european view - volume 2 - autumn 2005 europe, its borders and role in the world

EUROPEAN VIEW

Wilfried Martens EU-US Relations: Old Challenges and New Opportunities • Antonio López-Istúriz & Kostas Sasmatzoglou Democracy-building in Europe and Beyond • Elmar Brok The EU as a Global Player in the 21st Century Perspectives for the Common Foreign and Security Policy • Fraser Cameron The EU and Global Governance • Recep Tayyip ErdoğanTurkey - The Missing Link in the European Puzzle • Benita Ferrero-Waldner Future Prospects for the European Neigh-bourhood Policy • Franco Frattini Europe, Global Security and the Fight Against Terrorism • Ingo Friedrich Quo Vadis? Europe’s Role in a Globalised World • Lawrence Gonzi Mediterranean Security and Regional Management • Leonid Gozman Russia and Europe: Between Love and Hate • Annette Heuser Europe’s World - A Global Power in the Making • John Howard Australia - EU Relations: Shared Interests, Common Challenges • Ioannis Kasoulides Cyprus: Becoming Europe’s Hub in the Middle East • Jyrki Katainen Releasing the Northern Potential: Benefiting from Baltic Area Investment • John McCain Transatlantic Relations: An American View • Don McKinnon The Commonwealth and the European Union • John Edwin Mroz Securing Europe and Its Neighbours • Per Stig Møller Working Even Closer: the EU, the United Nations and the Reform of the Security Council • Ong Keng Yong Advancing ASEAN-EU Relations in the 21st Century • Jan Petersen Europe’s Role in Solving Conflicts and Building Peace • Mariano Rajoy EU and Latin America - A Special Relationship • Dimitrij Rupel Security and Cooperation in Europe - A View of the Future • Mikheil Saakashvili Democratic Choice • Nicolas Sarkozy France for a More Ambitious Europe • Jacek Saryusz-Wolski Belarus: The Gate of Europe • Mirek Topolánek Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Role of New Member States • Yannis Valinakis Paving the Western Balkans’ European Path • René van der Linden The Council of Europe and the EU - Partners for a Stable Europe • Victor Yushchenko Ukraine Towards the European Project

EUROPE, ITS BORDERS AND ROLE IN THE WORLD

Volume 2 - Autumn 2005

A Journal of the Forum for European Studies

EUROPEAN VIEW

European View is a Journal of the Forum for European Studies, published by the European People’s Party. European View is a biannual publication that tackles the entire spectrum of Europe’s political, economic, social and cultural developments. European View is an open forum for academics, experts and decision-makers across Europe to debate and exchange views and ideas.

EDITORIAL BOARD Chairman: Wilfried Martens, President of the European People’s Party, former Prime Minister, Belgium

Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister, SwedenElmar Brok, Member of the European Parliament, Germany John Bruton, former Prime Minister, IrelandMário David, Member of Parliament, PortugalVicente Martínez-Pujalte López, Member of Parliament, Spain Loyola de Palacio, former Vice-President of the European Commission, SpainChris Patten, former Member of the European Commission, United KingdomJan Petersen, former Foreign Minister, NorwayHans-Gert Poettering, Chairman of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament, Germany Alexander Stubb, Member of the European Parliament, Finland József Szájer, Vice-Chairman of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament, Hungary Andrej Umek, former Minister for Science and Technology, Slovenia Per Unckel, former Minister of Education and Science, SwedenYannis Valinakis, Deputy Foreign Minister, Greece ADVISORY BOARD Antonio López-Istúriz, Christian Kremer, Luc Vandeputte, Kostas Sasmatzoglou, Ingrid Goossens, Guy Volckaert

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFTomi Huhtanen

Assistant Editors:Michèle Cimenti, Mélanie Dursin, Galina Fomenchenko

For editorial inquiries please contact:European ViewEditor-in-ChiefRue d’Arlon 671040 Brusselsemail: [email protected]. +32 2 285 41 49Fax. +32 2 285 41 41Url: www.epp-eu.org/europeanview

The Forum for European Studies is a think-tank dedicated to Christian Democrat and like-minded political values, which is engaged in open, comprehensive and analytical debate.

European View and its publishers assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication. Articles are subject to editing and final approval by the Editorial Board.

This publication is partly funded by the European Parliament.

European View2

CONTENTS

• Editorial: Democracy-building in Europe and Beyond ................................................................................................5 Antonio López-Istúriz & Kostas Sasmatzoglou

• EU-US Relations: Old Challenges and New Opportunities ........................................................................................13 Wilfried Martens

• The EU as a Global Player in the 21st Century - Perspectives for a Common Foreign and Security Policy ..............................................................................................................................................................................19 Elmar Brok

• The EU and Global Governance .................................................................................................................................................27 Fraser Cameron

• Turkey - The Missing Link in the European Puzzle .......................................................................................................33 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

• Future Prospects for the European Neighbourhood Policy .......................................................................................41 Benita Ferrero-Waldner

• Europe, Global Security and the Fight Against Terrorism ........................................................................................47 Franco Frattini

• Quo Vadis? Europe’s Role in a Globalised World ............................................................................................................53 Ingo Friedrich

• Mediterranean Security and Regional Management ...................................................................................................57 Lawrence Gonzi

• Russia and Europe: Between Love and Hate ......................................................................................................................65 Leonid Gozman

• Europe’s World - A Global Power in the Making .............................................................................................................71 Annette Heuser

• Australia - EU Relations: Shared Interests, Common Challenges .........................................................................77 John Howard

• Cyprus: Becoming Europe’s Hub in the Middle East ....................................................................................................83 Ioannis Kasoulides

• Releasing the Northern Potential: Benefiting from Baltic Area Investment ..................................................87 Jyrki Katainen

• Transatlantic Relations: An American View ......................................................................................................................95 John McCain

• The Commonwealth and the European Union ..............................................................................................................103 Don McKinnon

• Securing Europe and its Neighbours ....................................................................................................................................107 John Edwin Mroz

3Volume 2 - Autumn 2005

• Working Even Closer: the EU, the United Nations and the Reform of the Security Council .............................................................................................................................113

Per Stig Møller

• Advancing ASEAN-EU Relations in the 21st Century ................................................................................................119 Ong Keng Yong

• Europe’s Role in Solving Conflicts and Building Peace ...........................................................................................125 Jan Petersen

• EU and Latin America - A Special Relationship ...........................................................................................................131 Mariano Rajoy

• Security and Cooperation in Europe - A View of the Future ..............................................................................137 Dimitrij Rupel

• Democratic Choice ............................................................................................................................................................................143 Mikheil Saakashvili

• France for a More Ambitious Europe ...................................................................................................................................147 Nicolas Sarkozy

• Belarus: The Gate of Europe .......................................................................................................................................................153 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

• Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Role of New Member States .........................159 Mirek Topolánek

• Paving the Western Balkans’ European Path .................................................................................................................165 Yannis Valinakis

• The Council of Europe and the EU - Partners for a Stable Europe ..................................................................171 René van der Linden

• Ukraine Towards the European Project ..............................................................................................................................177 Victor Yushchenko

European View4


With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the European Union faced enormous challenges in its effort to stabilise and gradually integrate the newly established, but fragile Central and Eastern European democracies. A major part of this challenge was to help build strong and reliable democratic foundations in these countries, based on the fundamental political virtues of post-WWII Europe; the same ones that inspired the creation of a common and united European home.

The European People’s Party (EPP) – whose founding fathers and member-parties have pioneered the European project from its inception – was determined to take a leading role, despite the magnitude of the task (dozens of countries, hundreds of economic and social problems, limited EU resources, etc.). The primary aim was to bolster the political forces that were committed to democracy, social market economy and the rule of law, particularly since many of them were kept marginalized by refurbished post-communist political elites, groomed by the European Socialists.

The hard work of the last 15 years has brought impressive results since our like-minded political partners have entered the center-stage of national and European politics and have managed to bring the most recent EU enlargement cycle to a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the drive for democracy-building by the EPP is far from over. Our work in the Western Balkans is still evolving and we have only started becoming engaged in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, not withstanding our ad hoc activities in the Trans-Caucasus and the Russian Federation.

Beyond our immediate neighbour-hood, the EPP is particularly concerned with the democratic challenges of the Middle East and North Africa and the grave dangers of religious and political extremism. The post-

September 11 global environment and the surge of terrorist acts – many of them on European soil – has made us particularly sensitive to the need for greater stability, democracy and prosperity in the problematic parts of the world.

Another region that was, is, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future politically problematic is Latin America. The EPP and our global partners have, for many years, been at the forefront of assisting democratic forces and exposing authoritarian regimes, such as Cuba and Venezuela, and will not rest until democracy takes root throughout the region.

Enlarging through Enlargement

The integration of the newly-established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe was a pain-staking process with political reform at its heart. With the swift submission of EU membership applications by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia the EPP, soon enough, received a wave of applications by political parties eager to join our political family and to utilise our political experience, resources and democratic methods. This eagerness was understandably acute in countries where yesterday’s communists became today’s ‘democrats’ who helped preserve large parts of the old economic and bureaucratic establishments while dipping into the new ‘spoils’, generated by the free-market economy.

Editorial

Democracy-building in Europe and Beyond

By Antonio López-Istúriz & Kostas Sasmatzoglou

Antonio López-Istúriz & Kostas Sasmatzoglou

More importantly, these post-communist politicians quickly found refuge in the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Socialist International (SI) who, due to their traditional ‘flexibility’ towards such politicians and practices, rose triumphantly to the occasion.

The EPP, therefore, had the task of commencing its own enlargement process that would also complement the overall enlargement policy of the European Union. It would, first, have to identify potential political partners that would generally adhere to the basic ideological principles and values of the EPP and that would also represent a noteworthy portion of the national electorate. After identifying such a party and before even considering any type of membership affiliation1, European political think tanks2 affiliated to the EPP would overtake the challenge of offering training and educational programmes to the leaders, advisers, youth and to any other party member that was considered important for the greater democratization and ‘Europeanization’ of the political party. In parallel, the EPP would pool all other available resources – particularly those from the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament – to organize conferences, seminars, and other relevant activities in all these countries. The coordinating role for all these activities was handled by long-standing EPP Vice-President Wim van Velzen3. The experienced Dutch politician, chairing both the EPP Working Group on “Enlargement & EPP Memberships” and the Working Group of the EPP-ED Group on Central and Eastern Europe, was uniquely placed to manage this Herculean task on behalf of the EPP.

The results from all these efforts proved to be very positive since, slowly but surely, most of these parties entered the center-stage of national and, eventually, European politics. By gradually integrating with the EPP as observers and associate members they managed, at the pre-accession stage, to become well-acquainted with European-level political behaviours and practices. For example, with the participation of their leaders at the EPP Summit – which prepares the agenda of the EU Council Summit – they had the opportunity to become engaged with EU policies prior to the accession of their countries. Furthermore, political leaders from these countries began playing a role in the internal decision-making process of the EPP. At the October 2002 EPP Congress in Estoril (Portugal) for example, two out of the eleven EPP Vice-Presidents elected came from the enlargement countries: the Hungarian leader of FIDESZ and former Prime Minister Victor Orban and the Bulgarian leader of UDF4 and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nadezhda Mihailova.

By May 2004, when the European Union welcomed 10 new Member States, the EPP had accepted 18 political parties as full members: one from the Czech Republic5, two from Estonia, two from Hungary, three from Latvia, two from Lithuania, two from Poland, three from Slovakia, and three from Slovenia.6 The success of the EPP in these countries was also reflected in the June 2004 European elections in which the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament secured 268 seats and first place, with MEPs from all the recently acceded Member States (and from all other EU Member States). In the newly enlarged European Commission, 3 out of the 9

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1 The EPP offers three types of membership status: a) observer member, b) associate member (maximum status for parties belonging to EU candidate countries, EFTA countries, & Stability Pact countries), and c) full member (maximum status for parties belonging to EU member countries).

2 The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS – by far the largest, linked to the CDU), together with the ÖVP Political Academy, the Eduardo Frei Foundation (CDA), the Hanns Seidel Stiftung (CSU), FAES (PP), along with the Budapest-based Robert Schuman Institute (directly affiliated to the EPP), a.o.

3 Wim van Velzen is the former leader of the Dutch CDA and former Vice President of the EPP-ED Group and Member of the European Parliament. He continues to Chair EPP Working Group “Enlargement & EPP Memberships.”

4 The EPP has accepted three parties as associate members from Bulgaria, including the UDF, with the application of Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria still outstanding.

5 Our EPP-ED Group also accepted MEPs from the ODS in its ED section - the EPP application of ODS remains outstanding.6 The EPP also accepted one member from Cyprus and one from Malta. For a full listing of EPP members, please visit www.

epp-eu.org.

EPP Commissioners came from the enlargement countries.7 Currently in the European Council, 4 out of 11 EPP heads of government are from the new EU Member States8. With the imminent accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the influence of the EPP is, once again, well represented in the political mainstream of these countries. In Romania, two out of three EPP member parties comprise the current government coalition and Romanian President Train Basescu is the former President of the Democratic Party.9

New Candidates - New Neighbourhood

The Western Balkans

In the Enlargement portfolio of the Barroso Commission, the entire Western Balkan region has been added for potential candidates to join the European Union. The enlargement drive of the region is spearheaded by Croatia, a candidate country, which began accession negotiations in 2005, despite initial resistance by some EU Member States. Serbia and Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are also making inroads in their accession aspirations, but it will be a long and hard road since many political questions – such as the future status of Kosovo in Serbia and the implementation of the Ohrid agreement and other problematic issues in FYROM – are still open. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union is still largely responsible for the stability and nation-building of this fragile country, whose wounds from the war are still healing. Lastly, Albania, although politically stable, remains one the most economically backward countries in Europe.

In this asymmetrical political jigsaw puzzle, the European People’s Party has, for many years, been actively engaged and making its own contribution in the stability and democratisation of the region. In the late 1990s, for example, EPP Vice President and President of Greece’s Nea Demokratia Kostas Karamanlis, launched on behalf of the EPP the ‘Western Balkan Democracy Initiative’10 – a series of training seminars and conferences that introduced the political practices and ideology of the EPP to the center-right political parties of the region. Furthermore, the EPP applied in the Western Balkans a similar methodology to that of the Central and Eastern European countries for building strong and reliable political partnerships, although in some countries the work is still in progress or has just began.

Croatia has been a model case for the EPP. Its main partner in the country, the HDZ, began its quest for EPP membership at a time when the shadow of Franjo Tudjman was still present in the party and Croatian nationalism was still thriving. The EPP, with the help of its member-parties, think-tanks, and associations, helped steer the HDZ11 in the right direction and facilitated its reform into a pluralistic and European-oriented political force. HDZ leader and Prime Minister Ivo Sanader has repeatedly proven his statesman qualities, his commitment to ICTY and his dedication to transform Croatia into a European ‘island’ of stability in this fragile region of Europe. Although these efforts were, for some time, not fully appreciated by some European and international cycles, our painstaking efforts bore fruit and Croatia is finally on its way to becoming the 28th EU Member State.12


7 Commissioners Jan Figel (Slovakia), Andris Piebalgs (Latvia), plus Joe Borg (Malta).8 Prime Ministers Aigars Kalvitis (Latvia), Mikulaš Dzurinda (Slovakia), Janez Janša (Slovania), plus Laurence Gonzi (Malta).9 In Romania, the EPP accepted two parties as associate members and in September 2005 also accepted, initially, the

Democratic Party (PD) as an observer. The PD is the first ever political party to abandon the PES and join the EPP.10 See The Western Balkan Democracy Initiative Report: Working Together, Moving Forward. European People’s Party, Athens:

September 2002.11 In April 2004, the HDZ was upgraded from observer to associate member of the EPP.12 In September 2005, at the initiative of EPP President W. Martens, a letter was sent on behalf of 9 EU Prime Ministers to

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, asking for the immediate commencement of Croatia’s accession negotiations.


In Serbia and Montenegro, the EPP was able to build strong partnerships in Serbia proper. The DSS of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and the G17plus of Deputy Prime Minister Miroslav Labus, have proven to be strong and reliable partners and, in fact, the only serious political forces which are capable of bringing Serbia closer to Europe. A major challenge for Prime Minister Kostunica will be the management of the future of Kosovo and the ultimate stabilization of his country. The question of the future of Montenegro in the State-Union also remains outstanding. Nevertheless, regardless of the political future of Montenegro, the EPP is committed to identifying in the near future partners in this country and to counter-balance the current domination of Montenegrin Socialists/post-communists.

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the EPP has just inaugurated its activity in the country with the implementation of a Fact-Finding Mission (September 2005). This venture will prove particularly challenging since the center-right forces in the Slav-Macedonian majority are fragmented and personalized and have become distant from their Albanian-Macedonian counterparts, who are in decline. However, these forces are the only real hope in reforming the country and bringing it closer to Europe since they are not associated with the corrupt post-communist establishment, which continues to dominate public and private interests.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the EPP was faced with a unique a situation since, in practice, the country is governed (through the High Representative), policed (through the peacekeeping mission) and financed (through European donors and investors) by the EU in the complex and labyrinthine Dayton agreement setting. Fortunately, EPP President Wilfried Martens was actively engaged in

the country for most of 2004, since he was given the responsibility by the country’s High Representative to apply his diplomatic skills for the creation of a BiH national police force. His repeated contacts with political parties from all three ethnic communities helped the EPP identify three potential partners – the Muslim/Bosniak SDA, the Croat HDZBiH, and the Serbian PDP. In this particular case, the EPP applied a modified version of its methodology for accepting parties by implementing a common approach and imposing strict requirements for all three parties. Essentially, all three parties were obliged to open-up their membership to the other ethnic groups and to commit themselves on having a positive working relationship with each other, based on political ideology. Despite initial difficulties, the approach was accepted by all three parties and the EPP reciprocated by accepting them collectively as observers13 (December 2004).

Albania is another small EPP success story. Although it was not difficult to identify the parties that represented the center-right, the democratic practices of these parties were, initially, far from acceptable, particularly in the case of Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party (DP). Nevertheless, after being in opposition for a number of years and having the opportunity to understand and gradually implement the political standards presented by the EPP, the DP and its leader made a political about-face. After being accepted at the Estoril Congress of 2002 as an observer, Mr Berisha was a regular participant of EPP activities and a frequent visitor of Brussels. More recently, we both had the opportunity to personally witness his maturity as a political leader at the DP Congress in April 2005, a prelude to his electoral comeback. The EPP sincerely hopes that Prime Minister Berisha will now turn words into deeds and transform Albania into a reliable and stable European partner.

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13 The SDA was the first Muslim-oriented party in the history of the EPP to become an observer member.

Turkey

For many years, the EPP was in search of a political party that would be compatible with its ideological principles and values. In the past, there were only indirect contacts with the Motherland party and the True Path party – via the European Democrat Union - but there was no real incentive to build relations. This situation changed dramatically with the entrance, in the Turkish political landscape, of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His manifold reform drive, to bring Turkey in line with the Copenhagen criteria and to begin accession negotiations in 2005, also included an openness to build political relations with European leaders from the center-right. AKP repeatedly declared that it was a secular conservative party, inspired by the country’s Islamic tradition, that was open to relations with like-minded, even Christian Democrat, European political parties. The EPP was, of course, the obvious choice since it included all those elements the AKP was searching for. From the point of view of the EPP, the AKP was perceived as a serious political force which defended the same values, and which had the potential of becoming integrated as any other member party. Finally, after months of contacts and negotiations, the EPP admitted in January 2004 the AKP as an observer member, as the initial step to its integration. This was truly a groundbreaking development since it was the first time in EPP’s history to accept a major political party from Turkey, with millions of supporters belonging to the Muslim faith.14

The European Neighbourhood

The European People’s Party always had an interest in the transition countries of the for-mer Soviet Union. Apart from its high profile involvement in the Baltics, the EPP had established contacts – via its parliamentary

Group in the Council of Europe - with members of parliament from Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, a more systematic engagement on a country-by-country basis was deemed necessary, in view of the growing need to support the democratic forces of these countries.

Ukraine was the first test-case of this new strategy. Following a request by Victor Yushchenko and his ever-expanding democratic movement, the EPP organized in early 2003 a Fact-Finding Mission for the purpose of assessing the needs of his movement and the likelihood of influencing Ukrainian society. The result of the mission was quite promising since the EPP delegation recognized the potential of this movement and the leadership qualities of Victor Yushchenko. Since then, contacts between the two sides gradually increased to the point were Mr Yushchenko addressed the February 2004 EPP Congress in Brussels and, in turn, received widespread political backing from most EPP member-parties. Soon after, Mr Yushchenko submitted an application for EPP observer status and expressed his commitment to join our political family. In the fall of 2004, during the critical election-campaign period, Yushchenko and his ‘Nasha Ukraina’ movement received manifold support by the EPP, at a time when few others from Europe and the international community were offering a helping hand.

The highlight of this support occurred in the midst of the crisis – between the first and second rounds of the elections – when EPP President Wilfried Martens formally endorsed, in joint press conference with Mr Yushchenko, his candidacy15. Moreover, in the critical period between the second round the re-run of elections, President Martens extended an invitation to Mr Yushchenko to participate at the December 17 EPP Summit of heads of government, as a show of support for his Orange revolution16. Finally, his


14 When the AKP joined the EPP, some analysts coined the term ‘Muslim Democrats’, inspired by the long-standing ideological concept of Christian Democracy. AKP rejects the term and considers itself a ‘Conservative’ party.

15 The report of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOB) states that: “although it was a lower profile endorsement, Victor Yushchenko received the backing of the European People’s Party.” IEOB – European Parliament, Council of Europe, OSCE-ODIHR, OSCE-PA, NATO-PA – Presidential Elections (Second Round), Ukraine: Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. Kiev: 22/11/04, p.9

16 Due to intense campaigning, Yushchenko was represented at the EPP Summit by current Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk.


triumphant election as President was followed by the granting of observer status by the EPP.17 On the other hand, the first months of the Yushchenko administration have been rather difficult and, at times, turbulent, while the post-Orange revolution political landscape remains particularly fluid. Nevertheless, the EPP and all its resources remain committed to this emerging democracy and will continue to work hard for its European future.18

In Moldova, our engagement has been modest. Various resolutions have stressed the need to strengthen democratic forces and a number of ah hoc activities by EPP partners have helped bolster the Moldovan Christian Democrats (PPCD). As a show of collective support, and on the eve of the March 2005 national elections, the EPP decided to grant the PPCD observer status. Nevertheless, a broader range of activities is being planned, in light of the continued domination of communists/post-communists in the country.

Belarus, the last European dictatorship that exists in complete isolation from the rest of Europe,19is a country of high priority for the EPP. As it is well documented, the Belarusian democratic opposition is suffocating from the Luckashenko regime and has very limited access to European and international support. The EPP has taken the decision to become actively engaged and to offer any possible support. Later this year, the EPP will organize a Fact Finding Mission to Minsk in order to get first-hand information on the situation and to assess the needs of the Belarusian opposition.

In the Russian Federation, our engagement has also been modest due to the lack of any serious political alternatives to the increasingly

unacceptable current state of affairs. Nevertheless, there is great interest in developing our involvement with non-governmental organizations and individuals, committed to true democratic reform of this pivotal country.

In the Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EPP has been present largely through a number of ad hoc activities from our associations and think tanks. The preparation of a wider strategy for these countries is currently underway.

Looking beyond Europe

In recent years, the EPP has been expanding its interest and involvement in regions beyond the continent in order to offer its experience and expertise to common international efforts of democracy-building. In doing so, we have begun to widen our bilateral and multilateral relations with like-minded political parties and organizations that are dedicated to similar goals.

Specifically, our longstanding affiliation with the Christian/Centrist Democrat International (CDI) has offered the EPP an influential multilateral platform to offer its input in regions such as Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, which the CDI is particularly active. Recently, we have also started to develop a tangible relationship with the International Democrat Union (IDU), with a view to strengthening the transatlantic dimension of our international activities. In fact, because of our emphasis on international democracy-building – a goal shared by both the CDI and the IDU – the EPP aspires to act as a bridge for the two organisations to improve global synergy and cooperation.

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17 At the January 2005 EPP Political Bureau meeting, observer status was granted to Yushchenko (as an individual) and his political platform. Since then, a number of political parties that originated from the platform have also applied for observer status.

18 In October 7, 2005, EPP President Wilfried Martens met with Yushchenko’s newly appointed Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov in Brussels and invited him to participate in the next EPP Summit. In the previous day, Yekhanurov met Commission President José Manuel Barroso who stated: “Our door remains open, the future of Ukraine is in Europe - the best way is not to talk all the time about membership but to achieve concrete results, show commitment to European standards and values.”

19 For example, Belarus was suspended from the Council of Europe because it “does not respect minimum democratic standards and violates the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law” – see the Council of Europe 13 January 1997 decision on Belarus.

Moreover, the EPP is building, on a bilateral level, international partnerships with influential political parties and organizations that are active in the area of democracy-building. For example, in the United States the EPP had, historically, contacts with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and collaborated from time to time on issues related to the Balkans. This year, the EPP began its cooperation with the International Republican Institute (IRI) and has already proven to be very fruitful on a variety of related issues20. We also established contacts with important like-minded parties such as the Conservative Party of Canada, led by Stephen Harper, the Liberal Party of Australia, led by Prime Minister John Howard, the Liberal Party of Japan, led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, a.o.

Middle East & North Africa

The Middle East is a region of protracted instability with numerous players and complex levels of interests. Although the Israeli-Palestinian problem has, undoubtedly, been the epicenter of this instability, since September 11, Iraq has dominated the Middle Eastern agenda. Iraq, of course, has been a particularly contentious foreign policy issue for many countries and very divisive within the European Union and, not surprisingly, within the EPP. Nevertheless, everyone has now reached the common understanding that post-Saddam Iraq must become stable and democratic, free from terrorism and, ultimately, free from foreign troops. In parallel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made progress with the bold step taken by Israel of withdrawing unilaterally all its troops and settlers from the Gaza strip; but the remaining occupied territories and recognition of Palestine as a sovereign nation continue to remain outstanding, with all the negative implications that this entails. The potential nuclear capability of Iran, on the other hand, has emerged as a worrisome issue and the EU is actively engaged in containing it21. Lastly,

Lebanon is currently undergoing a dramatic transition towards democratization and political self-sufficiency, despite terrorist attempts to sabotage this process.

North Africa, a region that is largely an extension of the Middle East, is significantly more stable but problematic, nevertheless. Egypt, the bridge of the two regions, has subtly begun to implement democratic reforms but, at the same time, terrorism and religious extremism are obvious detriments to this process. Algeria and Morocco are facing, in varying degrees, the same problems and democratic solutions have not been easy to implement.

In all of the above-mentioned countries, the EPP has in one way or another offered its good services: be it monitoring missions, conferences, training seminars, bilateral contacts (parties, organizations) and multilateral contacts (i.e. Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly). The extension of the European Neighbourhood Policy to North African and Middle Eastern countries has been welcomed by the EPP and it’s committed to helping it succeed. Together with our international partners, we look forward to seeing these regions transform from problematic barriers to stable and democratic global hubs.

Latin America

Latin America is a region with significant democratic deficits. And in countries with established, but weak, democratic foundations compounded by enormous economic difficulties, they are being systematically manipulated by the populist/neo-communist regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and by the almost infinite presence of communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba. The combination of resources by the two leaders – i.e. Chávez’s control of oil and other natural resources and Castro’s longstanding ideological baggage – has proven to be particularly dangerous for the democratic stability of other


20 Since the July 2005 visit of the EPP delegation to Washington - headed by President W. Martens and including both writers – the EPP and the IRI have cooperated on election monitoring issues (e.g. Afghanistan), fact-finding missions (e.g. Belarus) and activities for improving the transatlantic partnership.

21 In August 2005, EPP-ED Chairman Hans Gert Poettering visited Iran and lobbied for the adoption of the EU-3 nuclear comprehensive package.


countries in the region. Bolivia22, for example, a country with seven different frontiers in South America, is being targeted by the two leaders in an effort to create a populist domino effect.

The EPP, our partners in the CDI and all our other global partners, have a duty to prevent this nightmare scenario. We must continue to assist and bolster the democratic forces and governments of the region, while also exposing the regimes of Cuba, Venezuela and their accomplices – in any shape or form - in other Latin American countries. We must pool everyone’s resources to make sure that democracy will, ultimately and irreversibly, take root throughout the region.

Conclusion

The impact of democracy-building by the European People’s Party has been acknowledged as a great success story. The EPP is recognised, in Europe and globally, as a significant stabilising factor in emerging democracies and as a reliable partner for the promotion of democracy in sensitive regions of the world. Our commitment to improve and expand our activities, together with our partners, is a clear and unmistakable message to all those who are trying to undermine democracy and freedom. With every new breakthrough, our resolve becomes stronger and bolder and, in turn, Europe becomes stronger and bolder. After all, freedom and democracy - the foundations of our United Europe - are ideals worth fighting for.

Antonio López-Istúriz is Secretary General of the EPP and Member of the European Parliament. Kostas Sasmatzoglou is Secretary of External Relations of the EPP.

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22 Evo Morales could become a likely imitator of Chávez - Bolivia holds the second largest gas reserves in Latin America.

EU-US relations, the cornerstone of the transatlantic partnership, have experienced in recent years varying degrees of ‘ups and

downs’. The aftermath of the appalling September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, coupled by the subsequent attacks in Madrid and, most recently, London, were bound to have an impact on these relations. Nevertheless, the initial strain, highlighted by the disagreements over Iraq, was replaced by the recognition, from both sides, of the necessity to tackle our common new challenges together, side by side. Clearly, the turning point of this realisation was the second Administration of US President George W. Bush and the new European Commission led by President José Manuel Barroso.

A fresh start

As he entered his second term, President Bush made clear that a closer relationship with the EU would be a key US foreign policy goal. This is not to say that relations with the EU were not productive during the first Bush Administration, in combating terrorism, non-proliferation, and in many other issues, but it cannot be denied that transatlantic and intra-EU disagreements over Iraq had caused serious tensions in the EU-US relationship. Other US policies were perceived by Europeans as lacking in appreciation for the need to pursue international cooperation. A more positive atmosphere characterised the relationship in late 2003 and into 2004, as hard feelings over Iraq eased and moving the political and economic reconstruction forward became a mutual focus.

President Bush delivered this more positive message personally during his February 2005 visit to the EU institutions in Brussels, including a private meeting with new, EPP-backed,

Commission President José Manuel Barroso. This set the stage for a successful June 2005 EU-US Summit in Washington, where Summit participants confirmed that Presidents Bush on the one hand, and Juncker and Barroso (both leading EPP personalities) on the other, moved briskly from topic to topic, exchanging views succinctly, agreeing often and disagreeing sometimes. Even when disagreement occurred, the proceedings were conducted in a friendly vein as between people who knew one another well and shared basic principles, assumptions and values.

The Summit also produced important policy advances, including a number of declarations for joint action toward such issues as the promotion of democracy, freedom, and human rights, continuing the fight against terrorism and non-proliferation, supporting peace and stability in the Middle East, reform of the United Nations, and an initiative to enhance transatlantic economic integration and growth.

While these declarations are indeed important, the comments of President Bush during the Summit press conference were even more striking. Following the French and Dutch no votes on the Constitutional Treaty, the European Union had not yet fully recovered its composure as an institution. At such a sensitive moment, President Bush chose to be warm and positive about the European Union as an institution, and especially so about Presidents Juncker and Barroso personally.

The President’s message was particularly helpful as some in the US had seized on the failed referenda to suggest that the EU was somehow going out of business. While this is of course false, it does raise an important point. If Europe wishes to influence US thinking, it can best be done if Europe speaks clearly and forcefully and in a single voice.

EU-US Relations: Old Challenges and New Opportunities

By Wilfried Martens

Wilfried Martens


Before considering the many policies that comprise the EU-US relationship, it is important to underline the shared values and close emotional bonds between our peoples. Policy declarations and summits are important but have little weight without the support of our societies – this is a lesson that EU leaders should take to heart when reflecting on the Constitutional referenda. These social bonds are most evident in the transatlantic solidarity expressed at times of crisis, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, the subsequent terrorist bombings in Madrid and London, and most recently in reaction to Hurricane Katrina, which brought a rapid and generous response from the EU.

A broad foreign policy agenda

EU leaders, particularly those belonging to European People’s Party, share President Bush’s emphasis on combating terrorism, bolstering homeland security, and promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Our approach may sometimes differ, but we are working together successfully around the world, and particularly in dealing with a number of difficult regional issues, including the Broader Middle East, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Belarus, and Georgia.

The EU and US have worked with our Quartet partners in furthering the Middle East peace process. The successful Gaza disengagement was a very positive step forward for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and all sides must now focus on next steps in implementing the Road Map.

Regarding Iraq, the EU hosted a successful June 2005 donors’ conference and has contributed to political and economic reconstruction. The Commission has provided €518 million of assistance to date, including support for the rehabilitation of the provision of basic services to respond to the most urgent needs of the ordinary Iraqi people. As part of this assistance package, the Commission is supporting the

preparation of the constitutional referendum and providing €30 million for the preparation of the December elections.

The EU has also signed a “Political Declaration” with Iraq in launching a new political dialogue that will cover EU support to the political transition process and related issues. This Declaration will help pave the way for cooperation to cover a wide range of trade and development issues.

Similarly, in Afghanistan the EU and US have worked closely in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and supporting the transition to democratic government. The EU (EC and Member States) will provide more than €2 billion over the 2001-6 period, per the Bonn process, and most recently supported the September 2005 parliamentary elections, which were also reviewed by an EU Observer Mission.

The EU-3 non-proliferation negotiations with Iran, fully supported by the Bush Administration, offer a reminder that we must not underestimate the challenges we face, as has also been demonstrated by the setbacks in Uzbekistan and even Ukraine.

We must also redouble our efforts toward the developing world. Eradicating poverty and promoting development are moral imperatives which the world’s richest nations are obligated to address. European Commission President Barroso recently compared the modern scourges of poverty, hunger and disease to slavery 200 years ago. “Slavery” he said, “was then considered an inevitability; a natural part of the order of things. But that was wrong.” Equally, it is wrong for us today to think of poverty as a fact of life.

That is why reconfirming our commitment to the Millennium Development Goals and setting target dates for their achievement is so vital. The EU is already the world’s biggest donor, providing 55% of worldwide official development assistance between the Commission and Member States,

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worth $43 billion in 2004. Earlier this year we committed ourselves to further and substantially increase this amount – by 2010 we will provide nearly an extra $26 billion, and by 2015 we will reach the recommended 0.7% of gross national income.

In tackling poverty we also move a step closer to human security. If the US, the word’s second biggest donor, were to join us in this commitment and follow the EU’s lead on increasing ODA, the impact on poverty and security would be tremendous.

The successful conclusion of the 60th UN Summit is another example of the prospect for closer EU-US cooperation in the second Bush Administration. While EU and US approaches to multilateral cooperation frequently differ, with such cooperation a first reflex for the EU, here also President Bush and Secretary Rice have made clear that the new Administration is taking a more positive approach.

Where EU and US approaches are in fundamental disagreement, as in the case of the China Arms Embargo, it is important to speak calmly, as partners. Too much rides on our work together around the globe to allow a single issue to divert our focus.

Transatlantic and global trade

The EU and the US share the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world – the overall volume of EU-US trade in goods and services amounts to more than €600 billion annually, with no less than 2% of that total subject to the trade spats that attract so many headlines. Investment flows are even greater – the EU accounts for roughly 75% of FDI in the US and by 2003 the total stocks of two-way investments amounted to €1.4 trillion. The relationship directly supports 12 million jobs, with combined EU and US GDP at around 60% of the world total.

Our two economies are thus interdependent to an unparralleled degree – we are joined at both hip and shoulder. Close to a quarter of all US-EU trade consists of transactions within firms based on their investments on either side of the Atlantic.

The transatlantic relationship defines the shape of the global economy as a whole as either the EU or the US is also the largest trade and investment partner for almost all other countries. Being the largest players in global trade, the EU and US are therefore committed to a politically and economically significant cooperation agenda, be it on bilateral issues or in the multilateral framework of the WTO. The few trade-related disputes hitting the headlines affect a small proportion of the world’s largest trading relationship.

While trade flows continue to increase year-by-year, there are still a number of areas where more work can be done to facilitate trade, most notably in non-tariff barriers and regulatory differences. The EU and the US have consistently sought progress in this regard. In 1998, the EU and the US launched, in the context of the New Transatlantic Agenda, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). This “Partnership” aimed to create an open and more accessible world trading system, while also improving and further developing the economic relationship between the EU and US, and included a rolling ‘Action Plan.’

In 2002, the EU and US launched a Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) for bilateral cooperation in specific sectors. An initial indicative list of items led to the adoption in December 2002 of a so-called “Roadmap” which fleshes out the commitments taken by the EU and the US to cooperate in a number of areas such as electronic tendering, electronic customs, financial markets dialogue, and the wine trade.

At the EU-US Summit in June 2004, leaders adopted the ‘EU-US Declaration on Strengthening our Economic Partnership’ looking into new ways

Wilfried Martens


to make the transatlantic economic relationship stronger and give it new impetus. The US Government and the European Commission subsequently launched consultation exercises with civil society requesting comments and proposals from stakeholders. On the basis of the replies received, the EU and US adopted the ‘EU-US Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth’ at the EU-US Summit in June 2005. The Initiative sets a framework for further work in ten areas: regulatory co-operation; capital markets; innovation and technology; trade, travel and security; energy; intellectual property rights; investment; competition; procurement; and services. It thus complements the existing co-operative framework, in particular the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the Positive Economic Agenda.

The 2005 EU-US summit also cemented our readiness to work together, not only on our bilateral links, but equally importantly multilaterally. In addition to deepening the transatlantic trade and investment relationship, we need to stand up for trade liberalization by coordinating our efforts to secure decisive progress this year in the completion of the Doha Development Round.

Economic and Financial Relations

Over the last ten years the European Union lost economic ground against the United States. As a result, the EU-US GDP gap has started to widen again. This large and widening gap (currently the EU15 GDP per capita is about 70% of the US GDP per capita) is the outcome of a different utilization of resources, with the US employment rate and working hours higher than the EU, as well as productivity trends related to the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution and to investment dynamics favouring the US.

There is no doubt that the US economy would not have succeeded in adapting to

the new technological paradigm without the entrepreneurship of its CEOs (in companies both big and small) and their readiness to embrace radical innovation despite the risks and the costs entailed. The structure of the US financial sector was also better fit for the new paradigm. And the US, in its firms, laboratories and universities possesses a larger population of the scientists, innovators, entrepreneurs, and financial managers needed to lead the new economy.

Labour market flexibility and labour mobility at all levels have also been key factors in the US success: without this, it would have taken much longer for ICT investment to become profitable, weakened the momentum behind the adoption of new technologies, and dampened the productivity dynamics of the last ten years. Last but not least, the structure of incentives to promote the goals of economic growth and productivity has been strengthened.

It is important to remember that the US re-established its productivity growth leadership over the EU only a decade ago. Furthermore, population dynamics (much stronger in the US than in the EU) explains much of the growth differential. In per capita terms, in the last five years growth has been only moderately stronger in the US than in the EU.

The EU-US productivity gap could start to close, in particular if the European countries adopt the right policies and re-launch forcefully, through the Lisbon Agenda, the process of structural reform. There are a number of fields where the European Union is stronger and more competitive than the US. The US is also burdened by large macroeconomic imbalances (a large and growing current account deficit, speculative housing prices in some areas) that, if not addressed, will hamper its economic performance. Recently border security issues have hindered the inflow of science and technology graduate students from abroad, threatening one of the pillars of the “new economy” success story.

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European structural reform has been more widespread than generally perceived in the US, with increasing financial and product market integration and stronger competition, the EU can again become a thriving home for innovative companies and brilliant minds. With better environmental standards, a smaller crime rate, and a stronger social cohesion than the US, the European economy has the potential to lead again, if not in terms of per capita GDP, at least in terms of welfare and quality of life.

Such a renewed dynamism in the EU would be good news for the US, since it would help reduce some of the current US external imbalances and create room for a widening and strengthening of the transatlantic economic relationship.

A Positive Outlook

This broad but far from exhaustive overview of recent developments in EU-US relations, leads to the conclusion that our partnership has weathered a rocky period following the invasion of Iraq, with focus again on working together to meet bilateral, regional, and global challenges. Some differences in approach remain, particularly in emphasizing international cooperation as a first reaction, but it would be short-sighted and self-defeating for the EU to overlook the opportunity presented by policy trends in the second Bush Administration.

We should also recognize and seek to promote the strong ties between our peoples. The transatlantic relationship gains legitimacy when it contributes directly to the interests of our societies. That’s why the recent initiative by the European People’s Party to establish partnerships with the International Republican Institute and other important American organisations, is an important example for achieving this goal.

By effectively addressing common global concerns and by sharing best practices in addressing common economic and social challenges, it will inevitably have a lasting and

positive impact on our relations. Above all, our shared values and our unwavering dedication to democracy will always form the bedrock of our inimitable partnership.

Wilfried Martens is President of the European People’s Party and Chairman of the Editorial Board of the European View.

Wilfried Martens


The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty

on the European Union signed at Maastricht. Since then, with the European Councils of Amsterdam, Laeken and Nice, a number of important changes have been introduced. Within a little more than a decade, the CFSP has evolved considerably and at amazing speed. Interim structures have now become powerful permanent instruments. Today, it is obvious that the EU has become a global player:

− Via over 120 delegations and offices, the EU maintains relations in every region and with almost all countries in the world. A plethora of political and economic partnership agreements strengthens this network and guarantees the EU's influence in world affairs through an ever closer cooperation with partner countries throughout the world.

− 20% of world trade is accounted for by the EU, making it the largest trading block in the world.

− The European Union as a whole is the world’s largest donor in humanitarian and development aid, providing for more than half of all global development assistance.

− With the ongoing development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the EU has taken over several peace keeping missions, including mandates in comparatively remote places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Some of the EU's endeavours in foreign and security policy have become success stories. European diplomacy is gaining increasing influence: In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the High Representative

was able to prevent a civil war. Similarly in Ukraine, Javier Solana, the European Parliament and Polish president Kwasniewski provided successful mediation. The mediating role the EU played when addressing Iran’s use of nuclear technology, where the United Kingdom, France and Germany took the lead in the EU of 25, indicates that preventive diplomacy does not stop at the EU’s front door.

However with the increasing scope assumed by the CFSP, responsibilities as well as expectations have grown. It is not only in the light of the above-mentioned negotiations on Iran's nuclear policy that the EU's ability to secure the diplomatic success has been questioned. It has often been remarked that the EU, contrary to the USA, lacks the necessary enforcement capability to assert its role as an influential global player. In the past, other shortcomings and inefficiencies of EU foreign policy were revealed, notably the diplomatic and military failures in the Balkans, the painstakingly slow progress in the Middle East negotiations and the quarrels with the USA over the approach to the Iraq crisis which in the end even led to division among the EU partners.

Consequently, the question is, what are the perspectives and limits for the EU's CFSP? What needs to be undertaken to overcome the weaknesses and set-backs and to secure the EU's role as a global player in 21st century foreign policy? In this article, I will outline some of the areas where the EU needs to take further steps and enhance its capabilities in order to stand its ground as a global player in the future. Since it is impossible to address all relevant fields of CSFP here, I will focus on what will be some of the major issues for the next two years:

− Strengthening the Union's relations with its neighbours and its most important partners,

The EU as a Global Player in the 21st Century Perspectives for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

By Elmar Brok

Elmar Brok


especially creating new pillars for the Transatlantic Partnership,

− Adopting a European Security Culture in order to achieve greater coherence in its foreign policy instruments by linking and enhancing diplomatic, military and industrial capabilities,

− Strengthening the fight against terrorism,− Introducing the necessary institutional

changes as provided by the European Constitution in order to make CFSP more efficient.

The EU needs strong partners: new pillars for the Transatlantic Partnership

The most important cornerstone in enhancing the Union’s foreign policy capabilities will be tightening its relations with third partners. These “strategic partnerships” with third countries1 must be based on the sharing and promotion of common values. In particular, an assessment of the strategic partnerships governing relations with the old and the new super powers will be a key to success in this regard.

With regards to the relationship with our biggest neighbour, Russia, our common interests and values have to be based on human rights, the rule of law and democracy. The developments in crisis management in Transnistria and South Caucasus as well as the problem of finding a political solution to the Chechnya conflict will be milestones on the way to a genuine partnership. It is regrettable that relations with China thus far have only made progress in the fields of trade and economics without any substantial achievement on human rights and democracy issues. Here, political relations need to be deepened, in particular with regards to armament, the situation of Taiwan and the progress of democratic structures. Relations with India are also to be upgraded: conflict prevention, cooperation in development affairs and non-proliferation will be the critical issues.

Naturally, the Transatlantic Partnership will remain crucial to the EU’s foreign policy activities. Since it is vital for a number of CFSP issues (such as security policy, which will be focused on below) it should be discussed in more detail. The war in Iraq led to a split on both sides of the Atlantic and to some extent also within Europe. These tensions over how to face the common enemy, in other words the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, come as no surprise. They were the consequence of idealist rhetoric on both sides. Yet despite the rhetorical tensions, the climate has been frostier than the actual relationship itself. So how did all this happen?

The answer is simple: we allowed our most important relations to be based on chance. While the European Union cherishes Treaties and Association Agreements with numerous countries all over the world, nothing comparable exists between the USA and the EU bilaterally. The UN, NATO and the WTO alone cannot carry the transatlantic partnership sufficiently, thus leaving a structural gap to be bridged. The EU and the US need permanent coordination on topics as diverse as trade, terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, environmental protection and health threats.

The common interests of the USA and the EU are much greater than their differences. In the long run the USA cannot be successful in their “war” against terror alone. They need partners with them to exert moral pressure, to prove to the world that they are fighting a just cause. Even in many other fields, especially in trade issues, the rest of the world is quietly happy to see the US and the EU quarrel while others move on. The EU in turn has an interest in taking a more active part in agenda setting, which in part it already does (Kyoto, ICC). Both sides have an interest in achieving the mentioned common goals without frictional inefficiencies.

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1 Third countries are defined as those inside and outside Europe which are neither members of the EU nor states associa-ted with the Framework Programme (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Israel: from 1.1.2004).

This is why a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement (TPA) should be established. The so-called “New Transatlantic Agenda” between the EU and the USA of December 1995 must be fundamentally overhauled and extended. This must include NATO, WTO, UN topics and personnel, to coordinate special transatlantic issues in those organisations. Additionally, in order to strengthen economic cooperation to the benefit of both partners, we need a “Transatlantic Marketplace” as a part of the TPA. This marketplace could become reality by 2015 and, according to an OECD Study, could increase GDP per capita by 2 to 3%. The TPA will come with regular EU-US consultations, ensuring that co-operation towards our common goals is ensured and is not left to chance.

Towards a European Culture of Security

A topic which is increasingly incorporated in agreements between the EU and its international partners is security. Consequently, it becomes ever more important for the Union to clarify what shape its security policy should take. The Member States need to adopt a common understanding on this matter: a European Culture of Security.

In the 21st century, security cannot be provided by military means alone, nor can it be based on just one country’s national powers. This is the credo the EU laid down in its Security Strategy of December 2003. New threats, such as terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, “failed states” and organised crime demand an integrated approach to security policies. This must comprise military instruments and capabilities alike, ranging from conflict prevention to “nation building”.

The European Security Strategy, which was fully supported by the European Parliament, pursues three strategic goals:− coping with various threats,− creating security in the EU Neighbourhood,− supporting an international order, based on

an effective multilateralism.

The EU wants to be a credible actor in security matters. It seeks to handle crises more actively and above all to prevent them. It will develop the necessary diplomatic, military and industrial capabilities with greater determination and will make more coherent use of its different instruments of foreign policy.

Ten years after its diplomatic and military failure in the Balkans, it is in the same place, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the EU now intends to implement this comprehensive approach through the “ALTHEA” mission, combining civil and military elements of crisis management. The European approach distinguishes itself most strikingly against the background of the difficulties experienced by the US-lead coalition forces in Iraq, notably not only to win a fast war with the means of technological advantage, but also with the aim of winning peace.

The crisis in Kosovo made us realise that only a regional approach can really ensure peace - providing it with aspects of security, of democratic, constitutional and legal principles, of human rights and last but not least economic development. All aspects of this approach must be well-timed and well-balanced.

This approach goes back to the CSCE final act of Helsinki (1975), which covers three areas: security, democracy and economic development. It determined the structure of the stability pact for South-East Europe and has become the predominant feature of European foreign policy in recent years.

Yet the possibility for the EU to guarantee security remained the missing link for a long time. Only the progress achieved in the past five years is bringing the EU closer to closing that gap and to hold in one hand the above- mentioned diplomatic, economic and military instruments and capabilities, with which it can emerge as a credible actor in international crisis management. European security policy is still in its infancy and shows signs of fragmentation. The common Security Strategy set the framework. The

Elmar Brok


outlines are already visible and the competence areas are gradually becoming clearer: 7.000 EURFOR soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, plus police, reconstruction programmes (CARDs) and stability and association agreements (SAP). The EU acts at once as a protecting power, as a reconstruction partner and as a provider of a general perspective for the country.

A similar responsibility for Kosovo lies ahead. In this case, the international community must no longer hide behind the military mission of NATO. The Balkans remain the number one security interest for Europe.

With European diplomacy being increasingly successful, the perspective will remain a global one and many conflicts will only be resolved together with our American partners. The Middle East belongs in this category. The initiative will remain with the quartet (USA, EU, Russia, UN) in cooperation with the Arab partners. The EU must seize every possibility in the post-Arafat phase to achieve a revival of the peace process. Again, the unity of security, democracy and economic development is important. Today the region is already closely connected to the EU with respect to trade and economics. The EU could also contribute valuable know-how in building up a functioning democratic Palestinian State.

Can European peace forces combine with a strong police presence in Gaza? Why not? NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is already offering military capacities. Would a European mission not be much more suitable, with strong elements of civil, police and law enforcement? The answer probably lies elsewhere. Can such a young “baby” already master such a complex task? Would there be enough European troops for such a peace keeping mission? Would there be enough political will within the common foreign policy of the EU-25 to undertake such a major burden, thus going much further than just signing a cheque?

The EU will not be able to avoid certain responsibilities much longer if the UN was to ask it, if it received a mandate and if its presence was requested by both sides of the conflict. These same responsibilities would apply if the mission was coordinated with the USA and thus with NATO, and if such crisis management was to be accepted by the European public. This is where the European Parliament together with National Parliaments must initiate an opinion-forming debate.

After decades of development aid with very limited effect, not least in Africa, it has become clear that without security there can be no development. In Congo, the EU completed its first autonomous military mission (Artemis) requested by the UN and headed by France, and handed it over to UN peacekeeping forces as foreseen. Now the EU is helping to establish an integrated police unit in Kinshasa.

The European Security Strategy has delivered an analysis of the threats and a definition of European security interests. The Constitution will deliver further elements for a modern EU defence policy (see below) and EU Member States agreed last year to the concept of battle groups, the goal for the forces in 2010 and the creation of a European Defence Agency. It is this mosaic of individual decisions in the framework of the Security Strategy that lays the foundation for the growth of a genuine European security culture.

Fight against terrorism

The fight against terrorism will continue to be a priority for the EU and a key element of its security and external relations policy. However, greater coherence and decisiveness in the Union’s counter-terrorism policy vis-à-vis third countries is needed. Consequently, cooperation with international and regional organisations (in particular with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and with NATO) as well as political dialogue on terrorism with third partners is

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to be improved. Important elements in this context, are the further implementation of the 2004 EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism, the Commission’s targeted assistance strategy (such as CARDS, TACIS, MEDA, etc.) and the strict application of the anti-terrorist clause inserted in agreements with countries where there is evidence of terrorist threats or specific terrorist activities, such as recruitment, training or financing. Reinforcing the use of the Rapid Civil or Military Reaction Mechanisms and making full use when necessary of specific ESDP operations will also form part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy.

At the same time, the EU’s own contribution to the fight against terrorism must be strengthened. During recent months the developments in this area received new stimulus through a number of declarations and decisions by different EU-institutions:− The EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator, Gijs

de Vries, presented the Plan of Action on combating Terrorism to the Council.

− At the same time, the European Parliament forwarded a number of recommendations to the other EU institutions, most notably on preventing, preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks, protecting critical infrastructure and combating terrorist financing.

− In its priorities for the second half of the year, the European Council refers in particular to strengthening police and judicial cooperation, e.g. information exchanges and the new arrest warrant.

− In the shadow of the London attacks at the beginning of July, the Council decided to increase efforts and speed up the adoption of EU counter-terrorism legislation.

These efforts within the domain of security and justice constitute a very good example of how internal and external measures in the EU need to complement each other. They will be endorsed by the so-called "solidarity clause" as envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty: “In the case of a Member State falling victim to

a terrorist attack (or a natural or man-made disaster), the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities”. To that end, the Member States will have to coordinate between themselves in the Council of Ministers. Further improvements in the CFSP which will be introduced by the Constitution are outlined below:

Further enhancement of the CFSP through the Constitution

The Convention and the Intergovernmental Conferences were under the immanent impression of the shortcomings and inefficiencies in the EU’s foreign policy, notably in the Balkans, the Middle East and Iraq. Consequently, the Constitution envisaged a leap forward particularly in EU foreign affairs issues.

However, this does not mean a complete harmonisation of the EU’s foreign policy. On the contrary, it will still be based on the principle of unity in diversity, which is at the heart of the Constitution. Only through the expansion of the CFSP can we Europeans expect our values to be defended and our interests to be guaranteed in the world.

This is why the EU Constitution calls for the establishment of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would belong to both the Commission and the Council representing the 25 Member States. He will embody the EU’s common decisions regarding foreign policy. In order to be able to fulfil his duties, the EU Foreign Minister will need a European External Action Service (EEAS) with the necessary worldwide representations. It will be a cornerstone of the EU’s foreign policy, ensuring consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s Foreign Minister and his mission to promote our common values in our neighbourhood states and the world.

To avoid building up a huge bureaucracy, the service should be attached to the European Commission, which already has more than 120 representations outside the EU. These could

Elmar Brok


easily be converted into full EU embassies, with personnel drawn from the Member States on a rotating basis. Today’s representations would then no longer be just trade representations, but could represent the EU’s common positions on all issues of EU competence.

Some governments, in particular the former German government, sought to establish the EEAS outside the Commission, while at the same time withdrawing the Commission’s responsibilities for external trade, development and emergency aid. The Commission, which has to approve the establishment of an External Action Service, will hardly let itself be downgraded to a simple common market organisation. In order to be effective, the EU Foreign Minister must be able to make use of a service fit to respond to all foreign affairs related issues. The post will provide a bridge between the EU Institutions, because he will be under the responsibility of both Council and Commission, and is legitimised by the European Parliament. He will be the key contact and the world-wide face of the EU.

Now the recent crisis of the EU over the referenda on the Constitution Treaty might make some people think that the EEAS is obsolete. I wholeheartedly disagree. People will not appreciate Europe more if we fail to defend their interests with one voice. One of the clearest signals from France and the Netherlands was that Europe was not working satisfactorily: the EEAS is the main means to change that in the field of foreign policy.

The Constitution, however, also provides several other new elements for the CFSP - among others concerning European Defence Policy. The Treaty binds the EU to the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially to preserving world peace and international security. With the Constitution, civilian measures will have priority over military means for solving conflicts. Nevertheless, the Treaty also envisages that the EU in certain circumstances may resort to the use of military means to defend our values i.e.

with the force of arms. There will, however, have to be a unanimous decision from the Council for such operations.

Furthermore, the Constitution obliges the Member States to improve their civilian and military capabilities. First and foremost, this means a more efficient interlocking of national capabilities through a European Defence Agency. With Europe-wide coordination and cooperation it will be possible to reduce parallel structures and, consequently, costs.

Finally, the Constitution will confer legal personality to the Union. This will allow the EU to participate more actively and exert more influence in multilateral affairs by being represented in certain international multilateral organisations, including in particular the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. Above all, a seat in the UN’s Security Council would be the most genuine expression of a true and effective common foreign policy and would enable the Union to effectively support the reform of the United Nations.

The EU will remain a strong global player in foreign politics

The setbacks which the CFSP has suffered in the past can be overcome. It has to be kept in mind that the CFSP is still young and is not yet sufficiently developed to live up fully to the expectations that are placed in it already today. Similarly, it is important to realise that overall its development and success record are already rather impressive considering the relatively short period of 12 years since it became a stand-alone part of the Union’s spectrum of activity. Surely, nobody can doubt that in the meantime, the EU has become a powerful global player.

As a next step, the Constitution will provide an enhanced institutional framework that ensures an increased responsibility and engagement in foreign policy affairs for the future. It will help

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to protect and spread our values of freedom and peace. Together with the other measures that have been proposed here, it will help the EU to secure and expand its influential position among the other world powers. In this way, the Union’s CFSP will remain a constant point of reference for others on promoting stability, democracy and human rights in our world.

Elmar Brok is Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Elmar Brok


One of the prime motivations behind the Constitutional Treaty, and a point that achieved wide consensus during the Convention on

the Future of Europe, was the desire that the EU should play a stronger and more effective role on the world stage. To this end, the treaty contained a number of interesting proposals to establish an EU foreign minister and an external service. However, with the future of the Treaty in the balance, it is highly unlikely that these institutional changes can be introduced in the immediate future. Directly related to this ambition was the desire to strengthen the institutions of global governance. One of the central tenets of the European Security Strategy (ESS) was support for ‘effective multilateralism’. This was never defined in the ESS although there were references to the importance of strengthening the United Nations.

Nevertheless, given the necessary political will, there is much the EU can do now to achieve its aim of speaking with a united voice and to strengthening the institutions of global governance. For example, despite its obvious divisions over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the EU has played a prominent role in supporting the proposals of the Kofi Annan High-level panel that was discussed in September in New York.

Partly because of its own history of sharing sovereignty and constant inter-governmental negotiations, the EU has been more willing than the US and many other countries to work through multilateral institutions. It will be a major challenge for the EU to build support for “effective multilateralism” amongst its partners. These include its strategic partners

(Russia, China, India, Japan and Canada) and above all the United States. But it is the US that has appeared to reject the very idea of an international order. It has a poor record in recent years with regard to UN financing, the rejection of the Kyoto protocol, the efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the refusal to ratify a host of arms control treaties, notably the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In the spring of 2005, the nominations of two leading neo-conservatives, Paul Wolfowitz to head the World Bank and John Bolton to be the US ambassador to the UN, caused considerable consternation in Europe and renewed doubts about Washington’s commitment to strengthening international institutions.

There are, however, some small signs of a changed approach under the second Bush administration. There has been less hostile rhetoric about the UN although right-wing republicans have strongly attacked Kofi Annan for his alleged laxity in the ‘oil for food’ scandal. At the same time, an important congressional commission (Gingrich/Mitchell) has been broadly supportive of many proposals in the High-level panel report. Overall, the US attitude may best be described as ‘à la carte multilateralism’, a phrase first used by Richard Haass of the Council of Foreign Relations.

Who speaks for Europe?

At present, the EU’s external representation currently varies between different policy areas, CFSP, trade, financial, economic, environmental and development affairs. Every six months the US Secretary of State has a new European interlocutor. It is little wonder, therefore, that Condoleezza Rice knows the telephone number of the High Representative for CFSP, Javier

The EU and Global Governance

By Fraser Cameron

Fraser Cameron


Solana, better than whoever of the twenty-five foreign ministers of the EU is currently holding the presidency of the Council. Solana by dint of his experience and contacts has carved out an important role even though his position as described in the treaties is mainly “to assist the presidency”. He is, for example, the EU’s representative on the Quartet dealing with the Middle East peace process. When it comes to military action, however, the first addresses for Washington are London, Paris and Berlin.

Although Condoleezza Rice has Solana’s telephone number, Washington may need to call one of several Commissioners such as Benita Ferrero-Waldner or Louis Michel who deal with aspects of external relations. Washington may also wish to speak to one of the EU’s many special representatives dealing with the Middle East, the Caucasus, Bosnia or other regions and issues. Depending on circumstances, the EU may be represented, therefore, by Solana or the presidency alone, the presidency and the Commission, or by all three. If the US, with its lengthy history of close co-operation with the EU finds the situation baffling, other partners are even more perplexed.

The EU disposes by far the largest diplomatic network in the world. More than 40,000 officials work in the foreign ministries of the member states and the circa 1500 diplomatic missions abroad. Each member state maintains between 40 and 160 diplomatic missions while the Commission has a network of over 120 delegations around the world. In comparison, the US has about one third of the human resources that the EU devotes to diplomacy and one fifth of the diplomatic missions. However, as Solana once remarked during a Convention debate, it was not apparent that the US was less effective than the EU in pursuing its policy objectives.

The Constitutional Treaty contained several innovative proposals, including a new post of EU foreign minister (merging the positions of Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations); the

establishment of an EU external action service, strengthening the possibilities for some Member States to act in the name of the Union on the defense front and creating an EU armaments agency. These measures were intended to lead to a more coherent and effective EU voice on the world stage. The defense agency has already been established outside the Treaty but moving ahead on other issues, such as the EU Foreign Minister, despite widespread support, would be politically difficult. There are, however, a number of measures the EU could take without any treaty changes to strengthen its external representation and internal coherence. These include more high-profile missions for Solana including speaking at the UN on behalf of the EU, inviting Solana to attend discussions on external relations at Commission meetings and creating a joint Council-Commission planning staff. There is also much preparatory work that could be done to ease the transition of the Commission delegations to EU missions.

Leaving aside institutional changes, the political will to agree to common positions remains the key factor. There will remain areas of disagreement but the trend of the past decade (pace Iraq) is for the member states to agree increasingly on common policies toward third countries, regions and on functional issues.

The EU and the UN/OSCE/Council of Europe

The UN poses a special problem for the EU. Two of the member states, Britain and France, are permanent members of the UN Security Council and are supposed to inform and take into account the views of the Union as a whole. Although co-ordination between member states at the UN has improved in recent years, there is still some criticism of Britain and France pursuing national as opposed to EU interests in the UNSC. In January 2003, Spain and Germany joined the UNSC but even with four major European states on this supreme international body it was difficult to produce a coherent European voice as these four states took divergent positions

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on the Iraq crisis. Although both London and Paris favour reform of the UNSC, the proposed changes would more likely add extra members to the UNSC rather than lead towards a single EU seat. Germany’s demand for a permanent seat on the UNSC has sparked opposition from Italy, Spain and others.

Apart from the problem of the UNSC the EU is generally united on most other areas of UN reform. The EU and the Member States are the largest contributors to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets. There are also growing contacts between the EU and UN bureaucracies with regard to conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations. This practical cooperation has been welcomed by Kofi Annan in his increasingly frequent visits to the EU. The development of the ESDP and in particular the establishment of ‘battle groups’ is primarily seen as another practical way for the EU to support the UN.

With regard to the OSCE, it is the Presidency who speaks for the EU when there is an agreed political position. On economic issues, it is the Commission that takes the floor. But as Member States nearly always exercise their right to speak at OSCE meetings, this tends to dilute any EU message. There is also an element of duplication in some EU and OSCE activities, e.g. election monitoring, which leads to a feeling of competition rather than cooperation between the two bodies. The position of the EU in the Council of Europe is equally weak.

The EU’s Representation in International Economic Fora

The confused external representation of the EU in CFSP is mirrored in many other policy areas. The one notable exception is trade policy which has been an area of community competence for some time. In international trade negotiations it is the Commissioner for Trade (Peter Mandelson) who represents and speaks for the EU. The advantages of this approach for all Member states have been proved in many

trade negotiations, from the Kennedy Round to the Doha Development Agenda. The approach is simple: the EU Council of Ministers agrees a mandate which the Commission then uses as the basis for its negotiations with third parties. After agreement is reached, the Commission presents the results to the Council for approval. Such an approach could be useful in the foreign and international economic policy fields.

In the environment arena, an area of mixed competence between the Community and the Member States, there has been an ad hoc approach in recent years. The limitations of the six monthly rotating Presidency have also been exposed in international environment negotiations which usually last several years. As in the CFSP domain, there are substantial differences in capacities between the Member States. Some favour giving the Commission a negotiating mandate, as in trade policy, but others are opposed to what they would regard as ‘increased power’ to the Commission. In the negotiations on climate change and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, it is the Presidency which negotiates on behalf of the EU although the Commission plays an important role, in particular on issues which need to be coordinated and harmonized.

In recent years, some informal arrangements have been put in place to maximize the EU’s impact in international environmental negotiations, to facilitate preparations and to ensure continuity. Two specific ad hoc experiences deserve mention. First, the “lead-country” approach in the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Second, the “EU-team” approach in the bio-safety negotiations.

Despite the introduction of the euro, the EU continues to punch below its weight in international financial and economic fora. With the shift in euro zone countries of monetary policy sovereignty from national level to the European Central Bank (ECB), the EU’s role in international economic and financial governance has increased significantly. However, there are still

Fraser Cameron


problems stemming from the non membership of some Member States in the eurozone and jealousies surrounding participation in G8 meetings.

The EU’s role in the G8 has developed gradually over the years. In 1998, the European Council agreed rather complicated guidelines on the Union’s external representation in financial fora. For meetings of G8 finance ministers, ‘the president of the ECOFIN Council, or if the president is from a non-euro area member state, the president of the Eurozone, assisted by the Commission’ participates. Union views on other issues of particular relevance to the EMU would be presented at the IMF board by ‘the member of the executive director’s office of the member state holding the euro presidency, assisted by a representative of the Commission.’ On issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union, the European Council conclusions encouraged the Commission, Council and Member States to prepare common positions for presentation in international fora but it was recognized that this might be hindered by not being fully associated with the preparatory processes of international meetings.

In recent years, there has been mounting criticism of the G8 for its lengthy communiqués, lack of follow through, lack of transparency and restricted membership. Given the lack of substance of G8 meetings, it is not surprising that there have been calls, not just from anti-globalization protesters, to abolish the G8. Abolition is unlikely but the G8 could be transformed into a G20 to allow for greater representation from the south (India, Brazil, China, etc). Despite this pressure, it is unlikely that the current members will agree to change the status quo as it suits their vested interests. As in any international grouping there is often a trade off between increased size, and thus greater legitimacy, and reduced size, and allegedly greater efficiency.

So far, ad hoc solutions to external representation have prevailed for the IMF, G7 finance ministers, the Financial Stability Forum, the G20 and other

groupings where issues relevant to EMU are discussed. Member States have begun to realize, however, that these ad hoc solutions are not the best way for the Community’s voice to be heard internationally. There is also increasing pressure from emerging markets and non-European G7 countries for streamlining EU representation in bodies such as the IMF. In the IMF, procedurally, the euro area dimension has been taken into account by the twice yearly consultation of the euro area economic policies in addition to the traditional EU national consultation process. Institutionally, however, less progress has been made. The 1945 IMF Articles of Agreement confer on countries the right to become members. This is difficult to reconcile with the specific nature of the EU and EMU. Furthermore, the IMF decision taking process with countries grouped in mixed EU/non-EU constituencies can sometimes be at odds with the EU’s need to respect EU treaty requirements on position taking and representation.

Under the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a country must first join the IMF before it may become a member of the World Bank. Given this, and the fact that World Bank voting constituencies are organised along similar (sometimes mixed EU/non-EU) lines as in the IMF, the situation regarding EU representation within the World Bank is similar to that within the IMF.

The above situation is clearly highly confusing and clearly weakens the EU position in international fora. During a debate in the European Parliament on 11 June 2005 the Commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, Joaquin Almunia, deplored the disparity between the EU’s political and economic weight and its participation in the governance of international financial institutions (IFIs). The aim, he said, should be single EU representation in the Bretton Woods institutions. Speaking in the same debate, the European Affairs Minister for Luxembourg, Nicolas Schmit, pointed out that the 25 member states held 28% of the votes at the World Bank compared to 18% for

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the US. But the influence of the US was far greater as it spoke with one voice. MEPs in the debate were unanimous in calling for greater EU coordination in the IFIs as a prelude to single representation.

While ultimately it is to be hoped that there will be a single EU seat in the IFIs, the question is how to get there? There are those who argue for a gradual approach, placing the emphasis on improved co-ordination on base in Washington. Others suggest that as the IMF agenda is increasingly dominated by issues concerning EU competence. The EU should play a more prominent role through the EU Council dealing with economic and financial issues (Ecofin). This would mean Ecofin discussing IMF issues at their regular meetings and adopting common positions. A further complicating issue is Britain’s self-exclusion from the euro zone. This may be overcome if and when Britain joins the euro, but until then only piecemeal reform is likely. The Constitutional Treaty did, however, provide for the possibility of the euro-zone members agreeing on their own external representation. A step towards this goal might be a joint Franco-German seat, as these two countries have traditionally been pioneers in European integration.

The EU as a Model

The EU model is highly regarded elsewhere in the world and attempts to imitate parts of the EU system are perhaps the sincerest form of flattery. The EU supports these efforts through a mix of political, financial, economic and technical measures. In Africa there is the increasingly important Africa Union, as well as a number of regional and sub-regional organizations. In Latin America there is the Andean Pact and Mercosur as well as the Central American Free Trade Association (CAFTA). In the Middle East there is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In Asia there is the association of south-east Asian nations (ASEAN) and the Asian regional forum (ARF). There is also much talk of an East Asian community involving China, Japan and South Korea.

The EU has also been to the fore in promoting a wider concept of security. The ESS adopted a holistic approach in stressing the importance of human security and soft power but at the same time recognizing that the EU had to improve its military and non-military capabilities in order to deal with new threats and in particular the problem of failed states. The EU has also been a strong supporter of the concept of ‘global public goods’ and its input and influence on the UN reform debate was also significant. The EU has strongly supported the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, the idea of a Peace building Commission and a reformed Human Rights Commission.

Conclusion

The external representation of the EU is a complicated process and likely to undergo further changes as and when there is political will to implement some or all of the proposals in the Constitutional Treaty. The EU is gradually increasing its profile in the world and more and more countries are looking to Brussels for a lead on global issues. Yet, there are clear challenges to more effective EU participation in international bodies. Firstly, how to develop effective and coherent EU representation within bodies that were set up for a membership comprising only states. Some argue that an EU seat at the UN would not be possible under present international law. Secondly, there are challenges for reaching common EU positions. This applies on the economic and financial front as well as the political front. For example, the EU has been largely invisible in international efforts to deal with the recurrent financial and banking crises caused by the sharp swings in capital flows to emerging markets. No coherent EU position has ever been developed and defended, even in cases where Europe’s strategic interests are clear, e.g. Turkey. In contrast, the US usually has well defined positions and is highly effective at influencing multilateral bodies such as the IMF.

Another challenge is enlargement. If the enlarged EU of 27 Member States can speak with one voice, then clearly it will increase its influence

Fraser Cameron


on the world stage. But the Iraq crisis revealed differences between old and new Member States, especially in attitudes towards the US. It is likely, however, that the new Member States will align themselves, as they have done in the past, with the mainstream of EU policies. They will recognize the value of the EU speaking with one voice. Already, apart from Romania, they have withstood US pressure to sign bilateral agreements on the ICC.

The EU has also begun to make its voice heard in promoting support for reform of the international institutions. It is also increasingly respected as a model for regional governance elsewhere in the world. In the end, a Union with 450 million citizens, the largest trading bloc in the world with a single currency and the largest provider of development aid and humanitarian assistance, cannot escape from playing a greater role in world affairs. But it will be some time before it speaks with a single voice in all international fora.

Fraser Cameron is Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre.

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To paraphrase Kirke-gaard, history runs for-ward but is viewed with hindsight. We are still facing a challenge to de-fine the period after the

end of the Cold War. Whereas the period before was primarily of an ideological nature, today the challenges are mostly economic and cultural. Just as states were divided into two camps, the communist East and the democratic West, there is now a growing but misleading tendency to define societies in a new divide between the East and the West, along religious and cultural lines. Unfortunately, it seems that we cannot avoid creating such divisions. Against this back-ground, if any socio-political project can ever be defined as an antithesis and a synthesis both at the same time, it is certainly the process of Turkey’s integration into the EU.

Turkey’s membership to the EU is an antithesis to concepts such as “social escapism”, “lack of political realism” and an ignorance of “the logic of the facts”.

EU membership of Turkey is an all-encompassing synthesis of the present challenges and opportunities which face us today at a global level. This synthesis, defined simply, is the total sum of the best in East and West.

Turkey’s integration into the EU is a remarkable project that transcends the borders of our continent with its full political, economic, cultural and overall strategic implications. It is, if you like, an expansion of perspectives as well as a shift of mindsets on many levels. This is indeed a high calling. Precisely, since this is a

question of changing paradigms, it is a process all the more significant for the whole of Europe. It is time for the EU to grasp the opportunity that accession negotiations with Turkey present it with.

In a paper published last June, it asked whether Turkey’s accession to the EU would be “Just Another Enlargement?”1 The answer to this question is revealing, for such an answer is full of possibilities and opportunities for the EU’s future course of development on the global stage. It also reflects on whether or not the EU is ready to become a political, economic and cultural global actor at the same time.

Some analysts further contend that Turkey’s membership may change the nature of the old EU and continue to ask “why not?”

Defining the missing link

First and foremost, the formulation of, and response to, these questions requires an objective set of criteria, since the fundamentals of Turkey’s EU vocation are without comparison and are of a sui-generis nature. Turkey’s accession is not just about the politics or the economics of accession. Turkey’s EU membership is not so much about history as it is about her common future along European values.

The opening premise for analysing Turkey’s integration into the EU should be that Turkey’s European vocation is not up for discussion. Membership to the EU is a rational choice of the Turkish people. Nothing less can be an option for Turkey. Today, Turkey’s EU membership is driven as much by her own vision and definition

Turkey - The Missing Link in the European Puzzle

By Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

1 Kirsty Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement: Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession” Friends of Europe working paper, June 2004.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan


of modernization as by shared values and her common vision with Europe. It is for these reasons that the reform process in Turkey is a commitment to the aspirations of the Turkish people for the highest standard of democracy going, in other words, beyond the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria. These reforms will continue vigorously.

In a new millennium, where contemporary threats and risks take on many forms - from terrorism to environmental destruction, from regional conflicts and low-intensity warfare to extreme poverty and from hunger to diseases at epidemic levels - societies around the world are increasingly faced with questions of existence. The response to these universal malaises requires a global vision, not just rhetoric - a proven axiom calling for concrete action.

Europe, most notably the EU, is uniquely placed and well-endowed to rise to the current global challenges. Europe, espousing peace, stability, principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, cannot afford to turn inwards, choosing to remain an economic powerhouse but allowing itself to lack global political clout.

Europe has repeatedly succeeded in verifying new hypotheses in international politics. The very beginnings of the EC as a grand project of consolidating European peace, is a case in point. The EU is, without a doubt, the single most important political undertaking of its kind. It is a grandiose political work of art, with much commitment and devotion since its inception. However, the EU continues to require unparalleled dynamism to sustain itself both in its true shape and image and also to reconcile this image according to the contemporary global state of affairs.

In all this, the EU has, so far, proven beyond doubt its value. Most significantly, it has turned strife and mutual destruction into peace, stability and prosperity in Europe in the late twentieth century. Over the years, the enlargement process has played a key role in this systemic change. With the continuing process of

enlargement, European values and policies will certainly have a greater global reach and impact. At this point in time, the thinking behind the process of integration has to evolve beyond the mere mechanics of enlargement. The European integration process should move into a holistic realm, with a view to its possible projection capacity on an international level.

Rethinking the parameters of EU’s global reach

Our world today is being threatened by forces that defy our framework of civilized life, risking a plunge into some unpredictable pattern. It is, precisely, at this point that we need to stand back and take a look at the picture ahead of us: can any of us afford to be guided by an ossified system of symbols, be it political, cultural, social and even perhaps religious? If the answer is no, then time is ripe for action.

Europe can truly embark on this enterprise by contributing to lasting stability in its periphery. Turkey has much to offer to further this unique process. The advantages of Turkey’s membership to the Union are closely related to the future vision of the EU itself. Turkey’s membership to the EU will not only contribute to the maintenance of stability and peace in Europe but also to the spread of the European success story in implementing universal values in the region and beyond. In fact, with Turkey’s entry into the Union, new horizons will be opened in EU’s external relations. Turkey’s membership will also act as a catalyst for Europe in establishing closer ties with the countries of the wider region of the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as parts of Africa. This may take the form of political, social or commercial cooperation. Turkey, for instance, is among the leading actors of the international construction sector with over 2.500 projects worth around 60 billion US dollars in over 60 countries.

The embracing of cultural diversity in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding, as a code of conduct for addressing issues of common concern, should form the cornerstone

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of interregional cooperation within Europe and beyond. The EU should demonstrate this with all the means available to it. One such tool is the successful finalization of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

There are various estimates as to the exact number of Muslims living in Europe today. These range roughly from 10 to 16 million. These figures make Muslims the largest religious minority in Europe, constituting almost three percent of Europe’s total population. If one considers that only seven out of 25 EU member countries have a population over 13 million people, this would mean that the Muslim population currently living in Europe may even exceed the population of the other 18 EU Member States.

Turkey’s membership will constitute yet another step in mutually influencing Muslim and Christian societies positively, in their efforts of identifying with each other, as well as strengthening the ground for much-needed dialogue and cooperation between the two. This will also help the process of defining the EU’s own identity as a multicultural global power at peace “within” and “without”.

Keeping both the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations in Europe away from radical tendencies is possible only if there is viable evidence which shows that modernity, a secular way of life, democratic principles and Islam can coexist. Turkey’s EU membership will help the Union to counter arguments that it is an exclusive, and allegedly Christian, club. With religion having been accorded, albeit unjustifiably, much significance in international relations, by welcoming Turkey into its fold the EU will demonstrate that European advocacy of universal values is more than just rhetoric. With Turkey’s membership and even the process leading to it, namely the accession negotiations, Muslims in Europe are more likely to feel confident and more willing to integrate

in their host societies. Turkey joining the EU as a Member will prove to the Muslim world that a predominantly Muslim country can interact with the West as an equal partner and move towards deeper integration for the benefit of both sides. By the same token, Turkey would demonstrate that, with a functioning democracy, Islam need not be viewed merely as a channel of radical opposition or exploited by some as a rhetorical conduit for extremism and violence.

Indeed, I have been tasked to co-sponsor the recent UN initiative on the project of an “Alliance of Civilizations”. This is a significant undertaking; in fact, Turkey’s accession to the EU will constitute an alliance of civilizations under the roof of the EU.

In brief, in the context of East-West and North-South interaction, Turkey occupies a unique place. From an Eastern perspective, Turkey is part of the West; from the West, however, Turkey appears as the extension of the East; from a Northern perspective, given her GNP per capita, Turkey is considered an extension of the South; and from a Southern perspective, as a member of the OECD, NATO and an EU candidate, Turkey is the extension of the North.2 This unique position is the basis for Turkey’s potential for becoming a synthesis and an antithesis, both at the same time.

The historical and cultural aspects of Turkey’s EU voyage

One could, perhaps, argue that there are attempts to understand the nature of Turkey’s voyage towards Europe. Many of these attempts have sadly proven less than imaginative. In fact, such attempts may have their roots from many centuries ago. Today, there are still echoes of past centuries that linger around Europe. These echoes take many forms: from elements of racism and xenophobia to suggestions that Turkey’s faith is in permanent contrast with that



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2 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Küresel Bunalım”, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, pp. 206

of Europe’s. Some of them resonate with pure political rhetoric and even with unfortunate cultural insensitivities.

The European Union Turkey seeks accession to, is the direct opposite of such constraints and misgivings. Turkey’s EU is pragmatic and is not limited by the demons of the past centuries. Turkish society has traditionally and historically been open to change, accepting multi-culturalism and embracing the “other” in a universal way.

Yet, even at this volatile and fragile point in contemporary world politics, there are still those in Europe who find it hard to define the EU around common values. They prefer to consider a narrowly defined historical and cultural context more important. However, if history and historical culture are to be added in the criteria for EU membership, then these point even more strongly to Turkey’s place in Europe. After all, history and culture taken together are the sum of reciprocal influences, negative or positive prejudices and repeated action between states.States often define themselves by their geography. The process of the creation of a country’s identity is, furthermore, linked to its historical collective consciousness as well as to its national interest. Historically, even though the vast borders of the Ottoman Empire reached as far as Africa in the south and the Caucasus in the north-east, the main political orientation and social thrust of Turkish society has been towards the West.

This has been more evident since the end of the 17th century, with the appointment of the first Ottoman envoy as Ambassador to Vienna. At no point in history or nowhere else geographically other than Europe, did the Ottomans feel a need to forge formal diplomatic relations with another state. As Bernard Lewis points out, the Ottoman Sultan was formally admitted to the Concert of Europe by the European powers with the Treaty of Paris of 1856.3

The Turkish view, as early as the 17th century,

was that progress equalled modernity which, in turn, was a function of westernization. It was certainly no coincidence that one of the first books printed in the Turkish printing press in the early 18th century was a treatise describing the states and forms of government that existed in Europe.4 Already in the last few decades of the Ottoman Empire, reforms were introduced which brought Turkey closer to Europe. The Ottoman Empire was the first Muslim country to adopt a constitution and representative institutions in 1876.

Turkey has historically been a direct subject of European history. Naturally, the process accelerated after the Republic was established in 1923 and the country underwent a major transformation. The European model as a means of modernization was developed through this process. The Civil Code of Switzerland, the Criminal Code of Italy, and the Administrative Code of France were taken as models for the young Republic. These choices were not taken by mere coincidence or by chance. In each case, the most advanced piece of legislation of the times was adopted. Turkey was no stranger to adopting European legislation long before it became an EU candidate. Turkey also took an early interest in the efforts to build a united Europe. It asked to join the European Economic Community barely 1,5 years after it came into being, namely in July 1959.

There have been ups and downs but the final destination of full integration was never lost. In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership. The decision to give Turkey candidate status in Helsinki in December 1999 shifted the focus of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, from one mainly based on economics to one where politics also came to the fore. December 2004 was another milestone in these relations, with a specific novel characteristic: that Turkey’s European odyssey of four decades was put on the track with the opening of accession negotiations on October 3rd, 2005.

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3 Ibid, 1254 Ibid, 126

Turkey as a regional asset for the EU

In a period when a set of new and old phenomena continue to threaten our world and our very way of life, the EU has a rare chance to rise to this challenge by spreading its values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Military conflicts, poverty, terrorism, fanaticism, religious and ethnic discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, prejudice against Muslims, environmental degradation, epidemic diseases, and drug trafficking, all require a collective response.

Formulating global solutions to these inter-national problems pose a challenge for allnations. As long as the resolutions of at least some of these problems remain outstanding, they are a potential source of instability in the longer term which may yet haunt Europe. In the persistent absence of viable steps towards the eradication of the ills of our world, Europe’s very economic and political credibility and its overall security may be at risk. Turkey, as part of Europe, can be a moderating and stabilising actor in areas as diverse as the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea area, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and elsewhere. The discovery of one of the world’s largest petroleum and natural gas reserves in the Caspian rim has further increased Turkey’s strategic importance. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will help Turkey take a central place on the route through which these resources will be transferred to Western markets. It is calculated that 1 out of every 16 barrels of oil supplied to world markets will be transported via this route.

Thanks to Turkey’s existing linguistic and cultural ties with the Central Asian Republics, she has privilaged access to the region. In the Middle East, Turkey is the only country which both the Israelis and the Palestinians trust. For the prevention of regional conflicts, Turkey also has experience in the reconstruction of crisis regions. International peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, the Middle East and Georgia have included contributions from

Turkey. Turkey was the first to take over the command of the ISAF in Afghanistan and is continuing this task successfully.

Turkey’s membership in NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Black Sea Economic Organization is only a brief summary of some of the international platforms which we participate and which demonstrates Turkey’s regional reach.

There are enormous strategic, political, economic and cultural gains which Turkey’s membership will bring to the EU. Given that Turkey has spearheaded regional groupings such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or that a Turkish national is currently holding the post of Secretary General in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Turkey’s EU membership will naturally raise the profile of the EU in the projection of common values and standards in neighbouring regions. With Turkey as a member, the EU will have a stronger voice in the prevention and settlement of conflicts, especially along its external regional borders.

One of the current requirements for viable regional peace in the eastern Mediterranean is the need to find a just settlement to the Cyprus issue within the UN framework. This will bring about a new partnership on the Island and also constitute a new ‘state of affairs’ for the eastern Mediterranean region as a whole. Turkey’s membership to the EU will help consolidate, even secure this peace process, contributing to lasting stability in the region.

Given her cultural, linguistic and historical relations with a great number of countries, Turkey is uniquely poised to access, to interpret and help shape positively political and social tendencies in a vast geographical area. In an era where communication is more pertinent, reaching the hearts and minds of all these societies, it is significant and indeed, it is a task in itself.



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Economics of politics

This type of effective communication, which Turkey can readily project, can be further empowered by economic prowess in this age of globalisation. In addition to the vigorous political reform process which aims to reach and even surpass the Copenhagen political criteria, our government is committed to the process of structural reform of the economy.

Turkey is the only country to forge a Customs Union with the Union before membership. She has a comprehensive macro economic and political dialogue, a Pre-accession Strategy, and a related financial cooperation mechanism with the EU.

More than 80 thousand Turkish entrepreneurs are already operating in Europe. Turkey’s economy currently ranks as the 17th largest in the world. This is up from 22nd place only last year. As regards to economic growth, Turkey ranked first among the OECD countries in 2004. Our trade volume will stand at around 200 billion dollars this year, more than half of this with the EU. The EU is, clearly, Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Gross national product has increased by almost 10% in 2004, well above the estimated 5%, while income per capita rose by more than 20%.

Some analysts have calculated that if Turkey maintains a 6% annual growth, its GNP can double in the next 12-13 years. This would mean that Turkey’s GDP would approach the European average. The public sector deficit in terms of its ratio to GNP has been decreasing and is expected to come down to 3% in 2006, thus reaching the figure set out in the Maastricht criteria. Inflation and real interest rates have gone down to single digits, for the first time in the last 30 years. Structural reforms in the economic field, successful and on-going privatisation efforts, as well as fiscal and monetary stability achieved with strict discipline, are on-going positive indicators.

On 1 January 2005, Turkey launched a new

currency by dropping six zeros from the old one. By doing so, we have rebuilt confidence in our national currency. The new lira has also become a strong currency. Turkey’s main structural targets will continue to be reformed in the areas of taxation, social security, agriculture, and the fight against the “informal economy”. The banking sector remains an area for further reform.

Despite ongoing reforms, Turkish membership presents a challenge to the EU. Her size, the relative weaknesses of her economy, and her large population are cited by some as leading causes for concern in terms of her EU membership. It is true that Turkey’s EU membership may have a set of different political, economic and social implications with broad geopolitical dynamics. But it is not possible to know how Turkey and EU will be in 10-15 years from now. The potential of Turkey’s vibrant economy, its entrepreneurial strength and the expected levels of growth are more promising than fears fueled by domestic politics. The present positive trend in the economy in Turkey coupled with the economic reforms that complement the political reforms are significant positive signs.

As for demographic trends, Turkey’s population will not reach 90 million for another two decades. This figure will then only be a small fraction of the EU population. More significantly, and contrary to what some would like the European public to believe, rather than exceeding 100 million in the near future, recent statistics indicate that the Turkish population may reach 99 million only in 2040. In fact, the population is expected to stabilize around this figure. With the expected increase in foreign investment in Turkey during the accession process, the rise in domestic demand for labour is likely to drastically reduce the willingness of Turks to migrate to Europe in search of jobs. More importantly, given the worrying demographic trends in Europe over the next few decades - falling birth rates and even decreases in population in some cases - Turkey’s young population can be viewed as an asset rather than a hypothetical liability for the EU.

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The EU is part of which Europe? The Roman Empire did not include Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia never experienced feudalism, the Renaissance did not reach Northern and Eastern Europe and the Reformation movement remained limited to Latin Christendom. Most things relevant to Europe - from daily life to international politics, the arts, literature or the sciences, find their origins in the regions and cultures around Turkey, dating back 5 centuries ago. Despite all this, although the concept of Europe points to a certain degree of cultural, political and demographic unity, it is not possible to claim a uniform sense of Europeanness embraced in its entirety by the peoples of all EU Member States.

The recent rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in the referenda in France and the Netherlands have once again given rise to a renewed debate on the identity of Europe as a whole and on the state of domestic politics in the Member States. While both topics are relevant to an open discussion on the EU by its members, it is important that these do not reflect negatively on Turkey’s accession process in the long run.

Paradoxically, though, and perhaps under-standably for some, as Turkey’s prospects for membership become more real, the arguments expressed against Turkish membership have been voiced more openly in the last few years. Some of this self-defeating suspicion has recently led to references of special relations between the Union and Turkey instead of eventual EU membership. These views, lately expressed more openly in the wake of the EU Constitutional Treaty referenda in France and the Netherlands, suggest a privileged partnership for Turkey with the EU. It would be a gross mistake to assess Turkey’s integration process to the EU on the basis of short term perspectives alone or at the level of domestic political gains. This would, indeed, run counter to the idea of a dynamic EU.

There is a deceptive dichotomy, some tend to believe, between belonging to the Islamic faith and being fully democratic and modern. This is exactly the point where short-sighted perceptions, guided by short-term political gains, sadly miss the mark. It is true that this is a domain, unlike economics or demographics, where an empirical approach is much harder to employ. Thus, it is easier to overlook the opportunities presented by Turkey to Europe as a whole. Turkey’s experience harbours enough substance to demonstrate that the East and the West are not universally incompatible. Such incompatibility is an anachronistic view which should be left behind. Turkey’s contribution to this is much more than just rhetoric; it is the main element of the very synthesis Europe must forge itself in order to provide for the antithesis of a closed Christian club removed from the responsibilities of a global order.

The flip side of the coin is that a predominantly Muslim Turkey, once a member, will have joined a predominantly Christian union. Turkish society, however, is committed to a secular way of life and does not harbour misgivings or hesitations about EU membership based on this premise. The impact of Turkish accession to the EU will further demonstrate that the EU is a multicultural body, not a ‘Christian club’ and this would have important geopolitical ramifications.5 Such spillover effects are already evident. Scores of people from the countries of the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and the Caucasus with predominantly Muslim populations are watching closely the process of Turkey’s integration with Europe. A number of these countries rushed to express their pleasure at the decision of the European Council of 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

Conclusion

A self-reliant, self-confident and integrated Europe will be all the more sensitive to the needs of other regions of the globe and, at


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5 Hughes, Executive Summary iii


the same time, better equipped to respond to those needs. Such a Europe, whatever its eventual geographical size, will be effective and in essence can be “present” only in so far as the values it espouses can reach out. The merits of enlargement, however challenging institutionally, may far surpass any grand economic scheme. Enlargement of the Union is a global leap forward for Europe. The prospect of the complete unification of the continent offers Europe a real chance to become a force for stability throughout the world.

With the accession of ten new members to the Union last year, the population of the EU has reached 450 million with a total economy larger than that of the United States. The view that Turkey’s entry into the Union will yield large strategic benefits for the EU is neither new, nor exaggerated. The argument that the EU public is not convinced of Turkey’s potential contribution to the Union partly because their leaders have not begun to explain the case for enlargement,6 merits reflection. Indeed, in Europe there seems to be a tendency to project to the European public many mixed messages about the philosophy of enlargement or even where the EU would like to or should go. Prominent EU public figures have given conflicting signals about the future identity of the EU. Consider Valery Giscard d’Estaing announcing, as head of the European Convention, which drew up the EU Constitution, that Turkey’s entry into the EU would mean the end of the Union. Then, consider the preamble of the Constitution which points to “unity in diversity.”

The Report of “the Independent Commission on Turkey”, composed of former European political leaders, concluded that delay in the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey would damage the Union’s credibility and be seen as a breach of the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. The Report further affirms that any objections, in principle, against Turkey joining

the European integration process should have been raised in 1959 or at the time of Turkey’s application for membership in 1987 or in 1999, before Turkey was given candidate status. No government can claim that these decisions, including the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 2002 on accession negotiations, were not taken in full knowledge of all circumstances.7

Thinking of oneself in the context of the world is to be able to envision oneself as a power. However, one can only be a power if he has the ability to cross mental borders. As the French historian Lucien Febvre suggested in 1945 “Europe, if one has to make it, must be created in the context of the planet.”

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the Prime Minister of Turkey.

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6 The Economist, June 4-10 2005 pp. 117 “Turkey in Europe: More Than a Promise?” Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, September 2004, pp. 43

There has been much talk lately about the nature of power in the 21st Century, and in particular the European Union’s ability to play

a strong role in the world. It is true that our principal source of power – our power of attraction - is “soft” rather than “hard”. But it is no less potent.

For proof, we have only to look at the way countries on the EU’s borders have been demanding closer relations with the EU. We constitute a pole of attraction for countries in our region, one of the defining features of global powers throughout history.

Our traditional response to such demands has been membership. But this has its limits - many of those now asking for closer relations are not on track for membership, nor for the moment are in a position to meet its requirements.

Yet we do want closer relations with all our neighbours, whether or not they will one day become members. We want to reach out to our closest partners, building a circle of friends around us. So we have developed a new response to this impetus - the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is becoming increasingly important as citizens raise questions about the future limits of the EU. It provides us with a new framework and tools for engaging with our neighbours and utilises the valuable transition experience we have already gained from enlargement. It’s a way of responding to our neighbours’ desire for closer relations with the EU, without entering into discussions of membership.

It is also a way for us to deal more effectively with threats to our security and to project stability and prosperity beyond our borders. Within our neighbourhood we face complex challenges – conflicts, both frozen and live; trafficking of drugs, weapons and people; poverty; political instability; migratory pressures and organised crime. The nature of these challenges and their proximity explains why ENP is the number one external relations priority for this Commission.

The offer

I am often asked whether ENP is more than just a repackaging of old EU policies in new clothes. To me the answer is clear - it is a far more strategic and wide-ranging approach than anything we have attempted in the past, save for enlargement itself. But I am aware that we still need to prove ourselves to our partners, and for that reason the implementation of our policy will be key to its success.

2005 is the first year of delivery for the ENP. We are proposing a serious upgrade in relations to our neighbours. They are not being offered a second-best option to enlargement but rather a highly-desirable step-change in our relations.

This year saw the formal adoption and ratification of ENP Action Plans with seven partners – Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine. We also began work on five new Action Plans with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon.

So what exactly are we offering? The European Neighbourhood Policy is an opportunity for us, and our partners, to share the benefits which we have derived from half a century of peaceful integration. It’s a win-win policy, based on mutual interest and shared values. We

Future Prospects for the European Neighbourhood Policy

By Benita Ferrero-Waldner

Benita Ferrero-Waldner


share our neighbours’ desire to become more prosperous and stable. We encourage them to take meaningful steps to modernize, open up markets, and strengthen the rule of law, good governance and human rights. In return we offer deeper political and economic integration with the EU.

By deeper political integration we mean more frequent and higher level political dialogue - better reflecting the importance of our relations - and assisting our partners to further strengthen the institutions protecting democracy and the rule of law. But we also want to cooperate more closely in promoting our common foreign policy priorities, like making multilateral institutions more effective, and in addressing our common security threats like the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the economic field, the objectives of ENP are ambitious: enhanced preferential trade relations, increased financial and technical assistance, gradual participation in a number of EU policies and programmes and, the most novel and far-reaching feature of the ENP, a “stake” in the EU’s internal market. This means gradual participation in our internal market through approximating legislation and gradual integration of transport, energy and telecommunication networks.

ENP is a virtuous circle – by helping our neighbours we help ourselves. By helping to create prosperous, stable and secure conditions in our neighbouring countries we safeguard our own prosperity, stability and security. We want to reach out to our friends and establish closer ties.

But of course, we can only do that if our neighbours respond. The impetus for political and economic reforms must come from within if it is to be truly successful. So in the political field we have to see concrete progress in respect to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In the economic field there must be genuine movement towards sustainable reform and a

well-functioning market economy. In response, the EU will offer considerable assistance and opportunities for more cooperation.

Implementing far-reaching reforms will not be easy. But the benefits will be considerable – structural reforms will lead to increased growth rates; a better macroeconomic environment and trade liberalisation to increased foreign direct investment; and public administration reform to increased institutional capacity.

How will we achieve all this? First of all, by agreeing with our partners on realistic, achievable and measurable reforms, and secondly, by supporting their implementation.

The first part, agreeing reforms, is guided by the ENP Action Plans. These are jointly-drawn up political documents committing both sides to respect common values and norms of international conduct and undertake political and economic reforms. Each ENP Action Plan is tailor-made for the partner country, focusing on a limited number of key priorities.

Broadly speaking, all the plans cover political and economic reform; cooperation in the field of justice, liberty and security; infrastructure networks; and people-to-people contacts.

In the economic sphere, we want progress on issues like poverty reduction and sustainable development; promoting trade relations and developing regional trade links; streamlining customs procedures; converging technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures; and dealing with issues like state aid, intellectual property rights and public procurement. These and other measures will improve the trade and investment environment and stimulate small businesses and entrepreneurs.

ENP is also a response to expectations, hopes and fears within the EU. We will put in place structures to manage legal migration, thus helping to fill gaps in our labour markets

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and making a substantial contribution to our own economic growth, while simultaneously benefiting migrants’ ‘home’ economies. We will work together to fight on security issues that affect us all: terrorism, international crime, weapons of mass destruction, and human trafficking.

We will jointly tackle environmental issues, which know no geographical boundaries. And we will cooperate on long term strategic issues like energy supplies and integrated transport networks.

ENP is not only about activities for governments and institutions, it is also about people. Bringing our communities, our youth, our students, and civil society together is essential. ENP provides the base for grass-root contacts through exchange programmes for young professionals and others, and scholarship schemes. We also want to explore high-level scientific exchanges, and work on the convergence of our higher education systems so that our neighbours can participate in the European higher education area.

How far we get will depend on our partners’ political will and capacity, as well as our own capacity to deliver.

The second part, supporting reform, will draw on both our own experience of reform and integration, and on the Commission’s financial and technical assistance programmes. At present, the ENP countries benefit from TACIS and MEDA programmes, together with various other forms of EC assistance. From 2007, as part of a general reform of our external assistance, these programmes will be replaced by a single new instrument - the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). We will tailor our assistance to meet priority needs and support the implementation of the ENP Action Plans with improved and streamlined procedures.

We will use tried and tested methodology such as twinning and support for institution and capacity-building. We will also pay particular attention to cross-border cooperation - for the first time, cross-border cooperation at the EU’s external borders will be possible through a single instrument and a single set of rules; this is a substantial step forward.

This ambitious policy needs adequate financial means. So we propose a substantial increase in funding for the ENP region to nearly €15 billion for the period 2007-2013, nearly doubling the amount available for 2000-2006. Even before the ENPI comes into effect in 2007, we have enhanced the assistance provided under TACIS and MEDA e.g. by strengthening cross-border aspects.

The idea is not to replace our existing relationships, but to give them an added dimension. The European Neighbourhood Policy will bring the established Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with countries to our East and Association Agreements (AAs) with those to our South, into sharper focus. The Barcelona Process will continue to provide an essential regional forum.

The achievements

The tailor-made aspect of ENP is the key – different countries have different requirements. This approach is already proving its worth.

To our East we used ENP successfully to support the negotiations during Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” last year. As part of the ENP Action Plan agreed with Ukraine, we are discussing visa facilitation and readmission. We want Ukrainian businessmen, officials, students and tourists to travel to the EU more easily. We have also been pushing hard for progress towards Market Economy Status, an issue we know is very important for Ukraine. And we have significantly enhanced our cooperation in the fields of energy and transport.



Moldova is treating ENP as a ready-made blueprint of reforms required for this early stage of transition, and has already adopted the Action Plan as its reform programme. We are also funding a border assistance mission on the Moldova-Ukraine border, an important step in facilitating the end of the frozen conflict in Transnistria.

We will be discussing Action Plans with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Again we will be looking for cross-border cooperation to help facilitate an end to the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus.

We are also very committed to Belarus. We hope the Belarusian authorities change their attitude to democracy and enable Belarus to become a participant in ENP. But in the meantime, we will continue to support civil society and democratisation, including through independent news broadcasts.

To our South, we are using the ENP Action Plans signed with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to encourage practical trilateral initiatives between us. We have already made progress in the fields of energy and transport. Our Communication on EU-Palestine cooperation, beyond disengagement and towards a two state solution, outlines further measures for utilising the ENP Action Plans to support the Middle East Peace Process.

Beyond those two, we are using the Action Plans signed with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia to support political reform around the Mediterranean - for example, by setting up the first-ever fora to discuss democracy and governance issues with our partners.

We are currently negotiating new Action Plans with Egypt and Lebanon, which will give us more scope for political leverage and joint action.

The Future

We must use the attraction of the EU to promote sustainable political and economic reform, while responding to our neighbours’ urgent desire for closer relations. ENP reflects our commitment to avoid new divisions emerging between the newly enlarged EU and its neighbours. The people who live just across our borders are not simply citizens of “third countries” but close partners with whom we share practical interests, aspirations and ideals.

Today the EU is the world’s largest integrated market and biggest economy. But to maintain our position as an economic giant we must increase our competitiveness, through better, more efficient regulation, including deregulation, and more focus on education, research and innovation. European universities must be able to compete with their counterparts around the world. At the same time we must maintain our European way of life. This is the right answer to globalisation; we cannot isolate ourselves from the world.

This is also essential to ensure the security of European citizens. We have a responsibility to tackle terrorism and international organised crime, to prevent new conflicts flaring up and to spread the stability and security that flows from prosperity and democracy.

The response to all this is for the EU to remain outward-looking, to open up further to the world. ENP is an essential part of this approach, which is why it will remain the principal foreign policy priority for the Barroso Commission.

To conclude, we have already achieved much in this year of delivery, but much more hard work still lies ahead. The EU is committed to supporting its neighbours through their economic reform processes, and to anchoring them in the current spirit of democracy. I am confident

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that our neighbours are equally committed to us. Whatever lies beyond the horizon, I am convinced the European Neighbourhood Policy will be part of making the European Union and its neighbours an area of peace, security and stability. We must work with our neighbours to promote reforms that will improve life for the citizens of those countries, as well as our own.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner is European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.



The barbaric terrorist attacks of Madrid and London were squarely directed against our free world. Whereas our solidarity and our

thoughts are with the victims and their mourning families, our commitment to stand firm in defence of our common values strengthens us further. The international community stands united and has to act decisively so that terrorism does not achieve its objective of sowing hatred and dividing the world. We shall not allow terrorism to triumph.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union commits us unambiguously to defend human dignity, the right to life, physical integrity and security of persons. The European Commission supports wholeheartedly a reinforced commitment to combating terrorism, as most recently expressed by the Council of the European Union at its extraordinary meeting of 13 July 2005 in response to the London bombings.

But terrorism does not only aim at indiscriminate killing of people, it also aims at provoking counter-reactions which, in turn, may lead to an accentuated polarisation of our society, thoughts and ideologies. We will not fall into the trap of sacrificing our democratic values in the very defence against terrorism and international crime. Freedom is not possible without security; nor is security possible without justice and the rule of law.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights also commits us to respect private and family life, the protection of personal data and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is against this very background that

the European Union will further intensify its efforts and accelerate the implementation of the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and other related commitments. Upholding the fundamental principles of freedom, security and justice requires decisive but balanced action responding comprehensively by isolating and apprehending terrorists and their supporters, while at the same time strengthening democratic values, public debate and enhancing education towards tolerance, diversity and respect for others.

The European Commission is fully committed to promoting its policies in this spirit. The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism as adopted by the European Council in June 2004 is a living document with regular updates in line with current developments and evolving priorities. Complemented by the Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice of November 2004 and the Action Plan of 10 June 2005 translating it into specific measures, these documents provide the basis for the European internal security policy agenda for the years to come. In addition, the Framework Programme “Security and Safeguarding Liberties” under the new Financial Perspectives 2007 – 2013 is geared at supporting core policy initiatives in financial terms, thereby assuring inter alia that the European dimension of the fight against terrorism effectively complements respective efforts undertaken by Member States.

Global, external and internal security

Global trade liberalisation, as well as developments in transport, information and communication technology, increase economic and social opportunities world-wide. The European Union stands at the forefront of liberalisation in particular, by successfully

Europe, Global Security and the Fight Against Terrorism

By Franco Frattini

Franco Frattini


promoting the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital in the 25 Member States.

Terrorist and organised criminals exploit our free society. They may prepare an attack in one country, ensure funding from a second country, conduct the crime in a third one and seek safe haven in a fourth. A comprehensive strategy matching up to the challenges of international crime must therefore cover internal and external aspects of the problem, both being intrinsically interwoven.

No single government is, nowadays, in the position to offer security to its citizens in isolation from the policies of other countries. In this context, the European Security Strategy established a programmatic platform in order to synchronise efforts and pool resources at international levels. At European level, the challenge is to benefit from the advantages of free movement, but at the same time minimise the security threats, by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. Indeed, the challenge is local and global and so must be the response.

Policy developments in the area of freedom, security and justice have been breathtaking since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in May 1999. We set up new institutions such as Europol, Eurojust and CEPOL to complement national policies where European efforts can produce added value. We established framework legislation in many policy fields targeting at cross-border crime, organised crime and terrorism, and at the linkages that exist in this field. Under the Hague Programme, accelerated by the wave of terrorist attacks inside and outside Europe, we are moving increasingly towards the formulation of common policies and - under the new financial perspectives 2007 – 2013 - towards the funding of respective policies at national, European and international levels. Indeed, the European Union is developing the policies and policy instruments that will allow it to become a global actor in defence of freedom and security world-wide.

Today, the European Union has a lot to offer the international community, from judicial cooperation to police cooperation and border management, from enhanced information exchange to data protection, from effective prevention and protection against crime towards the management of its consequences, from legislation to policy funding, from national to regional cooperation. In this process, the Hague Programme and the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan form the backbone of our mandate which we implement with fierce commitment.

The link between terrorism and organised crime

The EU does not distinguish between different kinds of terrorism when it comes to condemning or fighting it. Although the most visible type of terrorism these days is the one which purports to have an ‘Islamic cause’, we are committed to confront with equal vigour all types and forms of terrorism. “Knowing your enemy” is one of our essential tasks. As a consequence, major efforts are being undertaken at EU level in the sharing of information and intelligence, enhanced cooperation between police and intelligence services, and the development of definitions and criteria which will in the future form the basis of European threat assessments, coordinated policies and joint operations.

The analysis of terrorism and related crime teaches us that the tools we are deploying need to be further sharpened and fine-tuned. In fact, we have embarked on a race in which terrorists use ever more sophisticated instruments to fund their activities, communicate with each other or move across borders. Enhanced action against state sponsored terrorism in recent years and more systematic financial investigations into terrorist support structures have forced terrorists to resort to sophisticated funding and financing strategies. These include a broad range of criminal activities including the acquisition and running of legitimate business or illegitimate fund raising through charities.

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In this process, terrorist groups have often lost their potentially more comprehensible political objectives, thereby blurring terrorist motivation and criminal enterprise, as was the case for instance in Afghanistan, Columbia or Northern Ireland. Today, terrorists may engage in organised criminal activity. Criminals may fund terrorist activities. Terrorists may become state leaders, and state leaders may engage in supporting or carrying out terrorist or criminal activities to further their objectives.

The lessons we have to draw from this are manifold. I would like to highlight three core issues which require our priority attention.

First, given the potentially strong links between terrorism and organised crime it is imperative to coordinate respective investigations. The setting up of effective coordination mechanisms between police forces and intelligence services, at national and European levels, is thus one of the big challenges to be addressed by the European Union in the years to come. Second, we must be determined to work towards a single European law enforcement space that establishes effective information and intelligence sharing across borders and allows for well coordinated operations based on shared European threat and risk assessments. Any technical, human or policy obstacles such as incompatible IT systems or the lack of trust between institutions will have to be systematically addressed. In parallel, enhanced multi-disciplinary cooperation between law enforcement bodies, government agencies, regulators, the private sector and policy makers is essential at national and European level in order to mobilise all available forces and tools against terrorism.

Third, terrorism and organised crime often go together, in particular in countries with weak political cultures. Given its trans-national organisation, the European Union cannot act in isolation. Our external relations programmes will thus address the external threats and their

complex root causes in a comprehensive manner, based on national experience inside the EU and the evolving European internal security policy.

Addressing the root causes - strengthening crime preventive cultures

The recent terrorist attacks in London of July 2005 have reinforced the priority the European Commission attaches to addressing violent radicalisation as part of a comprehensive approach to fight terrorism. The latter was stipulated under the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism which the European Council adopted in June 2004, following the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid.

The evolving policy to counter violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment at European level comprises a full range of measures, including enhanced control of mass media to prevent incitement to hatred, the use of media for radicalisation or even the preparation of terrorist attacks, but also enhanced focus on education, youth engagement, social integration, tolerance and inter-cultural dialogue. Overall, the dialogue between states and religions should be reinforced and supported by an extension of well-established anti-discrimination policies towards social integration measures.

The transformation of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia into the European Fundamental Rights Agency will also enhance its scope to reach out in addressing root causes. To underline the specific importance we attach to dialogue, integration and respect for the other, the Commission will shortly launch the proposal to make 2008 the Year of Inter-cultural Dialogue. Education towards tolerance in society is one policy element, but it must not be misused to justify certain violent practices as an expression of diversity or religious right. The clear and unconditional commitment to the letter and spirit of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights provides the foundation for our Europe of freedom, justice and security.

Franco Frattini


We also have to be aware of the economic dimension of security - interference in our open societies and free markets. The overall process towards privatisation and digitalisation of the economy on one hand, and the increasing inter-connectivity of private enterprises and their vulnerability from market environments will requires private actors to become active proponents of a market regulation that minimises the risk of crime and its covert funding. This is a security argument but it also aims at preventing the criminal distortion of competition and market destabilisation.

As a matter of principle, self regulation and voluntary standards based on thorough risk assessments should be the privileged tools to achieve transparency of market transactions and, in consequence, traceability of infringements or criminal acts. Appropriate reporting procedures, oversight and public private partnerships in the fight against terrorism and crime complement the effectiveness of crime prevention and facilitate criminal investigation and prosecution. The general thrust of our security policy should always be to strengthen good governance and accountability as the most effective long term remedy against crime. The same goes for the public sector. Transparency and accountability address corruption and mismanagement which often cause or facilitate weak criminal justice systems and criminal activities to flourish.

Fight against terrorism: the European agenda

The European Commission’s long term approach to the fight against terrorism is being built around four policy strands: (1) prevention, (2) protection, (3) prosecution and (4) consequence management:

1. Prevention: Successful preventive measures are crucial for the European Union’s success in the long-run. Reduction of crime opportunities must go hand in hand with reduction in incentives to isolate oneself from civil society. Issues such as violent radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism,

enhancing the security of explosives and improving cooperation in the area of criminal justice through, for example, better information exchanges, form an integral part of the European Union’s policy agenda.

At the same time, the EU is also addressing ways of preventing terrorists from access to financial resources, thereby hindering them to travel, hide and purchase or produce means that cause destruction and carnage.

2. Protection: The elaboration of a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is at the centre of current efforts in the European Union to strengthen the protection of key European and national infrastructures. Complimentary to this will be the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), which will equip Member States with a rapid alert capacity concerning threats to their critical infrastructure. CIWIN will also allow partners to share knowledge and best practice in the interest of greater security for all of Europe. The effective coordination of existing crisis management capabilities at European level is a major challenge to be addressed in close coordination with relevant players at national and European levels.

3. Prosecution: The prosecution of terrorists and organised criminals is primarily the responsibility of national law enforcement and intelligence services, whereas the European Union has a critical role to play in reinforcing the tools and conditions for improved cooperation.

The setting up of European institutions such as Eurojust and Europol are milestones of our recent history of law enforcement cooperation. The persecution of terrorists will not be successful if it does not lead to their sentencing. Judicial cooperation therefore plays a fundamental role in the pursuit process, which should end with prosecution, trial before a court of law and the

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implementation of the verdict. Since terrorist activities are frequently multinational in nature, the Union is setting up a framework for judicial authorities to co-operate efficiently and effectively. The principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions is attracting great interest from the international community and could, if underpinned by adequate criminal justice standards, form an important source of inspiration for the further development of judicial and police cooperation at international levels.

4. Consequence management: Response measures aimed at minimizing the terrorist threat and the consequences of a potential terrorist attack. Only a well-organised and effective response system can guarantee an expeditious return to normality.

The main responsibility for the direct response to terrorist attacks lies with the national authorities of the affected Member State. However, assets and capabilities required to handle the consequences of terrorist attacks may exceed the civil protection capabilities of the country affected. Joint action can ensure a timely and adequate response. Solidarity between all Member States is what underpins the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts.

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism has already been successful in various internal and external threat situations. The European Union is, however, determined to develop a broad crisis management capacity. Work is being carried out on the creation of the ARGUS system, which will link all specialised Rapid Alert Systems (RAS) hosted by the Commission and will facilitate coordinated and comprehensive responses to emergencies that require action at European level. Improved coordination and information exchange between national authorities will, furthermore, be aided by the establishment of the Law Enforcement Network (LEN).

A series of horizontal measures underpin progress in all core policy fields. Effective exchange of information and intelligence has become a major theme between police forces, intelligence services and policy makers. Structures are being set up at European level to inform European policy makers and, at the same time, provide the basis for enhanced operational cooperation.

The Council’s Joint Situation Centre processes intelligence from the specialised services whereas Europol will perform similar functions with material derived from police work. The European Commission will support this process by working towards IT-based solutions related to the inter-operability or accessibility of databases, the promotion of enhanced information exchange between police services - based on the principle that access to information should be granted to competent services of other EU Member States on the same level as national actors (principle of availability) - or through the strengthening of its own dedicated assessment capabilities.

The European Commission also pro-actively supports developments towards the establishment of European threat and risk assessment capabilities. The promotion of a public-private dialogue as spelled out in the Hague Programme will also be crucial for enhancing the EU’s protective capacity. As new security policies are being explored, European Commission-supported research will further gain importance under the financial perspective 2007 – 2013.

External action

Last but not least, external support measures become increasingly important in the area of international security cooperation. Counter-terrorism remains high on the international agenda and is being fully integrated into our political dialogue with third countries. In general, the EU supports the fight against terrorism in the external domain through targeted technical

Franco Frattini


assistance, political dialogue and cooperation in international and regional organizations. Around eighty countries benefit from our assistance programmes.

The EU stands ready to further strengthen its cooperation with the UN and supports in particular the rapid adoption of a new Comprehensive Convention against terrorism and the universal ratification of the existing 13 UN Conventions in this field, with particular attention being paid to the risk of weapons of mass destruction being used for acts of terrorism. The EU also cooperated closely with the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).

The European Commission is fully committed to play its full role in international cooperation and will continue to work closely with competent UN institutions and other international bodies such as the G8, OSCE, Council of Europe, the Financial Action Task Force and OECD.

Particular focus will continue to be on the cooperation between the European Union and the United States. Having both been targets of deadly terrorist attacks, the European Union and the USA share a common interest in fighting the terrorist threat in a sustainable manner. Unprecedented levels of cooperation have been developed since these events in areas such as intelligence sharing and information exchange, law enforcement cooperation, border and transport security and judicial cooperation.

Although the European Commission does not have a direct role in defence and military matters, it is clear that whatever the EU does militarily, be it in conflict prevention, crisis management or post-conflict reconstruction, it is inevitably part of a wider European Security Strategy including many elements for which the European Commission has a lead role.

Conclusion

There are no simple answers or magic solutions to the threat of terrorism, based on an abusive

interpretation of Islam. Indeed, this kind of terrorism aims at the very heart of our civilisation and requires us to mobilise our combined forces, without losing sight of the values we defend. Unfortunately, we also have to be prepared to witness more atrocities in the future, despite the enhanced and sustained efforts of all actors involved.

Europe has experienced different types of terrorism in its recent history. One of its most effective weapons to fight the scourge in the long run was to uphold the values of an open, democratic and tolerant society, whilst rejecting violence, hatred, racism and xenophobia in whatever form, with resolute determination.

History also tells us that there are no guarantees for a secure future. We have to be vigilant at all times. There will be qualitatively new threats to which we will have to respond. It is, therefore, in our genuine self-interest to address intolerance, weak governance and social exclusion alongside the effective tracking down of terrorists, inside the EU and beyond, that threaten our physical existence as well as our common values and prosperity.

The commitment to tackle terrorism and its causes must not diminish. The challenge for the EU is to develop its internal security capacities effectively, whilst maintaining freedom and a harmonious existence of different religions and cultures within a climate of tolerance and respect for the fundamental rights of people regardless of colour, race or creed, and at the same time exporting stability and security along these parameters. Europe must move beyond being a passive observer and consumer of security towards becoming a producer of security; a protagonist in world affairs. This is our truly global agenda.

Franco Frattini is the Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security.

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Without any doubt, following the two “No” votes of France and the Netherlands in the referenda on the EU-Constitution and the

failed summit on the financial perspectives, Europe is in crisis. During the current period of reflection, the question is now whether or not to go on with the ratification process and how to proceed with the European Constitution project, at the heart of which lies the reform of the European institutions themselves. The European Council, under the Austrian Presidency in the first half of 2006, will examine the status of the discussion in the Member States as well as options for future development. The reform of the European Union, its institutions and decision-making processes is of crucial importance for the future of the EU. The success of the European project depends on whether we are able to reform the Union and prepare it for its future tasks. The main question underlying this debate: what is the role of the EU in a globalised world?

On close analysis, the reasons for the rejection of the Constitution show that the French and Dutch have not only voted on the Constitution, they have also used the referendum to express their resentment concerning the general development of the European Union and, most of all, their dissatisfaction with their national governments. The citizens’ vote must be understood as a clear signal of discontentment, which has to be taken seriously. Europeans apparently do not comprehend an ever-enlarging Europe with no clearly defined frontiers.

The enlargement to the east with ten new Member States joining the EU only a year and a half ago is neither fully completed in

organisational terms nor has it been fully understood and accepted in the hearts and minds of European citizens. What Europe needs now is a change in overall approach, particularly in the policy of continuing enlargement. For example, if 74 % of the German population are against full membership of Turkey in the EU, it is irresponsible not to consider alternative options for the future integration of Turkey. All across Europe people have doubts on this issue. If we do not listen to the people, we will lose their trust. Without trust the European Union project will fail.

The overall legislation of the Union has to be reformed: some directives go too far and harm the economy rather than contributing to the goals of the Lisbon agenda. The optical radiation directive for example does not, in my view, give any incentives for economic growth, nor conforms to my idea of the principle of subsidiarity. The European institutions have to act more pro-actively in order to regain the confidence and the support of Europe’s citizens. The political change to a conservative-led government in Germany, the biggest EU Member State, will definitely have a strong impact on Europe and its policy.

What we need to communicate to the people is the good Europe can bring them. In the first forty years, the main political aim of the European Union was peace, first of all through the reconciliation of France and Germany. But from the very beginning, there has also been an external dimension to this project. European integration has always been about giving Europe’s nations more influence in the world. One of the driving forces behind European integration was the desire of Member States to build a new future together where European values such as peace, freedom, social security and prosperity reign.

Quo Vadis? Europe’s Role in a Globalised World

By Ingo Friedrich

Ingo Friedrich


These values are threatened by the dark side of globalisation: growing inequalities between rich and poor, climate change, international terrorism, the increase of disease and famine.

In Western and Northern Europe, the welfare state has come under pressure because of transformations in the world economy and cultural changes which are characterised by terms such as individualisation and globalisation. There is indeed a fundamental change in the social climate in European societies and we have to face up to the challenge. This is probably one of the main topics on the national as well as on the European level. The gap between the different social groups is widening and our social welfare systems are no longer able to cope with the demographic and social changes. We need a commitment to social justice, to the fight against poverty and all forms of exclusion as a priority on the European level. The poor and the sick should not be excluded but should be cared for and made an active part of society. This is of crucial importance for the success of the European integration process itself.

Dissatisfaction with current globalisation has led people to retreat to more nationalist positions, as the European Union is perceived to be part of the globalisation issue.

Democratic politicians across the political spectrum need to take these fears of Europe’s people seriously and explain why a retreat behind national borders and political and economic protectionism are not an option. The EU is not an island. We can not ensure peace and prosperity in Europe without taking into account the problems and the dangers of the rest of the world. The challenges of globalisation surpass Member State borders and individual States are unable to manage them on their own.

What is required is multilateral co-operation: the European Union is the only way to assure that Europe’s nations can fully realise their values and their interests on an international level. We can only win the fight for human rights,

worldwide peace, democracy and social security if we join forces. Consequently, the European Union is not a cause of globalisation, but it does provide an answer to it. It is the only way to give the inevitable process of globalisation a more human face. The EU’s size and weight after enlargement obliges us to behave as a global power. In the long term, we need a truly common foreign and security policy, including a common defence policy. Of course, this has to be done gradually.

I believe that it is crucially important, in this crisis of the European Union, to have a concrete definition of (1) the frontiers of the Union, (2) the aims of the European Union and (3) most of all, its vision. This is my vision of Europe: in times of globalisation and individualisation, Europe has to be a social anchor, an island of stability, a “light-house” for human rights, peace, freedom and social security. In the age of globalisation, it is of utmost importance to preserve our European social model, our specific combination of market economy, welfare state and democracy, our specific social market economy. The challenges of combining competition and co-operation, autonomy and solidarity are no longer restricted to the national or even regional level, but present themselves on a global level.

Europe has indeed the power to make the global order more equitable. In facing these challenges, Europe should be modest and aware; it must confess its Christian heritage, and it should have the courage to define its frontiers. What we need is leadership. We need clear and strong leadership in order to realise the necessary reforms and to follow a clear course for the future European Union. Then I think this Europe can indeed become a beacon in this globalised world. To achieve this, it is of utmost importance that politics do not overwhelm or dominate the people but involve them, and integrate them into this process in order to avoid endangering this European island of stability.

In doing so, it is necessary to be aware of the

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Quo Vadis? Europe’s Role in a Globalised World

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spiritual roots of Europe. The incorporation of a reference to God into the Constitutional Treaty would have been a good cornerstone. One can neglect one’s history, but one can not get rid of it. Europe is founded on an essentially western system of values. If Europe is to find its way again, I believe it is essential that we are willing and able to return to the source of our values.

The EU will have to be very courageous in order to clearly define its frontiers. Full membership of Turkey would overextend the EU both in terms of the functioning of its institutions, as well as in terms of culture, organisation and finances. The discussion about the referenda has shown that the citizens do not agree with this policy. We need a change in direction which allows the Union of Values, Europe, to deepen and to consolidate itself. This is the only way to regain lost confidence so that people will identify themselves more readily with the European idea. It is important that all of us take part in this process. The plan D1 announced by the President of the European Commission can only work if we, as politicians, together with civil society, participate actively in this process.

Even the USA, with its global superpower status, will not be able to rely on its so far undivided sovereignty in the long run. In the long term, global problems and events require globally coordinated responses. In this respect, Europe has already achieved amazing progress, and is able to play a leading role in the continuing process of globalisation.

Ingo Friedrich is President of the Forum for European Studies and Vice President of the European Parliament.

Ingo Friedrich

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1 „ D“ stands for „dialogue, debate and democracy“, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/


The burning questions of the European Union tend to snap and crackle in a distinctive way when they are considered from a perspective located,

like Malta, on the southernmost extension of the Union’s frontier with North Africa. Take two current questions: What are the limits of Europe? How should we think about the idea of a ‘privileged partnership’?

On the eastern frontier, the task of delimiting Europe from its immediate neighbourhood tends to focus on, among other issues, history and culture. Whether history and culture should be decisive factors is, of course, part of the debate.

On the southern frontier, things are different. History and culture are at once more clearly inconclusive and more clearly beside the point. They are more clearly inconclusive because the historic record of cross-cultural exchange, in the widest sense, between the northern and southern shores of the west Mediterranean is remarkable. And yet these considerations are more clearly beside the point because, strictly speaking, the immediate neighbourhood to the south of Europe is the sea, a marine environment that includes high seas, beyond any national jurisdiction.

The distinction between the nature of the eastern boundary from that of the south feeds into the considerations of what a ‘privileged partnership’ should be. The draft Constitutional Treaty refers to such a partnership in Title VIII (Article 56): ‘The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and

characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’ The Treaty does not explore this special relationship in further detail. Indeed, its generic formulation leaves open the possibility that the special relationships that the Union might cultivate could be of more than one kind – different kinds of partnership that are responsive to the rather different kinds of immediate environments in which the Union operates, depending on the frontier.

Thus far, within the Union the idea of a privileged partnership has been broached largely with respect to the eastern boundary. Although it has not been explored in detail, in general terms it has been depicted as a form of partial membership of the Union; that is, full economic union without full participation in governance. It is perhaps worth underlining that partial membership is not ‘lesser’ membership, since the area-specific participation that does take place is as complete as it is for Member States. However, Turkey has interpreted ‘privileged partnership’ to be a degraded form of membership, a second-class membership: an interpretation of considerable significance.

For Turkey’s interpretation has consequences that go beyond its own negotiations with the Union. If ‘partnership’ is perceived by other States in the Union’s immediate environment to be second-class membership, they will not find it easy to accept, nor will the special relationship succeed in fostering a ‘spirit of good neighbourliness’. This perception need not be confined only to the other States on the eastern frontier; but can also spread to the southern frontier.

For a range of reasons, linked not only, but not least to security and trust, the Union needs to address the concerns that might give rise to such a perception. Exploring the practical details of

Mediterranean Security and Regional Management

By Lawrence Gonzi

Lawrence Gonzi


what partnership with neighbouring States might involve would be an effective way to do so, although it would probably be helpful to make clear that the Union’s considerations were not being conducted with particular reference to Turkey.

Logically, of course, the case for Turkey’s membership of the Union is separable from the case for giving a higher priority to working out the details of privileged partnership: for example, Malta has supported (pending fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria) the opening of negotiations with Turkey with a view to possible eventual membership; but Article 56 entered the draft Constitution largely on the insistence of the Maltese members of the Convention. In practical terms, the separability of the cases would be established with greater force if it could be seen that the Union was exploring more than one kind of partnership, different special relationships according to the different immediate environments.

It is suggested that, in any case, such a pluralism of kinds of partnership is, in functional terms, what is needed. The nature of the immediate environment to the south – the fact that it is a marine environment with high seas – raises pressing issues of security cooperation that cannot be adequately addressed without the setting up of new institutions: a scenario that prospects the creation of a new network of regional governance in which the Union participates together with other non-member Mediterranean States.

The main aim of the remainder of this article is to make a proposal concerning the shape that such a special partnership could take. However, it would be useful, first, to resume the challenges facing the Mediterranean, and second, to show why institutions of regional governance are needed.

Security challenges and trust

Essentially, there are four issues – or rather, for those fond of the jargon of Mediterranean cooperation, 3 + 1...

The first three issues have to do directly with security in its widest sense, including the political, economic and environmental. To begin with the last aspect, in February 2005 a Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development produced a report (together with a strategic action plan) that showed in what alarming ways environmental degradation in the region has accelerated in recent years. Loss of valuable agricultural land, water resources threatened by depletion or degradation, deteriorating urban environments and rapidly increasing waste generation: these are among the major trends.

Some trends directly concern the marine environment, in particular: the erosion of coast-lines and pollution of coastal areas, including the sea; depletion of fish resources; and the disruption, because of over-exploitation or abandonment, of biodiversity of the region, with special mention being made of the densely populated coastal areas.

The costs of such environmental degradation include a higher risk of catastrophes like tsunamis, flooding and ecological imbalances. There is also a direct financial cost, in the range between 3-5 per cent of GDP according to the World Bank. And over the next 20 years, with the influx of mass tourism, the pressures are likely to increase.

Needless to say, if the pressures do increase in an uncontrolled way, then the very assets that act as magnets for mass tourism will be jeopardised. Hence, as the report makes clear, ecological security is intertwined with economic security. But the latter is challenged by other regional features, too.

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Currently, the Mediterranean is one of the least integrated regions of the global economy. Its share of world trade is dropping. It claims less than 10 per cent of private capital flows to developing countries – as compared with over 40 per cent to the emerging markets of Asia, or the almost 30 per cent to the markets of Latin America. The general outlook of the southern Mediterranean is particularly precarious. Its average per capita income is 10 per cent of the average per capita income in Europe. On normal growth rates, the prospects of halving this income gap are bleak, especially given the high unemployment rates, particularly among young men – rates of unemployment that in many countries soar between 20 and 25 per cent.

All this is taking place in the wider southern Mediterranean context of significant demographic growth and a rate of urbanisation that is placing considerable pressure on municipal services. Such economic insecurity is indubitably connected to regional issues that have to do with the political dimension of security. We should not be surprised if the destructive, false promises of terrorism find some response, of sympathy or outright support or enlistment, from a fraction of that youth which is disabled by the sense of having ‘no future’.

Indeed, the assessment of their future by certain experts is not significantly more optimistic: one of the key provisional findings of the Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (due to be established in 2010), which is being conducted for the European Commission, is that the proposed free trade area will generate some marginal economic gains for the region, but with significant social and environmental costs for the southern States (and Turkey).

Military security does not fall within the focus of this article but an issue related to it constitutesthe fourth point that needs to be considered: political trust between the partner States.

This year is the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process and next year, 2006, has been declared the Year of the Mediterranean. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been announced with fanfare by the Union, among other initiatives that involve some Member States. And yet these milestones are surrounded by a mood of regional scepticism, particularly among the southern States. In private conversation, politicians and diplomats from these States give voice to various anxieties, one of them being that European investment and funds which could have come to the region will, as a result of the enlargement to the east, be diverted in that direction.

Perhaps more surprisingly, it is sometimes expressed that the proliferation of strategies and policies addressing the Mediterranean might not be a sign of recognition of the region’s importance, but rather an indication of its weakness: a lack of a focused, integrated approach; a potential for the shifting of goal-posts, for tactical shifting between the specific criteria of one process and those of another (say, between the multilateralism of the Barcelona Process and bilateralism of the ENP).

Above all, there is scepticism about the ideals of partnership and solidarity held up by the Barcelona Process, a feeling that ‘partnership’ is a euphemism for a teacher-pupil relationship between Europe, and the southern Mediter-ranean. It goes without saying that such a view is likely to be reinforced if ‘partnership’ is seen to mean second-class membership of the Union.

All these perceptions, correct or mistaken, erode the political trust that is essential to any endeavour to address the security challenges effectively. But even if the degree of trust was encouraging, there is reason to believe that good governance of the region requires certain institutions designed specifically for it.

Lawrence Gonzi


The need for institutions of regional governance

The need for specific institutions is created by two peculiar features of the southern frontier, the marine environment and the high seas. Admittedly, high seas need not be a feature of the region. There is, in fact, virtually no point in the Mediterranean that is more than 200 nautical miles from the coast. In principle, therefore, the whole of the sea could be delimited between the littoral States in accordance with the Law of the Sea: Within the delimited zone, the coastal State would have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters super-adjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil.

In practice, however, delimitation agreements have been relatively few and the declaration of exclusive economic zones has so far been rather restrained: and for good reason. The small confines of the sea mean that there are bound to be overlapping claims – quite possibly by three or more States, making procedure a formidably problematic process; the region’s numerous islands would complicate it further. Existing tensions, caused by one or another of the numerous political disputes in the region, might be exacerbated by the pressure of claims for delimitation.

In this setting, the restraint on declarations of exclusive economic zones has been wise, since such claims would precipitate insoluble conflicts. One can imagine that such conflicts might also arise with claims over the archaeological treasures on the sea-bed. So high seas, while not being a necessary feature of the Mediterranean in legal terms, do constitute a practical feature for political reasons.

In recent years, however, claims have begun to multiply with respect to similar territorial rights under headings such as environmental or fishing protection zones. Indeed, in the case of fishing protection zones, something that might

be called a ‘zone race’ may well have been triggered. Libya has declared a 62-nautical-mile fishing preservation zone measured from the outer limit of the territorial sea. Tunisia has passed legislation enabling the government to establish an exclusive economic zone. In the wake of these declarations my Government thought it prudent to promulgate legislation that enables the government to extend its fisheries jurisdiction beyond the current 25-mile fisheries conservation zone.

The term ‘zone race’ is used with deliberate irony. Clearly, the intention behind the declaration of protection zones is conservative in the best sense of the term – a far cry from the mutually assured destruction inherent in the Cold War arms race. However, it is worth making the allusion to draw attention to two aspects of the zoning process. First, there is the competitive element: some governments, possibly the majority, might feel drawn into it in response to the behaviour of other States, not because it is their first preference but to safeguard their national interests.

The second aspect of the zoning process calls for a consideration of the other feature of the southern frontier of Europe: the fact that it is a sea, which means that there are resources whose mobility does not respect national boundaries. These mobile resources include non-living, mineral resources in the water-column; but the most obvious example would be fish stocks. National resource management will never be as effective in protecting fish stocks as regionally integrated resource management. The same can be said, of course, about ecological protection zones (although here the importance of regional management is not something that greatly distinguishes marine from land environments).

The marine feature of the southern frontier means that the national zoning process also increases the gap between policy aim and outcome. The irony of a zone race, should it really take off, is that it would induce States to energetically pursue strategies that they know

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are not the most suitable to obtain the intended outcome.

Thus, the nature of the southern frontier of Europe has a significant impact on the available choice of strategies to address the challenges of security. The marine environment implies that challenges to do with conserving and managing mobile resources are best addressed in a regionally integrated way (submarine, non-mobile mineral resources call for special consideration in their own right).

However, such integrated resource management requires its own institutional regime. For under the current regime, choosing not to delimit the entire sea would mean the presence of high seas, beyond all national jurisdictions; while the other option of delimiting the entire sea into exclusive zones is likely to precipitate a competitive, even adversarial process that would inhibit a truly collaborative project. Even with good will, the collaborative process is likely, all too often, to be entangled in formidable, even forbidding procedures to sort out overlapping claims of three States or more.

Some institutional creativity is needed to facilitate multilateral cooperation and secure the governance of all the marine area. International Law does provide a range of legal regimes that indicate alternative models of joint exploration, exploitation, conservation and management. However, political accountability will need to be provided by the setting up of specific Mediterranean institutions, organised as a network, concerned with the governance of the marine area. What follows is a proposal concerning the identity that this network could have, its first priorities, long-term aims and scope and the first steps to be taken to set it up.

A Euro-Mediterranean network for integrated marine resource management

Identity of the network

The basis of the network should be title VIII

(Article 56) of the draft European Constitutional Treaty. The special relationship it envisages with neighbouring states includes ‘the possibility of undertaking activities jointly.’ Action in this perspective does not have to await the ratification of the Treaty. Another way to characterise the basis of this network would be as a Mediterranean implementation of the kind of regional cooperation envisaged by Article 123 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The proposed network would facilitate integrated resource management by involving all Mediterranean and Black Sea littoral states as well as Portugal, with the European Union co-ordinating the participation of its members. The network would seek to bring together the management of:

a) fisheries (consolidating the work of the Mediterranean Fisheries Council and other existing institutions responsible for aquaculture, with the aims of the Union’s Common Fisheries Policy serving as a model),

b) shipping (consolidating the work of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO),

c) marine and coastal environmental protection (consolidating the work of the Mediterranean Action Plan and UNEP in this regard),

d) scientific research policies (consolidating the work of institutions like the Mediterranean Science Commission (CIESM), within the perspectives of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)).

First priorities

In connection with c) above, it may be recalled that the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development produced a strategic plan with seven prongs (marine and coastal zone management, urbanisation, agriculture, water, energy and climate, transport, tourism). The third part of the strategic plan contains many suggestions about the means of putting it into effect. The first group of these suggestions

Lawrence Gonzi


is mainly addressed to the Euro Mediterranean Partnership set up in Barcelona in 1995. They all appear to deserve support but may constitute too tall an order to be implemented at once. It is for this reason that while the strategic plan suggests the setting up of networks for each of the seven priority areas, rightly affirming their interdependence, it is here being urged that very concrete action be taken with regard to the first priority area (marine and coastal management) with the six other areas also being approached in the first place from their respective connections with the marine environment. Thus, for example the formation of the Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank, the setting up of which has already been lengthily debated, could be initiated through the network with initial reference to marine undertakings.

Long-term aims and scope

While the overarching purpose of the network would be to ensure an integrated approach to the governance of Mediterranean marine space, just how far joint management can and ought to go would be an ongoing task of the network itself to explore.

One should not exclude the possibility of movement in the direction of establishing Mediterranean marine space as a kind of ‘commons’, a common heritage of all Mediterranean littoral peoples. Certainly, the idea of a Common Heritage is now an established legal regime as well as a political concept. To explore how far it is possible to go down this route, however, the scope of the network would need to be widened: first, perhaps, by having all the Mediterranean States, whether belonging to the European Union or otherwise, establish a common system of joint management of all the resources pertaining to the neighbouring marine space (paying due attention to the special considerations to do with non-mobile mineral resources).

Such a system could also allow co-operation in the exploitation of submarine mineral resources

through possibly the setting up of a single Mediterranean exclusive economic zone in the terms of the Law of the Sea.

First steps

It is suggested that the setting up of such a network could begin by a meeting of Heads of State and/or Government of all the Mediterranean countries as well as of the European Union authorities. Such a summit meeting would obviously have to be preceded by preparatory meetings of senior officials and other exchanges. In view of the large design involved, an intermediate stage of meetings at the sub-regional level (for example, of the States of the central Mediterranean) is probably advisable.

Logistical support for these exchanges could be provided by the States taking the initiative in support of the establishment of the network as a stage in the fulfilment of the strategy for sustainable development in the Mediterranean region.

It would be very helpful to the Mediterranean Member States if they were given logistical support by the Union authorities. But it is important to emphasise that the setting up of the network should be a multilateral endeavour of the States on both sides of the Mediterranean – and not one with the Union en bloc striking bilateral arrangements with southern States. The latter course would in the short term perhaps benefit the Union because, as the single-most massive partner, negotiations would be weighted in its favour. In the long run, though, such a course of action would almost certainly be to the detriment of the Union and particularly its Mediterranean Members.

It is unlikely that the aims of the network, and therefore the challenges of sustainable development and security, could be met in an institutional framework that had manifest inequalities of status for the participating partners, in such a way that ‘partnership’ for

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the southern States came to signify (if only implicitly and unofficially) a degraded form of membership of the Union. There simply would not be the basis for trust and cooperation required for the project to succeed.

A new narrative for Europe

This proposal for a network of regional management is being made at a time when the Commission is in the process of preparing a Green Paper on a holistic approach to the maritime affairs of Europe. This laudable development will naturally be of considerable relevance to maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean; its proposals will no doubt impinge on the suggestions made here. Above all, a systemic approach to maritime affairs suggests a new narrative for Europe that is in the early stages of articulation.

What may be called the classic, post-1945 Union narrative emerged out of the industrial economy based on coal and steel of the continental heartland. Developments since then, however, have seen the importance of the coastal areas of the continent greatly enhanced. Not only is the sea still vital for communication and trade. The previously impoverished, peripheral coastal areas have become the most densely populated, following the remarkable growth of mass tourism, particularly in the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the underwater resources have evident extraordinary potential: fishing has been transformed from an activity akin to hunting to one that constitutes farming, and other economic uses of marine mineral resources cannot be neglected either. In the Mediterranean, the developments on the European coastline have, on the southern coastline, in some respects been mirrored, in other respects contrasted in ways that threaten the stability of the region.

Some Europeans are urging that accepting Turkey as a Member would signify the beginning of a new cultural and political narrative for the Union, and certainly their argument is worthy of

attention. But acceptance of that argument need not exclude another; namely, that a European approach to the governance of the Mediterranean region, one that is institutionally innovative and aimed at enabling greater prosperity and dialogue within an area fraught with tension, would both hark back to the initial impulse on which the Union is founded and represent a significant 21st-century development.

Lawrence Gonzi is Prime Minister of Malta.

Lawrence Gonzi


Relationships between the new Russia and the West, particularly Europe, looked like a romance at the beginning. Having

cast aside the basic premises of communist propaganda along with communism itself, tens of millions of Russians considered the West as a friend and a role model, rather than a potential enemy ready to attack. I will never forget a home-made poster telling about an eternal friendship between the two White Houses - Russian and American - held by one of the defenders of President Yeltsin’s residence (this building known in Moscow as the White House) encircled by the Emergency Committee (GKChP) forces.

Russian people, at least those who are politically active, trusted the West and had no doubts that Russia’s integration into the western world was desirable and inevitable. Besides, a substantial part of the new Russian elite shared this opinion. The situation was clear: friends in the West, and enemies in the South and East.

By participating in various conferences and giving speeches at the universities in Western Europe and the USA, I witnessed that these feelings were mutual. Western intellectuals were watching, with deep sympathy, the drama of rebirth or even birth of democracy in a vast country ridding itself of dictatorship. The Russians’ right to join the family of European nations was beyond question in the early nineties. Russia’s integration into Europe was seen as a natural process rather than a mutually profitable business. All-round support given to the Russian reformers by western governments during that period showed that such attitudes spread beyond think tanks.

Lately, the situation has been aggravated. In Russia, a person declaring that it is natural to set up a union with the West is considered inadequate at the least. The West speaks of traditional Russian hostility and Russian imperialism, referring to some peculiarities inherent in Russia and its people which cannot be explained and have not changed for centuries. Moreover, all the changes Russia has been through over last fifteen years are declared superficial and Russian democracy is pronounced a total failure.

Defeat or victory?

Notwithstanding all the present difficulties, there is no reason to speak about a defeat of democratic reforms in Russia. Furthermore, leaving emotions aside and looking at the situation not in terms of months – where one can see an obvious deviation from liberal democratic principles in many spheres of Russian public life – but in terms of a decade, it becomes clear that the peaceful revolution of the early nineties won a decisive victory and achieved nearly all its aims. There is not one decorative private property in the country – the private sector constitutes more than 70% of the GDP. The country that is supposedly unaware of democracy has now established democratic elections, freedom of speech has become a reality – nobody is persecuted for his or her words – borders are open, and there are active political parties and organisations including those opposed to the present authorities. Communism – the most dangerous, bloody and aggressive system in human history – will never come back.

It is important that all this is accepted by society as a whole and not only by conscious advocates of democratisation. According to public opinion polls, Russians overwhelmingly oppose any ideas

Russia and Europe: Between Love and Hate

By Leonid Gozman

Leonid Gozman


to abolish free elections, introduce censorship, close borders and return to one-party rule. Even those who are guilty of falsifying election results are defending free elections. Freedom of speech and guarantees of political rights are supported by those who are trying to suppress them - this situation has not changed in the past seventy years of our history.

It is clear that the democracy and human rights situation in Russia is far from being perfect – private property is not protected from the state racket, the media, particularly television, is under the state’s pressure and the parliament, along with the courts, are only independent de jure. In Great Britain or France, such a level of democracy would have meant a collapse of the system. But this is how it happens in Russia – a country which fifteen years ago lived under a Constitution when one party was in power, private property was prohibited, trade was considered a crime and one risked being imprisoned for reading a banned book. We should not assess absolute concepts, but rather the way in which we made it through. From this perspective, democratic reform in Russia should be recognised as the most successful political project of the late twentieth century.

There is only one area in which we can speak, if not of defeat – because the game is not over – but of an extremely complicated state of affairs. Over the last decade, Russian society’s attitude towards the West has worsened sharply. The USA rate first as the object of hostility, but Europeans have the only advantage of not being Americans. Both opinion polls and our daily experience show that there is no trace of former benevolence towards the West, and fear and offence have replaced friendly feelings. Now the talking point is the intention of the West to ruin and destroy Russia, eternal hostility to Russia and Russians; a world conspiracy against our country.

These paranoid ideas ceased to be merely the obsession of a group of delinquents. They are now in the spotlight of the mass media and,

allegedly, of scientific conferences. In rural areas as well as capitals, they are shared by both the most ignorant and well-educated people, though the most terrible thing is that more and more young people indulge in them.

Why and what for? It is easy and yet senseless to explain these trends with Russian traditions or the mysterious “Russian soul”, citing Dostoevsky or de Custine. Rising misconceptions completely ignore the complex and contradictory nature of Russian culture and history, and the Russian political idea excludes any possibility of remedying the situation. In fact, the “mysterious Russian soul” does not explain current Russian hostility towards the West, in the same way that the no less mysterious “French soul” does not explain widespread support for Le Pen. Generally speaking, references to immanent national peculiarities means missing an opportunity to explain and especially to influence. The growth of anti-western sentiment in Russia has entirely reasonable explanations.

It is both interesting and difficult to live in a time of changes. But more often than not, it is interesting for some, yet difficult and uninteresting for others. For tens of millions of people in Russia, the last fifteen years have meant the destruction of their usual way of life and the loss of a sense of stability and predictability cultivated by Soviet authorities, rather than gaining civil liberties. The expectations of a new way of life appeared quite different in August 1991, when people were awaiting if not a paradise on earth, at least justice and fairness.

The fervent anti-Communist movement in the late eighties was a moral movement. A massive protest was stirred by the apparent immorality and falsity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union authority rather than an unwise economic policy or feudal political system. The people were demanding the abolition of privileges not because they wanted to get something for themselves but because they were aspiring to a

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different and more ethical society. Today injustice, brutality and corruption, being either the inevitable consequences of a transitional period or a result of irresponsibility and egocentrism of a new elite, rouse disappointment and delusion, having dashed every hope of the first post-Soviet years and, in a way, of the whole post-Soviet period.

Not everybody has enough wisdom and coolness of mind to see how the grotesque “New Russians” are transforming into a solid and responsible bourgeoisie, or how new theatre companies and publishing houses are coming to life on the ruins of the Soviet state-controlled cultural scene, or how university enrolments are growing and education is restoring its prestige. Not everybody can see that now the average Russian has many more opportunities for self-realisation and that the new liberal principles have become an irreversible part of our daily lives. And there are so many Russians who need a scapegoat for their misfortunes. These are the oligarchs who stole from the people and the West, which deceived the Russians by promising wonders and, in reality, want to turn Russia into a colony or a source of raw materials.

Just as in Germany under Hitler, such primitive ideas could not have propagated without the state’s purposeful activity. We have to acknowledge that in modern Russia, anti-western sentiments are constantly and efficiently stirred by the authorities. By controlling television, the state gives airtime to those experts and commentators who suspect the West of conspiring against Russia, from the Orange Revolution to the Olympic Committee decision on the venue of the next Olympic Games. Doping scandals about Russian sportsmen are under discussion at the State Duma where it is now said that now Russia can rely only on its army and fleet. The books proving Europe’s eternal animosity towards all things Russian are printed in abundance. Many of them directly violate the Russian Constitution, stirring national and religious hatred. The courts of law remain silent. Moreover, such books are on sale in the

buildings of the Government and Presidential Administration.

A good example is offered by the recent decision concerning what will be Russia’s major red-letter holiday, the Day of People’s Unity, intended as a replacement for the 7 November anniversary of the October revolution of 1917. The selected date is now 4 October. According to the official version, on 4 October 1612, armed citizens led by Minin and Pozharsky drove Polish and Lithuanian troops from the Kremlin thereby marking the end of what is known as the Times of Trouble. It is not important that the Kremlin was, in fact, retaken on a different day, or that the civil war and, consequently, the Times of Trouble continued for a few more years, or that the selected date falls on a purely religious holiday. What is really important is that - even if one accepts the official version of national history - the day selected to symbolise national unity is a day of victory over Europe and over Catholics. In other words, the day that symbolises confrontation between Russia and Europe.

Yet, Russian history offers a great number of dates that would demonstrate the unity and national pride of the Russian people without references to Russia/Europe confrontation. They include the day Czar Nicolas II announced his manifesto that actually instituted constitutional monarchy in Russia, the day of the democratic revolution in February 1917, or 12 April 1961 when the Soviet Union sent a man into outer space thereby opening a new era in the history of human civilization.

If the sentiments within a society are the reaction to a complex set of social conditions, then the state’s deliberate activities must of course have some purpose. Why do authorities and certain pro-government circles stir up anti-western resentment in the country?

In today’s Russia there are many influential circles that have a vested interest in a closed society with minimal or heavily controlled

Leonid Gozman


contacts with the West. They are those in government or business who are incapable of taking on competition and who are striving for impunity. They are those who are exploiting the country’s natural resources and cheap labour. They are those who need protected markets to make people buy low-quality domestic goods at artificially high prices. They are those who have conducted the operation against YUKOS and who do not want the Strasbourg court to make what will be a very predictable pronouncement on the case. They are those who watch with horror the plight of Serbian generals. Of course, conditions in the Hague prison are far better than in Russian prisons but they are unwilling to experience even those better conditions, (notwithstanding the open issues with Russian generals over Chechnya).

All these individuals, rich and influential as they are, would prefer to see Russia not in the G8, but in an alliance with the peace-loving peoples of North Korea, Iran and some other countries that are in the forefront of the valiant struggle against imperialism and globalisation.

I am convinced that these very people cover-up neo-fascist groups which assassinate non-Russians in the streets of our towns. They provoke scandalous anti-Semite actions for which Putin had to apologise for in Auschwitz. These groups benefit by marring Russia’s reputation so that we turn our back on Europe and Europe to turn its back on us.

The ideology of these groups is based on the concept of Russia’s “special destiny”. They believe that Russia must have a specific, special political system that is radically different to that of the hostile West, so their activities may lead to Russia’s isolation from the democratic world, which is a grave danger for our country nowadays. Nonetheless, some democratic institutions and market elements can still be preserved, regardless of the activities of these groups.

The only weakness of these people’s position is their own desire to live up to western standards. Unlike Lenin and Trotsky, who wanted to ruin the Russian state of their time and head something completely different, the present adherents of a “special way” ideology among the elite, only long to seize high positions within the present system. They go for holidays to Europe instead of Iran and their children are educated at Oxford instead of Pyongyang or Havana. They are robbers rather than revolutionists and they are reluctant to destroy the current infrastructure. Still, they are not always well educated and clever, and could cross any line or boundary without even noticing it.

An Alternative

Russia’s isolation will be a defeat of both Russian democracy and of the West. It is not even an issue of nuclear weapons, since it is highly unlikely that an insane person daring to use such means could actually seize power in Russia. This separation from Europe may be a new “Berlin wall” but, while there are people enthusiastic about making progress in either Russia or the West, Russia will no longer be considered a still reservoir of oil and gas supplies, but an active player on the geopolitical scene.

History repeats itself and the situation which marked the twentieth century will reoccur – one part of our planet against the other. National liberation movements or terrorist groups – you may call them anyway you wish – will be manoeuvring between the two power centres, obtaining weapons and money, first to use them for the sponsor’s purposes and then for their own. Therefore, without a union with Russia, without democracy in Russia and without Russia’s integration into Europe and the Western world, it is impossible to give a decent response to a challenge sent by the new barbarians of democratic civilization.

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It is both possible and natural to improve democracy in Russia, just as it is natural for Russia to be a member of the European family. Family life does not exclude conflicts and arguments, yet they occur within the family without passing a certain limit. I am sure that in spite of all existing problems, we will be able to tackle those who want to drive us into isolation using slogans of a “special way” as a cover. The fact is that the West should not help them; the political and intellectual elite of Europe and the USA should not yield to fears and prejudices against Russia and get involved in a hopeless and immoral attempt to build its own security and well-being while betraying or ignoring Russian democracy.

Leonid Gozman is Vice Chairman of the International Democratic Union (IDU).

Leonid Gozman


It has become a European ritual to demand a more visible role for the European Union (EU) on the world stage. However,

an EU acting as a world power capable of providing leadership is nowhere to be seen. After the two No votes in the referenda on the proposed Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands, and the disastrous European Council of June 2005, the European Union has fallen into a kind of torpor that has been officially labelled a period of reflection. However, the world is not prepared to wait for the EU to develop the capabilities required in order to act globally. There is growing pressure to get rid of meaningless rhetoric and move on to create a Union which is a steady and reliable force in the world, which is capable of providing political and strategic leadership, and can face up to the challenges of the 21st century.

The items on the international agenda are more numerous and ambitious than ever before. Current events in Sudan, Iraq and Iran demonstrate that the arsenal of peace and security mechanisms – they range from preventive diplomacy to humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping – is to some extent inadequate and inefficient. In addition to this, the erosion of fundamental rights and the commitment to international law poses a threat to the legal framework that has ensured the rule of law on a global scale for decades.

Caught between ambition and reality

There can be no doubt about the fact that the paradoxical state of affairs which became apparent

after the negative result of the referenda has had a substantial effect on European aspirations to speak with one voice on international affairs. Citizens all over the continent have ambiguous feelings about the European Union, which has ignored their views for many years. The referenda on the EU Constitution gave them an opportunity to teach their national governments a lesson and to voice their disquiet and anxieties about the present European system. However, the truth of the matter is that this does not explain everything. Europeans in fact have high expectations and hope to see the EU taking on more external responsibilities, especially with regard to defining and defending European interests throughout the world.

A recent survey has shown that 70% of Europeans want the EU to become a superpower akin to the United States1. It is paradoxical that the public debate which ultimately led to the rejection of the Constitution favoured a “stronger Europe” capable of defending European values and interests. Despite all the criticism, citizens all over the continent expect the EU to continue to develop European foreign and security policy. Admittedly, this is not an easy task if one has to proceed on the basis of the Treaty of Nice.

The EU is in the throes of a threefold crisis: there are questions concerning its identity, the way in which the enlargement process was handled, and the present lack of political leadership. These three issues constitute a potentially explosive mixture. First, the rift between those advocating a deeper Union and those in favour of a common market model is widening. Second, the kind of enlargement process pursued in the past is no longer a feasible option. Forthcoming enlargement plans will simply not be able to

Europe’s World - A Global Power in the Making

By Annette Heuser

Annette Heuser


1 Transatlantic Trends 2005: http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf

ignore the views of EU citizens. Even if geo-strategic arguments suggest that integrating countries such as Turkey is beneficial, politicians will now have to take into account the fact that in Germany, for example, 74% of the population is against full EU membership.

The “traditional way” of enlarging the Union has become a symbol of the alienation of EU citizens. Yet, the most dangerous crisis is the lack of political leadership within the Union. Neither the Member States nor the EU institutions are currently in a position to suggest a strategy or a vision for the future of the European project. Even if certain leading politicians are of this opinion, the EU does not have the time to simply “pause”.

Instead of a new dynamism which could have been sparked by the Constitution, there are now signs of disorientation and inertia. In the area of foreign and security policy in particular there is a danger that the small projects which have been initiated in this policy field will slow down and grind to a complete halt. One of the most obvious signs of this is the fact that the European Commission has decided to put on hold the forward planning for the European External Action Service. The provisions of the European Constitution stipulated that the service was intended to support the first European Foreign Minister. The decision did not come as a surprise to European elites, since it was primarily construed as a logical consequence of the negative result of the referenda. However, what at first sight seems to be a minor issue, will have serious consequences for the future development of EU foreign policy.

If the institution that is designed to serve him is not established in the very near future, it hardly seems realistic to suppose that the Union will have its first Foreign Minister by the end of the decade. The message the EU is sending to both its own citizens and to the rest of the

world, is that it is inward-looking and lacks both leadership and a vision of the future. There has never been such uncertainty in the whole history of the Union. In such a vacuum, merely safeguarding the status quo of the European integration process, in particular in areas such as the common foreign and security policy, constitutes a distinct challenge.

The heads of state put their cards on the table at the European Council in June. It was not only a dramatic moment, but also a revelation and a moment of truth. What some people had suspected for a long time now came out into the open: the members of the “European Club” did not all have the same objectives. Some, like the British Prime Minister Tony Blair,2 envision the Union as a high-class free-trade zone, while others are convinced that the Political Union must be its final goal. Even after Tony Blair’s speech to the European Parliament, in which he presented the programme of the UK Presidency in the second half of 2005 and attempted to convince MEPs that he was committed to Europe, there are serious doubts about the attitudes of some Member States towards the European project.

However, the good news is that EU citizens are now central to the European debate. Thus the current crisis opens a window of opportunity: there is a good chance of reconciling EU citizens with aims of the political project by actually listening to what they have to say. In this way the current crisis can act as a catalyst for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in particular. With a large majority of EU citizens in favour of a more forceful EU foreign policy that is able to deliver the goods, it is time to make some progress in regard to the CFSP by seizing the opportunities presented by the intense public debate on what the Union should or should not be doing in this area. Europe needs to both discuss and define its common interests and commitments at all levels of society. A

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2 http://www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1119518580438

wide-ranging debate on what the EU is trying to achieve and to what extent it wishes to become involved globally is necessary, not only for its own sake, but for the sake of partnerships with other nations and regions based on reliability and trust.

It is evident that the Union now needs to demonstrate a clear commitment to its global aspirations. The EU, with or without a Constitution, is not in a position, either in its own immediate neighbourhood or with regard to various international challenges, to shirk its responsibilities. Being an economic world power without at the same time functioning as a political player is simply not enough in the 21st century. In order to cope with the problems created by globalisation, a coherent and integrated approach to dealing with political issues at all levels is absolutely essential.

Greater self-confidence in foreign affairs

If, and when agreement is reached that Europe should continue to develop as a global player not only in economic but also in political terms, it needs to acknowledge that it has global responsibilities. The Union’s values call for the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide. For this reason, Europe needs to define its understanding of strategic partnerships and reshape its military capacities in order to be in a position to combine soft and hard power when it becomes necessary. This will entail breaking European taboos and reaffirming EU’s policies in regard to foreign relations: strengthening and developing multilateralism and international law and functioning as the principal partner for nation-building and development.

In the future, Europe will also have to come to realize that there is no alternative to a partnership with the US However, a lack of trust continues to mar the relationship. For years both sides have felt uncomfortable with the institutions in which they are able to conduct a strategic dialogue. NATO is currently trying to reassert its role as the main forum for transatlantic debate. Since

transatlantic affairs are in need of profound remodelling, NATO should not simply be turned into a talking shop, although some participants think that this is what should happen. It should concentrate on its core task, which is to continue to be a successful military alliance. In the future it will have to act on a global scale, probably more than at any time in its history.

The current mission in Sudan demonstrates that the EU and NATO can deal with burden-sharing in an efficient manner. It is a promising sign of a new European approach that the EU is facing up to its responsibilities in other parts of the world by cooperating with NATO. Thus, the EU and NATO acting in concert have airlifted African Union peacekeeping troops into the Darfur region of Sudan. Since July 2005 the EU has supported the AMISII operation spearheaded by the African Union and has appointed a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan.

However, if there is to be a strategic dialogue between Europeans and Americans, it is imperative to find a venue for an informal exchange of views in order to ensure that issues on the agenda are discussed in a frank manner. The tendency for EU-US summits to flounder and become absorbed in minutiae has made it impossible to engage in broader and more strategic discussions. There must be priorities when the US President meets with his European colleagues.

In order to achieve this, both will to have to downsize their approaches. The players on both sides of the Atlantic should focus on common ground and areas where trust can be regained. The immediate neighbourhood of the EU is a region where there are common objectives, though different - and sometimes complementary - strategies. The EU and the US could perhaps collaborate on a joint concept to promote democracy from Minsk to Chisinau and beyond. By implementing such strategies, they will come to realize that a transatlantic convergence of views concerning strategic issues is also a distinct possibility.

Annette Heuser


Yet, there will continue to be conspicuous and controversial issues: environmental protection (Kyoto Protocol) and in particular, the strengthening of multilateral regimes and international law will continue to crop up until a way has been found to regain common ground with regard to fundamental issues. The approach outlined above could well lead to an ongoing transatlantic convergence of views. However, these concerns and issues can also demonstrate the “European touch” in international affairs.

It would be tantamount to ignoring the wishes of EU citizens if these important issues were to be “sacrificed” merely in order to buy American goodwill. Europeans are clearly taking a lead in fields like environmental protection and development aid. They should remember that they gained a “comparative advantage” by establishing “soft power networks” (ICC, Kyoto, etc.) throughout the world, and should try to persuade the Americans to participate in the emerging new global response structures.

The European Union is currently confronted with several security challenges not only within the Union itself, but also “out of area”. The latest example of a European attempt to engage in out-of-area action is the EU mission to Bandar Aceh in Indonesia, a remarkable start for the new European concept of security and foreign policy engagement. By providing €4million, the Union is helping to re-integrate former political prisoners and combatants into civilian life3. The EU’s engagement in Sudan must also be seen as a sign of self-confidence. These missions demonstrate that Europe’s foreign policy is becoming more mature and actually able to deliver the goods. This became obvious during the negotiations with the regime in Tehran concerning Iran’s proposals for uranium enrichment. The negotiations are being conducted by France, Britain, Germany and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana. The hands of

the US government are tied by the embargo that forbids any contacts with Tehran.

Even if, as seems likely, the European attempts at mediation fail, they will at least have demonstrated that diplomacy can at some stage be a “smart weapon” in international affairs. However, European involvement in new conflict zones throughout the world can only be credible and effective if the EU continues to integrate its foreign, security and development policies. In order to underpin involvement of this kind, it will be necessary to conduct a debate about how much of the EU budget should be assigned to foreign action. A significant increase is needed if Europe wishes to do more than merely pay lip service to the idea. However, the current debate about the next financial forecasts is not very promising in this respect. Only 9% of the budget for the period 2007-2013 has been earmarked for foreign and security activities.

The failure to adopt the Constitution has left the Union with the inadequate provisions of the Treaty of Nice. In order to comply with internal demands and those of EU partners in the world, it would be desirable to have a properly funded budget and a single EU Foreign Minister who will represent Europe on the world stage, coordinate the positions of the Member States and carry out his duties with the support of his own diplomatic service.

Profile of a global power

The tragedy of the EU is that it currently falls a long way short of what it is actually capable of doing. Europeans underestimate the fact, embroiled as they are in their internal disagreements, that the process of European integration was and continues to be a success story. It has become a role model for regional development and cooperation all over the world. From Latin America to Asia, the EU is perceived as an actor capable of guaranteeing prosperity

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3 http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1116&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr

and freedom within its borders and willing to promote its values globally.

What makes the Union so attractive for adjoining countries that would like to become members as well as for others, is the fact that it is much more than a common market. Its attraction resides in the political nature of the project. For this reason, the EU has no alternative to the continued development of its capabilities in the area of the foreign and security policy. The powers which will dominate the 21st century are those which can combine economic strength with political and strategic leadership. The EU has all the ingredients to becoming a fully-fledged global power, if, that is, it manages to fulfil the following criteria:

1) The Union has made foreign and security policy a top priority, starting with the necessary institutional arrangements for a Foreign Minister and the External Action Service and following this up with a clear commitment to increasing the Union’s budget for foreign and security policy.

2) There is a constant need to keep developing the strategic background for the way the EU thinks and acts with regard to international affairs. Even if the European Security Strategy4 can at present serve as a basis for orientation, it will soon need to be updated. Furthermore, Europeans should try to persuade the US to develop a transatlantic security strategy that reflects common interests and strategies as well as a common threat perception.

3) The foreign policy of the Union needs to be based on both sustainable and flexible partnerships. The spirit of coalitions based on the emotional appeal of a common history has evaporated. A new understanding of international coalitions is emerging: these are coalitions “of the able and willing” that are merely pursuing a realistic and pragmatic strategy.

4) The EU must promote the European model of regional integration in all parts of the world. Therefore it should do more to focus on regional developments in Latin America and Asia, and support such efforts with new forms of EU partnership.

5) Global players must respect international law and international institutions and be a role model for others in this respect. But they also have a special responsibility to identify the inefficiencies and weaknesses of international mechanisms and institutions, such as the UN and the Security Council, in order to make them capable of dealing with threats in an effective manner.

6) Finally, the EU must also be able to operate unilaterally – on both the economic and security fronts – even when the international community and its institutions are not involved.

It is now time to think about whether the EU should or should not become a real global power. The process of increasingly engaging the Union in international politics has already prepared the way. If the Union does not seize this opportunity soon, it will lose credibility both among its citizens and within the international community. Other up-and-coming nations will take over its role. The EU is faced with a choice: it can either become a global power or be marginalized.

Annette Heuser is the Director of the Brussels Office of the Bertelsmann Foundation.

Annette Heuser

4 http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf


I am pleased to be invited by European View to reflect on the state of Australia – EU relations, particularly as we approach the

400th anniversary of first European contact with Australia next year and in light of the recent commemorations that effectively marked the birth of a new Europe fifty years ago. That the relationship is built on deep historical, cultural and community ties is well known. Some 90 per cent of Australians originate from the nations of Europe. Our institutions, our way of doing business, our way of life, all reflect a distinctly European heritage. For many young Australians, the opportunity to travel to and work in Europe is still regarded as a rite of passage.

But the Australia-Europe relationship is not just about history or legacy. It is driven by shared values, a commitment to liberty and democracy and the principles of tolerance and diversity. We share interests in the development of open and outward looking economies and cooperate closely in dealing with a range of international challenges. More than ever, these shared values and interests, and the policies that flow from them, are creating opportunities for greater engagement between Australia and her European partners.

Australia has much to offer Europe. We are a significant trading partner and stable market in our own right and, increasingly, a gateway to the markets of the Asia Pacific. Australian businesses are world leaders in many sectors, from infrastructure to financial services, and are interested in investing in Europe. We have innovation, technology and resources to offer. Australia’s experiences and perspectives in engaging more closely with the countries of

North East and South East Asia are also of value to our European partners. Equally importantly, we share common views on trade, and a desire to unlock a deal on a further comprehensive multilateral trade round, despite our different perspectives and approaches on agriculture.

At the same time, we have much to benefit from that engagement. An increasingly integrated EU provides an important market for Australia’s products and services and an important source of investment, expertise and innovation. Further liberalisation of key sectors of the EU market, especially services and agriculture, should create even greater opportunities for Australian economic engagement. The EU is an influential force in international affairs, capable of providing strong leadership on critical international issues, such as the need for further global trade liberalisation and developing an effective, collective response to the problems of climate change. Through NATO and the EU, our European partners play a substantial role in contributing to security and stability in their immediate region and beyond – stability which is vital to our interests.

I see this article, then, as a chance to reflect on key aspects of the Australia - EU relationship - the strong trade and investment flows and practical cooperation we enjoy in a wide range of areas - and some of the major challenges we both face and which bring us closer together. I see it also as an opportunity to elaborate on some of the policies and actions we have taken to ensure sustained growth, competitiveness and security in Australia, and which can hopefully help inform debate in Brussels and other capitals on ways to manage the challenges Europe faces in building for the future, including through the Lisbon Economic Reform Agenda.

Australia - EU Relations: Shared Interests, Common Challenges

By John Howard

John Howard


Current relationship – dynamic and practical

The dynamism of Australia- EU relations is evident in the breadth and depth of our trade and commercial ties. As a whole, the EU remains Australia’s largest trading partner, with total merchandise trade for 2004 worth A$46.6 billion (€27.6 billion1). Our merchandise exports to the EU during this period totaled A$13.6 billion (€8.1 billion). And while unprocessed primary products continue to form a significant part of our exports to the EU, we are also seeing diversification through growing exports of processed primary products, elaborately transformed manufactures and services. Australia is now the EU’s largest source of imports for beverages (including wine).

The EU is now Australia’s largest overseas market for services exports, valued at A$7.4 billion (€4.4 billion) in 2004, much of this in travel, transportation and education sectors. In turn, the EU is our largest source of merchandise imports and services. In 2004, we imported over A$33.4 billion (€19.8 billion) worth of goods, much of that high value-add manufacturing such as passenger vehicles, aircraft and parts and pharmaceutical products. Australian airline Qantas has purchased 12 new Airbus A380 aircrafts, worth billions of Euro.

The EU is also our largest source of foreign investment, estimated at around A$374.4 billion (€214.1 billion) at the end of 2004. Major European companies, such as BP, British Aerospace, Unilever, ABN/AMRO, AXA, ACCOR, have established regional headquarters here and are increasingly utilising Australia as a base for their operations in the Asia Pacific region. Australian businesses are also looking increasingly to invest in EU Europe and surrounding economies. Total investment was estimated at A$193.6 billion (€110.7 billion) in December 2004, and Australian companies are

increasingly investing in Europe. For example, the Australian hearing implant company Cochlear along with Australian wine and sheep skin producers have invested in production facilities in the Czech Republic.

Underpinning this commercial engagement is a solid framework of dialogue, exchange and practical cooperation between Australia and EU Member States. At a formal level, we hold annual ministerial and senior officials’ level meetings with our EU counterparts to guide and review bilateral cooperation. In 2003, Australia and the European Commission adopted an ambitious agenda for cooperation which addresses seven priority areas: security and strategic issues; trade; education, science and technology; transport, environment; development cooperation; and migration.

In terms of security, a top priority for Australia and the EU, we are working to intensify information - sharing and practical cooperation in a number of critical areas, including counter-terrorism and infrastructure protection. A team of experts from the UK will shortly visit Australia to brief us on the UK’s response to the July bombings in London and to assess Australia’s domestic security and emergency response capabilities. We are increasing joint work to support counter-terrorism and law enforcement capacity in the Asia Pacific region, for example through assistance to the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation in Indonesia, which provides practical assistance to countries in the Asia Pacific region for capacity building in counter -terrorism.

We are also enhancing dialogue on weapons non-proliferation and export control issues, particularly with respect to regulating trade in dual-use items. Australia and the EU are developing closer police cooperation to better respond to transnational crime threats and terrorist financing. Negotiations are underway

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1 Conversion based on average Australian dollar to Euro exhange rate for that financial or calender year.

on a bilateral agreement between Australian law enforcement authorities and EUROPOL including information exchange and access to intelligence between the two police forces. These kinds of cooperation enhance both of our abilities to provide for the security of our citizens.

In the area of development cooperation, Australia and the EU are focusing more on ways in which we can work together to provide assistance in the Asia Pacific region. The EU has been a strong partner in contributing funds for tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, and in helping to build institutional capacity, with A$84 million ($49.8 billion) in contributions to the Solomon Islands. We are looking to strengthen cooperation with the EU in the region through joint initiatives and better coordination of development and humanitarian activities in-country. We work actively with the EU at the country level through field representatives in partner countries and hold bilateral discussions as opportunities arise, for example, at Pacific regional meetings and the annual Pacific donor consultations. Australia has invited the EU to attend the Pacific 2020 Summit, an important high-level forum to discuss regional development needs and priorities.

Australia and the EU are also exploring avenues for closer cooperation in advancing environmental protection. We have held four rounds of high level environment consultations, the most recent in November 2003. Australia’s principal interests are in ongoing policy dialogue and facilitating joint work and projects to address specific environment-related issues. At the Australia-European Commission Ministerial Consultations in Brussels in May 2004, we agreed to move forward on concrete bilateral climate change cooperation projects concerning ways to engage all countries in the fight against climate change; efficiency improvements to mobile air conditioners and end-use energy efficiency programmes in an urban environment.

Common Challenges

I have touched on some of the main elements of the Australia-EU relationship – the shared values and outlook, the substantial trade and investment flows and underlying business-to-business contacts and the dialogue and practical cooperation we benefit from across the policy spectrum. It is also worth briefly touching on a number of the critical common or global challenges we face that provide important new opportunities to strengthen and expand the Australia-EU engagement. These include critical security challenges, the spread of Islamist extremist violence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as other challenges to world-wide economic growth and stability, such as the pressing need for further liberalisation of the global trading system, more effective development assistance to poor and failing states and measures to address serious environmental problems.

For all of us, no challenge is more urgent than the continued threat of international terrorism and Islamist-extremist violence in particular. We learnt from the Bali bombings in October 2002, the attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta last year and the Madrid and London bombings that the threat to both Australia and the EU Member States is very real, and that our national security depends upon a collective response to this threat. Strong links with our partners in Asia form a key part of our response, but we also need broader international cooperation and engagement to defend our values and way of life. We are fully committed to international efforts to combat Al Qaeda and related groups, and look to Europe, through NATO and the EU, to continue to partner us and other allies in operations in Afghanistan and in the critical tasks of intelligence-sharing and surveillance to combat the export of terror.

John Howard


On proliferation, we are seeing the benefits of a more integrated, collective approach to preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but more needs to be done. We cannot rely solely on multilateral agreements and commitments to meet this challenge, particularly as more non-state actors seek to procure deadly technologies. Australia is a strong and active supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), along with a number of EU Member States, which is providing a practical response to changing proliferation and procurement trends. We are working with our Asia-Pacific neighbours to ensure that regional responses to proliferation and other security challenges develop in the direction of international measures and benchmarks.

We have a vital interest in a transparent, rules-based multilateral trading system that can provide for both the progressive liberalisation of and more equitable access to world markets. Australia holds strong ambitions for a successful outcome in the Doha round of negotiations. We must continue to co-operate on progressing the Doha Development Agenda and resolve in particular to progress issues of mutual benefit. The world needs the EU, United States and other highly protected markets, to make real progress on agricultural trade liberalisation. We welcome the EU’s reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to date and encourage further forward movement to address the disadvantages for Europeans and non-Europeans alike that the CAP brings. CAP quotas present real barriers to market access, while production and export subsidies have real impacts on price and trade competitiveness.

Turning to development assistance, a key challenge we face is finding the right balance between financing for development and capacity building in nations to provide for stable growth, good governance, the rule of law and security. There are no easy solutions to the poverty trap affecting many countries and regions, but we do know that funding alone does not provide the basis for economic development and growth. One of the biggest contributions we can make to poverty alleviation is to further reduce

barriers to trade and create fairer conditions for developing countries to compete. We also need to look at new strategies to make the aid we provide more effective. The recent G8 Gleneagles initiative makes an important start in refocusing international attention on the plight of the least developed countries and the need for substantial debt relief to enable resources to be used productively. Australia supports the thrust of the G8 approach, and will also continue to focus our development efforts in our region by promoting investment in health and education, sound economic planning and long-term investment, and better governance.

We also face together the serious challenge of developing effective responses to a range of global environmental problems, particularly climate change. We believe a meaningful response to climate change requires commitment and action by all major emitters, not just the most-industrialised countries, and real engagement by industry that allows for investment in the future. At this time it is critical that we look beyond Kyoto and concentrate on identifying truly effective options that governments and industry are prepared to pursue. We have recently helped to establish, along with a range of regional countries, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which focuses on the development and deployment of clean and low emissions technology. We see the EU as playing a valuable leadership role in building international support for a new more flexible and inclusive approach to reduce and manage global emissions and in providing technology and expertise to enable more environmentally-sustainable development by all countries.

Australian experience: Growth economy - reform and flexibility

I would like to finish by talking briefly about our experience in meeting one of our most important and difficult challenges – delivering sustained growth and greater security for all Australians - and suggest that these experiences may be of use to EU policy-makers in devising strategies to stimulate growth and productivity. I would

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argue that our efforts over the last 9 years have helped put Australia in a position to weather the serious economic crisis that affected much of South East Asia in the late 1990’s, to provide job opportunities for more Australians than ever before, and to invest in the new technologies and skills required to compete in an increasingly services-oriented global economy. It has also enabled us to give more to our region, both in terms of development assistance and natural disaster and humanitarian relief, and to take advantage of the many opportunities of greater economic engagement in our immediate region and beyond.

The Australian economy, now valued at around A$860 billion (€$508.9 billion), has grown by an average of 3.7 per cent a year over the last decade, well above the average growth of 2.7 per cent a year experienced by the OECD over the same period. In fact, Australia’s economy is now in its 15th consecutive year of growth. This strong economic performance has seen the unemployment rate fall to 5.0 per cent – the lowest unemployment rate in around three decades – interest rates fall to around historically low levels and inflation hold comfortably within the 2-3 per cent target band of the Reserve Bank of Australia. In real terms, wages have increased by over 19% in the last ten years while company profits now constitute a greater proportion of total income than ever before. Moreover, strong growth is expected to continue, with the Australian economy forecast to expand by a further 3 per cent in 2005-06.

The Australian Government can justifiably point to its role in securing and fostering this growth and prosperity. It has delivered on an ambitious agenda of structural reforms to strengthen the economy, including: comprehensive and deep tariff cuts, with another round of cuts taking effect earlier this year; a national competition policy; tax reform; labour market changes to promote direct negotiations between employers and employees; and, greater flexibility, which has helped realise productivity gains in nearly all sectors of the economy.

The government has done its part to reduce pressure on the current account and interest rates, delivering its eighth budget surplus in 2005-06, with substantial surpluses projected for the next four years. Australia’s current debt to GDP ratio of 1 per cent is much lower than most other industrialised countries, and we remain firmly committed to ensuring low levels of net government into the future. In 2004-05, the Australian Government’s net debt to GDP ratio was estimated to be just 1.9 per cent, well below that of comparable industrialised countries. The government’s pro-active approach to trade liberalisation has also delivered real benefits to the economy. In the past three years, Australia has concluded comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. We are actively pursuing agreements with Malaysia, China, the United Arab Emirates and (with New Zealand) ASEAN, and hope to explore opportunities for a trading arrangement with Japan in the near future.

As important as these policies and dividends have been to the Australian economy, we recognise that securing continued growth and prosperity depends on further domestic reforms, particularly measures to create a more flexible and responsive labour market. The Australian Government’s new workplace relations package reflects this commitment. It includes new arrangements for setting minimum wages and conditions; a more streamlined process for the making of workplace agreements; major liberalisation of unfair dismissal laws; and a national industrial relations system that reduces the plethora of industrial awards and provides for more consistent terms and conditions of employment across sectors and states.

We believe there may be some key lessons in Australia’s economic experience for others: the longer-term value of fundamental structural reforms that provide for greater flexibility, productivity and workforce participation; the importance of fiscal discipline and solid budget surpluses to contain inflation and interest rates and boost business and investor confidence;

John Howard


and the importance of investment in new technologies, skills and innovation to drive economic growth and competitiveness. We know that these are some of the challenges that policy-makers in Brussels and other EU capitals are addressing to stimulate growth and improve productivity in the Eurozone economies. We view the EU’s Lisbon Agenda as an important step in this direction, but note that progress on implementation has been modest and uneven.

Hopefully, the European Council’s decision in March this year to reinvigorate the strategy will spur further progress. Australia’s experience suggests that political commitment to reform must be matched by resolve and a willingness to take hard decisions, often in the face of strong opposition, to promote our shared long term interests.

John Howard is Prime Minister of Australia and Chairman of the International Democrat Union (IDU).

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Cyprus has been positioning itself for some time to become Europe’s economic stepping stone to the Middle East. Its ideal

position, via the new possibilities offered by EU membership and a series of reforms considered here, can ensure the success of this objective.

Solid foundations and changing realities

Since 1974, three major factors have attracted foreign companies and investments to Cyprus: taxation incentives, a highly-qualified workforce and geographical location. Indeed the island is strategically situated at the crossroads of three continents and is currently Europe’s Middle Eastern outpost. The local labour force is relatively low-cost yet highly educated and bilingual, and there is a favourable tax regime that includes a 10% corporation tax. In addition, the country’s modern and efficient services, combined with a liberal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regime allowing up to 100% foreign participation in most sectors of the economy, make it particularly appealing.

Despite such solid foundations and impressive results during the last three decades, today these features on their own are insufficient to ensure competitiveness in the globalised market. While it continues to possess these advantages, Cyprus now ranks only ninth amongst the ten new EU Member States in terms of percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to FDI, and in the last World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness report, it managed only nineteenth among EU countries1. In order for an economic environment to have the cutting edge

nowadays, it requires certain additional elements beyond low tax rates and a convenient position on the map, namely: simplified legislation and less cumbersome bureaucratic procedures; easily accessible and low budget high-end infrastructure; financial and monetary stability, and political credibility.

One year on, following accession to the EU, it would be useful for Cyprus to assess its position and the quality of its participation in the Union, and examine whether it has taken full advantage of its status as a Member State. That is to say, not just politically speaking and in relation to the Turkish occupation and efforts for reunification, but also in terms of economic development.

At a governmental level, we are often considered in Brussels as a one-issue country. Without wishing to undermine the magnitude and importance of the national issue, Cyprus must manage to look beyond it in order to actively participate in discussions and decisions on a wide spectrum of issues concerning the EU as a whole. These can equally enable the country to defend both its political and economic interests. After all, the vision of becoming an EU member was not only limited to political advantages. It included participating in the wider single European market under conditions of unhindered competition, facing the challenges of the present globalised world within a larger grouping and aiming to create sustainable growth levels. However, it would be an illusion to think that this will be offered by Brussels as a gift on a platter. It will be achieved through vision, a specifically designed national strategy and very hard work.

Cyprus: Becoming Europe’s Hub in the Middle East

By Ioannis Kasoulides

1 Growth Competitiveness Index rankings for 2004 – World Economic Forum: www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/Growth_Competitiveness_Index_2003_Comparisons

Ioannis Kasoulides


Economic theory dictates that if we are to resolve our deficit problem and succeed in achieving economic growth and development, it is not enough to find solutions within existing GDP. Measures such as a tax amnesty can only be temporary and will not provide a long term solution, while relying solely on tourism and services as we have done for many years is good, but not good enough if we wish to develop further in the present global economic context. Foreign investments are therefore the key to success for a country like Cyprus that has no significant natural resources or raw materials to export. They entail enormous benefits such as the flow of foreign capital; the import of technology and know-how; the improvement of productivity and economic growth; better business contacts abroad; direct benefits to local legal, banking, accounting and other services; and a positive impact in other sectors of the economy such as employment, the retail market and real estate.

In view of our geographic advantage and excellent relations with our neighbours, one of the main approaches for bringing in more foreign investment has been to make Cyprus a regional hub for business: attracting European companies to Cyprus in order to use the country as a launching point for operations in the Middle East, North Africa and beyond.

Using the EU to better serve the EU

EU membership and participation in a large number of Community policies provide a golden opportunity to consolidate and expand Cyprus’ capacity to perform this role and perform it well. The effort to make the most of our advantages in order to attract foreign investments cannot succeed without a comprehensive multilevel strategy. The Lisbon Agenda provides us with the opportunity and framework to devise such a national plan of action. The Agenda deals with boosting employment, improving competitiveness and creating growth while at the same time ensuring social cohesion and the protection of the environment. Cyprus

can benefit greatly from some of the measures proposed, such as dedicating more funds to research and innovation. The way forward is for Cyprus to gradually respect its engagement to allocate 1% of GDP to research, and collaborate with and encourage civil society and the private sector to gradually invest another 2% in order to reach the indicative target.

Given the nature of the Cypriot economy, the effort to create a true common market for services in the EU will also be hugely beneficial for Cyprus. While the services sector generates 60% of EU wealth, services represent only 20% of trade between the Member States. The proposed EU directive on services that suggests removing all remaining barriers between borders is controversial in several Member States. Yet the ‘country of origin’ rule whereby a service provider will be able to operate under the provisions of the law of his own country could be particularly beneficial for Cyprus which has liberal legislation on services. It would certainly attract many more European firms to register in Cyprus and operate in their own country.

The entry of the Cyprus Pound into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in May 2005 and the fact that it has traded well since, is another commendable first step. Efforts are continuing so that we can join the Euro zone as soon as possible in order to reap the benefits of monetary stability and low inflation rates, both vital indicators that draw in foreign investments.

In its efforts to achieve a more efficient and sustainable transport system, given the increasing congestion of roads and the serious environmental impact, the EU has been placing stronger emphasis on maritime transport. The expanded Marco Polo II programme (2007-2013) and the establishment of “motorways of the sea” including in the Eastern Mediterranean and countries bordering the EU, offer Cyprus another excellent prospect to play a pivotal role in the transport of goods from Asia and the Middle East to Europe. This is, however,

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conditional on overcoming the serious problem of the Turkish embargo on all ships under the Cypriot flag and also on any ship having first disembarked at a Cypriot port. Insisting on the EU’s stated position not to tolerate selective implementation of the Ankara Protocol, signed by Turkey in the summer, is the key to removing the embargo.

Attempting a series of educational, legal and social reforms

Furthermore, in order to give Cyprus the potential to become a knowledge-based economy and thus escape its reliance on services and tourism, the following reforms related to education are being considered: facilitating the presence of private universities on the island; supporting existing higher education institutions in the conversion to high-level universities; encouraging connections between universities and private sector businesses and taking measures to promote lifelong learning in order to adjust the workforce to contemporary needs. It is vital that education be directed towards academic and vocational fields needed for the future, and away from the traditional ones which only create more unemployment.

There is also a need to review existing legislation so as to remove barriers that hinder the competitiveness of small and medium sized businesses, as well as companies that will come from abroad. Firstly, there could be a simplification of the demanding bureaucratic procedures related to the Central Bank, the Registrar of Companies, residence and work permits. Secondly, the proposal made to open a Regional Arbitration Council in Cyprus should be welcomed, to save lengthy and cumbersome legal procedures in courts. The concept of a Banking Ombudsman for amicable settlement of disputes with clients is another interesting proposition.

At a social level, the trade unions must be convinced not to view the efforts to attract foreign investment with suspicion, as this investment is

also beneficial to the workforce, in terms of the new jobs created. They must therefore be given the necessary reassurances and be brought on board. Flexibility is also required on the issue of government working hours: the working time of civil service employees’ is disproportionate to continental European working time and this has to be addressed.

In the field of new technologies, it can be said that Internet use in Cyprus is available at limited speeds and prices are not yet competitive. Infrastructure that already exists, for example seven underwater connections for a whole neighbourhood, is only now being used more adequately. With Government policies that encourage the provision of high-end technology services and Internet access at attractive prices, Cyprus can capture the potential it has in this domain.

Lastly, the psychological factor is essential to the success of the economy. Prospective investors can be put off when Cyprus receives bad international press in the domain of politics. Issues such as the handling of the “no” decision after the April 2004 referendum and the projection of a negative image through statements made locally and abroad have serious economic repercussions as well as political ones. Political credibility therefore and a positive and constructive image abroad play as important a role as that of the other reforms discussed.

Conclusion

EU membership has provided an array of opportunities to further assist Cyprus’ progression towards becoming an attractive and advantageous stepping stone between Europe and its Southeastern neighbourhood. Making the most of this and building upon the rest of the reforms outlined will lead to tangible socio-economic results that will improve the popularity of the EU locally but also be beneficial to the European economy as a whole. The current international tension between the Arab and Islamic world on the one hand and the West

Ioannis Kasoulides


on the other makes it an even bigger priority for the EU to transform and use one of its own Member States as a reliable economic bridge to the Middle East.

Ioannis Kasoulides is Member of the European Parliament and former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus.

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Over recent years northern Europe has undergone great political change. The enlargement of the European Union and

NATO to the Baltic States and Poland has enhanced the stability of the area, and together with the economic potential in Russia, they have brought about an ongoing development which has made the Baltic Sea area the fastest growing in Europe. As always, change means new challenges.

In Northern Europe the greatest challenges are linked with the history of the area but also with uncertainties regarding political developments in Russia and its southern neighbourhood. When some neighbours are not on best terms with each other, the whole neighbourhood suffers. The same also holds for the Baltic Sea area. Studies show that the Baltic economic area has a large potential for economic growth and for integration benefits if we can overcome the obstacles left by the Cold War.

The European Union has committed itself to the management of this change. This should be happening within the framework of the Northern Dimension, but at the moment the level of European commitment does not meet the demand for management and investment in the area. To some extent, this is due to a certain lack of interest from the European Commission. The Baltic Sea countries also have themselves to blame.

By investing in the Northern Dimension initiative and especially in Baltic Sea cooperation and the partnership with Russia, the whole of the European Union will stand to gain in the long run.

Focus on Russia and energy

Officially the Northern Dimension is defined as a square. Its four corners are Germany, Greenland, the Kola Peninsula and Kaliningrad. This definition is rather grand since, in practice, almost all Northern Dimension projects have been undertaken in North-western Russia, close to the Finnish border.

This focus on Russia has its justifications for Europe and for Finland. From a purely security policy standpoint, it is clear that a constructive and cooperative relationship with Russia is the most important guarantee for stable development, especially in the Northern and Eastern parts of Europe. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana has stated that the development of a partnership with Russia is the single most important, most urgent and most challenging task for the Union this century. I dare say that Mr Solana knows which side his bread is buttered on!

The importance of Russia will not diminish even from an economic perspective. The European Union imports 25 per cent of the natural gas it uses from Russia. The picture is quite similar when it comes to oil. In the future, our dependency on Russian energy resources is more likely to increase, especially if more oil is replaced by natural gas. This development will be encouraged by emissions-trading and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.

At the moment, Europe is the most likely destination for Russia’s energy exports. The European Union’s market share is over 50 per cent. We should not take this for granted. The European Union is not Russia’s biggest neighbour; China’s huge population and its

Releasing the Northern Potential: Benefiting from Baltic Area Investment

By Jyrki Katainen

Jyrki Katainen


robust economic growth consume an incredible amount of energy. A lack of energy is already a significant obstacle to growth. At the moment the designs for a pipeline in Eastern Siberia look a little like a Russian ruse to see which country, China or Japan, is willing to pay a bigger premium on Russian oil flowing there first. In ten years’ time, oil will flow to both these huge economies and most likely to India as well. The European Union should now seriously invest in energy cooperation with Russia.

The new Member States are rather hesitant in the face of this growing dependency on Russian energy. In light of history, this is completely understandable. But one hopes that mutual interests can override old grudges and that this happens sooner rather than later. If the Northern Dimension framework can promote a more constructive atmosphere, all the better then.

What about the political development in Russia?

Those of us who live next to the Russian border are often asked for an assessment of political developments in Russia. The well known Swedish specialist on Russia at the Washington D.C. based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Centre, Anders Åslund, wrote recently about his Russian friends’ response to the same question: “the situation is completely predictable. Everything develops according to the worst possible scenario.”

Although Åslund is also critical of his own analysis, he suggests that the United States has a permanent interest in promoting the country’s economic integration into the world economy and thus into the international system. The evident WTO membership and the forthcoming G8 Presidency will hopefully have important consequences in this respect. Åslunds advice can also be adopted on a smaller scale, like in Baltic Sea cooperation. Russia can be integrated into the economic area and thus to the political system, and the Northern Dimension should be used to provide the framework for this development.

It goes without saying that Russia’s internal development includes elements that are alien to the mature democracies of Western Europe and North America. Yet, the President and the Parliament - however strong the former may be - are still democratically elected. The economy has developed well and the business climate has improved and become more predictable also for foreign investors. On the other hand, the centralisation of power has actually weakened the state: governing is less efficient and corruption is common. The political elite has no tolerance for open and free media which in the case of foreign media has caused counter effective reactions by the government.

President Putin is still a mystery to western leaders. Many of his actions have been explained by his background in the secret service, but his positive actions have caused more confusion than clear explanations in the west. He seems to be caught between western demands for reforms and potential Russian nationalism. The second term has been full of difficulties from Putin’s point of view and an often heard analysis is that the Russian President is no longer as strong as he used to be. The oligarchs are now in control and the people’s frustration has turned towards their President; the spontaneous demonstrations on social reform are signals of this unrest.

There are as many analyses of what shall follow Putin’s regime as there are analysts, but the possibility of a more nationalistic tendency is evident. The long-term development in Russia is difficult to predict. In my mind, there are only two kinds of analysts: those who don’t know, but don’t know that they don’t know, and those who know that they don’t know.

It is clear however, that Russia’s big problems are not on the western frontier, they are internal and behind the southern border. The border between Russia and EU is an area of huge possibilities.

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Russia as a European market place

The economies of Europe are struggling. In Western Europe, economic growth is at best a mere 2 per cent and growth in the United States hasn’t been enough to kick-start a phase of more forceful growth here. On the other hand the Russian economy has grown by well over 5 per cent for seven straight years.

Could Russia perhaps be an area of expansion, a market place for the products of an ageing Europe and, as such, a solution to the demanding problems we face? We could still have a logistical edge over American competition especially if we don’t delay.

Russia is of strategic importance to Europe, and more particularly to Finland. Trade between Finland and Russia grew by 25 per cent last year. Soon Russia will replace Germany as our most important trading partner.

So, the trade relationship is active and some 60 per cent of the foreign direct investments (FDI) that Russia receives come from the European Union. FDI inflows to Russia are still relatively small compared to those going to Eastern and Central Europe or to China, even per capita. Russia is feared and even belittled.

The fact remains that a middle class is rapidly forming in Russia. When consumers in St. Petersburg or Moscow start to spend, volumes will be large and the markets will be closer to Europe than to any other traditional western economy.

In many fields, Finnish or other European products have been able to establish a good brand name for themselves. But the production of consumer goods in Russia will expand even if there is currently a lack of capital and know-how in the country. European Union Member States have both, but are in desperate need of markets for their products. Taken as a whole, there is a huge potential in Russia.

We stand to lose this golden opportunity if we are overcautious. The political risks are not out of our hands yet. The Northern Dimension, for example, should serve as a tool to diminish these risks.

A recent report published by Sitra, a Finnish state-funded think tank shows that there are success stories. The report “Large Country, Long Quarter” looks at experiences of Finnish companies during the last 15 years of doing business in Russia. Companies originating from Finland now can boast leading market shares in the brewing, bakery or telecommunications business. Once again, if the Northern Dimension can help to inspire more of these success stories by supporting concrete business-based projects, or by fostering more understanding between different cultures, then all the better.

Northern Dimension at a crossroads

The Second Action Plan for the Northern Dimension will end in December 2006. We have arrived at a crossroads for three reasons.

Firstly, financing for Northern Dimension initiatives will change fundamentally with the new EU Budget for the period of 2007-2013. The existing financial instruments will be replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

Secondly, EU enlargement has transformed the map of Europe. We now have a new opportunity to respond to the challenges facing the Baltic Sea region. The essential question is how the Northern Dimension and the emerging Baltic Sea cooperation can reinforce each other.

Thirdly, and this follows in part from EU enlargement, the relationship between the European Union and Russia has also changed.

So, the time is right for an honest assessment of the progress achieved so far.

Jyrki Katainen


From Polar Bear Regime to modern challenges

Many believe that the era of the Northern Dimension began when Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen gave a speech in Rovaniemi in September of 1997. In that speech Mr. Lipponen revealed for the first time that Finland was to launch an initiative to create a Northern Dimension Policy for the European Union.

The cooperation on local and regional levels, these very practical partnerships that even today form the basis of the Northern Dimension, go far beyond this one speech. The first concrete action was the so-called “Polar Bear Regime” from 1973. All the Arctic countries committed themselves to undertaking measures for the preservation of Polar Bears. It was one of the first cooperative arrangements which included commitments from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Others date the beginning of the Northern Dimension to a speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, when he gave a very radical speech in Murmansk about how cooperation in the Arctic Region surpasses both the boundaries of States and the interests of military blocs.

In the early 1990’s, Norway was a very strong proponent of the Northern Dimension. Many were sure that Norway would become a member of the European Union like Finland and Sweden and that the country would definitely take a leading role as a mediator between Russia and the European Union in the Arctic region.

Since the launch of the Northern Dimension Initiative, Sweden has proven to be one of its strongest supporters.

The Implementation Guidelines for the Northern Dimension were adopted in June 1999 during the German Presidency of the European Union. The next presidency – Finland – prepared the way for cooperation between the European Union and the Partner Countries. In June 2000

the Feira European Council adopted the first Northern Dimension Action Plan.

Inadequate funding

The fact that the Northern Dimension became official policy of the European Union was a big achievement for Finland. Recognition must be given to all the hard work carried out during the Lipponen years. But we must also be able to step aside and ask self-critical questions: what have we achieved with the Northern Dimension?

I believe it was a mistake not to create a budgetary line for the Northern Dimension in the EU Budget. Most of the EU funding has come from the TACIS Programme which provides grant-financed technical assistance to countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

What is the honest added value of this Northern Dimension programme? Surely most of the projects which have taken place under it would not have received international funding if such an instrument did not exist. The value of these projects is therefore unquestionable.

Theoretically, the Northern Dimension Action Plan has five priority themes. They include among other things infrastructure, business and education. In reality, the Northern Dimension consists of just two partnerships: the Environmental Partnership and the Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being. The latter is just beginning and there are no plans to set up a separate fund for it.

When we consider the fact that the Nuclear Safety window of the Environmental Partnership is at this stage just a plan, we must conclude that in reality, the Northern Dimension is just an environmental partnership with Russia. Financing from the European Union has been relatively minor – about a quarter of the total sum. The hard reality is that the Northern Dimension is just 74 million euros worth of environmental projects with some 20 million euros coming from the European Commission.

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This is not insignificant. The South West Wastewater Treatment Plant in St. Petersburg has been of great importance for the Baltic Sea – one of the most polluted seas in the world – and I am very happy that this project will be completed this autumn. Six other smaller projects have also been started.

Comparing to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership

An interesting comparison for the Northern Dimension is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and its MEDA Programme. For this cooperation, the European Union has budgeted for the period of 2000-2006 a total of 5.35 billion euro. The total for the Northern Dimension is just under 4 per cent of MEDA financing.

Of course the Mediterranean region is more populous and the problems there are more volatile. But up here in the North, we should not be too modest when it comes to the problems of our area. We live on the shores of one of the most populated seas in the world. One of the sharpest divides between standards of living in the world exists between Finland and Russia. And Russia’s second-largest city is a very close neighbour of the European Union.

The challenges and opportunities of this region are such that in comparison with the MEDA programme, the Northern Dimension initiative should receive more funding than today. If there is no separate budget for the Northern Dimension because no one other than Finland is interested, shouldn’t we then consider developing the concept so that the benefits are more visible all around the Baltic Sea? More ambition is needed by the governments of all Baltic Sea states, not least the Finnish government.

Uncertain future with only a few friends

In public policy the most fundamental question always involves money. The Member States are negotiating the framework for the EU Budget for the period of 2007-2013. Many questions are

open at the moment, but as I have mentioned earlier the existing financial instruments used for Northern Dimension projects will be replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The sad fact remains that the Northern Dimension has but a few friends. Finland remains a loyal champion to this cause. Sweden comes out once in a while in support of the Northern Dimension, whereas the Baltic States and Poland look to the west and do not seem very interested in projects up north. The Kola Peninsula is far removed from them, and the situation isn’t that much different with Germany.

How will concrete Northern Dimension projects fare when financing becomes ever tighter and the current concept continues to fail in uniting even the most northern of EU Member States? It would be irresponsible not ask the question: what can we do to make the Northern Dimension concept more acceptable to Europe as whole, without losing sight of the importance of Russia?

This very important question formed the basis of a recent initiative taken by the whole of the European Parliament delegation of the National Coalition Party (EPP MEP’s from Finland). The initiative focused on a strategy for the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately the public debate in Finland saw the Northern Dimension initiative and the Baltic Sea strategy as rivals somehow cancelling each other out. This was not the intention at all.

Recently, the discussion has fortunately returned to more constructive territory. I have been informed that at a meeting of the Baltic Intergroup of the European Parliament, a large consensus was reached for further developing the Baltic Sea strategy.

In sum, it would be foolhardy to try to rebrand the Northern Dimension as a Baltic Sea Strategy. The political brand should remain, but at the same time we should look for something new to give life to this old and valiant effort. We need

Jyrki Katainen


something vibrant; something that unites all the Northern countries. If this level of commitment is reached, then we have a new dynamic concept.

The Baltic Sea in the core of the Northern Dimension

With this in mind, where else can we look but to the Baltic Sea? All Northern Member States are located on the shores of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea also unites the European Union and Russia. This is a real connection which implies a sharing of responsibilities for common problems. This summer, beaches all over the Baltic Sea were once again visited by floating algae, showing that the eco system really is on the brink of collapse. More assistance from programmes like the Northern Dimension would be very much welcomed. Water waste treatment in St. Petersburg, reducing the risks of increased oil transport, preparing for oil spills and taking measures, all require vast sums of money. A new problem waits in the wings; the overflow of nutrients from increased agriculture in the new Member States is a very serious threat. Soviet influenced agriculture used few fertilizers. Now that the new Member States have come under the Common Agricultural Policy, the use of fertilizers will expand rapidly. Measures to protect the Baltic Sea should be taken immediately, as part of the Common Agricultural Policy.

The Baltic Sea connection is not all bad news. The Baltic Development Forum issued a study last autumn, comparing four equally large and equally populated regional economies. The regions were the Baltic economic area, Central Europe, the British Isles and the Iberian Peninsula. The study found that the Baltic economic area has the highest potential of all. This result is not surprising. Expanding trade and increasing investment flows are sure signs of growth. This sort of exchange forms most easily between countries where development varies. Moreover, the sea has throughout history been the strongest uniting financial factor between different nations.

Around the Baltic Sea we still have a lot of bottlenecks when it comes to administration and infrastructure. These prohibit the formation of a real Baltic economic area and keep this region poorer than it should be. These problems have been identified in the close cooperation that the different Baltic Chambers of Commerce engage in. Stronger regional identity should be encouraged.

The issue of politics also plays a part. Since the heyday of Sweden as an empire, the Nordic countries have been politically marginalised. The European Community welcomed its first Nordic member in 1972 when Denmark joined its ranks. It took over twenty years for other Nordic countries to join the European Union. This happened ten years ago when Finland and Sweden both joined. And a year ago it was finally time for the Baltic States and Poland to join the European family. Together the Baltic Sea countries have a potential third of the power, of the gross national product, and of the population in the European Union.

The Nordic Council has lost its appeal

I am rather worried by the plethora of

organisations devoted to promoting cooperation

in Northern Europe: perhaps it is time to

rationalise these structures under the Northern

Dimension umbrella.

The oldest and by far the strongest cooperation

mechanism is the Nordic Council, with its

investment bank and cultural apparatus. For

some time, I have felt that the Nordic Council

has not been able to change with the times. This

has meant that several new organisations have

come into being. The most viable of these are the

Barents Euro Arctic Council and Council of the

Baltic Sea States. All traditional Nordic countries

are represented in all of these organisations

and overlapping activities can be a problem.

The Nordic Council has the most resources

and it also funds activities arranged by other

organisations. So a question arises: why do we

need people making applications for funding,

say, in the Council of the Baltic Sea States and

then other staff checking their applications in

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the Nordic Council? The Northern Dimension

should serve as a gravitational centre pulling these different organisations together.

The European Commission has lately toyed with the idea that the Northern Dimension would bring together Northern parliamentarians. This could signal the beginning of a new era, although I fear that one new annual parliamentary get-together will not change much.

This theme that I have touched upon was also discussed in the Finnish Parliament last November. The speakers were mostly MPs with a deep involvement and commitment to the different Nordic cooperation organisations. But even so, or perhaps exactly for that reason, the discussion echoed these same worries I have voiced here. Unfortunately our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Erkki Tuomioja, spoke without either enthusiasm or vision, which leaves little hope that Finland will take the initiative.

But what will happen when Finland takes over the EU presidency in the second half of 2006?

Finnish Presidency has a heavy agenda

The Second Action Plan expires by the end of 2006. In its place, we will have a framework agreement between Russia and the European Union. It will be signed at the Summit meeting held during the Finnish presidency. Finland will also most likely have to finalise the negotiations for the new EU Budget. This process will also be of great importance for the Northern Dimension.

But the truth is that others will have to bear the brunt of the work involved in reviving the Northern Dimension. This will take place later this year and at the beginning of 2006. The Commission is entering into discussions with Russia about the future of the Northern Dimension. The end product of these discussions will be common guidelines to be adopted at the Northern Dimension ministerial meeting to be held this autumn.

The Finnish Foreign Ministry has naturally also begun its own work. The Ministerial Committee for European Affairs received and also approved the latest overview of the situation. The Finnish Government was very satisfied with the overall plans that the Commission has sketched for the future of the Northern Dimension.

I feel that the situation can also be depicted otherwise. Both the Finnish government and the European Commission lack the ambition to truly develop the inherent potential of the Northern Dimension concept. For the latter, this is worrisome and for the former very reprehensible. Current Commission plans are not sufficient to transform the Northern Dimension. The existing hotchpotch of cooperation organisations and mechanisms has not offered the expected results. There are no plans to improve the effectiveness of Northern Dimension or to solve future financial shortcomings. There are no ideas of how to better commit the Baltic States, Germany or Poland to this concept. The Commission hasn’t even addressed the question of how to improve Russia’s poor commitment.

Lack of vision

The Commission is proposing a permanent political agreement to replace the multi-annual Action Plans. But what is left after this conjuring trick? Surely nothing but paper. This approach does not help us to reach an agreement with Russia on concrete projects, which is the ultimate goal.

In a nutshell one can say that the Commission proposal does not solve our most basic problem, which is Russia’s discontent with the following:a) the meagre resources that the Northern Dimension has at its disposal, b) the fact that important infrastructure projects, which would encourage growth, are lacking from the whole proposal, c) that fact that the second Action Plan fostered a perception that Russia was forced to accept something dictated by the EU. The Commission also clearly rejects the notion that the Northern Dimension should have a separate budget.

Jyrki Katainen


Through this overall lack of vision one can see only one rationale. The Commission wants to incorporate the Northern Dimension into the European Union’s overall Russia policy. The Commission is proposing that the Northern Dimension structure is adapted to fit the road map structure for the four Common Spaces which was agreed to recently in the EU-Russia Summit.

One can hardly blame the Commission for doing this. From its vantage point this is only natural, if and when the structural cooperation between Russia and the EU is finally moving from words to concrete deeds.

However, I am personally convinced that as long as the road map is merely a list of good intentions for further cooperation, no existing and functioning cooperation structure should be left to decline.

I am encouraged by the recent interest in the Baltic Sea cooperation by the CDU in Germany and other Member Parties of the European People’s Party (EPP) from the Baltic Sea area. At a recent conference organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in Berlin we agreed that our parties should deepen and prioritise this kind of cooperation. It is a strong message from the EPP to the people and governments around the Baltic Sea: Europe will benefit from investing in the Baltic Sea area.

Jyrki Katainen is Chairman of Kokoomus,Finland.

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The transatlantic part-ners form a community unlike any other in the world. United by common interests and sharing common ideals,

these liberal democracies possess the will and the means to protect and advance both. The story of this relationship is one of historic successes, and though divisions over Iraq and other issues have tested our ties, America’s relations with Europe remain of paramount importance.

It is both possible and necessary to recapture the commonality of spirit that has been eroded over the past few years. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic have taken important steps this year to do just that, but to go further in this direction requires first laying aside a central misconception of the post-Cold War era, then entails moving ahead collaboratively on a new transatlantic agenda that will draw on our shared strengths and values.

The times they are a changin’ . . . .

It is beyond doubt that the foreign policy postures in America and Europe have each changed since the end of the Cold War. Europe is bigger, with new entrants joining the European Union and NATO, more diverse, with eastward expansion and new immigration, and more dynamic, with ever-increasing economic and political integration. And while many remain skeptical of the European project, it is safe to say that Europe’s view of its own global role is changing. At the same time, anti-Americanism has risen dramatically throughout Europe. Something has changed.

It is also worth reflecting on how the United States has changed since September 11, 2001.

The catastrophic terrorist attacks on our country produced a shift in perception that remains poorly understood in some European quarters. This changed perspective was clearly evident in last year’s presidential campaign. For all of the talk of “red states” and “blue states”, there was a remarkable consensus in America about the urgent need to defeat international terrorism. While Republicans and Democrats may have differed on the exact combination of instruments required to do this, all shared a resolve to prevent future attacks on our homeland or those of our friends. Across the Atlantic, the choice between President Bush and Senator Kerry was often portrayed as one between vastly different foreign policies, chiefly with respect to our European allies. Yet both President Bush and Senator Kerry promised to fight terrorists wherever they are found, both promised to prosecute and win the war in Iraq, and both pledged to work with our friends and willing allies to enhance our security and prosperity. There were important differences in both style and substance between the two candidates’ approaches, but these differences were not as vast as many in Europe maintained.

A misconceived misconception

As I believe the gulf between “red” and “blue” in the United States has been overstated, so too do I believe that the issues that divide the United States and the countries of Europe on issues of great significance are manageable. A popular argument among foreign policy thinkers today runs along the following lines: the Cold War bound the United States and Europe together in the face of a common enemy. After 1991, the US and Europe began drifting apart, but the two sides remained interlocked due to geopolitical inertia and an uncommonly tranquil period in international affairs. But as Europe continued

Transatlantic Relations: An American View

By John McCain

John McCain


to integrate and grow more powerful, it relied less and less on the United States, while the aftermath of September 11 and the war in Iraq exposed fault lines that already existed. America and the countries of Europe inevitably began to head down separate paths. It is only natural, this argument continues, that the United States will emerge as one of several power centers in the world, with the EU as another. These two powers would have occasionally overlapping goals, but our so-called “transatlantic values” are not enough to counteract the centrifugal tendencies in the relationship.

This is nonsense. Surely there is some truth to the explanation that the demise of the Soviet Union has prompted us to look at other issues in the US-Europe relationship with a more critical eye. Certainly the war in Iraq strained our relations beyond anything we have experienced in recent years, just as it caused division among European countries themselves. But there always has been, and there will continue to be, much more that binds the transatlantic partners together than divides us. Celebrating the values that the United States and Europe share is not simply nostalgia for the days when our alliance was young. These ideals of democracy, the rule of law, human and civil rights, freedom from tyranny and oppression, and individual liberty - are the essence of our identity as nations, cultures, and allies. Indeed they are the essence of our importance in history. We confide in our foreign policies, not narrowly calculated national interests, but rather our best hopes for the progress of humanity. Our duty to fortify our common purpose in service to these ideals - a continuing duty for the leaders of both the United States and Europe - makes the relationship more than a collective response to a once imposing and now finished threat. Together, Europe and America constitute a fraternal, if occasionally fractious, order of liberal democracies with the will and the means to protect our shared ideals from outside threats, and to help advance them where they have too long been denied to others.

For so much that we seek to achieve in the world, a shared transatlantic commitment and a shared transatlantic effort is indispensable. Americans not only welcome European leadership, we believe it is necessary to make the world a better, safer place for our interests and our values. This means true leadership - not a group of countries that merely follows American directives, as some fear, nor a coalition that opposes American power simply because of its country of origin, as others suggest. Winston Churchill defined an optimist as one who “sees opportunity in every difficulty”. As an optimist, I see that we do not lack opportunities in the world today. To pay real tribute to our shared history and values, we must enhance and update the transatlantic partnership, transforming challenges into opportunities for cooperation.

Iraq and the Middle East

The first challenge we face is ensuring success in Iraq. Good people on both sides of the Atlantic disagreed about the wisdom of toppling Saddam Hussein and liberating the people of Iraq. I choose the word “liberate” deliberately, because I firmly believed - and continue to believe - that intervening in Iraq was the right choice. But even if in some European countries there exists lingering and significant domestic opposition to the coalition military operation, it seems hard to understand that these same countries would be prepared to accept the consequences of possible failure. Neither America nor Europe can afford such a scenario with all the implications that a failed state in the heart of the Middle East would have for our homelands – not to mention the bloodshed that a true power vacuum would unleash on the Iraqi population. It would also be wise to recall that the benefits of success in that country would be profound, not just for Iraq but throughout the region.

Victory is difficult but still possible. If realized, success in Iraq would set that country on a new course, in which democratic expression and economic opportunity could provide a

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compelling example for other societies in that troubled region. So despite the mistakes we have made in conducting this war, there remains a compelling case for all countries to help the Iraqis in any way possible. This does not imply merely putting more troops on the ground, though more troops are needed. It also implies assistance of all kinds, ranging from computers to well digging, from doctors and civil engineers to military and police trainers. The scope for help is limited only by the creativity and generosity of the donors. The coalition and Iraqi security forces must hold down violence to the absolute minimum and support the new Iraqi state while the Iraqis themselves hash out political settlements to the issues that now divide them. They can get there, but it requires Americans and Europeans alike to treat the situation there as an emergency in need of immediate assistance.

While Iraq remains our paramount challenge, other important issues provide great opportunity for collaboration. Iran continues to travel along the nuclear path, threatening to disrupt security in the region and beyond. The EU has shown great leadership in attempting to dissuade the Iranians from continuing on their dangerous course and in convincing them that the US and Europe cannot be split on this critical issue. But just as we have been united until now, we must remain so, and the ruling mullahs need to hear one unified message from all of us: the development of nuclear weapons constitutes a grave breach of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory, and a threat to international peace and stability. This message must indicate that such behavior will incur specific penalties, including referral to the United Nations Security Council, the imposition of multilateral economic sanctions, and targeted penalties (such as visa bans) against the regime leadership. At the same time, the reformers and the millions of Iranians who aspire to self-determination must hear that we support their natural desires for freedom, democracy, and economic opportunity. Oppression in that great land must not forever endure.

Both Iran and Iraq are key elements in the emerging consensus that the United States and Europe must support so as to encourage democratic change in the broader Middle East. For many years it was axiomatic that bonds of friendship among governments led to peace, irrespective of their domestic nature, and that a despotic ally was preferable to an unfriendly democracy. The September 11 attacks pointed out most painfully that, on the contrary, the domestic condition of other states, even those with friendly governments, does matter to our security. We have learned that, where repression rules, the lack of political participation and economic opportunity engenders despair and extremism. When extremism becomes terror, what was once under the domestic purview of one state becomes a security concern for everyone. This is not to say that political repression is the only root cause of terrorism; undoubtedly there are others, as the recent bombings in London suggest. But it is nevertheless clear that when autocratic regimes subvert their people’s desire for democracy, violence becomes a more attractive alternative. Where economies stagnate and fail to provide jobs, especially for the educated, extremism finds fertile ground.

This problem is acute today in the Middle East, but it is also solvable. In recognition of this, the G8 leaders last year launched their Broader Middle East/North Africa initiative, and NATO launched its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Both of these are building blocks on which the transatlantic partners can do more to engage the region. Working in partnership with willing reformers, the US and Europe must deepen their long-term commitment to use economic, political, and diplomatic resources to promote positive change in the region. There are many avenues through which we can do this. Programmatically, institutions like the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute (which I have the honor of chairing), and the National Democratic Institute support budding democrats

John McCain


and civil society institutions around the world. Europe has some fledgling organizations that work in a similar fashion, but can and should be doing much more. IRI frequently partners with European organizations in its work – with Slovak and Czech organizations in Iraq, with Spanish foundations in Latin America, with German, British, and Austrian parties and party foundations in the Balkans – but these worthwhile initiatives only scratch the surface of what is possible. Diplomatically, the US and Europe should stand together in calling for reform and democracy, never allowing the autocrats to split us in our ambition to support the reformers.

As we move ahead on this agenda, it is worth recalling that the drive for reform in the Middle East is, of course, not merely a transatlantic mission, nor can it be imposed from without - the people of the Middle East must seek freedom and democracy of the their own accord. We push for reform there because our security demands it and because we believe that the abridgement of Arab or Kurdish or Iranian human and political rights are no less offensive than the abridgement of our own. But we ultimately push for reform in the Middle East because the people themselves demand it, and because this demand is so clearly deserving of the support of the United States and Europe.

In the Middle East it is evident that many issues, both related and unrelated, are viewed through the prism of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Achieving peace between these two peoples would have positive reverberations throughout the region and the world, and recent events there present a real opportunity. In withdrawing from Gaza, Prime Minister Sharon took a huge and courageous step, and this action has the potential to reenergize the peace process – an opportunity that may not last forever. At the same time, Mahmoud Abbas faces huge challenges in managing post-withdrawal Gaza, and he will require the help of the international community. It is in the continuing interest of the transatlantic partners to provide financial

resources and appropriate political support to make this endeavor a success. At the same time, we need to encourage both the Israelis and the Palestinians to return to the Roadmap as soon as possible. Should they do so, NATO may have a key role to play. While I believe a peacekeeping role would serve only to prolong the necessary peacemaking, and should be avoided, there are other options for NATO participation, including training of security forces, enhancing border security, and monitoring the implementation of Roadmap commitments.

Neighbours to the east

While the Middle East cries out for change, the neighbours to Europe’s east illustrate some of the rockier soil on which the seeds of democracy have fallen, and they call for a cooperative attempt to support the forces of freedom there. From the great success stories, in the Baltics, Georgia, and elsewhere, to the countries in which democracy has struggled, like Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and where it no longer exists, in Belarus and Uzbekistan, the United States and the countries of Europe must work together to promote democratic rule. The effects of our firm messages are greatly enhanced when they are coordinated and supported by all of the transatlantic democracies, as events during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution illustrated so dramatically. Reacting to Russian interference and blatant electoral fraud, both the US and the EU refused to recognize the declared victory of Viktor Yanukovich as President. The world - and Ukraine - took notice. Only when these types of governments see that it is impossible to split the United States and Europe do they look inward at their own actions and consider change.

Nowhere on the continent is this as important today as in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin rules as a “creeping coup” his efforts to use the Chechen war to roll back the democratic gains Russia won in the 1990s. Over the last year, “galloping coup” has become a more appropriate term, as Mr Putin has moved to eliminate the

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popular election of Russia’s regional governors, end the election of independent members of Parliament, continue the crackdowns on independent media, and persist in repressing business executives who oppose the President. As President Putin reasserts his own form of old-style Kremlin control, Russia continues to interfere in so-called frozen conflicts in portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan.

Mr Putin is pursuing autocracy at home and exporting autocracy abroad. Yet in the face of these outrages, both Europe and the United States have remained too acquiescent, preferring to deal with Mr Putin as an equal. We have the power to hold Russia to a higher standard, both at home and in Europe’s backyard. A strong, unified message is necessary: reversing democracy in Russia will inevitably cause our relations with Russia to suffer, however much we value its cooperation in other areas.

For those skeptical about what a cooperative transatlantic relationship can achieve, I would point out the progress in the Western Balkans. By deploying peacekeepers in 1995, we halted the bloodshed in Bosnia. Working together, we stopped further killing in Kosovo by waging NATO’s only war, and then together averted a civil war in Macedonia. A look at this region today shows just how far it has come. Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are on track for NATO candidacy, perhaps as soon as 2006, and are on the path toward eventual EU membership. There are remaining challenges in Serbia and in resolving the final status of Kosovo but, overall, the transformation of the Western Balkans has been a significant transatlantic success.

As we look to the countries on Europe’s borders we must not neglect the countries of Central Asia. The democratic revolution in Kyrgyzstan showed the power of a movement that has showed stirrings in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, even in repressive states like Uzbekistan. And yet Europe has been strangely quiet in Central Asia, seeing it as beyond its borders and out of mind. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan transpired

in the absence of high-level European attention and in this sense contrasted sharply with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. But the future of Central Asia is of paramount importance to Europe. With its abundant oil and gas reserves, pipelines traversing the region, flows of people, narcotics, and goods, and potential for stability or upheaval, it deserves greater attention from Europe and provides an opportunity for the US and Europe to work together to bolster democracy.

On August 12, the Presidents of Ukraine and Georgia issued the “Borjomi Declaration,” inviting leaders of all countries in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region to create a Community of Democratic Choice. With a summit scheduled for this autumn and the EU invited as an observer, this pro-democracy initiative illustrates just one way in which the reform-minded leaders are moving forward. With diplomatic, financial, and programmatic support, the US and Europe can work together to bolster the reformers in power and the civil societies in countries where democracy is lacking.

Africa, transnational issues, and style

While we focus on Europe’s borders, we should not neglect the continent of Africa, where European countries have a special responsibility to assist the development of post-colonial lands. The UK’s focus on the continent during the G8 summit was an important start, and we need to build on this momentum in the pursuit of long term change. But we also need short term solutions to immediate problems, and nowhere is this more critical today than in Sudan, where the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis continues to unfold. As the Sudanese government and its allied Arab militias rampage through the region of Darfur, leaving in their wake a level of death and destruction the United States has labelled genocide, we must do more now. Targeted, coordinated penalties against all responsible Sudanese government officials and militia leaders are long overdue. The transatlantic partners should rally the call to install a broad visa ban,

John McCain


an arms embargo, and freeze assets, and then increase the international armed presence in Darfur, to protect refugees in their camps and ultimately help them return home.

But the opportunities to improve our ties do not stem from country-specific challenges alone. The specter of climate change, for example, presents a real and present danger to all countries and, indeed the world, and yet this issue hardly registers on the US-European agenda. Prime Minister Blair has shown great leadership on this issue, and he is right in describing climate change as “a challenge so far-reaching in its impact and irreversible in its destructive power that it alters radically human existence”. Scientists observe an increased melting of the polar ice caps, the shifting and destruction of many species, the destruction of coral reefs, unprecedented heat waves and extreme weather, and new outbreaks of health problems linked to climate change.

We must reopen US-European talks on climate change and work toward a new solution acceptable to both sides. I have introduced in the US Senate legislation that would require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but this is a modest start. What is required is a successor to Kyoto, a cap-and-trade system that delivers the necessary environmental impact in a financially responsible manner, and one that includes developing countries like China and India. New technologies hold great promise. We need to revise our innovation systems, so that we have policies in place that will encourage the marketplace to embrace more ideas originating in research labs. Together we can rekindle the spirit of creativity to find affordable solutions to the looming climate problem.

Many other issues - from the dangers of proliferation to trade issues to the role of an international criminal court - deserve serious consideration and discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. With issues such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), we need to recognize that, if they are important to our European friends, so too they are important to America. We need to

emphasize our areas of agreement and manage our disagreements. Only bad blood results when one side disengages completely, whether it is the Americans over the ICC or the French over Iraq. We have seen improvement on both sides this year, but we clearly have more work to do.

This brings me to another point, one that con-cerns the importance of style in the transatlantic relationship. Behind the substantive policy debate is a perception on the European side that I think is poorly understood in Washington. Europeans quite rightly wish to be heard and respected by the United States, while Americans, perhaps true to our nature, often let our certainty and self-regard override our impulse toward consultation and deference. For the American side, I believe we should heed Teddy Roosevelt’s famous dictum to “speak softly and carry a big stick”. We have carried - and used - a big stick, in recent years, and even more so now perhaps it is time to speak more softly.

Our exuberance, when perceived as arrogance, is rarely successful, and we should not forget to listen to the advice of friends. But our European friends should also note America’s real determination to work toward a freer, more secure world - for our sake and for theirs. We intend to continue, whether our efforts are appreciated in our time or whether we must wait for the judgment of later generations.

The true generational challenge

The true generational challenge, facing the United States and Europe today, cuts to the heart of what makes our countries special. I have long believed that the only means to happiness and the true worth of a person is measured by how faithfully we serve a cause greater than our self-interest. The same holds true for the conduct of nations, particularly in this unique era, during which the traditional balance of power has faded and America, along with its democratic allies, stands astride the world with unmatched power. Political scientists refer to this time as the “unipolar moment” and I’d emphasize the

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“moment” part of that formulation. None of us knows for how long the United States will dominate international affairs, but we do know that history has handed us a unique opportunity. The US and its democratic friends could choose to pursue narrowly defined national interests - internal and external security, economic prosperity at the cost of others, perhaps even territorial domination. We must choose a very different path.

We choose to infuse our foreign policy with values, the ones common to the world’s democracies and that are the natural rights of all mankind. We orient our national ambitions toward these ends, so that our interests and our values converge. Americans’ love of country is based not on some ill-considered desire for empire, any more than is Europeans’ love of theirs. Rather, America’s patriotism is based on a kinship of ideals, a shared dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal, and possess certain inalienable rights. So, too, with Europe, the continent to which Americans owe so many of its liberal conceptions. Whether we are speaking of America, or Britain, or Germany, or Latvia, one thing binds us - we rightly believe our core values to be universal part of the birthright of all people.

And so it is natural to work together to promote these rights in lands where they are lacking. We must use our power and influence not only for security and prosperity, but to promote the concepts we hold dear: democracy, the panoply of human and civil rights, strong and legitimate international institutions, a world of recognized international norms and rules. If we are successful in creating this lasting liberal order, we will have established a set of expectations for international and domestic behaviour that will endure long after the unipolar moment is passed. That is the great project that lies before the transatlantic democracies today. The American historian Charles Beard once said that “the supreme challenge to intelligence is that of making the noblest and best in our curious heritage prevail.” If we are to do this, it will require the brightest and most visionary minds

in our respective societies, and will require that we think proactively about how our foreign policies shape the world. Above all it will require leadership – European leadership and American leadership.

But there is no more appropriate project for the United States and the countries of Europe, in which the Enlightenment was born and took root, where the social contract saw its great fulfillment, and where the oppressed people of the world naturally look for solace and inspiration. President Harry Truman observed that “Men make history, not the other way around. In periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. Progress occurs when courageous, skilful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.” There are, in both the United States and in Europe, the necessary skilful leaders, and the opportunity for change now presents itself. Built on shared values, possessing bountiful resources and democratic legitimacy, the transatlantic community inspires the world. There are other democracies, other military powers, other economically prosperous countries. But when the United States and the countries of Europe stand together, it creates a moral and political force that gives no ground to the enemies of freedom. The world needs us together, and we need each other.

John McCain is United States Senator and Chairman of the Board of the International Republican Institute (IRI).

John McCain


The relationship be-tween the Common-wealth and the European Union is being built on a clear understanding of respective interests,

where they coincide and where they can be best advanced by cooperation and collaboration. That is why the relationship is currently growing in size and strength. It is a strategic partnership from which both gain.

While the memberships of the Commonwealth and EU are obviously distinct and based on different geopolitical considerations – one being international and the other regional – they are nevertheless like-minded in many ways, sharing similar values and goals. Both the Commonwealth and the European Union champion democracy, development, and fundamental human rights at home and further afield. Both are essentially political organisations.

Evolved commonwealth

If there is any misunderstanding about the relationship, it arises because the Commonwealth, like the EU, has evolved considerably in the last 40-odd years in terms of who it represents and how it works. We were once a basic construct of Britain and its former colonies and, indeed, were known as the “British Commonwealth”. Nowadays, the Commonwealth has a diversity of members. The two most recent members to join were Cameroon and Mozambique. Neither country could be seen as conforming to that common past, but both chose to share in our vision of the future. The Commonwealth spans continents and oceans and embraces the biggest and smallest of countries from India to Tuvalu. It has members in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Pacific, North America and the European Union. We count three EU members – Britain,

Cyprus, and Malta. There is a queue of those wishing to join.

The glue that unites the Commonwealth today, is a commitment to uphold certain fundamental political and human values enshrined in the Singapore and Harare Declarations of 1971 and 1991. Where a member does not adhere to those values, there are mechanisms for encouragement and sanction. Our membership also derives its strength from the strong networks and linkages at the civil society level which are all entirely voluntary. Just like the EU, Commonwealth politicians and officials assemble regularly and work together, but also professionals – from dentists and architects, to broadcasters and journalists, to artists and writers. On top of that, ordinary Commonwealth citizens come together of their own volition in clubs and associations simply because they believe in the organisation and want to promote all that it represents and advocates.

As the political landscape has changed in Europe, our relationship has been strengthened. The relevance of the Commonwealth to the European Union, or of the EU to the Commonwealth for that matter, has become easier to discern. The commonality of view and purpose is well understood between the Commonwealth Secretariat and the European Commission. We thus find it easy to talk, and I have done so with many Commissioners and EC Presidents over the years. Such political dialogue has now become regularised.

Our joint Commonwealth/EU work is increasingly focused on giving practical effect to this comfortable political relationship. The Commonwealth, for instance, has taken a lead role in providing negotiating capacity for the EU’s developing country trade partners, found in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) grouping.

The Commonwealth and the European Union

By Don McKinnon

Don McKinnon


The ‘Hub and Spokes’ project is a creative €20 million partnership between the Commonwealth Secretariat and the European Commission, along with support from La Francophonie and the ACP Secretariat. It is in the process of placing a network of nine trade policy advisers (the hubs) at the headquarters of regional organisations and 48 trade policy analysts (the spokes) in the capitals of ACP countries.

Building on the success of the Hub and Spokes project, President Barroso and I have agreed to develop greater collaboration in strengthening democratic institutions. Given that democracy is one of the cornerstones of the Commonwealth and Europe, it is a strong foundation on which we are strengthening the relationship in a practical and collaborative way. Both of us are committed to contributing, and Africa is likely to be the focus of our next partnership.

Developing democracy

Promoting democracy is about working closely with member countries to help strengthen democratic institutions and root them in a culture of good governance and transparency. The Commonwealth achieves this through working in our member countries to develop sound electoral systems; clear separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary; transparent public account systems; accountable bodies to protect human rights and freedom of information; and so on. Observing elections is another activity where our work is well respected and where we often meet EU counterparts in the field.

The Commonwealth knows its power is limited – some would call it, “soft power” – but it can at times be just as effective if not more so than tougher versions. We have networks and influence and we have been trying to use both to secure some important international decisions. It is often forgotten, for instance, that the issue of writing off debt for Highly Indebted Poor Countries – the HIPCs – began as a Commonwealth initiative in 1995, and we had worked on the issue for a decade or so prior to

that. Our work on the unique vulnerabilities and needs of the world’s many small states is another area of cutting edge work where the World Bank is now in firm partnership with us.

Sometimes, a rapid deployment of warning signs and safety barriers at the top of the cliff is required rather than an ambulance at the bottom. With our low-key, quiet diplomacy “Good Offices” work, the Commonwealth Secretariat has developed an effective way of influencing change and strengthening the building blocks of democracy. We have used this approach to help prevent and resolve conflicts in member countries from Fiji to Guyana to Swaziland. Our engagement in Cameroon, for example, is progressively bearing fruit with progress towards the establishment of an independent electoral body and human rights commission.

In 1995, Commonwealth leaders set up the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG). This “democracy watchdog”, empowered to suspend member countries when they are in breach of fundamental Commonwealth principles, has given a great deal of influence and moral authority to the organisation globally. After ten years, CMAG is still the only mechanism of its kind in the architecture of international organisations.

Above all, the Commonwealth champions democracy with the liberties and opportunities it offers our citizens. Only if democracy lives in the hearts of the people of a country and is real to them will that country’s institutions work as they should. Only if their democratic culture is genuine and strong and benefiting the people will they defend them.

In short, democracy must deliver. If this does not occur, as we all know from so many examples - look for instance at what happened in Western Europe just 70 years ago – democracy will be in dire danger. Even today, there are many in those new democracies to the east of the EU who point to a lack of benefits and suggest that democracy be discarded. But if it is easy to state, we all know that it is less easy to tackle.

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Economic development

The Commonwealth, like the EU, acknowledges that the fight against poverty is also a struggle towards economic development. Over the next decade, the fight against global poverty will be one of the central issues on the international agenda as we work towards the 2015 deadline for meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

Today, over one-third of the Commonwealth’s nearly two billion citizens live on less than US $1 per day. Women constitute almost three quarters of all those living in poverty across the Commonwealth. Almost two-thirds of HIV cases in the world occur in Commonwealth countries. Half of the world’s 115 million children without access to primary education live in the Commonwealth.

These are staggering statistics, and not ones about which the Commonwealth is proud. They underline, though, that we have work to do that cannot be done by any one person, country, or organisation alone. The Commonwealth and the European Union together have an important role to play here. With combined populations totalling over two billion people and a diversity of nations which include five G8 members, these two organisations can deliver real change in the lives of tens of millions of people. They can also help create the political environment in which the needs and interests of developing countries are taken seriously.

Trade

Trade is one of the most effective tools in the fight against global poverty. Moreover, trade can prove an effective antidote against conflict. If the stability of an economy and the well-being of a population depend on trading with a neighbour, the likelihood of war is considerably diminished.

European leaders after World War II, understood this well. With the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and subsequently, the European Economic Community, they decided to link their economies

together through trade so they wouldn’t go to war again. By further integrating economies and developing closer trade relationships, we can reduce the risk of political, religious and ethnic conflict. But for that to work, trade must not only be free. It must also be fair.

The Commonwealth accounts for one fifth of world trade. We also make up about 40% of the WTO membership, and we have representatives in almost half of the key WTO negotiating groupings such as the new Quad, the G20, G90 and the Cairns Group. The Commonwealth is not a trading bloc today but its roots are found in a pattern of colonial-era trade relationships which spanned the world. Our membership has one of the longest histories, of any group of countries, in trading with each other.

In February this year, I welcomed the EU Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, to the headquarters of the Commonwealth for a high level seminar on the Doha Development Agenda. Its purpose was to raise awareness of the DDA and to increase levels of understanding and support for trade liberalisation as a means to economic growth, poverty reduction and development. It was also a determined effort to keep development at the heart of the Doha Round.

It was a successful seminar on many levels, but one of the most important conclusions was the acknowledgement that the Commonwealth has a strategic role to play in securing a conclusion to the Doha Round. There are three main areas to consider. First, no deal will ever be reached in the Round - and even less, implemented - without real, sustained political impetus. Trade negotiations are conducted by officials, but they are driven by leaders.

The Commonwealth’s 53 Heads of Government will be meeting in Malta in November and I anticipate that they will conclude with a strong sense of political direction for their WTO negotiators. Then, the Commonwealth’s Trade Ministers will be meeting in Hong Kong on the very eve of the WTO Ministerial in December

Don McKinnon


to add political weight and momentum to the Commonwealth’s collective position on the Doha Round.

Secondly, development must come first. In the past, development issues were relegated to the periphery of trade negotiations. We must now ensure they take centre stage. Peter Mandelson has made a number of positive remarks in this regard, and I congratulate him and the Commission for this policy setting. Putting development first, will not only create a more level playing field that allows developing countries to get their fair share of the benefits of global economic integration it will also bring rewards to the industrialised world: as poor countries grow wealthier, they provide new export markets for rich nations. Cutting trade subsidies, ending the “trade apartheid” that prevents farmers in poor nations from selling their products in rich countries’ markets, will not only benefit the poor. Money saved on subsidies will also make consumers in the developed world better off through reduced taxes and lower grocery bills.

It is no surprise that many developing countries - especially the small ones - do not see any of the concessions offered thus far in the Doha Round by either the EU or US as concessions or even gifts, but rather as two-edged swords which they are being obliged to grasp. At the moment, world trade arrangements are stifling, if not entirely choking the life out of entrepreneurship in the developing world. The EU ought to be worried about that. It is why Special and Differential Treatment provisions in the Doha Round are critical. I have visited some of the most poverty-stricken places in the world. I have witnessed men, women and children who are desperately hungry, existing in makeshift shelters and still trying to make a living. They pick coffee beans despite suffering from HIV/AIDS; they collect water even though there is barely a drop in the well; and for their labour they accept the bottom dollar because they have no choice.

The European Union’s commitment to double aid to US$80 billion by 2010 is a step in the right direction. It is good news for developing countries, particularly, in Africa. It can fund educational projects and give people at least one decent meal every day. But aid without fair trade denies countries the opportunity to sell their goods and services at competitive prices in the international market and the opportunity to repay their debts.

I was pleased to hear that for the first time in 50 years a single framework of principles will be drawn up to establish a roadmap for the EU’s future development activities abroad. It will enable the EU to speak with one voice, establish further partnerships with developing countries and help to attain the ultimate goal - to eradicate poverty. It is an ambitious proposal which will require the support of all twenty five Member States and the Commission, but I am confident it can work. The Commonwealth has long held the view that progress is better achieved through consensus.

We are seen as a trusted partner by developing countries. We have networks and access to people and decision-makers which are the envy of many. We also have a track record of working effectively with other international and intergovernmental organisations including the EU.

Given the commonality of our two organisations interests and objectives, it is inevitable that the Commonwealth and the European Union will continue to find opportunities to collaborate as partners, especially in the areas of democracy and development. I look forward to that.

Don McKinnon is Secretary General of the Commonwealth and former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand.

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Europe’s policy makers currently face two key challenges: finding new methods for governments to work better together, and

identifying new ways for businesses and civil society to protect the continent’s citizens, infrastructure and economies from the threat of terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and London on 7 July 2005 were vivid reminders that not enough has been done.

In many ways, the European Union’s response to these terrorist attacks has been markedly multifarious in approach, reflecting the current structure of the Union and the limitations of policy integration when it comes to the more sensitive issues of defence and security. The looming question is one of how European integration can proceed while ensuring that a more effective European security policy is developed.

I was in London immediately before and after the July underground and bus bombings. A visit to Brussels several days after the London attacks was particularly revealing. There was an extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union on 13 July to discuss the post-London strategy. The EU Interior Ministers also held talks with high-level US Homeland Security officials. Participants of both meetings told me that amidst an unusually heavy atmosphere, agreement was reached to significantly accelerate the implementation of new policies to better protect citizens and infrastructure – many of which had been under discussion since 9/11 or Madrid but had yet to be adopted and moved forward. The new British Presidency of the EU Council has made

it clear that a lot will be happening before the 1st of January.

After years of indecision on the matter, the need for a concerted European security approach has finally been brought to the fore. The European Union is and should be the natural ‘bearer’ of policies to support such a harmonised collaborative approach. The question remains, however, as to whether the Member States are unified enough in their approach for a common policy to emerge and whether there are the pre-requisites for sufficient trust for cooperation to take place at all levels, including intelligence-sharing. There is also the question of what instruments the EU has at its disposal to deal with such problems and whether these can be effective.

As the EU becomes both a regional and global actor, it will have to deal more effectively with international problems such as cross-border terrorism. The distinction between internal security and external security is dissipating. One consequence is the need to tackle the problem of international terrorism by better protecting Europe’s borders, especially if the Union wishes to maintain and promote freedom of movement within its borders. Unfortunately, this implies harsher border regimes with the EU’s neighbours, just at a time when the EU is seeking to reach out to these very neighbours in support of an integrative approach to stabilisation and development in a region too often described as a potentially threatening arc of political and security uncertainty. Harsher border regimes would hardly be a carrot to these countries for closer cooperation, a cooperation that is paradoxically vitally necessary if these same external EU borders are to be secured. Borders, it has been shown, cannot be properly managed by one side alone.

Securing Europe and its Neighbours

By John Edwin Mroz

John Edwin Mroz


In addition, measures that might further widen the socio-economic gap for the EU’s outer frontiers can only contradict the EU’s security interests. True partnerships are therefore required, not only between Member States, but also between the EU and its direct neighbours. An integrated approach to border management, which incorporates principles of trade facilitation (movement of goods as well as people), alongside border control, and which also supports socio-economic convergence through border region cooperation is the key.

The EU has developed fledgling policies and mechanisms in this vein for Southeast Europe’s borders, which might, if optimally developed, serve as a template not only for EU’s outer borders but also for the management of borders throughout the ‘EU neighbourhood’. Finally, bringing in the business community can help provide the newest technologies to assist in better security and can also lead to a public-private cost-share in terms of the financial burden of securing Europe’s borders. The EastWest Institute’s Centre for Border Cooperation and the EWI Consortium on Security and Technology, both based in Brussels, are examples of tools that can advance both of these goals.

The European Security Strategy and its regional dimension

The European Union has had a distinct approach to security since cooperation between the Member States was strengthened in the 1970s in the face of the threat of terrorism by such groups as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Bader-Meinhof Group in Germany. Exchange of information and the working out of complementary strategies between Member States were set early on as the main objectives.

The rapid, albeit at times painful, development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA) in the 1990s, taken together with the European Union’s ongoing process of integration and enlargement, has given the EU the capabilities of a global actor.

The European Security Strategy constitutes the first clear articulation of the EU’s security interests. It defines the key threats facing the EU, and outlines the EU’s policy objectives in countering these threats. The European Security Strategy was written partly in response to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and it therefore reflects recent security thinking.

In the strategy, traditional post-Cold War threats such as regional instability are complemented by a focus on how to counter the threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. Furthermore, the strategy emphasises the need to “promote a ring of well-governed countries” around the European Union in order to increase security, bringing external policy together with security policy.

This promotion of a ring of well-governed countries around the EU is carried out through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is an important new policy, sharing the benefits of European integration with the neighbours of the enlarged European Union, through increased cooperation and active engagement. The ENP constitutes the regional dimension of the EU’s security strategy, in that a stable and well-governed neighbouring region adds to the security of Europe as a whole.

The EastWest Institute’s European Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI), which has a special focus on the Eastern Dimension, draws on a range of EWI’s programmatic competences and experiences to bridge the new dividing lines that EU enlargement threatens to create in Europe and to maximise the opportunities offered by EU integration processes. Such work focuses on helping the countries of the European Union’s new Eastern neighbourhood to take advantage of their EU proximity and to work towards creating a Pan-European Space of Security and Prosperity that will include the European Union and the Russian Federation.

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Firstly, we are dealing with the very real danger of a new dividing line between the European Union’s “ins” and “outs”, in particular the widening socio-economic gap and challenges to free movement of people and goods on the European Union’s outer borders. Secondly, we are working to create a new quality of co-operation and partnership between the countries in the Eastern neighbourhood, the European Union and the Russian Federation, leading towards the creation of that “Pan-European Space of Security and Prosperity”. Finally, we are utilising opportunities provided by the EU’s ENP for accelerating domestic reforms in the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood, as well as for their strengthened sub-regional co-operation.

The EU has drawn up a 10-point plan for relations with Ukraine that now accompanies the Action Plan, a policy move that shows the tailor-made approach of the ENP vis-à-vis each country involved. A tailor-made approach does offer the possibility of combining several policies if they meet the EU’s interests. This can be seen in the relationship with Ukraine’s neighbour Moldova. The EU has requested Ukraine to play a facilitating role in a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Transdniestrian region.

The new Ukrainian administration under President Yushchenko, in its bid to speed up the integration process for EU membership, has delivered in this regard by increasing its cooperation with the Moldovan government, coordinating a plan for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This has so far resulted in a common approach by the two Presidents, expressed in a letter that was delivered to Mr Solana by the Moldovan President Voronin during his visit to Brussels on 7 June 2005.

In this letter, the two Presidents ask for EU assistance in establishing international customs controls on the Transdniestrian segment of the Ukrainian-Moldovan state border, as well as for the creation of an effective international monitoring mechanism for this area. Russia’s participation is absolutely crucial to any efforts to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict. Romania

too has recently become more vocal about its need to be included. The EU, Russia, Ukraine and actively involved parties in Moldova and Transdniestria have an unusual opportunity to work together on creating workable border arrangements and an eventual solution to the conflict. Strengthening the new borders of the European Union

Free movement is one of the fundamental principles of the EU. Within the EU, borders are withering away and controls at the external borders are being strengthened. With the enlargement of the European Union, its external frontiers moved eastward. The EU shares borders with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia. The new European border has 6.000 km of land borders and 85.000 km of coastline.

During recent years, with the increase in major acts of international terrorism, and with the increase of cross-border flows of illegal goods, of illegal trafficking of people and substances, the question of border management and border regimes has finally come to centre stage. We are faced with a key strategic challenge, which is the question of how to balance the new requisites of security with requisites of facilitation of trade and the transit of people – basically, the requisites of freedom. We are also faced with a challenge of trying to develop a common vision on how to balance these requisites. We should also not forget that trade and people-to-people contacts are a basis for socio-economic convergence, and socio-economic development itself will underpin European security.

The recent enlargement of the European Union has placed a focus on securing the new external borders of the Union. The EU has sought a balance in preserving the integrity of the common, free travel area provided by Schengen cooperation, and the need to tackle the threats of terrorism and illegal migration into the EU. In preparation for this enlargement, the EU invested in equipment and training for border guards from the 10 new Member States, and in

John Edwin Mroz


the coordination of joint operations aimed at guaranteeing an equal level of border control. After enlargement, some of these countries are now responsible for the protection of EU’s external borders. The financial burden that this implies needs to be better shared within the EU. A welcome step was taken in November 2003 when the Council decided to create an external borders agency.

In April 2005, Warsaw was chosen to be the headquarters of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States, or FRONTEX. This agency is meant to coordinate and assist the activities of national border guard services of those Member States that represent the external borders of the EU in implementing the Schengen acquis on control of persons at the external borders. Unfortunately, very little has been done to date. Moreover, there is an important problem with how FRONTEX has been shaped by policy- makers and politicians.

While this will go some way to harmonize and hopefully increase the efficiency of the management of these external borders, the fact that customs authorities have not been engaged in the development of FRONTEX, and will not play any direct role in FRONTEX at least for an initial period, raises concerns about the the agency’s ability to support an ‘integrated’ approach to border management. Customs and border policing cooperation is at the heart of a properly integrated border management strategy and customs authorities bring an important alternative perspective to border management, in large part focused on the facilitation of trade. It will be vital for the EU to pursue such integrated approaches to border management if broader European integration is to be achieved whilst still ensuring a high level of security.

Partnering with neighbours

“Because terrorism is a global phenomenon, we need a global response” said Javier Solana at the Second Annual Worldwide Security Conference,

organised by the EastWest Institute and the World Customs Organisation in February 2005. He was explaining the need for partnerships with key actors and organisations, as well as the development of a comprehensive strategy to tackle terrorism. For Europe, a strong partnership with its neighbours, in particular Russia, is crucial in tackling international terrorism. Nowadays, it is increasingly difficult to make a distinction between internal security and external security.

The EU’s common strategies towards Russia include a Justice and Home Affairs dimension. For instance, at the EU-Russia Summit in Moscow on 10 May 2005, a single package of road maps for the creation of four Common Spaces was adopted. The road map for a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice includes cooperation on border issues. If managed properly, operational cooperation between the EU and Russia in the framework of FRONTEX could enhance good relations.

Russia’s relations with Europe have always been complicated to manage and this will not change following major elections on the continent this autumn. Critical issues at the heart of the security relationship between Russia and Europe are energy security, the fight against terrorism, and relations with Russia’s neighbours from the former Soviet Union.

President Putin has helped the West in the fight against terrorism and is committed to tackling the fundamentals that will assure social stability and economic viability, as the state comes to grips with issues of ownership and resources, equitable taxation and the need to maintain some distance between big business and politicians. Russia is taking the lead in crafting a new public-private partnership in fighting terrorism as part of its upcoming G8 Presidency - an important initiative that was acknowledged in the Glen Eagles Summit papers.

Issues of counter-terrorism and energy security are those areas where the Russian Federation has much to offer in terms of its resources,

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experience and new ideas. The EastWest Institute is working with both the EU and Russia to improve cooperation between the two actors in these fields. At our Third Worldwide Security Conference in February 2006, one day of the conference will be devoted to Russia’s role in the world as a security actor and will be chaired by Russian officials.

More attention needs to be given to the common neighbourhood of Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian elections did cause tensions between Russia and Ukraine as well as difficulties in EU-Russian relations over the electoral process that led to the coming to power of Viktor Yushchenko. EWI and others have been stressing the need to promote greater confidence and stability through an intensified schedule of higher level and expert meetings to break down stereotypes and biases, build confidence and move the agenda forward in a practical way. The issues we are focusing on include border cooperation as well as “frozen conflicts”.

Bringing in the private sector

Terrorism is an asymmetric threat. It requires an asymmetric response. Governments alone cannot do the job. Business and civil society must be included. The European Commission is developing a long overdue European Security Research Programme (ESRP) to do just that. It is now in the second-year of its preparatory phase (Preparatory Action for Security Research – PASR), funding selected projects that have to define both the required technological solutions and the supporting operational concepts. Particular attention is given to security of the EU’s borders.

One of the main conclusions that emerged from our Second Annual Worldwide Security Conference in Brussels was the existence of an enormously wide gap between private and public sectors. While high-level EU decision-makers called for stronger efforts to be made by the private sector, business representatives

clearly stated their difficulties in communicating with European government officials and EU regulators due to slow procedures in policy development. Implementation of regulations can take several years, while new technologies continue to progress, and furthermore, monitoring of the implementation of security policy is lacking. Hence, there is a strong need for better cooperation and coordination between public and private sectors.

Jonathan Faull, Director General for Justice, Freedom and Security in the European Commission, has a very important impact on the way we move forward. We are committed to strengthening and making more effective the fledgling partnerships that already exist between governments and EU institutions on the one hand, and large and small-scale leading technology companies on the other. I fully agree with Mr Faull when he says that the struggle against terror in the European Union will succeed only if the private sector and governmental bodies work closely together, and that this can only be done effectively if private and public actors come together to set the right legislative and regulatory framework and then ensure that this framework is kept up to date and that rules are properly enforced.

Representatives from both sectors challenged the conference organisers last February to find more effective ways to forge better public-private partnerships in the area of security, justice & home affairs. One of our major responses has been the creation of a Consortium on Security and Technology.

The Consortium provides a forum through which public-private partnerships in the field of civil protection can be built, thereby developing a more consolidated European technology market. It includes both European as well as US companies. Its members’ businesses are global, Europe-wide as well as nationally-based companies from France and Germany to Romania and Russia.

John Edwin Mroz


The Consortium focuses on various issues of civil protection, among them the supply chain and border security. This work is meant to bring together the public and the private sectors around the issue of enhancing citizens’ security, actively including different processes such as the actors involved in the EU’s development towards an ESRP, but also bringing in expertise from the Member States, Eastern European countries, NATO, WCO, and many others. In so doing, we are working to resolve some key challenges: how can the private sector, with more than 80% of the world’s critical infrastructure in its hands, become a more effective partner with governments? How can IT-infrastructures linking many critical infrastructures together improve coordination between sectors in the protection of this infrastructure?

Conclusion

European institutions, both public and private, are doing a great deal to meet the major security challenges of the 21st century. But they are working largely independently of one another. We will experience graver acts of terrorism than the ones we have been seen in London, Madrid, New York or Moscow. Our ability to limit their scope and provide maximum security for our citizens requires a Kierkegaardian leap of faith by governments, the private sector and citizens alike to cross old boundaries and cooperate in new ways with new partners.

We can and will do a better job of protecting Europe’s citizens, infrastructure and economy. Until now, security against terrorism has been looked at in a compartmentalised way, rather than as a whole. From borders to partnerships, Europe needs to think more boldly about how security can better be provided through new ways of cooperation. Thinking out of the box is always useful, but today it is more than that: it is essential. Many of the necessary tools are already in place; they only need to be connected and expanded.

Action begins with understanding. The best hope we have for being better able to provide security for Europe’s citizens is to take that leap of faith: build new links between issues, develop unthinkable partnerships and build new approaches based on what we now have in place.

John Edwin Mroz is President and CEO of the EastWest Institute.

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2005 is the year of review of the United Nations’ Millennium Declaration and of dealing with reforms of the United Nations. 2005 is therefore

also the year where the need for clear European Union positions on engagement in the United Nations’ agenda is of obvious importance: for the European Union, for the United Nations and for the world. The European Union’s size, its values and partnerships, and its foreign policy instruments all warrant a crucial role. The United Nations and the world community face unprecedented challenges, and the European Union is particularly well-equipped to handle them. The present cooperation between the two must therefore be intensified, and to this end we need stronger political will and courage within both the European Union and the United Nations.

In its Security Strategy, “A Secure European Union in a Better World”, from December 2003, the European Union presented the case for an international order based on effective multilateralism with a stronger United Nations as a key component: “In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system(…) Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European Union priority.”

Whether we strive to fight poverty, terrorism and crime or to prevent crises and stop conflicts, it is not a question of using the European Union at the expense of the United Nations – it is a question of strengthening both.

European Union – a global actor

With approximately 450 million citizens and the world’s largest internal market, the European Union represents a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product. Compared to other international actors, the European Union has a unique capacity to make its weight felt on the global stage through a broad spectrum of different policy instruments: aid, trade, political dialogue, diplomacy and crisis management, among other. The economic weight of the European Union’s development aid and its share of global development aid underlines its potential role as a global political actor. The European Union and its Member States donate more than half of the world’s development aid and earlier this year the European Union agreed to reach a collective goal of 0.56 per cent of GNP by 2010.

Despite being a superpower in terms of economy and development aid, the European Union is only slowly transforming itself into a global political player and, with its increasing political clout, it is gradually defining its role on the global scene. We need to speed up this process. The fate of the Constitutional Treaty does not change the need for European engagement on the global scene. Despite the two “no-votes”, the European Union can still be a driving force in many fields, such as the WTO negotiations and the ODA targets, and it must continue to play this role. We must continue to strengthen our ties across the Atlantic and with Asia in order to keep the focus on the long-term solutions to the present day and future challenges.

The need for Europe’s involvement on the global scene is indisputable, but our cooperation is not always that simple and important differences

Working Even Closer: the EU, the United Nationsand the Reform of the Security Council

By Per Stig Møller

Per Stig Møller


still exist between the European Union Member States. It is therefore essential that we all genuinely seek to work together in an open, inclusive and transparent manner with a view to finding sustainable solutions. Such an approach not only reinforces European Union positions, but also safeguards the perception of the European Union as a serious and reliable international partner.

The present Treaties offer many opportunities for strengthening our global role, but the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (unanimity) asks for strong will on the part of the Member States. This should not be too difficult, if we realise that everybody benefits from a strong European voice. When 25 States speak with one voice, our external relations policies gather more strength than any Member State can mobilise alone. Furthermore, we gained firm evidence during the Iraqi crisis that the expectations of the Europeans for a unified European Union position are high. The fate of the Constitutional Treaty won’t change that either. The European Union must mobilise the necessary will in order to live up to its potential and these expectations. It’s the only way to move forward and strengthen our cooperation with and support of the United Nations.

Closer EU/UN cooperation

While growing into the role of a stronger global player, the European Union has taken on greater responsibility, and the following five areas show how the European Union, in concrete terms, may assist in further strengthening the work of the United Nations.

1. Strengthening the European Union’s crisis management capacity is also a means to make the United Nations stronger. Over the last couple of years, important progress has been made in the European Union’s capacity to engage in international peacekeeping operations. This progress has taken place within the framework of the European Union Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In total, eight civil and military missions have been successfully launched since

the beginning of 2003, and some have been launched after an explicit request from the United Nations Security Council.

At the same time it is clear that the European Union needs to strengthen its capacities further if the European Union is to carry out more intensive tasks for the United Nations. Here, the creation of European Union Battle Groups is central. The United Nations Secretary-General recently stated in his report, ‘In larger freedom’: “Decisions by the European Union to create stand-by Battle Groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a valuable complement to our own efforts.” Quick action is often of crucial importance. A European Union Battle Group on stand-by is to be an important first choice in the time it takes to gather a traditional United Nations peacekeeping force.

In September 2003 the United Nations and the European Union agreed on a “Joint Declaration on UN/EU Co-operation in Crisis Management” in order to deepen the cooperation in this area. The declaration describes further practical steps to be taken, building on the momentum of the positive cooperation between the two partners. The idea behind the declaration is that in order for the United Nations to carry out its peacekeeping operations, it needs regional organisations and players to strengthen their capacity to carry out crisis management missions and, in turn, strengthen United Nations operations.

2. In this vein, Denmark and the European Union strongly support the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC), which is to remedy the absence of a body in the United Nations system to help countries through the difficult transition from war to lasting peace by coordinating the work of all relevant actors. The fact is that almost half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. Consistent, coordinated and better-funded strategies for peace building are crucial to sustainable peace and long-term development. Denmark strongly supports filling-

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in this institutional gap in the United Nations system.

The PBC will provide advice on peace-building strategies for countries emerging from conflict. Notwithstanding this, it will be for other participants; international financial institutions, regional organisations etc., to use the conclusions of the PBC’s discussions in adapting their own policies and activities towards the country in question.

3. The shared acceptance of and respect for international law is a prerequisite for strengthening peace and security on the global stage. The problem is not open disagreement about specific aspects of international law. Such disagreements have always existed and are completely normal in any legal system. But we must realise that the world has changed significantly in the last couple of decades, and that there is need to reaffirm the understanding and support for the existing basic principles of international law.

To this end, Denmark has initiated a number of national and international initiatives designed to promote the issue of strengthening international law. During the Danish Presidency of the Security Council in the second half of 2006 we intend to launch a debate on the need to reaffirm our commitment to fundamental principles and rules of international law, focusing on a number of key areas.

The European Union is a good starting point for reaffirming international law. One aspect of the international legal order - where the European Union already plays an important role - is the fight against impunity for international crimes. European Union Member States were instrumental in the historic creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998; a truly global, permanent judicial institution with a mandate to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Almost 100 States have ratified the ICC statute and the ICC has already started investigations into a number

of cases. In April 2005, partly through strong lobbying by European Union Member States in the United Nations Security Council, the Council referred the horrific crimes committed in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC; the first such referral ever to take place and a significant boost for the ICC.

4. In the area of counter-terrorism, the European Union is a privileged partner to the United Nations. They each have areas of comparative advantage and benefit vastly of the actions of the other partner. The United Nations provides the general framework for the international efforts to combat terrorism. This ensures that the fight against terrorism has global reach and legitimacy. The United Nations’ actions are supported and supplemented by the European Union just as the European Union member states implement a large share of the United Nations obligations through European Union legislation. Moreover, the European Union Member States are often able to undertake stronger, more detailed commitments in their common implementation of the United Nations obligations than what is possible to find in the ‘global’ United Nations Security Council resolutions. Another good illustration of the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in counter-terrorism is the current work undertaken to ensure all countries have the adequate means to counter terrorist networks. A lot of this work springs from the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) under the Security Council. Denmark chairs this committee in 2005-6 and during our presidency, a key priority will be to facilitate technical assistance to those countries which lack the resources and know-how to fight terrorism effectively. An important task of the CTC is therefore to identify the needs of these countries and relay the request for technical assistance to donors with the required know-how. Not least due to its first-hand experience with international terrorism, the European Union supports this work vigorously and offers its technical expertise, for instance in regard to border control or terrorist financing, to a number of the countries identified by CTC.

Per Stig Møller


In this manner, the European Union’s efforts to bolster third countries’ capacities to combat terrorism make a valuable contribution to the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee and the United Nations. Consequently, the European Union is and will continue to be a strong partner for the United Nations in the fight against terrorism.

5. The European Union is founded upon the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. For many years, the European Union has continuously played a central role in the international efforts to promote and protect these principles worldwide. In these endeavours, the European Union bases itself on a comprehensive human rights policy developed and refined over time to become one of the priorities of its foreign and security policy.

The European Union welcomes the prominent place given to human rights in the process of United Nations reform. It unreservedly supports the proposal to replace the United Nations Human Rights Commission with a standing Human Rights Council, which should be able to meet whenever the need arises rather than as the calendar dictates.

The European Union strongly believes that the establishment of a Human Rights Council will contribute to a strengthening of the United Nations human rights mechanisms, thus reflecting the universality of human rights and their central position in the United Nations system. With a strong mandate, such a council would improve the ability of the international community to effectively address thematic issues and country-specific human rights issues as well as urgent human rights crises. A Human Rights Council would also contribute to the streamlining of human rights issues throughout the UN system.

It goes without saying that the replacement of the Human Rights Commission with a permanent Human Rights Council should go hand in hand

with the strengthened role for the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, combined with the agreed doubling of its regular budget funding. The creation of a standing Human Rights Council is an idea that Denmark has promoted for some time and to which we attach major importance.

Reform of the United Nations Security Council

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the international community needs a United Nations that is capable of handling the new challenges and threats the world is facing today. To this end, it is crucial that the Security Council continues to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security. The present composition of the Security Council reflects the balance of power of the world immediately after the Second World War – a world that no longer exists. A broader representation is therefore needed with a more balanced geographical representation. For this reason, a broad majority of the United Nations Member States have, over the last months, demonstrated clear support for reform and enlargement of the Security Council.

In Denmark’s view, such enlargement should be enacted by increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members and by including developing and developed countries as permanent members. The draft General Assembly resolution of the Group of Four (G4), which consists of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, reflects this view. Denmark therefore supports the proposal and has offered its co-sponsorship. In addition, we have expressed our support to Germany and Japan as new permanent Security Council members. With an enlarged Security Council as outlined in the draft resolution, voices representing the whole world will be much stronger and thereby enhance the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of Security Council decisions. Effectiveness in the sense that the collective

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pressure to adhere to Security Council decisions will increase. Broader representation will also enhance the Council’s responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States.

As this Security Council reform has already been on the agenda of the General Assembly for more than 12 years, it is now time to decide on the issue. The G4’s draft resolution provides us with a unique opportunity to take action, and without reliable alternatives, a rejection would mean no to change, no to reform and yes to the status quo. In addition, a decision would be a great leap forward in our common effort to make progress on the comprehensive United Nations reform agenda. However, the reform of the Security Council must not develop into a prerequisite or an obstacle to our common ambition as to strengthening and modernising the entire United Nations system.

At the same time, adoption and implementation of the resolution will not mark a conclusion to the Security Council reform process, but rather the beginning of a new and reinvigorated debate. The envisaged review clause is an excellent mechanism to maintain a continued dialogue within the General Assembly on the Security Council reform issue. Hence, the performance of the new permanent members is to be appraised fifteen years after their admission to the Security Council. The review will also include the question of whether new permanent members should be granted a right to veto. Denmark opposes any such extension of the veto right as it would seriously hamper the effectiveness of the Security Council.

In a long-term perspective, Denmark favours a permanent seat for the European Union in the Security Council to represent the interests of all European Union Member States. Close European Union cooperation on Security Council affairs has already proven highly valuable and important to reach comprehensive peace solutions, e.g. as demonstrated during the process of adopting the three Security Council resolutions on Sudan in March 2005.

A European Union speaking with one voice in the Security Council would reinforce the normative and operational capacities of the Security Council, and increase the global importance of common European Union fundamental values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights. As mentioned above, a key prerequisite would be strengthening the existing cooperation under the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Conclusion

The European Union still punches below its weight on the global political scene. We have a great idea to sell and help implement – namely that integration promotes peace and stability. Peace and stability are on the top of the United Nations’ agenda, and the European Union has an obligation to contribute through cooperation with the United Nations.

The cooperation between the two is close today and there is no shortage of ideas on how to intensify this cooperation. In order to do so, we need willpower within both the European Union and the United Nations – the will to make better use of the European Union’s potential on the global scene and the will to make the necessary reforms within the United Nations. Solid cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations can contribute to stability and progress in our unstable world.

Per Stig Møller is Foreign Minister of Denmark.

Per Stig Møller


After 37 years of exis-tence, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprising Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,

Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, remains energetic and relevant to the well-being of Southeast Asia. ASEAN continues to maintain an active agenda in promoting peace, security, and prosperity for the region. ASEAN’s progress has been determined by regional and international developments. Its vision, dexterity and sagacity have helped the grouping obtain a substantial role in shaping the future of Southeast Asia and its immediate neighbourhood.

ASEAN in the 21st Century

ASEAN’s long-term goals are articulated in the ASEAN Vision 2020, which was adopted by the ASEAN Leaders in 1997, during the Second Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The vision defined four themes, namely, (1) a concert of Southeast Asian nations, embodying ASEAN’s vision of peace and stability throughout the region; (2) a partnership in dynamic development, describing ASEAN’s goal of economic integration within the region, and achieving global competitiveness; (3) a community of caring societies, bound by a common regional identity and aware of its cultural heritage, which successfully addresses the social issues of poverty and deprivation; and (4) an outward-looking ASEAN, that forges intensified relationships with Dialogue Partners and other countries and organisations, based on equal partnership and mutual respect.

The four themes of ASEAN Vision 2020 were given further clarification by the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (also known as the Bali Concord II), adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the Ninth

ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia in October 2003. The adoption of the Bali Concord II was a landmark decision for ASEAN. It committed the ten ASEAN Member Countries to work towards an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars, namely, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).

The ASC’s aim is to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane, to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. It addresses issues of security cooperation and peaceful settlement of differences, and thus relates to the first theme of ASEAN Vision 2020.

The AEC will be characterised by a single market and production base, with a free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and freer flow of capital. The AEC is defined as the end goal of ASEAN economic integration, which relates to the second theme of ASEAN Vision 2020.

The ASCC is a community of caring societies, diverse in culture, yet with a distinctive regional identity. The ASCC encompasses social and cultural issues and therefore relates to the third theme of ASEAN Vision 2020.

The fourth theme, the goal of an outward-looking ASEAN, cuts across the ASC, AEC and ASCC. It envisioned the will of ASEAN Member Countries to be inclusive and have productive relations with all those who wish to befriend the grouping. ASEAN believes a balanced relationship with all major powers will generate security and stability for Southeast Asia.

Plans of Action for the ASC, AEC and ASCC were drawn up and adopted within two years. In each plan, specific activities, measures and

Advancing ASEAN-EU Relations in the 21st Century

By Ong Keng Yong

Ong Keng Yong


projects were spelt out. Deadlines were also specified. The challenge today is to implement each of the Plans of Action according to the time laid down. Since these steps lead all the way to 2020, a strategy of maintaining the three pillars and managing the actions was adopted. A blueprint setting out the separate sections of work has been established. This is the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) which covers the period 2004 to 2010. The VAP also builds on the Hanoi Plan of Action which steered ASEAN’s market integration and community building efforts before the Bali Concord II. After 2010, it is anticipated that there will be two more action programmes like the VAP, each of five years’ duration, ending in 2020 when the ASEAN vision is realised.

In short, ASEAN is determined to build the ASEAN Community. It is not a community in the same sense as the EU. Political union is not contemplated. The glue is economic integration and a common vision for a better society for all ASEAN citizens.

In the 1970s when ASEAN first began, cooperation was very patchy and disparate. In the 1980s, ASEAN focused mainly on economic problems. The sweeping forces of globalisation and economic interdependence which characterised the decade of the 1990s compelled ASEAN Member Countries to venture on to a higher plane of economic integration. Strengthened economic cooperation in ASEAN included the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The ultimate objective of AFTA is to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production base geared for the world market. With the AFTA, ASEAN economic integration was elevated to a higher level. The acceleration of the AFTA deadlines on several occasions reflects the great importance that ASEAN attaches to trade liberalisation as an instrument for competitiveness and integration into the global market for goods and foreign direct investment (FDI).

The ASEAN Community has given ASEAN a new

sense of purpose: it serves as a definition of what ASEAN wants. The year 2020 is the target date because it is the year when many of the ASEAN economic agreements should be realised. This is also the target date for security and political cooperation to produce results.

What can ASEAN learn from the EU’s community building?

The historical, cultural and ideological foundations that impelled the EU’s formation and shaped its character are different from those of ASEAN. From European Coal and Steel Community to European Common Market, the European Economic Community, the European Community and finally the European Union, the journey took half a century. It is gradual and steady institutional construction and design which has shaped Europe. ASEAN is different from the EU. Unlike the EU, which embarked on the route of institution building, ASEAN favours functional cooperation first. ASEAN has proceeded even without the required institutions.

For years, ASEAN cooperation has been premised on political commitments. It subscribes to the fundamental principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member Countries, with consensus building playing an important part. We call it “the ASEAN way”. Many outsiders regard this approach as slow and cumbersome. They see it as too informal and tentative. Yet, it is necessary to promote trust and confidence, in order to deepen ties between ten diverse countries.

Although ASEAN will not be like the EU, the EU can certainly be a useful reference for ASEAN’s own community building efforts. ASEAN can certainly learn from the integrated approach of the EU in developing its high level regional institutions.

The significance of European regionalism is that all European countries have been gradually absorbed into a united and highly integrated “Grand Europe”, by a single market, a single

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currency, as well as a single political system. In this respect, ASEAN still has a long way to go.

In ASEAN, the association is not a supranational organisation where the ASEAN Secretariat has the mandate and legal instruments to direct Member Countries and drive regional policies. It is an organisation that is very much led and paced by the Member Countries with the Secretariat playing a coordinating and facilitating role. From time to time, the ASEAN Secretariat might serve as a catalyst but it must be mindful of the sensitivities of Member Countries.

Although we have improved the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) for economic and trade matters, ASEAN does not have the power to impose sanctions. This is again by design, as the aim is to get all Member Countries to behave in a responsible way through a common vision, political commitment and logic of group interest over national ego. As more and more economic agreements and other formal documents are signed among ASEAN Member Countries and between ASEAN and external parties, rules-making has become more and more prominent. Over time, it is expected that ASEAN’s decision-making will be more rule-based and this could transform the grouping. The EU’s experiences in coping with community rules over national laws can be instructive.

ASEAN-EU Relations: Strengthening the Partnership

Looking at the progressive changes in both regions - the EU is enlarging its membership eastwards, while ASEAN is entering into a new community and institutional building process - there exists a strong desire on the part of the EU to share its experiences on forging regionalism and on the part of ASEAN to adopt the best practices of the EU and to modify them to fit the ASEAN context. This would certainly provide ASEAN and the EU with a common platform to launch policy dialogues in a number of important sectors where ASEAN regional integration efforts have been intensified, such as in trade and investment.

The combined GDP of ASEAN is close to $700 billion and ASEAN has a population of 540 million growing at more than 2% a year. If the region is able to achieve an average economic growth rate of 6% a year, it will have a combined GDP exceeding $1 trillion by 2010.

The EU remains one of ASEAN’s major trading partners, third largest after Japan and the United States. On the economic front, total trade between ASEAN and the EU is around $100 billion. In terms of FDI inflows to ASEAN, the figures showed the EU contributing more than one third of the total FDI receipts in 2003. There is more scope for improvement in trade and investment between ASEAN and the EU.

Consultations between the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and the European Commissioner on Trade were first initiated in 2000 and, since then, have been held annually. They have become the highest-level forum where trade policies and initiatives supportive of closer ASEAN-EU partnership are being discussed. ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) also regularly meet (twice a year) with their counterparts from the European Commission.

ASEAN perceives the EU as a strong supporter of ASEAN economic integration. This is clear from ASEAN-EU cooperation in a number of areas, namely, Standards, Quality and Conformity Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights, Energy, Environment, Regional Integration Support, and Higher Education. ASEAN also welcomed TREATI or the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative which the AEM and the EU Trade Commissioner value as a “vehicle to develop a partnership for regional integration, establishing greater understanding between the two regions on issues of mutual interest and acting as a framework to establish the direction and priorities for technical assistance and capacity-building.” Through TREATI, both regions hope to expand existing trade and investment flows. A number of joint activities in the areas of mutual economic interest are currently being identified and implemented.

Ong Keng Yong


The TREATI would pave the way for a deeper and broader ASEAN-EU Economic Partnership which does not preclude a potential ASEAN-EU free trade arrangement. As the EU has its own concerns, ASEAN’s efforts to launch a free trade area agreement have not been successful to date. Nevertheless, the AEM and the EU Trade Commissioner have agreed to do a joint feasibility study. Officials from both sides are scheduled to meet soon to decide on the modalities of this proposed study.

Like the EU, ASEAN Member Countries play an active role in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), particularly under the current Doha Round. Discussion of the developments in the WTO is one of the regular features of ASEAN-EU consultations, whether it is at the level of the Ministers or the Senior Officials. Both sides take such opportunities to share each other’s expectations and to understand each other’s positions.

On the political and security front, ASEAN remains a main conduit for the EU to engage Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) continues to feature prominently in the EU’s strategy for engaging the region as it provides a window for the EU to extend its political presence in the region. Besides, the ARF is the most important and successful political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific in which all major powers participate. Currently, the ARF consists of 23 participating countries and the EU.

Transnational crime was identified as an area for substantive cooperation since ASEAN and the EU fully recognise its negative impact on their economies and societies. Given the global campaign against international terrorism and crimes related to it, fighting transnational crime and adopting common approaches in international fora is of mutual benefit. An increasingly important aspect in the fight against terrorism is inter-faith dialogue and understanding. ASEAN is a region with almost all the world’s religions in active co-existence with one another. Europe’s long history, civilisation

and interaction with different religions has a significant value for ASEAN’s own processes for inter-faith accommodation and co-existence.

On the social and cultural front, poverty reduction, education and the environment would be areas of common interest to pursue in the short to medium term. The EU has undertaken a number of innovative changes in the field of education such as introducing the concept of lifelong learning to keep up with the rapid changes of today and integrating protection of the environment as a key ingredient in its economic policies. ASEAN too is making efforts to improve its human resources through education and to safeguard the environment while pursuing economic development. The key element is sustainability. The EU’s policy-making in these areas, particularly in application to and conformity by new Member States of the EU, would be instructive to ASEAN Member Countries.

The EU has successfully developed strategies to minimise poverty through the harmonisation of social protection policies. The EU wants to include the eradication of poverty as a priority in its cooperation with ASEAN. This is another strong point for ASEAN-EU collaboration since ASEAN will have to continue to address poverty eradication through developing better socio-economic policies and by narrowing the development gaps between the more developed and the less developed ASEAN Member Countries.

In the longer term, ASEAN and the EU should capitalise on the historical and cultural bonds that have linked both regions for centuries. A greater mutual understanding through enhanced interactions in the areas of youth, media, culture and the arts is essential. There are perception gaps which hamper a closer relationship at the government-to-government as well as people-to-people levels. More student, business and civil servant exchanges, and more tolerance of each other’s diversity are necessary to close the comprehension gap.

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Conclusion

The key point of ASEAN’s community building is to enable it to compete in a highly competitive global economy. It is a survival game. ASEAN does not want to become irrelevant in international affairs and the global economy. It believes there is vast potential in coming together and organising ten diverse countries into a coherent grouping. The strategy is economic integration and the philosophy is “prosper thy neighbour.” The EU has been part of the Southeast Asian landscape for many years. The EU’s individual Member States have been in the region for centuries. Therefore, as ASEAN develops its survival plan, the EU has a prominent part in it. The question is how the EU wishes to play its role: with a traditional west-and-east approach or an innovative global citizen stance?

The existing cooperation illustrated in the preceding paragraphs has brought significant goodwill and benefits to both ASEAN and the EU. The base is broad and the foundations deep. This is the strength of the partnership. However, in the New Economy where technology and speed are paramount, the primordial mindset has to change. The relationship must be based on the spirit of partnership, leveraging on each other’s strengths with respect for diversity of cultures and traditions. New innovative processes must be applied to the ASEAN-EU partnership to take it to a more enduring and engaging level. The TREATI and the recently settled READI (Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) seem promising. Indeed, the health of ASEAN-EU relations seems to rest on positive dialogue, a focus on the bigger picture and sustainable development of opportunities, while strengthening bilateral ties between the EU and individual Member Countries of ASEAN.

Ong Keng Yong is the Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Ong Keng Yong


Ten years ago, on 11 July, the Bosnian Serb army forced its way past Dutch UN peacekeepers and took control of what had been declared

a “safe area” for Bosnian Muslims. Until then, Srebrenica had been just another place on the map of Yugoslavia. But since that day, Srebrenica has symbolised the cruelty of man and the inadequacies of the international community. The Muslims were herded out of the town, and as many as 8000 men, women and children are believed to have been killed. It has been described as the worst atrocity in Europe since the Second World War.

How could Srebrenica happen? All armed conflicts can create conditions under which atrocities can occur. This shows how vital it is to prevent situations from developing into armed conflicts and to resolve ongoing conflicts.

I believe that Europe has a major role to play in preventing and resolving conflict, both collectively and in terms of individual countries. Euro-Atlantic co-operation must function as a stabilizer in Europe and its vicinity. European states must contribute to the peace and prosperity of other regions of the world. Our response must combine peace, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, development co-operation and military means. We must also co-operate by creating sustainable and robust multilateral structures for dealing with conflict.

A question of values

We are faced with seemingly overwhelming challenges, the chances for success are limited, and the political upside within individual countries is negligible. Why, it is asked,

should we put our limited resources into the management of conflicts that are taking place far from home?

Of course, this is first and foremost a question of principles and values. We have a moral responsibility to contribute where we can. The victims of wars in other parts of the world are our brothers and sisters, and not so very long ago, many of our own people were suffering in a similar way. Norway is one of the proponents of the concept of “human security”, where the focus is on civilians. It is civilians who are at the epicentre of contemporary wars, both as collateral victims and frequently as prime targets. Our approach to security, therefore, can no longer focus solely on the security of territory, states or governments. We must take the security of individual people as our point of departure. Individuals should be able to live in freedom, and without fear.

Norway also endorses the UN Secretary General’s appeal to embrace the principle of “responsibility to protect” as a norm for collective action in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The question of the responsibility to protect has been more hotly debated in the context of Iraq, than in relation to Rwanda or Bosnia, and I am aware, of course, that this is a highly sensitive issue.

We must not, however, allow misconceptions to distort a debate of such paramount importance. The principle of “responsibility to protect” applies to the protection of civilians within the parameters of international law; it does not imply authorisation of the illegitimate use of force.

The concept of human security and the principle of responsibility to protect, create a moral

Europe’s Role in Solving Conflicts and Building Peace

By Jan Petersen

Jan Petersen


imperative: the obligation to do what we can. This is why Europe has responded and must continue to respond to the call to help resolve conflicts.

The global challenge - resolving conflicts is in our own interest

Today there are fewer conflicts between countries. However, the new security order that emerged after the end of the Cold War has led to an intensification of internal conflicts and greater international focus on these conflicts. One positive development is that the current political climate is more favourable towards external engagement. However, the effects of war have much wider repercussions.

Globalisation has proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand it has brought the countries of the world closer together through the flow of trade, investment and ideas. On the other hand, it allows instability and insecurity to flow freely through the system. The effects of internal conflicts spread beyond the immediate site of the conflict through migration, disease, environmental degradation, transnational organised crime and international terrorism.

The humanitarian challenges of yesterday have become the core security policy issues of today. Internal conflicts are now a global concern. It is therefore in our own interest to engage in preventing and resolving conflicts and rebuilding societies that have been ravaged by conflict, not only in our immediate vicinity, but also globally.

The European response

Europe has several distinct roles to play in the management and resolution of armed conflicts.

European integration as a model for peaceful development

Over the last fifty years, the EU has promoted democracy and boosted economic development in the whole of Europe. This has led to greater

stability and security for all. The unique contribution of the EU to peace and stability in Europe cannot be underestimated.

The EU is so far the most advanced example of an endeavour to achieve stability through integration. But it is not alone. Systems of regional co-operation are emerging throughout the world. The African Union’s efforts and ambitions to bring peace to the African continent are encouraging and should be supported. Often the motive behind regional co-operation is economic, but the end result is more political co-operation and thus also greater stability. Although countries that are engaged in regional co-operation are not immune to conflict, they have a forum for discussing issues that arise, and this makes conflict less likely. Furthermore, regional economic interdependence provides a greater incentive to find peaceful solutions.

European achievements have served as a model for integration efforts in many regions. By continuing its efforts to further develop European co-operation structures, the EU will also continue to provide inspiration for co-operative solutions around the world.

The attraction of the Euro-Atlantic co-operation

Euro-Atlantic co-operation has safeguarded peace and democracy in our region since World War II. NATO is a cornerstone of our foreign and security policy. NATO’s rapid enlargement has drawn an increasing number of countries into the community of values on which the Alliance is built on. Through its peacekeeping operations, NATO has supported the forces of democracy and helped secure peace in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

The prospect of becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic structures can serve as an incentive to choose peaceful solutions over conflict.

Stability in the Western Balkans is of great importance for Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. Norway has played an active

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role in security and development efforts in the Western Balkans since the early 1990s, both at the bilateral level and by contributing to multilateral efforts, such as those of the UN, NATO and the OSCE. We also contribute to the operations and programmes run by the EU.

The main foreign policy goal of all the countries of the Western Balkans is integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The integration process contributes to stability in each country and in the region as a whole. The countries, however, are at different stages of this process. Croatia is already an EU candidate, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has applied for membership.

The EU has initiated negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Albania, and negotiations on an SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina may start in the autumn. The European Commission also concluded in April this year that Serbia and Montenegro had made sufficient progress in meeting the conditions and developing the capacity to begin negotiations on an SAA with the EU. These are also expected to start in the autumn. For Serbia and Montenegro, with its recent history of conflict, this is truly an achievement, and is a strong testimony to the will for reform both in Belgrade and in the rest of the country.

Despite these achievements, there is still a long way to go, as was demonstrated by the recent discussions between the EU and Croatia over its lack of co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Sustained effort is required to maintain the momentum for change. Development co-operation and the presence of security forces in the region must be kept up.

Perhaps most important of all is a firm commitment to the idea that the Euro-Atlantic security architecture should encompass all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. This means continuing EU membership and association processes with the countries of the Western Balkans. It also means that Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro should be considered for membership in NATO’s partnership arrangements.

The future of the Western Balkans lies in integration with the rest of Europe, and the prospect of EU membership is a major driving force for reform in this region. We should take care to maintain the attraction of the Euro-Atlantic structures as a means of promoting development and prosperity in the region.

Europe as an actor

The strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), over the last few years has increased Europe’s ability to contribute to peace and stability on a global scale. The adoption of the European Security Strategy by the European heads of state and government in Brussels in December 2003 was a milestone in this respect.

The Security Strategy points to weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organised crime and ethnic and regional conflicts as challenges we will have to confront together. The strategy adopts a broad approach to these security threats, and emphasises conflict prevention, based on international law and multilateral co-operation, as the best means of tackling them.

Important steps have already been taken in the implementation of the Security Strategy, including the efforts to make multilateralism more effective. Another important step is the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management. Further steps are the EU’s action plan to combat terrorism, its strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and its strategic partnership with the Mediterranean region. The Security Strategy also provides a basis for strategic partnerships with countries such as Russia, China, India, Japan and Canada.

Jan Petersen


The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is another initiative that is based on the Security Strategy. The ENP creates a framework for developing stability and prosperity in the vicinity of Europe, establishing a ring of friends around the continent. Specific action plans for each of our neighbouring countries are being drawn up to enable them to take part in European co-operation in certain areas.

Plurality and flexibility in the European response

Although Norway is not a member of the EU, we face the same security challenges as all other European countries. Norway aligns itself with most of the decisions in the CFSP, and we participate in the European discourse on foreign and security policy.

We fully subscribe to the objectives of the Security Strategy and support the efforts to implement it. We have contributed actively to several of the EU-led crisis-management operations, and will continue to work with the EU on meeting common challenges.

However, a common European approach to foreign policy does not necessarily mean a uniform foreign policy. The new, emerging European approach to matters of peace could be described as one of communality. European states share many of the same ideas and ideals, and co-operate - in a number of different constellations - on peace and reconciliation in different parts of the world. Nevertheless, each country has its own policies, shaped according to its history and its present circumstances. Thus each country has differing levels of room for manoeuvre, and is able to fill a different set of functions. Maintaining this plurality is essential for preserving the flexibility of the European response, since individual countries are able to deliver individual solutions that Europe as a collective unit cannot.

One example is the Norwegian contribution to the European response to conflict management

through its participation in a number of peace processes and negotiations around the world. This takes different forms. We are acting as the official facilitator of negotiations in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. We have sponsored back channels for secret negotiations - in the Middle East for example - and we have been and still are an actor in several international coalitions - Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Colombia and Guatemala.

There are several reasons why Norway has come to play such a role. Generally speaking, Norwegian efforts are part of a broader setting. Our role as a peace facilitator springs from our long-standing support for UN mandates for peace and security, and builds on a tradition of humanitarian action and development co-operation.

Although we tend to support other leading actors rather than taking the leading role ourselves, we do take a leading role in certain cases. This is always at the request of the parties involved in the conflict and, in the cases where we take up this challenge, we are always careful to underline that we are peace-helpers, not peace-makers. As a facilitator, we do what we can to support the parties, but in the end the will to bring about peace has to come from the parties themselves.

Turning to some general features underpinning our efforts, one of Norway’s strengths as a facilitator is the broad political consensus in Norway on our policy for promoting peace and reconciliation. For example, our engagement in Sri Lanka has been kept up by three different ministers of foreign affairs, from three different political parties. This ensures consistency. We are able to maintain our commitment regardless of changing governments and political currents. The broad domestic political backing for our policy in this field also means that resources are always available for peace and reconciliation efforts, and we are able to use these financial and human resources in a flexible way. This means we can become engaged quickly.

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Another important feature of our efforts is the importance we attach to co-operation with national and international NGOs. Norwegian NGOs have gained valuable experience through their activities in different parts of the world over several decades. And perhaps even more importantly, their altruistic approach has earned them a reputation as highly professional teams of experts dedicated to helping others. The NGOs have valuable networks and hands-on knowledge of the various regions, and we have been able to draw on the skills and expertise of their members. Furthermore, in many of the places where we have become involved in peace processes, we already have a long history of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. In the case of Sri Lanka, our development co-operation dates back to 1977, and in Sudan we have had a significant humanitarian presence through our NGOs since the early 1970s. The interaction between diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, and between government and non-state actors, allows us to find synergies that make us more effective.

However, we cannot achieve success on our own; we work closely together with other international actors. This enables us to draw on resources we do not have ourselves, and ensures the necessary support for the processes we are involved in.

The need for an integrated, multifaceted response

There is a wide range of measures for managing and resolving armed conflicts and complex emergencies, and we must make sure we choose those most appropriate for the situation in question.

Countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan are examples of the complex challenges facing the international community. Peacekeeping, state building, election support, demobilisation, human rights monitoring, humanitarian aid and long-term development co-operation are all needed. However, the

international response is often uncoordinated, partial and fragmented.

The EU, with a large number of instruments at its disposal, is very well equipped to meet the complex security challenges of today. These instruments include diplomatic activity, development and humanitarian aid, trade policy and, as a last resort, the use of force. The task ahead is to co-ordinate the application of these instruments in the best possible way.

The possibility of combining civilian and military capabilities is an important aspect of European crisis management. Civilian means, such as the police, rule of law programmes, civil protection and civil administration, may be used alone; but recent experience has demonstrated the value of deploying a combination of civilian and military means. The EU is directing substantial efforts towards further developing civilian-military co-ordination.

More effective multilateral structures

In addition to examining concrete ways of dealing with situations on the ground, it is also important to concentrate on strengthening the ability of individual states to tackle situations of unrest and human suffering at a more general level. The capacity of the international community to provide assistance when required must also be increased. From our experience of conflict resolution, we have learned that a concerted effort by the international community is vital. No individual country is strong enough to bring about peace on its own.

Our fundamental task must be to strengthen the rule of law on international and national levels. To achieve this, we must strengthen the UN. The organisation needs a major overhaul if it is to operate in the way we want it to.

The UN’s capability and capacity for taking preventive action, for intervention and for peace-building must be increased. We need to reform the way the UN operates, the way member countries and other international bodies co-operate with the UN, and the way international

Jan Petersen


initiatives and actions are planned, co-ordinated and funded.

We must build greater consensus around the need for collective action and early diplomatic response, which can eliminate the need for military intervention. Steps should be taken to strengthen the Secretary General’s role and his capacity in preventive diplomacy. There is potential for the Secretary General to play an even more important role in mediation efforts to end conflict.

It should, however, also be clear that in situations where international peace is threatened, including situations of mass atrocity, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to act effectively, without hesitation and with authority.

Clearly, there is a need to establish an inter-locking system of peacekeeping capacities; to create a new partnership between the UN and regional organisations.

We welcome, therefore, the proposals for a more consistent approach to peace building. The proposal to establish a new Peace-building Commission is an important step in the right direction and we are eager to see it implemented. The Commission will be an important new arena for discussions on conflict and peace-building and a new framework for the co-ordination of assistance.

When Anand Panyarachun, the Chairman of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, delivered his report to Secretary General Annan, he wrote: “Ours is an age of unparalleled interconnection among threats to international peace and security, and mutual vulnerability between weak and strong.” The efforts to create a world based on binding international co-operation, respect for international law and freedom from want and strife are clearly in our own interest. This is a challenge that the European countries must take on, both at the individual and at the collective levels. It is our own future that is at stake.

Conclusion

As centre-right parties in Europe, we have a long tradition in solving conflicts and building peace through close international co-operation. The European Union has a great role to play in our future quest for peace and stability. We believe in European integration, and integration is itself a strong peace-creating force. By developing new structures for co-operation within the European Union, Europe can play an even greater role in managing conflicts. Until Norway becomes a member of the European Union, we will remain a close partner of the EU in this important area. There are no tasks more important than solving conflicts and creating peace.

Jan Petersen is Foreign Minister of Norway and Deputy Chairman of the International Democrat Union (IDU).

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If I were asked to identify one region of the world that has a particular affinity with Europe, the first that would spring to my mind would be Latin

America. The very name “Latin America” – or Iberoamérica as we like to call it in Spain – is a reflection of that essential, even constituent, nexus between the two regions. Over and above the mere name, though, few would deny that our continent and Latin America share common values.

The fact that we have the same cultural, social and political values - representative democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights and an adherence to international law - and that the history of the two regions has been closely intertwined for over five centuries, forms a solid foundation on which we can build a special relationship which will aid its integration into today’s globalised world.

Of course, Latin America and the European Union are two large complex sets of nations and societies with their own strongly differentiated features: in the European case, a multiplicity of languages and (often conflicting) national histories; in the case of Latin America, notable developmental differences at a regional and national level, and the existence of large indigenous populations.

Beyond this diversity, however, there is an essential homogeneity in terms of the principles and values on which coexistence is built in the two regions, enabling the building of a close and mutually beneficial relationship, that will also have a positive impact on the stability and progress of international society as a whole. It is not empty rhetoric, then, to say that that this

community of democratic values constitutes – particularly at this time – the greatest strength of the bi-regional relationship.

On a political plane, the most visible expression of this relationship consists of the meetings of Heads of State and Government from the two regions and the Caribbean, which have been held regularly since 1999. The ultimate aim of these Summits (Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, Guadalajara and the upcoming meeting in Vienna in May 2006) as established initially, is to form a bi-regional strategic association.

In May 2004 the highest representatives of over fifty nations met in the capital of Jalisco, in the first such meeting to be attended by the leaders of the EU’s ten new Member States. The Guadalajara declaration itself points out that the EU-LAC (Latin America and the Carribean) association now encompasses over a quarter of the world’s nations.

At the time of the Rio de Janeiro meeting, the EU and Latin America had already been forging complex and intense links for several decades at a number of levels. During the 1960s, leading political groups in Europe entered into close collaborative relations with their Latin American counterparts, further developing them over the next two decades and providing hope and resistance against the military dictatorships ruling much of the continent at that time. Simultaneously, the EEC began to develop its first instruments of cooperation with the region. In the 1980s, European involvement in the conflicts of Central America and in the restoration of democracy in South America – motivated by both political and strategic issues – helped provide major visibility on the international stage, possibly for the first time.

EU and Latin America - A Special Relationship

By Mariano Rajoy

Mariano Rajoy


This relationship received fresh impetus when Spain and Portugal joined the European Community in 1986. In the 1990s the EU and the various sub-regions and countries of Latin America signed a series of third and fourth generation agreements. European Member States became the largest investors in the region and the Rome Declaration institutionalised the dialogue between the EU and the Rio Group, thus furthering the increasing maturity of contacts between the two.

The Summit meetings marked a major advancement of the relationship, becoming the corollary to that process of rapprochement, and marking a recognition by both parties of the importance of existing links and, above all, a reaffirmation at the highest level of the potential of the relationship. By the turn of the century, the EU and its Member States were already the largest investors Latin America, the region’s second largest trading partner and the leading provider of development cooperation (around €2 billion a year).

A complex and intense relationship at many levels

The Summits have not been built out of thin air; rather, they form the cornerstone of an extremely complex relationship involving many different players and a variety of frameworks for relationships between the EU and Latin American sub-regions and countries, and encompassing practically all the issues that currently form part of the international agenda. This is not a static relationship, nor is it impervious to events either within these two great communities of nations or elsewhere in the world. All of these variables affect the EU’s policies towards Latin America.

Naturally a leading role is played in these relations by European states (some of whom have strong historical ties in the region), Latin American states and EU institutions, particularly the European Commission and the European Parliament. But they also involve all agents of civil society (NGOs, companies, trade unions, universities, churches, political and

social foundations), whose contributions are particularly evident in the preparatory stages of the Summit. Nor should we forget the role played by the human fluxes of immigrants, tourists, students and families who – as a consequence of historical migratory trends – live half way between the two worlds.

Together with the high-level meetings held during the Summit and the relations between European and Latin American countries within the general and specialist institutions of international society, there is also major dialogue between the EU and the Rio Group and the San José Dialogue. “Specialist dialogues” are held between the EU and Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America, intended to work towards Association Agreements along the lines of those already entered into with Mexico and Chile (largely the result of a determined drive by the Partido Popular government in Spain). These accords, which encompass both political dialogue and economic cooperation, reflect the more advanced phase of the relationship.

In addition, every year since 1991, the Iberian countries of Europe – Spain and Portugal – and the Latin American countries have met at the Iberian-American Summit, where Heads of State and Government address major issues and programmes of specific interest to that community.

EU and Latin America - perceptions, asymmetries and risks

Not surprisingly, the themes that dominate the EU-Latin America agenda vary depending on internal changes in the two groups and events on the international stage. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s they were predominantly political and in the 1990s the emphasis was economic, they are currently grouped around two main pillars, as set out in the Guadalajara Declaration: multilateralism and social cohesion. This is a direct consequence of the two leading concerns currently preoccupying the international community: coordinating the fight against the threat to democracy (so brutally manifested on

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the American continent in September 2001 and later in Europe—in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005) and the struggle against poverty, considered not only as an affront to human dignity but a barrier to the consolidation of democracy and peace.

The priorities also vary depending on the dynamics of each regional group’s interests vis-à-vis the other. Here mutual perceptions are particularly important, as well as what analysts term the asymmetries of the relationship. Perhaps one of the most widely held perceptions is that Latin America has a greater need of the European Union than vice versa, since the EU as a whole has greater economic and technological strength, greater degrees of democratic governability and social cohesion, a higher level of integration and supranational institutionalisation and is more fully integrated into the process of globalisation. Adding to these asymmetries, it is often said that there is a certain disinterest on the part of the Europeans (or at least an absence of sustained interest) towards Latin America, caused by the specific political and economic features of the European construction, eastward expansion, the absence of serious threats to Europe’s strategic and economic security coming from Latin America (with the possible exceptions of the drug trade and the revolutionary ambitions of the Havana/Caracas axis) and the un-containable spread of Asian economies onto international markets.

To mistake these asymmetries – which may be objectively true – for an immutable reality would, however, be to run the risk of indulging in both paternalism and simplification. In all the areas of comparison we have mentioned, Latin America has made undeniable progress in recent years and it would be a very short-sighted analyst who could think that such imbalances will last forever. We are all too familiar with this situation in Spain: just a few decades ago, our transatlantic cousins far outstripped us in terms of political and economic development: indeed, hundreds of thousands of Spaniards seeking opportunities they could not find here, sought refuge in Latin America.

Furthermore, in this globalised world, we might well have to pay a high price for relegating the relationship with Latin America to second or third place amongst European priorities – and much sooner than many might think. The current upturn has already turned a number of Latin American countries into world players by virtue of their political, economic, demographic and cultural importance. For them, Europe is a convenient partner, but not a priority one.

There is another latent risk in our relations with Latin America, which I believe to be visible in certain sectors of Europe, and also in some areas of Latin America: I refer to the danger of yielding to the temptation of anti-Americanism both in the way we view the nature of the bi-regional relationship itself and in the way we devise the joint frameworks that will enable us to take on the global challenges we face.

I believe that for Latin America and Europe alike, closer mutual relations are positive in themselves and also because they contribute to diversifying contacts with other global players. But that strengthening, whose ultimate aim must be to consolidate democracy and inclusive economic development as basic shared values, must not be built in opposition to any third party, least of all a country like the United States which proclaims those same values.

It would be grossly irresponsible to try to use the bi-regional relationship to drive a wedge into transatlantic – or inter-American – relations. Such loyalty does not, of course, preclude either an autonomy of policy or discrepancies as to approach, nor indeed does it prevent clashes of interests on important issues. However, I believe it would be highly damaging were the atmosphere of the relationship to become impregnated by a tang of anti-Americanism (and it would also be helpful if the distrust and prejudice felt in some circles of Washington against the EU were to be dissipated).

The international action of both the EU and Latin America is indisputably characterised by their attachment to multilateralism, albeit this concept

Mariano Rajoy


may sometimes be viewed differently in the two regions. But for multilateralism to be genuinely effective and to act as a positive contribution to world governance it must be realistic. It must take into account the existing make-up of the international community and be capable of clearly recognising who the allies of democracy and freedom are. It must defend democratic principles and respect for human rights as fundamental absolutes, especially in view of the fact that they are expressly mentioned as being amongst the inspiring factors behind the EU’s external actions.

A desire to work together and in the same direction is in everyone’s interest: it is in the interest of the EU, Latin America and the US itself, because these three regions are essential pillars of what is known as the West. If this were not the case, the consequences for the promotion of democracy and development would be grave, fostering the emergence of a terrain ripe for the most outrageous initiatives with regard to world governance.

If we accept that social cohesion and regional integration are now the main challenges for Latin America, the EU’s policies vis-à-vis the region must be tailored in such a way as to contribute as much as possible to achieving this goal. Europe is especially well placed in this field, given its experience and its achievements in these two areas - both internally and in the field of development cooperation, where it has been operating over recent decades - and its cooperation schemes can therefore be particularly helpful for Latin America.

In the area of social cohesion and its central plank, the war on poverty, there is, however, a clear risk that European priorities may be diverted towards other regions of the world. It is certainly commendable that the international community has chosen to place the fight against poverty in Africa at the forefront of its agenda but we should not ignore the fact that Latin America has over 220 million poor, of whom 100 million are destitute. These poor, however, often become invisible in international statistics.

Although Latin America (according to the World Bank) has more income inequality than any other region in the world, the poverty of the many – just as dramatic as that of the poor in Africa – is often obscured in national statistics by the wealth of the few. The result is an insidious “statistical spin” by which the EU should not be fooled. An increase in European funding for development cooperation in Latin America, together with more effective planning and management of the instruments of such cooperation, is therefore of pressing importance. Well thought-out programmes, such as Eurosocial (approved at the Guadalajara Summit), which seeks to strengthen the capacities of Latin American states in the areas of administration of justice, tax, health and education, with an allocation of €30 million, clearly run the risk of falling short of the mark. The same might be said of some existing programmes which urgently need to be revised.

At the same time, the winds of populism now blowing through certain areas of Latin America, which are jeopardising the progress towards democracy made in recent years, require that the EU provides intense political cooperation aimed at strengthening the institutions and consolidating democratic governance (with particular stress on again promoting collaboration with democratic political parties in the region, without whose backing it will be impossible to create the structure for politically mature societies). The EU must continue to provide efficient and sufficient support to furthering the moves towards integration, reform and democracy that begun in the region in the 1980s and 1990s. Doing so will help counter the opportunism and demagogy of certain leaders who have capitalised on the fragility of some of the region’s democracies (reflected in the UNDP’s 2004 report on “Democracy in Latin America”) in an attempt to profit from the suffering of the neediest sectors of society.

If the EU wants to prevent history from taking too high a toll for its prestige in the world, it must follow the process closely, adopting suitable policies, in order to ensure that democracy wins

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out against President Chávez of Venezuela’s “revolutionary” project, his close ties with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro and the two men’s desire to destabilise the American continent.

Trading relations and particularly free access by Latin American agricultural produce to the markets (so sensitive an issue for the EU and Latin America), has long been a sticking point in the bi-regional relationship: Latin Americans view Europe’s common agricultural policy as discriminatory, hindering their development and holding-up further the extension of the relationship, as well as detracting from the credibility of the EU’s overall policy towards the region. Some in the EU, on the other hand, see Latin America’s agricultural sector as oligarchic and export-driven, contributing little to the redistribution of wealth and social development in many countries in the region.

The tension in the trading sphere between the multilateral and regional approaches should be overcome through a model that is “WTO- Regionalism” compatible. This will allow the current talks on the Association Agreement between the EU and Mercosur to be brought to a swift completion and negotiations to be begun on similar accords with the Andean Community and Central America as well as effective application in of the new GPS “plus” to the benefit of the two regions. Paralleling these efforts, the EU must continue to provide even more backing than previously to sub-regional integration processes, stimulating the effective involvement of Latin American leaders in these arrangements.

To a great extent, it is up to the European governments with the greatest commitments in Latin America – particularly the Spanish government – to overcome the accumulated log-jam, breaking the present impasse in negotiations with Mercosur so that a conclusion can be reached before the end of 2005 (or at the very least, before the next round of ministerial talks in Doha). They must also decisively push for talks to begin with the Andean Community and Central America.

Ultimately, the success of that twin commitment to integration and trade will not only benefit exchange and economic growth, but at a political level it will enable Latin America to stabilise its democracies, balance the process of inter-action with Europe and become a more influential player on the global stage. The progress made in Vienna in these areas of the relationship will undoubtedly be one of the aspects that will attract most public attention in both regions.

The case of Cuba

Of over fifty countries attending the Guadalajara meeting in May 2004, just one – Cuba – failed to meet the minimum requirements on democracy and human rights that form the common bond amongst all the other participants. This Cuban exception is mirrored in the institutional terrain, in that Cuba is the only country in the Americas which has no agreement framing its bilateral relationship with the EU. However regrettable this absence of any legal framework, it is only logical in the light of the fact that the EU, and by extension its foreign policy, is founded on democracy and a respect for human rights.

In the political arena, the EU defined its Common Position in 1996, favouring a process of transition to a pluralist democracy. The Common Position, which was adopted unanimously (and it is worth stressing that it is still in force, despite the surreptitious moves made by some European governments to ignore or even abolish it), states that full cooperation with Cuba is dependent on improvements in the regime’s record regarding the rights and liberties of the Cuban people. It seems sorely unlikely that any such change will be forthcoming, as was made all too clear by the expulsions of MEPs and European citizens attempting to attend the opposition conference in May 2005 and by the latest wave of repression in July. Fortunately the European Parliament, turning a deaf ear to certain siren songs that would try to persuade it otherwise, warned in a resolution of autumn 2004 of the dangers of making any advance concessions to the Castro regime.

Mariano Rajoy


More recently, its latest human rights report deplores the political situation on the island and firmly rejects the ungrounded and unhelpful turnabout in European policy towards Cuba proposed by Spain’s socialist government. At this point, the policy of dialogue has clearly failed. Its only accomplishment has been an increase in the number of democratic activists in prison to above 2003 figures, and the withdrawal of the invitations issued to those activists to attend functions at EU embassies on the island, thus depriving them of an effective instrument of visibility and contact. This lack of solidarity towards the democratic opposition in Cuba is all the more surprising given that the people of the new European Member States faced similar situations of oppression and the danger of isolation until recently.

Ambition and rigour

The next Summit is due to take place in Vienna in May 2006. It will be the fourth such meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the two regions in a little over five years. Few could have imagined at the time of the Rio Summit that so many meetings would be held in such a short space of time. Moreover, the regularity is not inbuilt: participants at each Summit decide when the next is to be held. I think this proves that the Summits are no routine exercise: rather it is the complexity and importance of the agenda that requires a suitable approach from the countries involved.

The world has changed greatly since 1999 and so too has the situation in Europe and Latin America. The very geographical setting of the next Summit, traditionally one of the gateways to Eastern Europe, is a reflection of those changes and should serve as a positive signal in stimulating Latin America’s relations with the new enlarged EU. This proximity to the half of Europe that suffered under totalitarianism will also be a suitable occasion for the EU to underwrite its active commitment to democracy, freedom and human rights, rejecting outright the authoritarian tendencies of certain Latin American countries today.

To use the classical simile of the bottle, in the lead-up to Vienna the bi-regional relationship might be considered half-empty or half-full. However, I would add two factors to this picture: the bottle is very large (because the relationship has immense potential); and the glass from which it is made is exceedingly resistant because the democratic convictions and cultural affinities that make up the recipient of the relationship are very solid indeed.

Nonetheless, if Vienna is to be an unqualified success, it is essential, as certain clear-sighted representatives of the European Parliament have repeatedly argued, that the EU should go to the meeting with an ambitious agenda, based on a firm political determination and a long-term vision. Only such an attitude can enable the European Union to retain its prestige and credibility as the world class international player it aspires to be.

It is important that the Latin American attitude at Vienna is sufficiently rigorous when it comes to setting out its positions on such important issues as the consolidation of the rule of law and their legal frameworks, their work towards regional integration and their fight for greater social cohesion. I am convinced that if the parties approach Vienna with enough ambition and rigour then decisive steps will be taken towards consolidating a bi-regional association that will serve as a role model for the rest of the world.

Mariano Rajoy is President of Partido Popular of Spain.

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Following the break-down of real-socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of three multinational

federations (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), which were regrettably often accompanied by armed conflicts and ethnic cleansing, Europeans were once again confronted with fundamental questions. How to organise Europe in order to maintain peace and security and guarantee overall development, not only in Western Europe, but in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, which for obvious reasons is lagging behind economically, socially and politically.

In my opinion, the key elements for responding to these questions lie in the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. The EU admitted ten new members last year, eight of which are from Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, NATO enlargement also took place in 2004. I firmly believe that both enlargements guarantee peace, stability and prosperity for the countries of Eastern Europe who for centuries were victims of overpowering, aggressive, and totalitarian neighbours, who deprived them of human rights and democratic development. In view of this, it is not surprising that the populations of Central and Eastern Europe are generally more sensitive and attentive to the security situation of our countries than the populations of Western Europe. This geopolitical uncertainty naturally originates from our troubled history.

It is understandable therefore that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a vital interest in maintaining and successfully transforming

the transatlantic partnership, whose military-political component, represented by NATO, is undoubtedly the most successful alliance in modern history. I believe that most of us thoroughly agree with the words of the former NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson: “It has become fashionable to portray international relations in terms of consumer choice. Europe or America. NATO or the EU. Multilateralism or unilateralism. Tonight, I intend to be deeply unfashionable. I intend to argue that this concept of choice is simplistic and damaging. We can no more choose between Europe and America than we can choose between food and drink. We need both. As Europe needs the United States, so the United States needs Europe.”1

We certainly cannot deny that occasionally, clashes of opinion and disagreements do occur in relations between the US and the EU, or at least between some EU members regarding certain issues and dilemmas facing the global community. We need only to recall the disagreements regarding the intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003. I believe we ought to keep a clear head about these tensions arising on both sides of the Atlantic, and above all, we should not overemphasise them. We must keep in mind that even the best and most sincere friends sometimes disagree, and occasionally they are even involved in serious disputes. We should be particularly aware that the transatlantic partnership is not merely a common, more or less provisional, military-political alliance, a classical system of collective defence. It grew, long ago, into a real, pluralistic security community as defined by American political scientist Karl W. Deutsch. In its essence, this is a unified Western civilization determined by the values of ancient

Security and Cooperation in Europe - A View of the Future

By Dimitrij Rupel

1 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031124a.htm.

Dimitrij Rupel


philosophy, Judeo-Christian ethics, Roman law and other ideological principles drawn from various sources (enlightenment, liberalism, democratic socialist thought, Christian socialism, etc.). I firmly believe that the EU and the USA can successfully deal with the various problems of the contemporary international community, but only if they act together.

I believe in a comprehensive, enhanced and tolerant dialogue on the future of the European Union. It would be wrong if the political elites of the Member States tried to ignore the fact that French and Dutch voters recently rejected the European Constitutional Treaty. I also regret that no agreement could be reached on the new financial perspectives of the Union. It is obvious that the disparity between the ambitions and plans of the European political and economic elites on the one hand, and the wishes and expectations of citizens on the other, has become too great. Yet it is encouraging that the EU is increasingly serving as a model for numerous regions of the world (African Union, ASEAN, Mercosur, etc.).

European values are a precondition for peaceful co-existence and cooperation between nations, for comprehensive progress and well-being. The American expert in international relations, Jeremy Rifkin, even states that the “European Dream” has already replaced the “American Dream” and that a uniting Europe has become the “new shining city upon a hill.” 2 It seems that what we have achieved is often more appreciated by non-Europeans than by ourselves.

Despite these encouraging views, we must not disregard the unpleasant reality - the increasingly obvious economic and techno-scientific lag of our continent, compared with the US and particularly, the dynamic Asian giants China and India. It must be clearly and firmly stated: EU budget priorities need to prepare us better for increasing global competition. I understand the

political weight behind the agricultural policy, but I don’t see how ratios like 49:4 (agriculture and rural aid to research) and 6:4 (administration to research) support our collective commitment to our future generations. It is highly unlikely that Europe will again face the kind of war where food subsistence will prove to be a strategic asset. Our citizens and our companies are facing new daily challenges from the Chinese, the Indians, and the Americans to become innovative, more flexible, and more cost effective, while maintaining quality.

Economic decline is a recipe for global weakness and incapacity to shape the global agenda. The best social security is an economy that creates jobs and not one that nurtures its unemployed. We have insisted on keeping an element of social security in our approach to being competitive. This, I believe, is the appropriate approach. But social welfare cannot be an excuse for economic stagnation. Our model must do both: to provide for and protect those that fall through the cracks, and to encourage those who have the drive to excel. This is not ‘mission impossible’. Many amongst us - especially the Nordic countries - have come very close to achieving and maintaining this very delicate socio-economic balance.

South-East Europe

When we consider its geopolitical situation, history and numerous economic, scientific and cultural ties, it is understandable that Slovenia is particularly interested in the rapid “Europeanisation” of South-East Europe and particularly, the countries of the Western Balkans. The accession process of the Western Balkan countries is progressing slowly, encountering many problems along the way. However, it is clear that peace and security on the continent can only be maintained in the long-term if the region is fully integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

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2 Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream (London 2004)

Integration of South Eastern European countries in European and Euro-Atlantic structures will also confirm their belonging within Europe and Western civilisation. A Special working group, set up by the EU Council in March this year, will publish its assessment in the middle of October as to whether Croatia has really done everything to cooperate with the ICTY. Slovenia will continue to strive for an early commencement of negotiations with Croatia, as the harmonisation of the Croatian legal order and social life in general with Europe, is certainly in Slovenia’s interest. Croatia’s accession to the EU can serve as a positive model for democratic change in the rest of the Western Balkans.

Soon, the European Commission is to prepare its opinion on Macedonia’s readiness for EU membership. At that time, a possible date for the beginning of accession negotiations should also be recommended. Before it can commence negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina must fulfil quite a few (16) recommendations from the feasibility study. The main areas in which progress must be made include: cooperation with the ICTY, police reform and the adoption of public television legislation. We hope that our friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina can fulfil these conditions as soon as possible. I must add that it is upsetting that the international community, led by the EU, often devotes more attention to an extensive administrative apparatus in Bosnia and Herzegovina and various daily political disputes than encouraging reforms and pro-European efforts. Negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia and Montenegro could start by the end of this year. In addition, more should be done concerning cooperation with the ICTY. It also has to strengthen the rule of law, intensify its fight against corruption and organised crime. The Kosovo issue must be addressed appropriately, as this still has negative repercussions on relations between Serbs and Albanians and thus also on the security situation throughout South Eastern Europe.

As regards to Kosovo, Slovenia believes that the definition of a future international legal status would make it impossible to restore the pre-1999 status. Division of the province according to the principle of ethnicity is also out of the question. Furthermore, it would be equally unacceptable to integrate Kosovo into Albania or to unite areas with majority Albanian populations in South Eastern Europe. The status issue remains within the competence of the UN, yet the European perspective for Kosovo is crucial for its resolution. Slovenia, as an EU and NATO member, shares the basic objective of the international community: the establishment of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo. We are aware, however, that this objective will be extremely difficult to attain unless the Serb minority participates in Kosovo structures and in the political and social life of Kosovo.

The Mediterranean and Eurasia

European interest and the hand of friendship must stretch beyond South-Eastern Europe and Turkey – it must also reach people and countries on the south and east coasts of the Mediterranean. I strongly believe the EU Mediterranean policy (Barcelona Process) is faced with a multi-layered and complex reality, particularly in the Arab-Muslim world, which we may no longer perceive as a threat but rather as a good opportunity for cooperation and mutual enrichment. It is undeniable that ideologists of hatred and intolerance are constantly trying to stir-up violence between members of different religions and civilisations, as was the case in the recent atrocities in London. However, we must also be aware that a great majority of Muslims do not want to fight Europe and the Western world, but rather, desire fruitful cooperation based on mutual understanding and respect.

In addition to its southern neighbourhood, the enlarged EU must also devote much energy and attention to the Euro-Asian territories to the east of its borders. A long-standing European axiom of international relations is that European peace and security cannot be established and preserved

Dimitrij Rupel


without the active engagement of the Russian Federation and Ukraine. We therefore consider it vital that the EU enhances cooperation and partnership with these two large countries in all spheres. We welcome the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin has often explicitly underlined that moving closer to Europe and promoting real integration, were two of the main foreign policy elements of the Russian Federation. The results of the Summit meeting between the EU and the Russian Federation in Moscow last May are also encouraging. Plans were adopted establishing the four ‘common spaces’ covering Economy Freedom, Security and Justice, Cooperation in the Field of External Security, and Research, Science and Culture.

Slovenia certainly shares the EU’s responsibility for spreading security, freedom and democracy in its neighbourhood. The objectives of the European Council Common Strategy of 1999 also include the development of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human rights in Ukraine. In my estimation, political changes following the presidential election in Ukraine provide an excellent opportunity for promoting political and economic transition in this country of 48 million inhabitants. The EU strives for Ukraine’s economic progress, social stability and the establishment of the rule of law as well as for cooperation in environmental protection, particularly in strengthening nuclear security. With EU enlargement in May 2004, Ukraine acquired a common border with the EU, which also requires strengthened cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs and in the prevention of illegal migration and trade. The new border of the enlarged Union must not become an insurmountable dividing line, but an area of closer cooperation.

The OSCE community of nations

Slovenia is particularly aware of the dynamic political, security and economic processes in Eurasian regions this year, as it chairs the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is one of the few

international organisations whose operation is based entirely on the willingness of its participating states to engage in a permanent, institutionalised and open dialogue on any issues falling within the OSCE’s sphere of activity. This openness with regard to the OSCE’s agenda was a revolutionary way to organise security from the outset. It was at a time when political-military alliances were the dominant actors, and when it was far from clear that “security is not gained by erecting fences, but by opening gates,” as the Finnish President Urho Kekkonen put it in visionary terms at the inaugural meeting of the 1975 Helsinki Summit.

Over the three decades of its existence, the OSCE has created and maintained a culture of dialogue that has been the foundation of its success as a key player in contributing to security and cooperation in Europe. No organisation other than the OSCE has managed to unite Americans, Europeans and the post-Soviet nations in Europe and Asia. A comprehensive approach and cooperative security have proven to be the most efficient response to security challenges in the OSCE and also in the EU and NATO; they must therefore remain the constant in the OSCE operation. In the long run, the increasing respect for human rights and human security in relation to the security of the state strengthens peace and stability in the entire Euro-Asian area.

It is understandable that the nature of the threats and tasks faced by the OSCE has profoundly changed, following the end of the bipolar structure of the international community. The unbalanced socio-economic and political development in the OSCE area as well as the new security threats deriving from uncontrolled processes of globalisation, technological change, fast demographic growth in certain regions, illegal migration, various forms of international organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, require new approaches and working methods.

To conclude, I would like to emphasise my conviction that we should aim for further

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integration of the community that today is represented by the OSCE. What we need most is a Partnership for Prosperity, based on the supposition that the world from Vancouver to Vladivostok has so much in common that it should work together more effectively. Whether this will mean eventual extension of the EU towards Ukraine and Russia, or gradual upgrading of the OSCE, is less important. The important issue here is how to protect and develop stability and economic progress in places like the Caucasus, South-East Europe and Central Asia. Without an enhanced OSCE/Euro-Atlantic partnership, without a guarantee of ever closer cooperation, places such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey or Ukraine might become targets of dangerous and destabilising influences. The EU, NATO and the Russian Federation would be confronted with new, unnecessary sources of instability. We must all work together tirelessly in order to prevent this dreadful scenario.

Dimitrij Rupel is Foreign Minister of Slovenia and Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.

Dimitrij Rupel


Georgia is a country of democratic choice. Before the citizens of Georgia could elect me as their President, they first had to choose

democracy. And they did. In November 2003, hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens took a courageous stand for freedom and democracy against massive election fraud by which a hopelessly corrupt and incompetent post-Soviet regime was attempting to perpetuate itself. And, against almost everybody’s expectations, the Georgian citizens won! Without a shot being fired we succeeded in bringing about a dignified and lawful resignation of a government whose failure to uphold law finally became evident to all.

It is almost two years since our Revolution of Roses, and during this time we have been working hard – with extremely useful assistance from the EU – to strengthen the institutions of democracy in Georgia through court reform, by adopting suitable laws on local governance, by downsizing our government, overhauling our tax code, and rebuilding the economy and infrastructure. Throughout this process we have pursued a vigorous anti-corruption campaign – and the efforts of this campaign are bearing fruit.

While we are proud of the progress we have made, one thing is clear: we can only build a vibrant Euro-Atlantic style democracy in Georgia if Georgia’s neighbours are also committed to building democracy. The basic problem was well-expressed recently by Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy. Speaking about the successful democratic

challenges to entrenched ruling groups in Slovakia, Indonesia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and Mexico, as well as those in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Gershman said,

...these breakthroughs, especially the so-called “coloured revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, have sent shock-waves through the remaining semi-closed autocracies in the post-communist region as well as in other regions. The leaders of these regimes, alarmed at what they see as a new threat to their power, have stepped up measures to prevent a repetition of any such events in their own countries. This is the political context we face at the present time. It consists of a concerted backlash against internal democracy movements as well as against international democracy assistance...1

In the face of this “concerted backlash” against democracy movements, we recognise that preserving our own democracy requires Georgia to create a public conversation for democracy within and among the countries of our region. That is why the core of Georgia’s foreign policy is, and has to be, the promotion of democracy and freedom, not just for Georgia, but for the region at-large.

Recently, Ukraine joined Georgia in an umbrella of nations united by their commitment to Democratic Choice, and today we are actively looking for ways to provide a formal structure to this public conversation in support of democracy. On 12 August 2005, while Viktor Yushchenko and I held a meeting in the Georgian resort of Borjomi, we published the “Borjomi Declaration” in which we proposed to

Democratic Choice

By Mikheil Saakashvili

1 From Remarks by Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, delivered at The World Meeting of Democracy Promoting Foundations, Stockholm, Sweden August 29, 2005. See http://www.ned.org/about/carl/carl082905.html.

Mikheil Saakashvili


convene a “Community of Democratic Choice” in the area linking the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region:

Borjomi Declaration

We, the Presidents of Ukraine and Georgia, express our strong belief that the strengthening of democracy and civil society is one of the main tasks of and prerequisites for the economic development of our countries and our region, which, set in Europe, unites the three seas - Baltic, Black and Caspian, and is gifted with an enormous potential. Democracy and stability in this region is also the condition for a lasting stability and security for whole Europe.

We express our firm conviction that our region, if based and developed on the right principles of democracy, freedom and prosperity, represents today in Europe one of the major areas of opportunities, with a unique potential of human resources, transit lines, energy resources and communications between Europe, Central Asia and the Far East.

We pledge to conduct policies in our respective countries, Ukraine and Georgia, based on those principles, as members of the European family, sharing European values and history.

As members of the Community of Democracies sharing the universal goals of the global forum that unites democracies worldwide, we adhere to the principles of this Community and in line with the implementation of the Seoul Plan of Action, that envisages regional cooperation for the promotion and protection of democracy. In this regard, we are considering the creation of a community of democracies in our part of Europe: the Community for Democratic Choice. Our objective is to make this new community a strong tool to free our region from all remaining dividing lines, from

violations of human rights, from any spirit of confrontation, from frozen conflicts and thus to open a new era of democracy, security, stability and lasting peace for the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea.

We have thus decided to invite all the Leaders of the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region, who share our vision of a new Europe, our faith in the future and potential of this area and our democratic goals, to join us and the Community of Democratic Choice. We invite those devoted to ideas of democracy to our Summit in Ukraine and to unite our efforts to turn the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea region into a sea of democracy, stability and security, to make it a fully integrated region of Europe and of the Democratic and Atlantic community.

Stating our intention to hold the Summit in autumn 2005, we are hereby calling on all the Leaders of the region, who share our goals, to join us in this celebration of Democratic Choice. We also invite the European Union and Russia to attend this Summit as observers in order to examine the ways in which this democratic region, as a close neighbour, can benefit the security and stability on the entire continent. We invite the United States as an observer and as a representative of the Community of Democracies.

In Ukraine, we offer to put a final end to the history of division in Europe, of restricted freedoms and domination by force and by fear, and mark a new beginning of neighbourly relations based on mutual respect, confidence, transparency and equality.

During the September 2005 meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York, representatives of Georgia and Ukraine met with representatives of other relevant countries and announced that the first summit meeting of the Community of Democratic Choice will be held on 1 and

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2 December 2005 in Kiev, with participation expected from Poland, the Baltic countries and the Black Sea countries, as well as Georgia and Ukraine and other observers.

It is important to note that the Community of Democratic Choice is not designed to be antagonistic toward Russia or any other former Soviet country. On the contrary, the Community of Democratic Choice is intended to promote dialogue in what we mutually stand for. Our call for the constitution of this community is, in part, motivated by our perception that if we do not engage in dialogue we will by default find ourselves engaged in what individually stand against - this will leave us divided and weak.

Concretely, the result we hope to achieve through this initiative is an open and forward-looking forum for the new democracies of our region to share our experiences, learn from one another and better coordinate our efforts to promote democratic reform. We are looking to create stronger ties between democracies from the Baltic, Black Sea and Caspian regions.

This process is already underway. For the last year, Georgia and Ukraine have been actively sharing with one another the most valuable asset we gained following our revolutions: the experience of democratic transition and nation building. We have exchanged ideas on reforming our police forces, bureaucracies, schools and how to conduct a meaningful anti-corruption campaign. In doing so, we discovered that to become real democracies, we must build and become strong nations - a process that, in turn, requires us to support and uphold democratic processes. Specifically, this means conducting fair elections, encouraging an open and free press, and engaging with a vibrant civil society. The process of nation building will never be complete as long as citizens feel they are not masters of their own countries and lack a sense of personal responsibility. In one sense, the initiative announced in the Borjomi Declaration is a product of the new wave of liberation that was set in motion by Georgia’s Rose Revolution

in 2003 and continued by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2005. At the same time, our references in the text of the Borjomi Declaration to the “Seoul Plan of Action” and to the “Community of Democracies” are intended to signify that this initiative is aligned with -- and is an expression of - the international movement for democracy promotion that has been gathering strength since it was initiated more than five years ago with the Warsaw Declaration.

Perhaps the most ambitious of the results mentioned in the Borjomi Declaration is that of using the new Community of Democratic Choice as a tool to free our region from “frozen conflicts.” By “frozen conflicts” we refer to a group of secessionist disputes – particularly those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. All of these conflicts have in common the fact of political and military intervention by external powers. And it appears to us that these conflicts remain frozen because neither the external powers nor their local partners see an interest in resolving them.

Of course the term “frozen conflict” does nothing to convey the tragedy of these conflicts for the people who live in these regions or the harm and instability caused by the conditions which are allowed to persist in the conflict zones. In March of this year, when I met with President Voronin of Moldova in Chisinau, we issued a declaration against what we called the “Black Holes” in Europe:

Zones of conflict and separatist territories have become “black holes” in our countries and are openly supported from the outside. These territories function as criminal havens where massive contraband enriches a few corrupt leaders, while the populations live in poverty; where basic human rights are disregarded; where hundreds of thousands remain outside their native homes and where arms smuggling, human and drug trafficking, and kidnapping are considered “business as usual”....

Mikheil Saakashvili


If these conflicts remain frozen because neither external powers nor their local partners in these “black holes” see an interest in resolving them, what about the rest of us -- the countries of the European Neighbourhood, the countries of the European Union, the countries of the soon to meet Community of Democratic Choice? Do we not all share an interest in resolving these conflicts?

I am convinced that the answer to that question is a resounding yes. Aggressive separatism on the territories of Georgia and Moldova has created fertile ground for the imperial ambitions of those who do not want our countries to be free and prosperous. This separatism is not simply a local problem. It is a problem that creates instability on Europe’s eastern flank. It slows economic development in the region and seriously hampers efforts at enhancing Euro-Atlantic integration. The frozen conflicts are an unresolved legacy of the Soviet Empire, and it is very much in the interest of the European Union to work actively with us to put this sad legacy in the past, where it belongs.

The government of Georgia has committed itself to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in our Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions. We are strongly committed to the principles, expressed in the Warsaw Declaration, affirming the right of persons belonging to minority groups to equal protection of the law and the freedom to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion and use their own language. As Georgia is, and has always been, a multi-ethnic country, we recognise that Georgia can only achieve full unity and stability when it develops institutions that are respectful of ethnic difference and that allow a high degree of local autonomy, especially in regions which include significant concentrations of ethnically distinct minority populations. And we are prepared and committed to do just that.

We have made it clear that we are prepared to resolve the problems affecting our fellow citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in accordance with these principles – which would grant to the

inhabitants of these regions a very high degree of local autonomy – much greater in fact than either would have if they were to become part of the Russian Federation.

We believe that the resolution of these conflicts is not merely in our interest, nor merely in the interest of our neighbours and our friends in Europe. We truly believe that resolution of these conflicts is in the larger interest of all our neighbours, including Russia. Most of all, we believe that resolution is in the interest of the citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose well-being concerns us very much as they are our fellow citizens of Georgia.

How, then, can the Community of Democratic Choice serve as a tool to free our region from these frozen conflicts? It must do so in the same way, and for the same reasons independence was embraced by former Soviet countries. I believe that our best hope of resolving the frozen conflicts is to have the Community of Democratic Choice generate strong, public dialogue for democracy and peace that engages as much as possible with the people of the conflict regions and with whatever leaders will listen – a dialogue dedicated to exploring all peaceful avenues of conflict resolution and having the participants see the benefit of joining the community of democratic choice. And I believe that the chances for that public dialogue to be fruitful would be immeasurably aided by the serious and active participation of the members of the European Union.

The initial meeting of the Community of Democratic Choice will convene in Kiev on 1 December 2005. I invite all members of the European Union to send representatives to this meeting to contribute your energy and ideas to the task of making democracy flourish in this region. I also look forward to seeing you in Georgia, so you can discover for yourself the transformation and progress under way in today’s new Georgia!

Mikheil Saakashvili is President of Georgia.

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The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French, then by the Dutch, plunged Europe into crisis. On the one hand, this rejection

makes the entry into force of the Treaty legally impossible, even though Europe urgently needs to reform its institutions. On the other hand, this Treaty was a carefully balanced agreement between the 25 Member States and it is difficult to see how it could possibly be changed. The infamous plan B heralded by the ‘no’ campaign unfortunately clashes rather badly with a principle that is particularly strong in Europe: that of reality. Faced with what seems like a dead-end, it is very tempting not to discuss it. I disagree. Because there is too much at stake here, we must have the motivation to rebuild Europe, and right now! Nobody interpreted the referendum results of 29 May as a rejection of Europe. These votes rejected the way Europe is run today. The proof is that debates concerning the Constitution focus on Part III, which covers present rules. This is not a rejection of Europe. The French people want us to react to their expectations and to the resentment they expressed through the referendum. We campaigned for the yes vote in the referen-dum. This doesn’t mean that we should disre-gard the weaknesses of the Europe in which we live: a Europe which extended its borders before reforming its institutions, a Europe which is incapable of taking less than three years to make a decision… I see it every day in the domains of immigration and security; a Europe which does not protect us from globalisation - on the contrary: it fuels globalisation within its borders. The Constitution would have allowed the

resolution of many of these problems. This is why I supported the ‘yes’ campaign, along with the government, and with the support of Jacques Chirac, who was right to pose the question to the people, as it was so fundamental to our future. But the institutional question is not the only problem, and this is a point we have maintained throughout the campaign. I’m surprised, I really am, by the clichéd arguments that we so often hear about Europe. Of course, as the continent was once so divided, European integration is nothing less than a miracle, and we must uphold its successes. But it’s a fact that today Europe does not function as well as it once did, and that it hasn’t taken on the geo-strategic, political and economic strategies of today. The strength of the no vote was due to the synergy between economical and social difficulties in France and the French people’s perception of Europe, not as an opportunity, but as a threat. Today we have responsibilities and a mission Today, our responsibilities lie with the yes campaigners: we cannot let them down. 85% of our supporters voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, making the UMP the most European party in France. We must take the necessary initiatives and formulate the right proposals in order to achieve the political Europe that we want. Our mission is to follow up our unquestionable engagement in Europe, in order to hear the arguments of those who voted no, in particular those of friends and family, to understand their vote and answer their questions. We don’t have to apologise for the French vote. On the contrary, we, and our partners must seize the moment to

France for a More Ambitious Europe

By Nicolas Sarkozy

Nicolas Sarkozy


work, right now, at putting Europe back on the right track. We have to move beyond the divide of the referendum, give a decent response to those against the Constitution without disappointing its supporters, and propose a European project that will unite 80% of the French population. First of all we must give Europe a vision Just like many of us, I learnt the cost of Europe’s divided past from my parents. Because of my roots I was able to learn this lesson twice over. And I know what it would cost us in the future if we make the unforgivable mistake of thinking that we can “do without” Europe. This strong link between past memories and future possibilities is perhaps what was most obviously lacking in the referendum, and this is why there was no victory for the yes vote. A closer look at the votes reveals that it was mostly the young, active population who rejected the treaty, in particular the 30-55 age group. For this generation, the objectives of peace and freedom, which were at the origin of European integration, no longer appeal, as they have already been attained. This might seem ungrateful or immature, but that is how it is. But for these generations, the need for Europe to face the future more effectively does not seem any more relevant, because in the last ten years, Europe has not proven its ability to accommodate the disruptions caused by globalisation. Without abandoning its ideals of peace and freedom, Europe must take on new ambition, a new raison d’être. This ambition must be to control globalisation, to help European countries take advantage of all the possibilities that it presents, but without abandoning their people its excesses. Europe must follow globalisation, control it, and protect it.

Following globalisation means helping European economies to focus on what they do best, on those areas where Europe has a competitive advantage: goods and services with a high added value and high technology. I would also include

agriculture and the agri-foodstuffs industry, which constitute a distinct strategic sector. Europe can and must implement a Community policy in the field of research and innovation, because in this domain it can act as a lever. Along the same lines as Erasmus and the BA, MA, PhD system, Europe must encourage the setting-up of European university networks and also, in their wake, research laboratories and innovative enterprises. Europe must set up a European research agency which will finance future projects. At the Eurogroup level, it must set up economic governance that will reconcile the control of inflation, of public finances and of growth objectives more effectively. Europe must keep its promises of growth and prosperity. Controlling globalisation

Controlling globalisation means re-establishing the Community preference principle, which has been neglected. This does not mean a return to protectionism. Thanks to an expansion in trade, world growth has reached its highest point since 1976. It is up to us to work out how to benefit from this. On the other hand, we must also ensure that our business and employment interests are properly defended. We are much too reactive in the use of safety clauses and anti-dumping clauses which are provided for by the WTO itself, and which America uses three times more than us.

Trade policy is one of the most important domains which the Member States have entrusted to Community action. I don’t want to challenge this. But in these times of globalisation, which make this policy decisive, the defence of European interests must be ensured with all the force of political legitimacy. Once the posts have been created, the President of the European Union or the European Minister of Foreign Affairs must represent the EU in negotiations with the WTO. Our policy-makers must address the key questions for our future and growth. Public purchasing must focus primarily on

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European products and services, particularly those offered by SMEs, in order to encourage growth in our smaller businesses. This is a challenge that concerns 15% of our GDP. Europe must buy European. This can be achieved at no extra cost to public finances, and is perfectly compatible with our WTO commitments. Europe must finally protect against globalisation. By this I mean that it must be an area which allows us to consolidate economies, businesses and territories in order to open them up to international trade, and not an area given over to unbridled competition. Europeans do not want Europe to aggravate globalisation within our borders, as they are already confronted with it outside them. Competition policy must not prevent us from becoming European champions capable of acting on world markets. It must not stop us from implementing an industrial policy. In the same way, tax dumping and social dumping must not be accepted within the EU. A country cannot claim to be rich enough to abolish its taxes and poor enough to receive European structural funds. Europe should also aim to promote a world-wide conception of globalisation that is more human. Globalisation has enabled growth, but it has also caused injustice, both in industrialised and developing nations. Globalisation does not make sense if it leads to the economic slavery of ordinary men and women. Europe has invented almost everything in the domain of political ideas, now it must invent a more human globalisation. In international trade negotiations, Europe must address the questions of child labour, working conditions and forgery. Europe must lead discussion and action in favour of development, justice, defence, the environment, balance in trade, respect for different cultures and identities and social progress.

This is assuming that Europe is at ease in its influential role, not in order to oppose other

powers, which would not make sense, but in order to create a pole of influence and stability in the today’s multipolar world. Giving Europe a new vision, and a new ambition that has meaning for its people will enable it to become an important actor on the international scene. Europeans have the capacity to defend positions and lead joint actions on a wide variety of subjects, for example in the Balkans. We must reinforce Europe’s role in the domain of international relations. We must increase our deployability in the field of external intervention. We must set up the necessary institutions to sustain a common foreign policy, in particular the creation of a fixed post of Foreign Minister, whose role will be to ensure coherence in all the EU’s actions in the international domain (foreign policy, defence, cooperation, trade). Finally, from now on we must implement European policies in the domains where we have reached an agreement. One such domain is that of development. Today, development aid is dispersed, inefficient, and often corrupt. Europe can radically change this by making development aid useful and constructive and above all by making it an important factor in democratisation, as Jacques Chirac has already proposed. Europe must act effectively

Our aim must be to ensure that Europe is active, and that it acts effectively. Europe must be reconciled with its people via the implementation of concrete plans and future policies. When it comes to future challenges, Europe often participates insufficiently or inappropriately. This is the case in the domain of health and the ageing population, in that of energy, of immigration and of internal security. Europe no longer has a “motor”, because the Franco-German duo is no longer enough to provide an impetus that will be accepted by 25 countries. The Commission has too many Commissioners and the political importance of its role has been lost. Many policies cannot be implemented because they

Nicolas Sarkozy


depend on the rule of unanimity, which is the best way to never reach a compromise. In the domain of immigration, we must be able to regulate the quantity of the flux, in other words, set a limit on the number of new entrants according to our capacity to accommodate them, increase economic migration, forge agreements with countries of origin in order to apply a joint regulation of the migratory flux and contribute to development in these countries, which will moderate the desire to emigrate. With regards to security, the Schengen members must cooperate in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, which will allow those countries that wish to cooperate in a specific area to do so, (as was the case for Schengen), in order to share intelligence, undertake joint enquiries, harmonise procedures and track down Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Energy is at the heart of the two major challenges of the 21st century: environmental protection and the depletion of oil reserves. The countries of Europe can’t solve this problem alone. The EU must focus on four points: a diplomatic approach to energy in order to secure supply, as the United States and the United Kingdom have already put in place; an energy saving policy with, for example, common fiscal incentives; a questioning of the supremacy of road transport and the implementation of piggyback transport solutions throughout the EU; and research into new, cleaner energy sources. Europe’s “new Airbus” must take the form of research programmes into energy, for example to facilitate a quicker conversion to hydrogen cars. I would also like to propose that health, one of the major issues of this new century, become a Community field of action. With a common fiscal policy, harmonisation of research projects, a simplification of bureaucratic procedures and the creation of hubs of competition, Europe could aim to become as attractive an environment for health research as the United States or the UK.

It is in the EU’s interest for its Member States to work together in areas which function better with cooperation. In recent years, Europe has undergone successive enlargements, but there must also be some reductions. From now on our Parliament must respect the subsidiarity principle. Implementing these policies requires a budget and a plan We cannot expect Europe to implement new policies whilst remaining financially inactive. France must firmly defend coherent positions in the budgetary debate. The most obvious budgetary anomaly is the UK rebate. This measure must be gradually phased out. And Europe must be allowed to implement new common policies efficiently, particularly in the domains of research and transport infrastructure. A slight increase in the budget will no doubt be required in order to achieve this. It is an understatement to say that our farmers are feeling the brunt of the inequality that the CAP has created, and the bureaucracy that it causes. The CAP benefits Europeans in many ways: it guarantees us a healthy diet, ensures that we are competitive in the agro-foodstuffs trade, it is helping us to find a lasting alternative to petrol through the development of bio fuels and enables us to live in a high quality natural environment. All our farmers ask is that they are able to make a living from their work and that we support them. This policy has a price and requires solidarity. We must take this into account when drawing conclusions on the CAP. Whichever method is used, and however the institutions are reformed, we must find a new “motor” for Europe. I believe that we should open the Franco-German duo to the four other larger European nations, as the six countries together make up roughly 75% of Europe’s population. Despite what it says on paper, European integration is not spurred on by the Commission, and has never been. This impetus can only be political, and can only come from the countries themselves. For a long time, it came from the Franco-German duo. This “motor” is no longer enough to transform this impetus into

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an agreement between all the Member States. This is why I believe that this group of six must be the “motor” of the new Europe. Its role must be to drive new policies, in a transparent fashion and with the other Member States. The Commission’s role is to use this impetus and give it a community context in order to make proposals to the other Member States. The aim, of course, is for G6 proposals to be adopted by the Council. This is only possible if other countries agree. The other countries are Members in their own right, there must be no European “board of directors”. Nevertheless, if the six countries manage to reach an agreement without the support of the other Member States, the Council should not stop them from going further together. If we manage to deploy this method, we will have addressed, without a reform of the institutions, two of the major faults of Europe today: Europe will act effectively, and it will do so through the impetus of political responsibilities, not that of anonymous officials. Our aim is to finally give Europe borders Today, Europe is divided between those who believe that the Union has no borders other than democracy and free trade, and those who believe that political Europe has no meaning unless it is founded on a European identity. The principles that we must promote are simple and coherent: - firstly, there is a European identity and globalisation, far from abolishing the need for identity, actually reinforces it. Europe shares the same humanist values with the United States, the newly democratic Russia, and certain Asian countries. This does not alter the fact that its identity is very different to that of the American and Asian continents. It’s a question of history and of culture. Controlling globalisation means being open to exchanges, whilst at the same time confirming the European identity; - next, all those considering the European question, including the French themselves,

believe one of the greatest problems in Europe today is that enlargement has taken place without reforming the Institutions. We cannot permit new countries to join the European Union without first reforming its institutions; - we must create an area of prosperity and security with the countries situated at the borders of the European Union. This area must enable countries to hold discussions, have specific trade agreements, develop special relations of cooperation and trust on essential political, cultural, immigration, security and even defence matters; we must take our inspiration from NAFTA, and improve upon it; - finally, for the larger countries in this area, a new kind of partnership must be agreed upon: a strategic partnership. I am thinking specifically of Russia. This country is situated both in Europe and in Asia, and is too large to join the EU without causing an imbalance in its institutions. The UMP made its opinion known on the Turkey question during the Party Conference of 9 May 2004 chaired by Alain Juppé at Aubervilliers, and again during the Conference of 6 March 2005. We believe that a special, strategic partnership must be concluded. This opinion remains unchanged. As our president has already said, the French people will have a chance to express their views at the appropriate time. A Europe without borders, that has trade agreements with China, Brazil and India which are sometimes more advantageous than those with countries in our immediate surroundings, is not what we want. We want a Europe with borders that is also capable of creating a surrounding area of peace, security and prosperity.

The institutional question There is no miracle solution. The Draft Constitutional Treaty contains important advances which improve the functioning of Europe, and would move towards a political Union, which is the UMP’s aim: a stable

Nicolas Sarkozy


presidency of the Union, a European Minister of Foreign Affairs, double majority, reform of the Commission, co-decision, and the extension of the qualified majority. Our objective must be to implement these advances, whilst respecting the democratic vote of the French people. One way or another, we must give Europe the procedures that will enable it to make decisions in a quick and effective manner. The rules that have already been proposed have not been criticized, but they have nevertheless been refused along with all the rest. In order for these rules to be re-adopted, it is essential that Europeans rekindle their faith in Europe and its progress. The only possible way to re-convince Europeans to support European integration is for Europe to focus on concrete projects which address the real problems of the people: projects based on growth, knowledge, security and identity. And we must also resign ourselves to the fact that both the enlargement and the failure of the referendum have revealed the need for a more supple and agile Europe that is less static. Increased cooperation, within the framework of current Treaties or within an ad hoc framework such as those set up for the euro or for the Schengen area, are the instrument of this reconciliation between a more political Europe and a more workable Europe.

We already accept that certain states can be full members of the Union without participating in certain policies. It’s a sort of “opting out”. So why not have “opting in”? If some countries wish to do more, they should be able to do so. France can certainly take initiatives in this domain. France must be in a position where it can put forward a European political project to its partners. Our influence today no longer represents the important role we played in the emergence of the European idea and of our ambitious conception of Europe.

There are two steps to be taken:

- firstly, lead the political, economic and social reforms that our country needs in order to boost growth and attain full employment, as other European countries have done before us. Nothing stands in our way; nobody can force it upon us, and nobody can make this decision in our place. The no vote at the referendum was an expression of domestic and European fears and exasperations. Both must be addressed;

- secondly, we must find new ways to implement European policy, and an influence strategy in Community discussions. Like many of our partners, we must find ways to have more presence in Community Institutions, and we must be more aware of the fact that Europe is an integral part of our national life. Decisions made in Brussels have direct effects on our legislation, our economy and the whole of public governance. Reforming the State means taking this into account, it means increasing our numbers of government officials working on European issues and only employing the best individuals to work on them. And it means making Community questions an obligatory stage in the careers of high-level government officials, and also means defending our national interests without hesitation and giving them the appropriate importance, without false modesty. Europe exists. We must make the best of it, and we must make sure that our administration and the structure of the State itself urgently adapts to meet these requirements. Our objective is simple, but clear: we want an active role for France in an ambitious Europe that acts and protects.

Nicolas Sarkozy is French Minister of Interior and President of Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP).

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The eastern border of the Republic of Belarus emerged more or less in its present form in 1667 as the border between the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth and Russia with the Smolensk territory (land that had been the source of disputes between the Great Duchy of Lithuania and Russia for centuries). Two main rivers of the region, the Dniper and the Dvina, flow close to each other near Smolensk thus shaping a narrow pass called the Gate of Europe. This was the route of many Russian invasions of Poland and Lithuania, that of Napoleon’s march on Moscow and that of the Bolshevik offensive towards the west in 1920. At that time no one doubted which side of the European border Belarus was situated.

To answer the question on Europe’s frontiers in the region we have to examine five main factors that determine its European character: i.e. the geography, history and culture of the country, the aspirations of its people and their capacity to endorse European values as their own. The answer, however, cannot be separated from the political dynamics that open the way for democratic change in Belarus and makes the future European choice of its people a real possibility. However, the decision to be taken by Europe on its final frontiers should not be based on geography and sentiment exclusively, we also have to take into consideration the political interest of the Union by analysing both possible scenarios: the positive one - admitting that Belarus is a part of Europe - and the negative one leading to the opposite conclusion. There will be a price to be paid in both cases. Our task is to decide at what cost.

When considering the entire issue we have to remember that the present geopolitical position of Belarus is shaped by several factors.

1. The country’s history has largely determined its internal situation and to some extent its relations both with Poland and Lithuania on the one hand and Russia on the other;

2. The experience of the “old” 15 and of the new Member States who are direct neighbours of Belarus and have been dealing with Minsk after 1991;

3. The current dynamism of the political situation in the region created by the enlargement of the European Union, the Ukrainian revolution and the authoritarian route adopted by Russia.

To answer the question about the frontiers of Europe we therefore must examine the region’s geography and history, its present situation and the potential for further developments in Belarus and their impact on EU interests.

Belarusian geography

Although Belarus is situated close to the geographical centre of Europe, in political terms its frontier borders the large Euro-Asiatic landmass of Russia. The country shares a common northern and western border with three EU Member States (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) and a southern border with Ukraine. Belarus covers an area of 207 600 km2 and is inhabited by about 10 million people among whom Belarusians constitute about 7.9 million, Russians 1.34 million, and Poles - according to Soviet data - about 420 thousand, however some figures estimate the latter group to be about 1 million people. There are also about 290 thousands Ukrainians and 110 thousand Jews.

Thus, the country can be classified as a medium-sized European country. It is worth stressing again the fact that one of the six largest EU

Belarus: The Gate of Europe

By Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski


Member States, namely Poland, possesses a large minority in Belarus, which means Warsaw is not and cannot remain indifferent to the future of its eastern neighbour.

History - what has shaped Belarus?

The country used to be a part of Kyivian Rus and after the feudal division of that State (very European in its nature) it was finally conquered by the Great Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th century. With its specific culture, Belarus culturally dominated a common state created with the Lithuanians. From 1385, together with Lithuania, Belarus became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Union. In 1569, it became the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with a common Parliament and an elected king. To use the words of the eminent British historian Norman Davies, Belarus was a part of “the largest community of free men in the 15th –18th century world”. The laws of 1434 and 1447, based on Polish ones of 1422-1425 and 1430-1433, introduced the principle of neminem captivabimus nisi iure victim which was a Polish-Lithuanian (Belorusian) equivalent for the English Habeas corpus act adopted in 1679 (almost 230 years later!). The elites of the country were Polonised by the end of the 17th century. The Lithuanian Statutes of 1529, 1566 and 1588 that were written in the old Belarusian language turned the country into a state governed by law and placed it among the leading European nations of the time as far as the legal structure of the state was concerned.

Belarus participated in all the European cultural eras – renaissance, baroque, enlightenment, romanticism. If we want to see picturesque baroque pieces of architecture full of rich gold ornaments and paintings we can go to Spain, Portugal or Italy. In Belarus, we can easily see glorious monuments of the past, including old palaces and orthodox as well as catholic churches. It is true that the majority of them are in ruins now, though this is not the fault of Belarusians.

From 1772-1795 the country was conquered

by Russia. However, until 1863 the political life of Belarus was dominated by the Poles and all the Polish national uprisings against Russia (1768-1772, 1794, 1830-1831 and 1863-1865) provoked a fierce guerrilla war of local Poles, joined particularly in 1863, by the most active Belarusians. Each lost uprising was followed by massive repression and forceful Russification. In 1918 Belarusians proclaimed independence but their national movement proved to be too weak. The State, the Belarusian People’s Republic, existed only on paper. Finally, the territory of today’s Belarus, was partitioned between the newly reborn Poland and Soviet Russia and the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was born. Since 1924 its eastern borders, with the exception of the northern one, reflect those in existence between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia in 1667-1772.

Although the weak national movement initially supported the BSSR, there were still massacres by the Soviets in 1930s and 1940s (in the Minsk suburbs – the Kuropaty forest - mass graves of 200.000-300.000 victims of Soviet terror from 1937-1941 are a symbol of time). In the1930s, a new era of forceful Russification began that ended briefly in the first half of the 1990s.

In 1939, the USSR, acting together with the Third Reich, invaded Poland and incorporated what is now Western Belarus into the BSRR. The ethnic cleansing policy conducted by the USSR resulted in the extermination of a large part of the Poles and mass deportation of others. Due to the lack of hostility between the Polish and the Belarusian national movements, the Soviet action was not as effective as in Ukraine. Nazi Germany’s terror completed the devastation of the country - Belarus lost about 20 per cent of its pre-war population.

Belarus has no tradition of inter-war independence which was crucial to the Baltic nations in getting rid of their Soviet heritage, nor of the glorious national mythology of intensive but fruitless efforts to gain independence on the battlefields of WWI or WWII, which was the case in Ukraine.

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Due to the influence of both totalitarian systems (communism and nazism) soviet Belarus was one of the most Soviet republics of the USRR. National sentiments in the country were weak, traditional elites decimated, and the Russification of a depopulated Slavic orthodox country - subject to soviet style industrialisation - attracted great numbers of immigrants from rural Russia. That was the condition of the country in the years 1945-1989.

Independence of Belarus

The national movement, though existing in Belarus before 1991, did not play a decisive role in the creation of the independent state. The birth of the Republic of Belarus was the result of the external forces game (internal conflict within the elites of the USRR) rather than one of revolt by the Belarusians. Thus the new independent Belarus created in 1991, had no strong national independently minded elites. It had almost fully Russified cities where Belarusian culture was perceived as “peasants’ folklore”. Only one secondary school with instruction in Belarusian existed in the entire country.

The period of independence after 1991 consisted of two sub-periods. The first, 1991-1994, although characterised by slow and superficial reforms, underwent a national renaissance: the restitution of Belarusian as a state language and a return to old national symbols. The years after 1994 – when Aleksandr Lukashenka was elected President of the country brought an end to the Belarusian national revival and the country reverted to a mixture of the Soviet and Russian past, combined with more and more authoritarian ways of governing on the part of Lukashenka. Since 1999 he has become a full blown dictator, the last in Europe. This is the “partner” the EU is forced to deal with.

EU interests and the inevitable changes in Belarus

Historically Belarus is a European country with strong historical, cultural and ethnic links with

Poland and Lithuania, the two EU Member States with whom it has shared 600 years of common history both in a common state and in common enslavement by Moscow. This factor will inevitably lead to Polish and Lithuanian activity aimed at the democratisation of Belarus and encouraging its pro-European choice. The long European tradition inherited by Belarusians as one of the heirs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is not very strong in the country now, but it still exists among the politically active democratically minded elites that have adopted the symbols from that era. Belarusians are still threatened with Russification, so the Belarusian national revival must be European in its character. The fact that Moscow supports the authoritarian dictatorship of Lukashenka is stimulating a positive combination of Belarusian national sentiment aimed at distancing themselves from Russia’s imperial tradition and replacing it with democratic values symbolised by the European integration idea. Thus Belorusian soft nationalism or patriotism is now democratic in character and oriented towards Europe.

New dynamism

The regime in Minsk is of the old soviet type, however Belarusians are not isolated in the way in which Soviet people were in the past. The transfer of ideas, information and experience is incomparable to what existed in soviet times. The example of Ukraine is inspiring, especially given the fact that Belarus, like Ukraine has its “elder brother” that backs the autocratic regime of Lukashenka. This is in spite of some minor quarrels between Moscow and Minsk over the transit of Russian gas through Belarus. If the Ukrainian media remains free, the majority of the territory of Belarus will be covered by Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish or Ukrainian TV and radio broadcasting. The impact will be even greater if the EU engages itself in promoting free information for the Belorusian people. Bielorusians will be able to travel to neighbouring countries, observe reality and draw their own conclusions.The number of Belarusian flags (white-red-white) waved in Maydan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv



during Orange Revolution showed that there were daughters and sons of that country ready to take a risk and fight for freedom. Last autumn, young people in Minsk gathered many times to demonstrate their opposition to the dictatorship. There were thousands of them and soon there will be hundreds of thousands. It will take some time, but the collapse of Lukashenka’s regime is inevitable.

The Ukrainian Orange Revolution gave new dynamism to the political situation in Belarus. The old Soviet style regime can hardly survive in an increasingly democratic Ukraine and an enlarged European Union. The democratic changes in the country will happen but they will be neither easy nor quick. The sad fact is that the EU should be prepared for both scenarios - violent and peaceful. Development of civil society increases the probability of peaceful changes, it should therefore be supported. EU moral interests

There is no other way but to help democracy to prevail in Belarus. The EU must promote the rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech and democracy since these are its own fundamental values. It cannot refrain from supporting them unless it wants its political credibility to be put into question. The proud declaration of the EU as a global player and an emerging superpower counterbalancing the US, active in Africa, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Timor, etc. will look doubtful if it proves to be helpless in facing down a dictatorship just at its borders, in the very heart of Europe. One cannot ignore the fact that one of the best developed regions of the world currently shares a border with a backward dictatorship.

The Belarusian people aspire for freedom. They will achieve it. It is in the interest of the EU to play a decisive role in that process unless it wants to be marginalized. The transfer of ideas is inevitable and that will influence the authoritarian system of Lukashenka. The day will come, whether we want it or not, when the

Belarusian people will effectively demand their rights and freedom.

EU material interests

Belarus is one of the crucial transit countries for Russian gas and oil supplies for the EU. The peace and stability of that territory is therefore vital to the security of supplies of strategically important raw materials for Europe. Our security can be threatened by political destabilisation if the country remains a dictatorship, since human thirst for freedom is eternal and the existence of authoritarian regime creates a constant risk of revolution. In other words, political destabilisation. The backward political system of Belarus is combined with an even more backward economic one, which is leading to the degradation of the infrastructure of the country, thus creating a risk for the security of transit across the country. Corruption constitutes another obstacle for normal development of trade and transit between the EU and Belarus and the EU and Russia.

EU political interest

a) Democratisation of RussiaThe EU eastern policy priority is to have a democratic, stable and predictable Russia. The proposals to achieve that goal are primarily based on a false premise that the aim will be best served by showing respect for Russian neo-imperial ambitions and post-Soviet nostalgia. The Kremlin is inclined to think that Belarus, Ukraine etc. are part of an exclusive Russian zone of interest. We often hear that one should not isolate Russia or humiliate it and that an active EU policy in Belarus would lead to both humiliation and isolation of that great country. This is unacceptable for both moral and practical reasons. Morally, the freedom of other peoples cannot be sacrificed for the sake of Russian imperial sentiment, and practically, the condition sine qua non of the democratisation of Russia is slowly abandoning illusions of a new Russian empire. We face a “Weimar Russia”: the country which, under Yeltsin, was undecided as

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to the direction of its further development, and which under Putin is choosing an authoritarian model of the state. To stick to that analogy we should recall that the Weimar Republic turned into the Third Reich, not because it was humiliated after WWI (the humiliation after WWII was even greater and did not produce similar effects) but because it believed it could effectively revise the European order. It was a hope for victory and not humiliation that lead it from democracy to dictatorship and then to war. Therefore, the only way to democratise Russia is to put an end to the dream of recreating the empire. Opening the European doors for Belarus is a part of that process. –To deny a European perspective for Belarusians is to fuel Russian imperial ambitions and to weaken the chances for democratic changes in that great country.

b) EU political cohesionThe situation in Belarus is especially important to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. It is in the vital interest of these countries to help to establish a democratic and Europe-friendly Belarus. The political cohesion of the EU demands that the other Member States understand the situation and support the efforts of those EU Member States closest to Belarus.

c) The CFSP’s window of opportunityThe EU CFSP has not had much success so far. It failed in the Balkans in the 1990s, has had very limited achievements, if any, on the Palestinian question, on Algerian internal stability or on the Western Sahara conflict and has proved unable to produce a common position on the Iraq war. Its military dimension is still more a project than a reality, in spite of some minor actions in Congo, FYROM or Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has had a successful enlargement process and it is effectively bringing accession countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey, step by step, towards democratic standards and the rule of law.

Europe did not need military strength to achieve that success. Its soft power proved to be enough. This power was embodied in the European

perspective that was created for those nations and based on the common values shared by the populations of the accession countries and that of the old Member States. Such a situation exists in the case of Belarus. Belarusians and Ukrainians share European values and are ready to adapt their political system to European standards. The Ukraine is an active security provider, supplying EU countries with an air lift capacity in anti-Taliban operations, participating with its ground troops in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and in Iraq. Its Orange Revolution is positively influencing both Belarus and Moldova, and Ukraine is doing her best to solve the Transdnistria problem. This proves that if Belarus is given the right support on its way to democracy, it can be turned into another source of European stability.

If there is any chance for an effective CFSP – i.e. for achievements impressive enough to influence the public opinion of the EU Member States, Europe must seize the opportunity for decisive action in the democratisation of Belarus. Such a victory would be appreciated by at least a large part of central European EU Member States’ citizens. It would enhance the prestige of the Union as a serious international player, strengthen its credibility and its political cohesion. It could also contribute to the creation of a common European identity which can only be born from real political victory, won under the European flag in a real struggle for democracy.

There will be consequences whatever our choice. We must be aware that lack of support on our part will bring a risk of destabilisation in an important transit territory, and will build a potential for economic or political migration of impoverished or persecuted Belorusians to the Union. It will also undermine the credibility of the EU as a serious actor on the stage of international relations.

Finally, let us reflect on the moral dimension of the issue. Aside from all the political and material reasons mentioned above, there is a



strong moral reason to recognise the fact that Belarus deserves European solidarity. Belarusian opponents of the regime are probably the only people in the world who are risking their lives under the European flag by simply waving them during demonstrations and being charged by Lukashenka’s police. The EU should not ignore that fact, unless it is wishes to lose credibility in the hearts of a large part of its citizens and those of its eastern neighbours.

Conclusion - Is Belarus both a gateway to and part of Europe?

Historically, geographically and culturally, Belarus is a European country. The cultural links of Belarus with the western part of the continent were weakened after 1795 and heavily devastated after 1917 and 1939 but the country remains European.

Belarus for Poles and Lithuanians is like Dalmatia for Italians, Croatia for Hungarians, Slovenia for Austrians or Ireland for the British. There have been ups and downs in our common history. Still, among our European neighbours, nobody dares to say that it is a different or non European civilisation. To show solidarity and support for the democratic and European aspirations of Belarus is nothing less than an obligation.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski is a Vice President of the European Parliament and former European Affairs Minister of Poland.

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The process of the further enlargement of the European Union, as well as the policy maintained in relation to current and future

EU neighbours for whom the European Neighbourhood Policy has been formed, concerns all EU Member States. Occasionally, we ask ourselves whether the new Member States which acceded to the EU last year could play a special role in these two areas. My perspective on this issue is that the new members can definitely make a positive contribution to both processes.

Personally, I hold the view that the new Member States should be the driving force for enlargement and the fulfilment of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Who else is better placed than those countries familiar with this issue from both sides of the barricades? They have the experience of applying for candidate status, concluding an Association Agreement with the EU, and preparing for, and successfully rounding off, pre-accession negotiations. The citizens of the new Member States still have accession to the EU fresh in their minds, although some of them already doubt the wisdom of further enlargement. In common with many of the current and future candidate countries, is the experience of several decades of totalitarianism, a decade of preparations for accession to the EU, coupled with reforms intended to prevail over the relics of the totalitarian period.

All this means that we are destined to assume an active role in communicating with countries beyond EU borders. In this respect, I would like to set out the position of the largest Czech centre-right party regarding further enlargement of the EU and the states affected by the European

Neighbourhood Policy. I will concentrate primarily on the countries adjacent to the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Western Balkans cannot remain an island outside the EU

The future of Western Balkan countries clearly lies within the EU. We should not forget that after Bulgaria and Romania accede to the EU, the countries in this area will become an island surrounded by Member States. This geographic circumstance alone is sufficient reason for the Union to focus on the Balkan countries as a matter of priority.

The prospects of membership or closer cooperation with the EU, as defined in the Thessaloniki Agenda, have correctly been made contingent on continuing reform. Stability in this part of Europe must unquestionably remain an EU security priority, and not only because of the recent military conflicts in which the EU had rather negative, wait-and-see attitudes. Each country merits its own individual evaluation, based on the speed at which it pushes through reforms. This individual approach has also enjoyed the long-standing support of all the states of the former Yugoslavia.

Progress in this field is evident by the attempts of the region’s countries to intensify their mutual cooperation, which has already been established with the EU. One commendable event in this respect was last August’s initiative where South Eastern Europe (SEE) Prime Ministers (from Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), held talks in Salzburg on the future of mutual economic and trade cooperation. Although the current system of 29 bilateral free trade area agreements has had a positive impact on the

Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Role of New Member States

By Mirek Topolánek

Mirek Topolánek


development of trade in the region, this structure of mutual relations is rather complicated. The Prime Ministers agreed that it would be practical to create a single free trade area to replace all the existing zones. They should seek inspiration from the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), an agreement established at the initiative of the Czech Republic.

The guidance of Western Balkan countries towards EU membership is a prevailing feature in the manifestos of parties cooperating with the European People’s Party (EPP) and EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. In this field, these parties ought to have the support of their partners in the EU. In this respect, there is no ignoring the fact that another country in the region – Albania – following this year’s elections has now a right-wing government led by the Democratic Party of Albania.

Croatia is ripe for accession

There is one country in the Western Balkans which needs to take the final step towards the process of integration into the European Union, namely Croatia.

Croatia already meets all the Copenhagen criteria, which must be fulfilled before the European Union recognises the right of new Member States to join. I would like to underline that the Croatian government is cooperating with the authorities in the extradition of General Gotovina and has taken all measures to ensure his prompt capture and dispatch to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

Thus, I welcome the EU Council’s recent decision to commence entry talks with Croatia, which were already postponed in March. However, the European Union should link the commencement of these negotiations to the condition that Croatia must continue its full, unreserved cooperation with the ICTY and honour all its commitments. Should the Croatian government decide in the future to stop respecting these conditions, the

EU would be entitled to suspend accession talks.

I am of the view that the start of entry talks on Croatia’s accession to the EU is of key significance for the ongoing stability and democratisation of the Western Balkan countries, which have been promised membership in the European Union. We should not forget that all these countries aspiring to EU membership must comply with a multitude of conditions laid down in valid European regulations. Conformity often requires the transformation of the legal and institutional framework, in many cases coupled with painful political, economic and social reforms in these countries. The launch of entry talks with Croatia is sure to help improve the mood in this corner of Europe. Moreover, the speedy accession of Croatia to the EU will be the best possible proof that a solution to Western Balkan instability has finally been found.

Turkey needs the prospect of membership

Perhaps the most frequently discussed issue connected with the EU’s future enlargement is the possible accession of Turkey. In this case, European integration extends beyond the geographical borders of our continent; however, we should consider this an achievement rather than a problem.

Personally, I support Turkey’s EU membership. Naturally, this will not be a rapid process; accession negotiations with Turkey are sure to require considerable time. Yet, the launching of accession negotiations is a clear and unmistakable signal to Turkey that it is in the European Union’s plans.

Many characteristics set Turkey apart from the current members of the European Union. The current structure of the EU, with 25 Member States – soon to rise to 27 or 28 – is already very heterogeneous in some respects. This is reflected in the way the EU works, where certain Member States do not contribute to particular EU policies (e.g. the single currency and the Schengen

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system). This precedence could be exploited in discussions on Turkey’s future membership.

The main argument in favour of continuing the process of EU enlargement with Turkey is the need to anchor the country in a European security and geostrategic area. In addition, the possibility of EU membership will have a constructive effect on the Turkish political system. The prospects of EU membership have, so far, had a positive influence on the speed and content of institutional and economic reforms in all the countries which have aspired to accession. This trend has become strikingly apparent in Turkey in recent years and since the 2002 elections in particular. Thwarting Turkish ambitions of membership would halt this positive process and could even lead to the political reorientation of the country, which would result in major geopolitical complications for the EU.

Turkey, as a Member State, could boost the EU’s position in areas where the Union is already involved and the European Neighbourhood Policy is intended to cover. Turkey can offer European interests not only its strategic location, but also a network of cultural, political, and economic contacts.

Ukraine: from a neighbouring country to a potential candidate for accession

Ukraine is a large European nation with rich history and immense potential. It plays an important role in the political and security arena. An independent, democratic, powerful and stable Ukraine is fundamental to the security of the West and the whole of Europe and for our common political and economic interests.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine last year saw millions of inhabitants take to the streets in protest against rigged elections, oppression and corruption. The events at the turn of the year were a remarkable example of the strength and power of freedom. The changes initiated in December 2004 are a harbinger of

better times to come. Ukraine has a chance to overcome the main obstacles that stand in the way of democracy, respect for human and civil rights, and economic prosperity. This European country has now started a process of transformation as it seeks to realise the vision of an independent, thriving country and a free, open society. There are solid grounds for believing that Ukraine will maintain the course set in the spirit of the Orange Revolution and that after the necessary political and economic reforms have been implemented, the country will join the community of closely cooperating European and Euro-Atlantic nations.

Relations between Ukraine and the European Union are now based on the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, this policy is designed for countries the EU is not planning to admit as members. While this instrument was perhaps appropriate for relations with the ‘old’ Ukraine, it is inadequate in a situation where the representatives of the new Ukrainian leadership have clearly declared their intention of gradually integrating into Euro-Atlantic and European structures. Ukraine is now shifting from the status of EU neighbour to that of a future candidate country. In my view, the EU should respond to this shift flexibly. European institutions have already approved certain changes in their approach, but this is a process that needs to be continued.

Naturally, the current line adopted by Ukraine need not be definitive. We cannot ignore the fact that there are political forces in the country that are keen to scupper the country’s “European” orientation. In March 2006, Ukrainian voters will go to the polls to elect a new Parliament. This will be the first serious test of Ukraine’s passage to a genuine democratic society.

It is the responsibility of European centre-right parties to provide considerable assistance to their like-minded Ukrainian partners, who form the core of democratic and pro-Western forces in the country, in the run-up to the election. In this respect, I would like to stress the significance

Mirek Topolánek


of converting the ‘Our Ukraine’ movement into a fully fledged political party, capable of securing support in Parliament for the necessary reforms and of communicating its manifesto to the public. In particular, parties from the new EU Member States should be prepared to share their experience of the transformation of the political system in their countries and offer help and advice.

The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has already announced its support. This announcement was made in a joint declaration with partners from the Visegrad Group. The ODS, together with Poland’s Civic Platform, Hungary’s Fidesz and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, clearly expressed our readiness to work with the Our Ukraine party in the pre-election period and afterwards. Ukraine belongs to Europe, it has the right to strive for EU membership, and deserves our help and support as it follows this course of action.

Moldova and its indistinguishable orientation

In the case of neighbouring Moldova, the possibility of EU membership is still very remote. Although Moldova was part of Romania with whom it shares its language and culture, half a century in the Soviet Union has taken its toll. Moldova’s European prospects were not helped much by the subsequent post-Communist government either. The Communist Party (it did not restyle itself with a new name) has been in power for five years. Although the government has recently made a political U-turn and now declares a pro-Western orientation, the constancy of this position is highly questionable. After all, it was not long ago that the Moldovan Communists wanted to integrate in a completely opposite direction to the West. From this, we can infer that support should be channelled primarily to those forces which have been long-term actors and do not change their views with every term in office, notably the Christian Democratic People’s Party, which is a partner of the EPP-ED Group and an observer member of the EPP.

In the case of Moldova, the European Neighbourhood Policy and its action plan must play a key role. In one of the economically poorest states of Europe, economic issues should come to the fore. It is this aspect which could guide the longer-term orientation of Moldova in a European direction. The political transformation in Ukraine could be reflected in Moldova, especially in the form of a solution to the situation in the Trans-Dniester region.

Belarus and its wretched path to democracy

Relations between the European Union and Belarus are even more complicated. Although the country is geographically immediately adjacent to the EU, politically, it is the Union’s most remote neighbour. Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus has made it the final undemocratic island in Europe and we must treat it accordingly. An uncompromising position is the only possible response to any undemocratic conduct by the Belarusian regime. This is the only way which EU Member States can give Minsk a clear signal that its political regime is no longer tolerable.

The EU’s current role in relation to this country should focus on the breaches of human rights and provide universal support to the democratic anti-Lukashenko opposition. Only when Belarusian citizens remove Lukashenko’s undemocratic regime can Belarus follow a course of European orientation. Only then will it be possible to ensure the bolder development of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Belarus, a tool to help make the country a stable neighbour of EU Member States.

Shared responsibility

In this article I have intentionally focused in detail on those countries which are adjacent to the Central and Eastern European region.

The Union faces a wide range of challenges in its neighbourhood, placing enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy at the centre of its concerns. European centre-right parties play

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a key role in these debates and their initiatives will have a significant impact on EU policy in this region. Therefore, I am convinced that political parties from the new Member States and their indispensable contributions will make the European Neighbourhood Policy a success.

The Civic Democratic Party is no exception to this process and will continue to remain very active on the political field of our neighbourhood.

Mirek Topolánek is President of Obcanska Demokraticka Strana (ODS) of the Czech Republic.

Mirek Topolánek


Europe is in the midst of intense soul-searching. The recent rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty by the citizens of two of the EU’s founding

Member States, the lack of consensus on the financial perspectives for 2007-2013, the current state of our economies and the emergence of an even more competitive environment, all seem intended to diminish what is great about Europe and underscore all that has gone wrong. In this context, many wrongly ask whether the time has come to pull the breaks and start refuelling the European vehicle, and wonder about the viability of yet another expansion.

The lingerers

There is the usual reply: who knows what the state of affairs will be like in, say, fifteen years? Why deny other nations the opportunity to live and prosper as EU members, as long as they have fulfilled all the relevant criteria and requirements?

Doubters of future enlargements are not only to be found inside the EU. Nations on its borders, although still very eager to join, may entertain the same doubts. More often than not, these suit their parochial interests.

These doubters ask: “if some EU citizens express doubts about European integration, as shown perhaps by last spring’s referenda, why should we trust the EU by adhering to its criteria?” To put it bluntly, how can those who seem to doubt themselves want to promote democracy and the rule of law in countries which, although less wealthy, are confident and proud - at least of their own identities and particularities?

The short answer is: “because Europe is about to change and you will want to be part of this Europe.”

Still, some countries on the EU’s periphery may seem to be lingering at the edge of the future. They know the criteria; they may be led to choose inertia. They seek EU help but they may not be 100% attentive to EU obligations. They express their willingness to join but sometimes they tend to act as if final accession is just a European cultural imperative, akin to helping an ailing relative.

Turning the Balkan “powder keg” into a European neighbourhood

The “zigzag” path of the Western Balkans towards EU membership is a good part of this story. In the same way that the EU was built, after a painful and long war, now, these nations have been called on to proceed further to reconciliation and a European perspective. Two years ago, the EU leaders’ “Thessaloniki Declaration” made clear for the first time that the separate futures of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo, all lie inside the Union.

The Stabilisation and Association Process, the European Partnership Action Plan and the introduction of a new instrument of pre-accession assistance, are the EU’s helping hands to these countries, to come closer to Europe. The underlining logic is always to encourage these nations to endorse European values and reach European standards, in other words: to turn the Western Balkans from the “powder keg of Europe” into a European neighbourhood.

Paving the Western Balkans’ European Path

By Yannis Valinakis

Yannis Valinakis


Moreover, the EU has made clear that each country will be assessed according to its own merits.

The past year has had its successes on that front. On the Srebrenica massacre’s 10th anniversary, alongside the leaders of all three constituent communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stood the leaders of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. In Albania, elections were held and the general impression is that things could begin to change for the better. In Kosovo, the reviewing of the degree of achievement of the UN standards is already underway.

The past year has had its failures. The rule of law and the strict observation of electoral regulations have not always been observed, as the case of the local elections in FYROM showed. FYROM unjustifiably rejected a compromise solution put forward by the UN Special Representative over the name issue, which would end a long overdue issue and push cooperation further. The sporadic outbursts of violence and crime in Kosovo, such as this summer’s events, demonstrate just how fragile the situation still is there.

But successes and failures aside, the issue with the Balkans always seems to be a question of fundamentals.

Unfinished business

Ethnic suspicion, the poor progress in combating organised crime and corruption and ongoing problems regarding the distribution of state power continue to hold back the region.

As shown by the recent eruption of ethnic violence in Kosovo, the spectre of lapsing back to an atrocious past has not gone away. In certain areas, not only have organised crime and corruption remained undefeated, but they are still an everyday reality for many citizens, who were expecting the dawn of a different, more European way of life. Democracy functions albeit, at times, unsatisfactorily. Respect for human and minority rights is not where it

should be. There is a clear need for all in the region to cooperate more closely, so that they may improve their chances of success in their separate Stabilisation and Association processes. Some of the challenges can only be appropriately dealt with in a cross-border context; others, cannot. Here is a list of the region’s unfinished business:

• Kosovo needs to fulfil standards. The EU Foreign Ministers declared on 21 February 2005 that Kosovo would not return to the situation prior to 1999. Its future must take the form of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo which ensures effective protection for minorities, preserves and protects the cultural and religious heritage of all its communities, and respects the right of refugees and displaced persons to return – in other words, contributing to the stability of the region and adhering to the values and standards of the EU.

This autumn, the international community will review how far Kosovo has progressed in fulfilling the above criteria before the future status discussion starts. Dialogue is essential; the Kosovar Serbs and Belgrade must participate actively in the process. In the end, any solution must be in accordance with the UN Charter and resolutions, the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe. The message must be clear. The Kosovar Albanians must work to strengthen democracy and the protection of human and minority rights; the Serbs must be involved in a multiethnic Kosovo, where the constant plague of unemployment and low quality of life must be tackled in a spirit of cooperation.

• FYROM needs to show European credentials. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made important steps towards stability. Last year, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) came into force and FYROM applied for EU membership. The EU’s “Proxima” force has contributed significantly to improving the security situation. However the “name issue” remains.

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Greece has shown its willingness to see the issue solved. It constructively accepted the UN proposed plan as the basis for a final round of negotiations, so that a mutually acceptable solution can be found. A speedy solution will accelerate this country’s accession process (the EU Commission’s Opinion is expected late this year) and will enhance the two neighbours’ already good relations. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia must find the strength to abandon past nationalist thinking and practices - to step into this new era and exchange accepted wisdom for true wisdom. The ability to behave in a conciliatory way is, after all, the essence of European politics.

• Serbia and Montenegro: involvement. Serbia and Montenegro cannot remain a “black hole” on the map of Europe. European integration will remain incomplete without its inclusion. Belgrade has been making some real efforts. Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) creates a positive climate; Belgrade was rewarded with the Commission’s acknowledgment that the ground is laid for beginning negotiations for an SAA.

• Bosnia and Herzegovina: self-reliance. Bosnia’s extensive reliance on foreign aid and on the Office of the High Representative is obviously not a model that can be pursued for long. The European perspective can provide a vital solution to any possible deadlock. Progress needs to be achieved in the sixteen priority areas for action as stated in the Feasibility Study, which is a part of the Stabilisation and Association process. Inescapably, the EU prospect is dependent on full compliance with the ICTY and on Bosnia and Herzegovina having efficient working institutions.

• Albania: reforms. The Albanian authorities are the key to the implementation of the needed reforms so that the negotiations on a

Stabilisation and Association Agreement can be concluded. There is certainly no time for Albania to lose. Helping democratic institutions mature, fighting organised crime and corruption, respecting human rights and minority rights and lifting the Albanian economy out of a quagmire of dependence are necessary priorities for broaching closer relations with the EU.

These are issues that need to be dealt with as soon as possible by the respective countries. But no man is an island and the Western Balkan region is not an island, either. Some of the most pressing challenges that need to be faced in the Western Balkans know no borders. The complexity of the issues involved and the significant benefits of regional cooperation can be doubted by none. With this in mind, the region’s countries agreed in Thessaloniki to further promote their bilateral contacts. The need to work closely with each other on political and institutional issues, trade, justice, as well as infrastructure, energy, transport and the environment is a leadership challenge that should not be missed.

Regional co-operation is necessary for the Western Balkans. It is a precondition for coming closer to the EU, a complementary rather than antagonistic process on their European path. To achieve this, the tools exist. The region needs its own voice. The South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP), the only forum comprised exclusively of Balkan states, may become the main instrument of regional cooperation. Greece, having assumed the Presidency of the SEECP until spring 2006, will ensure that all our partners understand that regional cooperation must gather in speed and in greater efficiency.1 We are willing to give a boost to the SEECP role and its institutional presence.

Regional cooperation needs also to be further strengthened in combating organized crime

Yannis Valinakis

1 See SEECP Hellenic Chairmanship in Office 2005-06: www.mfa.gr/seecp/index.html


and the self-sustaining culture of dependency on local crime lords. Drugs, money laundering and human trafficking must stop. Finalising agreements with Europol will play a useful role in the fight against crime. Other sectors of cooperation can also bring immediate, tangible benefits for the region. In the field of energy, the “Athens Process” aims to create an energy community for South East Europe.2 Cooperation in transport can literally pave the way for integration into the strategy of the Trans-European Networks and Pan-European Corridors. There also needs to be joint, sustained efforts by these nations to increase the business potential of air and sea transport and therefore, bring the region physically closer to their European future.

In South-eastern Europe the issues of stability and security are of overriding importance. Now we know that we cannot seek either economic development or the consolidation of democratic institutions without enhancing the feeling of security of States, of the various communities, and of each and every citizen. Development, democracy and security go hand-in-hand. The feeling of security can therefore spread and substantial reform spillovers can enhance the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to fulfil their EU obligations.

EPP’s role

In a region where much depends on party politics, the greater involvement of European-level political parties has had a beneficial effect on how the present politicians and next generations view their EU future.

In 2001, the current Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis, conceived and led the European People’s Party’s Western Balkan Democracy Initiative.3 This way, the EPP has been a frontrunner in opening the path towards the European perspective. In the process, the

Western Balkan political parties have assumed a significant role on the European-level party landscape. Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and Albanian parties have benefited from the EPP policy of fair inclusion.

Today, the European People’s Party is a strong force throughout the region, giving the example of greater co-operation to political forces formerly isolated, or misunderstood. It is still the forum where even competing forces find a common ground and are, therefore, better able to address current issues, without carrying worn-out labels over their heads. This process continues successfully for EPP members, associates and observers, and the European logic of party cooperation must be assimilated by all.

The Western Balkans in an evolving EU

In the end, there are two parallel lines of integration in Europe. One signifies further integration inside the EU, the other, the inclusion of all Europeans in a better future. For Europe to be successful these two lines must meet at some point and Europe must fulfil its mission.

As with any mission, what defines the final result is the constant interplay between drawbacks and resolve. The drawbacks of the past have taught us that continuous engagement and a clear and firm strategy, assists all the relevant parties to fulfil their obligations.

The successful accession strategies of Bulgaria and Romania, and now Croatia following on this path, provide much-needed inspiration for the leaders and peoples of the region. The Western Balkan countries are realising that they cannot live in isolation, while their neighbours enjoy the full benefits of EU membership.

Moreover, the EU in 2007 and beyond, will probably not be like the current EU; Europe is

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2 See Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe: www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/sectors/energy/apsecretariat.htm

3 See “The Western Balkan Democracy Initiative Report: Working Together, Moving Forward”. European People’s Party, Athens: September 2002

going through fundamental shifts in the public’s perception of politics, which reverberate in policy itself. The end result may be nothing less than a more immediate political environment, where tolerance for procrastination, broken promises and delays in reform will take a direct hit – and that necessarily applies to all leadership efforts in the region. Thus, in a more competitive global environment, Europe may begin to insist even more vigorously on clearly defined “Europeanness”. To begin to truly honour the ‘Thessaloniki Agenda’ and the EU leaders’ declared policy of inclusion, the Western Balkan nations must understand there is no time to lose.

Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the incredible work that has been done already. In many instances, the countries of the region have shown a collective urge to change and have adopted new Constitutions, laws and mentalities in what is historically a very brief period of time. In terms of trade, the economy and the regional context, the Western Balkans have come a long way from the bloodshed of the 1990s towards a new era of cooperation. Often, a sincere willingness to mend the scars of the past and build together a common European neighbourhood surprises even the perpetual optimists. The EU, through its Stabilisation and Association Agreements and the other instruments of policy at its hands, has been pivotal in this process of change. However, it is the countries of the region themselves which have made it happen and it is only through their continuous effort that EU accession can be achieved.

The Western Balkans’ path towards European integration is a story of mutual commitment. For its part, the EU should keep its promises, renewed in Thessaloniki. We need to export ‘Europe’, not ‘euro-scepticism’. The Western Balkan countries should not interpret the recent developments in the Union as a message to slow down the pace of reforms. On the contrary, today it is even more imperative to demonstrate their willingness join the European family, and intensify their efforts.

Europe is a great force for reform founded on immutable principles and values; a force for reform that functions on the basis of the convergence and merging of views. It is an institutional and political mechanism that generates consensus. It is therefore a deeply democratic process.

Greece fully acknowledges the merits of European integration. We believe that the European integration project is gradually and thoroughly transforming the future of the states and peoples participating in it. Such a transformation is in the interest of peace, democracy and the prosperity of people.

Our vision is to also transform our neighbourhood into a region like the rest of Europe – in other words, a region of peace, democracy, prosperity and stability; a region with full respect for human rights and religious freedom; a region in which minorities are fully protected. This is a strategic choice for Greece.

There is a long road ahead to complete this promise of change; the process of integration must only gain in speed. This will be good both for the region and the EU. Honouring “Thessaloniki” means bringing on board a new European neighbourhood with great potential. Such a development can perfectly complement the EU’s own reform and leadership in tomorrow’s world.

Yannis Valinakis is Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Yannis Valinakis


This year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the European flag. This blue flag with the 12 gold stars is known by most people in Europe,

and to some extent also beyond, as the flag of the European Union. Only very few people know that it is actually the flag of the 46 nation Council of Europe, designed by one of its own staff members, Arsène Heitz, and which in 1986 was adopted, with the full consent of the Council of Europe, by the then European Community, now the European Union. The same holds true for the European Union’s anthem, Beethoven’s Ode to Joy (although it is far less known).

The story of the flag is indicative of how little the public knows about the Council of Europe. Often, even in serious newspapers and magazines, “Europe” is equated with the “European Union”. The fact that the European Union has only 25 Member States and that at least 21 other States, which are members of the Council of Europe are excluded by this definition, seems to escape many. Unfortunately, it seems to escape many policy-makers too. Yet Europe is much wider than the European Union. For it to be stable and prosperous, I am convinced that this wider Europe not only needs the European Union, important as it is, but also the Council of Europe. Two different, but highly complementary institutions, created out of the same vision, both born out of the ashes of the Second World War.

It was within the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly that proposals to create a European Community of Coal and Steel, the predecessor of the European Union, were first made. Had certain Member States taken a different position at the time, European history

would have been quite different and, quite possibly, Europe would be more integrated than it is today.

This contribution aims to recall what the Council of Europe stands for, discuss current relations between the two institutions and present proposals for increased synergy between them.

The Council of Europe: an overview

Because the Council of Europe is not nearly as well-known as the European Union, let me briefly recall some of its more salient features.

Already during World War Two, before the defeat of Hitler’s armies, Winston Churchill had argued publicly for the creation of a Council of Europe, which he saw as a means to prevent further wars in Europe. His vision, shared by other great Statesmen, such as Adenauer and di Gasperi, led to the Council of Europe’s creation in 1949.

For many years afterwards the Council of Europe remained an exclusively western European organisation. However, following the fall of the Berlin Wall it became the first, and only, truly pan-European organisation. Today, it unites over 800 million Europeans, stretches from Iceland to the Baring Straits and from the North Cape to the southern Caucasus.

The Council of Europe’s core activities concentrate on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This is complemented by policies and action on legal cooperation, local and regional democracy, social cohesion, the protection of ethnic minorities, public health and consumer protection, education, culture and cultural heritage, youth and sport, and the environment. In the 50 years of its existence, it has established

The Council of Europe and the EUPartners for a Stable Europe

By René van der Linden

René van der Linden


some 200 international conventions, replacing no less than 25,000 bilateral agreements.

Already in 1949 the Organisation’s Founding Fathers had the foresight to create two statutory organs; a traditional intergovernmental Committee of Ministers and a Parliamentary Assembly, referred to at the time as a Consultative Assembly. There can be no doubt that many of the Council’s main achievements, such as, for instance, the European Convention on Human Rights, and indeed over one third of all its Conventions, originated in the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). The Assembly can therefore quite rightly be considered the engine of the Organisation.

Whereas the Committee of Ministers brings together 46 Ministers - replaced by their Deputies, i.e. Ambassadors in Strasbourg - the Parliamentary Assembly is composed of 630 parliamentarians, which are nominated by their National Parliaments. They have therefore a national and a European mandate. They are able to inject an essential international dimension to national debates. The size of these delegations varies between 2 and 18 and they must always not only include members of both the governing majority and the opposition, but also both men and women. Its pluralistic composition is therefore markedly different from that of the Committee of Ministers and this has often enabled progress to be made in areas where governments alone would have remained deadlocked.

The PACE also acts as a school of democracy. Many European leaders obtained their international training here.

It has also been a pioneer in parliamentary diplomacy: effectively complementing the work of government officials.

An example of this is the Round-Table on Chechnya and the work in the Caucasus. It has recently resolved issues between Greece and Turkey, and Slovakia and Ukraine.

Moreover, PACE brings together politicians of every creed and culture in Europe and is thereby able to act as an important forum for intercultural and inter-religious dialogue.

In addition to the aforementioned organs, the European Court of Human Rights has acquired enormous importance. Through its legally binding judgements, which are the result of cases brought forward by individual citizens against their Governments, the European Court of Human Rights makes an invaluable contribution to a common legal space in Europe.

Other important institutions of the Organisation include the:

• Congress of Local and Regional Authorities;• Commissioner for Human Rights;• European Committee for the Prevention

of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment; and

• European Commission through Democracy and Law, also known as the “Venice Commission”.

Nearly 400 NGOs have been granted participatory status within the Council of Europe and make important contributions to its work. They are a key pillar of the Council of Europe’s policy.

The Council of Europe’s headquarters are in Strasbourg, and the whole Organisation has a staff of about 2,000 with an annual budget of around €180 million.

Current Council of Europe – European Union cooperation

Closer cooperation between the Council of Europe and the EU with a view to avoiding duplication is a priority. I underlined this in my inaugural speech as in-coming President of the PACE.

The legal basis for relations between the European Union and the Council of Europe is found in Article 303 of the EC Treaty, which stipulates that: “The Community shall establish

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all appropriate forms of cooperation with the Council of Europe.” This cooperation is further developed with regard to the European Commission, by two exchanges of letters, dating from 1987 and 1996, as well as the 2001 Joint Declaration on cooperation and partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

At the highest political level, cooperation is discussed at the so-called quadripartite meetings, which bring together the Secretary General and the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as well as the Presidency of the EU Council and the President (or Commissioner for External Relations) of the European Commission. These meetings are held once or twice a year. The PACE has repeatedly urged that they include a parliamentary dimension. A joint initiative with the European Parliament to obtain this is currently underway.

There are regular contacts between certain committees of the PACE and of the European Parliament. In October 2005, after an interruption of several years, a meeting between the Presidential Committee of PACE and the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament was held. Joint sessions of PACE and the European Parliament took place in 2002 and 2003.

At the intergovernmental level, there is regular dialogue between European Commission officials and the secretariat of the Council of Europe, including an annual meeting of senior officials.

Since 1993, joint programmes of assistance and cooperation aimed at helping Central and Eastern European States which have recently joined the Council of Europe, have been developed. They are financed jointly, with the Council of Europe taking responsibility for implementation. Thus the important contribution the Council of Europe is making to help some of the new EU Member States to achieve the acquis communautaire cannot be underestimated.

The recent enlargement of the European Union has been accompanied by increased competencies for the Union. In the absence of an appropriate legal basis, there has been a de facto appropriation of competencies by the European Commission.

Having started my career in the Commission secretariat and having been involved as a Deputy Minister and parliamentarian for very many years in EU matters, most recently as member of the Convention, I can say that I know both organisations well and have always strongly supported the independence of the European Commission. However, the above-mentioned initiatives have led me to take a more critical attitude. In particular, it would seem essential that the European Commission does not try to duplicate work that is already being carried out, and carried out most effectively, by the Council of Europe. An example of this tendency is the proposal, unfortunately rather rapidly endorsed by the Council, to transform the Vienna based EU Observatory on Racism and Intolerance into an EU Human Rights Agency. The proposals currently on the table still carry a real risk of duplication, and thereby weakening of human rights standards in Europe.

The European Union’s enlargement is based on the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. Upon close examination, it is evident that these criteria are virtually identical and clearly based on accession criteria to the Council of Europe. Commission reports on candidate countries, such as on Turkey, are based on Council of Europe texts and reports. However, more often than not, they fail to quote the source. Indeed, a rather incoherent approach can be observed in Commission documents concerning non-EU members which are Member States of the Council of Europe.

To overcome these difficulties, and following much insistence, notably from the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commission finally appointed a permanent representative to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, with the title of Ambassador. Although not resident,



he participates in all meetings of the Ministers’ Deputies and subsidiary groups. Unfortunately, the Council of Europe’s representative in Brussels does not enjoy any of these privileges. It would seem logical that Council of Europe representatives be invited to the meetings of COREPER when agenda items concern the Council of Europe activities.

The Council of Europe’s Conventions aim to create a common European legal space. 41 of these Conventions are open to the European Community, but the latter has only signed 11 and ratified 9 of these. Only 8 of these conventions have entered into force.

As a member of the European Convention, I strongly pleaded for the inclusion in the Constitutional Treaty of a clause concerning accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, a long-standing wish of both the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament. Regrettably, the negative results of the referenda on the Treaty in France and the Netherlands have delayed that prospect.

The EU Neighbourhood Policy directly concerns several Member States of the Council of Europe. It would therefore seem essential that the Council of Europe’s expertise, mechanisms, and instruments should be appropriately used by the Union. A report on the subject was adopted by the PACE in October 2005.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that the current relationship between the 46 member Council of Europe and the 25 member European Union does not do justice to the added value the Council of Europe has to offer. Transparency is a one-way street, where the Council of Europe’s expertise is not used to its full advantage; opportunities to accede to instruments and to benefit from considerable know-how are not seized. Its PACE and its Court are unique instruments for developing and promoting our values.

Political decision-makers should be made more aware of this. At the level of National Parliaments however, this issue is fortunately attracting more attention. COSAC (the Committee of Chairmen of European Affairs Committees of the EU Member States) is, for instance, considering the question of the EU Human Rights Agency and the risks of duplication with the work of the Council of Europe.

The Warsaw Summit

On 16 and 17 May 2005, the Council of Europe organised its Third Summit of Heads of State and Government. The choice of Warsaw as its venue was highly symbolic. In institutional terms the Summit coincided with Poland’s rotating Chairmanship of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. However, it would have been difficult to think of a better place than Warsaw to organise the first ever Summit of the whole of Europe. This city became a symbol of the horrors of World War Two and witnessed the birth of the Solidarity movement, the success of which ultimately resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Europe. The dates of the Summit were equally historic: 60 years after the end of the Second World War, 30 years after the Helsinki Final Act, 25 years after the founding of “Solidarity” and 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The event brought together almost the entire continent. Only Belarus, where people continue to suffer under the autocratic regime of President Lukashenko, remains outside the European family. As host, Polish President Kwasniewski stated at the opening: “never before has Europe been so strong, so safe, so close to being united.” The Heads of State and Government adopted the “Warsaw Declaration”, which confirmed the Council of Europe’s leading role in developing democracy, defending human rights and advancing the rule of law on the continent. They also adopted an Action Plan, which identifies ways and means of accomplishing these objectives.

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It is significant to note that many of the considerations of the Declaration, as well as the elements of the Action Plan, resulted in proposals made by the Parliamentary Assembly, which had also launched the idea of holding a Third Summit.1

An important part of the Summit’s deliberations concerned the question of European architecture, i.e. the relations between the various European organisations.

The Summit managed to secure and improve practical cooperation between the Council of Europe and the OSCE and endorsed a Joint Declaration of the two organisations on this issue. More fundamental, and of particular importance to this contribution, were the discussions on the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Union. Here it must be stated from the outset that an opportunity was missed in Warsaw for resolving once and for all the question of the relative competence of the two organisations. In its proposals for the Summit, the Parliamentary Assembly had clearly argued that the Summit should invite the European Union to:

• consider the Council of Europe as the key forum for developing and implementing its neighbourhood policy;

• accede to all Council of Europe conventions open to it in order to promote the creation of a Single European Area;

• make systematic and acknowledged use of the expertise of the Council of Europe’s mechanisms and instruments.

Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on these proposals and the Summit decided that cooperation between the Council of Europe and the European Union should be elaborated in a “Memorandum of Understanding”. In an appendix to the Action Plan, guidelines were agreed.

At my initiative, however, at the Summit, Heads of State and Government agreed to ask Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg to prepare, in a personal capacity, a report on the relationship between the Council of Europe and the European Union. Although not formally related to the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding, this report, knowing the extraordinary capability of its author, will no doubt chart a realistic political roadmap for cooperation between the organisations in the future.

The Parliamentary Assembly will certainly make a substantial contribution to this report. Some preliminary proposals are set out below.

Given that the EU wants to strengthen its relations with National Parliaments, this could very usefully be done via the PACE.

Proposals

Building on the increased awareness of the need for more synergy, the following proposal would seem to merit consideration by the 25 Member States of the European Union, all of which are, of course, also members of the Council of Europe. Standards and policies developed by the 25 with their partners within the “46” remain valid and important for them as EU members too.

It would be important that the Commission representative to the Committee of Ministers becomes resident in Strasbourg, enabling him or her to attend all meetings. Access should also be granted to the Council of Europe representative in Brussels where agenda items warrant this.

New impetus should be provided for EU accession to existing Council of Europe instruments, notably the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as for the acknowledged use of Council of Europe expertise.


1 http://www.coe.int/t/dcr/summit/default_EN.asp


PACE and the European Parliament should set the example by increased cross references to each others’ work. In particular:

• involve each other’s rapporteurs and committee chairpersons in discussions on issues of common interest;

• organise joint committee hearings, seminars and colloquies;

• organise joint fact-finding missions;• set up joint assistance programmes;• organise regular meetings of their bureaux;• invite their respective Presidents to address

the other body at regular intervals. Moreover, the European Parliament could make increased use of PACE monitoring reports.

A parliamentary dimension should be included in the quadripartite meetings. This would inject fresh thinking and enable increased action in National Parliaments, as well as in the European Parliament, to ensure follow-up to decisions taken concerning co-operation between the two institutions. It will also add credibility to the exercise.

The European Union would benefit greatly from making use of the Council of Europe as a forum for its cooperation with European non-member states. The EU would gain by also using its potential as a forum for intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, as well as for dialogue with civil society. The standard-setting role of the Council of Europe, also for EU Member States in fields of the Council of Europe’s competence, should be recognised, acknowledged and implemented.

Delays have occurred, and are perhaps inevitable in such an ambitious project as the European construction - which on a global level remains unprecedented. In this context, I am convinced that the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French, as well as by my compatriots, was a historical mistake: a missed opportunity.

Politicians have a clear responsibility to seize opportunities. Improving cooperation between the European Union and the Council of Europe is just such an opportunity.

We should not miss it.

René van der Linden is the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

European View


176

What does it mean to be European? First of all it means to be a citizen – a person enjoying inalienable fundamental rights and freedoms

and who has a relationship with other people based on duty and mutual respect. So, it is not surprising that one of the first joint documents on the way towards European integration became the European Convention on Human Rights and the first supranational institution, the European Court of Human Rights, was mandated to protect citizens regardless of their age, sex, race, origin or religion.

European identity is both a national and transnational concept. Being European is a unique national feeling which is underpinned by a special independent process of forming an institution of citizenship in each of the European Union Member States. Europe was not built all at once or according to a single plan. If people were the same all over Europe, the Union would have emerged long ago. If each national programme did not have to have common fundamental features, the European project would have failed due to national egoism. However, there may be other traits of national identity that emerge within societies from time to time as proven by the referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands - but these are exceptions that do not quash the general principle.

The transnational nature of European identity is manifested in the procedure of mutual recognition by nations of each other’s equality and self-sufficiency, incorporating a common set of rules and uniting efforts in maintaining dialogue with the wider world. Being European means making consensus decisions.

Civil Law provides two principles for gaining citizenship – jus sanguinis and jus soli. Considering them in the light of current integration processes in Europe, we see two major forces shaping the European Union’s profile – history (inheritance, roots, memory) and geopolitics (interests, resources, territory). In trying to give a clear and definite answer to the question on Ukraine’s future – European or whatever else – we must demonstrate the role of Ukraine in Europe’s history and its place in the European integration processes.

Let’s begin with geopolitics. If 50 years ago geopolitics was a science about balance of power, movement and conflicts between military powers, now it is about the strategic management of the movement of capital, goods and services, people and ideas.

Ukraine has both successes and failures in this sphere. 14 years of independence have passed but the weight of our Soviet heritage still remains our major problem. The “Eastern vector” of Ukrainian foreign policy has just started to take shape with a new status of real equality rather than cosmetic equality. In Russia, one can see that illusions of restoring Soviet-style supranational bodies and a single centre of decision-making are being abandoned. Russia represents a multi-polar world; therefore it ought also to accept a multi-polar system in the post-Soviet space. The successful European project has proved that national democracy only benefits from the democratisation (equality) of international relationships.

Presently, about 40% of Ukraine’s trade is with the European Union. Ukraine will enhance these relations after joining the World Trade Organisation and receiving market economy status. The European Union rates first among foreign investors in Ukraine (having made $4.652

Ukraine Towards the European Project

By Victor Yushchenko

Victor Yushchenko


billion of direct investments). By promoting legality, electing a new Parliament and forming a responsible government, Ukraine is expecting a marked increase in foreign investment. Such statements were made during the Extraordinary Ukraine Round-table 2005.

Ukraine is deepening its cooperation with the EU in both the energy and security spheres. The Ukrainian government is forging relationships with Russia and Turkmenistan in spite of non-transparent and unjust schemes of payment for energy carriers left by the former regime. Moreover, Ukraine is actively seeking partners to diversify methods of supplying Caspian oil and gas to Europe. We can achieve this goal by completing the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline project and holding negotiations on the creation of a gas-transport consortium to enhance the transit facility of the Ukrainian gas-transport system.

Since 1994 Ukraine has been positioning itself not only as a consumer but also as a contributor to security on the European continent. Ukrainian peacekeepers were present in all the European “hot spots” – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo - as well as the Persian Gulf and the Golan Heights. Ukraine proved to be an efficient participant of the Euro-Atlantic integration process: an intensified dialogue with NATO is proof that our country is making substantial contributions to collective security in Europe.

However, there are threats which a country cannot cope with alone. Ukraine deeply regretted the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, a school hostage siege in Beslan in September 2004 and the 7 July London bombings. We should respond to the challenge of terrorism using not only forceful but also civilised means, in other words by exporting high European standards of living, safety and democracy to the regions beyond Europe, such as the Black Sea, Caspian Sea area and the Near East. Regional integration based on European principles and values, forming a zone of stability and cooperation from Vitebsk to Baku, harmonising with the EU

space is one of Ukraine’s main goals. This is the only way forward for a new Europe.

An essential element of Europe’s civilised expansion is to continue providing humanitarian cooperation and remain open to a dialogue of cultures. Open societies, including the European Union, will remain stable and prosperous by keeping their doors open to reasonable cooperation and beneficial interchange. We are currently urging the EU Member States not to turn the “neighbourhood” mechanism into a political “purgatory” where candidates for EU membership will be retained for an indefinite period. Ukraine is against a “Europe of privileges”, Ukraine stands for a “Europe of opportunities”.

An important psychological factor will be an easing of European Union visa restrictions for Ukraine. Having improved living standards in Ukraine, its citizens will be able to find decent jobs in their homeland. Ukrainians will travel to Europe to visit, study and to share experiences. Initiatives such as “Europe – non-visa space for country members of the Council of Europe” are convincing evidence of a driving force for unifying processes on the continent.

It is in this context that we view the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. I am convinced that along with the fulfilment of this Plan, the European Union’s intention to develop another strategy of relationships with Ukraine will change into a political will to give Ukraine the prospective of EU membership.

Realisation of the Action Plan will result in the signature of a new agreement, in the form of a European Association Agreement. We will build cooperation and work hard so that we may, in the near future, apply for EU membership in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union. Ukraine is ready to work its way up to comply with the Copenhagen criteria.

The so-called jus soli, which indicates that

European View

Ukraine Towards the European Project

178

Ukraine territorially belongs to a United Europe, is clear and indisputable. However, the jus sanguinis of Ukraine to be spiritually regarded as a European state should be meticulously analysed. It may take elites and nations years to reach mutual understanding.

Europe was divided after World War II. To some extent, this geopolitical and historical split was a stereotype shared by many politicians and mainstream Europeans. They have been endeavouring to overcome this conscious obstacle since the fall of the Berlin Wall fifteen years ago.

The worst stereotype of that time was the division of Europeans into those who were susceptible to market and democratic changes and those who failed to accept them. The existence of such stereotypes can be seen in the difficulties Europeans faced to ratify the EU Constitution or negotiate their common budget. One of the more tangible signs of such problems is the rise of radical nationalistic forces in Europe.

There was an unsuccessful attempt to classify Ukrainians into territorial, ethnic, and linguistic groups during the 2004 presidential campaign. Fortunately, the nation proved to be wiser than some cynical politicians. The Orange Revolution was a massive response to this fraudulent election. The people who battled for dignity, free will and civil rights demonstrated that European values were an integral part of their world view.

The European Union is standing on the threshold of its own Orange Revolution, and I believe it is beginning to understand that history does not obey any directives or commissions. It is created by a dialogue between sides that tolerate each other and accept each other’s unique historical experience. By fencing itself off from Ukraine, the EU narrows its historical perspective as a community of free and developed nations. This is why I ask you to be unbiased. I ask you to start an all-European dialogue to discuss the future of our peoples in a United Europe. As

President, I would like to say that my country is ready for such a dialogue. We are ready to study the European integration process together with the 25 nations and leaders of the European Union.

Victor Yushchenko is President of Ukraine.

Victor Yushchenko


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european view - volume 2 - autumn 2005 europe, its borders and role in the world

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