eu-civcap deliverable 2-1 updated · 2017. 3. 11. · the european union (eu) and its members...

EU-CIVCAP Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU

CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace

Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding:

An Assessment of EU Member States’ Capabilities

DL 2.1

(version 1.4)

30 November 2016

TommasoDeZan,PaolaTessariandBernardoVenturi

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

This project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement N. 653227.

DL2.1Procedures,PersonnelandTechnologiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding

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How to cite this report Tommaso De Zan, Paola Tessari and Bernardo Venturi (2016) “Procedures, Personnel andTechnologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EUMember States’Capabilities” EU-CIVCAP Report DL2.1, available from:https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/eu-civcap_deliverable_2-1_updated.pdf.

Summary of the document

Title DL2.1Procedures,Personnel,andTechnologies

forConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:AnAssessmentofEUMemberStates’

Capabilities

LastmodificationState

30November2016Final

Version

1.4

LeadingPartnerOtherParticipantPartnersAuthors

IAIEUSCTommaso De Zan, Paola Tessari and BernardoVenturi

Audience SPublic☐Restricted☐Internal

Abstract ThereportaimstoprovideanoverviewoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)MemberStates’capabilitiesforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,focusingonpersonnel,proceduresandtechnologyandsuggestrecommendationstofillpotentialgaps.

Keywords • Capabilities• ConflictPrevention• Peacebuilding• Personnel• Procedures• Technologies• Training• Recruitment


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLEOFCONTENTS..................................................................................................................3

LISTOFFIGURESANDTABLES......................................................................................................4

EXECUTIVESUMMARY.................................................................................................................5

LISTOFABBREVATIONS...............................................................................................................7

1.INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................9

2.EUROPEANUNION’SGOALSINCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING.......................11

2.1EXTERNALGOALS.........................................................................................................................112.2INTERNAL/ORGANISATIONALGOALS................................................................................................13

3.RESOURCESFORCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING.............................................18

3.1ORGANISATIONALRESOURCESANDPROCEDURESFOREUCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING........183.2PERSONNEL:TRAININGANDRECRUITMENT.......................................................................................203.2.1Training............................................................................................................................213.2.2Recruitment......................................................................................................................28

3.3TECHNOLOGIESFORCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING.........................................................313.3.1Smartphones,Pcs,SoftwareandBigData.......................................................................333.3.2UnmannedAerialSystems(UAS).....................................................................................343.3.3SatelliteSystems..............................................................................................................363.3.4The“DarkSideofTechnology”:ChallengestotheUseofTechnologyinConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding...................................................................................................38

4.ASSESSINGEUMEMBERSTATES’CAPABILITIES......................................................................41

4.1CASESTUDY:FRANCE...................................................................................................................414.2CASESTUDY:ITALY.......................................................................................................................454.3CASESTUDY:GERMANY................................................................................................................474.4CASESTUDY:SWEDEN..................................................................................................................504.5CASESTUDIESANALYSIS................................................................................................................53

5.CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................59

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................62

ANNEXES...................................................................................................................................69


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LISTOFFIGURESANDTABLES

FIGURE1COMPLEXITYOFPEACEBUILDINGOPERATIONS...............................................................................19FIGURE2TOTALPERSONNELTRENDINCSDPMISSIONSFORFRANCE...............................................................42FIGURE3AVERAGEPERSONNELBYCOUNTRYFOROPERATIONSANDMISSIONSINMIDDLEAFRICA.........................43FIGURE4TOTALPERSONNELTRENDINCSDPMISSIONSFORITALY..................................................................46FIGURE5TOTALPERSONNELTRENDINCSDPMISSIONSFORGERMANY............................................................48FIGURE6TOTALPERSONNELTRENDINCSDPMISSIONSFORSWEDEN..............................................................51FIGURE7PERSONNELFIGURESOFTHECIVILIANCSDPMISSIONS(31/08/2016).............................................54TABLE1THE12IMPLEMENTINGPARTNERSOFTHEENTRINETWORK..............................................................26TABLE2EUGOALSINEARLYWARNINGANDEARLYRESPONSE.........................................................................32TABLE3MATRIXOFTHEFOURCASESTUDIES..............................................................................................55


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

The European Union (EU) and its Members States need adequate capabilities to prevent theoutbreakofconflictsandtopromotesustainablepeace.PreventingwarsandfosteringpeacearetwoofthemostimportantgoalsoftheEU,asdescribedintheEUGlobalStrategy(2016)andintheImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence(2016).ThisreportaimstoprovideanoverviewofMember States’ capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding – namely personnel,proceduresandtechnology–inlightofkeyEUgoalsinthesamedomains.WhileacknowledgingthattheEUownssomeofthecapabilitiesthataresuitableforthesetasks,thisreportsisprimarilyintended to highlight the assets and manpower available at the national level, with a view tounderstanding how these capabilitiesmight support and strengthen the EU’s external action inconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Thecoreof the reportmapskey capabilities, in termsofpersonnel, procedures and technologies in four relevant countries: France, Germany, Italy, andSweden.ThefirststepofthispaperistheidentificationofthekeygoalsoftheEuropeanUnioninconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding:externalgoals,tiedtothemissionandscopeoftheEU’sexternalaction,andinternal/organisationalgoals,relatedtothemanagementandproceduresoftheEU’sinstitutions.Toachievethesegoals,theEUhasdevelopedacomplexarchitectureforpeace,whichincludes appropriate expertise and instruments in Common Security andDefence Policy (CSDP)missions,theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),EUDelegations,theEuropeanCommission,etc.Conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingrelatednon-mandatorytrainingactivitiesareavailabletobothCommissionandEEASstaffinDelegationsandatheadquarters.ConcerningCSDPmissions,theEUhasachievedsignificantimprovementintrainingandrecruitment,butsomegapsarestillpresent. In particular, training programmes should aim to better integrate the specific contextwhere the personnelwill operate,with a focus on understanding the local culture, history andtraditionsandmoreattentiontotheissueoflocalownership.Despitehavingreceivedlittleattentionintheacademicliterature,theuseoftechnologyinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesisnotanewtopicforpractitioners.Thisreportshowshowrelevant actors at the national level have already developed technological tools and how thesetechnologiescanrespondtotheEU’sobjectivesinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Intermsofcapabilities,theEUcountriesconsideredinthisreportdohavesignificanttechnologiesthatcanbedeployedtofosterEUexternalaction.ThisisparticularlyevidentinthecaseofsatellitesystemsandUnmannedAerialSystems(UAS).However,‘lesscomplex’systemssuchasphones,tablets,PCsand related applications/softwarewere not particularly acknowledged during the interviews astoolsforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Despitethesepronouncedcapabilities,awarenessonthepossibleuseandimpactofInformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)onconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingisstilllimitedattheMemberStatelevel.Wearguethattheuseoftechnological toolswouldhelp theEUtostrengthen itsearlywarningsystem inorder toswiftlyassess crises, provide a more solid foundation for conflict analysis, and gain better situational


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awareness. However,when it comes to fully exploiting the potential of technologies in conflictprevention and peacebuilding, two key problems remain: the first relates to the willingness ofMemberStatestosharedata,whilethesecondreferstothemethodologyoftheEU’searlywarningsystemcurrentlyinplace.The comparison between the EU’s objectives in conflict prevention and peacebuildingwith theresourcesavailableattheEUandMemberStatelevelsledtodifferentresultsintermsofpersonnel,proceduresandtechnology.Personnelandprocedureshavesignificantlyimprovedinrecentyears.Yet,tofulfilitsobjectives,theEUneedstoworkmoreinspecificareas.TheEU’sinstrumentsforconflict prevention and peacebuilding are in place, but they need to grow in terms of practicalcoordination.Member States could play a key role in both ensuring a better coordination andstandardisation of training programmes and seconding well-prepared personnel for conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingtotheEUinstitutionsandinCSDPmissions.InthecontextoftheEU’scomprehensiveapproach,integratingtechnologicaltoolsdevelopedatnationalandEUlevelwithotherinstrumentscanallowthecreationofafunctioningEUearlywarning/situationalawarenesssysteminordertoanticipate,describeanddiagnoseconflictsaccurately.Againstthisbackground,thereportputsforwardsomespecificpolicyrecommendations:

1) TheEUneedscoherentpoliticalstrategiesthatstartwithallrelevantplayerssharingacommonunderstandingofthesituationorchallengeatstake.

2) The EUneeds to improve the training system in twodirections: first, to request andsupport context-based pre-deployment training for all personnel in CSDP missions;second, to coordinate with Member States for more specialised courses and for‘qualitatively relevant’ seconded personnel in conflict prevention and peacebuilding-relatedpositions.

3) TheEUneedstofullyimplementtheGoalkeepersystemandtosupportMemberStatestoimplementrecruitmentmodelsbasedonthemosteffectivecountries,forexample,GermanyandSweden.

4) TheEUneedstoraiseawarenesswithinEuropeanandMemberStates’institutionsofthepossibilitiesprovidedbyICTsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.

5) TheEUshouldintegrateandanalysedatathataregeneratedbyvariousICTsystemsandcollected from different sources, hence establishing a comprehensive earlywarning/situational awareness system to gain a better understanding of conflictdynamics.

6) TheEUshouldstrengthenciviliandefence/intelligencesynergiesinconflictpreventionand peacebuilding with specific reference to early warning/situational awarenessbetweenEUandnationalinstitutions.


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LISTOFABBREVATIONS

ASPR AustrianStudyCentreforPeaceandConflictResolutionAU AfricanUnion CEP CentreforEuropeanPerspectiveCEWARN ConflictEarlyWarningandResponseMechanismCEWARU ConflictEarlyWarningandResponseUnitCHG CivilianHeadlineGoalCMC CrisisManagementCentreCOSMO COstellationofsmallSatellitesforMediterraneanbasinObservationCPCC CivilianPlanningandConductCapabilityCRMA CrisisandRecoveryMappingandAnalysisProjectCSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicyDDR Disarmament,DemobilisationandReintegration DGDEVCO Directorate-GeneralforInternationalCooperationandDevelopmentDRC DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDGECHO Directorate-GeneralforHumanitarianAidandCivilProtectionEEAS EuropeanExternalActionService EGT EuropeanGroupofTrainingELINT Electronic-signalsIntelligenceENA EcoleNationald’Administration ENTRi Europe’sNewTrainingInitiativeforCivilianCrisisManagementEO EarthObservationESDC EuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollegeESS EuropeanSecurityStrategyEU EuropeanUnionEUCTG EuropeanUnionCivilianTrainingGroupEUMTG EuropeanUnionMilitaryTrainingGroupEUPFT EuropeanUnionPoliceServicesTrainingEUSG EuropeanUnionGlobalStrategyEUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeFBA FolkeBernadotteAcademy GIS GeographicalInformationSystemHEAT HostileEnvironmentAwarenessTrainingHRVP HighRepresentative/VicePresident IcSP InstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeaceICT InformationandCommunicationTechnologyIDP InternalDisplacedPersonIHEDN InstituteofAdvancedStudiesinNationalDefenceLRRD ResilienceandLinkingRelief,RehabilitationandDevelopment


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MFA MinistryofForeignAffairsMSB MyndighetenförsamhällsskyddochberedskapNGO Non-governmentalorganisationNIIB NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelationsClingendaelNSC NationalSteeringCommitteeP&S PoolingandSharingPCRU PostConflictReconstructionUnitSatCom SatellitesCommunicationSECPOL SecurityPolicyandConflictPreventionSEP SwissExpertPoolforCivilianPeaceBuildingSIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgencySJD StandardJobDescriptionSPOT SatellitesPourl’ObservationdelaTerreSSR SecuritySectorReform SSSUP ScuolaSuperiorediStudiUniversitariediPerfezionamentoSant’Anna SU StabilisationUnit UAS UnmannedAerialSystemsUN UnitedNations UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeWP WorkingPackageZIF CenterforInternationalPeaceOperations


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1.INTRODUCTION1

The European Union (EU) and its Members States need adequate capabilities to prevent theoutbreakofconflictsandtopromotesustainablepeace.PreventingwarsandfosteringpeacearetwoofthemostimportantgoalsoftheEU,asdescribedintheGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy2andintheImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence3.Byavertingconflictandcreatingtheconditionsforalastingpeace,theEUaimstopreservelivesandlivelihoods,toholisticallyaddresstherootcausesofviolenceandtoavoidconflictrecurrence inwar-torncountries,whosesocial,economicandpoliticaldevelopmenthasbeenplaguedbyinternalstrife4.ThisreportaimstoprovideanoverviewofMemberStates’capabilitiesinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,namelypersonnel,proceduresandtechnology,inlightofkeyEUgoalsinthesamedomains.WhileacknowledgingthattheEUownssomeofthecapabilitiesthataresuitableforthesetasks, this reports is primarily intended to highlight the assets andmanpower available at thenationallevel,withaviewtounderstandinghowthesecapabilitiesmightsupportandstrengthentheEU’sexternalactioninconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Finally,thisreportalsoproposesrecommendationstofillpotentialcapabilitygaps.InlinewithEU-CIVCAP’scapability-basedassessmentframework5,thefirststepofourresearchistheidentificationoftheEU’sobjectivesinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,whichisbasedonananalysisofrelevantEUpolicydocumentsregardingtheEU’sexternalactionatlarge,fromthe2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) to the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS),includingstrategic,policyandoperationaldocuments.ThisanalysisisfollowedbyanappraisalofkeyciviliancapabilitiesthattheEUneedstoacquireinordertoreachtheobjectivesestablishedforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Thisassessmentisconductedthroughtheanalysisofprimarydocuments (EUofficial documents) and secondary literature, including academic and think tankpublications,amongothers.

Thecoreofthereportmapskeycapabilities,intermsofpersonnel,proceduresandtechnologiesinrelevantcasestudiessuchasFrance,Germany,Italy,andSweden,whichwereselectedonthebasisoffourvariables:1TheauthorswishtothankDr.NicolettaPirozzi(SeniorFellow,IAI)forthevaluableinputsprovidedandthecontenteditingofthefinalversionofthepaperandMr.CristianBarbieri(JuniorResearcher,IAI)forthelayoutediting.2EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.Seesection2forfurtherreferencesconcerningEUgoalsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.3CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ImplementationPlanforSecurityandDefence,14November2016,availableat:https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf.4EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013.5EU-CIVCAP,EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:ACapabilities-BasedAssessment(2016),internaldocument.


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1) Theimportanceofciviliancapabilitiesownedand/orbeingacquiredbyacountry,atnational

levelorthroughmultinationalcooperation,andinparticularatEuropeanlevel;2) The importanceof key civilianexpertiseemployedand/orbeing trainedbya country, at

nationalorEuropeanlevel;3) ThecontributiongiventomajorCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)missionssince

2003(whenthefirsteverCSDPmissionwaslaunched)intermsofpersonneland/orassets;4) Thepossibilitytoconductmorein-depthresearchthankstoconsortiummembers’network

ofcontactsamongrelevantexpertsandstakeholders.Thefirsttwocriteria,relatedtociviliancapabilities,constitutethemainrationalefortheselectionofthesecountries.Thethirdandfourthvariablescomplementtheoverallmethodologicalapproach.Aqualitativeapproachhasbeenadoptedandsemi-structuredinterviewshavebeenconductedwithkeyexpertsandstakeholdersatinstitutionallevelforeachcasestudy.

TheanalysisofthecasestudieswillbecomplementedwiththeanalysisofcapabilitiesattheEUlevel conducted in other working packages (WPs), in order to improve the quality and overallcoherenceoftheEU-CIVCAPprojectasawhole6.Moreover,additionaldeliverablesinWP2willfocusspecifically on the analysis of dual-use technologies with application in conflict prevention andpeacebuildingandontheassessmentofthepotentialforpoolingandsharing(P&S)ofcapabilities.Inthefinalsection,thereportoffersasetoffindingsandrecommendationsonhowcapabilitiescurrentlyowned,or intheprocessofbeingdevelopedatMemberState level,caneffectivelybeusedtohelptheEUachieveitskeygoalsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.

6Seeforinstance,EU-CIVCAP,DL3.1Reportontechnologicalshortcomingsinearlywarningandconflictanalysis(forthcoming),EU-CIVCAP,DL3.2,ReportontheEU’scapacitiesforconflictpreventionandEU-CIVCAP,DL4.1,ReactingtoConflict:CivilianCapabilitiesintheEU,UNandOSCE,November2016.


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2.EUROPEANUNION’SGOALSINCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING

ThefirststepofthispaperistheidentificationofthekeygoalsoftheEuropeanUnioninconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Wedividethesegoalsintotwobroadcategories:externalgoals,tiedtothemissionandscopeoftheEU’sexternalaction,andinternal/organisationalgoals,relatedtothemanagementandproceduresoftheEU’sinstitutions.Theresearchismainlybasedonofficialinstitutionalsources:strategicdocuments(fromtheESStotheEUGSandtherelatedImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence),policydocuments(CouncilConclusionsanddeclarations,HighRepresentative’sstatementsandreports,EuropeanCommissionreports,etc.)andoperationaldocuments(CouncilDecisions,CONOPS,OPLAN,etc.).

2.1ExternalGoals

TheexternalgoalsarerelatedtothefinalaimsoftheEU’sexternalactionandaretiedtoitsmissionsabroad. We divide these goals into four clusters: fundamental goals, timing of intervention,geographicareasofintervention,andthematicissues.Fundamental goals for theEU’s conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingare topreserve livesandlivelihoods7,toaddresstherootcausesofconflictsinaholisticmannerandtoencompassactivitiesaimedatestablishingasustainablepeaceenvironmentincriticalandunstablesituationstoavoidrelapseintoconflict.Overall,wheneverpossible,theEUmustseektopreventconflictbeforeacrisisemergesorviolenceerupts–thisisaconstantandhighpriorityforallEUdiplomaticengagement8.Secondly,theEUhasspecificgoalsrelatedtothetimingofintervention,includingbothshort-termobjectives,namelyearlywarningandrapidresponseandlong-termapproaches.Earlywarningandearly action are both part of a strategy based on prevention. Specifically, the Commissionrecommendstheuseof“newandexistingEUearlywarningsystems,includingthoseofEUMemberStates,toidentifyemergingconflictandcrisisrisks,andidentifypossiblemitigatingactions”9;andto“workacrossEUinstitutionsandwithMemberStatestotranslateconflictandcrisisriskanalysesintospecificconflictpreventionmeasures,drawingonlessonslearnedfrompreviousconflictsandcrises”10.Earlyactionisacrucialpartofit:

7EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013.8Ibid.9Ibid.10EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TakingforwardtheEU'sComprehensiveApproachtoexternalconflictsandcrises-ActionPlan2016-17,July2016.


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to be credible as a security provider, the EUmust be in a position toswiftlyandeffectivelyassesscrisesandmobilizeitsvariousinstrumentsto address them, preventing and managing conflict. Early warning,advance planning, conflict prevention, regional security strategies andcrisis management planning and execution should be more closelylinked11.

DealingwithconflictsfortheEUalsomeansworkingwithlong-termapproachesinordertotacklebothlongstandingandnewsecuritythreats:

long-term engagement in peace and state building and long-termsustainabledevelopmentareessentialtoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofconflictandtobuildpeaceful,resilientsocieties.TheoverallobjectivesofsustainablepeaceanddevelopmentmustbeatthecoreoftheEU'sresponsefromtheoutset–theEUmustalsohavealong-termvisionforitsshort-termengagementsandactions12.

Infact,asabridgebetweenthetwoapproaches,itisimperativeto“establishco-ordinationsystemsbetweenlong-termandshort-termobjectivesthroughdialogueamongEUstakeholdersincludingontheground”13.Geographically, theareas of EU intervention in conflict prevention and peacebuilding are thirdcountriesandregions:toprevent,preparefor,respondto,addressandhelprecoveryfromconflicts,crises and other security threats outside its borders14. In the ESS, building security in theneighbourhoodisidentifiedasoneofthethreestrategicobjectivesoftheEU15.TheEUGSmentionsthe surrounding regions as a priority: “The EUwill engage in a practical and principledway inpeacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions16 to the east and south, whileconsideringengagementfurtherafieldonacasebycasebasis”17.Finally,EUgoalsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingarefocusedonsomethematicareas.In2004theCivilianHeadlineGoal(CHG)identifiedsomeofthem:advisingandtraininglocalpolice,11EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013.12CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CouncilconclusionsontheEU'scomprehensiveapproach,May2014.13Ibid.Oneofthekeycross-cuttingthemesthatwillbeaddressedbytheEU-CICAPprojectreferstothecoordinationbetweenlong-termandshort-termapproachestoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.14CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.InternalsecuritystrategyfortheEuropeanUnionTowardsaEuropeansecuritymodel,March2010.15EuropeanCouncil.ASecureEuropeInABetterWorld,December2003.16The“surroundingregions”areidentifiedas“totheeaststretchingintoCentralAsia,andsouthdowntoCentralAfrica.EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.17EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TakingforwardtheEU'sComprehensiveApproachtoexternalconflictsandcrises-ActionPlan2016-17,July2016.


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preventingormitigating internalcrisesandconflicts,restoring lawandorder in immediatepost-conflictsituations,supportinglocalpoliceinsafeguardinghumanrights,securitysectorreform(SSR)and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR)18. “Joint disarmament operations”,clearlyafrequentneedinpost-conflictsituations,arealsomentionedbytheLisbonTreaty(TEUArt.43.1).HumanrightsareconfirmedbytheEUGSasaclearthematicareaamongconflictpreventionandpeacebuildinggoals:“wewillactgloballytoaddresstherootcausesofconflictandpoverty,andtochampiontheindivisibilityanduniversalityofhumanrights”19.Finally,genderequalityispresentinthiscategorytoo20.

2.2Internal/OrganisationalGoalsTheinternalandorganisationalgoalsoftheEUonconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingarerelatedtothemanagementandproceduresoftheEU’sinstitutionsthatestablishtheconditionsforafullimplementationofexternalgoals.Wedividethesegoalsintosixcategories:credibility,coherenceandcomprehensiveness,coordination,synergiesandpartnerships,efficiencyandeffectiveness,andlearningprocesses.CredibilityisakeyfeatureunderpinningConflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Peacebuildingandmediationarebasedonthecredibilityoftheexternalactorinvolved,asexplainedbytheCouncil:“theEU,asaglobal actor committed to thepromotionofpeace,democracy,human rightsandsustainabledevelopment,isgenerallyseenasacredibleandethicalactorinsituationsofinstabilityand conflict and is thus well placed to mediate, facilitate or support mediation and dialogueprocesses”21.TheHRVPgaveto‘acredibleUnion’acentralroleintheEUGS:“toengageresponsiblywiththeworld,credibilityisessential”22.Credibilitydependsonthecoherenceof thedifferentactions implementedby theEU. In fact,a“coherentpoliticalstrategyforconflictprevention”23 isattheheartofEUworkinthissector:“acoherent political strategy for conflict prevention, preparedness and response starts with allrelevant players sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge”24. As aconsequence,“theEUhasdevelopeditsconflictpreventionandcivilianpeacebuildingcapabilitiestryingtoachieveinternalcoherence,creatingtailor-madeinstitutionsandinstruments,aswellas

18CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CivilianHeadlineGoal2008,December2004.19EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.20Ibid.21CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.ConceptonStrengtheningEUMediationandDialogueCapacities,November2009.22EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.23Ibid.24EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.


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developing partnerships”25. It is therefore fundamental to “ensure strategic and operationalcoherence in external relations policy and strategy, including as regards the external impact ofinternal policies”26. Also “mediation initiatives need to be guided by the principle of policycoherenceandundertakeninthebroadercontextofEUpolicyobjectivesinexternalrelations”27.Coherenceisalso linkedtothecomprehensiveapproach28.ThisEUapproachtoexternalconflictandcrisescovers“allstagesofthecycleofconflictorotherexternalcrises;throughearlywarningand preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery,stabilisationandpeace-building inordertohelpcountriesgetbackontracktowardssustainablelong-termdevelopment”29.Morespecifically,“theconnectionbetweensecurityanddevelopmentis therefore a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach”30.Implementing theEU’s comprehensive approachalsomeans including “key cross cutting issues,particularly human rights, gender, protection of civilians, children and armed conflicts andresponsibilitytoprotect,inallareasofshortandlongtermexternalaction”31.Finally,theEUGSalsorefers to an integrated approach to conflicts32. This choice means implementing “a multi-dimensionalapproachthroughtheuseofallavailablepoliciesand instrumentsaimedatconflictprevention, management and resolution”33. Additionally, the EU will “pursue a multi-phasedapproach,actingatallstagesoftheconflictcycle[…],amulti-levelapproachtoconflictsactingatthelocal,national,regionalandgloballevels[..][and]amulti-lateralapproachengagingallthoseplayerspresentinaconflictandnecessaryforitsresolution”34.Internal and external coordination are among the organisational goals of the Union and apreconditionforeffectiveinterventions.AsstatedbytheTreatyontheEuropeanUnion,MemberStatesareencouraged to: cooperate to reachobjectives concerningexpenditureonequipment,harmonisedefenceapparatuses,andcoordinatetrainingandlogistics(TEUArt.42.6).Thereisnominimumnumberofstatesrequiredforcooperationtotakeplaceatthislevel,asopposedtotheTreaty provisions on ‘enhanced cooperation’ (TEU Art. 20). The EU should therefore develop asingle,commonstrategicvisionforaconflictorcrisissituationandforfutureEUengagementacrosspolicyareas35.Inaddition,theUnionshall“coordinateandwherepossiblecombinetheuseofafull

25Ibid.26CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CouncilconclusionsonCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,November2013.27CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.ConceptonStrengtheningEUMediationandDialogueCapacities,November2009.28SeealsoEU-CIVCAP,DL4.3ReportonEUcomprehensiveapproachtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding(forthcoming),EU-CIVCAP,andDL4.5ReportonimplementationofcomprehensiveapproachinWesternBalkansandHornofAfrica(forthcoming).29EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.30Ibid.31CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.Councilconclusionsonconflictprevention,June2011.32EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.33Ibid.34Ibid.35CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CouncilconclusionsonCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,November2013.


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rangeofEUtoolsandinstruments[...]tocraftaflexibleandeffectiveresponseduringandafterthestabilisationphaseandincaseofrisksofconflict”36.Regardingsynergieswithotherrelevantactors,theirmainfocusisonthenon-governmentalsectorandotherinternationalandregionalorganisations.TheCounciloftheEUexplicitlystatedthat“theCrisisManagementProceduresforeseeconsultationandco-operationwithcivilianactors,includingnon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs),andnotethatmodalitiesforcoordinationinthefieldneedtobedevelopedinthecontextofESDP.Theaim, inparticular, istocontributeto increasingtheoperationalefficiency”37.In2009theCouncilhighlightedthattheEUwillstrengthenitscooperationand networking with international partners, relevant non-governmental organisations andinstitutions,drawingontheirknowledge,expertiseandcontacts38.Theinvolvementofdiversifiednon-governmentalactorshasincreasedandtheirrelevancewasalsopointedoutbytheHRVPin2013,whenshestressed theneed to“engagemorecloselywithmajor internationalNGOs,civilsociety,think-tanks,academiaandpublicandprivateactors”39anditismentionedseveraltimesintheEUGS40.TheEUhastraditionallyoperatedabroadbyestablishingregionalandglobalpartnerships.Theneedto reinforce key partnerships in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is highlighted by severaldocuments,forinstance:“partnershipswithkeyactors,notablytheUN,WorldBank,OSCE,NATO,the AU, other regional organisations and individual countries such as the US have beenstrengthened”41;the“importanceofworkingwithitspartners,inparticulartheUN,NATO,OSCE,andAfricanUnion,aswellasstrategicpartnersandpartnercountriesinitsneighbourhood,withduerespecttotheinstitutionalframeworkanddecision-makingautonomyoftheEU”isrecalledbytheCounciltwoyearslater42.Inparticular,themultilateralapproachandtherelationshipwiththeUnitedNationsarecrucial,asconfirmedbytheEUGS:“theEUwillpromotearules-basedglobalorderwithmultilateralismasitskeyprincipleandtheUnitedNationsatitscore”43.Efficiency and effectiveness are internal goals in place through different mechanisms andapproaches:36EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.37CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.RecommendationsforEnhancingCo-operationwithNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs)andCivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs)intheFrameworkofEUCivilianCrisisManagementandConflictPrevention.November2006.38CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.ConceptonStrengtheningEUMediationandDialogueCapacities,November2009.39EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013.40EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.41CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.Councilconclusionsonconflictprevention,June2011.42CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CouncilconclusionsonCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,November2013.43EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.


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Ø Conflict-andrights-sensitiveprogrammingofexternalassistancetoavoidfuellingconflictsindirectly44;

Ø Effectiveutilisationofconflictriskanalysis45andintegrationofconflictanalysisinallforeignengagementsfromtheverybeginning46;

Ø Cost-effectivedevelopmentofciviliancapabilities47;Ø Use the Crisis Platform mechanism48, chaired by the EEAS with the participation of

Commissionservices,inamoresystematicwaytofacilitatecoordination49;Ø StrengtheningthecapacityofEUDelegationstocontributetoconflictriskanalysis50;Ø Developing procedures and capacities for rapid deployment of joint (EEAS, Commission

services,MemberStates)fieldmissions,whereappropriatetoconflictorcrisissituations51;Ø Mainstreaming human rights and gender into the operation/mission's management,

leadershipandorganisation52;Ø Promotingtheuseofmediationasatooloffirstresponsetoemergingoron-goingcrisis,

whichisbotheffectiveandcost-efficient53.

Earlywarningandearlyactionrepresentakeychallengeforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Withspecificreferencetoearlywarning,theCouncilacknowledgedthatearlywarning

needstobefurtherstrengthenedwithintheEU,bybetter integratingexistingearlywarningcapacitiesandoutputsfromallsources,includingfromMemberStates, and drawing more extensively upon field-based information from EUDelegationsandcivilsocietyactors,inordertoprovideamoresolidfoundationforconflictriskanalysis.EnhancingearlywarningwillalsoenabletheEUtoworkmore effectively with partners regarding responsibility to protect and theprotectionofhumanrights54.

44Ibid.45CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.Councilconclusionsonconflictprevention,June2011.46EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.47CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.Multi-annualCivilianCapabilityDevelopmentPlan:ActionLinesfor2012-2013,July2012.48TheCrisisPlatformmechanism–whichcomprisesarangeofservicesacrosstheEUsystemandischairedbytheHighRepresentative,theEEASExecutiveGeneral(ESG)ortheEEASManagingDirectorforCrisisResponse–canbeconvenedonanadhocbasisandisactivatedtoguaranteeEUresponsivenesstoexternalcrises.MoreinformationontheCrisisPlatformhere:http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-response/what-we-do/crisis-platform/index_en.htm.49CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.CouncilconclusionsonCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,November2013.50EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.51EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013.52CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.InternalsecuritystrategyfortheEuropeanUnionTowardsaEuropeansecuritymodel,March2010.53EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TakingforwardtheEU'sComprehensiveApproachtoexternalconflictsandcrises-ActionPlan2016-17,July2016.54CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.Councilconclusionsonconflictprevention,June2011.


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AfinalgoalofEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingistheincorporationoflessonslearnedandbestpractices.TheconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingsectorisarelativelynewfieldfortheEUanditneedscontinuousinnovationandimprovement,aspresentedbytheCommission:“lessonsandbestpracticesofcivilianCSDPmissions, lessonsprovidedbyMemberStatesandfromotheractors should be integrated into civilian capability development at regular intervals” […]. “Thepurposeistotransformlessonsidentifiedintolessonslearnedinthefieldofcapabilitydevelopmentbymeansofconsidering the lessons identified in relationto, i.e., thetasks list, thecatalogueofstandardjobdescriptionsandanyavailableplansforresearchanddevelopment”55.TheseinternalandexternalobjectiveswillbeusedasyardsticksfortheassessmentofEUcapabilitiesin conflict prevention andpeacebuilding.More specifically, the report examines the capabilitiesavailableattheMemberStatelevelbyfocusingonprocedures,personnelandtechnologies.

55EuropeanCommissionandHR/VP.TheEU'scomprehensiveapproachtoexternalconflictandcrises,December2013.


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3.RESOURCESFORCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING

Thissectionpresentstheresourcesonpersonnel,proceduresandtechnologythatareavailabletoachieve the EU’s objectives for conflict prevention and peacebuilding56. These resources areanalysedthroughthelensoftheinternalandexternalgoalspresentedintheprevioussessionandthis preliminary overview of relevant literature and EU structures, procedures and resources isinstrumentaltotheanalysisofMemberStates’capabilitieswhichwillbeconductedinthefollowingsection.

3.1OrganisationalResourcesandProceduresforEUConflictPreventionandPeacebuildingIn the last15years, theEUhasdevelopedadiversifiedarchitecture forpeace57,and theLisbonTreatyhassignificantlycontributedtothisprocess.Asdiscussedinthissection,CSDPmissionsareonlyapartofthisarchitecture,whichalsoincludesappropriateexpertiseandinstrumentsintheCommission,theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),EUDelegations,etc.Figure1showsthecomplexityofpeacebuildingpoliciesandhowCSDPmissionsareconsideredakeycomponentintheshort-tomedium-range(1-2years)58.Asshownintheprevioussection,theEUaimsto“promotepeace,itsvaluesandthewell-beingofits peoples” (TEU Art. 3(1) as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) and to “preserve peace, preventconflictsandstrengtheninternationalsecurity”(Art.21(2)).Inordertoimplementtheseobjectives,conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingareattheheartofEEASaction.The2011CouncilConclusionsonConflictPrevention,buildingontheTreatyofLisbon(Art.21c),havealsoprovidedtheEUwithastrongmandatetoengageinconflictprevention.ThecurrentEUearlywarningandpreventioncapabilities involvedifferentactorsandstructurescoordinatedbytheEEASundertheauthorityoftheHRVP.TheHRVPactsastheconnectionbetweentheForeignAffairsCouncil(decision-makers)andtheEEASandcanalsotakeinitiativesonconflictpreventionandmediation.Thiswork issupportedbytheConflictPrevention,PeacebuildingandMediation Instruments Division at the EEAS, which aims to take real-time decisions in theanticipationofcrisesandthepursuitofpeace.TheDivisionworkscloselywithCommissionservicesonconflict-relatedpolicydevelopment,includingearlywarning,ontheprogrammingoflong-term

56 An important distinction here is between resources (for example, organisation, finance, staff or material) andcapabilities.Resourcesarestaticandciviliancapabilitiesaredynamic.Capabilitiesareabouthowresourcescanbemadeavailableforactualmissionsinsupportofcertainpolicyobjectives.EU-CIVCAP,EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:ACapabilities-BasedAssessment(2016),internaldocument.57EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement(2012),Factsheet–EEASMediationSupportProject–KnowledgeProduct,availableat:http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/EEAS-Mediation-Factsheet-Dialogue-Prevent-Mitigate-Electoral-Violence.pdf.58Thiscomprehensiveapproachisdescribed(i.e.presentingthedifferentareasofoperation)inthedocument“Addressingconflictprevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments”preparedjointlybytheEEASandEUCommissionin2013.


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activitiesaswellason the implementationofconflictpreventionandmediationassistance.TheDivision promotes greater sensitivity to conflict drivers and responsiveness in EU action. Itcontributestothesearchforconcretesolutionsacrossarangeofconflictsituationsandhastakendirectpartinanumberofpeaceprocesses59.

Figure1ComplexityofPeacebuildingOperations,Source:EuropeanCommission,EUStaffHandbookforOperatingin

SituationsofconflictandFragility,June2015,p.3.

Conflictpreventionisimplementedthroughlongandshort-termaction.Longtermactionsincludeprogramsrelatedtohumanrightsprotection,democracy,ruleoflaw,educationordisarmament.The short-term actions are based on economic, diplomatic and political measures. Some keyfinancialinstrumentscanbeusedbothinthelongorshortrun,astheInstrumentcontributingtoStability and Peace (IcSP)60. This instrument is also responding to the EU’s objective to bothintervenethroughspecificinstruments(e.g.DDRorSSR)andcreatepartnershipswithrelevantnon-governmentalactors,whichinmanycasesaretheimplementersoftheprojects.The EUConflict EarlyWarning System collects information froma number of different types ofsources, both quantitative and qualitative. This gathering of information involves the EEAS, theCommission,theMemberStatesandmanycivilsocietyorganisations.Infact,thesystemworksin

59ConflictPrevention,PeacebuildingandMediation,availableathttps://eeas.europa.eu/topics/crisis-response/426/conflict-prevention-peace-building-and-mediation_en.60InstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeace,preventingconflictaroundtheworldavailableathttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm.InMarch2014theInstrumentforStability(IfS)hasbeenreplacedbytheInstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeace(IcSP).ForinformationontheprojectsfinancedbytheIcSP,‘InsightonConflict’showsaworldmapdisplayingageneraloverviewofIcSP-fundedprojectsaroundtheglobe–around250projectsin70countrieswithatotalbudgetofEUR2.3billionfor2014-2020:https://www.insightonconflict.org/icsp/.


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cooperationwithMemberStates,externalexpertsandcivilsocietyorganisation,bothinEuropeandinotherregions61.Thus,conflictpreventionencompassesthesystematiccollectionandanalysisofinformationcomingfromavarietyofsourcesinordertoidentifyandunderstandtherisksforviolentconflict inacountryandtodevelopstrategicresponsestomitigatethoserisks. Itfocusesonthehighest global conflict risks, ongoing highly violent situations on a four-year time horizon. Itcommunicatestherisksorpeacebuildingopportunities,andgeneratescomprehensiveoptionsforEU-wideactions,whicharemonitoredaspartofthesystem'sbiannualcycle.ItalsoworksinsynergywithexistingEUtoolsandmodelsastheInfoRMindexforhumanitariananddisasterrisksupportedbyDGECHO62.Inthisregard,thissystemforinternalcoordinationcanbeseenasastepintherightdirectiontoachievingtheaforementionedEUobjectives.Mediation isalsopartof theEU’son-the-groundpreventivediplomacyand theEUhasplayedacrucial role in mediation and dialogue from the high-level work regarding Kosovo-Serbia tosupportinggrassrootswork inthePhilippines.ActorssuchastheEUSpecialRepresentativesarefrequentlyengagedinmediationefforts,andcomplementtheactionofEUDelegationsandCSDPmissions.TheCommissionhasalsointernallydevelopedtheEUStaffHandbookforOperatinginSituationsofConflictandFragilitywiththesupportoftwospecialisedunits,distributedtostaffinDelegationsandgeographicdepartments.63Inaddition,theCommissionandtheEEAShavejointlydevelopedaGuidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action (2013), anotherrelevanttoolforconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Overall,thisarchitecturerepresentsacomprehensiveapproachthatcoversallstagesofthecycleofconflicts.Somemechanismsarerecentandcoordinationneedstobestrengthenedinpracticemovingfrommerecomprehensivenesstofullintegration,inparticularatMemberStatelevel.Alsosomespecificaspects,forinstanceearlyaction,needimprovementsintheirapplication.64

3.2Personnel:TrainingandRecruitment TrainingandrecruitmentarecriticalcapabilitiesforEUconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.TheEUhasachievedsignificantimprovements,especiallyrelatedtoCSDPmissions,butgapsandcriticalissuesremaintobeaddressedboth intheCSDPrealmandinotherframeworks, includingthoserelatedtotheroleoftheEuropeanCommissionandEUDelegations.

61Examplesofprojectsimplementedbypartners,inparticularcivilsocietyorganisationsare:the“Peace-buildingpartnership",the“StrengtheningEarlyWarningandMobilisingEarlyAction”,the“CapacitiesforPeace”,andthe“CivilSocietyDialogueNetwork”.62EEAS,EUConflictEarlyWarningSystem,Factsheet,September2014,OnlineAvailableathttp://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf.63EuropeanCommission,Operatinginsituationsofconflictandfragility:EUstaffhandbook,June2015.64Formoreonthis,pleaseseeDL3.2ReportontheEU’scapacitiesforconflictprevention(forthcoming).


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3.2.1Training Havingwell-trainedpersonneliscrucialtoenhancingthefulleffectivenessofEUciviliancapabilitiesandtofulfillingtheobjectiveofinterveninginspecificareas(DDR,SSR,confidencebuilding,etc.).Conflict prevention andpeacebuilding relatednon-mandatory training activities are available tobothCommissionandEEASstaffinDelegationsandatheadquarters. SECPOL.2divisionintheEEASandtheFragility&ResilienceUnitB.7inDEVCOarebothtaskedwithprovidingresourcesonfragility,conflictanalysis,mediationandpeacebuildingtoEUstaff.Inparticular,UnitB.7inDEVCOisthekeyprovider on conflict sensitivity for the European Commission staff, as per its mandate. TheMediationSupportTeam(SECPOL.2)canalsoprovidetailor-madeelectivetrainingcoursesfornewlyappointedstaff,inparticularHeadsofMissioninconflict-affectedcountries.ThefollowingexamplesofthecurrentcoursesillustratetheEU’strainingcapabilities:

Ø CourseonEUExternalAction:Fragility,SecurityandDevelopmentinaChangingWorld:athree-day introductory training course whose objective is to provide participantswithknowledgeoncrisismanagement, fragilityanddevelopment inthewidercontextofCSDP/CFSP. The course is geared to personnel working in/with countries where CSDPmissions(orinternationalsecurityinterventions)aredeployed.ThiscourseisattendedbyDEVCOandEEASstaff,diplomatic,civilianandmilitarypersonnelfromEUMemberStates.

Ø Inter-AgencyWorkshoponWorkinginFragileCountries:athree-dayspecialisedworkshoporganised on the ground, in cooperation with other bilateral and multilateral donoragencies.TheworkshopaimstoanalyseanddiscusstheimpactandresultsofEUpoliciesona regional level. The focus lies on common issues affecting fragile and conflict-affectedcountriesintheregion.

Ø Workshops on Resilience at headquarters and country level: a two-day seminar aimingtoprovideparticipantswiththenecessaryguidanceandsupporttoapplytheEUapproachtoresilienceontheground,throughbettercoordinationofhumanitariananddevelopmentinterventions.ThiscourseisattendedbyEUDelegations,DEVCOandECHOfieldofficesandheadquarterstafffromrelevantservicesattheCommissions.

Ø DeliveringEUdevelopmentassistanceinfragile/crisissituations:athree-dayspecifictrainingcourse giving a thorough overviewof current issues relating to fragility and crises in EUdevelopmentpolicies andprogrammes, aswell as of the international agenda; it fosterstheexchangeofrelevantcountryexperiencesamongparticipants.ThecourseisattendedprimarilybyDEVCOstaffworkingondevelopmentassistance insituationsof fragilityandcrisis.

Insomecases,theEUhasrequiredthesupportofexternalprovidersthroughframeworkcontracts.For instance, the project “Mediation Support to the European External Action Service (EEAS)”provides conflict prevention and mediation support to the EEAS and its partners, including


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“Preparinganddeliveringcoachingandtrainingformatstargetingdifferentlevels,individualsandteamswithintheEEASandotherEUinstitutions”65.Theproject“ERMES-Europeanresourcesformediationsupport”isaimedatstrengtheningEUsupporttoconflictmediationpartiesworldwide.Asdescribedinitsblurb,“[t]heT.A.servicewillidentifytherelevantexpertiseand/orexpertsonmediation and dialogue to support third parties engaged inmediation and dialogue processes,including the deployment of experts to the field, drafting of research papers, and provision oftrainingandcoachingofindividualsand/orgroups”66.AthirdexampleisrepresentedbytheinstituteESSEC-Irene,whichhasbeenprovidingnegotiationtrainingtotheEuropeanCommissionstaffsince2007,aseriesoftrainingseminarssince2009,anda“NegotiationLearningPath",foradministratorsadvising the rotating Presidency of the Council since 2011. In addition, ESSEC-Irene provides a“PersonalisedCoachingProgram”forhigh-rankingEUmanagers.

Currently, the NGO Saferworld and EEAS/DEVCO are developing an online course on conflictsensitivityforEUstaffandmorespecificinformationwillbepublishedinthecomingmonths.Finally,SECPOL.2providestwootherservices.Across-institutionalconflictanalysisexerciseandanearlywarningexerciseconductedbytheconflictanalysisteamin-country.Theyarenotofficialtrainingcourses,buttheexercisescanbeconsideredaslearningtools.AspresentedintheEU-CIVCAPDL3.2,extendingtheuseofconflictanalysistootherpolicy instrumentssuchasthoseofDGTradewouldconsiderablystrengthentheEU’spotentialforconflictpreventionasawayofactingintheworld67.

TheEUhasthereforedevelopeddiversifiedcoursesonconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding,alsoinclosecollaborationwiththe leadingNGOsandtraining institutes inthissector.Thesetrainingmechanismswithin the EU institutions represent a good transfer of expertise and are a usefulresponsetopersonnelrotationandturnover.WhilsttrainingandmentoringactivitiesrepresentacornerstonetoimproveEUinternalcapabilities,theyarestillfragmentedandarenotmandatory.Itcouldbeinterestingtohavemandatorypathsforspecificpersonnel,forinstanceforCommissionorEAASstaffworkingonfragilitiesorforthestaffdeployedinDelegationsinconflictareas.

Concerning CSDPmissions, a decisive aspect is to establish an effective link between the EU’strainingprocessandrecruitment.Awareofthesepriorities,in2004theCounciloftheEUdefinedtheobjectives,principlesandimplementingpoliciesandapproachesfortraininginthe“DraftEU

65TheConsortiumfourleadingEuropeaninstitutionsinthisfield:BerghofFoundation,ESSEC-Irene,MediatEUr,andSwisspeace:http://www.berghof-foundation.org/programmes/dialogue-mediation-peace-support-structures/mediation-support-to-the-european-external-action-service-eeas/.66TheConsortiumiscomposedby5organisationsspecialisinginconflictmediation:CMI-CrisisManagementInitiativeMarttiAhtisaariCentre(Finland),HDCentre-CentreforHumanitarianDialogueMediationforPeace(Switzerland),ACCORD-AfricaCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes(SouthAfrica),SFCG-SearchforCommonGround(Belgium),andIA-InternationalAlert(UnitedKingdom)http://www.transtec.be/website20/news/Transtec-strengthening-EU-support-to-conflict-mediation-parties-worldwide-.html.67EuropeanPeacebuildingLiaisonOffice,TheEU’scapabilitiesforconflictprevention,forthcoming.


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TrainingConceptinESDP”68.Someofitsprinciplesandpolicieshaveguidedthetrainingpoliciesinrecentyears(i.e.thetrainingprocessdescribedbelow),othershavenotbeenfully implemented(for instance, theGoalkeeper project, discussedbelow)69. Thedocument establishes theoveralltrainingcycleatEUlevel,whichconsistsofthreephases:

1) Conduct: based on this analysis, to design the annual EU Training Programme, which iselectronically available in Schoolmaster (see below), listing the training activities of allrelevanttrainingactorsinthefieldofCSDP;

2) Evaluation:toconductandimplementtheEUTrainingProgrammebyrelevantactors;3) Assessment:toevaluate lessonstobetaken intoaccountwhenstartingthenewcycleof

analysingthetrainingrequirementsforthenextyear'strainingprogramme.Theassessmentis done through the Comprehensive Annual Report on CSDP and CSDP-related Training(CART)70.

Atthetimeofwriting,twoimportantdocumentsareunderdiscussionbytheEUinstitutions,whichcouldpartiallyreformCSDPtrainingprogrammes.ThefirstistheEUPolicyonTrainingforCSDPandtheotherisImplementingGuidelinesfortheEUPolicyonTrainingforCSDP.Thesedocumentsareconsideredinthissectiontopresentpossibletrendsbeyondthecurrentpracticesandlegislation.

Currently,thetrainingcycleforciviliansinCSDPmissionsisdividedintosixphases71:

1) Corecourse,designedtoprovideparticipantswiththebasicknowledgeandskillsrequiredonamission,independentofthespecificfunctiontheywillfulfilasexpertsintheirownfields(10-12days);

2) Specialisation courses, on single tasks for civilians (child protection, rule of law, conflictanalysis&conflictsensitivity,etc.)(5-10days);

3) Personalsecurity,i.e.HostileEnvironmentAwarenessTraining(HEAT)(5days);4) Missioninduction,in-countrytrainingonthespecificmission(1-2days);5) Inmissiontraining,onspecificissuesduringthemission;6) De-briefing,afterthemissioninthesecondingcountry.

Acriticalissueofthistrainingcycleistheobjectiveofinternalcoordination(whoisresponsibleforwhat). Currently, sending countries (if the personnel are seconded) are responsible for pre-

68CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,DraftEUTrainingConceptinESDP,2004,availableathttps://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/trainingconcept_en.pdf.69Onthistopic,seealso:HylkeDijkstra,PetarPetrov,andEwaMahr(2016),“ReactingtoConflict:CivilianCapabilitiesintheEU,UNandOSCE,”EU-CIVCAPReport,DL4.1,availableathttp://www.eu-civcap.net/files/2016/11/Reacting_Conflict-Civilian_Capabilities_EU_UN_OSCE.pdf.70EuropeanCommission,ComprehensiveAnnualReportonCSDPandCSDP-relatedTraining(CART),November2011,http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/st17438_en11_en.pdf.71AndreadeGuttry,'Lemissionicivilidell’Unioneeuropea:lesfideperlaformazioneedilreclutamento',inAzzoni,Alessandro,Pirozzi,Nicoletta(eds.),Civiliinmissione:l'esperienzaitaliananellemissionidell'Unioneeuropea,2016,pp.45-55,http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/civili_in_missione.pdf.


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deployment training, while the mission induction and the in-mission training fall within theresponsibilityofthemissionitself.However,responsibilitiesfortheothertrainingphasesandfortrainingoflocalstaffarenotdefined.Duetotheseambiguities,civiliantrainingsystemsintheEUoftenlackrelevanttrainingmodulesorduplicatesomeofthem72.Inthelast15years,somerelevantissueshaveemergedatMemberStatelevel,forinstancethelackofspecificresourcesfortrainingorscarcecoordinationandstandardisationofthecourses73.TheEUhastried,toacertainextent,toimprovethestandardisationoftrainingwithsomepositiveresults,eveniftrainingactivitiesstillsufferfromlimitedcoordinationanddiverseapproachesandmodels.Amongthetangibleprogresses,forinstance,theComprehensiveAnnualReportonCARTpublishedin2011listedsomefeedbackreceivedfromfieldmissionsandthemeswhichshouldhavebeen considered for future training courses74. Some of them – for instance CSDP missions’administrative,financialandprocurementprocedures,mentoring,monitoringandadvising,hostileenvironmentsecurity/awarenesstrainingorreportingskills–arepresentlypartofthespecialisationcoursesandarecertifiedbytheEU.Currently,attheEUlevel,themaintrainingprovideronciviliancapabilitiesisEurope'sNewTrainingInitiativeforCivilianCrisisManagement(ENTRi)75.ENTRi76isaninitiativefundedbytheEuropeanCommission(90%)andco-fundedbyits12implementingpartnersbasedinEuropeancountriesandled by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)77 (see Table 1). Before ENTRi, theEuropean Group of Training (EGT) was established in 2001, with similar but less structuredobjectives and ran until 2009. L’EGT was the result of the European Commission’s project onTrainingforCivilianAspectsofCrisisManagementlaunchedin2001,whichcreatedthefirsttrainingstandardsandcoregroupsoftrainingcentres.ENTRiiscurrentlyinthethirdprojectphase(2016-2019)andissettorununtilMay201978.ENTRicoursesarenotdesignedtoreplaceanyexistingcoursesthatgovernmentsandsendinginstitutionsorganisetoprepareindividualsforpossibledeploymentincrisismanagementoperations.Instead,ENTRi was created to foster the harmonisation of European and international approaches to

72Ibid.73AndreadeGuttry,“Lemissionicivilidell’Unioneeuropea”,2016.74EuropeanCommission,ComprehensiveAnnualReportonCSDPandCSDP-relatedTraining(CART),November2011.75Militaryandpolicetrainingsareimplementedby:ESDC(EuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollege),CEPOL(EuropeanPoliceCollege),EUPST(EuropeanUnionPoliceServicesTraining)andEDA(EuropeanDefenceAgency).76http://www.entriforccm.eu/about/about.html.77http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/.78Thetotalbudgetoftheprogrammesinceitsinceptionis€8million.ENTRiwascreatedbytheEuropeanUnion’sInstrumentcontributingtoStabilityandPeace(IcSP)andisguidedbytheEuropeanCommission'sServiceforForeignPolicyInstruments(FPI),whichisco-locatedwiththeEuropeanExternalActionService.Atmid-2016,1741individualsof97differentnationalitiesweretrainedinatotalof82ENTRicourses.Europe'sNewTrainingInitiativeforCivilianCrisisManagement(ENTRi)certifiestrainingcoursesinthefieldofciviliancrisismanagement.AC³MC-labelisawardedtocoursesthatmeetestablishedstandardsandcriteriafortrainingcivilianpersonnelthataretobedeployedtocrisismanagementmissions.


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capacity-building, with a view to creating synergies between European and internationalinstitutions79.

ENTRipartners

AustrianStudyCentreforPeaceandConflictResolution(ASPR),Austria

RoyalInstituteforInternationalRelations(Egmont),Belgium

DiplomaticInstitute,Bulgaria

CrisisManagementCentre(CMC),Finland

EcoleNationaled'Administration(ENA),France

ScuolaSuperioreSant'Anna(SSSUP),Italy

NetherlandsInstituteofInternationalRelationsClingendael(NIIB),Netherlands

CentreforEuropeanPerspective(CEP),Slovenia

FolkeBernadotteAcademy(FBA),Sweden

SwissExpertPoolforCivilianPeaceBuilding(SEP),Switzerland

79ENTRialsocooperatescloselywiththethreeassociatepartners:theOrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE),theUnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(UN-DPKO)andtheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollege(ESDC).


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StabilisationUnit(SU),UnitedKingdom

CenterforInternationalPeaceOperation(ZIF),Germany

Table1The12implementingpartnersoftheENTRiNetwork

Overall,ENTRihasthereforeimprovedthetrainingsystemforpeaceoperations.Theconsortiumpresents a valid array of courses and they could improve the effectiveness of the personneldeployed in a CSDPmission.However, some gaps are still present and deserve attention. First,trainingactivities–oratleastsomeofthem,asthemissioninductionandthein-missiontraining–could focus more on the specific context where the personnel will operate with a significantunderstandingoflocalculture,historyandtraditions.Second,moreattentionshouldbegiventolocalownershipandtotherelationshipwithcivilsocietyorganisations,bothlocalandinternational,inthetrainingmodules.Thesetwopointsarealso linked:agoodunderstandingof localculturalissuesfosterslocalownership.Moreover,synergiesamongcivilian,militaryandpolicecomponentscouldbeimproved,alsothroughjointpracticalexercises80.The future role of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)81 as the potential maincoordinatorforallCSDPcoursesisasubjectofcurrentdebate.TheworkingdraftoftheEUPolicyon Training for CSDP (version: 1 July 2016) presents the ESDC as a promoter of a “culture ofexcellence,acommonunderstandingofCSDPamongcivilianandmilitarypersonnelandtoidentifyanddisseminate,throughitstrainingactivities,bestpractice”.From a Member State’s perspective, some political resistances could hamper this process ofcentralisationhowever.TheESDCnetworkcurrentlyincludesseveralnationallybasedinstitutesandtraining centres. Their direct involvement through a decentralised structure represents a goodequilibriumbetweencoordinationandvalorisationoftheexistingcentresandtheircapabilities.Thisasset could also be improved by combining more effectively the ESDC’s military features withgenuinecivilianapproaches.Infact,evenifinthelastfewyearstheESDChasincreasinglyincludedspecificciviliancourses,civilianparticipantsandtrainers,itsmilitarybackgroundisstillinevidence.Inaddition,CSDPmissionsarejustonepartoftheEU’sintegratedapproachtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingand, consequently, the trainingpolicy should includeall the instruments andstructuresworkinginthisarea.80AndreadeGuttry,“Lemissionicivilidell’Unioneeuropea”,2016.81ThisaspectwillbediscussedfurtherinEU-CIVCAPDL2.5Policypaperonpoolingandsharingofcapabilities.


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Interestingly,thedraftofImplementingGuidelinesfortheEUPolicyonTrainingforCSDP(version1,June2016)envisagetwotraininggroups:theEUCivilianTrainingGroup(EUCTG)andtheEUMilitaryTraining Group (EUMTG). The ESDC is considered as the “main training actor providing civ/miltraining in the field of CSDP, with special focus on CSDP training courses on political-strategic,strategicandoperationallevels,alsoholdingamajorrolewithintheCSDPtrainingarchitecture”.Inaddition,ESDC“shallactasafacilitatorbetweenthetwotraininggroupsasfarasciv/miltrainingisconcerned”.Inthisnewarchitecture,theESDCplaysanimportantroleincivil-militaryinteractionsandstrivestoavoid‘silothinking’.Atthesametime,civil-militaryrelationsshouldbeconsideredinallcoursesandbecomeahorizontalthemeinEUtrainingactivities.Similarly,localownershipshouldbepresentasacross-cuttingissueinallcourses.Another key programme supporting training and recruitment is the Goalkeeper project. TheGoalkeeperproject82startedin2007intheGeneralSecretariatoftheCouncilandinApril2013theproject was transferred to the EEAS, where it ismanaged by CMPD 2 - Capabilities, Concepts,TrainingandExercisesDivision-anddevelopedandmaintainedbytheEEASITDivision.On1January2016,theadministrativemanagementoftheGoalkeeperProjectwasfullytransferredtotheEEAS.TheGoalkeeperplatformiscomposedof:Schoolmaster,Registrar,Headhunter,andGovernor,eachonewithspecificobjectivestosupportciviliancapabilities'training,recruitmentanddeployment.SchoolmasterisanonlinedatabasecontaininginformationonallcoursesdeliveredthroughouttheEU that are relevant to the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. WhetherdeliveredbyMemberStates'traininginstitutionsorbytheEUitself,allcoursesinSchoolmasterarein principle open to participants from all Member States. The Registrar module is devoted torecruitmentanddeploymentandisanalysedinthenextsection.

82Seehttps://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu.


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Figure2TheGoalkeeperwebsiteandstructure.Source:https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/about.do(23/11/2016)

The project could play a pivotal role in fostering the EU’s training and recruitment of civilianpersonnel. However, the implementation of the project has suffered from delays. In 2013, theCounciloftheEuropeanUnionmentionedthat“TheGoalkeeperprojectisnowwellonthewaytobeingfinalisedin2013”83.However,afteryearsofverylimitedprogress,in2016thewebsitehasmade some tangible progress. At the time of writing (October 2016), the technical fulloperationalisationofthesystemisenvisagedfortheendof2016,thetest-periodshouldruninthefirstmonthsof2017andtheGoalkeepershouldbefullyfunctionalinspring2017.3.2.2RecruitmentStrong links between training and recruitment is still awork in progress.One link concerns thepersonnel seconded by Member States to the Commission, EEAS, European Union SpecialRepresentatives (EUSRs) and EU Delegations. Well-trained seconded personnel on conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingcanprovideasolidcontributiontotheEU’speacearchitecture.ConcerningCSDPmissions,fillingthetraining-recruitmentgapshouldbeapriorityforthecomingyears to improve the effectiveness of civilian personnel. In quantitative terms, the number ofpersonneldeployedincivilianCSDPmissionsattheendofAugust2016amountedtoatotalof2,542;

83CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ThirdreportonMemberStates'progressinfacilitatingthedeploymentofcivilianpersonneltoCSDPmissions,2013.


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885ofthemareseconded(866secondedbymemberstatesand19bythirdstates84)and1,657contracted (457 international contractedand1,200 local contracted). In recent years, therehasbeen amarked decline in the number of seconded personnel,while the number of contractedpersonnelhasincreased.Thistrendislikelytocontinueinthecomingyears.Thecountriessecondingmore personnel are Germany (124) and Poland (124), Sweden (85), Italy (49) and Finland (48).Womenareunder-representedandconstitutethe29.1%ofthepersonnel intheCSDPmissions.Morespecifically,femalepersonnelrepresent21.1%ofsecondedstaff,27.5%ofcontractedstaffand35.6%oflocalstaff85.Thetrendinrecentyearsisforanincreaseinwomen’sparticipationandMemberStatesshouldtrainandrecruitmorefemalepersonneltocontinuetoreducethegendergap.The personnel of amission could be seconded or contracted (both internationally and locally).SecondmentmeansthatindividualsarenominatedbytheirrespectiveMemberStatesandthefinaldecisiononrecruitmentfallstotheEU.Thecontributingstatewillbearallpersonnel-relatedcosts.Internationalcontractedstaffarerecruitedbyeachmissionthroughanemploymentcontract86.Therecruitmentmechanismofsecondedcivilianpersonnel isthereforedecentralisedandconductedthroughMemberStates,butonlysomeofthemhavedevelopedrostersorsimilarmechanismstoselecttherelevantexpertsintherequestedtimeframe.Inaddition,rostersatMemberStatelevelarestillheterogeneousandtheroadtoharmonisationandstandardisationofexistingrostersseemspracticablebutlong,andtiedtothesuccessoftheGoalkeeperproject.Fornow,whilesomeofthemkeepacentralrosteratnational level,othersrelyononeormoreseparate rosters kept by individualministries or services and focus on specific expertise. GoodpracticesincludethePostConflictReconstructionUnit(PCRU)intheUKandtheZIFinGermany,cited earlier. However, only a few Member States include experts from outside nationaladministrationsintheirrostersforciviliandeployments,whereasinmostcasesnationalrecruitmentpracticesfailtoreachrelevantexpertsthatareemployedintheprivate,NGOoracademicsectors87.Asaconsequence,itisevenmoredifficulttofindrelevantexpertiseinsomeciviliansectors(i.e.ruleof law experts, senior policy advisors, etc.) and states aremore exposed to the risk of sendingpersonnel who are not fully adequate for a position. For instance, according to the interviewsconductedonthefourcasestudiesanalysedinthenextsection,themaingapsshownbysecondedpersonnel are related to linguistic skills, the ability to work in a multicultural setting, conflictsensitivityandthestaminatoworkinahostileenvironment.Deployment procedures at national level also present considerable problems that need to beaddressed, especially in terms of the legal, administrative and financial conditions for the84Canada,Georgia,Norway,Switzerland,TurkeyandUnitedStates.85EEAS,PersonnelFiguresoftheCivilianCSDPMissionsasof31/08/2016.86Vacanciesarepublishedonlineinthewebpage:http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site_en/?f%5B0%5D=bundle%3Aeeas_job_vacancy&f%5B1%5D=im_field_er_thematics%3A285.87NicolettaPirozzi,“EUPerformanceinCivilianCrisisManagement’,inRichardWhitmanandStefanWolff(eds.),TheEuropeanUnionasaGlobalConflictManager,LondonandNewYork,Routledge,May2012,pp.189-208.


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secondment of civilian personnel88. Incentives (e.g. career opportunities and better salaries) inpublicservicearerareandinjeopardy.InternationalcontractedstaffareconsideredasfreelanceandconsultantsanddonotreceiveanydirectcareerbenefitwithintheEUinstitutions.Aspartof theGoalkeeperprogramme, theRegistrarmodule isdesignedtoprovideEUMemberStatesand theEEASwithaweb-based technology thatallows the standardisedmanagementofcivilian personnel for potential deployment, the electronic management of applications forsecondedpositionsinCSDPmissionsandtheestablishmentofstatisticsatnationalandEUlevel.The Headhunter module aims to facilitate and expedite the production of job descriptions forpositionsincivilianCSDPmissions.AcatalogueofStandardJobDescriptions(SJD)ismadeaccessibletotheEEASinBrusselsandhumanresourcesofficersinCSDPmissionsasareferenceinstrumentforthe creation of mission-specific job descriptions to be published in mission-specific Calls forContributions.However, inSeptember2016 theCivilianPlanningandConductCapability (CPCC)published the document “Force generation for the Civilian CSDPMissions: A planning guide forMember States Seconding Authorities”89 that substitutes the catalogue of SJD. This documentdefinesnewapproachestorecruitmentandrenovatedjobcategories90,developingaroadmaptoimprovetheEU’sobjectiveto intervenethroughspecificcivilianapproachesandhighlyqualifiedpersonnel.Overall, the full adoption of the Goalkeeper system could considerably facilitate the civiliancapabilitydevelopmentprocess,butitssuccessfulimplementationwilldependonthebuy-inofbothEU actors – CPCC and Human Resources officers in CSDPmissions – and national authorities –beyondMinistriesofForeignAffairs91.AfullfunctioningGoalkeepersystemcouldansweralsototheEU’sobjectivesofmorecoordinationamongMemberStatesontrainingandrecruitmentandtostrengthenearlywarningandrapidresponse.Withreferencetochanging(andfuture)needsinCSDPmissions,therecentImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence92refersto“revisitingtheFeirapriorityareasforcivilianmissionsinlightoftheprofoundlychangedsecurityenvironment”(p.4).FromanEUGSperspective,thetrendseemstobetowards smaller, integrated, capacity-building missions with more skills tied to fragility and

88NicolettaPirozzi,“EUPerformanceinCivilianCrisisManagement’,inRichardWhitmanandStefanWolff(eds.),TheEuropeanUnionasaGlobalConflictManager,LondonandNewYork,Routledge,May2012,pp.189-208.89CPCC,ForcegenerationfortheCivilianCSDPMissions:AplanningguideforMemberStatesSecondingAuthorities,September2016,https://www.lyyti.fi/att/845AC0/86045F98A9719c50957dFB2F1Fc0F5869aa722F94FAc9EBf92c0C57.90Forinstance,thereareManagementCategories(i.e.,DeputyHeadofMission,ChiefofStaff,HeadofOperations,etc.)andMissionSupport(HeadofTechnicalServices,HeadofUnit,etc.).TheGeneralEssential(integrity,communicationskills,languageskills,etc.)andDesirableRequirements(knowledgeoftheEUInstitutions,drivinglicence,etc.)acrossallfunctionalrolesaredefined.91NicolettaPirozzi,“TheEuropeanUnionandCivilianCrisisManagementafterLisbon”,inEuropeanForeignAffairsReview20,no.2(2015):283–302.92CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.ImplementationPlanonSecurityandDefence,November2016.


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resilience.93IftheCSDPmissionswillmoveinthisdirection,thefuturerequestedskillscouldalsoinclude more soft knowledge related to: resilience, security-development nexus, confidence-building,andlocalunderstandingfromdifferentcorners(anthropology,sociology,history,etc.).

3.3TechnologiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding94 Despitehavingreceivedlittleattentionintheacademicliterature,theuseoftechnologyinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesisnotanewtopicforpractitioners.Asdemonstratedbytheinitiativesoforganisations suchas the“ICT4PeaceFoundation”and“PeaceTechLab”and“BuildPeace|PeaceThroughTechnology,” in recentyearssome international,nationaland localactorshave been increasingly including technological tools in conflict prevention and peacebuildingprograms95.According to themost relevant reports andpapers, there seems tobea consensusamongexpertsthattechnologies improvethecapacitytopredict,describeanddiagnoseconflictthanks to thepossibilityof generating, accessingand sharingdata in conflictprone situations96.Indeed, as Puig Larraui and Kahl put it: “The best thing that new technologies can offerpeacebuildingpractitioners is anopportunity to re-engineer existing data information gatheringprocesses, digitize collected data, and produce better analyses by comparing data that waspreviouslyheldinsilos”97.

93EUGS,SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion’sForeignandSecurityPolicy.2016.94WhilethefocusofourresearchwillbeICTsapplicationinaciviliandimension,whatemergedfromourstudyisthatoftentheyareoperatedbyarmedforceswithinEUmilitaryoperations,butnotwithcombattasks.Equally,thefirstsatellitesystemswereconceivedpurelyoutofdefenceneeds,buttheoverlappingbetweencivilianandmilitarycompetences,inEUoperationsparticularly,ledtothecreationofdual-usesystemsresultinginaninvaluablesourceformonitoringandsurveillance.95BrahimiReportReportofthePanelonUnitedNationsPeaceOperations(2000),http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml.InitiativesandreportsofICT4PeaceFoundation,PeaceTechLabcanbefoundhere:http://ict4peace.org/;http://www.peacetechlab.org/;http://howtobuildpeace.org/.96Somerelevantacademicendeavourstouncovertherelationshipbetweentechnologyandpeacebuilding/conflictpreventioninacomprehensivemannerincludeIoannisTellidisandStephanieKappler,‘Informationandcommunicationtechnologiesinpeacebuilding:Implications,opportunitiesandchallenges’,CooperationandConflict2016,Vol.51(1),pp.75–93;HelenaPuigLarrauriandAnneKahl,2013,«TechnologyforPeacebuilding»,Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurityandDevelopmenthttp://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.cv/;Mancini(2013),NewTechnologyandthePreventionofViolenceandConflicthttps://www.ipinst.org/2013/04/new-technology-and-the-prevention-of-violence-and-conflict.Accordingtotheseworks,technologymightbealsousedtoincludegrassrootsopinionsinthepublicdebate,conveyandshapeadifferentnarrativefromtheofficialgovernmentalone,challengetheconceptofidentityinsocietieswhereethnicorreligiousissuesaredominant,toshapepositivebehavioursanddwarfattitudesthatcandisruptPaCPprocesses.Inthisrespect,see:PuigLarrauriandHal,“TechnologyforPeacebuilding’,2013.Forthepurposeofthispaper,however,weconcentrateontheroletechnologymightplayingenerating/sharing/accessingdata,aswedidnotfindsufficientevidencetowarrantasolidanalysisofotherpurposes,suchasthosementionedabove.Inadditiontotheseworks,theliteratureondisaster/riskmanagementhasalsoinformedourresearch.Seeforinstance,Aitsi-Selmi,A.,Murray,V.,Wannous,C.etal.‘ReflectionsonaScienceandTechnologyagendafor21stCenturyDisasterRiskReduction’,InternationalJournalofDisasterRiskScience,7:1,2013. 97PuigLarrauriandKahl,‘Technologyforpeacebuilding’,2013.


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EUgoalsinearlywarningandearlyresponse“NewandexistingEUearlywarningsystems,includingthoseofEUMemberStates,toidentifyemergingconflictandcrisisrisks,andidentifypossiblemitigatingactions”;andto“workacrossEUinstitutionsandwithMemberStatestotranslateconflictandcrisisriskanalysesintospecificconflictpreventionmeasures,drawingonlessonslearnedfrompreviousconflictsandcrises”.“Tobecredibleasasecurityprovider,theEUmustbeinapositiontoswiftlyandeffectivelyassesscrisesandmobilizeitsvariousinstrumentstoaddressthem,preventingandmanagingconflict.Earlywarning,advanceplanning,conflictprevention,regionalsecuritystrategiesandcrisismanagementplanningandexecutionshouldbemorecloselylinked”.“Acoherentpoliticalstrategyforconflictprevention,preparednessandresponsestartswithallrelevantplayerssharingacommonunderstandingofthesituationorthechallenge”.ThisEUapproachtoexternalconflictandcrisescovers“allstagesofthecycleofconflictorotherexternalcrises;throughearlywarningandpreparedness,conflictprevention,crisisresponseandmanagementtoearlyrecovery,stabilisationandpeace-buildinginordertohelpcountriesgetbackontracktowardssustainablelong-termdevelopment”.Effectiveutilizationofconflictriskanalysisandintegrationofconflictanalysisinallforeignengagementsfromtheverybeginning.Earlywarning“needstobefurtherstrengthenedwithintheEU,bybetterintegratingexistingearlywarningcapacitiesandoutputsfromallsources,includingfromMemberStates,anddrawingmoreextensivelyuponfield-basedinformationfromEUDelegationsandcivilsocietyactors,inordertoprovideamoresolidfoundationforconflictriskanalysis.EnhancingearlywarningwillalsoenabletheEUtoworkmoreeffectivelywithpartnersregardingresponsibilitytoprotectandtheprotectionofhumanrights”.

Table2EUgoalsinearlywarningandearlyresponse(Source:EEASandEuropeanCommission.Addressingconflict

prevention,peace-buildingandsecurityissuesunderexternalcooperationinstruments,November2013)

Interestingly,theEUdoesnotyetseemtohavedevisedastrategyorspecificpoliciesfortheuseoftechnologies forconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.This isevenmoresurprising ifwetakeacloserlookatEUgoalsinrelationtoearlywarningandearlyresponse(seeTable2).Technologicalinstrumentsthatallowtoanticipatetheonsetofviolencewouldconstituteavaluablecontributiontoearlywarningandearlyresponseandtoensuretimelyandsustainableinterventions.Indeed,theCommissionitselfrecommendstheEUto“usenewandexistingEUearlywarningsystems,includingthose of EUMember States, to identify emerging conflict and crisis risks, and identify possiblemitigatingactions.”The same is acknowledgedby theUN: “accurate information; if accessed intime,verified,analysed,andsharedwiththerightactors,hasthepotentialtopreventviolenceorstopitfromescalating”98.Havingtechnologicalinstrumentsthatareabletopredicttheoutburstofconflictsand/orfollowtheirdevelopmentsincasepreventionfails,wouldalsobeinlinewiththe

98UN.PeaceandSecurity.http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml


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EU’sgoaltoapplyacomprehensiveapproachtoconflict.Infact,InformationandCommunicationTechnologies(ICTs)cancontributetomonitoringallstagesofconflict,togatheringinformationatalllevels(local,national,regionalandglobal)andtoengagingalltheplayersinvolved.In the following sections, we show how relevant actors in the field of conflict prevention andpeacebuilding have already applied technological tools in their programmes and how thesetechnologiescanrespondtotheEU’sobjectives inconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding. Inthisreport,werefertotechnologyasICT,thatis“thedifferenttypesofhardware,softwareandsystemsthatenablepeopletoaccess,generateandshareinformation”.Thisincludessmartphones,tablets,PCs, their relatedapplications (SMS, socialmedia) and software.Dual-use technologies, suchasUnmannedAerial Systems (UAS) – commonly knownas drones – and satellites also add to thiscategory,fortheirroleincollectinginformationremotely99.3.3.1Smartphones,Pcs,SoftwareandBigDataDuetotheirfunctionalitiesandsoftware,whichenablethepossibilitytogenerate,collectandsharedata,smartphones,tabletsandcomputersandrelatedsoftwarearewellsuitedforuseastoolstoachieve“situationalawareness”inconflict-proneenvironmentsastheycanallowindividualstoactbeforetheeruptionofviolence.Eventhough,tothebestofourknowledge,theEUdoesnotemploymobilephonesorspecificsoftwareandsocialmediaanalysistoolstocollectandanalysedata,otherinstitutions,suchastheUNortheKenyanauthorities(seebelow)havealreadyintegratedsomeofthesetoolstopreventconflictandtobuildpeace,especially,toprovidetimelyintervention.Itisworthmentioning,forinstance,thatmobilephonesandonlineapplicationsareessentialtoolsinKenya’searlywarningmechanism.ThesystemismanagedbytheNationalSteeringCommitteeonPeaceBuildingandConflictManagement(NSC),withintheofficeofthePresident.TheNSCisthenational unit known as Conflict EarlyWarning and Response Unit (CEWERU), subsumed to theregional Conflict EarlyWarning and ResponseMechanism (CEWARN). At the national level, thenetworkiscomposedofstaffbasedattheNSC,whileatthelocallevelthenetworkcomprisespeaceandintelligencecommittees,CEWARNandCEWERUfieldmonitors.Fieldinformationiscollectedthroughlocalnetworksbutalsofromcivilsocietyorganisationslocatedinthearea.ThepopulationcansendpeaceandconflictalertsusinganSMS(withlocation,phonenumber,andthepeaceorconflictissue)ortheAmani108OnlineReporter(usingemail,andsocialmediasuchasTwitterandFacebook).Whendataisreceivedfromthefield,analystsatNSCvalidatethenewinformationbymaking phone calls to the units on the ground. The NSC is also working to add geographicinformationsystem(GIS)datatovisualisemapsofconflictsituations100.

99Ibid.100FrancescoMancini,ed.,“NewTechnologyandthePreventionofViolenceandConflict,”NewYork:InternationalPeaceInstitute,April2013.OnlineAvailablehttps://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_epub_new_technology_final.pdf.


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Asanotherexample,theUNhasintegratedsoftwaretoachieveabettersituationalawarenessinconflicts.Forexample,since2007,theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)hasruntheCrisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project (CRMA) to map threats and risks affectingcommunitiesinsixstatesofSudanandSouthSudan.CRMApersonnelreliesonadesktopsoftwarebased on GIS technology, whose data are supplemented by communities’ workshops aimed atcollectinginformationonthepopulation’sthreatperceptions101.Giventhecentralityofdataandtheadvantagesofintegratingthemfromvarioussources,scholarsandpractitionershavebeguntodiscusstheroleof‘BigDataforconflictprevention’.Theconceptof‘BigDatafordevelopment’firstappearedinthetitleofaUNGlobalPulse’sWhitePaperin2012102.Althoughacommondefinitionhasyettobefound,BigDataforconflictpreventionreferstothedeluge of new available data (generally from social media like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram,Youtube, etc.) that can be exploited to devise conflict prevention and peacebuilding actions103.OptimismaroundtheuseofBigData inconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingstemsfromthreemainfactors:thevolumeofthesehighlygranulardata;animprovedabilitytocollectandprocessthemthroughmachinelearning;andfinallytheirnature,whichallowsbetterreal-timeinsightsintowhat is happening and what people think about current events104. Two notable examples ofprogramsthathavecollectedandanalysedBigDatatogaininsightsfromconflictinclude:theLibyaCrisisMapproject,inwhichhundredsofvolunteerscollected,cleanedandcodeddataextrapolatedfromsocialmediaatthedawnoftheLibyacrisis105;andtheUNGlobalPulse’sprojectinIndonesia,whichinvestigatespublicperceptionsaboutfoodandfuelpricesthroughTwitter106.3.3.2UnmannedAerialSystems(UAS)107Despitebeingcommonlyknownfortheiruseincombat,un-armeddronescanbeavaluableassettoconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingfordatacollectionandsharing.Whenequippedwithsmall

101Ibid.102Ibid.103HelenaPuigLarrauri,AnneKahl,Technologyforpeacebuilding,InternationalJournalforStabilityandDevelopment,2013,OnlineAvailablehttp://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.cv/.104SheldonHimelfarb,CanBigDataStopWarsBeforeTheyHappen?,ForeignPolicy,April2013,http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/25/can-big-data-stop-wars-before-they-happen/.105HelenaPuigLarrauri,AnneKahl,Technologyforpeacebuilding,InternationalJournalforStabilityandDevelopment,2013,OnlineAvailablehttp://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.cv/.106Ibid.107UAScanalsobearmed(UCAS:UnmannedAerialCombatSystems).Tobeclear,theInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)introducedRemotely-PilotedAircraft(RPAS)asasubcategoryofUnmannedAerialSystems(UAS)butthescientificliteratureusesthetermUASsinceitembracestheentirecategory.UAScanbeclassifiedaccordingtotheirfeaturesintermsofaltitudeandendurance.Forourresearch,itsufficestosaythatMALEdrone(MediumAltitudeLongEndurance)reachanaltitudeof15,000mwith14-24hoursendurance;HALE(HighAltitudeLongEndurance)droneflyupto18,000mwith18-36hoursendurance.ForamoredetaildiscussionofUASasadual-usetechnologyinpeacebuildingandconflictprevention,seeD.L.2.4oftheEU-CIVCAPProject(forthcoming).Thissectionisintendedasafirstoverviewthesubject,withaviewtoevaluatingmemberstatescapabilitiesinlightoftheEU’sgoalsinpeacebuildingandconflictprevention.


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camerasandrecordingdevicestheycan108:a)monitorpeople’smovement,forexamplesthoseofsmugglers and embargo breakers, relevant to timely intervention; b) carry out surveillance onpopulationatrisk;c)andhelpdamageassessmentintheframeworkofdisasterriskreductionandsearchandrescueoperations,assistingteamsdeployedontheground.Inlinewiththeideaofacomprehensive approach using all instruments aimed at conflict prevention and due to thissurveillance function, they can also help tomonitor key crosscutting issues, particularly humanrights,gender,andtheprotectionofcivilians.TheadvantagesofsuchapplicationsincreaseifweconsiderthatUAScanensurehighenduranceandbeoperationaloveralongtime-horizon.Infact,even when UAS are piloted from operators on the ground, the alternation of pilots allows acontinuousactivity,whichconstitutesagreatvalue,especiallyforlongmonitoringmissions.Clearly,thisallowsthemonitoringoftheEU’ssurroundingregions,describedasapriorityintheEUGS(seesectiononEuropeanUnion’sgoalsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding).BoththeUNandtheEUhavealreadytestedthevalueofsuchtechnologyinpeaceoperationsandtheyappeartobewillingtoexplorethispathfurther109.ThisacquiresmorerelevanceinviewoftheEU goal of strengthening partnerships with other relevant actors. It is worth mentioning theMONUSCOmissioncase(DemocraticRepublicofCongo–DRC,January2013):aleadingexamplethatmarkedthefirstcaseofUASusebeingexplicitlyauthorisedunderaUNpeacekeepingmandate,in order to provide real-time intelligence and help information gathering110. This episode wasfollowedbyanumberofinstanceswhereUASweredeployedwithintheUNmissions,collectedinarecentreportissuedbytheUnitedNationsOfficeforHumanitarianAffairsin2014.Justtomentionafewexamples,UASweredeployedinTimor-Lestein2006,withtheaimofhelpingtheresearchandreintegrationofIDPs(InternallyDisplacedPersons)111,andwithinUNOSATtosurveyprogressinrebuildingfollowingthe2010earthquakeinHaiti112.TheEuropeanUnion,foritspart,hasbeensupportingthedevelopmentofdronessincethe1990sandhas,sincethen,adoptedseveraldocumentstoensureacoordinatedEUapproachtocivilUASacknowledging the relevance of civilian applications of UAS, including humanitarian and rescuemissions,conflictpreventionandpeace-keepingandpost-conflictstabilisation113.Frontexhasalso

108KalrsrudJohnandRosénFrederik.“IntheEyeoftheBeholder?TheUNandtheUseofDronestoProtectCivilians”inStability,InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development,2(2):27,1-10,2013,http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bo.109EuropeanCommission,TowardsaEuropeanstrategyforthedevelopmentofcivilapplicationsofRemotelyPilotedAircraftSystems(RPAS),http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013438%202012%20INIT.110JohnKalrsrudandFrederikRosén,“IntheEyeoftheBeholder?TheUNandtheUseofDronestoProtectCivilians”,inStability,InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development,2(2):27,1-10,2013.http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bo.111LarrauriHelenaPuig,andPatrickMeier,“PeacekeepersintheSky:TheUseofUnmannedUnarmedAerialVehiclesforPeacekeepin

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