This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and

the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique

challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks. Related information is available at

www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

Introduction

Rebel fighters battling the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad now number between 100,000 and

120,000, according to defence consultancy IHS Jane’s and Aram Nerguizian, a senior fellow at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nearly fifty to sixty thousand are considered to be jihadist and hard-line

Islamists intent on establishing an Islamic state upon the ousting of the Assad government, reports The Telegraph.

Of that fifty per cent, approximately 10,000 fighters, including foreign fighting elements, are considered to be

jihadist1.

While the US and its allies continue to fund the rebel Free Syrian Army, many observers warn that the growing

presence of jihadist and militants from beyond Syria is creating a dangerous new conflict within the Syrian civil

war, according to Christian Science Monitor (CSM). The increasing number of radicalised young Muslims travelling

to Syria to fight against the regime has raised Western concerns over what might occur once those fighters return

home, according to Bloomberg. Matthew Olsen, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center says that the

Syrian war is providing both “a rallying point and a training ground for radical Islamists from other nations”.

Richard Barrett, former coordinator of the UN al Qaeda Taliban Monitoring Team, says the risks of returning

jihadists are real, while acknowledging that not all those retuning home will be inclined to engage in terrorist

activity.

Europol reports that terrorist attacks

and related arrests in the European

Union (EU) “significantly increased in

2012” compared to previous years. Its

findings lend credibility to concerns

that terrorism threats remain strong

and varied throughout Europe. In

2011, there were 174 reported

terrorist attacks in EU member states.

In 2012, 219 terrorist attacks were

documented (Figure 1.). Terrorist bomb

attacks at Burgas airport in Bulgaria

and shootings by a lone gunman in

France claimed the lives of fourteen

people in 20122. Separate attacks in Belgium, France and Northern Ireland killed three others. Director of Europol

Rob Wainwright says, “[t]here is growing concern about the threat posed by [foreign fighters] given the possibility

of their returning to the European Union intent on committing acts of terrorism”.

1 Charles Lister from IHS Jane’s offers variations in these numbers. In August 2013, Lister indicated that al Qaeda-linked jihadist fighters such

as those associated with Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) numbered 12,000. Lister also indicates that

the larger and more powerful rebel group Ahrar al Sham has approximately 15,000 to 25,000 fighters and is also strongly Islamist. 2 According to the Europol report, there were no terrorism related deaths in 2011.

November 2013

Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues

Linda Lavender Complex Coverage Desk Officer

linda.lavender@cimicweb.org

Europe’s Challenge:

The Return of the Foreign Fighters

C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E

M E D I T E R R A N E A N B A S I N T E A M P R E S E N T S

Source: Europol

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Terrorist attacks

Individuals arrested

Deaths

Figure 1: 2013 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

2012

2011

November 2013

Page 2

This report considers the current level of terrorist threats in the EU, provides an overview of a select number of

countries of origin for foreign jihadists now fighting in Syria, and discusses the on-going debate on how best to

address jihadists returning to their countries of origin.

Foreign Fighters in Syria

According to Newsweek, the Syrian civil war is the third-largest foreign Mujahideen3 mobilisation in history,

following Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq in the past decade. “Syria is the new epicentre for the global jihad

with would be ‘martyrs’ arriving from across the Islamic world to fight Assad (Figure 2.). They are getting

experience in the terror arts they will bring home”, according to Bruce Riedel, former CIA official and member of

the White House National Security Council, cited by The Washington Times. The newly-appointed head of the UK

Security Services, Sir Andrew Parker, issued a stern warning in October 2012 when he said that jihadi fighters

migrating to Syria are a major security threat to the UK, Europe and beyond, reports Newsweek. Parker reports

that “a growing proportion of our casework now has some link to Syria, mostly concerning individuals from the UK

who have travelled to fight there or who aspire to do so. Al Nusrah [Jabhat al Nusra] and other extremist Sunni

groups there aligned with al Qaeda aspire to attack Western countries”.

Precise information is difficult to gather and verify. Foreign Policy reports that foreign fighter groups operating in

Syria have integrated themselves into the social fabric of host communities, particularly in the northern

governorates of Aleppo, northern Idlib, Raq’a and in eastern Deir al Zour. Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute

states that in the early stages of the Syrian conflict, most foreign fighters joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but this

was prior to any jihadi group announcing its presence in Syria. In the autumn of 2011, there were only a small

number of foreign fighters in Syria. This changed after January 2012 when Jabhat al Nusra (JAN4) announced its

formation, resulting in a greater number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria to engage in the fight. Since 2012,

there has been a steady stream of foreign fighters entering Syria. This is significant as the majority of jihadists

come from the Arab world5, states Zelin,

3 Mujahideen is an Islamic-Arabic term for Muslims guerilla warriors engaged in jihad. 4 Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) is an al Qaeda linked militia fighting against the Assad regime. 5 “The Arab world”, Zelin’s description, includes Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.

Figure 2. Deaths by Country of Origin (May 2013)

Source: NBC News

November 2013

Page 3

JAN quickly became one of the most effective fighting rebel forces in Syria. According to Zelin, since the summer of

2011 when the Syrian uprising became an armed insurrection, the jihad in Syria has become “the du jour locale

for fighters who want to topple the ‘apostate’ al Assad regime for a variety of strategic, geographic and religious

reasons”.

Foreign fighters in Syria have varying motivations for engaging in the conflict. Some foreign fighters view the Syrian

conflict in jihadist terms. That is, they see the fight within Syria as an opportunity to establish an Islamic state

based on Sharia Law with intent to undertake jihad in the West. The hope of instituting a “Caliphate State” is one

of the most significant motives to enter the fight, and it is often linked to the Islamic sect of Salafism, a strict

interpretation of Sunni Islam. The rise of al Qaeda worldview fighters can be traced back to the fall of 2011,

according to Zelin, who also authored Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom

Notices.

Jihadi Tourism

Jihadi Tourism is a term often used to

describe travel to foreign destinations

with the object of locating and engaging

in terrorist training. As early as 2009,

British and US counterterrorism officials

voiced concerns that British Somalis

could return to the UK after participating

in jihad training in Somalia, according to

CBS News. Counterterrorism expert Anat

Berko asserts that “the overwhelming

desire of many Muslim adolescent boys,

even those educated in the West or who

are converts to Islam, especially those

living in countries where there is no real

governance, is excitement [performing

jihad]. To that end they stream into

confrontation zones like Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Chechnya, Libya, Iraq, Africa

(such as the recent terrorist attack in

Kenya), and Syria to experience the mission, the excitement and promise of being a shaheed6 as the ultimate in

self-realization”.

As of July 2013, reports suggested that “thousands of foreign terrorists” have travelled to Syria in order to wage

jihad (Figure 3). Jihadists that once used similar routes to access the insurgency in Iraq, now use those routes to

join jihadists in Syria. Ibrahim Talib, head researcher and deputy director of the Center for Strategic Studies in

Damascus indicated the same month that Tunisians in Syria number 15,000 followed by Libyans, Saudis,

Egyptians, Palestinians and Lebanese, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In September 2013, Syrian

Foreign Minister Walid Muallem told the UN General Assembly that “terrorists from more than 83 countries” were

operating in Syria, according to BBC. Jihadists have travelled to Syria at rates not even experienced during the

height of the Iraqi insurgency, according to the Washington Times. In March 2013 UK Foreign Minister William

Hague said, “Syria is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world today”. One senior

French counterterror official who requested anonymity stated, “Imagine this: Between 2001 and 2010, we

identified 50 jihadists who went from France to Afghanistan, surely there were more, but we identified 50. With

Syria, in one year, we have already identified 135. It has been very fast and strong”, reports Pro Publica.

At the Syrian border town of Atmeh near Turkey, one journalist described the scene as a “set for a movie about al

Qaeda”, reports Der Spiegel. New jihadists arrive pulling suitcases searching for their emirs. Africans and Asians

can be seen on the streets. Long-haired men dressed in traditional Afghan clothing walk around wielding AK-47s.

Atmeh was once considered a “sleepy smugglers” nest on the Turkish border. Now, it has become “mecca for

jihad tourists from around the world”. More than 1,000 jihadists were staying in and around the village in

6 Shadeed is a martyr for the sake of Allah. It is an Arabic term for holy martyrs.

Figure 3: Routes into Syria

Source: Truth Frequency Radio

November 2013

Page 4

September 2013, making it the densest accumulation of jihadists in Syria. Responding to the influx, Atmeh shops

now carry shalwar kameez, traditional Afghan clothing. New restaurants are opening and a new company,

International Contacts, books flights and serves as a currency exchange. In June 2013, a third Internet café

opened in Atmeh in order to accommodate the many jihadists looking to communicate with relatives and friends.

Atmeh has become the transit point for international jihadists arriving at the nearby airport in Hatay, Turkey. Some

jihadists will remain in the area, while others will travel on to Aleppo, Latakia to Raqa'a.

Jihadists in Atmeh consider Syria a staging ground. A young jihadist from the UK explains, “First there is jihad here,

until we achieve victory! Then we will liberate Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine”. According to Der Spiegel, in June

2013 there were at least five jihadist groups in and around Atmeh. The five groups are discussed below:

i. Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa bilad al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)

The name means “those who believed and migrated”. The al Qaeda-affiliated group continues to grow and has

more than 200 members. ISIS has played an important role in fighting on the outskirts of the city of Aleppo and in

the surrounding countryside. Recently, ISIS has sought to expand and consolidate control over outlying towns in

Aleppo and Idlib governorates – especially those with strategic importance along the border with Turkey. According

to Joshua Landis, an expert on Syria, ISIS martyrs are overwhelmingly foreign. Fighters from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,

Libya, Jordan have been killed while members of ISIS.

ii. Jaysh al Muhajirin wal Ansar (The Army of Emigrants and Helpers)

“The Army”, a Chechen jihadist group, is fighting primarily in Aleppo and is one of the most prominent groups

fighting in the Syrian Jihad. The group integrated several Syrian fighting units into its ranks. “In March 2013, a unit

of Mujahideen of Kataeb al Mujahideen, or Brigade of Emigrants, under the command of Abu Omar al Chechen

was joined by several brigades of Syrian Mujahideen, including Kataeb Khattab, or the Brigade of Khattab, and

Jaish Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, after which it was decided to reorganise the structure of Kataeb”,

Kavkaz Center reported. One report suggests there are over 1,000 in the group originating from different

countries, including the Caucasus Emirate, Russia, Ukraine, Crimea and other Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS7) countries. Formed in the summer of 2012, it is headed by an ethnic Chechen Abu Omar al Chechen.

As of June 2013, there are approximately 170 foreign fighters belonging to Jaysh al Muhajirin wal Ansar.

iii. Abu al-Banat

A group of an estimated seventy fighters, it is named after its emir and consists of Chechens, Dagestanis and

Azerbaijanis. The group’s numbers are in decline. Few additional details about its capabilities and activities are

known.

iv. Abu Musab al Jazairi

The group takes its name from the founder, an Algerian financier, and comprises sixty members. Few additional

details about its capabilities and activities are known.

v. Jahbat Al Nusra – JAN (Front of Defense)

Most of the foreign jihadists now fighting in Syria express loyalty to al Qaeda-affiliated Jahbat al Nusra (JAN).

Reports suggest that while fighters are coming from around the world. JAN ranks are largely comprised of Saudis,

Iraqis, Libyans and Tunisians. By all accounts, JAN is the best organised and ideologically motivated armed

opposition group operating in Syria, after the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA). According to Foreign Policy, JAN

maintains an operational presence in eleven of Syria’s thirteen governorates.

Jihadists in Europe

To date, counterterrorism measures are largely relegated to the individual European countries. However, the EU

Terrorism Chief Gilles de Kerchove anticipates EU member countries becoming more cooperative over security

measures and setting joint objectives in order to address the threat. Kerchove indicated a high priority for the EU

to engage with the Turkish government in order to more closely monitor suspicious travel of EU citizens. European

leaders express great concern over the return of foreign fighters, who arrive equipped with deadly military skills,

trained in the tradecraft of international terrorism and immersed in the extremist anti-Western ideology of al

7 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries are an association of former Soviet republics that were establish in December 1991 by

Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus to help ease the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

November 2013

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Qaeda. Of the large number of European Muslims who have received training overseas and fought in places such

as Somalia, Libya and Syria, few have actually conducted attacks after returning to Europe, according to Stratfor.

Still, in an era when jihadist ideologues are urging individual jihad in the West, these trained individuals pose a

very real threat to Europe’s security.

Foreign Fighters from European Countries

Foreign Policy indicates that the UK, France, Germany, and Ireland are among the countries from which up to

1,000 European transnational volunteers8 have left to join Syrian rebels against the Assad regime. Zelin reports

that European countries have growing concerns over the number of European Muslims joining the Syrian rebels

(Figure 4.). In February 2013, the UK-based Independent claims that more than 100 Britons had gone to Syria. Le

Figaro estimated 50 to 80 people came from France. Der Spiegel reported “dozens” of Germans, and Jyllands-

Posten reported 45 Danes. Without question, the picture on the ground in Syria is far from complete and will likely

change as the conflict continues to morph. As a result, accurate figures vary considerably, but do reveal the

European countries from which citizens have travelled to Syria to engage in the fight.

Figure 4. European Nationalities Represented in Syrian Opposition Forces (as of Feb 2013)

Albania Austria Belgium

Britain Bulgaria Denmark

Finland France Germany

Ireland Iceland Kosovo

Netherlands Spain Sweden

Source: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation

The threat of battle savvy, foreign fighters returning to Europe from combat in Syria and North Africa is fuelling

debate over immigration and integration policies throughout Europe, says an August 2013 Stratfor report. EU

Counterterrorism Coordinator de Kerchove estimated in April 2013 that 500 Europeans were fighting in Syria

mostly from the UK, France and Ireland; the ICSR reported up to 600 Europeans.

The challenge of monitoring returning fighters is complex. EU cross-border travel restrictions are minimal and

some European officials report they do not want to provoke reaction from Muslim communities. Compounding the

problem, according to Stratfor, is that returning fighters are in fact European citizens and are not flagged by

current immigration mechanisms. Hence, returning European fighters can receive support from people and groups

in the Middle East and North Africa largely undetected. Further, the networks made on the battlefield can be

leveraged to plan and execute attacks on Western targets. This potential threat posed by radicals has emerged as

an important policy issue, likely one reason both the UK and France have been reluctant thus far to arm Syrian

opposition fighters, suggests Stratfor.

Additionally, Thomas Hegghammer, an expert on terrorism and political violence, discovered that approximately

one in nine returning foreign fighters attempt to launch a Western attack. While the percentage is low,

Hegghammer asserts that the plots are more likely to succeed. Attacks planned by returning foreign fighters are

twice as likely to be lethal than those planned by terrorists who have never fought abroad. While Hegghammer’s

research reveals that most foreign jihadists prefer to attack abroad, the one in nine radicalisation rate

demonstrates that the foreign fighting experience is one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in

domestic operations. Hegghammer also emphasised that the vast majority of returning foreign fighters will resume

their “former, peaceful lives-albeit perhaps with enhanced prestige” among home country Islamists. Research also

suggests that some foreign fighters will never return home. Of course, some foreign fighters will die in battle but

some could move to other locations to fight9, and some may settle in Syria.

For those monitoring radicalism in Europe, Caucasian converts to radical Islam is of great concern. Patrick Poole, a

private counterterrorism analyst indicates that terrorist groups welcome Americans that join their ranks. These

new recruits facilitate fundraising and recruitment in the West, demonstrated in recent years with al Shabaab

8 Foreign fighters have also been referred to as transnational volunteers and transnational insurgents. 9 Thomas Hegghammer asserts that some of the battle seasoned jihadists currently fighting in Syria “cut their teeth” battling against Muammar

Qaddafi in Libya.

November 2013

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recruiting and fundraising in US Somali communities10. Al Qaeda has been attempting to recruit Americans and

Europeans as terrorists for years assuming that they would be capable of “more easily evading western security

monitoring”.

EU and US Case Studies

The following section demonstrates some of the internal challenges facing European countries as they encounter

returning foreign fighters and the threat of extremism. This section is not an exhaustive treatment of the legal

implications or the complex issue of foreign fighters within a respective country

Belgium

Belgium no longer conducts a national census; however, the population of Muslims in the country is estimated at

between 320,000 to 450,000 persons, translating to approximately four per cent of the population, reports Euro-

Islam. Almost 35 per cent of the Muslim population consists of Turkish or Moroccan immigrants. The Council of

Europe (COE) shows that since December 2003, Belgium has enacted counter terrorism legislation. The Terrorist

Offences Act transposed into Belgian law the Council of the European Union Framework Decision of 13 June

200211 on combating terrorism. Later, in 2004 Belgium incorporated the financing of terrorism12 into its Act of 11

January 1993 on prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering.

According to reports, Belgian authorities have found it difficult to prosecute jihadists in Belgian courts, as the

uprising against Assad is “generally regarded as legitimate”, according to Gatestone Institute. In a recent De

Standaard reported court case; thirteen Muslim extremists were acquitted of having membership in a terrorist

organisation. While the Belgian court claimed the existence of proof that the jihadists travelled to Chechnya, there

was no evidence that they fought in Chechnya as members of a terrorist group.

Relating to Syria, an outlawed Belgian extremist Muslim group, Sharia4Belgium, indicated that at least seventy of

its members are fighting in Syria. According to the De Standaard, the Belgian jihadists are “young people, between

the ages of 17 and 25, who grew up in [Belgium]. They are young people without qualifications and often with

criminal records. They come from Antwerp, Brussels, Mechelen and Vilvoorde”. Pro Publica places the number of

jihadists who have journeyed from Belgium to Syria between 100 - 300 persons.

In April 2013, the New York Times reports that authorities conducted 48 raids on suspected jihadi recruiters

allegedly affiliated with Sharia4Belgium, and who are believed to be “luring Belgians to the Syrian front”.

According to Al Jazeera, eighteen-year-old Jejoen Bontinck was arrested on 18 October for allegedly fighting

alongside Syrian rebel forces following a recruiting call from Fouad Belkacem, leader of Sharia4Belgium. BBC

reports that Bontinck did not deny he was in northern Syria for eight months, but asserts he only provided

humanitarian support in Syria as a hospital transport. On 23 October, the young man was remanded into custody

by an Antwerp court while police investigate the case further. The case underscores Europe’s growing concerns

over returning foreign fighters and what kind of security implications the returnees bring with them. De Standaard

reports that the Belgian security services are “particularly concerned about what will happen when the military-

trained ‘drop-outs,’ after the war from Syria, return to our country”.

Denmark

While there is no official census of Muslims in Denmark, some reliable data is available, reports American Foreign

Policy Council (AFPC). Between 1999 and 2006, the proportion of Muslims in the total population grew from 2.9

per cent to 3.8 per cent (207,000), resulting from Iraqi and Somalia refugee resettlement, in addition to a limited

number of family reunifications among Turkish and Pakistani immigrants. Denmark’s Muslim community is

ethnically diverse. The largest group is Turkish (24.7 per cent), followed by Iraqis, Lebanese and Pakistanis “(11.7

per cent, 10.7 per cent and 8.3 per cent, respectively)”.

Since 2001, the Danish parliament has passed two Anti-Terrorism Acts, first in 2002 and subsequently in 2006.

According to the Misson of Denmark to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ,the first

10 The 23 September attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi Kenya shines new light on the recruitment practices of al Shabaab in Somali

communities in the US, Canada and Europe. 11 The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 can be accessed at: http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002F0475:20081209:EN:PDF 12 The Law of 11 January 1993 can be accessed at:

http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/HalbantHon/docs/Lawof11January1993onpreventinguseofthefinancialsys.pdf

November 2013

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Act de facto amended the Danish penal code by introducing a separate terrorism provision (Chapter 13, §114)

that increased the punishment for a variety of previously-proscribed actions if carried out with the intention of

“frightening a population, unduly forc[ing] Danish or foreign authorities to act or abstain from acting,” or

destabilising “the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an

international organization”. The maximum sentence for committing an offense under the new terrorism provision

was raised to life in prison. A report commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council in 2013 states that in 2006 Denmark also introduced additional

offences, including the “provision of financial support or the making of money, other financial assets of financial or

other similar services available indirectly” to a person or group that commits or intends to commit terrorist acts.

The Anti-Terrorism Act similarly equipped authorities with new tools to fight terrorism, including secret searches;

the logging of telephone and Internet communications; easier access to computer surveillance; expanded ability to

refuse or withdraw residence permits.

Following the 07 July 2005 London subway bombings, Danish authorities began re-focusing on “home-grown”

terrorism threats, according to Extremis Project. State antiterrorism policies soon focused on preventing the

“radicalisation” of Danish Muslims, leading to the establishment of a comprehensive Danish counter-radicalisation

Action Plan adopted in 2008-2009.

With regard to Syria, on 03 March, the Danish newspaper Politiken reported that a Danish convert to Islam had

been killed in fighting near the Syrian city of Homs. The death of Abdel Malik came two weeks after another

Danish citizen, Slimane Hadj Abderrahmane, was killed while fighting with the Syrian opposition. Interestingly,

Abderrahmane spent two years in the US prison at Guantanamo after his capture in Afghanistan in 2001. Politiken

also reported that 65 Danish nationals had fought alongside Syrian rebels, with at least five of them having been

killed as of June 2013.

In efforts to bolster security, Danish intelligence services inform Danish authorities of trips made by the country’s

citizens to Syria and the source of any funds used for this purpose, reports Politiken. The government is

considering sanctions against returning fighters, ranging from a suspension of welfare benefits for immigrants to

criminal charges of terrorism.

France

France has an estimated six million Muslims, while according to the NYT, the number of Muslim converts has

doubled in the past 25 years as conversions to Islam are becoming more commonplace. French antiterrorism

authorities have been warning for years that the conversion of French nationals to Islam could be a critical issue in

the Europe-wide terrorist threat, as the converts “do not stand out” with Western passports. Muslims relate they

are regularly discriminated against, demonstrated by the 2010 law banning the full-face veil from public spaces.

France responded to the 9/11 attacks, with the 15 November 2001 passing of the Everyday Security law. The law

is considered controversial as it extends beyond the “boundaries of what normally could be considered counter-

terrorism” according to Euro-Islam. France has continued to adopt specific anti-terrorist laws including the Acts of

18 March 2003, 09 March 2004 and 23 January 2006 which have reinforced the basic legislation and procedural

regulations, according to COE. France deported 129 suspected terrorists between 2001 and 2010, reports The

Telegraph.

In October 2012, French police conducted a series of antiterrorism raids which resulted in twelve arrests including

three French citizens who had recently converted to Islam, reports NYT. Again in March 2013, CNN reported that

three citizens were Chechens suspected of Islamist terrorist activity.

French Interior Minister Manuel Valls claimed that only a “handful” of French jihadists had travelled to participate

in the recent unrest in Mali. However, it is widely believed that “at least fifty and as many as eighty” French

citizens departed the country to fight in the Syrian conflict as of March 2013. Travel to Syria is relatively

uncomplicated for French citizens. According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey does not require a visa

for French citizens. Upon arrival, it is relatively easy to cross the porous Syrian-Turkish border in order to join the

Syrian conflict.

Germany

Germany is home to the highest number of Muslim citizens in Western Europe and is described by AFPC as “a

hotbed of Islamist activity”. With a total Muslim population of 4.3 million, Salafists are the fastest growing Muslim

November 2013

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sect in Germany with 4,000 adherents. AFPC reports that the attacks of 9/11 were organised in part in Germany

by the “Hamburg cell” headed at the time by Mohammed Atta13, one of the 9/11 hijackers. Abu Hajer, one of

Osama Bin Laden’s deputies in Sudan and head of his computer operations and weapons procurement, was

arrested in Germany shortly after the 9/11 attacks, according to the 9/11 Commission Report.

Germany’s counter-terrorism provisions are located within the German Criminal Code (section 129a, b and 89a ff)

as well as a growing number of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedures14. The COE country profile asserts that

Germany recognises the importance of working on an international level to address terrorism.

German security services closely monitor extremism, reports The Guardian. The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz

(BfV15) estimates that there are 20 Islamist groups active in Germany with approximately 35,000 members or

supporters who desire to establish a “Koran-state” in Germany. As of May 2013, German intelligence suggested

that up to forty people had left Germany to fight in Syria and up to sixty militants had left Germany for Egypt where

they were traced to training camps in Somalia, reports The Guardian. In the 08 June 2013 interview with Die Welt,

Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said, “Radical Salafism is like a hard drug. All of those who succumb to her

become violent”. On 22 October, Germany's BfV secret service suspects there are some two hundred jihadists

from Germany in Syria, reports Deutsche Welle. The majority of fighters come from the western state of North

Rhine-Westphalia, followed by Hesse, Berlin, Bavaria and Hamburg. More than fifty per cent are German citizens.

In Syria the majority of German jihadists congregate in a so-called “German camp”.

A spate of Salafist-led attacks on German police in 2012 has many concerned of rising extremism in Germany. In

the aftermath, German authorities launched a major crackdown on radical Islamists suspected of working against

the interests of Germans. In March, 2013, the Ministry of the Interior banned three Salafist organisations as anti-

democratic, reports Reuters. DawaFFM, Islamische Audios and An-Nussrah16 were deemed incompatible with

Germany’s “free democratic order”. Evidence collected in country-wide raids involving over 1,000 German police

in June 2013 could enable the German government to outlaw some of the dozens of Islamist groups still operating

in the country, reports Gatestone Institute. Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich, in May 2013, raised the

issue of “home-grown terrorism” and pledged to address it at meetings of EU governments. Friedrich proposes a

controversial two year re-entry ban to the EU for suspected terrorists.

Netherlands

Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reported in 2012 that 951,000 Muslims reside in the Netherlands, accounting for

5.7 per cent of the total population. However, this accounts for legal residents while the illegal Muslim population

is reported to be “quite substantial” and more difficult to quantify. Turks account for 37 per cent of the Muslim

population and Moroccans an additional 36 per cent. Other large Muslim communities come from Afghanistan,

Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. Additionally, there are several thousand native Dutch converts and children of

second-generation Muslim immigrants. For example, “Dutch Islamophobe” Arnoud Van Door a onetime anti-

Islamic filmmaker and member of the anti-Islamic Geert Wilder’s party, converted to Islam in April 2013, reports

The Guardian.

The Dutch judicial system, like many other Western countries, lacks the authority to prevent Dutch foreign fighters

from travelling to foreign battlegrounds. In many instances, the cases are highly controversial. For example, three

Dutch Kurds were arrested in November 2012 under charges they were “taking preparatory actions for the

purpose of committing terrorist offenses”. The case is pending and two of the three Kurds have been released

from jail. In another case, on 23 October 2013, a Dutch court convicted two men of “preparing to commit murder”.

It set a legal precedent in the Netherlands for people planning to fight in Syria, reports Al Jazeera. The Court’s

ruling suggested that the two men planned to join rebel fighters in Syria; both men were Dutch citizens and

arrested in November 2012. Suspicions were raised after one of the men purchased an airplane ticket to Turkey,

terminated his apartment lease and told social service he was going abroad. Prosecution spokesman Paul van der

Zonden said the decision, “is the first time that the Netherlands hands down such a judgement and this helps

clarify the fact that it’s illegal to go to Syria to fight. This means that we now have a legal precedent and can

prosecute other people wanting to go to Syria or coming back”.

13 Spiegel reports that the al Qaeda Hamburg-Cell, was headed by Mohammad Atta. Atta and cell-member Marwan al Shehhi piloted the planes

that rammed into the World Trade Center. Ziad Jarrah, also a cell-member had skyjacked the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania. 14 An extensive listing of Germany’s codes that address aspects of counter-terrorism efforts can be accessed at:

http://legislationline.org/topics/country/28/topic/5 15 The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz is the domestic intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. 16 An-Nussrah is reported to be part of the Millatu Ibrahim group that was outlawed in Germany in June 2012.

November 2013

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The 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the European response that followed, motivated the Dutch government to

step up its own counterterror infrastructure. A new central body, the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism

(NCTV), was created and tasked, “to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior

measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts”. NCTV efforts focus on the issue of counter-radicalisation,

launching a joint government and law enforcement operations to “disrupt” the work of the main Salafi centres in

the Netherlands, reports AFPC.

Despite NCTV efforts, the Dutch government raised the terrorism alert level from “limited” to “substantial” in

March 2013 stating that the “chance of an attack in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests abroad has risen”.

The same month, the Dutch public broadcasting system, NOS television, reported that the Netherlands had

“become one of the major European suppliers of Islamic jihadists”. According to NOS, an estimated 100 Dutch

Muslims were fighting in Syria, most with JAN. NCTV shared that the individuals had left the Netherlands for

various countries in Africa and the Middle East, especially Syria. The agency cautioned that individuals fighting for

Islam abroad could return and “inspire others in the Netherlands to follow in their footsteps”.

Spain

According to the AFPC, 1.6 million of Spain’s 47.4 million inhabitants are Muslim. Seventy-five per cent of the

Spanish Muslim population lives across the Mediterranean Sea in two territories that border Morocco, Ceuta and

Melilla (Figure 5.). On the mainland, Spanish Muslims are concentrated in three regions: Catalonia (427,000),

Andalusia (253,000), and Madrid (242,000). According to Gatestone Institute, Catalonia, an autonomous region in

northeastern Spain, is home to the biggest concentration of radical Islamists in Europe. Spanish authorities are

particularly concerned over the threat to security posed by Salafism which seeks to re-establish an Islamic empire

across the Middle East, North Africa and Spain17. Catalonia is home to potentially hundreds of Salafists.

In Spain’s fight against terrorism, both the “general provision

of the Spanish juridical regulations established to prevent all

kinds of crime, including terrorism and the specific

provisions” adopted to fight terrorism can be applied.

According to the Council of Europe, Spain has no specific anti-

terrorist legislation. In Spain, the legal concept of terrorism is

closely aligned with Article 55.2 of the 1978 Constitution that

allows for the restriction of certain procedural rights in

connection with the acts of armed gangs or terrorist cells;

however, the Penal code does not contain a precise definition

as to what is meant by the term “terrorist group”.

In July 2013, Spain’s Secretary of State for Security Franciso

Martinez Vazquez suggested that Europe was witnessing a

new kind of terrorism “characterised by self-radicalisation and self-training mainly through the Internet, which is

absolutely different from what we knew before”, reports the Independent.

In Valencia Spain, according to Agence France-Presse, Mohamed Echaabi, a 22 year old Moroccan, was taken into

custody February 2013 for planning terrorist attacks in Spain and elsewhere in Europe. A year earlier, In March

2012, police in Valencia arrested Mudhar Hussein Almalki, a Saudi suspected of running jihadist Internet forums

and sharing documents with extremists. In August 2012, three suspected al Qaeda terrorists were arrested by

Spanish police for the alleged planning of an airborne attack on a Gibraltar shopping mall and another plan

against a US-Spanish naval base at Rota. The suspects were Chechen-Russians and a Turkish national. More

recently, in June 2013, BBC reported eight suspected members of an al Qaeda network based in Ceuta, and in the

city of Fnideq, stand accused of training, funding and facilitating travel for jihadist fighters. In an issued statement,

the Spanish Ministry of Interior said “dozens of people, some of them under eighteen, had left both Ceuta and

Moroccan territory under the cover of the al-Qaeda-linked network”. The Ministry indicated that some of them had

taken part in suicide attacks, while others had joined training camps to prepare for armed action. Several groups

of jihadists were still expecting to travel from Spain to Syria, the ministry statement said, adding that the

investigation was ongoing. Diaz said, “We are aware that they [al Qaeda network] facilitated the travel of a number

of persons from Ceuta, Morocco and other places in Spain, via Turkey”. Later in September, Spanish police

17 Salafists view Spain as a Muslim state that must be reconquered for Islam.

Figure 5. Spanish Ceuta and Melilla

Source: BBC

November 2013

Page 10

arrested the suspected leader of an al Qaeda-linked militant group that recruited and sent militants to fight in

Syria, according to Agence France-Presse. Yassin Ahmed Laarbi was arrested in the Spanish territory of Ceuta and

is charged with leading a group that sent an estimated fifty jihadists to Syria.

United Kingdom

According to the 2011 census, approximately 2.7 million Muslims live in the UK. Since the 7/7 attacks18, home-

grown terrorism remains a central concern for the country’s security services. Just recently, UK native Samantha

Lewthawaite, the widow of one of the 7/7 bombers Jermaine Lindsay, has been sought by Interpol for her

suspected role in the Kenyan Westgate Mall attack, reports The Telegraph. In October, Scotland Yard arrested four

men under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,

reports The Telegraph. Earlier in September, British police arrested four people as part of an on-going investigation

into suspected terrorism in Syria, reports NBC News. Two of the suspects were apprehended as they entered the

country at the port of Dover. The arrests were made in connection to the “commission, preparation or instigation

of acts of terrorism in Syria”.

In 2000, the UK passed the Terrorism Act that provides the legal basis for prosecuting terrorists and proscribing

organisations. Since then, the UK has passed a series of laws19 to address the evolving threat of terrorism. In

October 2010, the government published a new National Security Strategy which identified terrorism as one of the

four highest risks facing the UK. In May 2013, the Economist reports that Secretary of State for the Home

Department of the United Kingdom Theresa May announced that the UK government could withdraw the

passports of those suspected of involvement in foreign terrorist activities. British intelligence justified the move

with three primary concerns: (i) British fighters may have already been inclined to carry out attacks on British soil

but lacked the expertise they might gain in the Syrian theatre; (ii) foreign fighters may be exposed to al Qaeda

ideology in Syria and recruited as potential leaders; and (iii) the prospect of a large, ungoverned space closely

situated to Europe could be the ideal staging groups for attacks in the UK and other European countries.

Authorities surmise that more than one hundred British Muslims have departed the UK to fight in Syria. After

kidnapped British freelance photographer John Cantlie was released by British jihadists near the Syrian city of Idlib

in July 2012, Cantlie expressed his shock at the number of “disenchanted young Britons” fighting in Syria.

According to a King’s College of London study, the largest contingent of jihadists originates from the UK with

estimates between 28 and 134 foreign fighters from the UK.

In October 2013, Secretary of State for the Home Department of the United Kingdom Theresa May claimed that

UK jihadists, receiving “live training in the Syrian civil war and then returning home” are already considered to be

security threats by UK security agencies. In July 2013, the annual report of the Intelligence and Security

Committee of Parliament concluded that “al Qaeda elements and individual jihadists in Syria currently represent

the most worrying emerging terrorist threat to the UK and the West”. Also, “large numbers of radicalised

individuals have been attracted to [Syria], including significant numbers for the UK and Europe [who] are likely to

acquire expertise and experience which could significantly increase the threat posed when they return home”.

Further, the report states that the UK threat level from international terrorism is “SUBSTANTIAL, indicating that an

attack is a strong possibility”. Of particular interest, is the “a growing trend for UK-resident extremists to join

Islamist elements of the opposition in Syria which is likely to form part of the terrorist threat picture for years to

come”.

United States

The US hosts the most diverse Muslim population in the Western world and is estimated to have 2 to 3 million

Muslims identifying with different sects of Islam, reports AFPC. Sixty per cent of native-born Muslims identify

themselves as Sunnis, 5 per cent as Shi’a, and 24 per cent as having no specific affiliation. Immigrated, foreign-

born Muslims identify 68 per cent Sunnis, 14 per cent as Shi’a, and 10 per cent as non-specific. A large proportion

of Muslims in the US are first generation immigrants (63 per cent), native born (37 per cent) and second

generation (15 per cent). Foreign-born Muslim Americans have come from at least 77 different countries. Twenty-

six per cent of Muslim immigrants to the US come from the Middle East and North Africa, 9 per cent from

Pakistan, 7 per cent from other South Asian countries including India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, 7 per cent

18 7/7 Attacks refer to the 07 July 2005 London bombings, in which four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured more than 770 in

central London. 19 The UK has numerous terrorism laws, secondary legislation and case-law addressing the legal response to the terrorism threat.

November 2013

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come from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 per cent come from Europe, and 3 per cent come from Iran. Eighty-one per cent

of all Muslim-Americans are US citizens.

In the months following the 9/11 attacks, the United States created the Uniting and Strengthening America by

Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. The Act

was directed towards the detection and investigation of terrorist activities. Since 2001, a plethora of legislation

has been passed regarding counterterrorism activities. Additional policy measures have also been implemented.

For instance, in December 2009, Daniel Benjamin, then the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism,

announced the rollout of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The policy shares some commonalities with UK’s

Preventing Violent Extremism strategy. CVE focused on local communities prone to radicalisation. CVE attempts to

address underlying conditions for at-risk populations, seeking to improve moderates ability to express views and

strengthen opposition to violence. CVE, which now operates under the Department of Homeland Security, is

considered an important component of President Barack Obama’s 2011 National Strategy on Empowering Local

Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism. Internationally, CVE collaborates with partners in Australia, Belgium,

Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, in addition to international law enforcement

organisations such as Europol.

In May 2013, the Daily Mail reported that American Nichole Lynn Mansfield of Flint, Michigan was killed in Idlib

province, Syria. Nicole Mansfield, a single mother was the first known American to be killed in Syria’s civil war.

Syrian state television reported that Mansfield was fighting with JAN while another Islamist group, Ahrar al Sham,

also claimed that she was fighting with them. In October 2013, a North Carolina man was arrested after a

Facebook posting said that he was on his way to “join al Qaeda fighters in Syria”, according to NBC News.

Intelligence suggested that at least ten US citizens have signed up with al Qaeda-related groups in Syria, reported

Newsweek’s Daily Beast in September. An October Newsweek article argues that the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) estimates as many as 700 American Muslims are fighting in Syria.

The Collective Threat in Europe

A report published by the European Union indicates that seventy per cent of terrorist attacks in 2012 were related

to separatist terrorism20. However, eight people were killed in six religiously inspired terrorism21 attacks in 2012.

In comparison, there were no deaths in 2011. Arrests related to religiously inspired violence increased from 122

incidents in 2011 to 159 in 2012. Key conclusions in the Europol report revealed that the terrorist threat in the EU

remains strong and varied.

In July 2013, six people were killed in a French train accident when a train derailed shortly after leaving Paris. On

24 July 2013, a train crashed on the approach to Santiago de Compostela Station in northern Spain killing eighty

people when it jumped the tracks and crashed into a wall. Santiago de Compostela is a Christian pilgrimage

destination and the crash occurred on the eve of one of Europe’s biggest Christian festivals. While investigators

indicated that the crash was unrelated to terrorist activities, the Spanish crash stirred memories of a train

bombing in Madrid 2004 when Islamist terrorists killed 191 people. In August 2013, the German newspaper Bild

20 Separatist terrorism is violence carried out by separatist groups with the goal of separation from existing entities through independence,

political autonomy or religious freedom or domination. Typically the ideologies separatists subscribe to include social just or equity, anti-

imperialism, and the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. 21

Religiously inspired terrorism is on the rise. While Islamic terrorists and organisations have been the most active, all of the major world

religions have extremists that have reverted violence to further their perceived religious goals. Religiously motivated terrorists see their

objectives as holy writ, and therefore infallible and non-negotiable.

Figure 6: Failed, Foiled and Completed Attacks in EU (2012)

Source: Europol

November 2013

Page 12

reported that al Qaeda leaders have been plotting attacks on high speed rail systems throughout Europe. An

intercepted conference call between al Qaeda operatives revealed that the targeting of trains and tunnels, or

planning to sabotage railway tracks and the electric cabling serving them, was a central topic of conversation.

European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The EU, as it moves towards full European integration, has long sought to harmonise policies among its members

in the areas of justice and home affairs (JHA22). These policies seek to foster common internal security measures

while at the same time protecting the rights of EU citizens. The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports

that JHA includes countering terrorism and cross-border crimes, police and judicial cooperation, border controls,

immigration and asylum issues. In the past, EU efforts have been hampered by member state concerns that

cooperation could impinge on a country’s legal system and sovereignty. According to CRS, the September 2001

terrorist attacks, followed by the March 2004 Madrid and the July 2005 London bombings, provided a sense of

urgency to harmonise counterterrorism efforts.

Member states in 2008 expanded the common

definition of terrorism to include terrorist

recruitment, training and public provocation to

commit terrorism. Also in 2010, the EU issued

its first ever internal security strategy which

highlights the threat introduced by terrorism.

While most observers note that the EU has

made rapid JHA progress since 2001, the

relatively slow-moving JHA Council, has lagged

behind adaptable, versatile terrorism

organisers. The implementation of policies in

the JHA field resides with member states. Efforts

promoting greater EU-wide cooperation against

terrorism and other cross-border crimes largely

remain a work in progress.

In efforts to make Europe more secure, the EU’s Internal Security Strategy seeks to eliminate international

criminal networks, prevent terrorism and address radicalisation, increase cyber security for citizens and

businesses, strengthen security through border management and increase Europe’s resiliency to crisis and

disasters. The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy outlines four focus areas in order to effectively address potential

terrorist threats within the EU (Figure 7). Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond requires work at national,

European and international levels in order to reduce terrorist threats. This report considers the first three

components of prevent, protect and pursue.

Prevention

The EU recognises that assistance to and cooperation with North African, Middle Eastern and South East Asian

countries is vital. Beyond collaboration, the EU has identified key priorities in order to prevent terrorism.

Developing common approaches to spot and address problem behaviour, in particular the misuse of the Internet,

address incitement and recruitment in prisons, places of worship through legislation that makes these behaviours

offences, develop media and communications to better explain EU policies, develop inter-cultural dialogue with

and outside the EU, implement a non-emotive lexicon for discussing these issues and to continue to research,

share analysis and experiences in order to better understand issues. Collectively, the EU encourages a more

rigorous transport security process in order to protect airports, seaports and at the same time increase the

effectiveness of border security.

Protect

Key protect initiatives include improvements to the security of EU passports through the introduction of

biometrics23. Establishment of the Visa Information System (VIS), which allows Schengen States to exchange visa

data through a central IT system and communication infrastructure that links to the central system of member

states. Also the newly implemented second generation Schengen Information System (SISII) (Figure 8) increases

22 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is more fully considered at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations/justice-et-

affaires-interieures-(jai)?lang=en

23 Biometrics or biometric identifiers are an objective measurement of a physical characteristic of an individual which, when captured in a

database can be used to verify identity or check against other entries in the database.

Figure 7: EU Counter Terrorism Strategy

Source: EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy

November 2013

Page 13

security and facilitates free movement within the Schengen area. The SISII provides “easy exchange of information

between national border control authorities, customs and police authorities on persons who may have been

involved in a serious crime. It also provides alerts for missing persons, as well as information on certain property

such as banknotes, cars, vans, firearms and identity document that may ben been stolen misappropriated or lost”

according to the EU.

Further, protection can be enhanced through Frontex24

effective risk analysis of the EU external border and through

implementing common standards on civil aviation, port and

maritime security. Finally EU member states affirm that action

must be taken to protect critical infrastructure.

Pursue

While much of the terrorist threat to Europe currently

originates outside the EU, member countries must recognise

that pursue must include a global dimension and will work

with the UN Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism to

achieve dialogue and agreements. Instruments such as the

European Arrest Warrant25 are proving to be important but

controversial tools in pursing and investigating terrorists

across borders. Critics lament that it violates rights such as

due process and rules of evidence.

In June 2013, the Joint Communication to the European

Parliament, the COE, the European Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions published a

report that addressed ways to prevent radicalisation. In the

report, the EU affirmed its need to remain vigilant over potential threats of returning EU citizens from Syria. The

Commission indicated that it has initiated the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network,26 seeking to prevent and

counter violent extremism. The Commission encouraged member states to make better use of the Second

Generation Schengen Information System that could assist in better movement monitoring of foreign fighters. Also

the Commission will continue to work with the European Parliament and the Council towards implementing a

proposed EU Passenger Name Record (PNR27) Directive as the data will provide an additional tool to track foreign

fighters who leave or return to the EU via air travel. While most EU countries already collect such data, it is often

not shared due to the European Parliament concern of privacy rights.

Additionally, the body could increase use of EU-instruments and tools available under international agreements

such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP28) to track payments related to terrorist movements. With

border controls inside the European Union largely abolished, radicalised Islamists can easily threaten multiple

countries, making collaboration among EU members more important. Working in conjunction with EU intelligence

Analysis Centre (IntCen29), Europol30 and Frontex, The EU will continue to identify the major security risks for the

EU and the identification of possible mitigation measures.

24 Frontex’s mission is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter

applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. 25 The European Arrest Warrant has come under criticism that it violates human rights. 26 The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is part of the “Prevent” portion of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy and is guided by the EU

Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. 27 On 01 August the European Parliament was urged by nine member countries to review plans for an EU-wide passenger data list that could

help prevent suspected extremists traveling to fight in Syria. Earlier attempts to introduce legislation requiring airlines to share personal data

on passengers failed in April 2013, reports RT. Lawmakers concerned about privacy issues, failed to approve the proposed the introduction of

Passenger Name Record (PNR). PNR would provide detailed flight information to member states of passengers entering or leaving the EU. The

petition advanced by France, Belgium. Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Britain and Sweden underscored “the importance

for the security of the European Union and those who live within it, of being able to quickly have at our disposal a PRN system offering a high

level of privacy protection”. 28 According to the European Commission, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) has been successful in generating intelligence that

has helped detect terrorist plots and trace their planners. A new EU-US TFTP agreement signed in August 2010 improves appropriate

safeguards to address concerns over security, privacy and respect of fundamental rights. 29 IntCen monitors events both inside and outside the EU in order to provide “intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness” to

EU institutions and member states in the realm of security, defence and counter-terrorism. 30 Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency whose mission is to “achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens”.

Figure 8: Schengen States (as of Dec 2011)

Source: Europa

November 2013

Page 14

However, the management of public assets within the EU is challenging and complex. The density and

transnational character of many European critical infrastructures as well as the interdependency of border

security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures have only increased the opportunities for multifaceted

crisis, posits Javier Argomaniz, expert in European terrorism and political violence. Unfortunately, Argomaniz

concludes that while the EU recognises the need to better secure infrastructure against attack, EU actions to date

have not yet matched the ambitions outlined in its programmes and declarations. This is partly due to the fact that

there are long-running tensions related to security and the notion of national sovereignty versus the trans-border

character of European critical infrastructure (ECI). EU member states are aware of the necessity of enhancing

cross-border cooperation but remain reluctant about “delegating powers to the EU”. While Argomaniz

acknowledges a few notable instances of “swift and firm EU action”, he suggests the EU still has not moved far

from the discussion stage of enhanced protection.

Efforts to Counter Radicalisation

Without question, the UK has taken the lead in prevention strategies, according to the Centre for Security Studies

(CSS), launching its first incarnation of a prevent strategy in 2003 with several countries following suit. In 2005,

the EU launched its own counter-radicalisation strategy and has since encouraged member states to adopt their

own measures. Today, only Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and the UK have issued a comprehensive national

counter-radicalisation strategy detailing a budget, goals, methods, and responsibilities. Broadly speaking, counter

radicalisation efforts can be divided into two categories; general prevention initiatives and targeted

interventions31.

Preventative initiatives seek to help the target group32 become less vulnerable or, more “resilient”, to radical

ideologies, according to Washington Institute’s Matthew Levitt. Preventive initiatives vary significantly in

characteristics and underlying philosophy. Some have a strong religious component such as the Radical Middle

Way, a British government-sponsored project that brings traditionalist Muslim scholars to speak to young British

Muslim audiences and denounce terrorism from a theological perspective. Other projects focus on integration,

seeking to provide employment and education for young Muslims. Many initiatives seek to foster critical thinking

and the ability to deal constructively with opposing views. Stephen Jones at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity

and Citizenship at the University of Bristol argues that government funded initiatives such as the Radical Middle

Way risk being discredited because “everyone assumes that point of view is being pushed for political reasons by

the same politicians that support Israel and smashed up Iraq”.

In order for EU members to better address the threat of jihadist attacks at home, security along the bloc’s borders

will likely need to be tightened, reports Stratfor. This tightening will affect not only potential terrorists but also

other Muslim and European travellers. This could add pressure on countries such as the Balkan states to increase

their overall security efforts, many of which are not EU members, though they border EU territory and reportedly

have seen extensive outflows of fighters to Syria. Western European countries will probably provide aid in the form

of money, personnel and hardware to those that need it, according to Stratfor.

Conclusion

According to the EU, the international dimension associated with terrorism and other types of organised crimes

must be addressed through international cooperation. However, the intensification of cooperation among states,

which have differing standards on the subject of fundamental rights, puts these rights at risk. Member states tend

to infiltrate terrorist organisations by employing special methods of investigation that may constitute potential

threats to privacy, particularly when they are used proactively before an actual offense has been committed. Legal

tools to prevent potential jihadists from engaging in Syria are lacking throughout Europe. EU initiatives to protect

member states from terrorism have been strong on rhetoric but weak on implementation. While there is political

commitment of EU leaders to promote cooperation in the JHA field and to improve the EU’s ability to better combat

terrorism, forging common internal security polices remains a challenge. As such, EU member states face an

adaptable and resilient opponent. Some analysts assert that al Qaeda franchises, and foreign fighters, now control

more territory and can call on more fighters than at any time since 1988 when Osama bin Laden created the

organisation. The EU, while making calculated advances, remains vulnerable to terrorist activity.

31 According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), European countries have developed

schemes “that seek to identify individuals that have displayed clear signs of radicalisation but have not yet committed a crime. Authorities

assess each case” and specifically tailor targeted interventions aimed to sway the individual away from militancy. 32 In this particular the “target group” consists, de facto, of Muslim youth.