eu’s relations with russia – issues pillars · ternal relations, including the three-level-game...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Paper
ECPR joint session
Grenoble 6-11 April 2001,
workshop 23:
Understanding the the EU’s International Presence
EU’s relations with Russia – Issues – Pillars – Levels
DRAFT
Jens-Jorgen Jensen
Ass.professor, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
University of South Denmark
DK-6700 Esbjerg, Denmark
Phone: 45+ 6550 4174
Fax: 45+ 7914 1199
Email: [email protected]
2
EU’s relations with Russia – Issues – Pillars – Levels
International system, EU external relations and Russian policies ...... 4
Main Traits of the Development of EU-Russian Relations .................... 7
Security aspects of EU-Russian relations ................................................................ 10
Economic aspects of EU-Russian relations ............................................................. 13
Value politics in the EU-Russian relations .............................................................. 15
The Russian policies of Germany .................................................................. 18
The Russian policies of Denmark .................................................................. 22
Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 25
Annex ...................................................................................................................... 28
Table 1 – EU Trade with Russia............................................................................... 28
Table 2 – Country allocation of TACIS resources 1991-1999 ................................ 28
Table 3 ....................................................................................................................... 29
Table 4 ....................................................................................................................... 29
Comparison of bilateral, public gross transfers from the G7 states to Russia ....... 29
Table 5 Denmark’s trade with Russia ...................................................................... 31
Table 6 Danish bilateral assistance .......................................................................... 31
Top ten of Danish bilateral Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe 1999........ 31
Literature: ............................................................................................................. 32
3
The relations of the EU and its member states to Russia belong to the most important
among third countries’ relations and comprise essential issues of international secu-
rity, home affairs, economic interests and human rights and other democratic val-
ues. The policies towards Russia are formed and conducted inside and across the
three ‘pillars’ of the EU and on EU level and national levels as well, thereby illus-
trating the combined supranational, intergovernmental, national-governmental and
trans-national character of EU’s external relations. The study is concerned with the
recent developments including the 1999 EU strategy on Russian, which encompass
security issues, welfare aspects of foreign policy as well as value politics. The analy-
sis on EU level is supplemented by parallel case studies on German and Danish
relations to Russia. This predominantly empirical study has as aim to analyze the
dynamics of EU-Russian relations on the background of developments in EU institu-
tions and member states. However, along with this explorative intention, the paper
will point to the relevance of some concepts and approaches in the study of EU ex-
ternal relations, including the three-level-game approach.
The development of the EU’s external relations in the 1990ties poses many questions
to the observer! The activities and competences on the EU level regarding external
affairs have been extended simultaneously with revolutionary changes in the global
and European systems, and this ‘internationalisation’ does not only cover the tradi-
tional external policy areas of economic affairs but increasingly also other policy
areas like security policies and even home and justice affairs. Further, the pillar
structure established by the TEU f has created complicated and diversified structures
of decision-making on EU level. Finally, the EU’s various external relations cannot
be separated from the actions of the member states – they influence the EU policies
and, along with that, the members maintain their ‘own’ external relations, conducted
by governments as well as non-state actors. In short, the external relations of the EU
and the EU members have supranational, inter-governmental, national-governmental,
sub-national as well as trans-national character.
The purpose is to analyse the Russian polices of the EU and the EU member states
since the creation of the Russian Federation in 1991. The paper is going to discuss
the main lines of development of the EU’s policies and also treats two national
cases, namely Germany and Denmark1. The character of the paper is mainly empiri-
cal and explorative, however, it is also an intention to contribute to the ongoing dis-
cussions on appropriate concepts and theoretical frameworks in the study of EU’s
external relations.
1 The choice of countries can of course be disputed. The two countries are different regarding size,
importance as to the EU context and Russia as well, the historical setting, etc. They are similar in as
far as the relations to Russia are perceived as more important than in most other member states
4
Regarding the structure of the paper, it will start with a brief outline of develop-
ments in the international system and the EU that are important for the EU-Russia
relations. The following sections treat EU’s Russian policies as well as the policies
of Germany and Denmark. Finally, the concluding chapter will return to more gen-
eral considerations.
International system, EU external relations and Russian policies
There are several and well-known reasons for the extension of the EU engagement in
external relations during the 9o’ties: Firstly, the end of the cold war changed the
security agenda. In Barry Buzans wording, the time of cold war overlay has been
replaced by new conditions where regional security complexes are emerging and
must be dealt with2. Secondly, the post-cold war meant new types of violent con-
flicts, primarily internal in nature and caused by ethnic and national contradictions
and these problems may have a scale and intensity that is threatening the prospects
for a democratic and peaceful European development. Thirdly, the ongoing process
of globalisation has gained momentum, partly as consequence of the dissolution of
the bloc-system, and economic and political interdependence in the European region
have increased. The opening-up has increased the prospects of economic and cultural
interaction but provides also new potential for illegal immigration and criminal
transactions, too. To sum up, the end of the cold war meant a de-securitization in
security matters in traditional narrow sense as well as increasing interdependence,
that, in turn, among other things, seems to mean a securitization of new policy areas.
The particular position of Russia in the new picture will be discussed in the follow-
ing, but a few points shall mentioned already here.
Due to size and potential, Russia is the successor of the Soviet Union, and it
has become direct neighbour to the EU.
The Eastward enlargement which even will include countries on former So-
viet territory, is the key project of the EU in the first decades of the new cen-
tury, and , therefore, it becomes necessary to have basic understandings
common with Russia.
EU’s dealing with the new forms of violent conflicts, replacing the old secu-
rity confrontation, makes it unavoidable to cooperate with Russia, still the
greatest military power on the continent
EU’s dealing with justice and home affairs has been extended during the
90’ties for several reasons. One of the causes is the mentioned internationali-
sation of home and justice issues that, in turn, are caused by fears of uncon-
trolled migration and organized crime from Eastern Europe, not least Russia
and other CIS countries3 . Therefore, an interplay actually exists between the
development of EU’s home and justice policies and its Russian polices
2 Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear, New York, Harvester, 1991, chap 5
3 For overviews of the development in EU policies on justice and home affairs, see Boer, Monica
Den:”Justice and Home Affairs”, in Wallace,Helen and Wallace, William (eds.): Policy-making in the
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.389-410, and Hix, Simon: The Political
System of the European Union, London Macmillan 1999, pp. 307-30
5
Economic interdependence has increased between Europe and Russia, and
though the Russian transition has been an obstacle way, the potential of eco-
nomic operation in energy and other sectors is evident4
Human rights principles seem to have obtained growing influence in interna-
tional politics, and are also influencing the relations between the EU and Rus-
sia5
However, it should be added that the interpretation of the nature of the international
and European systems after the cold war is a question of dispute. Observers with
realist glasses emphasise the basicly conflictual character of international politics
and the continuing key role of the state and its traditional security considerations. In
contrast, scholars with liberal-institutionalist worldviews stress the positive possibili-
ties for peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation as well as the growing plurality
of transactions and a stronger role of international organizations. Both worldviews
can be found among European decision-makers and determine in different ways how
the Soviet successor state is evaluated. A third worldview is Huntington’s famous
thesis on the clash of civilizations which focus on the conflict potentials between the
West and the Eastern European (orthodox) ‘civilization’ (in fact, Huntington drew a
border line between the two cultures that is almost identical with the future EU-
Russian border!)6. Such opinions may be held in the European public rather than the
political elites, but threats, real or perceived, of Russian illegal migration and mafia,
have become a factor behind the ongoing europeanization of home and justice affairs
and are influencing Western general attitudes to the Russian transformation.
Though EU’s external activities and competences have been enlarged, it remains an
open issue how to assess EU’s functioning as an actor on the global arena. Evidently,
EU is not a ‘unitary actor’ in neorealistic sense, nor – in the other end of the spectre
of interpretations – an actor like an intergovernmental organisation as OECD or
OSCE. The ongoing discussions have attempted to identify some in-between position
of the EU.
An almost classic contribution is the Hill’s discussion on the expectations-
capabilities-gap, looking upon possible disappointments of the environments due to
alleged ineffectiveness of the EU system and its lack of ‘conversion-power’7. More
implicitly, Hill is also pointing to a possible feedback on EU’s institutional capabili-
ties from the non-fulfilled expectations of actors outside the EU.
Other discussants have also been occupied with EU’s actorness. Some authors con-
clude, looking upon the existence of a number of autonomous actors and different
and complicated decision procedures, that EU must simply be characterized as an
4 Regarding the medium-term perspectives optimism on Russian economic prospects have become
widespread, see Stonemann, Richard/ Oppenheimer, Peter / Isaeva, Patricia:”Russia – a growing
economy in the new millennium”, Russian Economic Trends, ,Moscow, 11Oct 2000 5 Moravcik, Andrew:“The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar
Europe“, International Organization, vol 54, Spring 2000, pp. 217-252. 6 Huntington, Samuel: ”The Clash of Civilisations?”, Foreign Affairs vol 72, 1993 Summer, pp. 22-
49 7 Hill, Christopher: ”Closing the capabilities-expectations gap?”, in Peterson/Sjursen, op.cit., pp. 18-
37
6
external relations system8. Inspired by Easton’s analysis of the political system,
Ginsberg has elaborated this concept and tried to establish categories for the analysis
of the interplay between EU environment, member states and pillar structures - and
he includes categories from systems analysis as input, process, output and feedback9.
Patterson is approaching the actorness problem by taking her departure in a classic
contribution from foreign policy analysis, namely Putnam’s analysis of foreign pol-
icy as a two-level game between external pressures and constraints and demands
from domestic interests. The suggestion made by Patterson and others is to use this
approach by expanding the analysis to the games on three levels, namely the na-
tional, the level of the EU and the international extra-EU level10
.
The various approached suggested in the literature on European external relations
system still have the character of pre-theories, i.e proposals for concepts, classifica-
tions and formulation of assumptions, etc. For the present, few theories have ex-
planatory ambitions, but it seems that the heuristic ability, their role as ‘catalogues of
problems’ or roadmaps, has improved. The present study is primarily inspired by
three-level analysis which seems to be suited as framework when dealing with a
multi-layered and relatively loosely structured phenomenon like the Russian rela-
tions of the EU and its member countries. In the final section we will return to this
discussion .
The treatment will also depart from a well known, three-fold classification of for-
eign policy in security, welfare and value policies11
. Security policy refers to the
policies on traditional core issues of external survival of the state. But in this paper
the concept is widened to encompass broader issues of home and justice affairs be-
cause the internationalisation of these issues seems to have been one of the driving
forces behind the development of the EU’s policies regarding questions of internal
security, in particular the struggle against international organized crime. Welfare
policy refers to the policies aiming at improving the material conditions. In our case,
we look upon the policies regarding trade, investment and aid in relation to Russia as
well as policies concerned with Russia’s integration in the World economy (WTO
membership). Value policy refers to foreign initiatives to further democracy and the
respect of human rights outside the union. Here, the analysis will focus on the
Chechnyan wars, in particular EU’s handling of Russia’s relations to the European
Council.
8 Peterson in Peterson/Sjursen, op.cit
9 Ginsberg, Roy H.:“Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor“, Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol 37, 2000, pp.429-54 10
Patterson, Lee Ann: ”Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game
analysis”, International Organization, vol 51, Winter, 1997, pp. 135-65 11
The classification is a modification of Holsti’s distinctions between foreign policy purposes of secu-
rity, autonomy, welfare, status and prestige, see Holsti, K.J.: International Politics. A Framework for
Analysis, New Jersey Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 83-116. In our context. Security policy in narrow mean-
ing refers to policy concerned with survival of the state and In broader sense with issues of law and
order, including crime, illegal immigration etc. Welfare policies refer to external policies aimed at
increasing the economic level of the society, e.g. trade policies, relations to international economic
regimes and organizations.
7
Main Traits of the Development of EU-Russian Relations
The relations between Brussels and Moscow changed basically already during the
Perestroika period that among other things made an end to the deadlock in the nego-
tiations between EC on one side and the Soviet Union and COMECON on the other.
The EC-Soviet agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1989 meant not
only a change in Soviet relations but also that Gorbachev gave up the former Soviet
demand of equality between EC and COMECON.
New radical changes occurred in 1992 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1991. The Russian Federation, emerging as the main actor and successor of the
Soviet Union, was headed by a political elite who wanted to build up a new Russia
with market economy and democracy, and the leaders perceived the EU and EU
member states as main supporters of this revolutionary change. The key persons
during these first years, president Yeltsin and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kozyrov,
were European Westernizers like Gorbachev and even more optimistic than their
predecessor. In their opinion the EU, in particular Germany, should play a key role in
the modernizing of the Russian economy, because of the geographical closeness and
economic complementarity. Further, the EU countries should have an intermediating
role between Russian and other actors in the democratic world, especially the United
States. Therefore, Russia was sympathetic towards EU’s efforts to develop its foreign
policies, and –contrary to the case of NATO – has been supporting EU enlargement.
The 90’ties have experienced somewhat change in the basic Russian outlooks, in
direction of more ‘realistic’ opinions, but the positive European orientation has been
maintained.
In the beginning of the 90ties, the options for the future looked green on the EU side,
too. In continuation of widespread hopes for a “new world order” the close coopera-
tion - and for some countries - regular membership were seen as the Königsweg to-
ward a peaceful and democratic Europe12
. Though the EU countries did not consider
Russian membership as a relevant objective, the basic assumptions about future EU-
Russia’s cooperation were similar to the notions behind the policies toward Central
and Eastern Europe, consisting of three interacting goals, namely the creation of
market economy, political democracy and common values. Despite disagreements
these assumptions and objectives – associated with the notion of security communiy
– have remained the point of reference for the Russian policies and are reflected in
the following typical official statement 13
:
A stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of
law and underpinning a prosperous market economy benefiting alike all the
people of Russia and the European Union
12
Pedersen (1997) 13
Quoted from EU’s Strategy for Russia, see below
8
Maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to
the common challenges of the continent through more intensified cooperation
with Russia
Already during the last phase of the Soviet period it was realized on part of the EU
that the trade and cooperation agreement from 1989 had to be updated in order to
avoid any Soviet isolation as consequence of the ongoing and more close contacts
and agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries. Hence, negotia-
tions were continued with the new Russia with the purpose of attaining an agreement
with Russia covering both political and economic issues. The process of negotiations
was not without obstacles but in June 1994 the two parties could sign the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) treating political, economic and cultural issues.
However, ultimo 1994 the Russian government invaded Chechnya and the ratifica-
tion by the several member states was delayed as protest. Additionally, an interim
agreement approved by the Council in 1996, became an issue of conflict between
the Council and the Parliament because the Council had acted without informing the
Parliament that, in turn, used the occasion for an address to the Intergovernmental
Conference14
. The process of ratification was not completed until the end of 1997
(after the end of the war). 15
The PCA entered into force on 1 December 1997.
The overall PCA objective on part of the EU was to link Russia to the process of
European cooperation along with the Eastern enlargement. It was not coincidental
that the signing of the PCA in 1994 took place at the same time as NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace agreement with Russia was signed and not remote in time from the
free trade agreements with the Baltic states and the completion of association
agreements with other Eastern European countries16
. The main focus of the PCA is
the economic relations, and the PCA has remained the key document in this regard.
The PCA also foresees construction of an institutional framework for the future co-
operation between two parties. The PCA stipulates biannual meetings between the
Council and Commission presidents on one side and the Russian President on the
other. Additionally, political dialogue shall take place within the Cooperation Coun-
cil (on Ministerial level) as well as meetings on senior official and parliamentary
levels. The PCA has brought about dialogue and meetings to start, and especially the
presidential meetings have become opportunities for exchange and public presenta-
tion of viewpoints on top level.
The next important step in EU’s Russian policy was the 1999 adoption of the Com-
mon Strategy of the European Union on Russia, a type of initiative made possible by
14
The parliament demanded that the Council in future should consult the Parliament in connection
with similar agreements, and, it was promised to be consulted in future cases. 15
The last countries (Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) had to be urged by the EU commissioner
to complete the ratification before the end of 1997 16
In fact, the Baltic free trade agreements in 1994 were replacing the more ambitious association
agreements we expected at that time, because the EU would not ‘provoke’ Russia.
9
the Amsterdam treaty 17
The strategy is treating all aspects of EU-Russian affairs and
can be seen as an elaboration and updating of the PCA. Its main components are pro-
posals for EU action in following priority areas:
Consolidation of democracy and public institutions and rule of law in Russia.
Integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space
Stability in Europe and beyond
Common challenges on the European continent (environment, crime, others)
It was agreed that the first common strategy should be concerned with Russia, and it
thereby got a model character (later initiatives have been strategies for Ukraine and
the Mediterranean). However, the preparations faced serious troubles in the first
months of 1999 because of the Kosovo action, and it was not coincidental that the
Russian strategy was be approved under German presidency (at the Köln council).
The launching of the strategy shall also be seen in the light of the Russian economic
crisis that culminated in the Fall 1998. The crisis was a reminder of the weaknesses
of the political and economic institutions in Russia, and its course illustrated, too,
lack of efficiency and coordination of initiatives on part of the EU and its member
states18
. Finally, the strategy reflects new concerns and priorities in EU attitudes ,
compared with the PCA: Similar to the aid programmes (see below) the needs for
institutional reform is underlined and, additionally, the need for cooperation regard-
ing illegal immigration and international crime is upgraded.
Along with the preparations of the Common strategy a more specific Northern Di-
mension was elaborated. The discussion of a Northern Dimension started in 1997 as
consequence of the Nordic enlargements and the prospects of membership of Poland
and the Baltic states. An important role was played by the Finnish presidency in
1999, and an Action plan for the period 2000-2003 was adopted at the European
Council meeting in June 2000.The action plan underlines energy cooperation and
common fight against organized crime.19
We have touched upon the Russian conceptions on the EU, but a few remarks shall
be added about the specific Russian reactions to the EU strategy. Already at the EU-
Russian summit in the Fall 1999, Putin responded by presenting an official Medium-
term strategy for Russia’s relations to the EU. In its structure the Russian response is
17
Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/414/CFSP)
http://europa.int.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/common_strategy 18
A good example was the EU in-fights about the food assistance to Russia 19
The Finnish initiative has become a prominent element in EU’s Russian policy for several reasons.
The Finns have been linking it to the Common Strategy, a focal part of the energy cooperation with
North West Russia, and finally does the Dimension include cooperation about development of the
Kaliningrad which has increased German and Scandinavian interests , see Arter, David:”Small State
Influence Within the EU”; Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000 vol 38, no 5, pp.677-98.
10
following the list of items, outlined in EU’s Strategy, and it is obliging and generally
very positive, especially in the treatment of economic relations between the two par-
ties. However, compared to the EU Strategy, the Russian declaration contains impor-
tant differences, which could deserve a discourse analysis! Thus, the basic world-
views in the two documents are different. Whereas the EU Strategy sees the intensi-
fication of EU-Russia relations as means for the strengthening of a liberal and de-
mocratic world order, the Russian Strategy underlines the goals of creation of a ‘mul-
tipolar world’ and improvement of ‘economic security’ – key concepts taken from a
more ‘realistic’ perception of world politics. In more concrete terms, the Russian
declaration also contains considerations, which are not in accordance with the views
of the EU, for example that the EU-Russia cooperation should contribute to the ‘con-
solidation of the Russian role as leading force in the creation of a new system for
intergovernmental relations inside the CIS area’20
. Although Russia has welcomed
the EU’s Nordic Dimension, reservations are also expressed regarding possible
Western intervention in the future of Kaliningrad21
.
Security aspects of EU-Russian relations Security in narrow as well as broad sense has played a role in EU-Russia in two di-
rections to be discussed here, namely in context with the discussion on EU’s foreign
and defence policy including the prospects for a European security dimension, and in
the context of struggle against international organised crime policy.
The PCA did not focus on issues of security in narrow sense, whereas such issues
were treated extensively in the EU Common Strategy. Thus, the Strategy singled out
‘Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and Beyond’ as one of the
so-called areas of action, and it recommends reinforcement of political dialogue
(more continuity and a stronger role of the High Representative on the EU side), dis-
cussions on ‘Russia’s place in the European security architecture’, including ‘partici-
pation of Russia when EU avails itself of the WEU for missions within the range of
the Petersberg tasks’.
At the Köln summit (also the occasion of the adoption of the Strategy) and the Hel-
sinki summit in the Fall 1999 the EU decided to launch a European Security and
Defence Policy, which intends to provide the EU with a capacity for independent
military action. The decision also implied the creation of a EU military force of 50-
60,000 troops for implementation of peacekeeping tasks 22
.This leap in EU’s military
scope and potential must imply a change in security relations to Russia, still the larg-
est military power on the European continent. The Russian foreign minister Ivanov
used the first possible occasion to tell the German government that the EU could
account with Russian cooperation with the new military force, and at the EU-Russia
summit in October 2000 the ordinary joint statement was supplemented by a specific
declaration on political and security matters. The statement reiterates the purpose to
20
On the EU web site can be found an un-authorised translation of the Russian Strategy:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/medium_term_strategy 21
22
Jensen, Frede P.: Opbygningen af en fælles europæisk sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik: De
institutionelle implikationer for EU, DUPI Report 2000/7, Copenhagen
11
strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the field of ‘security and defence’ (italics by
author) and add that the two sides shall:
Institutionalise specific consultations on security and defence
Develop strategic dialog on security matters, in particular relevant for Russia
and the EU
Extend scope of regular consultation on issue of disarmament, arms control
and proliferations
Promote cooperation in operational crisis and management
In light of the forthcoming Nice conference the document concluded that more con-
crete initiatives should to be taken regarding the mechanisms for the contribution of
the Russian Federation to the European Union’s crisis management operations. Fi-
nally it is provided that proposals shall be drawn up in context of the preparations for
next summit in order to give substance to the cooperation
23. Preliminary information,
however, about the meeting with Putin at the summit in Stockholm indicates that
the subject has been postponed.
Organised crime in Eastern Europe crime has expanded dramatically in Russia and
other CIS countries during the 90ties and may today be the highest in the world ac-
cording to international comparisons. This development can be explained by factors
as the un-regulated, partly chaotic process of privatisation, the general lack of legal
framework for the economic and political transition, and deep social crisis24
, And
due to the development of more open societies it has become easier to hide criminal
activities behind normal legal international transactions. Organized crime is often
closely intertwined with public administration and political life, and has become
threat to internal security not only in the concerned countries, but also to ‘law and
order’ and a functioning business environment in the EU countries, thereby ‘interna-
tionalizing’ and ‘securitizising’ justice and home matters.
Already the PCA treated questions about cooperation in the struggle against interna-
tional organised crime. However, the strategy and later documents on EU-Russian
relations have given higher priority to such problems, reflecting that these questions
also play an increasing role in the European public and political decision systems
perception of the relations to Russia. The strategy lists major challenges on the Euro-
pean continent and among these are mentioned ‘fight against common scourges,
such as organized crime, money-laundering, illegal trafficking in human beings and
drug trafficking. The fight against illegal migration is also a major preoccupation’. In
its more operational chapter, the strategy returns to these issues. The fight against
crime is singled out as one of the ‘areas of action’, and the ‘specific initiatives’ of the
strategy outline problems for cooperation ask to set up a plan for common action
23
Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, Mr J. Chirac, assisted by the Secretary-
General of the Council/High Representative for the Common Foreign Policy of the EU, Mr. J. Solana,
of the President of the Commission of the European Community, Mr. R. Prodi, and of the President of
the Russian Federation, Mr. V.V. Putin on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and
security matters in Europe, Paris 30.10.2000 24
For descriptions of weak public administration and poor governance on enterprise level and the
interplays, see Transition Report 1999, EBRD London 2000, chap 6
12
with Russia. The EU concern regarding international crime was again underlined at
the European Council meeting in October 1999 in Tampere that had as its special
task to discuss the struggle against crime (together with issues of immigration and
asylum policies)25
. The Council meeting was followed up a week later at the EU-
Russian summit in Helsinki, where discussions on the Common Action plan were
resumed, and, finally, the plan could be endorsed at the Cooperation Council meet-
ing in April 2000.
The Plan on Common Action Plan for Russia on Combating Organized Crime can be
seen as a more concrete and obligating version of the provisions of the Strategy and
other statements on the subject26
. The action plan refers to the many former declara-
tions and states ‘that organized crime is increasingly affecting legal business and
commercial activities conducted between the member states and the Russian Federa-
tion. In particular, it is using the legitimate commercial environment to conceal its
activities’. It outlines three main areas of cooperation:
Judicial cooperation including the development of legislative framework and
institutional capability in Russian
Law enforcement cooperation
Coordination between the parties, including EU institutions, other multilateral
activities (e.g. the Baltic Sea Task Force) as well as the member states’ own
bilateral initiatives in relation to Russia
The struggle against organized crime has become a high priority on the agenda of all
EU-Russia summits since the Strategy was approved. According to the joint declara-
tions from the meetings and other official Council and Commission declarations the
work is fairly well underway. However, a more critical stand can be found in the
European Parliament whose Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice
and Home Affairs in an assessment of the implementation of the Strategy pointed to
lack of ‘comprehensive strategy’, including ‘lack of realization of the fact that Rus-
sian internal administration and criminal prosecution system are plagued with ram-
pant abuses’. The Parliament recommended the Council to give ‘serious considera-
tion to the option of making support conditional on independent action by the Rus-
sian Federation to combat and eradicate such abuses’.27
A report on the progress of
the implementation of the Common Action is planned be discussed at the Council
meeting in May 2001.
An essential and controversial element in the Action plan is that, in principle, it in-
cludes establishment of transgovernmental net works in areas traditionally located
inside the core competence of the nation state. For that reason the cooperation in the
field of home and justice affairs has been met with suspicion in some political circles
in Russia, however, it seems that the attitudes after Putin’s take-over have become
25
See Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999; also Press Re-
lease on EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki October 22 1999 26
European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised
crime. Official Journal, C 106, 13/04/2000 27
European parliament, Opinion of the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and
Home Affairs, RR/426904EN.doc
13
more positive at least on governmental level.
Economic aspects of EU-Russian relations
On one hand, EU-Russian relations have obviously large potential for both parties.
On the other hand, the present importance is very asymmetrical. Whereas the EU
countries receive about 40% of Russia’s exports and thereby play a decisive role in
Russian foreign economic relations, Russian goods count only for about 2% of the
imports of the EU countries (e.g., Germany’s trade with Denmark amount to same as
it trade with Russia).
EU’s economic relations to Russia are built upon three pillars, namely trade, invest-
ments and aid. Further, we shall look briefly upon two more specific issues, the en-
ergy partnership between EU and Russia, and EU’s role regarding Russia’s accession
to WTO 28
.
As to trade its relative importance to the two sides has already been mentioned. EU-
Russian trade has normally been characterized by Russian surplus. This is explained
by another characteristic of the trade relations, namely their commodity structure, see
table 1. Russia is exporting energy and other raw materials, partly semi-
manufactured products of various kinds. This export structure has not changed com-
pared with the exports to Western Europe in Soviet times and its ‘developing coun-
try’ character underlines the asymmetry. The Russian import side is dominated by
industrial products, technology as well as some luxury products, including foodstuffs
from the West. The total amount of the EU-Russia trade has changed with the eco-
nomic fluctuations in Russia, whereas there have not been substantial developments
in the commodity structure.
Trade relations, policy issues as well as current questions on trade practices, are on
the EU side part of the Common Commercial Policy. Regarding the legal framework
of EU-Russian relations, the Cooperation agreement of 1989 provided for most-
favour-nation principle/MFN, and the PCA endorses that MFN as well as other
WTO norms shall prevail in EU-Russian relations. As to EU exports, Russia has
removed quantitative restrictions and lowered tariffs, but nonetheless a number of
problems persists. Recurrent complaints on part of the EU point to the lack of pre-
dictability in Russian trade policy and the lack of any satisfactory and adequate legis-
lative framework 29
. Regarding EU imports from Russia, energy and raw materials
normally don’t cause controversies, but semi-manufactures, some of which belong to
the sensitive areas in EU (steel products, some chemicals), frequently arise accusa-
tions about unfair trade practice from EU interests, whereas the Russian side is criti-
cising about discrimination.
As to foreign investments in Russia the EU countries also play a principal role, as
total investments (public and private) from EU and member states represent one half
28
Towards greater Integration. The European Union’s financial assistance, trade and investments for
the New Independent States, DG1A, Brussels 1998 29
Implementation of the EU/Russia Common Strategy: EU Trade policy Priorities in the Short to
Medium Term, European Commission, 2000
14
of total foreign investments into Russia (a similar picture can be found for port folio
investments)30
. Though Russian governments declare that foreign investment are a
main vehicle for technological progress in general and development of the decisive
energy sectors in particular, the level of foreign investments in Russia has remained
low not only in comparison with Eastern and Central Europe but also with some
other CIS countries. Thus, the level of foreign direct investment relative to national
income is relatively low in Russia, namely 61 Mill. USD per capita accumulated in
the period 1989-98 (compared 415, 200 and 52 in, respectively, in Poland, Romania
and Ukraine)31
. From the EU’s side it is underlined that neither EU nor national gov-
ernments can steer the behaviour of private investors, and that reforms of the legal
climate are even more essential than in trade matters , with the frank words of EU’s
Commissioner for external relations, if ‘the investor cannot rely on the law to protect
himself, his family and workers, he will take his money and know-how elsewhere’32
.
A combined trade and investment issue of huge future importance is energy coopera-
tion. Oil and gas represent about 45% of Russia’s exports to the EU - or 20% of the
total world Russian exports - and the shares will probably increase. The EU coun-
tries have substantial interests , as for the time being about 40% of the gas supply is
coming from Russia and this share will grow. It is a widespread viewpoint that the
world will experience energy shortages and price increases in the first decades of the
new century, and future problems of security of supply may be solved by a close
cooperation with Russia. The October summit of 2000 launched a so-called Energy
Dialogue that shall be concerned with the prospects of partnership in energy saving,
production and transport and includes European investment possibilities. On the part
of Russia there is a strong focus on the investment possibilities, which, however, as
underlined from EU’s side, once again stress the importance of the legislative
framework33
.
According to the PCA and the Strategy the principal objectives in the field of trade
policy as well as investments are to support Russian efforts for accession to the
WTO and creation of the conditions for a future EU-Russia Free Trade Area (FTA).
Russia first applied for accession (to GATT) in 1993.Following the EU assessments
some progress was made in the initial period until but as more substantial matters
were approached the work slowed down, especially after the Russian crisis in 1998.
The negotiations have been revitalized in 2000 which brought positive Russian of-
fers in goods and services as well as removal or reductions of various technical barri-
ers. A core problem in the assessment of Russian progress is the fact that satisfac-
tory legislation may exist but it is not properly implemented. The WTO process con-
sists not only of multilateral talks but also of bilateral negotiations between Russia
and interested WTO members. As the most important trade partner of Russia EU is
to a certain extent functioning as a “WTO representative” setting the agenda having
a deciding vote in the WTO decisions.
30
The amount of investments has been fluctuating, especially after the 1988 crisis 31
Transition report 1999, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, London 2000, p. 78f. 32
See Chris Patten: EU and Russia - The way ahead, European Commission, External Relations, 18
January 2001 33
ibid,
15
As mentioned both the PCA and the Strategy foresee the creation of a EU Russian
free trade area, and for obvious reasons the possibilities of such an agreement are
closely connected to the discussions on WTO accession. Building upon a study on
the conditions for a future FTA the Commission recommends that Russia attain
WTO accession before negotiations can start, thereby establishing a strong EU influ-
ence on the reform process in Russia. This linkage has made the discussions more
complicated and controversial. It is characteristic that the topic of WTO accession
was mentioned without touching upon the FTA neither in the joint statements from
the latest EU Russia summits in May and October last year nor at Chris Patten’s visit
to Moscow in January 2001.
The third pillar in EU’s economic relations to Russia is aid. The EU aid consists of
various programmes, among them food aid in acute situations of crisis, with the food
aid in 1998 comprising 470 Mill ECU as the most recent example. Other pro-
grammes are ECHO (EU Humanitarian Aid). The most important and best-known
EU programme is the TACIS programme (Technical Assistance for Commonwealth
of Independent States), launched in 1991 and now, following a new regulation, pro-
ceeding in its third period of planning (2000-2006)34
. From the beginning Russia has
been the main receiver of technical assistance from the EU and it receives about 50%
of the transfers. But as depicted in table the relative importance has declined com-
pared to other CIS receivers, not least Ukraine. There have also been periods of
freezing of TACIS activities in Russia, due to the Chechnyan wars. As to the content
and directions of TACIS the present plan emphasises capacity building and im-
provement of implementation abilities of the Russian politico-administrative sys-
tems, compared to stress on investment projects and privatisation in former TACIS
involvements35
.
TACIS has become the largest aid programme for Russia compared to assistance
programmes from donor countries outside Europe But this multilateral initiative has
minor importance compared to the bilateral programmes of the member states, which
thereby maintain their own, independent priorities and instruments in relation to Rus-
sia36
. A major point in the Strategy was in fact to improve coordination between the
various multilateral and bilateral activities, as the experiences -not least in connec-
tion with the 1998 crisis - had demonstrated poor comprehensiveness and effective-
ness in the total assistance.
Value politics in the EU-Russian relations
Human rights regimes seem to play an increasing role in international relations37
.
Explanations are pointing to the end of the cold war, the spread of advanced post-
34
Council Regulation (EC) no 99/2000, 18.1.2000. For an overview of the first 5 years of the Tacis
programme, see Sodupa, Kepa and Benito, Eduardo: ”The Evolution of the European Union’s Tacis
Programme, 1991-96”, Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, 1998 vol 14, December no 4,
pp.51-68 35
TACIS programme – Overview, European Commission, External relations 36
For the period 1991-96 the total Western assistance to the CIS countries amounted to 123 billion
ECU. The EU granted 4,1%, its member states 54,9%, and US and Japan 13,9%, respectively 5,1%,
see Towards--- 37
Moravcik, Andrew: ”The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post war
16
industrialism, ‘waves of democracy’ or the emergence of a ‘global village’ as conse-
quence of globalisation, etc. Thus, Realism and Liberalism include such develop-
ments in their interpretation of the role of human rights in the modern world, how-
ever, they emphasize the international power structures and existence of a Western
hegemony, respectively are underlining the general trend of spread of liberalism and
democracy in connection with globalisation. On the European scene broader imple-
mentation of the principles of human rights were also seen as one of the possibilities
that became obtainable after the political transition in the former communist bloc,
and at the same time, human rights were understood as a fundamental political
means, as prerequisite for a cooperating and peaceful Europe.
Here we shall focus on Russia’s membership of the European Council for two rea-
sons. Firstly, both parties - EU and Russia - have a basic interest in the Russian
membership. To Russia, a membership means that the country become recognized in
terms of value politics, its government attains a kind of ‘proof’ of Russia as part of
modern European state. The EU countries see Russian participation as means for
preventing isolation of Russia and for influencing domestic politics in Russia. Sec-
ondly, the case is included here, because the EU countries have a deciding influence
in the European Council. They are determining the outcome of decisions in the
European Council – at least when the EU member states want to and are able to act
in unity. Therefore, the politics in the European Council also become a reflection of
the intentions and abilities of EU’s foreign policy38
.
Russia asked for membership of the European Council already in 1992, and its re-
quest was supported by the EU states. The accession process was stopped due to the
start of the first Chechnyan war, but eventually Russia became member in 1996. In
the Fall 1999 the second Russian invasion started, and consequently the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the European Council decided in the Spring 2000 to deprive the
Russian parliamentarians their voting rights. Further, the Assembly wished that Rus-
sia’s membership should be suspended. Such a step, however, requires approval on
ministerial level of the European Council, by the Committee of Ministers, and was
denied at the following meeting in the Committee39
. The main role behind this re-
fusal by the Committee was played by the EU ministers, in accordance with the re-
servated reactions of EU representatives immediately after the Assembly session.
The very modest reaction was also consistent with the reluctant decisions on the
European Council meeting in Helsinki in December, which only adopted mild sanc-
Europe“, International Organization, vol 54, Spring 2000, pp. 217-252 38
The EU Council and Commission as well as well as the President and Committee chairman of the
European Council have regular meeting. At the meeting in March 2000 the Chechnyan conflict was
the main topic, and the joint statement condemns Russia’s human rights violations and point to the
Russian commitments accepted at the accession to the European Council, however, there are no indi-
cations of economic or political sanctions. See 15 Quadripartite meeting EU/Council of Europe,
Strasbourg 14 March 2000 39
The Committee of Ministers is composed by the foreign ministers of the member states and is the
decision-making body of the European Council. The Assembly and Committee decisions are respec-
tively Conflict in the Chechen republic. Implementation by the Russian Federation of Recommenda-
tion 1444(2000), adopted 6 April 2000, and 106 session Communiqué, adopted 10-11 May
17
tions against Russia (postponement of food aid and some Tacis projects as well as
reduction of some steel imports).40
Since, the European Council - together with the OSCE - has been monitoring the
development and conditions of human rights in Chechnya and neighbouring Russian
republics, and in the beginning of 2001 the European Council sent a mission to the
area. Eventually in February this year, the Assembly decided to give the State Duma
delegates back their voting rights while it, a the same time, recommended to the
Committee to continue monitoring Russian adherence to human rights principles as
well as holding accountable individuals who have violated human rights41
.
In relation to the Chechnya issue the official EU policy has been to confirm that an
outside actor like the EU can intervene legitimately in human rights affairs no matter
what the Russian government may consider to be its own jurisdiction, but the EU has
always been adding that EU is ‘acting with due respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation’ 42
. Therefore, the EU has supported efforts to
stop the war and violations or indifference towards human sufferings of non-
combatants and displaced persons in the war regions but not indicated any support
for Chechnyan demands for independence. The joint statement from the summit in
October 2000 says that (here quoted in its length) ‘we agreed upon the need to seek a
political solution as a matter of urgency, with due regard for the sovereignty of the
Russian Federation’43.
The EU has pursued what has been labelled a twin-track strategy. With the words of
MEP Oostlander at the presentation to the European Parliament of the report on im-
plementation of the Common Strategy:’ The best thing we can do in our strategy
towards the Russian Federation is to follow a twin-track strategy. On the one hand
we must indicts those who violate human rights and wield a disproportionate amount
of power. On the other hand, we must enter into cooperation in a variety of sectors’44.
This two-fold way of arguing was repeated in the contributions from the leading frac-
tions in the Parliament as well as Commissioner Patten’s remarks in the debate .
The Oostlander report also complained about lack of coordination of EU’s reactions
with the responses of the US and Japan to the Russian invasion. As part of its restric-
tive measures EU decided to postpone the ratification of the EU-Russia Scientific
and Technological Co-operation Agreement, but according to the disillusioned re-
marks by the Oostlander report ‘this appears only to have left room for expansion of
US-Russia co-operation in this sphere while damaging the EU’s own interests. In
40
’EU packt Russland nicht härter an’, Welt online 11.04.2000 41
Assembly of European Council, resolutions 1240 and 1498 (2001), adopted 25 January 2001 42
See the declaration from the EU-Russia Summit October 2000, Joint Declaration of the President of
the European Council, Mr J. Chirac, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Represen-
tative for the Common Foreign Policy of the EU, Mr. J. Solana, of the President of the Commission of
the European Communities, Mr. R. Prodi, and of the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. V.V.
Putin, http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/Russia/summit_30_10_00 43
ibid 44
Debates of the European Parliament: Sitting 12 Dec 2000.
18
conclusion, the experience gained provides ample food for thought on how sanctions
should be used, as an instrument in relations to third countries’45.
The Russian policies of Germany
This is not the place for an extensive analysis of Germany’s European policies since
the end of the cold war. The point of departure will be the view that, so far, the fun-
damental international and domestic changes have meant adjustments rather than
radical new strategies46
. German foreign policy is still confronted with well-known
dilemmas.
A first dilemma, reinforced by the break-up of the bi-polar world system, is the
question, whether German interests are best understood and defined in framework of
‘realistic’ considerations of traditional ’national interests’ of a European great power
or liberal-institutional notions of participation in international institutions. In con-
tinuation of this, a second dilemma has come to a head, namely the question whether
post-war German Handelsstaat, with a foreign policy led by welfare objectives and a
‘soft power policy style’ will have to add ‘ hard power’ policies to its foreign policy
and to act in a more autonomeous way than it was suitable during the Einbindung of
the Cold War period47
. Finally, the unification also accentuated the problem about
the prospects when the existing political elite at the turn of the century will have to
be replaced by a generation of politicians without personal war experiences
So far, Germany has dealt with the problems of the post Cold War period mainly in
the accordance with liberal-institutional expectations48
. Germany has played a focal
role in formulating EU’s Eastern policies and the enlargement process. The change
of government in 1998, not only implying a generational shift but also a party
change, including involvement of political forces that until 1998 formed a radical
opposition – develops apparently without revisions of the basic orientations of for-
eign policy49
. However, as the Balkan lessons of the 90ties have been received, new
questions of security , may arise and this will give security relations to Russia new
importance.
45
Report on the Implementation of the Strategy of the European Union on Russia, European Parlia-
ment, 29 Nov 2000, Final A5-0363/2000 46
Staack, Michael: Handelstaat Deutschland, Paderborn, Schöningh, 2000 Stent, Angela: “Germany and the Post-Soviet States“, in Dawisha: op. cit., pp. 197-216; and Paterson,
William: ”Beyond Bipolarity: German Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold-War World”, in Smith et alia:
opus. cit., pp. 134-55 47
The concept ‘Handelsstaat’ refers to Rosecrance’s distinction between war and trading states, for
the application on the case of the Federal republic of Germany, see Staack, op.cit, pp. 34-56 and 524-
47 48
With former Bundespresident Weizäcker’s phrase ‘for the first time we German’s are not the point
of contention in Europe’, see Kirchner, Emil J.:” Germany and the European Union”, in Smith et alia,
opus cit, pp.156-72 49
Schwarz, Hans-Peter: ”Die Zentralmacht Europas af Kontinuitätskurs: Deutschland stabilisiert den
Kontinent“, Internationale Politik, 1999, vol 54, no 11, pp.1-10; and Vernet, Daniel: “Kluge
Ausschöpfung begrenzter Souveränität. Die Europa-Politik der rot-grünen Koalition“, Internationale
Politik, 1999, vol 54, no 11, pp. 11-18
19
The shift of 1989 and 1990 also changed Germany’s relations to Moscow. In the re-
lations to the Soviet regime the issue of unification and the Soviet troop withdrawal
were the problems of top priority, and Germany involved itself in an extensive eco-
nomic assistance to the Soviet Union. German aid and various types of credits repre-
sented more than 50% of Western involvement in these years. The friendly connec-
tions to the Soviet Union were continued in relation to the new Russian Federation
by the signing of a German-Russian Common Declaration in November 1991 (in fact
a month before the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union!). These German engage-
ments had several reasons. It was motivated by regards for president Gorbachev and
his leadership but also by the realizing of a new ‘Soviet threat’, the risks of societal
instability, illegal migration and organized crime. Considerations of German busi-
ness interests – at least in longer run – played a role, too. Further, it was a main com-
ponent in Germany’s Soviet/Russian policy that the new Eastern policies of EU and
NATO would require at least a passive accept in Moscow. This basic viewpoint is
illustrated by an official German statement saying that ’security, welfare, stability
and integration in Europe cannot be considered and developed without Russia. How-
ever, it is decisive that Russia sees itself as a European country and necessary parts
of such a development are successful transitions to democracy and market econ-
omy’50
.
As for security policies, the development of an European security framework has
been strongly supported by Germany, but it is constantly urging for Russian coopera-
tion, in one form or another, in future EU actions. A good example of European-
Russian cooperation and the role of Germany is, according to the Germans them-
selves, the ‘constructive participation’ of Russia in the political settlement after
NATO’s Kosovo action. Thus, Joschka Fischer could stress:
‘Germany in massive way engaged itself for Russian participation that, as demon-
strated, was indispensable … and will also in future work intensively for a close in-
clusion of Russia in all important security issues in Europe … and revitalize the co-
operation between Russia and NATO…’51
.
The Germans are keen to underscore the importance of Russian Einbindung in a fu-
ture European security architecture. At the same time two additional viewpoints are
included. Firstly it is underlined, with the Americans in mind, that a possible EU
cooperation with Russia in security affairs is a natural parallel to NATO’s coopera-
tion with Russia, secondly, to the French and other Europeans, that there is no Ger-
man Alleingang with Russia. Recently, - the Bundeskanzler has felt it appropriate to
repeat that German-Russian friendship has nothing to do with a new ‘Spirit of Ra-
pallo’52
50
Ischinger; Wolfgang: Europa und Russland: Perspektiven deutscher Politik in Mittel- und
Osteuropa, Foreign Ministry, Berlin 6.10.2000 (WI is state secretary at the ministry) 51
Fischer, Joschka: Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen bei der Mietgliederversammlung des
Deutsch-Russischen Forums in Berlin 15. Feb. 2000, Deutsche Botschaft, Moskau 2000 52
Scharping, Rudolf: Gesamteuropïsche Sicherheit unter Einbeziehung Russlands, Rede des
Bundesministers der Verteidigung auf der Münchener Konferenz für Sicherheitspolitik, München 4.
20
Regarding questions of internal security Germany was one of the initiators behind
the original informal networking in justice and home affairs and the Schengen
agreements and been one of the protagonists behind the further development of
EU’s competencies during the 90’ties. This has obvious background in geography,
level of economy and existence of historical and cultural links. Today Germany is
considered to be one of the EU countries in focus of attention of organized crime
with Russian-Eurasian origin and has been supporter of the elaboration of the Com-
mon action plan on Russia against organised crime53
. Germany has also been initiat-
ing discussions and urged for action in other international fora like the G-8, and the
country takes part in the Northern European activities, connected with the Council of
the Baltic Sea States (established in 1992 on German and Danish initiative). Finally,
in bilateral contacts with Russia the German side is also stressing that the common
struggle against organized crime is a top priority in the relations between Russia.
And Germany54
.
As far as economic relations are concerned Germany is the most important trade
partner for Russia whereas the asymmetries mentioned above also apply in the Ger-
man case. As shown in table 3 the commodity structure is similar to the general
composition of the EU–Russia trade. German exports are part of the Hermes, a sys-
tem of public guarantees for export to risk countries to which Russia belongs.
Though trade and investment flows between Germany and Russia are still limited the
traditional complementarities between the economies of the two countries persist and
the future prospects, among other things in the engineering and energy sector, pro-
vide potential for growth. Germany has been a key actor behind EU’s energy initia-
tives in relation to Russia, thereby confirming the basic interests behind the old gas
agreements from the first half of the 80’ties.
Further, Germany has been the main donor, see table 4. This economic involvement
– discussed above - started already in 1990 and the German engagement has contin-
ued. As depicted in table 4 the German transfers amount to about 2/3 of total public
transfers to Russia from the G7 countries. A main form of public involvement is the
Transform programme, technical assistance covering all the transitional countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. In relation to Russia it has granted about 350 Billion
DM in the period 1994-98, which amount to about 40% of EU’s total TACIS trans-
fers in the same period. An important part of the German approach is what may be
labelled a ‘bottom-up approach’: Direct contacts are seen as a goal as such, not only
in economic relations but also in politics and culture, e.g. more than 5000 Russians
students studying at German universities (1999), compared to 2800 Americans.
Feb. 2001. It is noteworthy that S. is using the well known concept Einbindung in the Russian con-
text. See also about the recent Schröder-Putin summit in ‘Russland spricht deutsch’, Die Zeit 01/2001. 53
See Højbjerg, op.cit; Already in 1997, according to official information about 20 criminal organisa-
tions from the CIS area were operating in Germany, and the was estimated as being almost hopeless,
‘Die Ost-Mafia – ein fast übermächtiger Feind’, Welt on line 26.05.97 54
.Lagebild. Organisierte Kriminalität. Bundesrepublik 1999., Bundeskriminalamt, Wiesbaden 1999
and ‚G-8-Gipfel berät in Moskau über organisierte Kriminalität’, Welt online 19.10.99
21
Finally, German firms belong to the most important private, foreign investors in Rus-
sia. Investments have been increasing (apart from the crisis year 1998) but are still
hampered by the lack of transparency and property protection due to the well-known
problems of Russian legislation and institutional framework already discussed.
In order to promote trade and investment the two governments have established the
Cooperation Council, which meets each second year and is headed by the concerned
ministers. The Bundeskanzler and the President have erected a Strategic Working
Group consisting of high-level civil servants as well as business representatives.
German business is the best organized and represented in Russia. The Ostauschuss
der deutschen Wirtschaft is the old association of German enterprises acting in East-
ern Europe, and umbrella organizations in German business like Verband deutscher
Industrie and Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag are present in Moscow and other
Russian centres. For the time being about 1200 German firms are active in Russia55
It must be added, however, that the extensive economic engagement has also be-
come a problem in German-Russian relations. Thus, Hermes credits were stopped for
a period in the 1998 due to dramatic increases in German losses, and Germany an-
nounced in the Fall 2000 that it planned to propose to expel Russia from G8. Though
Germany has backed the EU support for the Russian efforts to approach WTO, the
negative experiences have caused Germany to indicate to Russia that the support for
WTO accession could be withdrawn. However, the meeting between President Putin
and Bundeskanzler Schröder in the Summer 2000, afterwards described officially as
a new beginning in Russian-German relations, agreed to resume Hermes involvement
in exports to Russia and revitalize the Transform56
.
Turning to the issues of value politics Germany has kept in line with the EU attitude
in the Chechnyan crisis but it has influenced the formation of EU’s policies to make
it more modest in its reactions to the Russian invasion and violations of human
rights. The German dilemma has been, that on the one hand Germany is arguing for
the liberal picture of international politics and is recommending Russia to realize that
‘power in the 21. century is based upon economic power and dynamics, an open,
democratic and innovative social order rather than the number of missiles and sol-
diers’57. On the other hand, Germany has special relations to take care of, which in-
clude Russian expectations to Germany to behave as Russia’s ‘ambassador’ in the
EU, and for that reason the government backed the decision in the Spring 2000 by
the Committee of the European Council not to support an suspension of Russia. The
stand of the government in the Chechnya issue has been criticized by the conserva-
tive opposition in the Bundestag, however, the Social Democrats and Greens were
supported by German industry58
.
55
Deutsche Botschaft, www.germany.org.ru/de 56
See Ischinger above; also die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen, Interview mit Ernst-Jörg von
Studnitz, German Botschafter in Moscow, 11.01.2001, www.auswaertiges-amt.de ; also „Schröder
und Putin planen deutsch-russischen Neuanfang“, „Was Putin von Deutschland will“, and „Wir zahlen
so viel wie wir können’ as well as ‚Kein Geld für Russland’, in Welt online, www.welt.de
14.06.2000, respectively 16.06.2000 57
Ischinger, see above 58
In connection with the discussions in the European Council, the head of the Ostausschuss, Klaus
Mangold wrote, that ‘it makes little sense to construct obstacles that makes a return impossible. There-
22
The Russian policies of Denmark
During the Cold War Danish foreign policy was determined by the existing bipolar-
ity. Denmark’s relations to the Soviet Union were a ‘high politics’ area, though char-
acterized by a low profile membership of the Western alliance as part of the so-called
‘Nordic balance’59
. For obvious reasons the Perestroika policy in the 80’ties was full
–heartedly welcomed in the whole political spectre of the country. The dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1990-91 was on one hand approached very cautiously by the
liberal-conservative government, but on the other hand Denmark could now launch
an activist foreign policy in particular urging for international support and So-
viet/Russian accept of the independence of the Baltic states60
.
The period after the Cold war provides quite new conditions for Denmark. Observers
with ‘realistic’ glasses are pointing to the fact that a small state in the Northern Euro-
pean region has a favourable security environment and ‘room for manoeuvre’ that is
only comparable with the 1920’ties. Others with liberal-institutional viewpoints
would add that the Northern European situation is even more favourable due to the
development of international regimes and institutions in Europe in general and the
Baltic region in particular.
The Danish political decision-makers seem to rely on liberal assumptions about in-
ternational politics. As to Eastern Europe and the CIS countries an official presenta-
tion of Danish foreign policy today states that is very important for Denmark that the
‘region develops toward peaceful and stable democratic societies based upon princi-
ples of market economy and that the countries adhere to international obligations
regarding human rights, including protection of the rights of minorities’61. With an-
other formulation, it is the overall objective to further the development toward an
European and especially a Northern European security community62
.
Danish security policies are still conducted in multilateral context. However, due to
the Danish reservations toward EU cooperation in the areas of the second and third
pillars, Danish participation in the new developments in Northern European region
fore, it must be welcomed that the EU irrespective of the conflict wants to develop cooperation with
Russia’ and ‘it is in the interest of the Federal government to play a mediating role’, see Mangold,
op.cit, p.5f. 59
The relevance of ’Nordic balance’ concept has been disputed, but can be seen as a description of
how the global bipolar balance was reflected in the Northern European region, with (low profile)
NATO memberships of Denmark and Norway, Swedish neutrality and Finland’s special relationship
to the Soviet Union. 60
Due the sympathy of the Danish public toward Baltic independence the effects of Danish activism
in 1990-91 have probably been exaggerated by the government itself. In fact, the Danish initiatives
were closely coordinated with the Western allies, especially Germany (thus, the Danish foreign minis-
ter at that time, Ellemann-Jensen, had good personal relations to his German colleague, Genscher) 61
See the web site of the Foreign Ministry, www.udenrigsministeriet.dk/udenrigspolitik 62
See Wiberg, Hakon: ”The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future”, in Danish Foreign
Policy Yearbook, Copenhagen 2000, pp. 121-38; see also Heurlin, Bertel: Denmark and the Northern
Dimension, Paper, Danish Foreign Policy Institute, Copenhagen 1998
23
has partly taken place elsewhere, in NATO and in the Council of the Baltic Sea
States . After some initial reservations Denmark has actively been supporting the
development of EU’s Northern Dimension, in particular its focus on the Kaliningrad
area63
. About the more specific priorities, a recent Foreign Ministry communication
on Russia states, that ‘in the beginning of the 90s the attention was concentrated on
the integration of the Baltic countries into the regional and broader European coop-
eration, but in recent year the interplay between the EU enlargement and the exten-
sion of cooperation with Russia have come more into focus. The objective on part of
Denmark is to avoid new barriers in the Baltic region by a strong inclusion of Russia
in the regional cooperation’64.
The strategy has pursued a double track. On the one hand Denmark has supported
the EU agreements with Russia as well as NATO’s Partnership for Peace treaty
with Russia. On the other hand the new activism has also been reflected in pressures
for a speeding-up of the process of EU accession of the Baltic countries, and – what
has not been received positively in Moscow – Denmark also pledged for Baltic
membership of NATO. Along with these policies Denmark has acted on the bilateral
level in relation to Russia by concluding a cooperation agreement between the min-
istries of defence of the two countries - according to Danish sources with the purpose
to ‘further common understanding and civil and democratic control with the armed
forces of the Russian Federation’65.
As to the new types of security issues emerging after the cold war, official authorities
in Denmark are assessing that problems of organised crime with origin in Eastern
Europe including Russia and other CIS countries do not have the size known in
Finland let alone Germany, although problems are increasing and got public atten-
tion66
. Despite the general reservation toward the EU cooperation in Justice and
Home affairs Denmark is participating in some of the activities mentioned above,
e.g. Europol and a special taskforce for struggle against crime in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. The accession in March 2001 to Schengen will also have implications for the
cooperation in these fields67
.
The economic relations were characterized by sudden reductions following the Ru-
bel crisis in 1998 but are now recovering. Trade has minor importance to Denmark
(less than 2% of total trade), and like the other EU countries Denmark has a deficit.
The Danish imports have the usual structure known from European trade with Russia
with energy, raw materials and various semi-manufactured goods as dominating im-
port items, while manufactures and, until the crisis in 1998, agricultural products
played a major role on the export side. Danish direct investments are limited and
concentrated on few large projects. A recent survey conducted by the Eastern Club
of the Danish Industrial Association, Dansk Industri, shows that Danish business is
63
See the report on the conference on Kaliningrad organized by the Danish Foreign ministry and pro-
vided with as much prestige as possible, Conference on the Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad:
European and regional integration, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 2000 64
Rusland. um tema 1999, Udenrigsministeriet 1999 65
Rusland (1999), p 52 66
Højbjerg, op.cit. 67
The Danish reservation, existing in justice matters too, will, like the foreign and defence policy
reservation, face problems when the EU integration in these matters continue.
24
now confident regarding the prospects of the Russian market, and Dansk Industri is
frequently underlining the huge potential of the Russian market. 68
Danish business activities in Russia are included in the general system of export sup-
port and specific systems for Eastern Europe have been established, too. A Danish-
Russian Commercial Council is discussing a wide range of problems but has no
competence69
. Besides the mentioned programmes for support of Danish business,
Denmark has various programmes for technical, environmental and democracy assis-
tance. In the period 1990-99 Russia had the third position among the Eastern Euro-
pean receivers (after Poland and Lithuania and closely followed by Latvia and Esto-
nia). The Danish involvement is deliberately focused on the Baltic regions of Russia,
and the bilateral Eastern assistance is four times as high as the multilateral aid (pri-
marily via the EU and the EBRD)70
.
Finally, Denmark supports the integration of Russia in the world economy, includ-
ing a future membership of the WTO. In relation to a Russian accession to the WTO
Denmark is critical towards the EU policy that such a membership shall be a precon-
dition for starting talks about an EU-Russian Free Trade Agreement. According to
the Danish viewpoint such a stand de facto gives the US a veto in a matter of EU’s
commercial policy.
Implicitly, value-political objectives have been behind several of the mentioned Dan-
ish activities. However, direct initiatives have taken place in connection with the
Chechnya wars, and Denmark has been pursuing a course very similar to the policies
of the EU and other member states. Thus, Denmark has insisted that the crisis has
only political solutions, and Russia has been criticized for violations of human rights.
But the present Social Democratic and Social Liberal government also joined the
other EU states in their refusal of the recommendations made by the Assembly of
the European Council regarding suspension of the Russian voting rights. The argu-
ment was that president Putin and his government now seems firmly determined to
embed Russian in the international society as a democratic and market oriented
state.71
Russian policies are not a hot topic on the domestic political agenda. The govern-
ment has been criticized by the conservative opposition for accept of ’Machiavel-
lian’ policies, but at the same time discretely supported by business72
and the issue
wasn’t followed up in the parliament. Though the relations between the two countries
68
Dansk industri, www.di.dk 69
Rusland nye perspektiver, um tema no 28, Udenrigsministeriet 2001, p. 18ff and press release from
Dansk industri ”Russia abundant with possibilities’, 5.10.2000, www.di.dk 70
Se Evaluering af den danske øststøtte 1994-97, Udenrigsministeriet. København 1998 (official
evaluation of the Eastern aid 94-97). Compared to BNP Denmark is paying substantially more than
for example Germany or Sweden and is the largest bilateral donor to the Baltic countries. 71
Oral communication, the Danish Foreign ministry 72
Danish –Russian relations have according to writings in the Danish press in the beginning of this
year worsened and reached a low point. The reason should be that the Danish prime minister at the
opening of a Danish Holocaust Research Centre compared the war in Chechnya with the holocaust of
WW2. Apparently, these disagreements found somewhat solutions at the visit of the Danish foreign
minister in Moscow in mid-March 2000.
25
according to Danish and Russian media in a period came ‘close to bottom’ because
of these disagreements, it appeared that ‘business was going on as usual’, as the
Danish Foreign Minister visited Moscow in March 200173
.
Conclusions
The EU’s Russian policies has been built upon a liberal-institutional paradigm on
world politics and European politics after the Cold War - assuming positive link-
ages between the transformations to market economy, democratisation and peaceful
cooperative foreign policy. Though the obstacle way of Russian transition, not least
the experiences of the 1998 crisis and the two Chechnyan wars, hurt the optimism ,
the assumptions have remained unchanged.
Security in traditional more narrow sense didn’t play an important role in EU-
Russian relations until the second part of the 90ties as it became clear that the Euro-
pean scene was more conflict-ridden than hoped for, and that the prospect of further
development of especially EU’s defence policies would bring new dimensions into
the recent EU Russia summits. The leap to options of more extensive military opera-
tions on part of the EU makes it necessary to have basic understandings common
with the Russia, still the largest military power on the European continent.
Home and justice affairs, until recently conceived as traditional ‘internal affairs’,
have become part of EU’s and the members external relations due to the real and
perceived threats from uncontrolled immigration and organised crime. Russia and the
whole CIS region is seen as a centre of international crime - a ‘securitization’ of this
aspect of the relations to Russia has occurred in the public and among decision-
makers.
Increasing economic cooperation has been seen as a main road to closer relations
with Russia, and EU has in own as well as Russian perceptions a deciding role and
responsibility for integration of Russia in the world economy, e.g. Russia’s accession
to the WTO. The uncertain or at least long during character of the transition process
in Russia and the weaknesses of the new economic institutions were not fully real-
ized until the crisis in 1998. Since, the strategy with its broader scope (compared
with the PCA) has been approved and the assistance programmes have been focusing
on institutional capacity building. But the beginning of reality talks on WTO acces-
sion has been postponed, and concrete discussions on a EU-Russian free trade zone
belong apparently a more remote future. These developments, however, have not
excluded the start of more intensive talks on energy cooperation that may create new
and more symmetrical dependencies in future.
Regarding value politics many hopes have been replaced by disillusioning, with the
two Chechnyan wars as the key events. However, the EU has pursued its ‘double-
track’ strategy of both insisting on the right to condemn violations of international
73
Headlines like ‘Disruption in 500 years of Danish Russian cooperation’, ’Foreign minister: No cold
from Russia’ or ‘ Denmark has got a Russian policy’, see Jyllandsposten 28.01.01 and Politiken
11.03.01 and 18.03.01, cf. Politiken on line.
26
law and human rights and maintenance of cooperative links in other policy areas.
Regarding all three aspects of foreign policies, security, welfare and value policy, the
analysis seems to demonstrate that EU’s main lines of policy are supplemented by –
not contradictory to – the activities on national level . The cases of Germany and
Denmark, both belonging to member states with relatively strong concerns for Rus-
sian relations, indicate that there are no substantial differences in the formulated
policies on the two levels.
As to the making of EU policies towards Russia two themes should be singled out.
Firstly, a three-level approach confirm that the formation of Russian policies don’t
belong to the controversial topics in domestic politics – the first level of analysis -
even not in two member states as Germany and Denmark,. Regarding security is-
sues, Russia has primarily been on the agenda among the decision-makers, but the
recent years have brought public concerns bout ‘law and order’ and the develop-
ment in Russia and CIS. Trade and other economic interests are articulated in usual
maner through the national governments to the supra-national decision making on
EU level without open political conflicts though the great German losses have been
exposed to public critique that , in turn, has caused German reactions. In value poli-
tics, German, Denmark and other member states have been witnessing public critique
of ‘realistic’ responses by human rights groups but the policies of the governments
have at the same time been supported by business. In the national parliaments parties
in opposition have criticised the official policies but never allowed the disagreement
to come to a head.
The game on the second level of analysis, the EU level, has been characterized by
deep disagreements, neither. For the time being there are few indications of serious
controversies among the member states regarding the new security initiatives in rela-
tion to Russia. Regarding economic issues, the member states and the EU institutions
all support the policies to assist Russia’s integration into the world economy includ-
ing the WTO accession, and the usual procedures in cases of unfair trade practices
have been widely supported. An exception are the German troubles due to its great
losses in Russia that have caused the German attempts to exert pressures on Russia
not only directly but also via EU and other bilateral fora. However, the member
states have kept means for their own policies towards Russia, in particular regarding
aid. This also applies for Germany and Denmark. As to the interrelationship among
the EU institutions themselves the early PCA negotiations and the implementation of
the strategy have given occasion for critique from the European Parliament. But the
disagreements have been concerned with the roles of Council and Parliament rather
than the substance in the Russian policies.
On the third game level, the interaction between the EU on the one hand and con-
straints and pressures from the environment on the other, the interplay between the
EU and Russia has been characterized by agreement on the existence of basic com-
mon interests regarding economic ties andthe necessity of cooperation in security
politics in Europe. These consensus has been upheld irrespective of disagreements
on, for example, debt rescheduling and Chechnya. The Russian policies have, so far,
not given rise to cardinal disagreements with the US that until now seems to accept
27
EU’s specific role regarding Russia’s possible WTO membership as well as the de-
velopment of a EU defence framework in more less explicit understanding with Rus-
sia. Minor disagreements occurred as mentioned in the Chechnyan policies.
As mentioned already, the Russian policies don’t belong to the controversial among
the issues in EU politics, and this affects the assessment of the relevance of three-
level-game analysis. Whereas it is obvious that a three-level-game approach can give
a useful capture of the complex and intensive interest articulation and interest aggre-
gation from domestic to EU and global levels taking place in connection with a pol-
icy process like GATT or WTO negotiations on agricultural policy, the fruitfulness
of a three-level analysis may be less evident in cases where ‘high politics’ plays a
more significant role and various societal pressure groups accordingly are less articu-
lated. It seems to be have less heuristic value to start to look for possible ‘win sets’
in Putnam’s terms in a case like the Russian policy of the EU and its members.. The
relevance of three-level game analysis depends on the character of the concerned
policy issue.
However, the policy-making, especially on the EU level, can be discussed in a useful
way in light of the development of the pillar structure. Regarding the economic ties
with Russia they have remained an important and constant part of EU-Russian rela-
tions, conducted primarily in the EC context. The extension of EU’s involvement in
pillar two and pillar three topics, however, has simultaneously been followed by
extensions of the policies on the agenda between EU and Russia. The dynamic
change in the field of foreign and defence policies is still an open process, but irre-
spective of the strategies that are going to be chosen, cooperation with Russia will
be a first priority. As to the development and continued externalization of home and
justice affairs, Russia - not the government but the crisis ridden Russian society - has
been an important factor. The development of the pillar structures and the increas-
ing importance of Russia have underlined the necessity of more cross-pillar and cross
level coordination, and this, in turn, was the background of the Strategy for Russia,
the first of the strategies made possible by the Amsterdam treaty.
The introduction of this paper touched about Buzan’s notion of ‘regional security
complex’, meaning that security interdependencies on regional level will get more
importance because of the disappearance of the super power overlay. An additional
argument about security after the end of the cold war - also present in Buzan’s con-
siderations - is the view that a relevant security concept of today shall pay less atten-
tion to traditional ’narrow’ security issues and, instead, focus more on questions of
economic, social and cultural threats. The same arguments lie behind the notions of
an ongoing ‘de-securitization’ and ‘securitization’ of military, respective important
societal issues. The picture may be more complex, because parts of the process of
‘securitization’ are actually concerned with security in traditional ‘hard’ sense. But
these concepts and arguments have obvious relevance for the understanding of EU’s
Russian policies.
28
Annex
Table 1 – EU Trade with Russia
Main Products in 1999 (Mio € and %)
EU Imports EU Exports Balance
Products Value Russian share
by products
Products Value Russian share
by products
Agricultural Products 1.570 2,2 Agricultural Products 2.835 5,4 1.265
Fuels 11.707 15,1 Fuels 62 0,4 -11.645
Machinery 291 0,1 Machinery 4.171 1,8 3.880
Transport Materiel 148 0,2 Transport Materiel 1.078 0,9 930
Chemical products 1.536 2,6 Chemical products 1.729 1,6 193
Textiles and clothing 225 0,4 Textiles and clothing 764 2,3 539
Source: Eurostat
Table 2 – Country allocation of TACIS resources 1991-1999
TACIS funds committed by country 1991-1999 (in million €)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Armenia 2,3 9,6 17,0 0,0 6,0 14,0 0,0 10,0 0,0 58,9
Azerbaijan 0,4 12,5 8,0 8,0 6,0 16,0 0,0 26,8 9,5 87,2
Baltics 15,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 15,0
Belarus 8,9 14,6 9,0 7,0 12,0 0,0 5,0 0,0 0,0 56,6
Georgia 5,0 9,0 6,0 8,0 6,0 16,0 0,0 16,0 0,0 66,0
Kazakhstan 7,7 20,6 14,0 14,0 15,0 0,0 24,0 0,0 16,6 111,09
Kyrgyzstan 0,7 9,2 10,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 13,0 0,0 8,6 49,5
Moldova 1,1 9,0 0,0 10,0 9,0 0,0 18,0 0,0 14,7 61,8
Mongolia 0,0 0,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 9,5 0,0 11,0 0,0 28,5
Russia 212,0 111,0 160,8 150,0 161,2 133,0 132,9 139,7 73,5 1.274,0
Tajikistan 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,0 4,0 0,0 00 0,0 0,0 8,0
Turkmenistan 0,9 8,8 0,0 8,0 4,0 0,0 11,5 0,0 6,7 39,9
Ukraine 28,7 48,3 43,3 50,5 72,5 76,0 59,0 44,0 38,6 460,8
Uzbekistan 1,7 18,8 0,0 15,0 10,0 28,0 0,0 29,0 0,0 102,5
Regional Programmes 106,0 88,6 172,0 131,5 124,5 152,0 135,0 155,8 129,4 1.194,8
29
Donor Coordination 0,0 34,9 21,0 24,7 40,0 43,0 37,0 43,0 64,4 308,0
Programme Implemen-
tation Support
6,2 24,0 11,1 21,0 23,0 37,5 34,5 31,9 65,3 254,8
Others 0,0 0,0 0,0 10,0 10,0 11,0 11,9 0,0 0,0 42,9
Total 396,5 418,9 472,1 469,7 511,2 536,0 481,7 507,2 427,6 4.220,9
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm
Table 3
German trade with Russia in 199874
and important commodity categories
German Exports German Imports
14,512 Bill. DKK 15.061 Bill. DKK
Machines, equipment 35.8% Energy 41.4%
Food, other agricultural products 26.2% Metals and metal products 22.1%
Chemical products 15.2% Machines 11.0%
Chemical products 8.4%
Wood products 5.1%
Source: Deutsche Botschaft, Moscow, www.germany.org.ru.de
Table 4
Comparison of bilateral, public gross transfers from the G7 states to Russia
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Germany 1,501.6 5,529.0 4,288.4 5,025.8 1,249.4 631.3 4,608.8 22,834.3
USA 47.0 1,891.0 1115.0 276.0 416.0 830.0 459.7 5,034.7
UK 49.3 22.8 37.5 52.3 9.2 56.2 54.8 282.1
France 3.6 14.9 15.0 17.0 21.0 18.0 82.1 171.6
Italy 135.9 15.3 1,039.4 2,043.6 6.3 8.1 18.0 3,266.6
Canada 795.1 18.9 30.5 42.4 15.1 31.7 27.6 961.3
74
1998 was the year of crisis in Russia, which meant about 10% reductions in exports and imports
compared to the previous years.
Source: Deutsche Botschaft, Moskow, www.germany.org.ru.de
30
Japan 54.2 130.9 311.8 249.4 92.3 85.7 556.4 1,480.7
Total 2,586,7 7,622.8 6,837.6 7,706.5 1,809,3 1,661.0 5,807.4 34,031,3
Source: See above
31
Table 5 Denmark’s trade with Russia
Danish exports Danish Imports
Total amount (Mill. DKR): 3349.3
- Foodstuffs: 39%
- Chemicals 20%
- Engineering products: 19%
- Other industrial commodities. 11%
Total amount (Mill DKR): 3349,3
- Foodstuffs: 22%
- Energy: 48%
- Semi manufactures: 13%
Source: Statistiske efterretninger. Udenrigshandel, 2001:3, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 2001
Note: The year 2000 was unusual due to Danish surplus
Table 6 Danish bilateral assistance
Top ten of Danish bilateral Assistance to Central
and Eastern Europe 1999
1. Lithuania 255,543,898 DKK
2. Poland 244,834,851 DKK
3. Latvia 160,800,804 DKK
4. Estonia 146,542,545 DKK
5. Russia 111,174,867 DKK
6. Romania 82,731,443 DKK
7. CEEC unallocated 79,576,042 DKK
8. Hungary 67,662,307 DKK
9. Slovak Republic 57,388,920 DKK
10. Ukraine 49,970,232 DKK
Source: www.udenrigsministeriet.dk/udenrigspolitik/oesteuropa/oeststoette
32
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Welt online, www.welt.de
Wirtschaftswoche, www.wiwo.de
Zeit online, www.zeit.de