatachallenge ispreciselydepends largelyon the

nature of the threat or the nature of the attack. Threat and attack can be seen as a

combination of (potential) weapons and (potential) targets.Weapons can be conventional,

non-conventional, including both weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) and non-WMD; and

targets can range from individual human beings (important dignitaries and VIPs, but also

ordinarycitizens) to largenumbersofpeople,critical infrastructures,aswellasother targets.

The essence is that challenges are the reasonswhy countries have to engage in counter-

terrorism.

Dimension2:MeasuresThisseconddimension is infactacompilationofallnecessaryresponsestochallenges.Sub-

dimensions are categories of responses. Main categories are strategic, operational and

tactical. Examples of categories of measures are planning, training, exercising, equipping,

raisingawareness,monitoringmoney transfers, informationsharing,stockpilingofantibiotics,

outfitting first responders, law enforcement cooperation, etc. Thesemay be detailed further,

down to the level of individual measures, for instance personal protection of ambulance

personnel against biological or chemical agents, or monitoring the contents of shipping

containersbywayofx-ray. In fact,wedidsomeof thatdetailing in thisproject, focusingon

post9/11measures.Thiswillbeexplainedextensivelyinalatersectionofthischapter.

Dimension3:ActorsThe third dimension deals with the question of who is responsible for implementing the

measures for responding toaparticular challenge.Examplesofsub-dimensionsare federal,

state and local; civil andmilitary; public and private.Of course these again can be further

detailed,rangingfromthechiefofthelocalfirebrigade,forexample,totheMinisterofInternal

Affairs,andwewilldoso later.Fornow, itsuffices toemphasize that thisActordimension

dealswithassigningresponsibilitywithregardtomeasuresandchallenges.

Ofcoursecertainactorswillberesponsible forcertainmeasures thatcorrespondwithcertain

challenges. This is how the three dimensions are interdependent.Also, one actormay be

responsible for many measures (for instance, the Chief of Federal Police may have the

overallpolicymaking responsibility forresponseduringanattack),andonechallengemaycall

formanymeasures ofmany actors. This iswhy counter-terrorism is complex:many actors

andmanyinterdependencies.

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Dimension4:StageThe first three dimensions -- Challenges, Measures and Actors -- together form a three-

dimensional space (i.e., a cube) representing the counter-terrorism area. We will position

these first threedimensions relative to time,or thestageofanactual threatorattack.The

sub-dimensionswithin the Stage dimension are pre-, trans- and post-attack. In pre-attack,

pre-emption is important, consisting of preparation, prevention, protection and deterrence.

During an attack, and immediately following it (trans), response including detection and

interdictionandmitigationare important.Postattack, importantsub-dimensionsare recovery,

counter-attackandimplementationoflessonslearnedinthecounter-terrorismcycle.

Fig1.OverviewoftheanalyticframeworkwiththefourmajordimensionsChallenge,Measures,Actors,andStage

ApplyingtheanalyticframeworkinthisquickscanOne way to analyse counter-terrorism policies and their implementation would be to

systematically check all the cells7 of the framework at a particular level of sub-dimension

detail. In each cell,we could researchwhatmeasures have been assigned towhat actors,

responding to which challenges, relative to what stage. Clearly, even if only three sub-

dimensionswereusedinanapproach likethis,and ifthisapproachwereappliedtoanumber

ofcountries,alreadya largestudywould result.However,withonly threesub-dimensionsper

dimensions,notenoughdetailwouldbeprovidedinthisapproachtocomeupwithmeaningful

results, again indicating that such an approach would quickly result in a massive study.

Therefore, in thisquickscan,wewilluse theanalytic framework from theoppositedirection.

We will first identify individual items of post 9/11 counter-terrorism policymaking and7AcellisaspacedefinedbyChallenge(x),Measures(y),Actor(z)andStage(w)

Challenges

Actors PRE-ATTACKSTAGE

Measures

Challenges

Actors TRANS-ATTACKSTAGE

Measures

Challenges

Actors POST-ATTACKSTAGE

Measures

19

implementationand thenclassifythemaccordingtotheanalyticframework.Usingtheanalytic

frameworkinthiswaycorrespondswiththenatureofaquickscan.

First we identify individual items of post 9/11 counter-terrorism policymaking andimplementationandthenclassifythemaccordingtotheanalyticframework.

Surely,thisapproachwillleavemanyofthecellsoftheanalyticframeworkblank.Afterall,the

framework is broad, and can cover old and new terrorism and both pre- and post 9/11

policymaking and implementation,while in thequick scanweareonly narrowly focusing on

post9/11.Ofcoursethatdoesnotmeanthattherearenomeasurestoberecognizedatallin

blankcells.On thecontrary;wecangenerallyassumethatpost9/11counter-terrorismaction

plansare formulatedsuch that theycover thehighestpriorities (consideringalldimensionsof

theanalytic framework)percountry.Post9/11measuresareeithermeant torespond tonew

challenges of the New Terrorism, or - to a lesser extent - to fill gaps in the terrorism

preparedness that were already there in light of the pre 9/11 perspective. In linewith this

assumption, we can postulate that 'cells' in the analytic framework that are not covered

apparently do not need special action right now for various reasons. But there is also a

possibility thatacertainchallengehasbeenoverlooked.Therefore, the threemost important

considerationsregardingemptycellsare:

! Thechallengehassuchahighpriority that ithadalreadybeen takencareofbefore

9/11

! Thechallengehasa lowpriority (because it representsa low riskor isperceivedas

such)andthusrequiresnofurtherimmediateaction

! Thechallengehasbeenoverlookedandmayrepresentaseriousrisk.

Again, this quick scan doesnt allow checking why blank cells of the analytic framework

remain empty. The resources of the quick scan were too limited; that comprehensive,

systematic analysis will have to be postponed to follow-up work. This quick scan may

however be looked at as proof of concept. In other words, we are looking for data and

experience thatmay provide support to the concept of comparing counter-terrorism policies

onthebasisoftheframeworkusedhere.

In the future,we could for instance try to identify threedifferent cross-country categoriesof

cells:

! Cellsthatarecoveredbyallcountries

! Cellsthatarenotcoveredbyanycountry

! Cellsthatarecoveredbysomecountries

20

The last categorymay provide an interesting opportunity for targeted future analysis as to

why, apparently, some challenges and measures are assigned a high priority in some

countries,butalowpriorityinothers.

Sub-dimensionsIn the followingwe provide further detail of the four dimensions in as farwe think that this

detailmaybenecessary toallow formeaningful resultsononehand,whilestayingwithin the

limitsofthequickscanontheotherhand.

ChallengesChallengesconsistof thecombinationofweaponsand targets8. Ithasbeen recognized that

theNewTerrorismstrives to inflictmasscasualtiesofordinaryciviliansandmassdestruction

of critical infrastructureswhileusingunconventionalweapons, suchasWMD9.But thenew

terrorismdoesnotprecludetheold,whichusesconventionalweaponsandtargetsindividual

dignitaries and VIPs (attacking politicians, businessmen, athletes).Therefore, our reference

frameworkforthedimensionChallengescouldlooklikethis:

Weapon Conventional10 WMD(NBCRI)Target

Individuals 1 2

Masscasualty 3 4

Infrastructures 5 6

This matrix provides sixmajor sub-dimensions. Examples of challenges for each of these

couldbe:

1. Killingagovernmentofficialwithagrenade

2. Threateningabusinessmanwithanthrax

3. Levellingaheavilypopulatedofficebuildingwithatruckbomb

4. Chemical attack on a population concentration (e.g., major sporting event) with a

lethalpersistentnerveagent

5. Blowingagaspipeline

6. Cyber attack on financial data networks (or radiological dirty bomb in a major

seaport)

8Ofcourse,riskisamajorfactorhereaswell.Riskistheproductoflikelihood(threatplusvulnerability)andimpact.Lowprobability,highimpactchallengesmayhavethesamelevelofcomparativeriskashighprobability,lowimpact.Riskanalysisisnotpartofthisquickscan.However,nationalgovernmentsdotakeriskintoaccountwhentheyputtogethertheirnationalactionplans,eitherexplicitlyorimplicitly9AcommonclassificationofWMDis:Nuclear,Biological,Chemical,RadiologicalandInformational.Whetherthelattercategorycanbeseenasmassdestructiveisdebatable10Gunsandexplosives

21

Of course, someweaponsmay be regarded asmass destructive and conventional aswell,

such in the case of 9/11. Also, some weaponsmay be targeting combinations of targets.

One could therefore argue that separate categories are needed for these.However, for all

practical purposes, we believe that these six sub-dimensions cover the challenges that

requireconsideration inthisstudy.Finallywerecognize thatmanypoliciesarenottargetedat

any specific single challenge. Intelligence, for instance,would cover allpossible challenges.

Incaseswherepoliciesdonotdiscriminatebetweenchallenges,wehaveindicateda0inthe

associatedcellsintheframeworkmatrix.

MeasuresWe do not believe that a further sub-dimensioning than the method outlined earlier, i.e.

strategic,operationalandtacticalisnecessaryforourpurposes.

Strategicmeasureswouldbe long-termmeasurespreparing forcertainchallenges.Examples

of thiswould be to change the organisational structure of thenationalsecuritysystemor to

developnationalplansforcombatingterrorism.

Operationalmeasureswould include freezing financialassetsofknownorsuspected terrorist

organisations or their financiers, or implementing and enforcing sanctions against a country

thatprovidesupporttoterrorists.

Tacticalmeasurescouldbe tosetup localcrisismanagementplans,or toprovide improved

equipmenttoresponseorganisations.

ActorsTo break down the dimension of actors, we will have to consider federal, state and local;

public and private; as well as military and non-military. A sub-matrix is not needed here

however,since themilitary isonlyacentralactor,and theprivatesector isonlya localactor.

Therefore,thebreakdownlookslikethis:

! Publicsector,federal/nationallevel,civil(includingspecialforces)

! Publicsector,regional/statelevel,civil

! Publicsector,locallevel,civil

! Military

! Privatesector(alllevels)

This results in five sub-dimensions. Again, there may be borderline cases that call for

judgment or even a separate subdimension, suchas theSpecialForces in some countries,

that are part of themilitary in terms of training and equipment, but non-military in terms of

commandstructure.However,webelievethatthefivesub-dimensionsabovewillsuffice.

Withthethreesub-dimensionsforStage,theanalyticframeworklookslike:

22

Challenges(6)xMeasures(3)xActors(5)xStage(3)=270cells

ValidationofdataintheanalyticframeworkOnce we categorised measures in the 270-cell framework based on desk research, we

interviewed several key persons per country to validate that categorization. In addition,we

askedintervieweestoprovideuswithadditionalmeasuresthatwehadoverlooked,aswellas

withadditionaldatapermeasure,suchas implementationstage,budget,etc.Thus, forpost-

9/11measures,wecouldcodemeasuresintermsofstateofprogressasfollows:

1. Nospecificpost9/11action

2. Needforactionidentified,policyinthemaking

3. Budgetappropriated,actorsidentified

4. Policyimplementationwellunderway

5. Policyimplementationfinalised

Inthe interview,weprovidedtheopportunityto intervieweestocommentonwhycertain'cells'

were not covered in the action plan as they saw fit to do so. However, we did not

systematicallyask thisquestion forallcells,asthe limitationson thequickscandidnotallow

for it.Also, the functionof thequickscan,weforesaw,wouldbetopointoutthatcertaincells

could remain irrelevant forpracticalpurposes,whileother could turnout tobe importantbut

requiringmoredetailedresearch.

Morespecifically,thefollowingissueswerediscussedintheinterviews:

! Isthecategorisationcorrect?

! Inwhatstateofprogressisthemeasure(1-5)?

! Are thereanypost9/11measureswehavemissed? (Mostnotably lateadditions to

roadmaps)

! Are there any particular aspects of themeasures that should be highlighted? (For

instance'highpriority',or'internationalcooperationcrucial')

! Aretherecertainempty'cells'thatyouwanttocommenton?

LimitationsThequickscanhasawidescope,butasaconsequencethelevelofdetailislimited.Wewere

unable to systematically check all relevant issues with interviewees. Alsowewere able to

interview justa fewkeypersons.Manykeypersonsweredifficult to reachand theextent to

which reports and data are available was often limited, due both to the often-confidential

nature of the subject and its in progress status. Also, counter-terrorism policies are

constantly evolving and changing. The analysis based on our findingsmust therefore be

regardedaspreliminaryasnapshot in time, inotherwordsandall relevant issuesmust

be researched in furtherdetailbeforeanyconclusionscanbecast instone. One functionof

23

thisquickscanmay thereforebe tosetamoredetailed researchagenda.Assuch, thequick

scanshouldbelookedatintermsofproofofconcept.

24

Results

We believe that the approach in this quick scan holds promise for a more detailed and

comprehensive analysis. The analytic framework employed here allows for useful

categorisationofcounter-terrorismpolicies,but thestudy lacked thenecessary resources,as

expected,toapplytheframeworktoalevelofdetailnecessarytodrawsharpconclusionsand

toidentifymanycleardistinctionsbetweencountries.

In order tomake a useful quantitative comparison,wewould suggest performing additional

research, focussing inmoredetailon the followingareaswherepreventivecounter-terrorism

measureshavebeen takenorconsideredbyallcountries inonewayoranother, inorderof

priority:

! Intelligence

! Finance

! Legal

! Military

! NBCRI

! Criticalinfrastructures

! Researchanddevelopment

! Institutionalframework

This quick scan however does offer a qualitative description of post 9/11 counter-terrorism

policymaking and policy implementation in seven selected European member states. We

catalogued a number of commonalities in their reactions. There is no doubt that this is the

resultofcoordination that tookplacewithin internationalbodiessuchas theEuropeanUnion,

the United Nations, the international coalition against terrorism led by the USA, and, to a

lesserextent,NATO.

Differences between countries are relatively few and seemmostly rooted in the context of

experiencewithdomestic terrorism in the recentpastaswellas in thecharacteristicsof the

nationalinstitutionalframeworkregardingcounter-terrorismresponsibilityandauthority.

The initialsenseofurgency thatwasapparent inallcountries following the9/11attackshas

materialised in extensive actions and initiatives, largely aimed at prevention through

protection of critical objects, increased intelligence, strengthening the legal structure and

crackingdownonmoney laundering.Althoughallcountriesengaged insomemilitaryaspect

of the fight against terrorism, and some countries prepared for or even engaged in actual

combat (e.g., UK and France), the conclusion is justified that, in general, the European

25

answer (of thesevencountriesstudied) to international terrorism isneither tostrengthen the

militarysignificantlynortochangeitsmissionmaterially.

Inourdiscussionsandobservations,wenoticedthat the initialsenseofurgency following the

attacksof9/11haslargelydissipated.Thisisdue,insomemeasure,tothefactthathigh-level

(steering committee) policymaking is now being implemented. Also, many European

governments have a general policy refraining from issuing unspecified warnings and

statements.

Allsevencountrieshaveexhibitedcommon reactions to theeventsof9/11.Firstofall, they

have swiftly put together Ministerial steering committees that took charge of measures

necessary to counter the actual or perceived challenges. These committees provided

leadership and a focal point for the public, the media and all those involved in counter-

terrorismat thenational,provincialand the local levels. Inorderofpriority, thesecommittees

oversawtheinitiationofthefollowingactionsinallcountries:

! Settingupatoplevelresponsestructure(committee,taskforces)

! Protectingpotential targets (powerplants,bridges, tunnels,waterways,borders, food

&water,embassies,foreigncompanies)

! Increasingairportandaviationsecurity(persons,luggage,aircraft)

! Steppingup intelligenceand informationsharing(Civil,Military,Europol,International,

threatanalysis)

! Engaging in international consultation (EuropeanUnion,USA,NATO) and adhering

toresolutionswhereappropriate

! Act upon and assist in developing international lists of terrorists or terrorist

organisations

! Followingfinancialleadstoterroristsandfreezingassets(usingvariouslists)

! Adoptinginternationalcounterterroristresolutionsatincreasedpace(mostlyUN)

! Re-evaluating institutional frameworks for responsibility and authority (None of the

countrieshavecentralisedorganisationsspecificallyaimedat terrorism.Nosignificant

changes were deemed necessary and the important role of first responders was

recognized)

! Harmonisinglegislation(forinstancetheEuropeanArrestWarrant11)

! IncreasingpreparednessforWMD(monitoring,diagnosis,prophylaxis)

! Understanding aspects of the New Terrorism (in particular biological and chemical

weapons)

! InitiatingR&Dinitiativesforincreasingdependabilityofcriticalinfrastructures11EuropeanUnion(EU)memberstates'judiciarywillnolongerhavetogothroughtheformalextraditionprocedureinordertoforciblytransferapersonfromonememberstatetoanotherforconductingacriminalprosecutionorexecutingacustodialsentenceordetentionorder.On11December2001,theEUreachedapoliticalagreementontheEuropeanarrestwarrant.ItspurposeistofacilitatelawenforcementrightacrosstheEU.(Europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/laecken_council/en/mandat_en.htm)

26

Whileallsevencountriesexhibitedsimilarapproaches to9/11 initially, thereweredifferences

inhowresponsiveactionswerecarriedoutandhowtheyevolved.

! Althoughall countries setupministerialcommitteesand top-levelgovernmental task

forces, these have been dissolved already in some countries (e.g., Finland and

Belgium).

! Somegovernments kepta ratheraccessiblepaper trailof theiractivities, inorder to

share the progresswith the general public, themedia and congress.Germany has

published two counter-terrorism legislative packages and communicated these

extensively with all relevant stakeholders, including the public at large. The

Netherlands has published a listof actions,which is continuouslyupdated, together

with associated budgets, responsibilities and sometimes suggestions for further

action,on thewebsitesof relevantdepartments.TheCouncilof theEuropeanUnion

also has published very openly its resolutions, approaches and roadmaps

accordingly12 on the web, but although the other six countries that were studied

certainly kept minutes of their progress, they were not put together in an openly

published form. Some countries (like Belgium) regard their action plans as

confidential,and the inventoryofnationalresponsesthatwasdrawnupbyEuropol is

equallynotpublic.

! Theprotectionofcriticalobjects insomecountrieshasalready returned to lesshigh

levels (e.g., The Netherlands, Finland and Belgium) whereas other countries have

maintained their levelof vigilance (e.g.France,SpainandUK). It seems that those

countries that had significant experiencewith domestic terrorism aremore likely to

extendstepped-uplevelsofsecurityforalongerperiod.

! Some countries can declare certain levels of increased alert in counter-terrorism,

most notably France. This is an area that couldmaybe be harmonised throughout

Europe.

! All countries have increased their intelligence collection,analysis,disseminationand

coordination,butsomecountrieshavededicatedmuchmorecapacity todoso (e.g.,

France) than others. Also, the authority for intelligence agencies to operate seems

broader in some countries, notably France, Spain andGermany. Also, in countries

thatseem tohave ratherautonomous intelligenceunits, the tiesbetweenmilitaryand

civil intelligence seems strongest. This seems to occur in countries whose police

force isorganised federally (France,Spain,andBelgium)asopposed to locally (The

Netherlands,Finland,TheUKandGermany).

! In the international arena, the dedication to military action, and in particular in

supportingOperationEnduringFreedom,hasbeenveryapparentbuthasalsobeen

very different between countries. Here, The UK is clearly in the lead, followed by

12seeforinstancetheEUcounter-terrorismroadmapof9april2002onhttp://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st07/07686en2.pdf

27

France.Allcountrieshoweverhaveprovidedsomesupportalbeitnot inactualairor

groundcombat,evenFinland,althoughitisnotamemberofNATO.

! Some countries cracked down hard on terrorists whose names appeared on

international lists of suspects (name on these lists oftenwere provided throughUS

intelligence in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom). In particular in

Germany,France,TheUK,andSpain,several terroristswere capturedandbrought

beforecourt.

! All countries obtained lists of organisations suspected of financing terrorism, and

subsequentlyengaged in various initiatives to freeze theirassets. In some countries

(FranceandGermany)thisresultedintheblockingofalargenumberofaccountsand

assets, but in others (Belgium and The Netherlands) eventually no assets were

blocked.

! Institutional national frameworks for structuring the responsibility and authority for

counter-terrorism differ with respect to the role of the military and the role of the

police. It seems that those countries that recognise terrorism in their legislation and

thathaveafederalpolice(France,Spain)exhibitamuchstrongerroleforpolice,than

countries thatdonot.TheNetherlands for instanceshowsa leadrole for theMinistry

of Justice and Internal Affairs and a supporting role for other Ministries, including

Defence.This is incontrastwithsomeothercountries inwhichtheroleofthemilitary

ismorepronounced(France,Spain).

! Finland and The Netherlands both do not recognise terrorism in the penal code.

Therefore, the penalty for terrorist activities ismilder than in other countries. This

situationwilllikelybecorrectedandharmonisedinthecomingyears13.

! The Netherlands, Germany and Spain have emphasized the use of biometrics

databases, initially focussingon fingerprintsonly, tokeepbetter trackofmigration, in

particularofrefugeesthatoftenlackpassportsorotheridentitypapers.

! In reality, governments threat assessment of the New Terrorism indicates that

classical terrorism (conventionalweapons, individual targets) ismore likely tohappen

than the New Terrorism that may use weapons ofmass destruction (NBCRI) and

attacks infrastructures. Therefore the risk associated with classical terrorism is still

considered to be largest. Nevertheless,most countries have engaged in particular

activities to strengthen the knowledge about biological and chemical weapons, to

stockpilevaccinesandantibioticsand to trainandequip firstrespondersaccordingly.

France has a standing biotox plan that already addressed the issue. The

Netherlands is particularly engaged in producing smallpox vaccine and in improving

diagnostic capability, but other countries aswell, such asBelgium,Spain and even

Finlandhavededicatedspecificattention toaspectsofWMD,mostnotablyB,Cand

I.Inmanycountries,thegovernmentoftenreliesonNBCknow-howthatispresentin

13LegislationhasbeendraftedinTheNetherlandsthatrecognisesmembershipofacriminalorganisationwithaterroristgoal.ThedraftiscurrentlyunderconsiderationbytheCouncilofState

28

themilitary --Finlandalmostcompletely.TheNetherlandshassteppedup itsR&D to

increase the expert knowledge level.Spain,France andTheUKhave considerable

experience in the fieldalready.Germanyhasso farabstained fromspecialactions in

thisfield.

! Lastly, the issueof infrastructuredependability14has todowith thecomplex issueof

dominoeffects,where small failures inone infrastructure,maycause largeones in

another and thus affect the intricate fabric ofmodern societies. Sincemany critical

infrastructures are increasingly liberalised (finance, food, energy, transport, telecom,

and to lesserextentwater,security,health,education)protecting the interdependent

infrastructures requiresnot just thecollaborationof industry,butevena leading role

for theprivate sector.Therefore,albeit important, this issuehas so farbeen lowon

thepriority listofcountries.However,somecountries, inparticularTheUK,Germany

andTheNetherlandshaveat leastengaged in initial roundsof thinkingandagenda

setting.

Clearly, all countries priorities are prevention through intelligence, cutting off terrorists

resources, increasedsurveillanceand securityand improving the legalstructure.Tobeable

to do so, several agencies, departments and law enforcement units are being strengthened

with personnel. This is the largest priority as well as a large difficulty, because often, not

enough trained personnel are available.Equipment,mainly of an informational nature, such

as easy and rapid access to visa databases, and diagnostic equipment, such as x-ray

scanners todetectmetalobjects,offers lessofaproblemagain,it isthepersonnelrequired

toworkwiththeequipmentthatrequiresthelargestinvestment.

Even although all countries have intensively engaged in international coordination, often

through permanent representatives in the European Union and the UN, and embassy

personnelandotherstaffnormallyengaged in internationaldeliberations, therehasbeen little

time fornationalgovernments toactuallyexploredirectly in the firstsixmonthsafter the9/11

attacks how events evolved in othermember states, other than indirectly through Council

meetingsandtheworkof theUNCounterTerrorismCommittee(CTC).Thisquickscan isof

courseonewaytofillthatgap.

Another gap is the involvement of the private sector. Of course, private sector security

companies are involved in securing company buildings and even public infrastructure, but

what is meant here is the responsibility of the private sector regarding issues such as

dependability of critical infrastructures. Since these are increasingly socio-technical, the

privatesectorshouldcarryaresponsibility inrelationtopersonnelandsystems.Those issues

are being addressed necessarily in the aviation industry; in other areas, such as container

14Seealsowww.ddsi.org

29

transport,theresponsibilityof theprivatesectorhasnotbeenadequatelyaddressedinanyof

theresearchedcountries.

Again,mostof the sevencountries threatassessment issuch that theclassical terrorism is

stillconsidered toposea larger risk than thenew terrorism.Consequently,protectionagainst

and prevention of attacks with WMD did not receive very significant extra attention. In

particular, the threatofanuclearattack isconsideredunlikely.However,allcountriessupport

internationalefforts in theareaofnon-proliferationofnuclearweapons. Ingeneral,countries

seemconfidentaboutthematchoftheirmeasureswiththeperceivedthreat,butwhenasked,

the measures seem to match less well with specific vulnerabilities, such as in the

transportationsystemorinenergynetworks.

Europeancountries ingeneralhavehadexperience in the recentpastwithdomestic terrorist

attacks,orat leastwith terrorism inneighbouringcountries.Asa result,somesystemsare in

placetodealwithvariousterroristthreatsandattacks,and,most importantly,totrytoprevent

them. Most countries are used to the requirement to coordinate among large numbers of

entitiesthatplayarole,ortheyareatleastwillingtoimprovethatcoordination.Asinformation

sharing is probably the best weapon in the fight against terrorism, this puts European

countries in a good starting position in the fight against terrorism. Also, the unification of

Europeprovidesanadditionalatmosphereforinformationsharing.

Europes strength is also its weakness. Its modern societies provide easy access to

infrastructures. As a result, terrorist organisations are easily supported, but the same

infrastructures could also be targets. On one hand, securing these infrastructuresmay be

increasinglydifficultasa resultof thegeneralsocio-technicaldevelopment, includingmarket

mechanisms and globalisation. On the other hand, these very mechanisms may cause

increasing redundancy in infrastructures, and thereby decreasing vulnerability.This paradox

will have to be addressed by European nations. Also, the current lack of centralised

responsibility forsecuritywithin theEuropeanUnionmayberegardedasaweakness.France

in particular would like to change that situation in the future, by the establishment of a

Europeanpoliceforce.

Finally, an important supportive infrastructure for terrorism is formed by networks of

international crime, often related to trafficking of drugs, humans, cars, illegalweapons and

other contraband, and various kinds of fraud. According to a spokesman of Interpol,

international crime is on the rise, particularly in The Netherlands, but also in some other

countriesoutside thisquick scan.ThispositionsTheNetherlands, togetherwith its relatively

tolerantpenalcode,openborders, largemainports,etc.,asacountry thatmaybe favoured

by international terrorist networks. Turning this argument around, wemay say that fighting

crimewillhelptofightterrorismaswell.

30

Thefollowingtablevisualisesthefindings.

Broadareaofcounter-terrorismmeasures Finland France Germany

Nether-lands Spain

UnitedKingdom

Toplevelresponsibilityassigned Protectpotentialtargets Aviationsecurity Increasedintelligence Actupon&createlistsofsuspects Internationalcooperation Financialsurveillance&intervention Institutionalchange Legalharmonisation NBCRIpreparedness Cybersecurity Infrastructureprotection Increasepolicytransparency Identifylevelsofdomesticvigilance Militaryactionabroad BiometricsData/visa Privatesectorinvolvement

Colorcoding

Nospecificpost9/11measuresneeded

Needidentified,noaction

Someaction WellunderwayAccom-plished

Legend:Toplevelresponsibilityassigned Setupoftoplevelcommitteesandtaskforcesdirectlyfollowing9/11Protectpotentialtargets Protectingembassies,bridges,tunnels,dignitariesAviationsecurity Implementing100%luggageandpassengerchecksallflightsIncreasedintelligence IncreasecapacityforcooperationandcoordinationActupon&createlistsofsuspects SeizeandidentifysuspectslinkedwithterrorismInternationalcooperation ContributeactivelyininternationalbodiesforCTpolicymakingFinancialsurveillance&intervention Freezeassets,monitormoneyflowsandtransactionsInstitutionalchange Change institutional domestic framework regarding CT prevention and

responseLegalharmonisation HarmonisepenalcodeandidentifyterrorisminlegalcodeNBCRIpreparedness Monitoring,prevention,decontaminationprophylaxisregardingvariousWMDCyber-security ImplementstrategicmeasuresinprotectionagainstcyberterroristsInfrastructureprotection ComeupwithintegratedplansforcriticalinfrastructureprotectionIncreasepolicytransparency Detailedinformationofpublicatlarge,interdepartmental,inter-institutionalIdentifylevelsofdomesticvigilance identify levels of domestic vigilance linked to increased activity of allstakeholdersMilitaryactionabroad ParticipateinactivemilitaryoperationsandcombatBiometricsdata/visa CreatedatabaseandrealiseaccessregardingvisaPrivatesectorinvolvement Seekclearroleandcommitmentfromprivatesector;senseofurgency

ComparingTheNetherlandstoothercountriesKeeping inmind the limitations indetail,depthand levelofcertainty inherent inaquick-scan,

it is possible to make some preliminary observations regarding how The Netherlands

comparestoatleasttheothercountriesexamined.

ThereareanumberofareasinwhichTheNetherlandsappearstobeatleastasadvancedas

anyoftheothercountries.

31

! Biometrics

! Useofadvancedsurveillancetechnologiesandtechniques

! Financialtransactionmonitoringandintervention

! Environmentaldamageassessmentandremediation

! Bio/chem-terrorismpreventionandresponse

Thisdoesnotnecessarilymean that theothercountriesareweak in theseareas. In fact,all

appear tohavestrengths inoneoranother. However, itmightbehooveTheNetherlands to

explorewhether itmightofferhelp inanyof theseareas tocountries thatmightnotbeas far

advanced,forwhateverreason.

Therearealsosomeareas inwhich,accordingtoourQuickScan,othercountriesmighthave

movedfurtherand/ormorequicklyfurtherthanTheNetherlands,amongthem:

! Finland appears to havemade amajor effort in countering cyber-terrorism. (This

would be consistent with the high-priority Finland has placed on cyber-security for

sometime.)

! Francehastakenstepstobolsterdefenseofitsairspace.Wedidnotdiscoverinour

QuickScanwhatstepsinthisdirectionTheNetherlandshastaken.

! Although The Netherlands appears relatively advanced in bio/chem-terrorism

response, it isnotclear from theQuickScanwhether ithas takenthesamestepsas

others (e.g.,FinlandandSpain) tobeready forresponses toother large-scale, large-

casualtyattacks.

! Spain appears, on the surface, to have been more active than any of the other

countries in urging the EU to take steps inmany facets of counter-terrorism. This

couldbeanattemptbySpain togaingreaterEUsupport for itsown lengthystruggle

withinternalterrorism.

32

Section2:CountrychaptersIn the following sectionwewillprovidecountrychapters for the countries thatwere studied.

They are listed in alphabetical order, exceptBelgium,which is listed lastbecausewewere

unable in thecontextof thisquickscan togeneratecomparabledata in relation to theother

countries. The format of reporting about the selected countries (except forBelgium) follows

foursteps:

! Generaloverview

o Background

o Reactionsto9/11

! Somecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframework

! Selectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementation

! Matrixofchallenges,measures,actorsandstage

33

Finland15

Generaloverview

BackgroundFinland, unlikemany otherEuropean countries,hasno significantexperiencewith domestic

terrorism. During the 1990s, some radical groups (such as violent motorcycle gangs and

animal liberation movements) emerged to cause problems for Finnish law enforcement

authorities and policy makers. These groups cannot, however, be labelled as terrorist

organisations.Alsoanti-globalismmovementshavesupporters inFinland,butat leastso far

these groups have not caused significant problems for theauthorities. International crime is

present and active in Finland, mostly in the form of Russian and Estonian mafias. But

although thesemafiasmanagedrugtrafficking,prostitutionandsmall-scalearmstrade,so far

the impact on society has been limited and nomajor violent disputes between rival groups

have occurred. Other incidents requiring special measures such as aircraft hijackings,

assassinationsofprominent individuals,orevenviolentbankrobberieshavealsobeenrare

inFinland.

Thenon-existenceof terrorism inFinland isalmostexceptional.Reasons for thismaybe its

stableparliamentarydemocracyandasomewhat remotegeographical location.Also,Finland

hasnocolonialpastandnomajordomesticdisputesbetween regionsorpopulationgroups.

The two largestminority groups, theSwedish-speaking population and theSaamipeople in

Lapland, have extensive minority rights and are fully integrated into the Finnish society.

During theColdWar (especially in the late 1940s) itwas feared that Finnish communists

were planning a coupwith Soviet assistance, but eventually the communists chose to use

onlyparliamentarymeanstopromotetheirpoliticalgoals.Therehavesofarbeennoextreme

rightistorleftistmovementsinFinlandthatareworthmentioninginthiscontext.

Internationalterroristgroupshaveshownnosignificant interest inFinland.Thismaybedueto

notonlyFinlandssomewhatremotegeographical locationbutalso to itsmodest international

role in fighting international terrorism: a militarily non-aligned country, devoted to

multilateralism, is not a probable target for international terrorists. This does notmean that

individualswith connections to international terrorist organizations do not find theirway into

thecountry.TheFinnishSecurityPolice(SuojelupoliisiSUPO)announced inMay2002that

oneof theoperationaldirectorsofa terroristgroupcalledAbuNidalwas found tobe living in

15The sourcesof this studyconsistofpublishednewsmaterial (newspapersandmagazines),officialgovernmentdocuments (somecanbe foundathttp://formin.finland.fi/doc/eng/policies/terror.htm)andinterviewswith thePermanentSecretaryofMinistryof Interior and thePoliticalUnderSecretaryofStateofMinistryforForeignAffairs(whoalsoactedasadeputydirectorofinter-ministerialworkinggroupestablishedafter11Septemberattacks).Alsovariousminorgovernmentofficialsprovideddatapere-mailandphone.

34

Finlandattheendof1980s.AbuNidalwasinvolvedinthebombingofPanAmflightoverthe

Scottish village of Lockerbie in 1986. Theman, obviously using Finland as a base for his

terroristactivities,hadaFinnishpassportandwasmarriedtoaFinnishwoman16.

Reactionsto9/11The attacks of 11 September showed that terrorist organisations (especially Al-Qaeda) are

spread intomanycountriesworldwideandareextremelywellorganisedand financed.This is

true forFinlandaswell. Individualswithconnections to terroristorganizationshavemanaged

toenterFinlandaswellasestablish themselves in thecountry.Theconfirmation for thiswas

found in the investigations conducted after 11September that are still ongoing17. Latest

findings of these investigations was published by SUPO in May 2002. According to this

information, there are currently a few dozens individuals living inFinland that have or have

hadconnections to international terroristorganizations.SUPO thinks thatFinlanddoeshave

appropriate targets,potentialperpetratorsandpossiblemotives for terrorism.AsSUPOsees

it, some of individuals with links to terrorist organizationsmight be capable of perpetrating

terroristactsthemselves,somenot18.Despitethisshockinginformation,SUPOstillthinksthat

terrorist are not likely to attack Finnish targets and that Finland does not face any direct

terrorist threat.SUPO suspects that thepotential targets for terrorists inFinlandare foreign

embassiesandinternationalbusinesseswithconnectionstotheUSA19.

SUPO, however, emphasizes that there are no terrorist organizations operating in Finland.

EvidentlyFinland iscurrentlyusedasaplace toestablishasupportivenetwork for terrorists.

As lateas inOctober2001,SUPOsuspected that terroristorganizations(includingAl-Qaeda)

useFinlandasa transitcountryandasaplace for theirmembers tounwind.Thedirectorof

SUPO stated that the reason for this could be that terrorist organisationsmight think that

surveillance in Finland is not as strict as in other countries20. In the light of the latest

information, it seems that Finland has a greater importance for terrorists than a mere

relaxation.

Despite discovering the tracks of terrorists on Finnish soil, the Finnish authorities do not

believe the country is significantly threatened by terrorism in any way. The attacks of 11

Septemberand thediscoveryof individualswithconnections to terroristorganisationsdidnot

radically change this belief. Some sections of administration, especially SUPO, have been

closely following theactivitiesof foreign terroristgroupsformanyyearsthroughrelationswith

16STT(FinnishNewsAgency),20.5.200217The investigationsshowedalsothata terrorist involved intheattacksof11SeptemberhadappliedforavisatoFinlandin2000throughtheFinnishembassyinRiad,SaudiArabia.Theapplicationwaseventuallyturneddownbutthereasonforthisisunclear.SUPOclaimsthattheycouldnotbecertainoftheapplicantsidentity.18HelsinginSanomat,21.5.200219STT,20.5.2002,Ilta-Sanomat21.5.200220SuomenKuvalehti,42/2001,pp.14-15.

35

foreign intelligenceservices.OneofthemainobjectivesinSUPOsfightagainstterrorismhas

been toprevent theentryofsuspected terrorists toFinland,andalso tokeepaneyeon the

individualslivinginFinlandwhohavelinkstoterroristorganisations.

Theeventsof11Septemberdid,however, initiatesomeadditionalpreparednessplanning in

Finland against terrorist attacks, since the international response forced the Finnish

authorities to take terrorism seriously as well. Finland, like every other country, has

emergencyplansandemergency legislationincaseofacrisissituation,buttheyaremeantto

beusedprimarily inwar-likesituations,suchasa foreignmilitaryaggression.Preparation for

terroristattackswithweaponsofmassdestruction forastrikewithbiologicalweapons, for

instancewasgivennospecialattention in theadministrationbefore11September.But the

attackscompelled theauthorities toconsidersuchapossibility inearnest.11Septembercan

therefore be seen as an important impulse for the authorities to review the existing

emergency plans.Whilemany sectorsofadministrationhavebeen activeon thematter,no

completely new comprehensive plans for terrorist attacks have so far been introduced. For

instance, a review conducted at theMinistry of Interiorwithin its own jurisdiction found the

existing emergency guidelines to be sufficient and led to no significant changes in them21.

However, newmeasures have been undertaken to prepare for bioterrorism and information

securityrelatedcrime.

Although the Finnish authorities do not consider Finland as a potential target for terrorists,

specialworking groups have been established and preventive and precautionarymeasures

have been undertaken in various fields of administration after the events of 11September.

Thesewill be discussed in detail in part threeof this chapter.Attentionwillbepaidalso to

legislationandbudgetaryissuesaswellasFinlandsinternationalcontribution.

SomecharacteristicsofthenationalinstitutionalframeworkThe followingorganigrampresents the relevantnationalactors thataredealingwithcounter-

terrorism.On thetoparebodiesdealingwithlegislativeand internationalaspectsofterrorism.

The centre level includes the executive branch. The performing actors, such as thePolice

ForcesandSUPO,areplacedat thebottom. Itmustbestressed that theorganigram isnot

comprehensive.Viewed fromawideperspective,anti-andcounter-terrorismactivitystretches

to several fields of administration atmany levels. This is true for eachmodern state. The

attached organigrammerely tries to provide the readerwith an overall picture of themost

essentialinstitutions.

21InterviewwiththePermanentSecretaryoftheMinistryofInterior.

36

Figure2.Organigramofrelevantnationalactorsforcounter-terrorisminFinland

The Finnish administrative system is vertically oriented. Although this dates back to when

Finland was under Russias reign, the verticality is still visible. The horizontal cooperation

between different branches is increasing steadily but in normal day-to-day conduct their

interaction is stillquite limited. Inter-ministerialworking groupshavebeenestablished in the

fieldswherenosingleactorplaysadominantroleandcross-linkingcooperation isnecessary.

The co-operation has, however, sometimes proved to be quite difficult because competing

andcliquishattitudesbetweengovernmentalbodiesstillexist.Themostvisible indicationof

the increasedcooperationare themeetingsof theexecutive-levelcivilservants fromvarious

ministries, who for some time now have frequently assembled in informal gatherings to

discuss issues relevant to all ministries. The inter-ministerial working group that was

established in theaftermathof11Septemberwasof this typeandpartlyonlya formalization

oftheexisting inter-ministerialgathering.Thebigdifferencewasthat,thistime,thegroupwas

given proper authority to implement decisions and conduct coordination. Previously the

MinistryoftheInterior

SupremePoliceCommand

RegionalPolice

NationalTrafficPolice

SecurityPolice(SUPO)

BureauofInvestigation(KRP)

HelsinkiPoliceDepartment

KARHUSpecialUnit

LocalPolice

MinistryofDefence

Government

5ProvincialOffices

SecurityandDefenceCommittee(inter-

ministerial)

ForeignAffairsCommittee

DefencePolicyDepartment

DefenceForces

DefenceStaff

SecurityDepartment

MilitaryIntelligence

InternalSecurityManagementGroup

MinistryforForeignAffairs MinistryofJustice

Parliament

LawDraftingDepartment

InternationalUnit

UnitfortheLawoftheEuropeanUnion

LegalDepartment

PoliticalDepartment

Terrorismtaskgroup

DivisionforPublicIntlLawand

Treaties

DivisionfortheLawoftheEuropeanUnion

Internationalorganizations:EU,UN

PrimeMinistersoffice Secretariatfor

EUaffairs DefenceCommittee

TheGrandCommittee(EUaffairs)

FrontierGuard

MinistryofFinanceCustoms

37

meetingshadbeenmoreofaround-tablediscussiongroupwhere issueswereonly informally

discussed.

In the field of counter-terrorism theministries of Interior andDefence play a dominant role

since they have responsibility for internal and national security. Because the fight against

terrorism requires strong international cooperation, international organizations such as EU

andUNplayan increasingly importantrole in it.TheMinistryforForeignAffairs interactswith

internationalbodies and shares the legislativedutieswithMinistryofJustice.The legislation

initiatedbyEUandUN is filtered intoFinnish legislativesystem through theGovernmentand

Parliament.

MinistryofInteriorThe Ministry of the Interior is responsible for local and regional administration, regional

development, and internal security in Finland. TheMinister of the Interior also acts as the

highestauthorityinpolicematters.

The InternalSecurityManagementGroup discusses strategies for public order and security

and performance plans. It also coordinates security matters that belong simultaneously to

severaldepartmentsjurisdictions.

The FrontierGuard is amilitarily organized troops subordinate to theMinistry of Interior. It

guards theFinnishbordersandcarriesoutborderchecks related tocontrollingentry intoand

departure from the country at border crossing points on land borders and at sea ports and

airports.TheFrontierGuardisalsoinchargeofmaritimerescueservice.

FinlanddoesnothaveseparateSpecialForcessolely forcombating terrorism.Aunitclose to

thisdefinition isKARHU (bear),which ispartof thepolice forcesanddesigned tobeused in

problematic and dangerous situations such as hostage crises. It is worth mentioning that

according to the existing principle, every police district is responsible for its own area.The

person inchargeonthecrisissceneisalwaysthelocalpolicecommanderifnospecialorders

are issued. For instance, if a hostage situation breaks out inNorthernFinland the regional

police handles the situation unless the Supreme Police Command decides to alter the

commandstructure(forexample,sendaKARHUunittotakeoverthesituation).

Grass-root intelligence work is conducted by SUPO, which has wide international network

with secret services in other countries.SUPOs interactionwith its foreign counterpartshas

increasedenormouslyafter11September.Thiswillbediscussedinaseparatesectionlater

38

MinistryofDefenceThe Ministry of Defence is responsible for national defence policy and security and

internationaldefencepolicycooperation.TheMinistry isalso responsible fornationalmilitary

defence resources and for the operating framework of theDefenceForces. TheMinistry of

Defencealsoactsas the linkbetween theGovernmentand theDefenceForces.Theannual

budget of the Ministry of Defence is about 1.7 billion Euro. Currently the nationalmilitary

defenceexpensesaccount for some1.4%ofGDP,which is less than in theothersurveyed

EUcountries.TheMinistryofDefence isnotdirectlyresponsibleforcombatingterrorismbutit

cooperates with the Ministry of Interior onmatters concerning internal security. In a crisis

situation, theMinistry ofDefence can providemilitary assistance to thePoliceForces.This

option applies especially in situations where heavy weaponry and extra manpower are

required.

Consisting of functionaries from various fields of administration, the Security and Defence

Committee is an institution providing aid to the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet

Committee on Foreign andSecurityPolicy inmatters related to total national defence.The

tasksof thecommitteeare(i) toobserve thechanges inthepositionofFinlandssecurityand

defencepolicyandassess theireffectson thearrangementsof totalnationaldefence, (ii) to

observe the activity in the different sectors of administration for the maintenance and

development of the arrangements in total national defence, and (iii) to coordinate the

preparationofmattersbelongingtothefieldoftotalnationaldefenceinthedifferentsectorsof

administration. The committee issues statements and takes initiatives but has no executive

powers.

The roleof theMilitary Intelligencedepartment isslightlyunclearsincenoofficial information

is available. The department gathers information about foreign armed forces and their

activities, strength, etc., partly through forty military attachs posted abroad. Filtered

informationisforwardedtotopdecision-makersandmostlikelytoSUPOaswell.

MinistryforForeignAffairsAn ad-hoc group for terrorism has been established under the political department of the

ministry.Thisgroup,with itspersonneloftwo,communicatestheFinnishpositiononterrorism

matters to international organisations. It has lately also taken over the work of the inter-

ministerialworkinggroupasthecoordinatorofpossiblefurthernationalpreventivemeasures.

SelectedelementsofnationalpolicymakingandimplementationPlaced in the timeframe of six months following the attacks, the priorities of the Finnish

au