erikson charting castro possibile successors sais 2005

8/8/2019 ERIKSON Charting Castro Possibile Successors SAIS 2005

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89CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORSSAIS Review vol. XXV no. 1 (WinterSpring 2005)

Daniel P. Erikson is director of Caribbean programs at the Inter-American Dialogue,the Washington-based policy forum on Western Hemisphere affairs. He is co-editorof Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond(New York, PalgraveMacmillan, 2005). Earlier drafts of this paper benefited from the comments of panelists and participants at the 2004 meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in Miami, Fla., as well as from staff and colleagues at the Inter- American Dialogue in Washington, D.C. Adam Minson of the Dialogue is creditedfor his first-rate research contribution to this article. 89

Charting CastrosPossible Successors

Daniel P. Erikson

Fidel Castro has been president of Cuba for close to 50 years, butdespite the hopes of some around el Comandantehe will not live forever. Observers watch Castros healthand the swirl of leaders in his inner circle. There is no clear indication that communismwill collapse after his death or that his brotherRaulwill take control. A number of would-be successors wait in the wings. This article looks at the top echelon of these figures, suggesting the next leader will likely come from a group of men numbering less than 10.

O n Jan. 1, 2005, Fidel Castro marked his 46 th year as the president of Cuba, one of the worlds few remaining Communist states. Now 78,he is the longest serving head of government in the world. 1 Although Castrocontinues to remain an active and visible leadership presence and faces noserious challenges as Cubas chief decision maker, his long tenure in officeand iron-fisted control have provoked considerable interest in what willhappen when he eventually takes his final bow. The crux of the question iswhether the Communist government will be able to maintain its grip onpower or if Castros death from old age will lead to economic opening anddemocratic reform in Cuba.

This guessing game, once confined to Cubas Miami-based exile com-munity, has begun to preoccupy even the top levels of the U.S. government.In May 2004, the Bush administration released a major report, chaired by Secretary of State Colin Powell, which outlined new measures intended tohasten a political transition in Cuba. The document argues that the Cu-ban leadership is making preparations to manage a succession of the re-

gime that will keep the senior leadership in power and that the regimessurvival strategy is to maintain the core elements of the existing politicalstructure in passing eventual leadership of the country from Fidel Castroto other members of the Cuban government. 2 Indeed, some U.S. analystshave argued that Cuba is better positioned to achieve a Communist suc-cession than Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union and is likely toemulate the example of China. 3


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90 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005 Admittedly, any effort to predict the politics of post-Castro Cuba is

akin to looking through a glass darkly. Yet there can be little doubt thatthe Cuban government and the Communist Party are preparing to weatherhis passing. In 2002, Castro spearheaded a petition drive to change theCuban constitution to declare the socialist revolution untouchable, whichmore than 8 million Cubans signed and the National Assembly subse-quently ratified. In the last two years, the Cuban government has engagedin a series of high-level personnel changes, appointing new heads for thedepartment of ideology and the ministries of health, finance, mining, tour-ism, and transportation. For years, the passing of Fidel Castro due to natu-ral causes was thought to pose the biological solution to Cubas long hia-tus from democratic rule. Now it is becoming apparent that the answersmay not be so simple.

It is no secret that Castros aging has important political implications

for the islands future. The state of his health is a subject of constant ru-mor and conjecture. In a well-known incident on June 23, 2001, FidelCastro fainted from heat exhaustion in the middle of speech. In Decemberof that year, he disappeared from public view and missed his first parlia-mentary session in 25 years, reportedly to recover from an infected bug biteon his leg. 4 After a meeting with Castro last winter, Bogots left-wingmayor, Luis Eduardo Garzn, sparked a media firestorm when he reported

that the Cuban leader seemed very sick to me. You could see

he had physical limitations,especially in his speech. 5Most seriously, in October2004, Castro tripped whileleaving the stage at a gradua-tion ceremony in the Cubanprovince of Santa Clara,

breaking his knee and an arm. He quickly regained his composure and re-assured the Cuban public on state television that he was all in one piece,saying even if they put me in a cast, I can continue my work. 6 The in- jured comandantethen strove to maintain his schedule of frequent appear-ances, demonstrating that he is likely to continue to be a visible presencein daily Cuban life as long as possible.

But Castros ill-timed tumble struck an unwanted blow at his recentefforts to maintain an image of vigorous health. In Oliver Stones docu-mentary Looking for Fidel, Castro interrupted a hospital visit by hoppingon a table for an impromptu electrocardiogram, in an apparent effort tosquash suspicions about his physical decline. In another media interview,Castros personal physician said that the Cuban leader remains extremely

fit and may live until 140. 7 In a speech before a group of economists lastFebruary, the Cuban leader joked about how the U.S. was planning for a post-Castro Cuba, commenting, The dead man is not dead yet! 8 Never-theless, other members of Cubas senior leadership have conceded that ad- vancing age has become the most implacable foe facing the islands revo-

Bogots left-wing mayor sparkeda media firestorm when hereported that the Cuban leaderseemed very sick to me.


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91CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORSlutionary generation. In an interview last spring, Ricardo Alarcn, presidentof Cubas National Assembly, said, The fact is that the generation whichtook power 45 years ago is retiring and dying off. People like Fidel, Ral,and myself are getting older every year. Unfortunately, I havent found a way out of that one yet. 9

The Cuban Government: A Second Look

Castros eventual passing will leave Cubas political system caught in thecrux of an unenviable quandary. Cuba has an authoritarian institutionalstructure supported by many levels of popular organization, but the legiti-macy of the Cuban government is intrinsically dependent on Fidel Castrosrevolutionary legacy and his embodiment of the national identity. Castrostill has the authority to set and oversee economic, social and foreign policy,

the energy to micromanage many aspects of the islands affairs, and thechutzpahto pick fights with friends and foes at home and abroad. After a period of limited economic experimentation following the economic crisisand the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the last several years havewitnessed a return to increasingly orthodox socialist policies. Faced withgathering economic troubles, Cuba has continued to tighten the screws onsmall-scale entrepreneurship while controlling foreign direct investment.In November 2004, Castro phased out the U.S. dollar, which had circulatedfreely on the island since 1993, saying that Cuba was protecting itself fromexternal economic aggression. 10 Most of the islands top policymakers haveled their entire professional lives in a system where politics consist of lob-bying a single decision maker and acting under his authority. As a result,those who argue for greater economic opening do so at considerable short-term risk to their political careers.

This dynamic has resulted in a great degree of caution and conserva-tism within Cubas inner political circles, especially among people who arepositioned to occupy important roles in a post-Castro government. Thereis little incentive for these people to push aggressively for greater reformtoday at the risk of losing their jobs. Such were the fates of former head of

ideology Carlos Aldana in 1992 and former Foreign Minister RobertoRobaina in 1999, two reform-minded rising stars in the Cuban hierarchy who fell from Castros favor and were dismissed. The Communist Party later expelled Robaina in 2002. 11

Not all ministers who have left positions of influence in Cuba can becounted among the reformers, but several presumed reformers have suf-fered recent setbacks. Jos Luis Rodrguez, the minister of the economy whobacked many of the reforms implemented during the mid-1990s, has beenrotated off the Council of State and lost four of his six vice ministers in a

mini-purge in 2003. Roberto Diaz Sotolongo, the reform-minded justiceminister, was also demoted from the Council of State in 2003. In 2004, eco-nomic czar Carlos Lage saw the tourism industry removed from his over-sight several months after the minister of tourism, Ibrahim Ferradaz, wasfired on suspicion of corruption. Shortly thereafter, the minister of basic


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92 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005industries, Marcos Portal, was abruptly dismissed after a summer duringwhich frequent blackouts plagued Cuban cities.

Once Castro departs the scene, the countrys top decision makers willinherit from him an authoritarian and centralized political system that isfar from assured of a sudden demise. Although Castro sits at the apex of Cubas collective political institutions, his power is still at least partially based on the bully pulpit, and arguably on some residual level of popularsupport. No other member of the regime has a base of support outside thegovernment, but dozens occupy important places in the multiple, overlap-ping power structures in Cuba, including the Politburo of the CommunistParty, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers. 12 Cubas mili-tary, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, or FAR, is a powerful institu-tion in its own right that is blended with the political structure. As Presi-dent of Cuba, Fidel Castro serves as the commander-in-chief. His brother,

Ral Castro, is head of the armed forces and minister of defense. Many other top military officers serve in key roles in the Politburo, Council of State and Council of Ministers, and the army exercises disproportionateinfluence in Cubas largest state-owned enterprises. Most important figures arealso represented among the 600-plus delegates of Cubas National Assembly.

If the next leader assumes all of Castros current roles, he will be ableto exercise significant institutional authority, although the decision-mak-ing process will likely become more collective in nature. If the leadershipinstead begins to practice a division of labor among the highest postsfor

example, with different individuals at the head of the Politburo and theCouncil of Statethen this would establish competing power centers withinthe government. Managing the tensions among them would present anunprecedented challenge for communist Cuba. Figure 1 illustrates the sig-nificant overlap between the Politburo (24 members), the Council of State(31 members), and the Council of Ministers (38 members), with 19 peopleserving in at least dual capacity and 7 people serving on all three organs of state. In sum, only 67 members of Cubas current government serve in allthree of these state organs combined. If a succession process occurs, thenthe leadership of post-Castro Cuba will likely emerge from this group.

Cubas political organization is modeled on the former Soviet Unionand enshrined in the 1976 constitution that was significantly modified in1992. Under the Cuban system, the president of the Council of State ishead of state, the president of the Council of Ministers is head of gov-ernment, and the executive secretary of the Politburo heads the CubanCommunist Party, whose members total about 780,000. Fidel Castro oc-cupies all three posts, but the constitution does not mention him by nameand there is nothing that would legally preclude new personalities assum-ing these roles. 14 The National Assembly must ratify all high-level appoint-

ments. When not in session, it is represented by the Council of State, whichhas the power to hire and fire government ministers. The Council of Min-isters is the largest of the ruling bodies, consisting of a cabinet-like groupof administrators plus the executive leadership of the country. This body has wide-ranging powers to run the country, manage the budget, and set


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93CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS

foreign policy. Members of the executive committee of the Council of Min-isters also form part of the Politburo of the Communist Party.

Checks and balances, made irrelevant by Castro, may become opera-tional in his absence, a process that would inevitably lead away from suchpersonalized and centralized rule. A successor government will face thechallenges of managing the bureaucratic politics and factional alliances thathave emerged during Castros long tenure. Cuba has repeatedly postponedthe Sixth Party Congress originally scheduled for 2002, a crucial gatheringwhere government and party leaders appoint new decision makers and setpolicy for the coming period. The last Party Congress was held in 1997, andits continual delay suggests that tensions may be brewing within govern-ment ranks. The prospect of Castros departure is likely to be disorientingbut not necessarily catastrophicfor Cubas leaders. Members of the gov-ernment will likely realize the need to avoid prolonged infighting and focustheir energies on governing the country. The Cuban military and the Min-istry of the Interior, which runs the state police, will act as an anchor tostabilize the new government. In 2001, officers of the FAR accounted for13 of the then-37 seats in the Council of Ministers, and in 2003, senior gen-

erals represented three of 31 members of the Council of State.15

But no gen-eral will be more pivotal to Cubas future than Ral Castro, the quintes-sential military man.

Ral Castro: The Heir Apparent

The enigmatic Ral Castro, who turned 73 in June 2004, is the longest serv-ing defense minister in the world. Best known as Fidel Castros younger

Politburo242

6

7

4

Council of

Ministers38

Council of State31

Figure 1: Diagram of Membership in Cubas Government Structures 13


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94 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005brother and the head of Cubas armed forces, in recent years Ral Castrohas solidified his position as next in line in Cubas communist hierarchy. At Cubas Fifth Party Congress in 1997, Fidel Castro declared that we haveto guarantee the revolution and that Ral is younger, more energetic,and can count on much more time. 16 During the fainting incident in2001, Cubas Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque stepped forward to calmthe crowd by announcing, Viva Ral! Viva Fidel! 17 Once he recovered,Castro remarked to reporters that if they tell me tomorrow morning,Youre having a heart attack and I go to sleep for eternity, Ral is theone with the most experience. 18

Ral Castro can count on more than fraternal loyalty; his institutionalinfluence far exceeds that of any other minister. He occupies the numbertwo position in the three principal bodies of the Cuban hierarchy: first vicepresident of the Council of State, vice president of the Council of Minis-

ters, and second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party. He is also headof Cubas military, one of Cubas most respected and powerful institutionsand the leading economic powerbroker on the island. The military is widely viewed to be the guarantor of any succession process in Cuba, and, as itsleader, Ral will inevitably play a crucial role.

Nevertheless, the differences between the Castro brothers have beenwell-documented. Some former Cuban officials have cited a big communi-cation gap that has bred strong disagreements between the Castros. Ralis said to feel undervalued by Fidel, despite his key role in organizing the

structures of the Communist Party.19

U.S. Gen. Charles Wilhelm, who spent20 hours with Fidel and 10 with Ral during three visits to Cuba, summa-rizes the differences between the two brothers as follows: Ral plays check-ers where Fidel plays chess, and Ral is a soldier first, politician sec-ond, while Fidel is a politician first and second. 20 Ral is frequently derided by ordinary Cubans for lacking the charisma and vision of his olderbrother, thereby consigned to play the perennial role of second banana.

These characteristics have led many analysts to dismiss Ral Castroas a purely transitional figure in any succession scenario. Indeed, his close-ness in age to Fidel means that he has little chance of securing a lengthy tenure as Cubas president in the future and may even predecease his elderbrother. 21 But Ral Castro has emerged as a key figure in his own right,and is thought to enjoy the strong support and loyalty of top military of-

ficers, known as ralistas. Ral Castro remainsdeeply committed to the political primacy of theCommunist Party, which he played a leading rolein developing and institutionalizing. In 1994, dur-ing the nadir of Cubas severe economic crisis, hereaffirmed that I am firmly convinced that we are

going to solve our problems united under the di-rection of the [Communist] Party and Fidel. In April 2001, Ral reiterated that the Communist

Party would maintain control in the post-Castro era. Many other comradesand I will have authority. However, we want the party to have it, which is

Ral Castro hasemerged as a keyfigure in his own

right.


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95CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORSthe only thing that can guarantee continuity, the unity of the nation.Within that unity we can have differences and everything we might wantto air. 22

Ral Castro may have a streak of economic pragmatism that separateshim from his elder brother. In 1986, he oversaw the partial liberalizationof several small enterprises under army control, giving them some au-tonomy over productive decisions and allowing them to lay off employees.The positive results gave him ample evidence to argue for greater reformduring the economic crisis at the turn of the decade. 23 During CubasFourth Party Congress in 1991, he emerged as an unexpected ally of reform-ist factions, arguing that what worries me is what will happen if we dontmake much-needed changes now, and if we dont make them under Fidel. 24 Although thought to be the more traditional Communist of the two Castrobrothers, Ral Castro may have a greater tolerance for economic reform

than other members of the Communist hierarchy. He supported many of the economic and agricultural reforms that helped to partially revive thefailing Cuban economy in the mid-1990s. 25 If Ral indeed backs furthermarket liberalization, then that would likely boost the fortunes of a suc-cessor regime.

Yet the possibility still lingers that Ral Castro might be the first toleave the stage. In late 2003, he disappeared from public for several months,sparking intense speculation about his health. 26 By opening multiple linesof succession in the Communist Party, the Cuban government, and most

critically, the FAR,27

Rals death could precipitate a destabilizing clashbetween civilian figures favored by Fidel Castro and military personnel loyalto Ral, or unleash latent tensions within the military itself. In this light,the perpetual delay of Cubas Sixth Party Congress favors Ral, who hasnothing to gain and everything to lose from revisiting the crucial issue of succession. The reality is that the struggle for succession in Cuba is a two-tiered game. Ral is clearly favored in the contest to succeed Fidel, but theparallel competition to replace Ral is one of the least understood dynam-ics within the Cuban government.

If Ral Castro does indeed possess the support of key military offic-ers and a penchant for economic reform, then this may prove sufficient tosustain a ralista successor regime for some years. Loyalty to Ral is con-sidered a necessary prerequisite for management of the enterprises ownedby Cubas armed forces. 28 Any small economic opening would be a welcomedevelopment for the Cuban citizenry if it alleviated the stark scarcity fac-ing the island. With the apparent blessing of Cubas chief revolutionary,the familial and institutional advantages of being both a Castro brotherand head of the countrys armed forces, and a lifetime of tutelage at theelbow of Cubas shrewdest politician, Ral Castro is well-positioned to see

off any rival for Cubas future leadership. But the question remainsdo hisambitions include assuming the post of maximum leader of Cuba? Perhapsin the absence of his brother, Ral Castro would be content to spend hisfinal years as the chairman emeritus of his cherished military, while leav-ing the politics, once again, to the Cuban politicians.


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96 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005Powerbrokers in Waiting

While Fidel and Ral Castro are the most well-known, top-tier membersin the Council of State, Council of Ministers and the Politburo, they havebeen joined by five other men: Carlos Lage Dvila, Abelardo Colom Ibarra,Marcos Portal Len, Pedro Miret Prieto, and Jose Balaguer Cabrera. 29 They are the most reliable partners of the Castro brothers and the only mem-bers of the government fit to serve in all of the countrys overlapping powercenters. A range of other figures occupies crucial positions in various gov-ernment ministries, the National Assembly and the military. Any effort tocontemplate a future succession process in Cuba must consider the per-sonalities among these potential powerbrokers.

Carlos Lage Dvila

A physician with no military experience who is several decades younger thanmost of his colleagues in Cubas ruling elite, Carlos Lage is one of thesealleged powerbrokers. He was appointed to the powerful post of secretary of Council of Ministers in 1990 and became a vice president of the Coun-cil of State in 1993. His rsum consists of a succession of high-rankingposts, including president of the Federation of University Students (FEU)in 1975, delegate to Cubas National Assembly in 1976, and secretary of theUnion of Communist Youth (UJC) in 1982. In 1986, he joined Fidel Castrosspecial assistance and support team and was appointed to the Council of

State. Like many other younger members of the Cuban government, Castrois said to have a close father-son relationship with Lage. 30 During CubasFourth Party Congress in 1991, Lage was reported to be the leading candi-date for a plan for controlled political opening that was to transfer sig-nificant political power to the office of prime minister. 31 Although the planeventually fell away, Lage has subsequently served in a prime ministerialrole, with a more visible policy presence than any other member of the topcabinet, including Ral Castro.

Aged 53, Lage is perhaps the most prominent member of the so-calledreform faction within the Cuban government. He frequently visits andnegotiates cooperation agreements with other countries and plays a key rolein formulating economic policy. However, in June 2004, the military clippedhis wings by moving responsibility for the tourism to the FAR, promptingspeculation that his influence is waning. 32 In his recent book, former Mexi-can Ambassador to Cuba Ricardo Pascoe wrote that Fidel Castro might havesown the seeds of this power struggle by increasingly favoring Lage whenan internal government poll found most Cubans disapproved of the deci-sion to turn power over to Ral Castro. 33 Nevertheless, Lage remains a vis-ible presence within Cuba and hascorrectly or notgiven some sectors of

Cuban society the impression that his penchant for economic reform isaccompanied by a greater tolerance for political and civil liberties.

Marcos Portal LeonUntil recently, Marcos Portal Leon was another major figure in Castrosinner circle representing the younger generation of revolutionary Cuba.


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97CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORSBorn in 1945, Portal was trained as a chemical engineer and first rose toprominence as the secretary general of the University of Havana chapterof the Union of Communist Youth (UJC) in 1972. He later married the nieceof Ral Castro, and in the early 1980s, he served on Fidel Castros personallogistics and support team until he assumed the leadership of the Minis-try of Basic Industries in 1983. During the 1990s, Portal was among thefew civilians to become involved with Perfeccionamiento Empresarial, theenterprise rectification process led by the Cuban military. In this capacity,Portal incorporated more market mechanisms into the Ministry of BasicIndustries, mixing greater autonomy with economic incentives based onperformance. This experience helped him to emerge as a key player in theprocess of economic reform, and he has since negotiated deals with majorinternational companies including Sherritt of Canada, Petrobas of Brazil,and Repsol of Spain. 34

Portal was widely considered to be one of Cubas most efficient andcompetent ministers, and his close association with Ral Castro may havegiven him greater authority in matters of economic policy than would oth-erwise have been possible. Yet Portal suffered an abrupt setback when hewas relieved of his ministerial duties in October 2004. The state publica-tion Granma printed an official note explaining that Portal had exhibitedthe tendencies of self-sufficiency and undervaluing the advice of otherexperienced colleagues. 35 He was replaced by Yadira Garca Vera, a youngparty leader. 36 Portals dismissal suggests that Castros Cuba has become

an increasingly inhospitable environment for those affiliated with economicreform.

Gen. Abelardo Colom Another prominent figure in Cuba, Gen. Abelardo Colom, boasts a pro-fessional background radically different from those of his younger coun-terparts. Colom, nicknamed Furry, joined Castros rebel army in 1957and became the chief of counterintelligence in 1970. He later led Cubasarmed forces in Angola, served as vice minister of defense in the mid-1970s,was elected to the National Assembly in 1976, and joined the Council of State in 1986. Colom emerged as minister of the interior in 1989, follow-ing the drug trafficking scandal that resulted in the execution of Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa. Today, as a vice president of the Council of State and thehead of the powerful and feared Interior Ministry, Colom is a majorpowerbroker within the Cuban government and is second only to theCastro brothers in terms of the importance of the institutions that he com-mands. As the head of Cubas secret police, his access to the classified filesof other leaders may be a crucial asset in the future. Colom was the firstarmy general to be honored as a Hero of the Republic of Cuba, and he isthe most likely successor as defense minister in the event that Ral Castrois elevated to the top spot or is no longer able to serve in that capacity.

The Old Guard: Gen. Pedro Miret Prieto and Jos Balaguer Cabrera Although they are not as distinctive as their other high-level colleagues, itis worth noting that Gen. Pedro Miret Prieto and Jos Balaguer Cabrera also


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98 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005sit on the Council of State, Council of Ministers and the Politburo. Bothin their 70s, their association with the Castro brothers extends back formore than half a century to the rebellion against the Batista dictatorshipin the 1950s. Miret Prieto was appointed head of agriculture in 1959 andlater served as minister of mining for several years. Balaguer Cabrera wasCubas chief of ideology from 1985 until 2003, when he moved to the Min-istry of Public Health at Fidels request to oversee an influx of investmentin this vital sector. Despite their privileged position within the Cuban gov-ernment, these men are less notable for their personal influence than forthe generation that they represent. Cubas Party elders, many in their sev-enties or eighties, represent a diminishing pool of talent for post-Castrosuccession in Cuba. Yet they continue to wield considerable influence that hasthe capacity to shape the process for selecting new leadership on the island.

Ricardo Alarcn QuesadaWhile he does not hold concurrent seats in all three ruling bodies of Cuba,Ricardo Alarcn Quesada is frequently perceived to be on the short-list of government figures that are likely to hold sway in post-Castro Cuba. Alarcn is the president of Cubas National Assembly of Peoples Power,the 609-member unicameral assembly that rubber stamps decisions madeby Castro. Serving as president of this body seems an unlikely role fromwhich to achieve prominence, but Alarcn has succeeded in positioninghimself as one of the leading contenders for Cubas top job in the future.

Born in 1937, Alarcn served as Cubas ambassador to the United Nationsfrom 1966 to 1978 and was subsequently appointed as vice minister of for-eign relations for 14 years. In 1992, he was briefly elevated to minister of foreign relations, and in 1993 he was elected president of the National As-sembly, a role he has now held for more than a decade.

Alarcn is best known as the shrewd point man on U.S.-Cuban affairs. As U.N. ambassador, he lived in New York in the 1960s and 1970s, an ex-perience that afforded him an intimate view into the workings of the U.S.government and society. He has played a central role in several sensitiveU.S.-Cuba negotiations, including the 1994 migration accords and the19992000 custody battle over Elin Gonzlez, the Cuban child whowashed ashore in Florida and was informally adopted by Miami relativesbefore eventually being returned to his family in Cuba. As a trained diplo-mat at the head of what passes for Cubas legislature, Alarcns incisivepolitical skills, deep knowledge of the United States, and keen mind makehim a formidable contender for a prime ministerial position in post-CastroCuba.

Others in the Mix A brash, young foreign minister who has forged a powerful relationshipwith Fidel Castro, Felipe Perez Roque is one of the younger members of Cubas Council of State. Born in 1965, he quickly emerged as a leading fig-ure of his generation after being elected to the National Assembly at theage of 21 and later serving as president of the student union during his


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99CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORSmid-20s. In 1990, Perez Roque was named to the special support team of the commander-in-chief, as were Carlos Lage and Marcos Portal, and he re-placed Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina in 1999. In the past five years,he has emerged as one of the more outspoken members of the Cuban gov-ernment. His loyalty to Castro is unquestioned, and he once even workedas Castros private secretary. Vanity Fair reporter Ann Louise Bardach citeda Cuban source as saying that, Felipe is so loyal to Fidel, that on the day his wife gave birth to his first child, he remained at Castros side for tenhours. Then he went to see his newborn baby. 37

While some see Perez Roque as merely Fidels lapdog, he has devel-oped a knack for provocative speeches. His over-the-top anti-U.S. rhetoricin international forums such as the United Nations has repeatedly provoked the ire of U.S. officials. In November 2003, during a U.N. debateabout whether Washington should end the trade and travel sanctions

against the island, the U.S. representative announced that Cubas best day is when the Cuban people have terminated Castros evil Communist dicta-torial regime and said to him, Hasta la vista, baby. Not missing a beat,Perez Roque responded that I am sorry to say that the representative of the United States will never in his entire lifetime have the slightest possi-bility of saying Hasta la vista, baby, to the people of Cuba. It is the peopleof Cuba, with the support of the international community, who will say Hasta la vista to the blockade. 38

Perez Roque also emerged as the public face of the regime following

the mass arrests of dissidents in the spring of 2003, when he held an inter-national press conference to promote the Cuban government view that theopposition figures were in cahoots with theUnited States. It is hard to imagine that PerezRoque is a likely candidate for succession inCuba in the short term. Yet he is one of thefew members of his generation to hold a high-level position in the Cuban government, andhe has also shown the potential for outreachto some sectors in the Cuban-American com-munity. Perez Roques brand of fiery youthpolitics will remain useful to the less telege-nic members of Cubas aging gerontocracy.

Meanwhile, the re-emergence of the feared Ramiro Valdes is evidenceof Fidel Castros increasing reliance on traditional hardliners. A veteran of the 1953 assault on the Moncada barracks, Valdes was appointed as theminister of the interior from 1961 to 1968, during the years of greatestupheaval following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Valdes laterserved as vice president of the Council of State from 1976 until 1986 and

remained as a member until 1997, when he was rotated off Cubas highgoverning body. But in 2003, Valdes was once again elevated to a positionin the Council of State, a move that may have presaged the crackdown oninternal dissent and the increasing political rigidity that characterizes theCuban government. Castro has turned to Valdes during difficult times in

It is hard to imaginethat Perez Roque is alikely candidate forsuccession in Cuba inthe short term.


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100 SAIS Review W INTER SPRING 2005the past, most notably in 1979 when Valdes reprised his role as ministerof the interior to help repress rising domestic opposition. 39 As the presi-dent of Cubas Electronics Group, a state-owned enterprise, Valdes is alsoamong a number of high-ranking officials with substantial economic in-terests in the islands future. Having regained a key role in the Cuban gov-ernment after several years in the political wilderness, it remains to be seenwhether Valdes long experience with the repressive instruments of the statewill shape a post-Castro government.

One thing that appears clear about post-Castro Cuba is that family ties are unlikely to trump political experience or maneuvering. Flix FidelCastro Diz Balart (a.k.a. Fidelito), the eldest son of Fidel Castro, wasborn in September 1949 and studied in Cuba and the Soviet Union, wherehe earned a doctorate in physics. 40 He served as executive secretary of theCuban Atomic Energy Commission from 1980 to 1992, until the countrys

profound economic crisis, when his dismissal ended most speculation thathe was being groomed for an important role in the countrys future. Whenasked about Fidelitos departure, the elder Castro replied: There was noresignation. He was fired for incompetence. Whats the problem? We donthave a monarchy here. 41 Today, Fidelito lives in Havana and works as a consultant to the Ministry of Basic Industries but has no role in any of themajor power centers in Cuba. Although nothing can be certain, it seemsunlikely he will ascend to a position of power in post-Fidel Cuba.

Indeed, absent the comandante, Ral Castros preferences will matter

most. A Ral-centered analysis leads away from leaders favored by FidelCastro, such as Carlos Lage, Ricardo Alarcn, and Felipe Perez Roque, andback towards the Revolutionary Armed Forces. In addition to AbelardoColom (and perhaps even the chastened Marcos Portal), figures like Gen.Ulises Rosales del Toro, a senior three-star general who has made sweep-ing changes in the sugar industry, may gain in prominence. The same istrue for Julio Casas Regueiro, a Politburo member who is first vice minis-ter of the military, and Alvaro Lopez Miera, the army chief of staffbothpromoted to the rank of three-star general in early 2001. 42 In their early tomid-sixties, these men are at the head of Cubas 100,000-strong armedforces. They and their lesser-known comrades are poised to have signifi-cant future influence. Cuba-watchers have long posited that there exist con-flicting fidelistaand ralista lines of loyalty within the government. The ex-tent to which these matterand what their impact might beremains tobe seen.

Post-Castro Cuba: Hiding in Plain Sight?

The long-awaited Cuba after Castro has acquired a veil of mystery that

will be impossible to dispel until the moment finally arriveswhich couldhappen soon or many years into the future. The nature of Cubas succes-sion and transition process will depend on many factors, including theoutcome of internal negotiations among the Cuban political elite, the skillsand ambitions of the likely contenders, the response of the Cuban popu-lation, and the reaction of the United States and other international ac-


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101CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORStors. According to one rumor making the rounds in Havana, on the day of Castros demise, all of Cubas top policymakers are expected to go to theirhouses and await a phone call from Ral Castro providing further instruc-tions. Whether valid or not, this claim emphasizes the idea that managingshort-term uncertainty will be the most urgent challenge facing a succes-sor government. Yet the shape of Cubas post-Castro leadership is stilllargely indecipherable, and any attempt at a Cuban version of Kremlinology founders due to the uncertain value of available information.

What is clear is that the Cuban government consists of more than justFidel Castro. Over the decades, a series of institutions has evolved that al-lowed the Castro brothers to maintain old alliances while cultivating new leadership. What these new leaders want, what types of incentives they willrespond to, and how deftly they will be able to handle the succession pro-cess remains to be seen. A military or civil-military regime headed by Ral

Castro seems most likely, with perhaps another political leader in a primeministerial role. Bereft of Fidel Castros revolutionary legitimacy, a succes-sor government may seek to obtain political support by undertaking tar-geted economic reform that will improve the welfare of the Cuban people.If the country moves towards democratic reform, many Communist Party leaders may strategically reposition themselves as representatives of demo-cratic socialism, as occurred in many countries in Eastern Europe after thefall of the Berlin Wall.

Yet leaders in the Cuban government, having spent so many years

under Fidel Castros spell, may have developed an illusion of control thatwill dissipate quickly in his absence. Fear of popular dissent may just aseasily force the successors to lean more heavily on the repressive instru-ments of state, like the feared Ministry of the Interior, to maintain controlof the island. How long these successor governments could last is anyonesguess. Neither do we know if Cubas current government contains the seedsof enlightened leadership that would lean towards democratic opening if that change were cultivated by the United States and other actors.

The late French statesman Charles de Gaulle once observed thatgraveyards are filled with indispensablemen. Fidel Castro is Cubas indispensableman, but rumors of his eternal life havebeen greatly exaggerated. The leaders whoinherit his mantle will face the unparalleledpolitical challenge of either maintaining ortransforming an anachronistic system cre-ated by more than four decades of one-manrule. Here, on the outside, the greatest chal-lenge is trying to penetrate the silence and

mystery of Fidel Castros government in or-der to determine which personalities will rise to the topand to interpretwhat their ascendance will mean for the future of Cuba.

Fidel Castro is Cubasindispensable man, butrumors of his eternallife have been greatlyexaggerated.


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103CHARTING C ASTROS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS21 Brian Latell, The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Institute for Cuban andCuban-American Studies, 2003, 6.22 Bauz.23 Andres Oppenheimer, Castros Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) 300.24 Ibid, 386.25 Hidalgo.26 Ral Castro Makes Public Appearance After Months of Absence, Agence France Presse,Dec. 15, 2003.27 Latell, 67.28 Latell, 19.29 The analysis of who composes the top level of the Cuban government is principally takenfrom the Jul. 14, 2004, briefing of the Cambridge International Reference on Current Affairs,with two exceptions. The first case is Felipe Prez Roque, whom the CIRCA documentlists as a member of the Politburo, a fact which conflicts with several other sources thatsimply identify him as on the organizing committee of the Communist Party. Thus, I haveexcluded him from this group. The second case is Pedro Miret Prieto, whom theCambridge document does not list as a member of the Politburo. However, both CubaOn-lineand the Asamblea Nacional page include him as a member of that body since at least1983, and I have included him in this group. Both of these cases are ambiguous in partbecause the Cuban government has not published a current list of Politburo membersonline. Whether members of that body in 2004 or not, both men continue to holdpositions on the Council of Ministers and the Council of Statean influential subset inits own right.30 Leycester Coltman, The Real Fidel Castro(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) 316.31 Oppenheimer, 383387.32 Pablo Alfonso, En duda el futuro poltico de Carlos Lage, El Nuevo Herald, Jun. 19,2004.33 Tracy Eaton, Power Struggle Within Cuba? The Dallas Morning News,Jul. 18, 2004.34 Cuba Transition Project Database.35 Nota Official, Granma , Oct. 14, 2004.36 Despite the large number of accomplished professional women in Cuba, including thosein high political office, at present none seem positioned to play a powerful role indetermining Cuban succession.37 Ann Louise Bardach, Cuba Confidential (New York: Random House, 2002) 280.38 UN Votes Against Embargo, Miami Heraldon-line edition, Nov. 5, 2003, .39 Robert E. Quirk, Fidel Castro(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 7945.40 Bardach, 49.41 Coltman, 315.42 Latell, 7.

erikson charting castro possibile successors sais 2005

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