Niels Grootjans

David Brunner, Camille Flückiger, EliškaMatějová, Anja Šmit, Petar Rankovic, Irisvan Beers, Nora Varga

Björn van Noord, David ParentesGolobardes, Felix Jeske, Gabriela AdinaMoroșanu, Niels Grootjans, Jaka YzmaĆosić, Sander van der Klei

Alistair Langmuir, Christoffer A.Lundegaard, Dirk Bruncken, Ivana Nedic,Mathias Cox, Wendy Wuyts

Denise Thomas, Katrine Schuster Hansen,Anja Ključevšek, Cosmin Mincu

Marija Dujic, Irene Gerritsen, Sanne Heijt,Anahita Innavong, Filip Jakovopic, NoraHilbert, Marius Raebiger, Samantha vander Sluis

Justino Losada Gómez

Jaime Jover-Báez

The EGEA Magazine is a publication of theEuropean Geography Association forGeography students and young geographers.The EGEA Magazine is published at least onceper year. The magazine is produced for theEGEA community, EGEA partners andeveryone who is interested in geography,Europe, and EGEA.

EGEAFaculty of Geosciences - Utrecht UniversityP.O.Box 80.115NL-3508 TC UtrechtTelephone: +31-30-2539708E-mail: egea@egea.euE-mail EGEA magazine:egea.magazine@egea.euWebsite: www.egea.eu

Colette Caruana (Chief Editor), Rachel Abela(Chief Editor), Florin-Daniel Cioloboc, UweKocar, Gabriela Adina Morosanu, AnnikaPalomäki, Noora Rämö, Avishai Roif,Matthew Stephens, Henna Tiainen.

Marek Kapusta; edited by Tobias Michl

Tobias Michl

David Brunner, Dirk Bruncken, Jaka YzmaĆosić, Mathias Cox, Marija Dujic, CamilleFlückiger, Irene Gerritsen, David ParentesGolobardes, Niels Grootjans, Katrine SchusterHansen, Sanne Heijt, Nora Hilbert, AnahitaInnavong, Filip Jakovopic, Felix Jeske, JaimeJover-Báez, Anja Ključevšek, AlistairLangmuir, Justino Losada Gómez, ChristofferA. Lundegaard, Eliška Matějová, CosminMincu, Gabriela Adina Moroșanu, IvanaNeđić, Marius Räbiger, Petar Rankovic, AnjaŠmit, Denise Thomas, Iris van Beers, Sandervan der Klei, Samantha van der Sluis, Björnvan Noord, Nora Varga, Wendy Wuyts.

Photographer: Camille FlükigerPicture title: “Home, Colourful Home”Take in: Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2011.

All authors are completely responsible forthe content of their articles, their figures andthe references made by them.

ESRIFaculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University

The IDEA Seminar, to which this magazine isdedicated, was made possible through thesupport and collaboration of:The Association for promotion of IT, cultureand coexistence (IKS)The Centre for Peace Studies (CMS)DelfinNansen Dialogue Centre OsijekThe Parliamentary Committee on Humanand National Minority RightsThe University of ZagrebThe European Commission

This publication reflects the views only ofthe author and the European Commissioncannot be held responsible for any usewhich may be made of the informationcontained therein.

Dear EGEAns, participant of IDEAs andfellow geographers,

This 13th issue of the EuropeanGeographer presents the outcomes ofthe Intercultural Dialogue – a EuropeanAdventure (IDEA) seminar, held inZagreb from 10th – 16th July 2013. Thismagazine gives you the opportunity toread some of the most adventurous,frontier-spirited articles that geographyhas to offer. The articles came to lifethrough participant observations anddialogue with locals and exemplifiesEGEA’s motto: ‘Experience Geography,Explore Europe’. Six of these articles arewritten by international groups ofyoung academics coming from allgeographic disciplines who wouldrather spend their free time exploringin their hiking shoes, eating anddrinking unidentifiable local treats andwith no return ticket. During the week,each participant placed themself in theshoes of a key Croatian stakeholder

tackling the topics of social integration,immigration, intercommunitydialogue, restoring trust, xenophobia,and youth participation. At the end ofthe week each group presented theirfindings to everyone by collaboratingwith or defeating them, witharguments of course, in a politicalsimulation.

So was this seminar original? Asalways, in retrospect, you have toconclude that ‘the Simpsons alreadydid it’ (for the geeks: Coming toHomerica, season 20 episode 21). Butstill we did some things differently!Firstly, as a European communityconsisting of 18 nationalities, we madecurrent and historically sensitive topicsaccessible for discussion. In fact, this iswhat EGEA is best at. Secondly, havingone leg in the academic world and oneleg in the field, we heard fromCroatians and non-Croatians from allwalks of life what it is like to live inCroatia and what they want to achieve.Third, the organising team consisted ofno less than seven nationalities andorganised the whole event from sevendifferent countries. The aspect that wasnot so original, yet perhaps the most

important element: it was fun to doand a great occasion to spend timewith friends! I suppose that is alsowhat moved the EU to choose IDEA asthe national winner of theCharlemagne Youth Award.

On behalf of all participants andorganisers, I would like towholeheartedly thank the contributionof our local partners: Centre for PeaceStudies (CMS), Association IKS, NansenDialogue Centre Osijek, TheParliamentary Committee on Humanand National Minority Rights, Delphin,and the University of Zagreb for sharingtheir knowledge, facilities, and thatthey did not hesitate to throw us intothe deep end during field excursions.

I would like to thank every participant,organiser, and contributor for theirfantastic work to make this event asuccess. I am convinced that I speak forall when I say that IDEA was a classicEGEA event that ought to be repeated.Are there any ambitious geographersout there?

For now, enjoy reading the articles!

Since negotiations aboutentering the European Unionstarted in 2005, Croatia hasbecome attractive for asylumseekers. Althoughimprovements in Croatianmigration policy have beenaccomplished, the system stillfails at several points.Additionally, a big challengeconcerns the social acceptanceof asylum seekers which isincreasingly shaped by negativemedia representations.The article, written within thecontext of the IDEA(Intercultural Dialogue – aEuropean Adventure) Seminarin Zagreb organised by EGEA, isbased on an in-depth interview

with a pioneer in theintercultural dialogue betweenCroatian society and asylumseekers. Drawing upon hisexperience, the findings of thepaper point towards theimportance of interculturaldialogue and its hiddenpotential to become a solutionfor the growing problem ofsocial tension. These originatefrom almost inexistent contactwhich lead to a lack of mutualunderstanding.

“Dobar dan, that's how we greet inCroatia.” Prince Wale Soniyikiwelcomed our group of students withthese words in the Centre for PeaceStudies (CMS) in Zagreb, Croatia. PrinceWale Soniyiki is a refugee from Nigeriaand is one of the eighty eight asylumseekers who received asylum in Croatia.He was born in 1985 in a Christian royalfamily in Jos, from where he had to runaway when a conflict started betweenMuslims and Christians. After sometime of tramping through Nigeria andNiger, he arrived in Libya. In thiscountry, affected by a civil war, he lostall his legal documents. While othermigrants remained stuck in Libya, hewas lucky enough to still have enoughmoney to buy a boat fare to Italy.However, the trip did not go as expectedand the boat landed in Split, Croatia.Once arriving on the Europeancontinent he paid a taxi driver to bringhim to the Italian border. Upon arrivingon the Croatian-Bosnian border, thePrince was told he had reached Italy.The policeman at the border broughthim to reality: “This is not Europe, youcannot seek asylum here.”

Deceived by the smuggler, the Princewas not at the entrance door of Europebut rather in the antechamber of theEuropean Union (EU). For years Croatiawas a country of transition, consideringits strategic position between Greeceand Italy. With its entry in the EU onthe first of July 2013, the situation willslightly change and Croatia will have toface several new challenges. As newmember of the EU it has committeditself to align its practices in the field ofasylum to the European laws and

international humanitarian norms(Šabić S. et al., 2011). Croatia is a countrywith a highly homogenous population.The Census of the year 2012 revels that89.6 % of the population is Croat, 4.5 %Serb, 0.5 % Bosnian, 1.8 % are non-declared and the remaining 3.6 % areanother ethnicity (DZS, 2012). Thisrather locally influenced composition ofthe population is due to the historicalcontext of the region. Croatia and othercountries in the western Balkans(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia andMontenegro) were affected by war inthe nineties. These wars caused thedisplacement of more than threemillion people inside and outside ofcountries of the western Balkans (KempW., 2011). This is Croatia’s majorexperience with refugees.

Mr Wilfried Buchhorn (the UnitedNations Refugee Agency (UNHCR)Representative in Croatia) stated that atthe beginning of the 21st century no onesaw Croatia as a country in which toask for asylum. When Croatia beganwith the process of entering the EU, thecountry itself became more attractivefor refugees (UNHCR, 2010). Sincenegotiations with the EU started in2005, some improvements in themigration policy have beenaccomplished but Croatia still has along way to go so as to reach EUstandards (Zdravković L., 2011).

The Croatian Law on Asylum definesasylum seekers as “an alien [(either aperson who has no Croatian nationalityor a stateless person)] who has appliedfor asylum, regarding which a finaldecision has not yet been made”(Ministry of the Interior, 2010).According to the same law, asylumseekers have a right to stay in thecountry, to be ensured adequatematerial living conditions andaccommodation, to health care, toelementary and secondary education, tofree legal aid, to social welfare, tofreedom of religion and religiouseducation of children and a right towork (Zakon o azilu, 2010). However, theCroatian system has someimperfections due to a lack of money.That is also a reason why asylumseekers in the Asylum Seekers’Reception Centres (ASRC) are not eligibleto financial support (Zdravković L., 2011,p. 6). Financial means for the ReceptionCentre are provided by the Ministry ofInterior. The Croatian government

Keywordsasylum policies, asylum seekers, Croatia,European Union, immigration, integration,media representation, volunteering,xenophobia

supplies asylum seekers with theirbasic needs, food and accommodation,the rest is supported by national andinternational NGOs like the Centre forPeace Studies (CMS) and the UNHCR(Zdravković L., 2011). The main purposeof these NGOs is to provide asylumseekers opportunities for integration.The CMS, one of these NGOs, is anorganisation locally based in Zagrebwith different sections. In the concretecase of asylum seekers theorganisation aims at directlysupporting asylum seekers withdifferent kind of services, whileinforming the Croatian society aboutthe current asylum situation andlobbying. Some other NGOs working inthis field are the InternationalOrganisation for Migration and theCroatian Law Centre which providesasylum seekers free legal aid(Zdravković L., 2011). The work of theseNGOs is an essential part of the“asylum case” and, as will be shownfurther in this article, a key element fora successful asylum procedure andthen for a sustainable integration.

The Prince stands just between theimmature asylum system and the workof NGOs, between the still conservativeCroatian society and the asylumseekers arriving from all over theworld. He is a bridge that links the towor is willing to be, and therefore a veryinteresting case to focus on for thosewho would like to know more about theimmigration policies of Croatia and theactual situation in the country.

The organisers of the IDEA Seminarmade first contact with the Centre forPeace Studies and asked them tofacilitate an excursion for some of theparticipants of the seminar. The IDEAseminar aimed to instigateintercultural dialogue between the

participants from different countries inEurope with Croatian society. Theseminar consisted of differentcomponents: fun games to get to knoweach other’s culture, ambitions andexpectations; lectures and a practicalintroduction to the topic from thedifferent stakeholders involved (CMSwas one of those). The output isillustrated in this paper, written by aninternational group of students.

The article first defines the chosenmethodology and presents the timeand spatial context of our work. Themain part contains the results of thefieldwork, analyses it from differentangles and is structured as follows:presentation of the Croatian asylumsystem, historical context based on acomparison between the currentsituation and that during the Balkanwar, integration of asylum seekers andfinally, a perspective on the future ofasylum seekers. The Prince’s story, hisexperiences and thoughts areembedded in every part and serve as athread throughout the whole article.The titles of most of the subchaptersare his own words. The articleconcludes by summarising the mainresults of our research and pointing outthe importance of interculturaldialogue.

This research is based on an in-depthinterview with a pioneer inintercultural dialogue between Croatiansociety and asylum seekers (Figure 1).Prince Wale Soniyiki is a volunteer atthe Centre for Peace Studies (CMS) whois actively involved in the process ofimproving the quality of life ofrefugees. The interview was held on the12th of July 2013 in the headquarters ofthe Centre for Peace Studies in Zagreb,

Croatia, by a group of internationalstudents of Geography. The focus wasset on the integration of asylumseekers into Croatian society.Furthermore, it broached topics like thepersonal path of asylum seekers, theirdaily life and their opportunities tointegrate into local society. Somequestions were related to thefunctioning of the centres for asylumseekers and the engagement of theCentre for Peace Studies. A topic list wasprepared in advance and served as aguideline for the interview, although itwas a very open discussion and endedup being more of a semi-structuredinterview. Thanks to the Prince’snetwork there was also the possibilityto meet other asylum seekers who willbe mentioned in this article as well.These rather informal talks took placein front of the asylum centre of Dugavein Zagreb which is closed for allexternal visitors.

The personal story of the Prince isembedded in a more theoreticalframework based on literature researchand review, as well as media analysis.For the examination of the Croatianasylum system it is essential to have acloser look at the international asylumregime which nowadays ischaracterised by a strong restrictiveapproach in the developed countries,due to a range of wrong perceptions(Koser, 2001). A common feature of therestrictive policies is that they arelargely ineffective in the long run andnowadays there seems to be consensusregarding their unsustainability aswell. Evidence shows that restrictionshave not reached their original aim ofreducing the number of asylumseekers, because, due to the easier andcheaper travel and communicationopportunities, more and more peoplehave become able to move. In addition,unintended consequences, such as thegrowth of human smuggling andtrafficking, have been increasingworldwide, adding further negativeeffects. Although there are severalproblems to be resolved, seriousquestions can be raised about thepolitical will to find more innovativeapproaches over the imposition of stillfurther restrictions (Koser, 2001).

When the Croatian police arrested thePrince at the border with Bosnia andHerzegovina, they sent him to theAsylum Seekers Reception Centre inKutina. In total, he spent six months inthis centre, waiting for his request to beaccepted. During the first two weeks hewas confined to a room speciallyarranged for new arrivals, where hewas medically checked and where his

personal information and fingerprintswere recorded in the register forasylum seekers. The next months hehad to stay at the Centre in Kutinawhich was overflowing with asylumseekers. Nowadays the centres forasylum seekers are still too small incapacity and have very low standards ofaccommodation, providing only thevery basic needs to asylum seekers. Inorder to acquire his permit, the Princehad to go through many interviews.During these, he told the whole story ofhis life and his reason for having leftNigeria to the asylum authorities.Contrary to other asylum seekers, whoare afraid or simply not used to beingconfident enough to tell the truth, hewas able to talk about his experiencesand he could convince the officialbodies that he is really in need ofasylum in Croatia. Although the Prince’srequest has been accepted, theprocedure he had to go through clearlyshows the difficulties and negativetreatment that asylum seekers have toface after their arrival in the country.Such an attitude from the part ofauthorities may lead to the conclusionthat the Croatian asylum system drawson the restrictive internationalexamples that aim the prevention ofarrivals by making the country lessattractive (Koser, 2001).

At the moment, Croatia officiallydifferentiates between three differenttypes of support for immigrants whoflee from countries because of politicalor religious problems. The first one isasylum, which means that a foreignergets a permanent permit to live andwork in Croatia. A second type is thesubsidiary protection of refugees whoare not able to get asylum, but who arealso not able to go back to theircountries of origin because they are indanger of serious harm. The third wayis the temporary protection of refugeesin the case that there are too many ofthem and the capacity for asylum is notlarge enough (EIGE, 2013). At this pointwe have to note that the capacity is alsodetermined by the state, therefore, theestablishment of such categories andlimits serves as further proof of arestrictive, unwelcoming attitude.

The Croatian asylum policy is organisedby the Ministry of the Interior, theGovernmental Office for Human Rights,international organisations like theUNHRC (United Nations Human RightsCouncil) and the IOM (InternationalOrganisation for Migration) as well asby some Croatian NGOs, like CMS, theCroatian Red Cross and the CroatianLaw Centre. NGOs like CMS play animportant role in the complex matter ofasylum. While the Ministry of Interioris responsible for providing the basicneeds such as accommodation (the

main centres are located in Kutina or inthe periphery of Zagreb, Figure 2) andfair treatment of asylum seekers. NGOsprovide them with further services, likelanguage courses or legal advice.Furthermore NGOs do their best totackle serious problems likeXenophobia and stereotypes withregards to refugees, as well as trying toinfluence politicians to modify theasylum policy. There are also cases inwhich no official body feels responsiblefor refugees and sometimes there isjust a lack of coordination. If thishappens the CMS helps the asylumseekers with the administrativeprocedure. Another important point forthe CMS is to bring the whole topicabout asylum to Croatian peoplethrough mass media portals. In 2004the CMS launched a big research projectwith the name “Asylum in Croatia”. As aresult of this an open discussion aboutthis topic started. It is interesting topoint out, that it is not a priority of thegovernment, thus the project has to becarried out by a NGO. One could deplorethat the government is not working onraising the awareness of Croatiansociety regarding asylum seekers and isnot working on a national campaign totackle prejudices (Centre for PeaceStudies, 2010).

Considering the experiences oftraditional receiving countries aboutthe effectiveness of such a non-responsible attitude in the long run,questions may be raised as to whetherthe Croatian government is on the righttrack. What seems to be evident is that

the Croatian policy on asylum showssimilarities to international trends interms of restrictions, despite the factthat its system is not fully developedyet.

Croatia does not seem to be a warmwelcome country for asylum seekers.One of the Prince’s good friends, who isstill waiting for a residence permission,stated the following: “Croats are notacting truthfully in my opinion; whenthey were at war some of them wererefugees themselves. Now they have gota chance to help people that are in thesimilar situation as they have been butall they are doing is the contrary,there’s no a tolerance and little help.”This experience has similarities withthe theory of “violence breeds violence”(Silver et al, 1969, p. 152). This approachreflects that a child who, for example,has been beaten in its childhood has agreater chance of becoming an abusiveparent themselves. What is striven tobe explained is that behaviours welearn as children could be integratedinto personal development; thereforethose behaviours could be imitated inthe long term. That is what could occurnowadays in Croatia, according to thePrince’s friend, but also according tosome scholars. Šelo Šabić et al. (2011, p.1), in a policy brief of the Institute forDevelopment and InternationalRelations (IMRO), pointed out: “Mostimportantly, twenty years ago Croatiancitizens were forced to leave theirhomes due to the war and hundreds ofthousands were offered refuge in

Europe and elsewhere in the world.Croatia, thus, also has a moral duty tohelp those in need just as it was helpedbefore”. In the following sectionanalyses how, given their recent past, itcomes to be that Croatian society ingeneral reacts in such a contradictorymanner regarding the flow of asylumseekers.The attitude of Croatia towardsthese refugees can be divided into twoscopes: the policy of the government onthe one hand, and the generalacceptance and tolerance of theCroatian society on the other. Thepolicy of the government may bedescribed as sharp: in 2006 only oneout of 750 potential asylums was givenresidence (Zuparic-Iljic, 2006, p. 1).

The attitude of the Croatian societytowards asylums seekers, whether it isadmitted or not, is more complex.According to Zuparic-Iljic (2006), after asmall research carried out in Kutina,the Croatians are roughly divided inthree groups: tolerant, neutral andnon-tolerant. The main reason ofacceptance for “tolerant” people is thefact that Croatia was at war only 20years ago and at that time a lot ofCroatians were in need of asylum inother countries. Now they would bepresumed to be glad to pay that“historical debt” they have contractedby giving residence to others who needit. On the contrary, the cause of “non-tolerant” Croatians is underpinned by aself-protecting argument: the countryhas its own issues, such asunemployment, and nationals deserveto have a privileged position in thesolution. The attitude described is themore repeated one in the opinion of theasylum seekers interviewed during theresearch in Zagreb. Media has a keyinfluence in these matters (de Haas,2008). Not only in Croatia can this beviewed, but also all over Europe termssuch as “flood of immigrants” or“plague from Africa” are beingconstantly used in different papers andmagazines. As it will be mentionedfurther in this article, the Croatianmedia and its influence on Internetforums are not precisely objective. Thisreflects on the attitude of Croatians andstimulates them to keep thinking thesame way. Šelo Šabić et al. (2011) argue

that the Croatian society should bemore open-minded to asylum seekersand know their position better in orderto understand the problem in its wholecomplexity. This could be achievedthrough the cooperation of thegovernment, NGOs, and a more positiveand objective approach of the media.Those instruments together should beable to tackle the xenophobia inCroatia.

The “violence breeds violence” theorydoes not completely fit on thissituation. The main argument seems tobe that Croatians have suffered“enough”. Furthermore, media has adeep influence on the general attitudetowards asylum seekers. A change inthe attitude of media could play a rolein increasing toleration of “others” inCroatia.

Migration into countries of the EU,especially from third world countries,has been in constant growth over thelast years. In the concrete case ofCroatia, the number of asylumapplications submitted has beenincreasing significantly between 2008and 2012. Only 160 persons soughtasylum in 2008 while they were 1,190 in2012 (UNHCR, 2011). The mostrepresented countries of origin betweenthe years of 2004 and 2011 wereAfghanistan, Serbia (including. Kosovo)and Pakistan (Table 1) (UNHCR, 2012).This constantly growing foreignpopulation brings several newchallenges and can lead to conflictswith the local population. In thiscontext, integration is one of the keysfor a smooth transition to livingtogether and for accepting “the other”.

Integration is a two-way process whereboth immigrants and local communityneed to cooperate. On the Croatian side,the Croatian Law on Asylum entitlesasylum seekers to several benefits andrights. One of them is precisely to offerassistance in integration to society(Šabić S. et al., 2011). So as to becomefully integrated, immigrants should

first be able to understand and speakthe language of their new country. InCroatia these language courses areorganised by CMS and given byvolunteers (Šabić S. et al., 2011). Duringthe procedure to get asylum, whichlasted almost six month, the Princeattended these language classes andstarted learning the Croatian language.He now speaks Croatian fluently and isteaching it to other asylum seekers.Another important part of integrationcomes about through work. Concerningthis one, EU member states have theresponsibility to provide opportunitiesof education and employment tomigrants (European Commission, 2011).One of the main problems is that mostof the asylum seekers have lost or donot have access to their certificates orschool reports. They have nodocumentation that would prove theirlevel of education. In the lucky case ofthose who do have them, it oftenhappens that these documents are notrecognised by officials. Therefore,vocational training offered by thegovernment is an essential part forsuccessful integration. According to thePrince’s tale, the Croatian governmentfails in this field; there is no propersupport or opportunities for asylumseekers once they get the right to stayin Croatia. The situation is not betterduring the procedure itself. There is nospecial program for asylum seekersand most of them spend their dayswaiting for an answer to their request.On the other hand, for the immigrantsthemselves integration happens in thesense that they should accept to changesome of their habits so as to fit into thelocal community. For example, since hearrived in Croatia the Prince has startedto drink coffee and to be on time whenhe has an appointment.

Another challenge in the field ofintegration is that, as evoked in theintroduction, Croatia is a veryhomogeneous country with 89.6 % of itsinhabitants being Croats. The religiousstructure is homogeneous as well as88.0 % of Croatian inhabitants areCatholics (DZS, 2012, p.7). Due to a lackof awareness and a fear of theunknown, it is very likely thatCroatians will not accept new people

coming to their country, especiallypeople that have different culture andlook different from them. In somecases, even xenophobia (Figure 3) canappear, because locals do not get toknow the asylum seekers and that is areason why they are afraid of them.

According to the Prince's words, most ofthe Croats are fine by them, whilearound a fifth of the population acts ina racist manner. Every day they have tolive with people staring at them andsometimes they even have terribleexperiences. The Prince experiencedsome of these during his time inKutina. One day he went to a café withseveral friends, among them otherasylum seekers and Croatians. They allordered drinks, but the employee onlyserved the Croatians and Serbs andrefused to bring drinks to all asylumseekers as her boss threatened to fireher if she would serve them. Thisexample comes along with the opinionsreflected in media. Some forums hostlively discussions about the case ofasylum seekers and most of thecomments are negative. Asylum seekersare called “vermin” and many forumusers describe them as criminals,killers and cannibals (Stormfront, 2013).Many discussions broach the sensitivesubject of the location of centres forasylum seekers. People state that theydo not want them in theirneighbourhood and that they wouldprefer if immigrants wereaccommodated outside of cities, inforests for example. These opinions aremainly influenced by the waynewspapers and other media report onimmigrants. They have the power tochoose the point of view, thetransmitted information and above all

the title of the article or newsflash. Forexample “Jutarnji List”, one of the mainCroatian newspapers, published anarticle about a Somali asylum seekerwho robbed a man of his money(Jutarnji List, 2013). However the titledid not mention the nationality of thevictim, who was an asylum seeker too.This biased information leads tomisunderstandings and is one of thereasons why an important part of theCroatian society has a negative imageof asylum seekers.

This mostly negative opinion ofCroatians on asylum seekers coupledwith a lack of opportunities forintegration provided by the governmentmakes the current situation of asylumseekers in Croatia very challenging. IfCroatia wants to reach a sustainablesituation for both Croatian society andasylum seekers, it should put moreeffort into the integration of asylumseekers and later on of those givenasylum. What is the purpose of givingasylum to somebody who does not feelintegrated enough to stay in thiscountry and to build something there?

The theory of “violence breeds violence”,explained earlier on, could be used inthe opposite way and state thatsomebody who was blessed bysomebody else, may most probablywant to give something back. This isexactly the case of the Prince.

During the procedure to seek asylum,the Prince benefitted from the supportprovided by the CMS. Through theengagement of their volunteers, hestarted learning Croatian which

completely changed his daily life as itfilled up his days with anotheroccupation besides waiting for ananswer. However, this is not the onlyimpact that the visits of the volunteershad on him. Unlike the employees ofthe Reception Centre, the volunteerswere able to gain the asylum seekers’confidence. Prince Wale Soniyiki told usthat “the volunteers are positive” andthat “when they come, all [asylumseekers] shave and want to look nice”.This positive experience andenthusiasm about the work of thevolunteers (“they talk with us and taketheir time, they are different”) madehim want to do the same, to “be in thesystem”. In case he would get asylum,of course. So when, a few months later,he got a positive answer to his request,he did not hesitate a single second andstarted volunteering for CMS. Besidesteaching English and Croatian toasylum seekers, he talks a lot withthem and provides them with usefuladvice. Due to the fact that he wentthrough the same process and knowswhat difficulties they are facing, he isable to give them appropriateinformation and tips. This is his way ofmaking changes and of making use ofhis own experience.

The Prince’s voluntary work at theCentre for Peace Studies comes alongwith another engagement to raiseawareness among Croatian society.Currently he is giving presentations atschools or in churches where he tellspeople who the asylum seekers are,what they have endured and how theirsituation in Croatia is. He likes tocombine these presentations with aninitiation to African culture andtraditions and, for example, performpercussions’ shows in front of scholars.On the way to Hotel Porin whereasylum seekers are accommodated inZagreb (Figure 4), while the Prince andour group were walking through a niceand quiet neighbourhood, hementioned a roundtable sessionorganised a few weeks earlier to discussthe situation of asylum seekers. He didsome promotion about it in theneighbourhood and invited allneighbours to join it. Several officialswere invited as well. Unfortunately onlya few locals came and the Princeperceived it as a negative sign, as a lackof interest. This disappointingexperience reinforces his wish to workhard to raise awareness among thelocal society and encourages him. Hisbiggest wish, or rather dream for thefuture, is to open a centre for Africanculture or something else, like arestaurant or shop, related to Africa. Hewould like the centre to be a placewhere asylum seekers, immigrants andCroatians could meet. The centre wouldgather books, music and other

materials connected to Africa. Themajor obstacle to this project is the lackof start-up capital. The Prince has noprovisions and the asylum seekers’ caseis not an urgent topic for thegovernment who would most probablynot see the need of having such a place.For these reasons this project has tostay in a standby state for the moment.

It is not only his dream of having aplace dedicated to Africa that isunrealisable, but the Prince’s generalfuture is also unstable. Since hiscertificates got lost and he has no otherpossibility to certify his educationalbackground, many doors remainclosed. He told us that he “has no hopeof finding a job” nor of having thepossibility to get schooling, as theCroatian government does not careabout the future of asylum seekers.Despite this rather hopeless situation,the Prince wants to stay in Croatia andsees his future in this country.Nevertheless he would suggest otherasylum seekers to move to othercountries as, according to him, theCroatian society is not ready yet towelcome a massive foreign population.

Due to its integration into the EuropeanUnion, Croatia has been experiencing asharp increase in immigration fromdeveloping countries over the lastyears, and this is causing significanttension in the host society. After ourresearch and the in depth interviewwith the Prince, a pioneer asylumseeker and volunteer at the Centre ofPeace Studies, our article has attemptedto give an overview of the situation andfuture prospects of asylum seekers in

the newest member state of the EU. Ourfindings can be concluded as follows:

Arriving in Croatia and waiting forrecognition of status are mainlydescribed as negative experiences byasylum seekers. Evidences suggest thatthe state is practicing a restrictiveapproach in terms of asylum policy andshows a clear lack of responsibilitytowards the integration of newcomers.Nevertheless, the consequences ofsimilar international examples arepointing towards the need of a changein attitude and a focus on a moresustainable solution. The growingnumber of incoming asylum seekerscalls for a complex integration policy tofacilitate a peaceful co-existence in thelong run.

Integration is a complicated and longprocess, which requires contributionfrom both the receiving country andnewcomers. Clearly, the governmenthas a great responsibility on behalf ofthe hosting country. With theallocation of financial resources andinitiating a stronger cooperation withNGOs, detailed educational programsshould be developed so as to increaseopportunities for asylum seekers in thelabour market and for everydayinteraction with the local population.The role of education is easilyunderstandable - without qualificationand ability to speak the local languageit is hardly possible that one will createplans and visions for the future in therespective country, therefore successfulintegration will not happen either.Despite the fact that some initiativeshave been taken on a smaller scale,Croatia still lacks such intentions onthe policy level.

Additionally, tackling xenophobiarequires special attention as well. Thestrong influence of the media onsociety suggests that a changing andmore positive representation of asylumseekers is essential in order to increasetolerance and acceptance in thehomogeneous and mainly closedCroatian society.

On the other hand, the willingness tointegrate from the side of asylumseekers is of the same importance. Asthe case study shows, adaptation tocompletely new surroundings afterfleeing persecution is a very difficultstep to make. Thus, the importance ofvolunteers who can facilitate thisprocess by building a bridge isinvaluable. The Prince’s example showsthat a positive and active attitude ofvolunteers towards mutualunderstanding is essential inimproving the situation. Nevertheless,the scale of its potential benefits islargely limited due to a lack ofsufficient assistance from the side ofdecision makers.

The main finding of our research isthat appreciating and supportingintercultural dialogue might serve as asolution for the growing problem of thesocial tension, originating in a lack ofmutual understanding. To develop suchan attitude, it seems that the newestmember of the European Union needsto take a step further towards therecognition of the people fleeing theirhomes, just as happened to them onlytwenty years ago. Although experienceshows that history is repeating itself,we should also remember that theopportunity of shaping the future isalways in our hands.

We would like to warmly thank PrinceWale Soniyiki for having taken his timeto tell us his story and to answer ourquestions. Thank you, Prince, forhaving opened our eyes while youopened your heart. We hope that thearticle will spread your message andthat you will continue to successfullylink Croatians with asylum seekers.

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In an attempt to research theattitudes towards interculturaldialogue in Petrinja City, weinvestigated statistical data onthe ethnical and languagestructure of the population, andalso analysed theunemployment rate, socialrelations and the effects of thewar on the general economicand ethnic state of the region.Besides a formal visit to the“Udruga IKS” association, ourspecific contribution consistedof interviewing a number ofinhabitants of different agesabout how they perceive the

evolution of the relationsbetween different ethnicityrepresentatives living inPetrinja. The article ends withan evaluation of the economicand social potential of the city,and with alternative solutionsto the problems, that involve thelocal authorities.

This article presents the actual ethnicstructure in Petrinja and the challengesthat are faced by organisations trying toenhance intercultural dialogue on alocal level. We chose Petrinja because ofits bipolar ethnic structure in which theCroats and Serbs represent the largestpart of the population (Čačić-Kumpes &Nejašmić, 1999), and due to the presenceof Udruga IKS (Figure 1) in thecommunity.

Udruga IKS was founded in 2003 by asmall group of locals from the town ofPetrinja. Back in 2003, the initiatorsstarted the organisation as a way tobreathe new life into the localcommunity, which is part of one ofCroatia’s most economicallydisadvantaged regions (Udruga IKSofficial website, 2013). The organisationwishes to develop the local communityby strengthening civil society,promoting information technology and

the socio-economic empowerment ofmarginalised citizens, thus aiming tobecome a leading organisation in theregion in the field of non-formaleducation and democratic development.Over the past 10 years the organisationhas become an important factor in localcivil society. Most projects are focusedon the local level, but Udruga IKS is alsoinvolved in many national andinternational networks. In 2011 theorganisation became an accredited EVS(European Voluntary Service)organisation which provided theopportunity to bring more people fromdifferent cultural backgrounds into thelocal community.

It is important to highlight thatcreating intercultural dialogues andmixing local minorities are not amongthe main targets of the organisation,but the projects undertaken by UdrugaIKS play an important role in theseprocesses as well. Some of the majorprojects in 2012 included plans toincrease the employability ofunemployed women, opening volunteercentres, organising an internationalyouth summer camp in Petrinja,raising awareness of Human Rights inlocal high schools and supporting in theinformation, consultation and trainingof other local communities andorganisations of civil society (UdrugaIKS official website, 2013).

KeywordsIntercultural dialogue, Udruga IKS,unemployment, social relations, ethnicstructure, ethnicity, homeland war

Petrinja City is located approximately 60km south-east from Zagreb, Croatia, ina geographical area dominated by theKupa Valley and Zrinska GoraMountain. It is the largest urban centrein the Sisak-Moslavina County andtogether with the city of Sisak, itbelongs to the historical region ofBanovina. Archive records (Lipovac,2005) mention Petrinja as an importanturban centre which began its existencein the XIIIth century, when its citizensenjoyed privileges and a period ofwealth in the time of Koloman, theDuke of Slavonia. Despite its quiet past,nowadays the municipality of Petrinjais considered to be an area with specialneeds, representing a cause of concernfor the Croatian economy anddemocracy, because of theconsequences of the war (1991-1995).Petrinja proved to be interesting for ourresearch due to its bipolar ethnicstructure, in which Croats and Serbsconstitute the majority of thepopulation (89%), but also due to thefact that in the period between 1945 and1998, its demographic structureunderwent radical changes, the mostnotable of all being the reduction ofSerbian representative from almost 40%in the early 90s, to less than 15% in thepresent. These transformations in thedemographic structure, with aparticular focus on the ethnic andreligious elements, helped set the stagefor newer approaches and also allowedan interdisciplinary approach of thecity, namely through the study ofintercultural dialogue.

The Population of Petrinja is 15,683inhabitants in the city itself and 24,786inhabitants in total, when including allthe surrounding dependent ruralcentres (Annual Census of Croatia, 2011).The main problems faced by thepopulation living in Petrinja, are thedifficulty of the municipality inproviding suitable and sufficientemployment for the population and thelimited chances for young people toobtain a proper education and jobsupport. A detailed picture of thestructure of the population shows asignificant diversity of ethnic groups,out of which the Croatians and theSerbians are the largest ones, but thereis little concern when it comes to thelogistical and financial support of thisethnical diversity of the city. Regardingthe country development, all reports(Lipovac, 2005 & Čačić-Kumpes et al.,1999) emphasise the city’s isolation and

need for reconstruction programsaiming to improve its economy. Theeconomic potential of the city hasdramatically changed since 2001, whenthere were still opportunities to workand 34% of women were economicallyactive, whereas almost 9% of residentswere daily migrants (engaged inoccupation), Furthermore, youthsrepresent a third of the entirepopulation of the city and almost 8%were pupils (1,190) studying in othercities. Unfortunately, the most recentcensus highlights a total of 12,744unemployed residents in Petrinja, out ofthe 16,210 people constituting theworking-age population. Furthermore,the population can be classifiedaccording to cathegories of income, asin the 2001 Census (Figure 2).

Thus, Petrinja is a case where traces ofthe civil conflicts from the early 90s are

still visible and reflected in theeconomic situation, the mentality ofthe people and the political-administrative organisation in general(Stiperski & Braičić, 2009). Recenthistory has witnessed the Serbaggression against Croatia duringwhich people were exiled from Petrinjabetween September 1991 and May 1995(Čačić-Kumpes & Nejašmić, 1999). Thetown itself has suffered extensivedevastation after 1991. In terms ofcultural identity, and in particular theCroatian cultural identity, manymonuments have been built in memoryof Croat war heroes and victims of thewar. Additionally, many places inPetrinja are still scarred by the war andwere not renovated or used again tosustain the needs of its inhabitants(Figure 3).

The demographic picture from the last

three censuses reveals a fluctuation inthe number of residents in Petrinjafrom 35,151 inhabitants in 1991, to 23,413in 2001 and 24,671 inhabitants in 2011,with a general decrease in the yearsimmediately after the war and aslightly increase in the last 10 years.Migration flows have not yet stabilisedand the last two population censusesclearly highlight the consequences leftby the war and post-war aggressionsand development on the ethnicstructure of Petrinja (Čačić-Kumpes &Nejašmić, 1999). The residents’statements regarding native language,ethnicity (Figure 4) and religion (Figure5) are conclusive in terms of culturalidentity and its expression in diversity.

Thus, it can be understood that,although 12% of the city population is ofSerb origin, only 6.53% of themacknowledged Serbian as their motherlanguage to express their culture, the

others declaring Croatian-Serbian astheir mother tongue (a category that isnot officially recognised) or even theCroatian language, which is a sign ofan intercultural approach. All of thisleads us to believe that the first stepstoward integration have already beentaken, although ethnically speaking,ethnic memory, expressed by the nativelanguage, is still alive and it is anexponent of the cultural diversity.

The gender structure is also veryinteresting, revealing a predominanceof women among minorities, especiallythe Serb one. It proves on the one hand,the different life expectancy betweengenders, and, on the other handanother consequence of the war: that ofbeing responsible for the decimation ofa large section of the male population.

The population structure according tothe level of education also defines

people's expectations in terms of jobvalue. For example, in the census of2001, there were fewer college graduates(907), only 29 master degree graduatesand just 12 doctoral students comparedto 928 unschooled children older than 15years, which demonstrates that thepopulation of Petrinja does not benefitfrom the best educational conditions.

Because of time limitation, the goal ofthe research, and the opportunity tovisit the town of Petrinja, we chose toconduct qualitative research.Qualitative research in humangeography is mainly used to go deeperinto a subject and collect informationfrom the population and human orsocial factors.

Interviews were conducted on thestreets of Petrinja. The interviews tookplace during the day of July 13th 2013 atseveral locations (Figure 6). The weatherwas sunny and dry, usual for this areaat this time of the year. The interviewswere conducting between 12:00 and14:00 and between 15:30 and 16:30. Weattempted to take as diverse a sampleof respondents, taking into account thebalance of different ages and genders.Jaka Ćosić (EGEA Zagreb) served as atranslator when needed, especially witholder generations.

We used open questions which weformulated after a quick individualbrainstorming session of 20 minutes.During the actual interviews the orderin which the questions were asked wasoccasionally varied, depending on theway the conversation was developing.

We started by asking the residents’opinions about the town and the regionand their current mobility. Next, weasked questions about the mainproblems that people have to face intheir area and the main reasons whythese problems occur. Afterwards, weasked them about their social relationsin their neighbourhood and their senseof community. Moreover, we askedwhat they think about Udruga IKS andits contribution to the community.Lastly, we inquired about what could beimproved in their town, as well as theirwishes and perspectives for the future.

Depending on the answers to thesequestions we created new questions onthe spot during the interview, such as‘Do you experience cultural differencesin your town?’, ‘What needs to changefor the town?’, ‘How do you experiencethe social relations?’

We had a group discussion (Figure 7)about the topic of this article with avariety of participants, including localyouth, international volunteers in IKS,and members of the NGO. Thediscussion lasted approximately oneand a half hours.

In the following section, the answers ofthe respondents to the interviews willbe analysed.

As far as we could notice, young people(Figure 8) are more tolerant of eachother, no matter which ethnic groupthey belong to. The only cases offriction between ethnicities appearwhen a teenager or a child comes froma family where at least one memberfought against other ethnicities duringthe war, or suffered damage andcasualties from the conflicts of the pastcentury. In this case, parents oftenforbid them to have strong friendshipties with people of other ethnicities,especially when the youth of otherethnicities have to pass the threshold ofyoung Croats’ homes. However, it wasnot a question of discrimination, but

rather a cold attitude toward the ethnicrelations, translated by the indifferenceof adults and older people, for whomthe past counts more than the present.They are also not very interested instriving for the wellbeing of the entirecommunity, if that would meanneglecting their cultural values andtheir national pride.

In order to encourage young people tobecome more involved in decisionmaking about issues affecting them, itis necessary to take a number ofmeasures. These could range fromeducation based on democraticprinciples (such as non-discriminationand integration), presenting theimportance of civil society and its role

in the community or, even more, thepossibility to express their own opinionand leave their mark on the city life interms of cultural events andinvolvement for all the community.What is more, everything the localgovernment does directly affects therelationship between generations and,moreover, between ethnicrepresentatives. However, the first stepin this respect has been taken. Thecurrent level of involvement of youngpeople in the City of Petrinja covers boththeir social life and decision-makingabout their future by the establishmentof the Commission for Youth asinitiators of change and guides for theirneeds.

The driving force for the entire processis the implementation of the NationalProgramme of Action for Youth, inaccordance with which Petrinja wasdesignated as the pioneer city for theProgramme “Action for Youth”. Howeverpromising it may seem, life in Petrinjadoes not prove to be so simple, becauseof a lack of communication betweenthe grown-up representatives of Croatand Serb ethnicities and also betweenthe population itself and theauthorities.

According to the 2001 census, in thetown of Petrinja, over 38% of thepopulation, or nearly 9,000 people, livewithout any income; less than 27% ofpeople are employed; and almost 5% ofthe population "survives" only on thebasis of social benefits, which formtheir only income. Of the totalpopulation, only 4,368 of them, or 19%,belong to the age group of 15-29, whichis the category taken into considerationby the National Programme of Action -Youth. Also, about 39% of young peoplelive in rural areas near Petrinja, which

is a symptomatic indicator for the needto leave the village environment andstart looking for better education,employment and a more comfortablelife by migrating to larger urban areas,and often to other countries (just under25% of young people remain inPetrinja).

Our study in Petrinja revealed the factthat people, in general, are open to oneanother, regardless of their ethnicity,but there are still many adults andmembers of the older generations whodislike the fact that young people ofdifferent ethnicities meet andparticipate in the same activities(school, cultural meetings). As far as thenative language of the population isconcerned, it could be seen that,although in the last census, there werefewer declared Serbs (for demographicand ethno-cultural table), the numberof native speakers more than doubledand the number of speakers of the so-called Croatian-Serbian language alsoincreased.

Premises for a thorough citydevelopment still exist, represented by agenerous natural setting and ethnicallandscape, offering multiplepossibilities for economic activities(such as agriculture, hydropower on theriver Kupa, industry, leisure, tourism,vocational training in economicactivities, employment opportunities inthe meat industry - the well-established Gabrilović meat factory, orin other light industry sectors, whichcould be restructured).

We were impressed by the imageUdruga IKS has in the city, given thefact that even adult people have heard

about these volunteers and believe theyknow how to manage and improve thesituation of the population innumerous ways. As a recommendation,the local and national Governmentshould clearly define goals for theeconomic development of Petrinjamunicipality, as well as set targets formaking ethnicity integration andinteraction less difficult and moredurable in the long term.

Annual Census of Croatia, 2011. [online]Available at: <http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm>[Accessed 13 July 2013]

Čačić-Kumpes, J. and Nejašmić, I., 1999.Social changes, migration and ethnicstructure: Case study of Petrinja(Croatia). Zagreb: Institute for migrationand ethnic studies.

Lipovac, N., 2005. Petrinja - UrbanHistory of a Croatian Town as RevealedThrough Archive Graphics and Maps.Acta architectonica. Zagreb: Faculty ofArchitecture.

University of Zagreb.Official Voice, 2009.Petrinja City. Acts of the City Council,[pdf] Available at:<http://www.glasila.hr/Glasila/SV/SV2209.pdf> [Accessed 12 July 2013].

Stiperski, Z. and Braičić, Z., 2009. Theinfluence of war on the dynamics ofunemployment in Banovina (Croatia).Journal for Geography, p.103-112.UdrugaIKS official website, [online] Availableat: http://www.udrugaiks.hr/ [Accessed19 July 2013]

Within the Croatian Parliamentthere is a Committee on HumanRights and National Minoritiesthat establishes and monitorsthe implementation of policiesand treaties regarding thehuman rights of minoritiesliving in Croatia and Croatianminorities living in othercountries. The Committee iscomposed of Parliamentariansand some representatives of theexisting minority groups.Together with NGOs theCommittee’s remit is to decideand vote on the policies andmeasures to be taken regardingthe integration of stigmatisedminorities into a largelyethnically homogeneous societywhich is still struggling withthe painful legacy of a recentcivil war. One of the work

groups at EGEA’s IDEA Seminarincorporated a short meetingwith the chairperson for thisCommittee, Mr. Furio Radin andother members of his team.This article presents theinformation gathered from thisshort interview in contrast withthe opinions and impressions ofmembers of the public whichwere interviewed at random.

During the IDEA seminar in Zagreb, thework group studying the Committee onHuman Rights and National Minoritiesgathered information and data aboutthe subject by using different methods.In the beginning, we conducted aninterview with Mr. Furio Radin,chairperson of the Committee andsome members of his cabinet. Althoughit lasted only an hour, it gave us astarting point and valuable informationabout the political representation of thedifferent minority groups and theircurrent situation in Croatia. In thefollowing days we did some individualliterary research, so as to gainknowledge about the history ofmigration in Croatia as well as themigration policies in Croatia, theEuropean Union and our own countries.In the last part of the program weadministered a questionnaire torandom people in the city centre. Thissurvey provided valuable information

Minority’s rights, ethnic groups, nationalminorities, Constitutional Law

about people’s perception of minoritiesand their integration into Croatiansociety.

When discussing the human rights ofnational minorities, the first step is todefine and identify the target groups.This process ought to be flexible andrelative, depending on the territory,society, and geographical interrelations.For instance, a minority group inAmazonia is differently defined andstructured from one in Turkey. Thereare some basic issues to be tackledbefore one can begin to discussminorities in any territory.

Pentassuglia (2002) criticises the lack ofa definition at an international level,preferably in the shape of a universaltreaty. He refers to the difficulty ofidentifying common elements tocomprise the plurality of existingrelevant communities.The UnitedNations, in a consensus reached in 1992,fell short of formulating aninternational definition. Nevertheless,it is stressed that the existence of aminority is “a matter of fact and thatany definition must include bothobjective factors (such as the existenceof a shared ethnicity, language orreligion) and subjective factors (thefeeling of belonging to a minority group

or the shared identity with particularmembers of a given society)”. (UNHR,2010, p.2)

In addition, the situations in whichminorities live differs between thevarious countries and regions. Somelive together in well-defined areas,separated from the dominant segmentof the population while others arescattered throughout the country. Someminorities have a strong sense ofcollective identity and recordedhistory Others retain only afragmented notion of their commonheritage. Caportorti, a special reporterof the United Nations Sub-Commissionon Prevention of Discrimination andProtection of Minorities, describes themas “a group numerically inferior to therest of the population of a State, in anon -dominant position, whosemembers being nationals of the Statepossess ethnic, religious or linguisticcharacteristics differing from those ofthe rest of the population and show, ifonly implicitly, a sense of solidarity,directed towards preserving theirculture, traditions, religion or language”(UNHR, 2010, p.2). As stated above, theapplication of policies and measuresconcerning national minorities arerelative and directly depend on thegeographical interrelations that occurwithin different societies.

“While the criteria of nationality […]have often been challenged, therequirement to be in a non-dominantposition remains important” (UNHR2010, p.2).

In Croatia there is a clear majoritygroup. According to the statistics ofresearch conducted by the CroatianBureau of Statistics in 2011, more than90% of the population are Croats: thereis a clear division between this majority

and the 22 other ethnic groups, whichare defined as minorities. (CroatianBureau of Statistics, 2001).

In the following sections, we willintroduce some of the minorities inCroatia, how and why they have cometo live in the country and some of theproblems concerning their integration,focusing on the most numerousminority: Serbs.

During 20th century and in thebeginning of the current centuryCroatia has been part of many differentcountries, kingdoms and republics, allof them having had different policies.

During the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes (1918 - 1941), the Croats didnot feel that they were being treated onan equal level with the Serbs. Duringthe fascist regime of the IndependentState of Croatia (1941 1945) manyminorities in Croatia, such as Serbs,Roma people and Albanians weresystematically eliminated and replacedthrough a process of overt ethniccleansing. Within the Social FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (SFRY, 1945 -1990), Tito attempted to diffuse tensionsand rivalries by implementing policiesbased on ethnic equality. The HumanRights framework in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia ensured a freeand equal use of minority languages inpublic life, the right to receive abilingual education, to celebratecultural identity and a proportionalrepresentation in governmental bodies.Indeed, at the time the constitutionrecognised the national state of Croatia,including Serbs in Croatia and alsoother nationalities. As a consequenceSerbs and other minorities felt more

secure and integrated, especially afterhaving suffered the consequences of anauthoritarian dictatorship.

The break-up of the Republic ofYugoslavia triggered a period ofupheaval and atavistic bloodletting.During the nineties, war and ethniccleansing effectively undermined allthe efforts of integration made by theTito regime. Hatred and persecutionflourished in the former Yugoslavia:Croats accused Serbs and Muslims ofthreatening their territory theSerbian army started bombing itsneighbours armed insurrections wereunleashed all over the FormerRepublics territorial disputes inBosnia led to mines being laid andbarricades erected everywhere.Populations were displaced, refugeesmultiplied, people had to leave theirhomes in a matter of hours to avoidbeing massacred. The simple fact ofbelieving in one religion or another, oreven belonging to a differentdenomination was enough to getimprisoned if not executed.Minorities,in Croatia and all territories werepersecuted and abandoned to their fate.

During the war years, the size of theminority population eventuallydecreased, with the biggest effect beingfelt by the largest minorities: Czechs,Hungarians, Italians and Serbs.(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2001) Thereason for this does not lie not innatural migration, but in movementunder pressure, which was, in effect,ethnic cleansing.

The reasons for this decrease ofminorities include:

• The nationalist Croatian policy mainlytargeting Serbs, who were exposed todenunciation, harassment, threatsand killings, both inside and outsideof the war zones.

• Migration towards urban areas whichresulted in the weakening of ruralcommunities, leading to thediscontinuation of traditional tradesand links with any minority culturalheritage.

• Migration within the regions andoverseas, particularly during and afterthe 1991/1995 Croatian war.

• Improved education resulting ingreater social mobility for members ofethnic minorities.

• A rise in ethnically mixed marriages.

•The weakening of cohesive elements ofethnicity, which are being replaced byprofessional or social group identity,or even by regional identities.

According to Minority Rights GroupInternational, Minority Rights GroupInternational (MRG, 2003) the mostnumerous minority in Croatia areSerbs. In the following paragraphs, wewill focus on this particular minority,which is the most stigmatized andpersecuted within society and has beendeeply affected by the recent conflicts.During “The Storm” (the last majorbattle of the Croatian war ofindependence, 1994) Serbs living inCroatia had to migrate to their countryof origin. Several thousand became warrefugees while others weresystematically killed.

In the last five years, the Croatiangovernment has been taking measuresto help Serbs restore their houses andallow new communities to settle inCroatia. Still, Serbs do not feel as secureand confident in Croatia, and a bigproportion chose to remain in thecountry that gave them asylum or inSerbia. One of the institutions createdafter the war aiming to achievebilateral dialog is the Serb DemocraticForum, which was established in 1991.This forum was set up at first to helpresolve the issues regarding the statusof the Serbian minority in Croatia.Today it mainly focuses on issuesregarding returnees, reconstruction, therestitution of returnees’ property andthe renewal of communities inextensively affected areas. (MinorityRights Group International, 2003)According to Croatian Constitution,Serbs are guaranteed the freedom toexpress their religion (SerbianOrthodox), using their language andletters, and to educate in theirlanguage. Although they are protectedas a minority, Serbs suffer from

discrimination (unfair proceedings incourts, unemployment because of Serbstatus, being targets of violent acts andharassment, among other actions). Inorder to protect their national identityand defend their rights, Serbs areestablishing political parties andassociations.

The Serbian minority has anautochthonous character. For thisreason, the community has the right ofhaving three special representatives inthe Croatian Parliament. In addition,Croatia ratified a bilateral agreementwith Serbia and Montenegro in 2005 (itwas one country until 2008) regardingthe protection of Serbs andMontenegrins in Croatia, as well asCroats in Serbia and Montenegro. TheCroatian Constitution outlines that theRepublic of Croatia is a unified,democratic state in which thegovernment is performed by andbelongs to the people as a communityof free and equal citizens. This right isexercised through the election ofrepresentatives via a direct vote. TheCroatian Parliament has 151 members(MPs) in its Chamber ofRepresentatives. Minorities arecurrently represented by 11 of the 151MPs. The Republic of Croatia inheritedfrom the SFRY a regime for minorityrights protection, which only coveredsome of the existing minorities. Croatiaimmediately recognised these inheritedrights, yet problems remained. Howcould the status of non -Croat citizensbe defined for those who had newlybecome ethnic minorities in a differentstate, i.e. in Croatia rather than SFRY?

In December 1991, the Parliamentadopted the Constitutional Law onHuman Rights and Freedoms ofNational and Ethnic Communities, as

this was a precondition for Croatia'srecognition as an independent state inJanuary 1992. By accepting internationalstandards, Croatia achieved a high levelof protection for minorities in itslegislation. However, this was not areflection of a genuine internal politicalwill to resolve minority issues, but theconsequence of international pressures.(Minority Rights Group International,2003) In May 2000, the Parliamentamended the 1991 Constitutional Law,reintroducing some of the suspendedprovisions regarding the Serb minority,but repealing the vast majority of theprovisions related to Serb minority self-government. Article 19 of theConstitutional Law on NationalMinorities guarantees members ofnational minorities the right torepresentation in the Croatianparliament. It provides for: Serbs toelect three MPs Italians to elect oneMP Czechs and Slovaks to elect oneMP Albanians, Bosnians,Macedonians, Montenegrins andSlovenes to elect one MP andAustrians and other small minorities toelect one MP. (Croatian Parliament,2002, p. 6, art.19) Parliament hasappointed the Human RightsCommittee, within which theSubcommittee for Ethnic MinorityRights operates. The Committee'smandate is to determine and monitorthe implementation of ethnic minoritypolicy, and to participate in theChamber of Representatives procedurefor adopting new laws. The Committeeis also an authorised working bodyregarding the implementation ofinternational legal provisionsregulating human rights protection,interstate agreements, minorities’rights and programs of internationalcultural cooperation for minoritygroups.

(Based on an interview with Mr FurioRadin, the President and Chairman ofthe Committee, 11/07/13)The Committeeon Human and Minority Rightsestablishes and monitors theimplementation of policies and treatiesregarding human rights of nationalminorities and Croatian minorities inother countries. The Committeecomprises a Chairman, the Cabinet andfour External Members, which areconstituted by NGOs and communityrepresentatives. Although they do nothave the right to vote in PlenaryDiscussions, they provide a frameworkand support to the Committee. In thisCommittee, there is a representativefrom the Catholic Church and arepresentative of other religions. In

each mandate, a representative of otherdenominations or religions such asOrthodox, Protestant or Muslim, hasthis second seat. The currentrepresentative of this mandate isProtestant. The Committee and otherpolitical entities count on some supportfrom NGOs. The different associationsand non -governmental organisationsformulate programs, provideintercultural dialogue, mediate betweenminorities’ representatives and politicalinstitutions, fight for the mostvulnerable groups’ rights and provide aframework to be applied, depending onthe object of the policies and thegeographical distribution in space.Unlike other Parliaments in the region,the Croatian Parliament, and especiallythis Committee, is well followed by themedia. For instance, the PlenarySessions of Croatian Parliament arestreamed live on TV. The Centre forPeace Studies is one of the existingNGOs in Zagreb. It arose from avolunteer program that allowedreconstruction and understandingbetween frontier localities in Croatian-Bosnian territories. By the promotion ofnon-violence, encouragement of socialchange and developing a culture ofdialogue and mutual understanding,

NGOs like the Centre for Peace Studiescreates a link between governmentstrategy and society.

Additionally, the Nansen DialogueCentre creates and promotesintegrating relations without conflictapplied to educational system inEastern Croatian. Their projects focuson peace building and buildingcommunities. Stigmatisation andstereotyping are constant amongmembers of villages next to each otherfor centuries, yet separated bycontroversial and painful borders. Thisconflict can already be observed fromprimary schools. Solutions to thisconflict are difficult to achieve, yet notimpossible. The Nansen Dialogue Centreenables children of differentnationalities in a multiculturalcommunity to learn about the culturalheritage of all ethnic groups that live inthe region. The participants at the IDEAseminar were exposed to both of theseNGOs through the course of the event.

"If there is one thing that thisCommittee takes for granted, it is theopenness to NGOs. We have twoexternal members in the Committeewho are NGO representatives. For each

specific issue, we always invite NGOrepresentatives to attend our meetingsand they have a huge influence ondecision making. Of course the oneswho vote and have legislative power arethe politicians, but the opinions andadvice of NGOs determine and influenceour decisions." said Mr. Radin.Sometimes, however, the competencesand powers of NGOs in applying theprograms are hindered by localgovernments, municipalities and/ormayors that refuse to accord minoritiestheir rights. If not controlled or properlyregulated, this issue may reduce theimpact and influence of constructivedialogue.

This issue fundamentally depends onthe region involved. Local governmentsoften disobey laws and regulationsregarding minority rights. TheCommittee has the task of identifyingthese situations and regulating them.The procedure followed is initially towrite a warning letter to the respectiveadministrative power, and then workwith a special Committee which hasspecific power to take furthermeasures. Conflicts between thenational and regional levels isextremely common.

Croatian society and the relationshipsbetween different ethnic groups are stillhighly influenced by the mentality andprejudices that were formed during thewar. Many members of ethnic groupssuffer from stigmatisation, especiallyin the rural and less developedterritories that the suffered mostduring the war.

To close the interview Mr. Radin said:"Thank you for having IDEA visit theCommittee and the CroatianParliament. I hope you have learnt fromus. We have certainly learnt somethingfrom you, because we always learnfrom young people. I always seize theopportunity to learn more from theirquestions than from any answers”(11/07/13)

We conducted a small scale interviewon the streets of the city centre ofZagreb so as to get an impression of theperception of minorities and their(political) presence in the country. Ourinterviewees (26 in total) were asked ifthey agreed with a series of statementson a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (totallyagree). The questionnaire addressesissues concerning ethnicdiscrimination and the integration ofminorities in Croatia: segregation ofschools and the right to receiveeducation in minority languages freedom of religion; the politicalrepresentation of minorities; among

others. The results showed that youngerpeople (less than 25 years old) are notheavily involved in, nor are they awareof the political life and social conflictsregarding minorities in Croatia. On theother hand, people over 25 years old areslightly more concerned aboutintegration, language privileges,freedom of religion, and so on and soforth. This is due to them havingexperienced the war period and itsconsequences for themselves.

Furthermore, elderly persons often setYugoslavia as a point of comparison,and some of them expressed evidentsigns of nostalgia.

However, in the overall analysis weconsidered all age groups together sincethe difference mentioned above seemrather nuanced when processed intogeneral statistics.Figure 4 representsthe answers from 1 to 5 (1 being “not atall” and 5 meaning “totally”) to two

different questions, regarding theintegration of minorities and ethnicdiscrimination in Croatia. On the otherhand, people tend to think minoritiesare integrated in society: 20 out of 26(76.9%) consider that minorities areintegrated, giving a mark from 3 to 5 while 11 out of the 26 (42.3%)interviewees state that minorities aretotally integrated. Hardly anyonedisagrees that all children should go tothe same school, regardless of theirethnic background. In fact, more than70% totally agree that children shouldattend the same schools. (Figure 5)

The majority of respondents answeredthat ethnic discrimination exists inCroatia, but only 3 out of the 26 (11%)think that it occurs at a higher level.The people who were interviewedstrongly believe in the protection ofminorities’ culture. Interviewees agreedthat keeping and protecting eachminority’s culture is important and nota single one was against or partiallyagainst this, indeed 15 out of the 26(57.6%) stated that they totally agree.However, when we compare theseresults with those obtained further on:Do you think minorities shouldintegrate and become more Croatian?(Figure 6) we discovered a controversialresult. The majority stated thatminorities should definitely becomemore Croatian. A possible explanationfor this paradox can be explained by thefact that 23 of the 26 intervieweestotally agree about freedom of religionfor all (Figure 7). Hence, we can deducethat people agree with the maintenanceof the culture at an individual level.However, regarding public life,interviewees think that the nationalidentity of Croatia should bemaintained. Apart from the strictquestions on bilingual education,religion, integration anddiscrimination, we also added somepersonal questions regarding thefeeling of belonging to one culture oranother.

As Figure 8 shows, most of theinterviewees feel that they belong toCroatia, although half of the 26interviewees were born in a differentplace. Only 3 out of 26 did not feelCroatian. Croatia was accepted into theEuropean Union in July 2013 and in thefollowing figures we can recognise thatthe majority of people feel that they arepart of Europe; only 4 answered thisquestion with a “no” (Figure 8). Thereare divided opinions regarding thepossible positive change that the entryinto the EU can achieve. Figure 9represents the expectations of Croatiansfrom joining the EU. The majority (15out of 25) think that it will bringpositive change, but this was closelyfollowed by the eurosceptics: 10 out of

25 think that the European Union willnot bring about any positive change.

The authors greatly thank: Milda, forthe great support, energy and ice-cream; the IDEA organising team andEGEA Zagreb, for this great seminar; Mr.Furio Radin and his team, forwelcoming EGEA at the CroatianParliament and sharing their time andopinions with us; the EuropeanGeographer editors, for their helpfuladvice and patience.

Radin, F., 2013. Interview with CroatianCommittee in Human and MinorityRights Protection in the CroatianParliament. Spoken interviewundertaken by authors on 11/07/2013 atthe Croatian Parliament Building inZagreb.

Pentassuglia, G., 2002. Minorities inInternational Law: An IntroductoryStudy. Council of European Publishing,Strasbourg.

DeSchouwer K., 2004. Ethnic Structure,

Inequality and governance of the publicsector in Belgium. United NationsResearch Institute for SocialDevelopment

Croatian Parliament, 2002.Constitutional Law on the Rights ofNational Minorities. [pdf] Zagreb,December 13, 2002. Available at:<http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Constitutional-Law-on-the-Rights-NM.pdf> [Accessed:15 May 2015]

Minority Rights Group International -MRG, 2003. Report Minorities in Croatia.[pdf] Available at:<http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=1005> [Accessed: 15 May 2015]

UNHR, March 2010. Minority Rights:International Standards and Guidancefor Implementation. [pdf] Office of theHigh Commissioner. New York andGeneva, Available at:<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf>[Accessed: 15 May 2015]

UNHR website, Updated 2013. Minoritiesunder international law. [online]Available at:

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx>[Accessed: 15 May 2015]

Croatian Bureau of Statistics – CB, 2001.Croatian Census 2001. [online] Availableat:<http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/censuses/Census2001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html> [Accessed: 15 May 2015]

Croatian Parliament website, amended2010. The Constitution of the Republic ofCroatia. [online] Available at:<http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2408> [Accessed: 15 May 2015]

Tanjug, V., 2013. Rights of Serbs inCroatia obligation of EU, B92 newspaper.[online] Available at:<http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2013&mm=07&dd=08&nav_id=86877> [Accessed: 15 May 2015]

Intercultural living issomething that the majority ofus have already experienced inour lives; it is a characteristic ofcontemporary societies. Thecapital of Croatia, Zagreb, is noexception. It is a place ofcultural diversity and thereforea place of interculturalinteraction. But what is thepublic’s view about being part ofthis intercultural society? Arethey aware of interculturalliving and do they see it as anadvantage or as a disadvantage?As Croatia is now part of theEuropean Union (EU), and thequestion has arisen if this willmake any changes tointercultural living. The Councilof Europe has formulated a“White Paper on InterculturalDialogue” to promote andimprove intercultural dialogue.Will this also lead to animprovement of interculturaldialogue in Zagreb and Croatia?Is there a need for improvementat all? It appears that theintentions and objectives of thepopulation to improve and liveinterculturally are good, but ineveryday life it has a lowpriority.

Intercultural living in Zagreb - publicviews and politician’s visions was oneof the research topics during the IDEA-seminar in Zagreb, Croatia. Theresearch group was an interculturalgroup formed by four members from:Germany, Romania, Slovenia andDenmark, who also came from variededucational backgrounds.

When one experiences Zagreb, it can beunderstood to be a city in which peoplefrom many different cultures inhabit -as was made apparent during theseminar, which was also a space forintercultural living. Yet, what does thatmean for a city, to be a place of culturaldiversity, especially for the population?

During the seminar one topic waspresent all the time: The entry ofCroatia into the European Union on the1st of July 2013. Would this cause anychanges in intercultural living inCroatia or would it continue as it didprior to EU entry? The Council of Europehas released a White Paper onIntercultural Dialogue entitled “LivingTogether as Equals in Dignity”, but canthis be implemented in Croatia?

The following article will concentrateon cultural diversity in Zagreb.Furthermore, it will include differentviews of the population on interculturalliving in Zagreb and the entrance ofCroatia into the European Union. It willalso contain a brief update of what theWhite Paper from the Council of Europecontains.

The Yugoslavian war in the 1990’s had abig influence on the recent history ofmigration in Zagreb. During the war,Zagreb was one of the maindestinations for refugees, particularlyfor Croatians and Bosnians (Fassmanand Görgl, 2007). According to thecensus of 2001 the largest ethnic groupin Zagreb were Croatians (91%), whileSerbians comprised the largest ethnicminority (7%), followed by Bosnians,Albanians, Slovenians and Roma people(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2001). Theofficially counted number of Romapeople in Zagreb is about 2000, but theestimated number is 9000 (Fassmanand. Görgl, 2007, p.7).

All in all there are 22 different minoritygroups living in Zagreb and therefore it

Intercultural living, European Union, Whitepaper, Cultural diversity, Minorities, Zagreb

is a place of cultural diversity andintercultural living. To guarantee“Living Together as Equals in Dignity”,successfully, intercultural dialogue isnecessary.

To facilitate “Living Together as Equalsin Dignity”, the Council of Europeformulated a White Paper onIntercultural Dialogue, but what is a“White Paper”?

“Generally speaking, White Papers arepolicy documents containingbackground information and proposalsfor action in a specific political area.”(Council of Europe, 2007, 5.1)

The “White Paper on InterculturalDialogue” was published in 2008 by theCouncil of Europe. The process ofcreation was an open consultationprocess, where all stakeholders ofintercultural dialogue were involved. Inthis paper the political orientations ofthe council in this area wereformulated. The aim of the document isto promote intercultural dialoguewithin European societies and betweenEurope and its neighbouring regions.The paper includes suggestions forpolicies and initiatives in order toimprove intercultural dialogue and tomaximise its benefits (Council ofEurope, 2008).

The majority of the research which wasconducted during the IDEA seminarconsisted of interviews, which wereconducted on the street with a sampleof diverse inhabitants of Zagreb. Thepoint of this was to represent the viewsand opinions of the general public. Twopeople performed each interview - onewas the interviewer and one recordedthe interview by writing it down byhand. The interviews were conducted indifferent areas and districts of Zagreb,to have as diverse a sample as possible.So as to interview people who were notin a hurry, locations were chosenwhere the population would spend theirleisure time, an example of this beingpublic parks. The aim was to gatherdata from a group of respondents withdifferent cultural backgrounds, agesand gender.

The purpose of the interviews was togather the views and personal

experiences of the population on thesubject of intercultural living in Zagreb.The questions asked were divided intosix different blocks concentrating on:cultural diversity in Zagreb, theirpersonal experiences, theresponsibilities concerningintercultural living, the community’srights, Croatia’s accession to the EU andfinally, their personal information.

The number of interviews conductedwas five and the interviewees werefrom different cultural backgrounds,ages and of both genders. Theinterviews were mainly performed inSlovenian (the interviewer) andCroatian (the interviewees). Interviewswhich were attempted in English, wereoften met by a polite refusal. After theintroduction and explanation of thepurpose of this research, we askedabout the presence of different culturalgroups in Zagreb. Several minoritieswere mentioned here, particularlyBosnians, Roma people, Serbians andSlovenians. These minorities werementioned by nearly everyone. Whenasking for an explanation for why thereare so many different cultural groupsin Zagreb, the respondents listed newopportunities that a city like Zagreb hasto offer to immigrants, such as jobs, butalso noted that a lot of inhabitants arewar refugees. The respondents sawcultural diversity mostly as anadvantage, but some also mentionedthat there are some disadvantages, asthey felt that the immigrants weretaking away jobs and subsequentlyfewer jobs will be left for locals. Oneinterviewee also stated thatimmigration was the cause of a lot ofsocial issues. It was also stated as anopinion that not all the groups areequally integrated into society and thatlanguage barriers exist between theindigenous population and migrantgroups.

Then we asked about the personalexperiences of the interaction betweenthe different cultural groups in society,and if this is the cause of any conflictsbetween different ethnic groups. Therespondents were generally inagreement that there are no majorproblems, just minor ones. Those issuesmentioned were about religion,different cultural backgrounds andabout informal work. We also asked thepeople for a personal assessment, ifthey are doing something to improveintercultural living. The intervieweeshad similar responses: that they do notjudge minorities; they are tolerant andto some extent also interact with peoplefrom different cultural backgrounds intheir daily life - mainly through theworkplace. Only one mentioned a

concrete example of interaction.

We were furthermore interested in whothe population thinks should beresponsible to make society moreaware and to improve interculturalliving, and if it was important to do soat all. The respondents agreed that it isimportant to raise awareness in societyand it is the responsibility of the state,but also the personal responsibility ofeach individual - including theminorities themselves. Additionally, itwas made apparent that theinterviewees did not know of anyconcrete projects or organisations inrelation to intercultural living inZagreb; a few respondents just knewthat several of them exist.

Following these questions we askedabout the importance of a policy paperregarding intercultural dialogue, and ifthey knew that something like thisalready existed. They all agreed thatthere should be policy papers on thistopic, but no one knew about theexistence of any. Some simplymentioned the existence of foreignlaws concerning ethnic minorities.

As mentioned earlier, the accession ofCroatia into the EU was a constant topicduring the seminar and therefore wealso asked our interview subjects aboutthat, so as to discover the opinion ofthe sample population. We wereinterested in their personal views andif they believed that entering the EUwill bring about change relating tointercultural living. Our researchshowed that the respondents werehighly doubtful about that and lookedtowards the future with someuncertainty, but all hoped that positivechanges will take place in the future. Itwas mentioned, that entering the EUwill transform Zagreb into a morecosmopolitan city, which will havepositive and negative outcomes.Croatian membership in the EU willresult in increased collaboration, notjust with neighbouring countries butalso on a worldwide scale, which everyinterviewee saw as an advantage to thecountry.

The decision of conducting the researchbased on interviews rather thanquestionnaires conferred bothadvantages and disadvantages. Withinterviews, we were able to ask detailedquestions and to inquire into theanswers. It was also possible to adjustthe questions to the individualinterviewee and reword them, if thequestion was not understood in thefirst place. One of the disadvantageswas that through an interview wemight have received more polite and

not entirely honest answers, whereaswith a questionnaire the respondentsmay be more frank in their answers asthey feel more anonymous and do nothave as intimate an interaction withthe interviewer. Conducting theinterviews was also considerably moretime consuming than conductingquestionnaires, and therefore it wasonly possible to obtain a very smallsample.

Since the interviews were performed inSlovenian and Croatian respectively,the language barrier between theinterviewer and the interviewee wasreduced. The questions from theinterviewer were better understood,compared to the interviews conductedin English and the interviewee wasable to answer the questions in theirmother tongue and use their ownwords and expressions to explain theirperceptions and emotions. Someindividuals refused to be interviewedwhen it was suggested to conduct theinterview in English. We received theimpression that the people did not feelcomfortable with their foreignlanguage capabilities and, thus somequestions were misunderstood and notanswered because of language barriers.Interviews only performed in Englishcould also have resulted in significantbias, as it could be expected that peoplewith superior foreign language skillsmight be more open to and also havemore interaction with other culturesand nationalities.

Based on the results from theinterviews it seems that the populationof Zagreb is knowledgeable of thedifferent cultural groups living in thecity, and that they were aware of thereasons behind this diversity. Both thepositive and negative aspects ofintercultural diversity were observed,but very few concrete examples ofadvantages were mentioned. Thedifficult job market and problems ofunemployment was named as one ofthe challenges, which also wereexpected to increase in the futurefollowing the accession to the EU andthe opening up of the country’s borders.Integration and interaction of thedifferent cultural groups resident inZagreb, as well as language barriers,particularly for the Roma people, arepresented as a challenge of significantimportance. All of the intervieweesmentioned that personally they aretolerant and did not judge minorities.To some extent they also interactedwith people from different culturalbackgrounds, but few particular effortsseemed to be made by the generalpopulation, and awareness of anyconcrete projects on interculturaldialogue and cultural integration ofminorities was low. Contrary to this,

the respondents perceived eachindividual as responsible for improvinginteraction and responsibility, whichsuggests that the intentions andobjectives of the population on thistopic are positive, but in daily life it isconsidered to be of minor importance.Enthusiasm about entering the EU andthe advantages of this were not acommon occurrence in the generalpublic. According to our results, thepublic could only see new challenges inthe future with regards to interculturaldialogue. They regarded the future withsome doubt and uncertainty, but alsohoped that some positive changes willoccur. Furthermore, they gave theimpression that they believed that theEU will play a large role in thisinitiative and will contribute towardsmoving things forward and overcomingthe challenges presented.

Despite the limited time within whichto conduct the research, as well as thesmall sample collected, someknowledge of the population of Zagreb’sopinions and awareness aboutintercultural interaction and dialoguewas gained. Throughout the interviewsperformed, it was seen that the generalpublic had a good overview of thedifferent cultural groups living in thecity and that they were clearly aware ofthe reasons behind Zagreb’s diversepopulation. Both advantages anddisadvantages of intercultural diversitywere observed, although most of theconcrete examples mentioned were ofdisadvantages. It was also clear, thatthe intentions and objectives of thepopulation on improving and livinginterculturally are good, but in theirdaily life it is considered to be of minorimportance. The accession of Croatia tothe EU was associated with somedoubts and uncertainty, but there washope that positive changes will occur inthe future and that the EU will be partof the solution and progressionforward.

Fassman, H., and Görgl, P., 2007. CaseStudy on Housing. EuropeanFoundation for the Improvement ofLiving and Working Conditions.

Council of Europe, 2008. White Paper onIntercultural Dialogue “Living TogetherAs Equals in Dignity”.

Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2001.Census 2001

Council of Europe, 2007, Preparing the”White Paper on intercultural dialogue”of the Council of Europe, Consultationdocument,https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1081461 last accessed 31/01/2015.

During the war that took placebetween 1991 and 1995, the Serbsand Croats fought each other.After the war, the two groupshad to live together in someborder regions. This gave rise tosome friction in the beginning.Nowadays, some projects havebeen put in place that attemptto reinforce harmony betweenboth ethnicities and teachmutual respect andunderstanding especiallyamongst children. This paperinvestigates whether theseprojects live up to theirexpectations and bring Serbsand Croats closer to each other.

During the Seminar "InterculturalDialogue - a European Adventure" heldin Zagreb, Croatia in 2013, almost 50students from 18 different countriescame together to deal with Europe'sdiversity and its interculturality.Especially in Croatia, interculturaldialogue has an important role. It hasonly been eighteen years since theofficial end of the war between Croatsand Serbs. The following article willdiscuss the way that relations betweenboth ethnicities have developed andwhat has been done to improveintercultural dialogue between theseethnicities in the municipality ofVrginmost.

The municipality of Vrginmost, an areaconsisting of 212 km2 and situated circa20 km from the Bosnian border, is aninteresting example of interculturalsharing of space. Currently the townhas a Serbian name (Vrginmost),however, the town was officially knownas Gvozd between 1996 and 2012. Theswitching of names is related to thechanges in the ethnic background ofthe population of Vrginmost. After thedivision of Yugoslavia, the majority ofthe population was of Serbianbackground. This changed in 1995,when the Croatian army retook thearea by force during “Operation Storm”.This subject and its influence on thetensions between Serbs and Croats willbe treated more elaborately further onin this paper.

Vrginmost is an agglomerationconsisting of 19 different settlements,that all have a population between 50and 300 people. In the populationcensus of 2011, Vrginmost alone had1,122 inhabitants. According to aninterview with the mayor of themunicipality, the population has onlybeen shrinking since 2011. Before that,there were 14 people per squarekilometre; nowadays this number hasfallen to circa 10 persons for eachsquare kilometre. Compared to theaverage Croatian minimum of 40people per square kilometre, this is a

huge difference.

The shrinking population is not theonly problem Vrginmost faces, anotherissue is the ageing of its population:more than 50% of the population is overthe age of 50. This is a result of the out-migration of the younger generation tobigger towns, because of a lack ofworking possibilities in themunicipality. The out-migration hasincreased since 2010 when therecession became a serious issue. Moreand more factories closed down and theincome of the municipality fell by 70%(Source: Interview with the Mayor).Vrginmost fell into a vicious circle: thefall in income caused factories to close;people lost their jobs and theunemployment rate increased; highunemployment made Vrginmost a lessattractive place to live in and thereforecaused a wave of out-migration;because of a smaller population themunicipality got less aid from the state;and with less funding from the state, itbecame more difficult to invest in thearea. Another problem that occurs inrelation to its low population density isthe need for more infrastructure. Due tothe dispersion of the population, moreroads need to be built and maintainedfrom the small funds received from thegovernment.

In the border areas many Serbs andCroats live together and because of thehistory between these two nationalities,this has triggered some problems. So asto have a more clear understanding ofthese problems, some backgroundknowledge is needed.

Serbs are the largest national minorityin Croatia. They represent about 4.4% ofthe total population of Croatia (2011).Before the war, 12.2% of the populationwas Serbian. Due to the war ofIndependence between 1991 and 1995, agreat number of Serbs and Croats fledfrom their homes. Croats moved awayfrom the Bosnian and Serbian Border.The Serbs moved towards the borderareas. After the war, many Serbs movedaway from Croatia, even though theywere told to stay in Croatia. ManyCroats moved into the abandonedhouses of the Serbs, because their

houses were previously destroyed bythe Serbs.

In Vrginmost (Gvozd) a large group ofSerbs was forced to move away whenOperation Storm took place in August1995. Afraid of ethnic violence from theCroats, some Serbs never returned afterthe war because of discrimination andproperty repossession problems.Operation Storm was the major battleof the Croatian War of Independence. Itlasted for three days and during thebattle there were also Serbian civiliandeaths, but exactly how many died stillremains unclear. The Croatiangovernment claims that 214 were killed,while the Serbs claim that 1192 civilianswere killed. The tension between theSerbs and Croats was very high in the1990s, but it has reduced since 2000. Ithas stayed that way ever since, eventhough there are still some problems.The main problem is socialdiscrimination, especially in officialmatters. Serbs face discriminationwhen it comes to finding a job, and insome cases they are even subjected toviolence. However, the government triesto reduce discrimination by makinglaws against it. During the excursion toVrginmost, the Mayor explained thatthe municipality tries to reduce thediscrimination against Serbs, as muchas they can. For example, when itcomes to work Serbs and Croats aretreated equally in Vrginmost and as aconsequence, there is an equalpercentage of employed Serbs andCroats in the municipality.

During the research in Vrginmost,Croatia, the main method used was theinterviewing of stakeholders. On the13th of July, various semi-structuredinterviews were held. Some researchwas also conducted on the Internet soas to supplement the fieldwork. Thefollowing stakeholders wereinterviewed: two teachers of theprimary school in Vrginmost, themayor of the municipality of Vrginmostand one of the leaders of Suncokret, aproject located in the area near toVrginmost. We also had the chance totalk to one of the children taking partin the Suncokret project.

Non-governmental organisations, suchas the “Nansen Dialogue Network” and“Suncokret” contribute to achieving abetter understanding between thedifferent ethnicities in themunicipality.

The Nansen Dialogue Network is a non-governmental organisation, founded in

1995 in Lillehammer, Norway. Peacebuilding actions and projects arebrought forward in different Europeancountries. Especially in the Balkan area,which was left with divided andsegregated societies after the wars inthe 1990s. The Nansen Dialoguenetwork established projects of dialoguein Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia,Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia(Nansen Dialogue Network, 2013).

The mission of the NDN is: “To supportactively and effectively interculturaland interethnic dialogue processes atlocal, national and regional levels withthe aim of contributing to conflictprevention, reconciliation and peacebuilding.” (Nansen Dialogue Network,2013).

About 150 students attend the localschool of Vrginmost and are between 6and 14 years of age. The two ethnicities,Serbian and Croatian, represent anequal percentage of the students.

NDN conducts and supports an afterschool club, where students can spendtheir free time together, voluntarilyparticipating in workshops andactivities dealing with topics such as“differences and similarities”, “wall ofprejudices” or “this is me”. The studentsalso created a cook book of typicalmeals of their individual heritagetogether.

Suncokret - Centre for CommunityDevelopment is a Croatian organisation,which was established in 1998. Thisorganisation aims to fight against thenegative social and culturalconsequences of the social tensions inthe Sisak County in Croatia, to promote

community rebuilding, socialinteraction and to support developmentof a sustainable democratic society(Suncokret, n.d.). In Vrginmost,Suncokret organises workshops,summer camps (figure 1) andexchanges, particularly addressing theyouth of the region in order to supportthe development of dialogue (Suncokret,n.d.).

There are, unfortunately, still sometensions between Serbs and Croats inCroatia, even in Vrginmost. During theresearch, different stakeholders showedus their approaches to interculturaldialogue between Serbs and Croats.

The teachers of the local schooldeclared that the school has a ratio of50% of Serbs and 50% of Croats. Thechildren learn about each other’sculture through the regular lessons andthe ones that are more interested incultural exchange can follow an extracurriculum for one hour a week. Inthese sessions, the children undertakedifferent activities to learn more abouteach other’s culture and to fightexisting prejudices (Figure 2). The mainidea is that children did not go throughthe history that their parents orgrandparents have been through andtherefore they should have a neutralview on relationships between differentethnicities.

The mayor of the municipalityexplained that an effort is made toestablish equal chances for Croats andSerbs concerning jobs. Supportingdifferent activities to unite thepopulation, such as cultural festivals,was another aspect that he mentionedregarding the relation between Croatsand Serbs in Vrginmost.

The leader of the Suncokretorganisation gave us the opportunity tolook around at their activity centre.Children of all ages and ethnicitieswere doing activities together and someparents also came along to volunteer.

To answer the main question: ”in whatway have relations between Serbs andCroats developed and what has beendone to improve intercultural dialoguebetween these ethnicities inVrginmost?”, a few things can bestated. First of all, it is hard to saywhether or not real improvement hasbeen made in diminishing tensionsbetween Serbs and Croats in the region.The same applies to the question ofwhether or not the projects that havebeen set up contributed to this or not.As a result of the fact that the mainsources of this investigation are thestakeholders, the results found might

be biased and mostly represent theirviews on the question, and thus do notrepresent objective facts. However, twoimprovements were undoubtedlyachieved: projects aimed at creatingharmony in the population have beenset up (the Suncokret project) andtensions between the ethnicities havediminished since 2000. The extent towhich the Suncokret project diminishesthese problems and influencesintercultural dialogue still remains tobe seen. For the time being one canonly say that the first steps in the rightdirection have been made.

During the fieldwork there was notmuch time left to do our own researchin the city. We only managed to talk tostakeholders and therefore got a biasedview on the question. It would havebeen better to speak to locals andobserve the way the inhabitantsinteract with each other. For furtherresearch we would recommend aquestionnaire, which can be carried outby randomly sampling people from thestreet.

Another point of improvementconcerns the interviews with thestakeholders. Due to a lack of priorknowledge we did not feel like we werewell enough prepared, which resultedin conducting semi-structured ratherthan structured interviews. This mayhave resulted in forgetting to ask someimportant questions or mention certaintopics.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR), May 2003, The Status of theCroatian Serb Population in Bosnia andHerzegovina: Refugees or Citizens?[online] Available at:<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3eccfafc2.html> [accessed 21 April 2015]

Nansen Dialogue Network, variousarticles, [online] Available at:http://www.nansen-dialogue.net/[Accessed 15 August 2013]

Suncokret - Centre for CommunityDevelopment, various articles, [online]Available at: http://www.suncokret-gvozd.hr/?lang=en/ [Accessed 15 August2013]

Prettner, K. 2013, 'Population aging andendogenous economic growth', JournalOf Population Economics, 26, 2, pp. 811-834

Interviews conducted with the Mayor ofVrginmost, teachers, and the leader ofSuncokret.

The relationship between therise of neoliberal economics androotless individualism, versusthe classic concept of society intimes of Post-Democracy, istreated in a theoreticalframework of geographicalconsequence that aims toexplain the recent territorialchanges in response to theperpetuation of the markets. Inreturn, a civic response byparticipating in a newframework which allowsterritorial cohesion is proposedto promote the integration andownership of the inhabitants -citizens with the territory inwhich they dwell.‘Truth should not be confused with theopinion of the majority’…

Jean Cocteau (The Umbilical Cord, 1962)

The recent state of the economy inwhich markets and finance seem to bemore important than society hascreated a sense of uprooting, shared bymany people who understand theirurban constitution much more asinhabitants than citizens. This realityshows how cities have becomecommercial spaces to be bought andsold rather than places to live, changingthe morphology of places andlandscapes. Thus we are passing fromthe espace vécu status (Frémont, 1974)to economic speculation and bubblemodels thanks to the development ofneoliberal economic policies after aquite perverse reading of Fukuyama’sThe End of History of 1992. In thecurrent scenario, landscape is beinghomogenised by means of urban

sprawl, that derived intourBANALization (Muñoz, 2006) lookingback in a reactionary way toeconomicist1 urban models like Alonso’s(1964), in which the downtown is muchmore expensive than the surroundingareas due to its better connections.Therefore skyscraper constructiontends to be frequently follow thepurpose of depreciating the investedfund, and according to Massey (1993)allowing structures of geometry ofpower as a direct consequence togentrification processes in well-connected central old districts (Garnier,2011).

People’s behaviour is approaching thisnew geographical processes, as Harvey(1989) explains in his The Condition ofPostmodernity, and going closer to thetheory of Individuality2 (Lipovetsky,1989) which depicts lucidly the currenthuman condition in urban landscapes,recalling in a modern distortion ofclassic Epicureanism. This style isbecoming a sort of ‘social hedonism’that prioritises personal values insteadof cultural civil ones. The paradoxresides in the creation of collectivenesswith fewer social roots and nexus thanbefore, so the same adjective - social - isapplied to the self-destruction of theclassic society by means of an infinitebuenismo3 full of hypocrisy andeffrontery under a patina of politesse.Fascination for technology is a greatpoint shared by Lipovetsky, and, withless impact, by Castells (2007), whoadmits real social exclusion in themultilayered transformation that theInformation Age has brought us due tothe uneven access to new gadgets.

According to those points in closersocieties, technology forces us to makereal communication through virtuallife, stretching distances and breakingnatural tête-à-tête contact in whichspace and time converge (Hägerstrand,1975), and it leads us to the adoration ofexclusiveness of brands who fight incompetitive evolution by using theirdevices and making them part ofmodern lifestyle. (Lipovetsky, 1992).Moreover, technology was the meansused to organise recent protests andrevolutions having as opposition to theestablishment as their mainconsequence. The same establishmentthat allowed technology for its personaluse, but also filtered and cut libertiesand avoided the infringement of its

status quo, and only allowed changes inits particular and paradoxicalLampedusian journey; that is ‘changingeverything to let nothing change’.

Concurrently to the presence oflandscape change by people who do notlive in it, behaving more like spectatorsthan real actors, all the acknowledgedsocial principles derived from theKeynesian welfare state are beinginfringed as the state is not able toregulate the free economicdevelopment. It is well known that theeconomic paradigm that led Keynes(1936) to gain support for his model, wasthe counterpoint to contain thecommunist menace at the peak of thesocialist planned economies during thelate 50s and the decade of the 60s,when all the possible reproduction ofcapital was guaranteed. After the 1973oil crisis and even more so after the fallof the Iron Curtain and the end of thebig socialist planned economies, theeconomic paradigm shift, led Friedmanto propose a new status in which, as aconsequence, the state as a key figure toregulate economy was not necessary, asthe economy could regulate itself, aclear fallacy as it would break its ownscientific concept4 (Garrison, 1984).

Apart from the elasticity5 in themicroeconomic patterns that explainsthe law of supply and demand in termsof big scale economy very well, if it isself-regulated we can predict its futurebehaviour, so we can act inconsequence to avoid crisis. Forneoliberal economists that is notpossible, as economy is governed bystochastic processes so it would not bepossible to regulate it. As a mid-termconclusion and according to Feyerabend(1975), who proposed the biggestpossible span in philosophy of scienceby promoting epistemological anarchy,it finally seems that economy as ascientific concept contradicts itself,because if its behaviour cannot bepredicted, it cannot be treated as ascience at all, at least, not in classicterms.

Proof that the state is not only welcomebut also loses its importance as aneconomic regulator when a crisisbegins is the bunch of recipes forsolving the crisis. These are focused onopening new markets to private capital,privatising all the services provided bythe state and consequently increasing

civic participation, society, uprooting, class,economy

the social exclusion of people whocannot afford the access to new privateinfrastructures. What we live in is not anew landscape in which problems arestrictly derived from the mixed culturalpalimpsest of globalisation, asHuntington explains in his ‘Clash ofcivilizations’ (1996), but an ideologicalwar between neoliberal economy andthe state seen as an obnoxious andobsolete historical obstacle, as amodern version of Marx’s classstruggle. In these terms, asfinancialised capital6 fights to imposeits ideology, economists have realisedthat speculation contributes morebenefits even if risk is higher, creatingnew and increasing profit expectationsby means of bubbles. This is thanks tothe general improvement incommunications during theinformation age that allow faster andinnumerable automatic speculativetransactions. This global expositionfeeds back a rate that forces economiesto grow faster than before only ifmarkets are spread ad nauseam. AsLatouche (2003) exposes, the key ofmarkets spreading is a Gordian knotbased on advertising, credit andplanned obsolescence that makecustomers feel unsatisfied with theirpurchases in a short period of time.

This creates the necessity of acquiringnew goods to fulfil psychologicalemptiness, promoting the constantgrowth of companies. An averagegrowth of 3% was measured by Harveyfor companies, while the bubble modelsare in top form, but as markets arefinite, if companies decrease from 3%even having benefits, a new crisisbegins because they cannot stand thisrhythm of growth. In fact, and just asan example, the Spanish governmentavoided saying the maleficent anddamaging word ‘crisis’ by means oftypical euphemisms that curiously fitthe facts very well. Even the formerPrime Minister of the SpanishGovernment, Mr. Rodriguez Zapateropointed to the ‘economic deceleration’7in contrast to former conditions (Pérezand Bolaños, 2008).

The geographical consequences due tothe new economic status come fromthe value of the inherited physicalheritage added to all its intangible andcultural background, including all theinherent aspects of landscape. In theseterms, Brandification, as a new branchof the advertising world and very muchrelated to what Lipovetsky calls the‘Economy of Aesthetics’, has put a priceon place and on all culturalbackgrounds. It modifies all theinformation we can get through thesenses, and changes the meaning ofplace in its diverse spans: as a complexand deep spatial experience studied

under phenomenological assumptions(Buttimer, 1992; Relf, 1976; Frémont,1974) or just as the spatial tessera fromwhich all possible information isgathered by the senses (Aguiló, 1999). Iflandscape can be understood as anetwork of places in which a culture, inthe anthropological meaning of sharedknowledge, is received as a connectorfor society, the new sense of placemutates the basic qualities oflandscape, the way to understand itand subsequently all its related culture.As an example to illustrate the fact, allthe changes in main cities that converttheir downtowns into thematic parks(Disneyfication) can be presented(Harvey and Smith, 2005). In these newno-places commercial activities do notdisplay the real monetary resources,but a pantomime where the mostcliché aspects of the local culture areexaggerated to attract and impresstourists and future off-city inversions,extending market to non-tangiblegoods (Harvey and Smith, 2005) andcontinue supporting Alonso’s (1964)model. According to this new way,landscape is not lived or experiencedanymore but can be consumed even inall its ephemeral terms. (GómezMendoza, 2013). Having said that, thecapitalist society as an evolution ofhomo economicus would become a fulltautology in itself since it would besupremely individualistic, generatingthe paradox of calling society to acollective of isolated individuals whowould be infinitely selfish andcompetitive. In other words, the drift ofneoliberal economy degenerates into ahuman problem of purely existentialnature with geographicalconsequences, linking its essence withthe relation of all the identity processeswithin the territories and how freedomis articulated in those societies (Nadal,1990). Although nationalism is still akey topic for the understanding of thestructure of regions and their borders,Relph (1976) explains that uprooting is agrowing process due to the decrease ofidentities on account of the progress oftechnology and the increase inmobility. As new trends in economyhave landscape homogenisation as oneof their most important consequences,they complement the statements givenby Relph (1976), as they are spoilingtheir basis and experiences, demeaningthe importance of place as the key linkbetween society and territory.

Although relations between man andterritory are often described under theabstract terms of ‘expansion’, ‘balance’and ‘sustainability’, the need for spatialplanning has shown that, althoughthese terms foster good adaptation tospace, experience shows a different

reality, with adjustment problemsarising over time as they areformulated in financial rather thanhuman conditions. The return toclassic values in terms of size andresources in urban development, suchas the model of a compact city (Chueca-Goitia,1999), and human-scaledurbanism would minimise theseproblems, as well as a non-speculativevision of landscape and territory (SGA &Colegio de Geógrafos, 2006). From ageographical point of view, maybe thereformulation of teaching as a SpatialArt in which freedom and equality arewell-balanced (Frémont, 1974), and itsconsolidation as a key field of humanknowledge (Morin, 1999), could be thebasis to act, think and live the territory.However, due to the terms of Post-Democracy (Crouch, 2000) in which theincreasing and prevalent lack of socialjustice due to the divorce between thebureaucratic political class and society,and the violation of the terms ofdemocratic participation (Swyngedouw,2011), people have begun to expressthemselves spontaneously.Additionally, the contradiction betweenelectoral programs and governments,in a kind of real performance of Fo’sThe Two-Headed Anomaly, has ledsome local grassroot groups linked tosquatters' movements to take the reinsof common sense in protecting heritagein its cultural span and avoiding itsfinancial side (Jover-Baez & Almisas-Cruz, 2015), contrary to the purposesintended by effect of the lack of realgovernance in municipal politics.

Possibly an unhurried cultural renewal,filtered by an educative backgroundcould be the key to create citizens fromhabitants through the responsibility ofreal action and consciousness inpolitics to prevent uprooting. Thus,citizen participation should be key tokeeping the heritage landscape or toavoid its Disneyfication or the non-democratic exclusivity mentioned byMassey (1993) that led us to marketdemocracy. This becomes anothercontradiction in itself, but is quite closeto the idea already existing idea of afull market society8. Civic participationshould also be crucial to understandingthe basic strategies (Porras & Losada,2010) of social unity in a territory, suchas:

• Economic sustainability to promotethe egalitarian development of thewhole territory through theredistribution of assets throughbalanced planning of land use,development and effectivemanagement of resources as well asthe development and improvement oftransport infrastructures.

• Social sustainability through social

cohesion and integration of theterritory, which evolves and developssolidarity and equal growingconditions, in order to integrate andrespect the cultural and naturalenvironment by providing a betterquality of life for citizens.

• Environmental sustainability thatharmonises the requirements ofeconomic and social developmentwith the preservation andimprovement of the urban andnatural environment.

Although many details remain withoutenough development, the core of thisarticle is intended to show how thedisposition of land and landscape havechanged with the rise of an economicparadigm. This has led to changes inthe base of society’s existentialbehaviour through uprooting andalienation from the political class, withthe sole purpose of dissolving all theethical attitude and social structures,due to the presumably infinite growthof the markets. The aforementionedLatouche (2003) explains that marketscannot grow forever, for the simple factthat all activity is constrained within aterritory, and thus the horizon ofmaximum extension is previewedindicating that markets have limitsbecause of their territorial nature.Because of that relation, the strugglefor the control of territory has justbegun to price everything from territoryand landscape to the environmentalfootprint. For this scenario Latouche(2003) proposed the development ofDegrowth’s theory9 to distributewealth, work and heritage; in otherwords, solidarity and socialconsciousness within the territory andits finite resources. At the same time,the striking and impassive gaze ofindifference of much of societyemerges with disappointing results, asits will for change through civildisobedience cannot respond to theomnipresent controlling neoliberaleconomics that cut civil rights toperpetuate itself if necessary. It seemsthat the only step forward is consensusand greater interrelation betweensociety and political class in aframework of territorial redefinitionthat allows the development of humanbeings and their activities onacceptable terms of social cohesion in aterritory in which they dwell andbelong.

1 The term economicist explains andjustifies every aspect of society andbusiness on economic grounds placingthe well-being of the economy above

all. More information about this termin relation to land use can be gatheredin Alonso (1964).

2 Lipovetsky’s Theory of Individuality isderived from his consequent analysis ofpostmodern society in which theseparation of the public scene, the lossof sense of large collective institutionsand an open culture based on theexaggeration of permissive education,sexual freedom, tolerance andhedonism, create a new code ofinformal human relations thatarticulates a neo-individualism of thenarcissistic type. Further informationcan be found in Lipovetsky, G. (1989).

3 As Buenismo does not have a propertranslation in English, it can beinterpreted as ‘a mode to act thatmakes other people think about thekindness of people behaving that way’.

4 The confrontation of economic modelsby Keynes and Friedman is mostlybased on different readings of Keynes’General Theory of Employment,Interest and Money (1936) that explainshow global demand is the result of thecombination of family demand,investment funds, public spending andexports. The formula shows howunemployment can be controlled whenincreasing Global Demand by droppingtaxes and allowing a bigger familydemand, decreasing tax rates tofacilitate investment and credit,increasing Public Spending anddecreasing the foreign currency rate tofoster exportation. In the same termsand implementing the oppositechanges, inflation can be controlled.According to the theory, the mainconsequence says that unemploymentand inflation become antinomies astheir simultaneous existence is notpossible. Friedman criticised the lack ofresponse to the theory after the 1973 oilcrisis, in which inflation coexisted andincreased with unemployment, becausethat was not related to global demand,but for the real cost of oil. Then liberaland more recently neoliberal theoriesin relation to the ideas of AustrianSchool economists like Hayek and VonMises became the main guideline foreconomic control, controlling tax ratesand cutting back public spending,fostering privatisation, and optimizinggeneral spending not in terms of themacro-economy but in the micro-economy, with direct consequences onfamily demand, companies andsubsequently on scarcity. The actualpanorama of the crisis in the EUbecomes more restrictive as nationalgovernments cannot control tax ratesor the foreign exchange rates, thus thepossibility of exiting the Eurozone or ofa new ‘two-speed currency’ is still invogue, with all its geographical

implications. Further information canbe sought in Garrison (1984).

5 The concept of elasticity captures themeasure of the sensitivity of a variableto a change in another variable,referring to the degree to whichindividuals (consumers/producers)change their demand/amount suppliedin response to price or income changes.Refer to Harvey and Smith (2005) forfurther information.

6 Financialised capital is the non-stablevalue budget arising from riskymanoeuvres regarding speculation andbubble-based economic models. Furtherinformation can be gathered in Harveyand Smith (2005)7 A full discussion ofthe semantic nature of this point, aswell as the assumption of thedeceleration as a full crisis waspresented by the Spanish journalistsPérez and Bolaños (2008) in the Spanishnewspaper El País.

8 The concept of a market societymakes reference to the extension of theeconomy operated by voluntaryexchange in a free market towards thesociety and human necessities,depending on their purchasing power.For more information see Massey(1993).

9 Degrowth’s Theory is an economic andpolitical concept partly based on thetheory of the Romanian economistNicholas Georgescu-Roegen in 1971. It isbased on the hypothesis that theconstant increase of Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) is not sustainable for theglobal ecosystem, as natural resourcesare finite, so quality of life-improvement may be achieved withoutan increase in consumption but ratherby changing the dominant paradigm.See Georgescu–Roegen (1971) for moreon the subject.

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Buttimer, A. ed., 1992. Special Issues:History of the Geographical Thought,GeoJournal, 26(2).

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Chueca-Goitia, F., 1999. Breve historiadel urbanismo. Madrid: Alianza.

Cocteau, J., 1962. The Umbilical Cord.Paris: Plon.Crouch, C., 2000. Copingwith post-democracy. Fabian Ideas 598,London; Fabian Society.

Feyerabend, P.K., 1975. Discurso contrael método, Spanish translation ofAgainst Methode, translated by F.Hernán., 2001. Barcelona: Folio Fo, D.,2004. L'anomalo bicefalo, Roma :Gruppo Editoriale L' EspressoFrémont,A., 1974. Recherches sur l´espace vecu,L´Espace Géographique, 3(3), pp. 231-238.

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The essay strives to portraysome of the relationshipsbetween state, nationalism andidentity within the currentEuropean integration process. Itwill be argued that, since itsorigins, the latter has sufferedfrom some sort of alienationconducted by a socio-economicestablishment ruling anorganised political andeconomic system, the statecapitalism, which results inmany contradictions. On theone hand, it may be said that ithas permitted European nationsand citizens to become closerand to share some spaces; inboth its physical and abstractsenses. On the other hand, thissystem has progressed byreproducing intrinsicallystructural features andbehaviours that confront thementioned integration process.Nevertheless, it is believed thatEurope, regardless its widesocio-economic and culturaldifferences, could performbetter towards real integration.It is believed that changes areneeded and therefore somealternative ideas are presented.

The contents of this essay partiallyconverge with others the author isworking with on the Research Group onGeography and Regional and UrbanDevelopment (Andalusian R&Dprogramme, HUM-177).

“…Imagine there's no countries

It isn't hard to do

Nothing to kill or die for

And no religion too

Imagine all the people

Living life in peace...

You may say I'm a dreamer

But I'm not the only one

I hope someday you'll join us

And the world will be as one…”

Extract from Imagine, by John Lennon(Imagine LP, 1971).

Relations between nationalism, stateand identity are extremely complex andexplaining them requires a socialsciences multidisciplinary approach. Todo so, this paper adopts a geohistoricalstandpoint – in which geography andhistory do not overlap, but aredialectically interwoven (Soja, 2010) –striving to give an alternative and briefinsight into their current configuration.This is done following critical thinkingin geography combined with ideastaken from anthropology, economics,political science and psychology.

This latter science is a commendingpoint to start from. The theory of socialidentity was postulated within the fieldof social psychology in the late 1970s. Itsobjective is the investigation ofdynamic relations betweenpsychological processes and socialcontexts. One of the main hypothesisaims to analyse people’s motivation tocategorise and identify themselves witha certain group and in this way opposethemselves against others. Thepsychological structures that lie behindthis in-group behaviour, and thedepersonalised self-perception thatfollows, are also studied. In order tounderstand this broad self-categorisation process, Turner andOakes gave a key role to social norms,defining them as: “…the basis and mainproduct of influence: a response ispersuasive to the degree that itrepresents and participates in someshared, consensual reactionstereotypically associated with an in-group self-category and hence isperceived as valid, correct and

competent… which in turn leads to itsperception as appropriate, desirable,expected and something one ought tobelieve or do…” (1986, p. 246)

Turner and Oakes went on to explaingroup polarisation using these ideas. Atthe same time, they drew somehypotheses as to the source of influencethat leads to the definition of socialnorms within groups. The contradictionbetween the current production of thesesocial norms by the European nation-states in a context of bothsupranational integration andglobalisation as well as the legitimationof that nation-state by enforcing ademocratic, allegedly free and justsystem, is my departing hypothesis.

The principal aim is thereby to analysewho, throughout history, has definedand structured these social norms, howthe nation-state has developed andwhich implications can be found todayin Europe. Since it is believed socialnorms are a product, it is safe to deducethat they are shaped by dynamic socio-cultural processes that generate in bulkin-group self-identification. The theoryexposed and defended is that it hasbeen the national capitalist state andits rulers who, through adaptiveideological domination and theconsequent practical influence on everyaspect of life, are one of the causes – ifnot the main cause – of individuals’strong national self-categorisation.That is, an ongoing process of identity-making by reinforcing the nation-statethat diverges from the Europeanintegration process.

The origin of nation-states andnationalism can be traced back to themodern age, while three milestones areto be mentioned in particular. Firstly,the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, widelyknown as the maiden international lawagreement which recognised statesovereignty over territories it claimedfor its own. Secondly and thridly, both18th century American and FrenchRevolutions had marked consequences.The latter symbolises the transitionfrom the Ancien Régime to a new one,where political (national) secularfeatures came to light in opposition tothe absolutist dynasties ruling Europe.Though the revolution occurred in a

nation-state, democracy, globalisation,integration, identity, Europe

specific space-time, the continent wasalready developing a Europeanconsciousness thanks to theEnlightenment’s thinkers (Anderson,2011). This movement also had a majorrole in stimulating the liberalimaginary: including principles such asfree-market, private property, andterritorial sovereignty. These ideasconverged with the dissatisfaction ofthe bourgeois, the social class whichcontrolled, to varying extents, themeans of production and existingcapital, and, in some cases hadamassed fortunes by appropriatingsurplus. In short, the bourgeois hadaccumulated the economic power.However, the political power remainedlargely in the absolutist state, whoseautocratic system shaped a rigidestablished economic, social andpolitical organisation that gave thebourgeois reasons to look for major, ifnot radical, changes. As Hobsbawm(1962) noted, notwithstanding thebourgeois’ economic power, they wouldhave never succeeded without theparticipation of the proletarian class.The ideology the bourgeois created andused to overthrow the absolutist statewas nationalism, stemming from boththe Enlightenment’s rationalism andthe Romanticism’s exaltation. Nationswere legitimised by their liberalcorollary (exemplified by the triad:liberty, equality and fraternity). Theseideas had already spread over societyduring the 18th century and in so doing,had started to transform social norms.

At this point, it is essential to definesocial class. I accept the definitiongiven by Thompson, who consideredthat: “…class happens when some men,as a result of common experiences(inherited or shared), feel and articulatethe identity of their interests as betweenthemselves, and as against other menwhose interests are different from (andusually opposed to) theirs. The classexperience is largely determined by theproductive relations into which men areborn – or enter involuntarily” (1963, p.10-11). It is indeed productive relationsthat demarcate the belonging to a classthroughout history. As Mandel (1964)observed, the capitalisation of society1

is the process that, through thecenturies, fostered private property andindividualism, while redefining socialroles towards a particularcategorisation by recasting social andlabour regimes. The two maincategories consist roughly of ‘exploiters’– owning and controlling political andeconomic power, not always at thesame time – and ‘exploited’.Simultaneously, Thompson describesclass-consciousness as “…the way inwhich these experiences are handled incultural terms: embodied in traditions,value-systems, ideas, and institutional

forms…” (1963, p. 11). He used the verb“to handle” because he was assumingthat the bourgeois – again, to differentextents – had taken advantage of theireconomic privileged position toinfluence social and cultural shifts tomove in a direction that benefited onlytheir own class interests. Yet tosucceed, it was necessary to makethose interests universal in order todismantle that identities being shapedon labour grounds; therefore producingin-group self-categorisation on a basisdifferent to the strictly economic,political or socio-cultural grounds. It ishere where the national rhetoricemerged. Anderson (1983) referred tothis as the coming of the imaginedcommunities, inventing characteristicdiscourses underpinned in certainartefacts projected in the state scale. Ifindustrialisation and its rapidurbanisation recast lower classesidentities’ based on labour and newlocalities, nationalism worked to alterthese latter by redefining social norms,traditions and custom. The describedprocess is dynamic as a result of theinteraction of people’s beliefs,experiences and behaviours within agiven space-time. Many of these socialnorms were usually unwritten andhistorically structured on a local scale.

It has been the nation-state, throughinstitutionalisation, that has turned (orjumped the scale of) many of thesenorms into law, making them officialwithin a wider (national) territory andenforcing them by a monopoly onviolence. That is, what Weber describedas the “monopoly of the legitimate useof physical force” (1919, p.84). In order toovercome the absolute power of theruling European monarchies, thebourgeois defended the theory of thestate not as a consequence of divinewill, whose unique head was themonarch, but as a consequence ofcitizens, who were called nationals andtherefore giving back sovereignty to thenation. Despite this self-determinationprocess, the aforementionedreproduction of old regime parametersis continued, for instance, from whowere called nationals under this newregime. An example is the firstConstitution of Spain (1812, cited inTomás y Valiente, 1979) whichconsidered nationals (españoles), aspersons with fully recognised rights,only those free men born on Spanishterritories (including Spanish America)and their sons2. The expansion of thatnew regime also suffered cycles whichare closely related to the performanceof the capitalist economy. Neither isthe geohistorical development of theIndustrial Revolution – includingAfrica’s and some Asian areas’colonisation – a coincidence, nor is therapid growth of nationalisms and

imperialism after the early-mid 19thcentury revolutions (see Harvey, 2003).All in all, the way such ideas couldcatch on with the impoverished andillerate lower classes has not one singleexplanation. However, the standingpower of the promoters, i.e. the controlthe bourgeois effectively exercised atdifferent scales of social life wasundoubtedly essential in thisendeavour (see Arendt, 1945). The eliteof this class managed to alter thegeometry of power, using Massey’s(1993) concept. Hobsbawm also pointedout its recentness as a consequence ofits swift success: “…because the nationitself was historically novel, it wasopposed by conservatives andtraditionalists, and therefore attractedtheir opponents” (1990, p. 40).

The rise of the nation-state is thus fullof contradictions; two of which are veryobvious. Despite their mentionednovelty, nations expressed a necessityof differentiation that drove them toadopt a cultural discourse which wentback, in some cases, to ancient history.Whereas it proclaimed a transitiontowards a modern socio-politicalsystem, it required tradition to sustainits foundation and in turn fostered themaintenance of a sort of economic‘natural order’. Simultaneously, itbased its secular legitimacy on theimitation of some religious patterns,such as the creation of symbols andrituals. The adoption of a stateeducation system was crucial for thestandardisation of a national languageand the dispersion of its propaganda,i.e. flags, anthems and any othercultural artefacts (see Anderson, 1983).Its adulteration of history towards thedesired past can also be viewed in thealigned treatment given to culturalheritage (Jover-Báez and Almisas-Cruz,2015). The process of rapid intra-country cultural homogenisation andthe simultaneous creation of inter-country difference based on a ‘massproduction of traditions’ between 1870and 1914 as identified by Hobsbawm(1983), led to two World Wars in thefirst half of the 20th century.

Yet, in this period the nucleus is shapedfor what would later be called thewelfare state in Europe. FollowingPoulantzas (1978), the conquest of civiland human rights – which are pivotalin the development of the currentwestern democracies and this welfarestate – as we know them today, werenot fought by individuals in oppositionto the state, nor was a concession givenby the state. It was a long strugglecarried out by lower and oppressedclasses. In fact, the production systemthat imposed the capitalist modernstate increased class difference andtried to diminish, if not conceal, its

socio-economic impact by using thecultural artefacts that nationalismbrought to the fore. This can bedescribed as some of the ‘ideologicalstate apparatuses’; as Althusser definedthe associated function of thesetransformed social norms and old andnew legal norms through repressive,technical and ideological institutionsplaying a key role in theaforementioned legitimisation of thestate (Harnecker, 1969). Even though thestate presented itself as neutral, theupper classes managed to channel theirinterests as the state’s common wealth.In the process, working classes had toagree by giving their partial consent, asGodelier (1984) noticed. That is, thedegree of acceptance the ‘dominated’(or exploited) are adding to the powerthat ‘dominators’ (or exploiters) alreadyhave on them. The manner thisconsent has been and still ismanufactured, in Herman andChomsky (1988) words, is directlyrelated to the instrumentalisation offeelings towards nationalities(production of patriotism) by the stateand the mass-media (owned by thewealthy) through control andmanipulation: generation, alteration,suppression, of culture and identitieswithin a designated territory.Production and control over scales havebeen crucial to achieve this given that;“scale is… not socially or politicallyneutral, but embodies and expressespower relationships” (Swyngedouw,1997, p. 140). Such relationships are stillunbalanced nowadays, as is illustratedin the support of a particularinterwoven production and politicalsystem, of which some of its unjustsocio-economic consequences are beinganalysed in the next section.

“The bourgeoisie cannot exist withoutconstantly revolutionising theinstruments of production, and therebythe relations of production, and withthem the whole relations of society…The need of a constantly expandingmarket for its products chases thebourgeoisie over the entire surface of theglobe… The bourgeoisie has through itsexploitation of the world market given acosmopolitan character to productionand consumption in every country…”(Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 38).

In this extract of the CommunistManifesto, Marx and Engels hadalready noticed the uneven spatialexpansion of what was thriving as anew international (cosmopolitan) socio-economic system. In fact, what wasbeing simultaneously constructed (and

struggled with) was the foundation ofthe national-states as democraciesalongside the referred capitalisation ofsociety. The changes introduced havebeen intensifying ever since the 19thcentury, affecting all areas of lifeincluding the self, and its relationshipwith the state. It is here where, addingglobalisation to the equation, I wouldlike to set the focus.

In terms of the self, the capitalisationof society has brought theories aboutthe homo economicus. That is,individual agents constantly seekingtheir own welfare by maximizing theirpreferences, making economic rationalchoices using a cost-effective scheme,and thus achieving satisfaction (seeHargreaves Heap, et. al., 1992). This hasbeen theorised as being pivotal for theproper function of the capitalistsystem, since it claims that thecommon wealth is guaranteed if everymember of society adopts thatutilitarian behaviour. A result alreadyinstitutionalised by the liberalgovernments in the 1830s is illustratedby the fact that “…the man who had notshown the ability to accumulateproperty was not a full man, and couldtherefore hardly be a full citizen”(Hobsbawm, 1962, pp. 197-198). Hence,what the described process has alsoeffectively inserted, through thecenturies and more recently byneoliberal thinkers, are several changesof personal preferences. The extremematerialistic sense given to life by thegeneration of new constant needs,presently resulted in the reification ofpersonal relations and the design ofone-dimensional people, in Marcuse’sterms (1964), within the consumersociety (see Featherstone, 1991). For thesake of the economy, citizens are nolonger people, but (mass) consumers.To achieve this, the nation-state hasbeen instrumental. Hirsch andKannankulam have indicated that: “Bymeans of a process of socialisation thattakes the form of a state, members ofthe exploited classes are disorganised asindividual citizens. Simultaneously, thestate constitutes the terrain on whichthe development of a shared policy to bepursued by the ruling classes… becomespossible...” (2011, p. 16). It is indeed thedesired dismantlement of any type oforganisational formation outside thestate apparatuses towards the realm ofthe individual that the system, i.e., theelites who run it, have sought throughthe last centuries. That process iscurrently combined with institutionalstrategies of depolitisation (see Wilsonand Swyngedouw, 2014). Evidence isfound at different scales, for instance,on increasing legal restrictions onrights such as free speech in publicspaces (Mitchell, 2013). Citizenship, as asynonym of nationality, therefore

expresses the self-submission to theinterwoven political-institutional andsocio-economic (neoliberal) capitalistsystem. The lack of in-group belongingthat the theory here explained wouldhave brought to societies has beensubstituted for a broader self-categorisation, which succeedsalternatively due to the reinforcementof individual freedoms, globalisationand the cultural power of the nationalsymbols, among them, the territory. Itis not only the local community wherepeople are born and/or brought up, noris it only that local spatial and culturalentities to be identified in, but it is also,and specially, a larger space, a territoryproduced under capitalist rules,abstractly represented in the nationand institutionalised as a state.

European democratic welfare states, asmentioned above, are political productsof contested socio-spatial processes. Inthat geohistorical configuration, aturning point was the emergence of thepost-industrial society (see Bell, 1973),which altered social, labour, andeconomic relations at the same timethat electronics and informatics throve(Castells, 1996). This phenomenon wasdefined by Harvey (1989) as a time-spacecompression. It was precisely duringthe 1970s and 1980s that neoliberalfinancial capitalism successfullyexpanded (with the connivance of thestate; see Harvey, 2007) towards manyeconomic sectors, becominghegemonic. Its effective financialcontrol is run mainly throughindebtedness, as Peet (2011) proves. He,like Ferguson (2012), also highlights theintimate relationships between largecorporations, the wealthy, stategovernments, and supranationalinstitutions like the World Bank, theIMF or the ECB, which in turnillustrates modern class exploitation.The system has restructured itself,including the role given to state’snational discourse on differentiationand the way democracy functions. Ishall start explaining the latter.

After all that has been said, the nation-state can be viewed as both cause andconsequence of the capitalist systemand its development. Thus, it is notsurprising that the nation-state’sevolution suffered since globalisationtook off, with a sequential decrease ofstates’ power in relation to the market.It cannot be forgotten that it is the statewhich is intended to ensure, guaranteeand watch over democratic principles.The process by which that is done couldalso have suffered alterations, asHarvey noticed. What the state does istranslating abstract principles: such asequity, freedom, tolerance, solidarity,etc., into law within a territory, but this“…act of translation offers a moment of

liberatory as well as repressivepossibility” (2001, p. 199). The state as aninstitution has a privileged positionfrom which advantage can be taken tomanipulate the meaning or the degreeof intensity of these principles. Thenew alteration of the geometries ofpower caused by globalisation and itsneoliberal ideology has modified statesovereignty (see Sassen, 1996; Smith,2005). If the liberal revolutions in the18th century turned sovereignty fromthe private to the public (from theAncient Régime to the nation-state),neoliberalism is acting conversely.Power is being transferred to private(today corporate) hands, instead ofmaintaining it in the state, in thepublic. Though institutions still exist,they are being hollowed out since itspolitical (democratic, plural) nature isdenied by identifying it with thegovernance. The nation-state raisond’être is questioned and therefore therule of the majority, democracy, iscurrently being threatened (Harvey,2007). The role of the state in thisglobalised society no longer seems to bethat of the preservation of democracyand the social principles that itrepresents, but rather the maintenanceof a system ruled by the market. Here,social injustice, is partially concealedby a national affiliation discourse andthe orchestration of a neoliberal‘cultural hegemony’, which, followingGramsci draws a sort of ‘commonsense’ (as opposed to a ‘good sense’; seeHarvey, 2007). This means a sort ofdomination, “...no longer directly basedon military force, but on forms ofideological consent that call for newkinds of political and culturalresistance” (Anderson, 1998, p. 120).

How has this alteration of thegeometries of power by globalisationturned into such a hegemonicscenario? One of the theoreticalanswers is found on the re-scaling ofthe national discourse and the newgoals given to nationalism. Forinstance, national differentiation thatused to be fostered within Europe acentury ago, has shifted towardsmutual recognition of nationalcultures, especially after the SecondWorld War and the necessity of anintegration process in Europe.Nonetheless, the global capitalistsystem needs state structures and stateeconomic competition, so integrationhas limits. While this is contradictoryin a society which is more globalisedevery day, it explains whydifferentiation discourses in Europe arestill alive, normally pointing towardsother objectives, while nationaldiscourse is nowadays structureddifferently, but is still feeding from theculture of fear.

Fear, like love, is incredibly powerful.The neoliberal nation-state has alsobenefited from reinforcing fear amongits citizens to maintain its socio-politically privileged position. If there isan enemy, an antagonist, the nationalrhetoric is managed and designed inopposition to it (or usually, them),which at the same time helps toconsolidate in-group (intra-country)sentiments. However, nationality hasnot been exclusively used, but rather, awide range of discourse, lately basedprimarily on ethnicity and religion.Todorov (2008), in his Fear ofbarbarians, defends the plural anddynamic identity of individuals and thetwo main inherent characteristics ofcultures: their plurality and variability3.Precisely, these concepts, in their pureessence, cannot be totally acceptedunder the capitalist system as it isconceived today, because what isconstantly evoked is the exclusivebelonging to a nation, a religion, a race,a group, etc. This neoliberalisednational discourse is ideologicallyhegemonic and thus, as a general rule,unlikely to be pluralistic, being at thesame time opposed to any sort ofuniversality (see Maalouf, 1998). Inorder to legitimise the difference inthat new global scenario, thathegemonic discourse (always stronglymediatised) has adopted innovativetactics. A classic example, is theemployment-related speech, by whichothers (immigrants) are coming to ourcountry to steal our jobs, which belongto us as nationals (please noticeemphasis). Albeit it is a discourse onethnicity and religion, as I was saying,it is usually connected to illegalactivities, the one that has a deeperimpact in Europe. In a work about fearand terrorism, Altheide writes: “It is notfear of crime… It is what this fear canexpand to, what it can become… Themajor impact of the discourse of fear isto promote a sense of disorder and abelief that “things are out of control”…”(2009, pp. 57-58). At the end, theobjective is remarking on difference,and is persuasively used – withoutforgetting, by those who are in power –are forms of non-physical violence.Appadurai reminds that it is in“…events of extreme collective violence[non-physical, and especially physical,such as terrorism or foreign militaryintervention] that we can see thespiralling loop which producespredatory nationalisms” (2000, p. 138).

In a recent work, Merrifield points outthat: “The people can’t be wrong,Rosseau always insisted, but they can,he warned, often be deceived, deceivedinto acting for what isn’t in their owninterests. One of the most effective formsof deceiving people is fear, and today abig perpetrator of fear is austerity”

(2014, p. 127). Merrifield refers toausterity measures that are currentlytaken by the elites and the political andeconomic establishment across Europethrough the policy regime, as Peet (2011)calls it. Such measures in times ofcrisis provoke, among others, scarcityin the labour market and thereinforcement of the discourse of fearof immigrants ‘stealing’ jobs, followingthe previous example. It is a discoursedriven by fear and focused onindividualism and difference to othersand carries first scepticism anddistrust, followed by isolation,discrimination, and xenophobia. Thiscan ultimately be done thanks torescaling nationalisms to make thempolitically and culturally hegemonicwithin the globalised neoliberal statecapitalist system4.

In the preface of the Statute of theCouncil of Europe, also known as theTreaty of London, signed in May, 1949,the states that first joined stated,among the reasons to sign, thenecessity of: “Reaffirming their devotionto the spiritual and moral values whichare the common heritage of theirpeoples and the true source of individualfreedom, political liberty and the rule oflaw, principles which form the basis ofall genuine democracy”. The momentowhen the treaty was signed cannot beforgotten: after the end of the SecondWorld War, in the context of theincreasing Cold War. Shortly after, in1952, what would be the EuropeanUnion embryo was established: theEuropean Coal and Steel Community.What I want to be emphasised is thatthe economic grounds of the current EUdiverges from the democracy-basedCouncil of Europe motivation.

That is why it is not difficult to statethat the EU project has had a biasedeconomic cause since its foundation.Maintaining peace was essential, but itwas mainly thought and done throughthe sharing of a common market forgoods. In contrast, EU citizenship isonly a twenty year-old phenomenon.Belina explains how this economic,neoliberal character of the EU issustained and fostered by a triadfetishisation working at the same time:the fetishisations of credit/debt,competitiveness, and territories.Nowadays these processes “…hiderelevant aspects of the political-economic reasons for the current Eurocrisis and the way in which it is dealtwith politically” (2013, p. 33). In thiscontext, compromises towards socio-cultural and economic integrationwithin Europe are encountering majordifficulties. Identity seems to be crucial.

Déloye writes in general that “Europeanidentity is… offered up as compatiblewith the cohabitation of preexistingnational identities within a publicmultinational European civil society”(2008, p. 103), which is in turn,following Déloye, defined by thecommon democratic culture. Theproblem is that the EU’s final objectivesare not entirely socio-cultural, buteconomic, and that consequentlyaffects European democracy andEuropean identity. For instance, theTitle IV of the Treaty of the Functioningof the EU (European Union, LisbonTreaty, signed in 2007) assures the ‘freemovement of people, services andcapital’, all at the same scale. Yet peopleare to encounter more difficulties tomove within the EU than capital5. As aresult, a survey-research conducted bythe Pew Research Centre in 2012 aboutEuropean unity in some different EUcountries shows that EU favouritismhas decreased in some countries up to20% between 2007 and 2012, coincidingwith the crisis.

The neoliberal measures undertaken bythe European institutions, especiallythe ECB, reaffirm the biased economiccharacter of Europe, giving moreimportance to certain companies andbanks than to people. To illustrate this,the example of the policy changes onthe banks’ required minimum ratio ofreserves can be mentioned. Banks haveto maintain, by law, an amount ofmetallic money (ready cash), which isformally called the cash depositrequirement, and that is decided bycentral banks, such as the ECB in theEuro zone. As Navarro and Torres-López(2012) denounce, cash depositrequirements have shifted from 30% inthe seventies to approximately 10%nowadays, due to financial sectorlobbying. That shift gives a broadercapacity of action to banks andfinancial corporations, since they canmanage a larger amount of money to

lend in loans or mortgages as well asinvest in all types of markets and in sodoing, make profit. This system ofcreation of money (bank money orabstract money, not ready cash) allowsthem to strengthen their power, endowthem to take higher risks, and permitsthem to encounter less, if not totallyavoid, public control. Here is anexample of the sovereignty transfermentioned above, which has movedfrom the nation-state to privatecorporations and to supranationalinstitutions. Some of the latter – likethe European Parliament – arepresumably controlled by citizens, andsome others – like the ECB – are not6.The question therefore could be: who isbenefiting from this situation?Definitely those elites ruling thesystem, who are never entitled to losetheir investments, no matter how largethe credit crunch would be7.Simultaneously, austerity measures areimposed in countries such as Greece,Portugal, Ireland or Spain (the so-calledPIGS), which means public policies arealmost exclusively made of cutbacks intheir social welfare systems. As aconsequence, national culture is now –with different spatial extent – acting asa catalyst for anti-europeanism.Especially worrying is the increase ofpower of Greece’s extreme rightautocratic, separatist, racist andhomophobic party Golden Dawn,having entered the Parliament (18deputies out of 300) with 6.9% of votesin the elections in June, 2012, althoughthis was reduced to 17 seats during themost recent elections in January 2015.It is therefore not surprising that inthese countries (in the followingexample, Spain and Greece) mostpeople do not trust the free marketeconomy anymore. Even the ECB isseen plainly in an unfavourable light.

The political-economic neoliberalregime created in Europe has alsoreceived a serious warning in the last

European parliament elections. It is nota coincidence that extreme right isincreasing in countries such as Greece,Bulgaria or Hungary which rank in thelowest positions of a recent report onsocial justice within EU countries(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014). Yet farright or populist, anti-european partieshave significantly increased also inFrance, the United Kingdom, Germany,the Netherlands and Denmark, amongothers8. These organisations whoseconcept of democracy is ratherexclusive if not nonexistent are gainingpower thanks to European institutionsand their neoliberal policies. They haveemphasised market integration insteadof democracy (people’s) integration,being instrumental in the deregulationof the national economies andprivatisation of state (public) welfareassets and resources, while rescalingnationalism and fetishisingcompetition and territories instead ofbuilding a project based on collective,universal, plural and just principles.

Many ideas have been mentionedthrough this paper and it is obviouslynot the intention of the author to coverall of them, as this would beimpossible. However, some conclusionscan be reached.

Class dominance exists. It is no longera dichotomy between bourgeois andproletariat, but a redefined, well-planedstructure in which the upper classreproduces itself ad infinito to remainin power: they are the elites, the power-holders, the 1%. In this article, ageohistorical approach ending in a briefanalysis of our current situation inEurope shed light on this.

The expansion of the capitalist statetowards a democratic welfare statebrought prosperity to Western Europefor decades. Seeking a broader welfare

was key for the EU integration processto start. However, it has developed as aprocess dominated by globalisation, inwhich neoliberal nation-state rhetoricconducts the political, spatial andcultural domination exercised inalmost all scales benefiting Europeanelites. Nationalism is constantlyfuelled, while the market has no nationbut profit, allowing capital and goods tomove with freedom. The economicpreponderance over other spheres oflife is strikingly outstanding, despitepeople’s commitment to subvert thissituation. That commitment is usuallyorganised in social movements orsubaltern collectives, which struggle forinfluence and control at several scales.Nevertheless, neoliberal ideologicalsupremacy commands the economy,which, through the market forces,controls many of these scales:supranational, national, regional oreven local institutions, policy strategies

and daily decision-making. Aninternational example can be given:whereas consensus on Human Rightsin supranational scales such as theUnited Nations has been achieved,there are still some issues to be tackled,i.e. some countries to ratify importantagreements. In contrast, agreementsconcerning the market are usuallysmoothly reached and protected.Developed countries’ reluctantbehaviour to implement taxes oninternational transactions, such as theTobin tax, give evidence of this.Unfortunately, it seems that, when itcomes to making profit, everything ispossible, while human lives aresecondary.

The hypocrisy, selfishness or lack ofdemocratic principles lying behindthese situations can be explained by theeffectiveness of the capitalisation ofsociety and the role of the culture of

fear and difference displayed in theinterest of the dominant class. Only theinterrelated processes studied are ableto explain the turning of valuessuffered by European society in the lastdecades, which has been especiallyrapid since the fall of the Berlin Wall.Henceforth, individualisation sought bythe consumer culture in globalisedsocieties built and rebuilt new schemesaround people’s self-categorisationparameters, raising the importance, forinstance, of constantly shifting fashionin many aspects (architecture, music,clothes, etc.) which people couldidentify with. Concurrently,globalisation triggered new interlinkedspatial processes: concentration in andgentrification within cities, urbansprawl, mass-tourism andbrandification of historical urban areas,massive migration flows, etc.; many ofwhich reinforced national characterseven if the states would not havepursued it. Herein lies one of the mostdangerous features of nationalism: itspower to take out patriotism,instrumentalised by adulteratedsentiments of belonging, and usuallyseized by fear given particularcircumstances that are beyond thecontrol of the nation-state that holds itand benefits from it. In fact, patriotismhas suffered changes through the lastcentury at a similar rhythm as culture,yet it seems to be healthy –probablybecause it is constantly reproduced inthat globalised context. Perhaps themost visual example can be massivesport events, such as Olympic Games orfootball World Cups.

The most remarkable of these changesare the strives and achievements totransform from a working class-oriented collective feeling towards aglobal-oriented individual self whosein-group necessity is satisfiedalternatively by fashion, global trendsand national symbols. In the process,many local, physical and mentalstructures were attacked, adapted,mutated, and substituted by fresh built-up identities linked to other scales ofbelonging, the nation being theprincipal one. The paradox raises todayas the nation seems to be usefulbecause neoliberal capitalism,symbolised by class interest, needs toreflect its ideological hegemonicdiscourse in order to maintain theintra-country, socially unjust and thusdemocratically weak status quo, andthe inter-country competition andpower distribution which, in turn,allows the system to keep working bybreeding extremely uneven spatial,social, labour, and productive economicrelations. In the latter, exploiters andexploited can be easily identified,especially in non-developed areas ofthe world. In any case, deeper studies

from the network society to bolstertheir hegemonic, and intrinsicallyunjust, position. Our virtual lives areimportant; they help us to shareabstract spheres we would have neverthought possible years ago. We need tokeep doing this, as a necessity for thecohesion of the plural people of Europe:EGEA is a fabulous example of this.However, it is also important to beconscious of the manifold class control,not easily perceived, exercised in thatabstract spaces as well as the physicalones. It is important in both, toorganise ourselves, to cooperate, andexchange; that is how empathy,tolerance or critical thinking increase.Belonging to and working in ourlocalities, or regionalities, alwaysbearing in mind the importance ofshared democratic principles governingour relations, creates a communitywhere everyone can feel involved, andcould boost our vision towards anotherEurope. Because at the end theintegration needed is the one ofEuropean people, not European biasedinstitutions: they are the means, butwe are who must decide what futurewe want for our continent.

This article was written in the summerof 2013 and corrected one year later. Iwant to firstly thank the editors of theEuropean Geographer for theirextraordinary work: corrections andcomments that undoubtedly improvedthe quality of this paper. Secondly, I amgrateful to my entity friends of EGEASevilla – Guadalgea and my felloworganisers, as well as all theparticipants, of the EMRC 2013: yourpersonal and scientific contributionhas been essential. More concretely, Iwould like to dedicate this article toAlejandro Martín for teaching me,among other things, that life hasinfinite paths waiting to be discovered,and to Justino Losada for his ever-stimulating and insightful comments.And last but certainly not least; thisarticle is dedicated to Iris van Beers, forher help with language and logistics,support and inspiration. Of course, Ialone remain responsible for itscontent.

1Capitalisation of society refers to theacceleration process of using capital inparticular ways from the early ModernAge onwards, the industrialisation, andthe consequent effects in society. Itdoes not refer to the existence of capitalitself, which can be dated as ancient asmankind, since it has been alwaysintended to the satisfaction of humanneeds (Hobsbawm, 1962).

2In fact, family heritage was also takeninto account; a characteristic ofEuropean liberal states in the 19thcentury as an example will show later.Foreigners could obtain citizenship byparliamentary concession, andfreemen could acquire it if they wereliberated –since the Constitution stillrecognised slavery (see Tomás yValiente, 1979).

3The Bulgarian-French philosopherfocuses, in some parts of his book, oncriticising works of those who haveconceived and supported either frompolitics or academia “the clash ofcivilizations”, such as Hirsi Ali orSamuel Huntington, who coined thatconcept.

4Please note the rescaling of the nationby the neoliberal state does notexclusively apply to that done bynation-states, but also other territorieswhich have their own state historybefore modern nation-states,.Nowadays many of them have somesort of institutional (regional, federal)autonomy, such as Scotland, Catalonia,the Basque Country, etc. (seeSabanadze, 2010).

5For example, an official draft reportreleased in March 2014 proposes tolimit residence permits for EUimmigrants in Germany up to 3months of stay without having found ajob. Yet it is not law, the discussion onthe welfare state abuses in the firsteconomy of the Eurozone is on thetable. (German Federal Ministry of theInterior and German Federal Ministryof Labour and Social Affairs, 2014)

6It should be reminded that Eurozonecitizens do not directly elect thepresident of ECB, while the institutionis obviously political. Furthermore, thelack of citizens’ sovereignty is alsorelated to doors between public andprivate institutions usually spinning(see Ferguson, 2012; Merrifield, 2014).The better example might precisely bethe current head of the ECB, Mr. MarioDraghi, who came on power from theprivate sector: concretely fromGoldman Sachs, a bank that had a keyrole in the unfolding of the 2008 crisis.

7Nobel Laureate economist PaulKrugman, in the NY Times on-linedefined the picture of Europe as “…aEuropean policy elite always ready tospring into action to defend the banks,but otherwise completely unwilling toadmit that its policies are failing thepeople the economy is supposed toserve.” (2013)

8An interactive map on the topic can befound on The Telegraph online:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl

on these related topics must be carriedout in the future, always adhering to amultidisciplinary approach.

Referring specifically to the EUintegration process is therefore nottotally positive. It seems difficult tomake real achievements once thesystem places economy overdemocracy, and uses nationalism as aweapon to ensure that this occurs byconstantly replicating difference.Experiences such as the IDEA Seminarthat encourages this paper are crucialto turn over the situation.Simultaneously, it is necessary to raiseawareness on the configuration of thehistorical and current roles played byevery actor in our continent’s scenario.European integration, in my opinion,means the deconstruction ofnationalisms as they are understoodtoday, whilst recognising andrespecting difference and searching forwider social justice in socio-economicterms. That clashes with the interestsof the upper class minority governingthe system, and produces ongoingmultiscale and hardly ever loud,usually silent, figurative fights. Theseare, in essence, fights for whichprinciples must rule our lives, whetherthey are those which are ethicallyuniversal to humanity and ensured bysocial-based democracy, or those whichhad kidnapped and altered the latter soas to impose their neoliberalimaginary.

Solutions to overcome this historicallyrooted situation in relation to Europeanintegration therefore begin bycriticising the current mass consumerculture, as well as using creativity todismantle our national mentalstructures – and its barriers, fears andprejudices, i.e., to emancipateourselves. Being aware of our realneeds, not the ones fostered by thesystem, is therefore crucial: money willalways be a means to life, never theobjective. At the same time, beingconscious of the historical trajectory ofnations and nationalism as have beenexplained is considered vital, giventheir ideological exclusive discourseand therefore their discriminatorynature. On the contrary, workinglocally as an alternative, appropriatingof the public spaces of our regions,cities, towns, villages, etc., in order toshare knowledge and experiences inour spatially closer scopes, i.e.,generating community from below, areways in which to augment integration.Large-scale national as well as globalidentities that still producedifferentiation, that are using theirpower to divide in cultural, ethnic,religious, or national blocs, arenormally lacking of direct humaninteraction. They are usually benefiting

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