Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones

FIGHTERS

Frank J. Cilluffo | Jeffrey B. Cozzens | Magnus RanstorpOctober 1, 2010

FOREIGN

About the authors

Frank J. Cilluffo is Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the Homeland Security PolicyInstitute at The George Washington University. Cilluffo joined GW in 2003 from the White House where heserved as Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Shortly following the September 11, 2001terrorist attacks on the United States, Cilluffo was appointed by the President to the newly created Office ofHomeland Security, and served as a principal advisor to Governor Tom Ridge. Prior to his White Houseappointment, Cilluffo spent eight years in senior policy positions with the Center for Strategic & InternationalStudies (CSIS), a Washington based think tank.

Jeffrey B. Cozzens is President of White Mountain Research (WMR), a service disabled veteran ownedcompany providing elite counter terrorism and security research and advisory services to select corporate andgovernment clients. Prior to joining WMR, Mr. Cozzens served as Religious Extremism Advisor at the U.S. ArmyDirected Studies Office (ADSO), an alternative analysis center that advises senior government leaders. A formerResearch Associate at the University of St Andrews (Scotland) Centre for the Study of Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, U.S. State Department counter terrorism analyst, and long time advisor to the homeland security,defense and intelligence communities, Mr. Cozzens has been at the forefront of conceptualizing, defining andpredicting emerging patterns in terrorism and political violence since 2001.

Magnus Ranstorp is the Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish NationalDefence College (SNDC) where he has directed two major research projects in the last five years. Each projectwas funded by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. One examined radicalisation processes andcounterradicalisation policies within Europe; the other examined CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear, explosives) terrorism. Dr. Ranstorp has also led a Swedish cabinet study on radicalization (2008/9); aSwedish International Development Agency (SIDA) funded project on counterradicalization efforts in Indonesia(2009); and an Armed Forces Headquarters study on forecasting terrorism in 2018 (2008). His most recentedited book is Understanding Violent Radicalisation (Routledge, 2010). In 2006 Dr Ranstorp was invited to jointhe European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, an official advisory body on all mattersrelating to violent radicalisation and recruitment of extremists within the EU.

About this paper

This paper is intended to serve as a primer on an emergent threat. As such, it is an outgrowth of a report bythe Swedish National Defence College's Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (SNDC CATS) based on a June2010 conference "The Trajectories of Western Foreign Fighters: Shifts and Implications." Held under theChatham House Rule, this invitation only event included speakers and participants from the transatlanticintelligence, defense, law enforcement, and academic communities. The authors gratefully acknowledge thecontribution made by members of the staff of both SNDC CATS (in particular Nathan C A Forsdyke) and TheGeorge Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (specifically Sharon L. Cardash and Brian E.

Engel). Without their help, this paper could not have been completed. The Homeland Security Policy Institutewishes to thank its sponsors for their generous support: The George Washington University, ICF International,Northrop Grumman Corporation, and Raytheon Company.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the views of any individual institution or government.

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FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones

FOREWORDS

This report FOREIGN FIGHTERS: Trends, Trajectories& Conflict Zones is a very welcome contribution totransatlantic efforts to better understand andcontend with the present critical terrorist challengesfacing both the European Union (EU) and the UnitedStates. It clearly outlines the rapidly evolving natureand dynamic of the threat posed by expatriatefighters from and in both Europe and North Americaand offers relevant tactical as well as strategic policyprescriptions. Above all it demonstrates that this isan area where we need to deepen the EU USTransatlantic Partnership in Countering Terrorismand leverage different levels of cooperation andinstruments in a concerted fashion.

With the Treaty of Lisbon now in effect, the EU isbetter able to further the coherence of its counterterrorism policies, especially with regard to the linkbetween internal external policy. A major part ofmy role is to outline the key counterterrorismchallenges for the EU. In May 2010, in my report tothe European Council on the implementation of theEU Counterterrorism Strategy, I underscored thatmonitoring terrorist travel should be a key priorityfor the EU.

Firstly, as demonstrated in this Report, a notinsignificant number of radicalized EU nationals andresidents are travelling to conflict areas or attendingterrorist training camps and returning to Europe.

Secondly, the problem needs to be addressed in acomprehensive way, by enhancing the coordinationbetween the relevant agencies within the EU, andtaking advantage of the improved possibilities todefine integrated policies offered by the Treaty ofLisbon.

It is clear that terrorist travel is also of great concernto the United States and we have much to gain fromenhanced cooperation on this issue.

Gilles de KERCHOVEEuropean Union Counter Terrorism Coordinator

22 September 2010

The United States and the European Union faceserious challenges in dealing with the flow ofradicalized Westerners travelling into jihadi conflictzones. This report of the Homeland Security PolicyInstitute and Swedish National Defence College onthis subject will be an important contribution tounderstanding the dimensions of this flow and howthe US and EU must further collaborate to confrontthis increasing threat.

We saw al Qaeda and affiliated networks increasetheir efforts in the 2005 2006 timeframe in appealsto US and European young Muslims to travel toPakistan, Yemen, East Africa, and elsewhere forterrorist training �– especially in the use of explosives.

Today, al Qaeda recognizes that to conduct attackssuccessfully in the West, it must find radicalizedMuslims, including converts to Islam. It needsindividuals who understand Western culture; speakfluent English or other Western languages, and whocan move comfortably in Western societies.

Its appeals have been conveyed through radicalImams and other extremists, espousing al Qaeda�’sviolent extremist ideology to those residing in theWest. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and NajibullahZazi were examples of those who answered alQaeda�’s call; both plotted to kill hundreds of

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Americans. Al Qaeda has had other successes;dozens of young men from North America andWestern Europe, especially from the UnitedKingdom, have found their way to the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the safehavens of Yemen and Somalia. Many have receivedtraining at al Qaeda or affiliated camps of the jihadinetwork. Some Americans have fought inAfghanistan and at least two Somali Americans have�“martyred�” themselves for al Shabaab in East Africa.Western intelligence and investigative agencies haveidentified some of the Western jihadist fighters;many, however, have not been identified.

A stronger, more comprehensive effort between theUnited States and the European Union is urgentlyneeded if we are to avoid serious attacks in theWest. Thwarting terrorist travel is of the highestpriority. Yet, more needs to be done. EU passengerdata, for example, that flows to the Department ofHomeland Security cannot be shared with USintelligence agencies. More progress is needed if weare to reach a level of collaboration that gives us theconfidence needed to track extremists, who with theproper credentials and a �‘clean�’ record can travelglobally.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS: Trends, Trajectories & ConflictZones is not only a vital addition to ourunderstanding of this threat but will be a vital inputinto the thinking of policy officials responsible fornegotiating US EU travel agreements. We mustcontinue our search for ways to interdict travel ofindividuals determined to do damage to Westerninterests, either in the conflict zones or, more likely,here in the West after having received the requisitetraining.

Charles ALLENFormer Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,

Department of Homeland Security;Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection,

Central Intelligence Agency22 September 2010

INTRODUCTION1

Western jihadi foreign fighters and the bridge figuresthat help inspire, radicalize, and motivate them posea significant threat to the security of Western states,and to their counterinsurgency and counterterrorismmissions around the globe. Foreign fighters have thepotential to bolster insurgent or terrorist factionswithin a given theatre of conflict, both operationallyand motivationally.

Foreign fighters and bridge figures can boost moraleby lending credibility to the notion that all jihadistsare fighting for a calling that transcends any specifictime and place. Foreign fighters also draw attention(especially from Western media) in ways thatindigenous fighters cannot. Thus foreign fightersserve to globalize local conflicts and promote thejihadist narrative. Bridge figures legitimize theactions of foreign fighters and help recreate newrecruits among populations living in Western hostcountries.

The present scale of foreign fighter training andactivity is significant and increasing. However, thephenomenon is not new. A recent CongressionalResearch Service report estimates that between1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged inviolent jihad during the 1990s. These individualsfought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.2

Yet the phenomenon remains difficult to quantify,and much of the known data is held by Western

1 This paper is an outgrowth of a report by the Swedish NationalDefence College�’s Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (SNDCCATS), based upon a June 2010 conference, �“The Trajectories ofWestern Foreign Fighters: Shifts and Implications.�” The invitationonly event included speakers and participants from thetransatlantic intelligence, defense, law enforcement, andacademic communities, and was held under the Chatham HouseRule. Items in this paper not otherwise cited may be attributed tothe unpublished SNDC CATS conference report.

2 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. �“AmericanJihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.�” Washington,DC; Congressional Research Service.

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security and intelligence services and thusinaccessible to academic researchers.

The insidious potential of Western foreign fighters,the violent histories of some who have returned tothe West, and the genuine possibility that Westernsecurity services�’ observations only touch the tip of amuch larger, undocumented and undetectedproblem, necessitates a greater understanding ofthe global foreign fighters trend.

What motivates these individuals remains an openquestion �– and there likely is no single answer. A2010 United States Institute of Peace study of 2,032foreign fighters found that many were seekingrevenge, status, or simply a cathartic and definingexperience.3 Regardless of their motives, theactions of these individuals pose a grave risk toWestern interests at home and abroad.

Abdullah al Faisal

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005illustrate the magnitude of the threat posed byforeign fighters. The 9/11 terrorists were led by acore of educated, English speaking extremists whoresided for years in the West and trained with alQaeda in Afghanistan. The 7/7 terrorists who struckLondon were Britons of Pakistani and Jamaicandescent motivated and radicalized by the teachingsof jihadists, including Abdullah al Faisal, a Jamaicanimmigrant. Both contingents participated in trainingin South Asia.

3 Venhaus, John M. 2010. �“ Why Youth Join al Qaeda.�” SpecialReport 236. Washington, DC; United States Institute of Peace

These infrequent eruptions of foreign fighter linkedterrorism catalyzed far reaching effects that changedthe course of Western security and counterterrorism policies.4

To clarify terms, �“Western foreign fighters�” orsimply, �“foreign fighters,�” refers to violentextremists who leave their Western states ofresidence with the aspiration to train or take uparms against non Muslim factions in jihadi conflictzones.

Most of the foreign fighters discussed in thisdocument participated principally in the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA) along theAfghanistan Pakistan border, in Somalia, and inYemen. Currently, these are the regions of greatestconcern to Western security and intelligenceservices. Yet, foreign fighters have also participatedin conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, as well asin Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Maghreb, andSahel. As is clear, the use of foreign fighters byglobal jihadists is no longer limited to a particularconflict zone.5

The �“foreign fighter�” label fails to reflect the widerange of factors and dynamics driving individuals andgroups to engage in foreign fighter activity across awide spectrum of conflicts and causes. The termhides the complexity of the phenomenon and thefact that many of their actions and effects occurwithin Western host countries.

4 Examples of single events achieving significant effects areextensive. In 2004, the Madrid train bombings are widelyregarded to have directly affected the outcome of Spain�’s nationalelections. The 2003 Baghdad Canal Hotel bombing that destroyedthe UN field Headquarters in Iraq resulted in the complete halt ofUN operations throughout the country. The 1983 suicide bombingof the US Marine barracks in Beirut led to the withdrawal of USforces from Lebanon. Given the ability of a single foreign fighterto have a significant political and propaganda effect, the riskposed by even minimal numbers of experienced and trainedforeign fighter returnees to host nations is significant.

5 Bergen, Peter and Bruce Hoffman. 2010. �“Assessing the TerroristThreat.�” Washington, DC; Bipartisan Policy Center. pp. 5 14

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Foreign fighters may intend to fight abroad, but mayinstead be radicalized further, trained, and turnedback home to attack Western states. This was thecase with Najibullah Zazi.

Zazi, an Afghan citizen and legal resident of theUnited States, returned to Afghanistan with theintention of joining the Taliban. Trained by al Qaedain Waziristan, including in the use of explosives, Zaziwas instructed to return to the United States inJanuary 2009. In September of that year, he wasarrested. Zazi later admitted that he and two formerclassmates who had accompanied him toAfghanistan (Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin�– both US citizens) had planned to attack the NewYork subway system. The three planned to strapexplosives to themselves and bomb the GrandCentral and Times Square stations during rush houron either September 14th, 15th, or 16 th (2009).6

The case of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah providesadditional illustration of the potential threat (thoughnot an example of a US resident or citizen whotrained and returned to the country). Born in SaudiArabia, Shukrijumah is a naturalized US citizen andspent much of his youth in New York and Florida. Heleft the US to join al Qaeda in June 2001. Althoughhe started off doing menial tasks at training camps,he has worked his way up. Today, he is the seniorleader of al Qaeda�’s international operations and istied to many recent attempted attacks �– includingZazi�’s. Given his knowledge of the US, this makeshim particularly dangerous.7

6 Gross, Samantha, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam. 2009.�“Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect.�” New York, NY;ABC News. Wilson, Michael. 2009. �“From Smiling Coffee Vendorto Terror Suspect.�” New York, NY; New York Times. Johnston,David and William K. Rashbaum. 2009. �“Terror Suspect Had BombGuide, Authorities Say.�” New York, NY; New York Times. Marzulli,John. 2010., �“Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush Hour Attack onGrand Central, Times Square Subway Stations.�” New York, NY;New York Times. Hawley, Kip, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Sharon L.Cardash. 2010. �“Stopping Terror In and On Its Tracks.�”Washington, DC; The Homeland Security Policy Institute

7 Alfano, Sean and Corky Siemaszko. 2020. �“Adnan Shukrijumah,believed to be the new head of global operations for Al Qaeda,

Turning a foreign fighter toward homeland basedattacks maintains the operational security ofoverseas jihadist networks on one hand, whiledramatically increasing the chances for a successfulstrike in the West on the other. Foreign fightersreturning to their Western host nations armed withoperational expertise, jihadist �“street cred�” basedupon their bona fides as mujahideen (those whostrive and fight in God�’s path), and the capacity andintent to orchestrate domestic attacks represents acurrent and likely growing threat, especially as alQaeda linked factions come under increasingpressure abroad. These fighters�’ familiarity with thetargets they select adds to these individuals�’ capacityto cause harm; and if they do not have a criminalbackground or known affiliation with any terrorist orextremist organization, their so called �“clean skin�”also furthers their ability to evade the authorities.8

Although the threat from foreign fighters is not new,it is now quickly growing in size and prominence. Afact recently noted by Peter Bergen and BruceHoffman in their report on the current terroristthreat: �“A key shift in the past couple of years is theincreasingly prominent role in planning andoperations that U.S. citizens and residents haveplayed in the leadership of al Qaeda and alignedgroups, and the higher number of Americansattaching themselves to these groups.�”9 Thecomments of Bergen and Hoffman have beenechoed by U.S. Department of Homeland SecuritySecretary Janet Napolitano.

FBI says.�” New York, NY; The Daily News. Candiotti, Susan andRoss Levitt. 2010. �“From dishwasher to al Qaeda leadership: Whois Adnan Shukrijumah?�” Atlanta, GA; CNN. Hirschkorn, Phil. 2010.�“Who Is Al Qaeda Figure Linked to NYC Bomb Plot?�” New York,NY; CBS News

8 Basham, W. Ralph, Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, andDaniel J. Kaniewski . 2010. �“No Longer On Auto Pilot: AviationSecurity and Intelligence Reform.�” Washington, DC; TheHomeland Security Policy Institute

9 Bergen, Peter and Bruce Hoffman. 2010. �“Assessing the TerroristThreat.�” Washington, DC; Bipartisan Policy Center. p. 1

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Testifying before Congress in September 2010,Napolitano said the following about foreign fighters:�“In their roles as terrorist planners, operationalfacilitators and operatives, these individuals improvethe terrorist groups�’ knowledge of Western andAmerican culture and security practices, which canincrease the likelihood that an attempted attackcould be successful.�”10

Likewise, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)Director Robert Mueller recently testified to thefollowing effect: �“The fact that Zazi and hisassociates had access to the United States and werefamiliar with the environment here from anoperational security and targeting perspectivedemonstrates how al Qaeda can leverage Americans.The potential exists for al Qaeda to use and trainother Americans for additional homeland attacks.�”11

The intent of this paper is to shed light on andcontextualize the complex and volatile phenomenonof foreign fighters, which is of increasing concern toWestern intelligence and law enforcementcommunities.

This paper is not a strict academic treatise designedto provide clear causal arguments. Given thecomplexity of this issue, such arguments would bedifficult at best. Instead, it is a primer on anemergent threat, one crafted in such a manner as toprovide a basic understanding of the challenges andopportunities at hand �– from the perspective ofthose entrusted with stopping it.

10 Napolitano, Janet. 2010. "Nine Years After 9/11: Confrontingthe Terrorist Threat to the Homeland." Statement of SecretaryJanet Napolitano before the United States Senate Committee onHomeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, DC; USSenate

11 Mueller, Robert S. 2010. Statement Before the SenateCommittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.Washington, DC; US Senate

WESTERN FOREIGN FIGHTERS: A COMPLEX SYSTEM

Western foreign fighters occupy a unique niche inthe contemporary landscape of non state threats.Defined for the purposes of this paper as activiststhat leave their Western homes to fight �– or train tofight �– Islam�’s perceived enemies, their challenge isas multifaceted as their typology.

The population of fighters includes strugglingnovices, who view trips to the front as rites ofpassage, and die hard militants seeking mortalcombat and martyrdom against non Muslimmilitaries.12

The aura of legend, lore and extreme commitmentthat sometimes surrounds these militants bolstersthe radicalization process in a variety of ways, andsimultaneously undermines authority in WesternMuslim communities.13 Furthermore, their travelscan cement and revitalize key jihadi logisticsnetworks. Even the often modest training andindoctrination these militants receive at the frontthreatens Allied militaries and regional Muslimcommunities �– the latter often bearing the brunt ofal Qaeda�’s violence, as we have witnessed inPakistan, Iraq, and Somalia.

Numbers on foreign fighters are hard to come by.The data is difficult to collect in the field; many ofthe most precise figures are held tightly by Westernintelligence communities; media reporting is oftenunreliable; definitions of foreign fighters vary,inhibiting uniform data collection; fighterssometimes leave the West, fight or train, then returnwithout publicity; moreover it is sometimes hard todetermine whether certain individuals from

12 Gartenstein Ross, Daveed. 2009. �“Western Recruits inSomalia.�” Ontario, CA; National Post

13 See, for instance, two of the seminal jihadist works on theconcept, obligation, and benefits of emigrating for combat andtraining: Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands and �‘Esaal Hindi�’s (nom de guerre of convicted British terrorist and alQaeda linked foreign fighter, Dhiren Barot) The Army of Madinahin Kashmir (Birmingham, UK; Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications).

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majority Muslim diaspora communities in the Westhave travelled to visit friends and relatives from theirfamilies�’ countries of origin, or if their intentions aremore sinister.

From a methodological perspective, most of themore rigorous quantitative accounts of Westernforeign fighters only observe them within thecontext of Western plots. Fighting in far flunginsurgencies or training in jihadist camps often goesunseen and thus unaccounted for in such reports.For now, we are left to cobble together imprecisefigures that sketch only a rough quantitativecomposite of what qualitative analyses tell us couldbe a much more significant issue.

Paul Cruickshank quantified one dimension of theforeign fighter threat in his February 2010 report,�“The Militant Pipeline.�” Of the 21 post 9/11 plots inAustralia, North America and Europe, Cruickshankclassifies as �“serious�”�—those which were intendedto kill at least 10 people and did not rely exclusivelyon undercover law enforcement agents to provideexplosives �– the majority (of the 21 plots) involved37 Western residents who travelled to Pakistan�’sFATA, the central nervous system of global jihadiactivism. Other cases cited by Cruickshank involvedtraining in Yemen.

Brian Michael Jenkins�’s 2010 RAND study, �“WouldBe Warriors,�” provides a perspective on Americanforeign fighters. Of the 46 �“publicly reported casesof domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadistterrorism�” between September 11, 2001 and theend of 2009, Jenkins observes that 13 of theseinvolve foreign training and direction. A quick surveyof Jenkins�’ data shows that it actually includes over60 individuals who qualify as Western foreignfighters under the definition used here.14

14 Analyst Lorenzo Vidino, citing a former FBI official, writes thatduring the 1990�’s, �“between 1,000 2,000 volunteers left theUnited States to fight or train with various jihadist outfitsthroughout the world, a number comparable to that of EuropeanMuslims who left the continent during the same years.�” See,Vidino, Lorenzo. 2009. �“Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the

A June 2010 Washington Post story noted that�“foreign fighters in Somali number 300 1,200,�”including �“at least 20 Somali Americans,�” amongthem the rising jihadist media personality andalleged al Shabaab field commander, OmarHammami, an Alabama native.15 Several of theseindividuals have become suicide bombers �– includingthe first American (Shirwa Ahmed) to hold thatdistinction in modern times.16

In an attempt to arrest what US Attorney GeneralEric Holder labelled a �“deadly pipeline�” of moneyand fighters travelling from the US to al Shabaab,American officials have stepped up efforts to indictand arrest US residents.17 In June 2010, MohamedAlessa and Carlos Almonte, both US citizens, werearrested at JFK Airport. The two were recorded byundercover officers of the New York PoliceDepartment as they planned to travel abroad to killAmericans. The two were stopped en route toSomalia where they hoped to link up with alShabaab.18 This was, in fact, their second attempt tojoin the fight. In 2007, the two had gone to Jordan,with the aim of fighting US soldiers in Iraq, but forunknown reasons were not recruited.19

United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?�” Studies inConflict and Terrorism 32. London, UK; Routledge. pp. 1 17

15 Elliott, Andrea. 2010. �“The Jihadist Next Door.�” New York, NY;The New York Times

16 Hsu, Spencer S. and Carrie Johnson. 2009. �“Somali AmericansRecruited by Extremists.�” Washington, DC; The Washington Post

17 Miller, Greg. 2010. �“U.S. charges 14 with giving support toSomali insurgent group.�” Washington, DC; The Washington Post

18 U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey. 2010. U.S. v.Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte, Criminal Complaint,Magistrate No. 10 8109 (MCA). Trenton, NJ; US Department ofJustice

19 Finn, Peter and Jerry Markon. 2010. �“New Jersey Men ArrestedAre Latest From U.S. Tied to Terrorist Groups.�” Washington, DC;The Washington Post. Sherman, Ted. 2010. �“FBI Followed EveryMove of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in AirportArrests.�” Newark, NJ; The Star Ledger

PAGE 7

In a recent comprehensive open source analysis ofAmerican jihadi activism published to date,Congressional Research Service�’s September 2010�“American Jihadist Terrorism,�” authors Bjeloperaand Randol note, �“Fifteen of the (40) post 9/11homegrown plots have featured individualsexclusively seeking to become foreign fighters�…�”20 Ifwe include those plots featuring individuals indictedfor �“intended or actual plotting or training abroad�”�—another of the authors�’ categories commensuratewith this report�’s definition of foreign fighteractivity�—the number jumps to 24.21

A 2010 report from Danish analysts Michael Taarnbyand Lars Hallundbaeck notes that at least 25Americans, up to 40 Australians, perhaps 100Britons, and maybe as many as 80 Scandinavians(including more than 15 Danes), have fought inSomalia.22

The Swedish Security Service has officially reportedthat around 20 30 nationals have travelled toSomalia to fight for al Shabaab and less than fivehave died in battle.23This recruitment process isfacilitated by the fact that Fuad Muhammed Qalaf(otherwise known as Fuad Shangole) is a SwedishSomali and a senior operational figure in al Shabaab.

The same number of recruits is seen in neighbouringDenmark according to Somali communityrepresentatives and the Danish Security andIntelligence Service. However, in Denmark, a Somaliindividual with alleged contacts to al Qaeda in EastAfrica and al Shabaab were within seconds of axing

20 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. �“AmericanJihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.�” Washington,DC; Congressional Research Service. p. 26

21 Ibid, p. 25

22 Taarnby, Michael and Lars Hallundbaek. 2010. �“Al Shabaab:The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and theImplications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe.�” Copenhagen,DK; Danish Ministry of Justice

23 Stiernstedt, Jenny. 2010. �“Svensk misstankt for terrorbrott.�”Stockholm, SE; Svenska Dagbladet

HISTORICAL THEMES

Important lessons can be identified fromhistorical precedents of foreign fighter activity.Foreign fighters espousing different causes havefeatured in conflicts ranging from Spain, toAfghanistan, to the Balkans. Although each caseremains unique, there are themes, strategies, andtactics that are endemic to each.

Rhetoric focusing on defensive mobilization hasbeen a feature in nearly all instances of foreignfighter activity. Recruiters consistently appeal toforeigners�’ ideological convictions and seek toalign distant conflicts with an assault on acommon identity. During the Spanish Civil War,both Francisco Franco�’s nationalists and antifascist republicans framed their respectivestruggles through a defensive lens and appealedto sympathizers on the basis of a greater moralduty. Fifty years later, the obligation to defend atransnational identity from an existentialaggressor was used by Abdullah Azzam. In hiscall for support from Muslims worldwide againstSoviet aggression in Afghanistan, defence ofIslam was a duty incumbent upon all as part oftheir religious obligation to God. In the 1990s,similar language and reasoning was used bymujahideen leaders during the Bosnian War andthe first Chechen war.

In the historical examples, there are importantcleavages to be studied as well. Foreign fighterswho travelled to Afghanistan in the name of�‘jihad�’ often found themselves at odds withnative Afghans whose culture, geography, andtribal society fosters a wariness of outsiders.This lack of acceptance of foreign recruits wasprevalent during the Spanish Civil War as well.Foreign fighters often found themselves treatedas expendable and their sacrifices viewed as�‘second rate.�’ This contributed to manyreturning home disillusioned with their �‘cause.�’Today, many of the foreign mujahideen fighterswho settled in Bosnia now find themselves

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to death the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in hishome in January 2010.

The heads of the US Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) and British Security Service (MI5) have raisedconcerns about Somali linked foreign fighters. CIADirector Leon Panetta told reporters that suchindividuals raise �“real concerns about the potentialfor terrorist activity�” and �“constitute a potentialthreat to the security of this country.�” With morethan 100 UK residents now fighting training in alShabaab camps in Somalia, Jonathan Evans, the

Director General of MI5, recently argued that �“it�’sonly a matter of time before we see terrorism on ourstreets inspired by those who are today fightingalongside al Shabaab.�” Evans�’ sentiment wasechoed by the Chief of the UK�’s Secret IntelligenceService (MI6), John Sawers.24 Evans�’ concern washighlighted less than a week after his remarks by thearrest of a British citizen of Somali descent by Dutchauthorities as he attempted travel betweenLiverpool and Uganda.25

Some British terrorism experts, and a study by theUnited Kingdom�’s Centre for Social Cohesion, pointto the fact that �“seven of the eight major terroristplots in the UK included in their cells one or moreindividuals who had attended terrorist trainingcamps; six of the eight of these had been inPakistan.�”26

Even in 2007, press reports quoting Britishgovernment officials suggested �“up to 4,000Islamic extremists have attended terrorist training

24 Norton Taylor, Richard. 2010. �“MI5 chiefs warns of terrorthreat from Britons trained in Somalia.�” London, UK; TheGuardian. Hsu, Spencer S. and Carrie Johnson. 2009. �“SomaliAmericans Recruited by Extremists.�” Washington, DC; TheWashington Post

25 2010. �“British terrorism suspect arrested at Amsterdam�’sSchiphol airport.�” London, UK; The Daily Telegraph

26 Clarke, Michael and Valentina Soria. 2010. �“Terrorism �– theNew Wave.�” RUSI Journal. London, UK; Royal United ServicesInstitute. pp.24 31

camps in Afghanistan before returning to Britain.�”27

MI5�’s Jonathan Evans voiced serious concern inSeptember 2010 about a �“significant number ofBritish residents. . .training in camps run by the alQaeda linked al Shabaab�” and �“that as many as100 Britons of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and WestAfrican backgrounds had travelled to Somalia.�”28

27 Leapman, Brian. 2007. �“4,000 in UK trained at terror camps.�”London, UK; The Daily Telegraph

28 Gardham, Duncan. 2010. �“Britain facing a new wave ofterrorist attacks, MI5 warns.�” London, UK; The Daily Telegraph

ostracized by their fellow Muslims.a

More historical background can be found in the

following selected sources:

Kohlmann, Evan F. 2004. Al Qaida s Jihad in

Europe the Afghan Bosnian Network. Oxford,

UK: Berg Publishers

Malet, David. 2009. Foreign Fighters:

Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts.

Dissertation. Washington, DC; The George

Washington University

Malet, David. 2009. �“Why Foreign Fighters?

Historical Perspectives and Solutions.�” Orbis.

Philadelphia, PA; Foreign Policy Research

Institute

Moore, Cerwyn and Paul Tumelty. 2008.

�“Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A

Critical Assessment.�” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism. London, UK; Routledge

aWolker, Martin. 2007. �“Established Muslims ResistNeo Salafists.�”Website. Berlin, DE; Qantara.de

PAGE 9

Further, German officials have noted that there are�“hundreds�” of German residents (most from Turkishbackgrounds) now fighting in Pakistan andAfghanistan �– primarily with the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union. There areeven growing indications that a German contingentof the Taliban has been formed.29 The GermanFederal Police (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) statedrecently that there is concrete evidence linking 70individuals to paramilitary training camps inPakistan�’s FATA along the Afghanistan border andthat the agency has stopped 26 from going toPakistan since early 2009.

Similarly, French terrorism experts acknowledge thatFrance is facing the most severe threat from alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but estimatethat there are a total of 30 50 French nationals inthe FATA/Yemen area with 10 15 participating in theYemeni theatre with al Qaeda elements.30

In other smaller EU states the pattern seems tosuggest fewer numbers. Austria has had one case in2005 when 5 people received training in FATA whilethe Netherlands have had two cases of individualsgoing to Chechnya; one case in Iraq; two cases inKashmir; four arrests in Kenya hailing from theHague and two in Yemen.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee notedwith concern in January 2010 that dozens ofAmericans may be involved in extremist activities inYemen �– including Anwar al Aulaqi (al Awlaki), aprominent Yemeni American jihadi theoreticianaffiliated in some manner with al Qaeda in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP). Media reports citingYemeni security sources note that tens ofWesterners have been arrested in security sweeps

this year, including US citizens and Europeans

29 Smith, Nicola and Bojan Pancevski. 2010. �“German militantsseen in Taliban border unit.�” London, UK; The Sunday Times

30 Personal communication with Jean Charles Brisard and otherFrench intelligence specialists.

suspected of some level of involvement withAQAP.31

Although the exact scale of the problem is illdefined, the empirical evidence suggests that asignificant number of Western volunteers areattracted to violent extremist milieus likeAfghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Theunderlying phenomenon and threat these figureshighlight poses a grave threat to the security andstrategic interests of Western nations.

THE �“SPIN�” MODEL AND COMPLEX SYSTEMSANALOGY

The framing of the multilayered and evolving natureof al Qaeda and the foreign fighters in its service is amajor challenge. The interlocking relationshipbetween al Qaeda �“core�”, its affiliates and localizedcells is often not adequately captured by staticcategories of al Qaeda�’s constituent parts orchanging geographic centres of gravity. A useful wayto conceptualize the complexity of al Qaeda�’sinterlocking components is offered by Arquilla andRonfeldt and their adaption of the so called SPINmodel: the notion that al Qaeda resembles a�“segmented, polycentric, ideologically integratednetwork.�”32

31 Majority Staff. 2010. �“Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: ATicking Time Bomb.�” Washington, DC; U.S. Senate Committee onForeign Relations

32 David Ronfeldt adapted this model from Luther Gerlach�’s studyin 1987 which focus on social movements in the 1960�’s. See:Ronfeldt, David. 2008. �“Al Qaeda and its Affiliates.�” Santa Monica,CA; RAND

PAGE 10

The SPIN model applied to al Qaeda:33

segmentary (composed of many diversegroups, which grow and die, divide andfuse, proliferate and contract);

polycentric (having multiple, oftentemporary, and sometimes competingleaders or centers of influence);

networked (forming a loose, reticulate,integrated network with multiple linkagesthrough travelers, overlapping membership,joint activities, common reading matter,and shared ideals and opponents)

More specifically it is useful to approach the foreignfighter phenomenon as a complex system: a series ofinterconnected parts and processes that, as a whole,ultimately exhibit telltale properties.

In this system, the most notorious characteristicsinclude extremist combat and training in locales suchas South Asia, East Africa, and the Arabian Peninsulaas well as sporadic eruptions of violence in the West.

Like the ill defined boundaries of any complexsystem, a foreign fighter�’s agenda is as theoreticallyopen as the besieged ummah (a contested termdefining the global community of Muslims).

Travel to Pakistan, Chechnya, Somalia, etc. �– landswhere jihadi theoreticians like al Aulaqi explain thatfighting is not only legitimate but also compulsory �–present almost limitless options for aspiring Westernmujahideen. The question becomes, how do theychoose?

The decision making that governs Western foreignfighters�’ choices for travel are nested within andaffected by other choices. Elements that weigh into

33 Gerlach, Luther P. 2001. �“The Structure of Social Movements:Environmental Activism and Its Opponents.�” In Networks andNetwars: the future of terror, crime and militancy. John Arquillaand David Ronfeldt (eds.). Santa Monica, CA; RAND

their decisions include their ideological frame, theprocess by which they are radicalized, self interestedchoices governing risk in activism, and diverse social,financial, and operational constraints. Each and allof these factors play a role in deciding not onlywhere, but also when, how, and whom to fight.34

Further, like any complex system, external pressuresand events affect regions of foreign fighter activity.Militants ebb and flow to different geographicregions in response to diverse and wide rangingcatalysts. These catalysts can include social andpolitical opportunities and constraints in the combatareas; increased or decreased surveillance efforts inand by the West; multinational intelligence agencycooperation (or lack thereof); and even mundanematters such as weather, travel restrictions, oradequate kit.35

Even incremental developments can generatedisproportional effects in overall processes andevolution. Events such as Pakistan�’s Red Mosquesiege, which cemented for some Western jihadiststhe infidelity of the Pakistani state; the involvementof Ethiopian and African Union forces in Somalia;and al Aulaqi�’s presence and activities in Yemen, forinstance, appear to be more or less isolated events.Yet they also appear to have greatly influencedaspects of foreign fighter decision making.

Finally, even in the dynamic foreign fighter system,the effects of collective memory are apparent.Shifting preferences in combat areas (for example,the apparent surge in Western foreign fighters inEast Africa relative to their diminution in Iraq) and inoperational methods like suicide bombings andtargeting decisions amplify or dampen perceptions

34 On a social movement theory approach to understandingframing processes and decision making in jihadi activism, see:Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. �“Framing Jihad: IntramovementFraming Contests and al Qaeda�’s Struggle for Sacred Authority.�”International Review of Social History. Cambridge, UK, CambridgeUniversity Press. pp. 159 177

35 Rotella, Sebastian. 2009. �“Al Qaeda recruits back in Europe,but why?�” Los Angeles, CA; Los Angeles Times

PAGE 11

and affect future choices. In short, past events andmemories of such affect the political and socialecosystem in which the foreign fighters operate.

Examples of past choices affecting currentoperations are not hard to find. For example,logistical networks that once supported fightersmoving between North America and Europe toAfghanistan have also buoyed aspiring mujahideenheaded to other venues. Alternatively, many of thesame Western extremists and associated online forathat previously extolled militancy in Chechnya andAfghanistan, for instance, have used comparableideological frameworks and methods to promoteviolence and training elsewhere. When theseindividuals or means grow silent, recant from jihadistactivities, or become irrelevant, others will harnesscomparable themes rooted in system history andrise to prominence. These themes are maintainedby a �“jihadi culture�’�’ resident in the system�—itsglue�—which can be defined as the shared andperpetually reinforced attitudes, values and beliefsthat constitute a framework for action in its ideal.36

Foreign fighters�—especially �“bridge figures,�” whichwill be defined later in the paper�—are among themost eager consumers and progenitors of thisculture.

INTERCONNECTIONS ACROSS THEATRES

Training

Foreign fighter training is primarily based overseas inor near conflict zones, though some does occurwithin Western host nations. For example, trainingactivities have been observed in the UK (especially inrural areas including Wales and Scotland), designedto pre screen and prepare potential recruits. Jihaditraining has also been discovered in Canada and theUnited States.

36 Cozzens, Jeffrey B. 2007. �“Approaching al Qaida�’s Warfare:Function, Culture, and Grand Strategy. �” In Mapping TerrorismResearch. Magnus Ranstorp (ed.). London, UK; Routledge

Training within Western host nations is often ad hocand low grade, and frequently with extremelylimited access to weaponry or explosive materials (ifany). Ad hoc training over longer periods consists oforganized physical exercise designed to establish anesprit de corps and basic exposure to operatingwithin a relatively disciplined group environmentunder a leadership figure�—all against the backdropof extreme ideological learning.

This was the case with the Virginia jihadi network. In2003, eleven men from Northern Virginia werecharged with providing material support to al Qaedaand Lashkar e Taiba. The men engaged in paintballgames as military training in preparation for jihadagainst the West.37

Often these leadership and group activities, asshown by Muhammed Siddique Khan and the 2005London bombers, consists of paintball, white waterrafting or camping which fuses the group closertogether and exposes critical elements of groupdynamics to the leader and any potential weaknessin commitment to the cause and overall mission.

The primary goal of this rudimentary training,however, may be to solidify the radicalization offoreign fighters and to ensure commitment to thegroup and the cause. Many accounts of life in jihaditraining camps �– including those from the primarysources �– support this notion, indicating that sociallyreinforced religious learning and exercises focusedon in group cohesion represent a large part of thetraining regimen.

The exploits of the so called Toronto 18 cell, whichtrained in the Ontario woodlands in 2005 2006 areinstructive here. Like many other cells that train inthe West, the impact of the exercises conducted by

37 Associated Press. 2004. �“Two �‘Paintball�’ Terrorists Sentenced.�”New York, NY; FOX News. Markon, Jerry and Mary Beth Sheridan.2003. �“Indictment Expands Va. �‘Jihad�’ Charges�” Washington, DC;The Washington Post. US Attorneys' Office, Eastern District ofVirginia. 2005. News Release. Alexandria, VA; US Department ofJustice. Markon, Jerry. 2005. �“Muslim Lecturer Sentenced to Life.�”Washington, DC; The Washington Post

PAGE 12

the group �– including obstacle courses, callisthenics,and multiple trips to a Tim Horton�’s coffee shop toescape the cold �– were quasi comical. Perhaps themost crucial element of the training was simplyspending time together listening to al Aulaqi�’s(originally Yusuf al 'Uyayree�’s) �“Constants on thePath of Jihad.�” On a frigid December night in a tent,this lecture hit home for the group, reminding themof their obligation to fight and die in God�’s path,their status as a type of �‘persecuted chosen�’, and themany ways in which the mujahideen find victory injihad. In so doing, the ideological raison d�’être forthe planned �“Battle of Toronto�” was solidified.38

Foreign fighter training camps solidify theradicalization process by translating an individual�’srhetoric and intention into action and experience.The camaraderie of a small group under theinfluence of a leadership figure is a key step indeepening radicalization. This helps prepare theindividual to carry out overseas or home basedterrorist acts. The mere act of holding an illegalweapon for the first time is noted as both an act thatenhances self confidence and as a significantpsychological step across legal and personalboundaries.

There is a significant capability difference betweenrhetoric/intention and action. Training �– no matterthe level of sophistication �– bridges this transition.

Life in foreign and mobile terrorist training camps isnot easy �– a fact starkly underscored by AQAP�’sINSPIRE magazine published in mid 2010. The onlineEnglish language article aimed specifically at foreignrecruits offered some basic advice �– bring a friend.

INSPIRE noted that language barriers are difficult,but critical, to overcome; otherwise individuals mayfeel depressed and lonely. The article noted thatlanguage issues can also result in an individualmissing out on operational details and make itdifficult to effectively blend into the environment.

38 Teotonio, Isabel. 2010. �“The Mujahideen inWashago.�” Toronto, CA; The Star

JIHADIST CONFLICT THEATRES

The Western foreign fighter phenomenon injihadist conflict theatres began principally as areaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistanin the 1980s. Although the clear majority ofjihadists fighting in Afghanistan during this timewere of Arab origins, a minority were fromEuropean states and North Africa. Themujahideen�’s perceived victory over the USSRgenerated confidence in the jihadist movement �–not least because it �‘demonstrated�’ that Godrewards those who fulfil their obligation todefend Islam and Muslim lands �– and created anenduring legacy that helps fuel the conflicts inSomalia, Yemen, and (again) Afghanistan. Ineach of these cases, endemic problems such asresource shortages, lack of governmentauthority, weak institutions, and traditionalreligious, tribal, and ethnic cleavages havecreated ungoverned spaces which jihadists havesuccessfully exploited.

Jihadist leaders have woven the politics of theselocal struggles into a global fabric. Thisfacilitates the radicalization and recruitment ofindividuals to what jihadists portray asprincipled Muslim resistance against theimperialist ambitions of Western forces. Foreignfighters attracted to the notion of fighting insupport of a transnational identity group haveflocked to these areas and make up an importantand growing segment of the jihadist arsenal. Inaddition, the �“Islamic Maghreb�” region of NorthAfrica and the region of Central Asia have alsoshown signs of susceptibility to jihadist forcesbolstered by foreign fighters.

FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)

Most younger generation foreign fighters joiningthe jihad in the FATA zone between Afghanistanand Pakistan view themselves as a continuationof the heroic mujahideen resistance against a greatpower. (The critical role of US support to the

PAGE 13

There are additional motivations behind INSPIRE�’sbring a friend suggestion. Bringing a companion andfriend to the foreign training camps may servemultiple operational purposes. Being together witha friend reinforces the focus of the mission andreduces the chances an individual will turn back.Furthermore it helps support group cohesion.Additionally, it is a potentially useful safeguardagainst a single foreign intelligence operativeinfiltration (as two individuals may be easily playedoff each other during random interrogation andsecurity checks). As testified by a Belgian Frenchgroup, who arrived in Waziristan in 2008, they were�“expecting at least a welcome for 'our brothers fromEurope' and a warm atmosphere of hospitality" butwere instead subjected to lengthy interrogations byal Qaeda officials.39

Even before the publication of INSPIRE�’s bring afriend advice, foreign fighters have been observedtravelling in groups. The five Northern Virginia men(Uman Chaudhry, Ramy Zamzam, Ahmad Minni,Waqar Khan, and Aman Hassan Yemer) who werearrested in late 2009 by Pakistani officials hadtravelled as a group from the United States in thehopes of engaging in jihad against American forces inAfghanistan.40 Such was also the case withNajibullah Zazi �– who was accompanied by twoclassmates (Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis Medunjanin)when he travelled from the US to Pakistan forterrorist training.41 The Daniel Boyd group, a jihadifaction from North Carolina that trained inAfghanistan and Pakistan allegedly pursued combatin Israel and the Palestinian Territories (among otherlocations, including a planned attack against the

39 Rotella, Sebastian. 2009. �“Al Qaeda recruits back in Europe,but why?�” Los Angeles, CA; Los Angeles Times

40 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. �“AmericanJihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.�” Washington,DC; Congressional Research Service. pp. 70 71

41 US Federal Bureau of Investigations. 2010. �“Two Charged withTerror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot.�”Press Release. Washington, DC; US Department of Justice

mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980sthrough supply of anti aircraft missiles andfunding is ignored in the modern anti Westernextremist narrative.)

In the initial aftermath of Operation EnduringFreedom and the overthrow of the Taliban, someforeign fighters returned to their Westerncountries of origin. These foreign fightersreturned with extensive combat experience andan element of street credibility within extremistmilieus.

Al Qaeda suffered heavy losses due to targetedoperations that eliminated key leadershipfigures, and hampered their planning andcommunications efforts. Al Qaeda links with theTaliban have reportedly deepened due to alQaeda supplying the Taliban with weapons,logistics and training�—including religiousindoctrination and use of arms and explosives.The deepening link is reflected in a moreasymmetric Taliban strategy that has reliedincreasingly on suicide attacks to achievemaximum international media impact andundermine the local population�’s confidence inthe authorities�’ capacity to provide security. AlQaeda foreign fighters also married Taliban andtribal daughters, thereby furthering bondsbetween and among these entities, andbenefiting from consequent inclinations toprotect.

Direct al Qaeda activities in the FATA regionfocus largely on propaganda and limitedoperational support, while various Talibanentities conduct most insurgency operations.Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is considered tohave an international agenda and strong alQaeda links. TTP claimed responsibility forFaisal Shahzad�’s failed May 2010 attemptedbombing of New York�’s Times Square. Shahzadtestified that TTP had supplied him withexplosives training and orders.a More recentlyTTP has reportedly shifted to primarily

PAGE 14

Marine Corps base in Quantico, VA) offers yetanother example.42

Yet being in a group may not alleviate difficulties inadjustment. The same Belgian French groupreferenced above describes how in their trainingcamps they felt frustrated and �“increasingly cut off,bored, and fed up with the primitive living conditionsin their mountain shacks. They often did not seem toknow what their next orders would be or wheretheir handlers would take them.�”43 Additionally,the group became more disillusioned when theirhandlers did not deliver on repeatedly emptypromises to fight in Afghanistan and when they hadto partially pay for their travel, training andweapons.

Overseas foreign fighter training courses are nowoften very basic and serve more as a final phase ofindoctrination than as a phase of operationpreparation. As Peter Nesser notes in one of themore extensive treatment of European foreignfighter training, today�’s �“second generation�”Western jihadis are not necessarily groomed tobecome the mujahideen�’s �“special operators,�” asthey once were in the 1990�’s.44

42 Office of Public Affairs. 2009. �“Seven Charged with TerrorismViolations in North Carolina.�” Press Release. Washington, DC; USDepartment of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. 2009.�“Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter Charges Defendants withConspiring to Murder U.S. Military Personnel, WeaponsViolations.�” Press Release. Washington, DC; US Department ofJustice

43 Robertson, Nic and Paul Cruickshank. 2009. �“Recruits reveal AlQaeda�’s sprawling spread.�” Atlanta, GA; CNN

44 Nesser, Petter. 2008. �“How did Europe�’s Global Jihadis ObtainTraining for the Militant Causes?�” Terrorism and Political ViolenceLondon, UK; Taylor & Francis. pp. 234 256

propaganda operations, a fact that may reflectdelicate balances reached with Pakistanigovernment forces.

Lashkar e Taiba ( Army of the Pure, abbreviatedLeT) is the largest and most dangerous extremistgroup in Pakistan. Following the 2009 Mumbaiattacks, they have increasingly adopted a globaljihadist outlook and have expanded theiroperational focus to conduct attacks againstISAF forces in Afghanistan.b

Political, social, and ideological drivers ofvarying levels of sophistication are primarycatalysts for foreign fighters engaged in theFATA.

Interviews with Western jihadists incombination with a wealth of primary sourceliterature and public court transcripts indicatethat many believe deeply in both the spiritualand temporal political benefits of fighting nonMuslim and �‘apostate�’ forces in the FATAregion. The region, steeped in jihadi tradition asthe graveyard of communist forces, also carriessome degree of eschatological significance asKhorosan, making it a highly desirable place tofight. Some would also argue that it isideologically �“purer�” venue for combat,untainted by the brutal takfiri tactics of AbuMusa�’b al Zarqawi, whose activities werereminiscent of the Algerian GIA�—a jihadi factionthat fell out of favor with bin Laden owing totheir wholesale excommunication and slaughterof innocent Muslims.

Foreign fighters from several western countries,especially those from Europe, are extremelyactive in the FATA region. German securityservices have identified 200 foreign fighters thathave links to Germany. 65 of those identifiedhave received training, with 90 believed to be intraining and 30 involved in armed hostilities.Despite their activity in the FATA, foreignfighters pose a greater threat if they return homewith expertise and credibility. This was the case

PAGE 15

Eric Breininger

Beyond verifying that the would be trainee is not aspy for Western intelligence agencies, the emphasisin the majority of cases seems to be to prepare themeither as suicide bombers, marginally effectivecombatants, or occasionally propagandashowpieces. The roles of Eric Breininger, Adam

Gadahn and Omar Hammami illustrate the latterpoint. Indeed, typical overseas training is sometimeslimited to one month in a temporary camp. Foreignfighters are often trained in basic bomb making, withlimited knowledge of materials and methods. Thiswas the pattern of training received by DanielMaldonado. Maldonado, the first Americancriminally prosecuted for joining jihadists in Somalia,told authorities he was given an AK 47, uniforms,and then participated in physical fitness, firearms,and explosives training.45

Potential recruits that pass through such camps havevery limited ability or time to improvise and adaptinformation to different scenarios or unpredictedevents. This condition has in some instancesundermined jihadi operations. It was a key factor inthe failure of a terror plot in Denmark.

In a Danish case, Hammid Khursid, a 22 year old ofPakistani origin, had spent considerable time in

45 US Attorney�’s Office, Southern District of Texas. 2007. �“USCitizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad.�” Press Release.Houston, TX; US Department of Justice

with Bryant Vinas.

Vinas, an American Muslim convert, wascharged by US officials with providing materialsupport to al Qaeda and receiving military typetraining. In the FATA, Vinas received weaponsand explosives training. He provided al Qaedawith detailed information about the Long IslandRailroad system �– which was then used to helpplan a bomb attack against the commuter railsystem. Vinas was arrested by the FBI before hecould carry out the attack.c

Both the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have extendedpropaganda activities towards Germany�’smainland. Eric Breininger, a young Germanforeign fighter killed in Waziristan in May, 2010,featured in several IJU videos where heappealed to German Muslims to join the jihad orat least support it financially.d

Following his death, Breininger�’s memoir, MeinWeg nach Jannah (My Way to Paradise), appearedon a number of jihadist websites. Officialsfeared that Breininger�’s death and account of hisjourney would serve as motivation for otherpotential jihadists to attempt to engage inforeign fighter activity. The IJU and IMU haveproven transnational agendas linked with alQaeda that focus on Uzbekistan andAfghanistan, as well as target troop contributingnations to ISAF, especially those with troopsnear the Uzbek border.e The IJU has also beenlinked to a plot to attack US military forces inFrankfurt, Germany.

Somalia

The conflict in Somalia includes actors engagedin activities across the entire spectrum ofwarfare, including conventional warfare, urbanwarfare, insurgency, rebellion, acts of terrorism,and violent crime. The southern Somalia conflictzone contains small, highly mobile forcestotaling less than 30,000 individuals. Foreign

PAGE 16

Pakistan�’s Red Mosque during a confrontation withauthorities in 2007. He had been radicalized andchannelled to Jani Khel in Waziristan to attend oneof Abu Ubaid al Masri�’s mobile training camps forone month�’s duration.

At the Red Mosque, where he spent considerabletime sleeping and �‘hanging out�’ with his contactfacilitator to al Qaeda, he had copied down one ofthe bomb manuals in Urdu, containing explosivesrecipes and instruction on how to make a suicidebelt.

Khurshid showed great proficiency in securecommunications in public Internet cafes, havingestablished several �‘dead drop�’ Internet accountswhich he used to communicate with MuhammedIlyas Subhan Ali, a well known Saudi liaison andlogistics officer between �‘core�’ al Qaeda andaffiliates and members around the world.

When arriving home to Copenhagen with the bombmanual, Khursid managed to manufacture sometriacetone triperoxide (TATP) for a test explosion buthe had great difficulty improvising and replacing a 3volt light bulb to be used in the circuitry board whenthe one he brought back from Pakistan broke.

Limits to improvisation mirrors frustration in someUK cases where returning fighters were disappointedin training levels as �“they only practiced strippingAK 47�’s.�” There are more advanced courses andother UK cases point to opposite experience withmuch more advanced training courses �– enhanced insome instances by the fact that there are trainingcamps inside the UK for pre selection. However, thisconstitutes the exception rather than the norm.

Foreign fighters gain the most significant experience,skills, and knowledge during actual fighting inconflict areas. Often, fighting NATO�’s InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) or foreign invadingforces is a principal reason for why they travelled tothese conflict zones in the first place.

Foreign fighters seek to �“graduate�” to this level inorder to prove their bona fides, especially withimpressionable members of their extended social

fighters are a relatively new (year 2000)phenomenon, and make up less than 5 10% ofthe jihadists in Somalia.

The jihadist movements in Somalia are dividedinto two main, clan based, factions: Al Shabaaband Hizb Al Islam. As in Afghanistan, Somaliclan/tribe affiliations take primacy over ideologyand religious factors. The jihadists share acommon agenda, but lack real coordination andeven disagree on ideology.

Somalis expatriates holding foreign passportsare present on both sides of the conflict�—addinga new dimension to the foreign fighterphenomenon�—while foreign fighters with noSomali background are few in number. Mostforeign fighters are associated with al Shabaab(estimates range from 200 to 1000 individuals).

Some contend that the media has overstated theimpact of foreign fighters in Somalia and hasunderstated the troubles they face integratingwith the indigenous forces. It is argued thatforeign fighters in Somalia are generallycharacterized as �“jihadist tourists�” by localfighters, who also question the foreigners�’fighting capacity and competence.

Yet Jonathan Evans, Director General of MI5,believes foreign fighters with connections toSomalia present a real and growing danger.

With more than 100 UK residents now fightingor training in al Shabaab camps in Somalia,Evans recently argued that �“it�’s only a matter oftime before we see terrorism on our streetsinspired by those who are today fightingalongside al Shabaab.�” Evans�’ sentiment wasechoed by John Sawers, Chief of MI6.f

These concerns on the part of security servicesare well founded. According to Peter Bergenand Bruce Hoffman, al Shabaab �“had managedto plant al Qaeda like ideas into the heads ofeven its American recruits, and has shown that it

PAGE 17

groups and communities. Those who cannot reachthis phase may miss out on the �“rock star�” status towhich they aspire and instead face humiliation.

Due to their image and their ability to operate with adegree of competence upon returning to theirWestern host nation, veteran foreign fighters arethus the primary concern to host nations as opposedto trained foreign fighters with no appliedexperience.

There are foreign fighters that receive moreadvanced training in camps over a longer duration.The case of US citizen and convert Bryant Vinas, whobetween March and July 2007 attended three alQaeda training courses in handling explosives andweapons, is instructive of several elements oftraining practices, rigorous security procedures andhow al Qaeda adapts protectively againstincreasingly effective Predator or Reaper strikes.While training in the FATA, Vinas provided al Qaedawith detailed information about the Long IslandRailroad system �– which was then used to help plana bomb attack against the commuter rail system.Vinas was arrested by the FBI before he could carryout the attack.

Many of the previous al Qaeda training camps whichused to be stationary, larger scale installations havebeen replaced by small, mobile bivouac trainingcamps consisting of reportedly around 300 500Arab fighters divided into small units of around tenrecruits in each and their trainers.

These recruits, often introduced through referrals,face rigorous background checks through severalforms specifing personal details. Handing overpassports and adopting an alias together with theirmobile phones, the recruits then travel aroundliving in safe houses and conduct small arms training.If they prove to be good enough, they may be givenmore specialized courses in the construction ofsuicide vests and the manufacture of improvisedexplosives. Much of the instruction occurs nowadaysindoors and small arms training in small courtyardsor remote valleys. Vinas�’ experience was similar to

is capable of carrying out operations outside ofSomalia.�”g

Western foreign fighters are often unpreparedfor the harsh environment, limited medicines,linguistic problems, and religious cleavages theyface in Somalia. Also, racism is an importantdividing force between Arab and Africanjihadists that runs below the surface, but affectstheir ability to unite effectively to fight incommon cause. Due to these factors, foreignfighters have grown disillusioned and returnedto their host nations following only a limitedperiod. The few that have remained in Somaliahave often adopted an advisory role, providingtraining or propaganda work. The evolution oftactics regarding the use of improvised explosivedevices stems from the presence of moreexperienced foreign fighters migrating toSomalia from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Events such as the Ethiopian intervention intoSomalia or perceived western interference arerecognized triggers for increased foreign fighteractivity in Somalia. Nevertheless, the number offoreign fighters has decreased since the peak offighting against Ethiopian forces in 2006/2007,but there is worry that al Shabaab may pushforeign fighters toward hitting soft targetsabroad �– a real concern, particularly in the wakeof al Shabaab having pledged allegiance to alQaeda, which brings with it the need todemonstrate al Shabaab�’s capability.

Yemen

The presence of bridge figure Anwar al Aulaqi,the attempted Christmas day downing of anairliner by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, as wellas continuing evidence that Al Qaeda in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP) operates withimpunity make Yemen an attractive destinationfor foreign fighters. Indeed, both of the twosuccessful post 9/11 jihadi attacks in the UnitedStates have links to Yemen. AbdulhakimMuhammad, who killed a US soldier in

PAGE 18

that of a French Belgian group who spent time inWaziristan in 2008.

The entry of Walid Othmani, a French recruit, into alQaeda�’s fold provides detailed insight into rigidprocedural protocols that al Qaeda handlers andtrainers require to maintain discipline and security.Before being allowed to train, Othmani was requiredto sign forms pledging absolute obedience to theinstructions of his recruiter and indicating whetherhe would volunteer to become a shaheed, a martyr,while at the end of the training the instructorsprovide written evaluation of performance.46

Pipelines

As illustrated by, �“The militant pipeline,�” a report byPaul Cruickshank for the New America Foundation �–a link exists between jihadist conflict theatres andhomeland terrorism.

The report surveys 21 �“serious�” terrorism plotsagainst the West since 2004 and highlights thecurrent danger posed by terrorist safe havens inPakistan. In half the cases studied, the plotterseither received direction from or trained directlywith al Qaeda or its allies in Pakistan.

Foreign fighter support and control structures areinterconnected across jihadist conflict theatres.According to Bergen and Hoffman, this increases thedanger presented by jihadi groups. For example, theauthors note �“the danger of al Qaeda comes notonly from its central leadership in Pakistan, butthrough its cooperation with other like mindedgroups.�”47

This is often the result of common nodes capable ofredirecting resources. Overlapping logistics andfunding networks supply multiple conflict theatres

46 Robertson, Nic and Paul Cruickshank. 2009. �“Recruits reveal AlQaeda�’s sprawling spread.�” Atlanta, GA; CNN

47 Bergen, Peter and Bruce Hoffman. 2010. �“Assessing theTerrorist Threat.�” Washington, DC; Bipartisan Policy Center. p. 6

Arkansas in June 2009, was deported fromYemen earlier that year. Further, the perpetratorof the Fort Hood, TX, massacre, Nidal MalikHasan, was in communication with the Yemenbased al Aulaqi prior to the shooting.

Daniel Benjamin, US Ambassador at Large forCounterterrorism, recently noted that,�“Terrorism emanating from Yemen is a majorsecurity concern for the United States.�”Benjamin has highlighted the risk posed byAQAP. He contends it is determined to strikethe US homeland.

In a speech to The US Institute of Peace,Ambassador Benjamin singled out the threatposed by American born Anwar al Aulaqi.Benjamin told the audience that the Americancitizen �“is not just an ideologue but someonewho has been personally involved in planningterrorist acts against Americans.�”h

AQAP has exploited the Yemeni government�’sineffectiveness to gain traction and support,especially in the Hadramout�—the ancestralhomeland of Osama bin Laden and otherimportant jihadist figures. As is the case inevery jihadist conflict zone, AQAP has proven�“adept at aligning grievances of Yemenicommunities with its own narrative of what iswrong and who is responsible.�” Their ability tooffer �“a coherent narrative that is consistent withthe core tenets of al Qaeda�’s ideology butinfused with themes that resonate locally�”increases their salience, credibility, and audienceacceptance.i

Yemen�’s location on the Arabian Peninsulaposes additional problems. Analysts note thatthe country�’s access to the Bab al Mandab, thestrait of water which separates Yemen frommainland Africa, and by extension Somalia, is amere 20 miles across. This proximity makesoperational cooperation between al Shabaab andAQAP a real and serious possibility.

PAGE 19

and can readjust as necessary to reflect shifts inpriorities and resource requirements.

Adjustments due to individual decision making addto the complexity of recognized networks. This wasstarkly revealed by David Headley (see also below),who provided the advance reconnaissance forMumbai attack teams using GPS coordinates duringhis multiple visits to the sites, as he later pursuedsimilar �“casing�” activity for an attack team againstthe Danish Jyllandsposten newspaper in Copenhagenand other public targets. In this case it appears thatthis operational strand was semi independent asthere seems to have been discussions anddisagreement about target priority with IlyasKashmiri, one of the key operational leaders ofLashkar e Taiba and architect of the Mumbai attack.

Connections and interactions between individualforeign fighters and networks are also made throughwide reaching organisations such as Al Ummah (�‘thepeople�’) and the overarching concept of global jihadthat binds non aligned or even competingorganisations. Western intelligence has alsoencountered cases where foreign fighters have evenused the Tablighi Jamaat movement as a cover tofacilitate travel.48

There are no clear travel patterns to any singleidentified jihadist conflict theatre, such as Somaliabeside neighboring Kenya. Travel through multipleintermediary countries and cities is used as a tacticby foreign fighters to cover traces of activity in orderto return unmonitored to their host nations.

It is possible to establish various travel patterns andconcealment methods, from facilitation networks inTurkey as a route to the FATA region, and Eastleighin Kenya as a route to Somalia, to Arabic languageinstruction as cover in Syria, Egypt, and Yemen,toname just a few possibilities.

48 Interview with intelligence officers from EU states at theEuropean Expert Network on Terrorism Issues (ENER).

As in Somalia and Afghanistan, but to a greaterextent, Yemeni cultural norms also complicatethe true fusion of indigenous and foreign fighterjihadist elements. Yemenis possess alongstanding hostility to outsiders�—even thoseostensibly fighting on their behalf.j

Therefore, it is not surprising that AQAP hasstated on websites that they only requireWestern foreign fighters who possess specializedskills that bring added value. AQAP leadershave requested potential Western foreignfighters not to travel to the conflict area butinstead to support AQAP by sending money. AlZawahiri has been quoted as requesting Westernfollowers to �“contribute to jihad at home.�”

As problems continue to mount for Yemeniauthorities, AQAP will certainly attempt toexploit the situation for its own propagandapurposes. Yemen affords bridge figures andforeign fighters alike an unchallenged area ofoperations which permits them to conductmedia, recruitment, training, and planningoperations without fear of reprisal. Yemen alsooffers a variety of educational and religiouscenters that seem to attract Western Muslims,including some that have embraced violentextremism. If not addressed soon, Yemen has thepotential to become an even more serious sceneof terrorist and foreign fighter activity.

The Caucasus

Recent press attention has focused heavily onthe aforementioned jihadist conflict zones;however the Caucasus remain an importantcomponent of the overall jihadist landscape.Chechen rebel leader, Doku Umarov, has soughtto distance the insurgency from its originalstated goal of Chechen independence andinstead align it with the global jihadist narrative;a narrative which supports the establishment ofan Islamic emirate in the Caucasus. To that end,the insurgents have become increasingly adeptat using the Internet to post videos of successful

PAGE 20

The primary routes to the FATA go usually throughTurkey, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Whiletravel facilitators provide fake passports and IDcards in Turkey, the routes go often throughBaluchistan in Iran into FATA areas.

There are also two kinds of travel facilitators: firstly,for procurement of passports and ID cards; secondly,those capable of providing high tech equipment andorganizing financial transactions for travel.

The Danish case of Ameer Saeed, an Iraqi refugeefrom Turkmenistan, reveals the modus operandi oftravel facilitation which in 2006 and 2007 sentaround 30 men from Morocco, Saudi Arabia,Denmark and Sweden via Syria to Iraq to conductsuicide operations against Western troops. Saeedorganised logistically the travel via Syria andinstructed the recruits to establish �‘electronic deaddrop�’ e mails (using shared usernames andpasswords) for instruction and meetings withfacilitators. One such intercepted message from2006 read: �“At Saladdins grave, inside the Al Arnawimosque, there will be someone with a pack ofcigarettes and a bottle of Coca Cola. The otherperson will wear a black hat and will ask: where isNourelldine�’s store? The other will answer: on theother street.�”49 Saaed�’s facilitation network alsoorganised the travel for Muhamed Moumou (AbuQaswarah), a Moroccan born Swedish national whorose to the position of second in command afterAbu Musab al Zarqawi.

Geographic vicinity is no guarantee for facilitationinto conflict zones. For example, according to Spain�’sGuardia Civil, there is a bigger trend of trying totravel to Pakistan than to the Maghreb theatres(Algeria, Morocco and the Sahel countries). In othercases, the Chechen theatre has proven too difficultto gain entry to and has pushed instead

49 Maltesen, Bo. 2010. �“Jakker eller selvmordsbombere.�”Copenhagen, DK; Politiken

attacks on Russian military and securitypersonnel, to espouse a message of jihad, and torecruit new fighters to its ranks.k

In March 2010, Umarov announced that he hadordered the Moscow subway suicide bombingswhich claimed 40 lives and injured over 100.Russian authorities have linked him to otherChechen suicide attacks as well. They worrythat jihadists in the Caucasus seek to expand theconflict into Russia proper; Umarov warned invideo messages following the subway attacksthat they would not be the last attacks aimed atMoscow.

Over the last year, public statements of supportfor Doku Umarov and other Caucasus rebelleaders have increased. Leading al Qaedamentor, Jordanian Sheikh Abu Mohammad alMaqdisi, wrote in an open letter in 2009 �“it is mygreat pleasure to express my alignment with,patronage for, and support to the Mujahideen ofthe Caucasus.�”l Considerable debate remains,however, over to the extent to which Chechenrebel leaders agree with Umarov�’s recasting ofthe conflict in a jihadist narrative. Many see thedeparture from the traditional nationalisticrhetoric of the Chechen rebels to jihadi languageas an opportunistic move aimed at securingforeign financial and material support, and as asource of potential new recruits who identifywith a transnational, Islamic identity.

a Kornblut, Anne and Karin Brulliard. 2010. �“U.S. Blames

Pakistani Taliban For Times Square Bomb Plot.�” Washington,DC; The Washington Post. Miller, Greg. 2010. �“Pakistan ArrestsMan With Militant Ties Who Says He Aided Times SquareBomb Suspect.�” Washington, DC; The Washington Post. USAttorney�’s Office, Southern District of New York. 2010. �“FaisalShahzad To Appear In Manhattan Court.�” Press Release. NewYork, NY; US Department of Justice

bMudd, Philip. 2010. �“Evaluting the Al Qa�’ida Threat to the

U.S. Homeland.�” CTC Sentinel. West Point, NY; CombatingTerrorism Center

PAGE 21

recruits, like Mohamed Atta and later the GermanSauerland cell, to the FATA theatre.50

Without targeted investigations and the assistanceof third party national security services, the finaldestinations of foreign fighters can be difficult toidentify and monitor. Because of this, currentestimates on foreign fighter activity likelyunderestimate the scale of the problem.

A variety of decision making factors shape thepipelines used. Which pipeline aspiring foreignfighters elect to use depends on access, opportunityand ideology �– more than origin.

While Iraq, for example, has become an unpopularforeign fighter destination, the FATA, Somalia, andYemen are the most attractive conflict areas forforeign fighters. In all cases, contacts within theconflict areas are critical in order to facilitaterecruitment. All travel routes to conflict areas areconsidered viable for foreign fighters as long as theyhave connections to facilitation networks within thejihadist conflict region of choice.

IMPACT OF INDIVIDUALS

Bridge Figures

As identified in studies conducted by the UnitedKingdom�’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre; keyindividuals and leadership figures have come to playan increasingly important role in foreign fighteractivity. These �‘bridge figures�’ play an importantpart in radicalizing new recruits and sustaining thejihadi network.

Bridge figures are primary actors in the radicalizationprocess and serve as a major catalyst forrecruitment. They play a noted role in developingnew techniques which target at risk populations and

50 Steinberg, Guido. 2010. �“Trial and Error: How a failed plotrevealed a movement.�” Jane�’s Intelligence Review. London, UK;Jane�’s Information Group

align international jihadist efforts with localgrievances thus making them more salient. Theyalso provide legitimacy to the actions and aspirationsof foreign fighters.

Bridge figures possess transnational salience; thismakes them appealing to at risk populations. Oftenthey draw on their past associations with legendaryjihadi ideologues and militant figures such as SheikhOmar Abdul Rahman, Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza alMasri and others. A case in point is Said Mansour, a

c Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. �“American

Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.�”Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service. p. 88

dMusharbash, Yassin. 2010. �“German Jihadist Eric Breininger

Killed in Pakistan, Group Claims.�” Hamburg, DE; Der Spiegel

eMoore, Cerwyn. 2010. �“The Rise and Fall of the Islamic Jihad

Union: What Next for Uzbek Terror Networks?�” Washington,DC; The Jamestown Foundation

f Norton Taylor, Richard. 2010. �“MI5 chiefs warns of terror

threat from Britons trained in Somalia.�” London, UK; TheGuardian

g Bergen, Peter and Bruce Hoffman. 2010. �“Assessing the

Terrorist Threat.�” Washington, DC; Bipartisan Policy Center.p. 110

h Benjamin, Daniel. 2010. �“US Counterterrorism Strategy in

Yemen.�” Remarks to the US Institute of Peace. Washington,DC; US State Department.

i Harris, Alistar. 2010. Exploiting Grievances: Al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula. Yemen: On the Brink. Washington, DC;Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

j Gnehm, Jr., Edward W. (2010) A Focus on Yemen. The 2010

Annual Kuwait Chair Lecture. Washington, DC; The ElliottSchool of International Affairs

k Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 2010. Hagiography,

Bomb Making, And A Dejeuner Sur LHerbe. Washington,DC; Broadcasting Board of Governors

l Ferris Rotman, Annie. 2010. Global jihad creeping intoRussia s insurgency. London, UK; Reuters

PAGE 22

veteran facilitator within Denmark who wassentenced to prison (now released) for possessionand distribution of 3,000 CDs with vast amounts ofterrorist propaganda material. When arrestedMansour had a list of visits to 73 senior jihadi leadersand militants in the West and the Arab world. Thesebridge figures have an ability to act as key leadershipfigures which adds a new and disconcertingdimension to the foreign fighter phenomenon.

Bridge figures, characteristically speaking, areeloquent, educated, often bi or multilingual, andskilled at employing the tools of a globalized world.They use these skills to access specific subgroups ofsociety �– of which they typically have social andcultural knowledge of �– to aid in recruitment tojihadi causes and to impart radical ideologies.Severalrecent foreign fighter plots have featured suchleaders. Anwar al Aulaqi, an American and Yemenicitizen active in AQAP in Yemen, was in extensiveemail contact with US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasanprior to his shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas �–which left 13 dead and 32 others wounded. AlAulaqi also reportedly met with failed Christmas Daybomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, in the fallprior to his attempt to blow up Northwest AirlinesFlight 253.

Abdullah al Faisal, a Jamaican, had ties to shoebomber Richard Reid and Faisal Shahzad, the suspectbehind New York�’s attempted Times Squarebombing in May, 2010. Shahzad was reportedly incontact with al Aulaqi as well. Both men havesuspected ties to dozens of terror plots where theypurportedly provided moral and spiritual guidance tothe suspects.

Anwar al Aulaqi

Al Aulaqi and al Faisal have been characterized byofficials as adept at using technology, naturallycharismatic, and quite capable of framing theirextremist message in such a way that it is readilyaccessible to Western audiences and their culturalbiases. It was apparently the speeches of al Aulaqithat motivated Shaker Masri�’s failed attempt toenlist with either al Shabaab or al Qaeda.51

A Yemeni official familiar with counterterrorismoperations in the country commented on al Aulaqi�’sconnections and recently characterized him as �“themost dangerous man in Yemen. He's intelligent,sophisticated, Internet savvy and very charismatic.He can sell anything to anyone, and right now he'sselling jihad.�”52

In regards to al Faisal, the head of the IslamicCouncil in Jamaica and an old friend of the cleric�’s,Mustafa Mohammad, remarked that Faisal�’seloquence caused people to naturally gravitatetowards him. This ultimately led the council to banhim from preaching in island mosques for fear thathe would radicalize the youth.53

Both al Aulaqi and al Faisal remain active online.Faisal recently launched a chat room, the majority ofwhose regular members are believed to residewithin the United States.

Moez Garsalloui is another interesting bridge figure.Garsalloui, a Tunisian immigrant is married to thewidow of the man that killed Northern Allianceleader Ahmad Shah Masoud. The widow, Malika alAroud, was widely revered in militant circles as awidow of a martyr, for her passionate support for

51 Bjelopera, Jerome P. and Mark A. Randol. 2010. �“AmericanJihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat.�” Washington,DC; Congressional Research Service. p. 66

52 Coker, Margaret. 2010. �“Yemen Ties Alleged Attacker to alQaeda and U.S. Born Cleric.�” New York, NY; The Wall StreetJournal

53 Temple Raston, Dina. 2010. �“Jamaican Cleric Uses Web ToSpread Jihad Message.�” All Things Considered. Washington, DC;NPR

PAGE 23

Bin Laden�’s jihad and for administering an Arabiclanguage jihadi internet forum under the variousversions of the name al Minbar.

Al Aroud�’s jihadi websites have served as importantnodes for claiming responsibility for attacks anddisseminating propaganda. The Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan (IMU) has employed the Internet tocelebrate and promote its attacks. Ayman alZawahiri has used it to issue announcements. Thefirst broadcast of Sout al Khalifah, a product of theGlobal Islamic Media Front; and the GSPC (originallyknown as the Salafist Group for Preaching andCombat, now al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) havealso employed the internet as a conduit for reachingmass audiences.

For some bridge figures, the internet is critical fornot only spreading their message, but directingaction, and maintaining support.

Writing in French and known by her online penname Oum Obeyda, al Aroud, together with herhusband Garsalloui, routinely and actively used theweb. It served as the chief tool by which theyactively sought to �“bully Muslim men to go and fightand rall[y] women to join the cause.�”54 Garsallouiused his wife�’s websites to search for potentialrecruits to join him to travel to Pakistan�’s tribalareas.

While Garsalloui is still at large with al Qaeda circlesin the FATA region, Belgian authorities arrested alAroud in Brussels in December 2008, charging herwith inciting two French youths and four youngBelgians to go to terrorist training camps inAfghanistan or Pakistan. Described by authorities asan �“al Qaeda living legend�”, a Belgian courtsentenced her in May 2010 to eight years in prisonfor �“creating, directing and funding the terroristcell.�” According to the judges, Malika El Aourd usedthe minbar sos.com website, which she had

54 Sciolino, Elaine and Souad Mekhennet. 2008. �“For a jihadistblogger, �‘Writing is also a Bomb.�’�” New York, NY; The New YorkTimes

established with her husband, to attract the mostvulnerable surfers in an attempt to indoctrinatethem and then recruit them to participate in theglobal jihad led by al Qaeda.

Malika al Aroud

The question of how to handle identified keyleadership figures who aid radicalization and foreignfighter activity is a difficult one. It is complicated bythe fact that bridge figures in particular are typicallycalculated in their use of language and operate closeto, but within, the line of the law.

Overt monitoring of such figures can itself raise theindividual�’s credibility and potential reach withintheir community �– thus becomingcounterproductive. As a result, security services andpolice forces are faced with a dilemma; whether totreat key identified leadership figures as primarilyintelligence targets that reveal wider networks or toshut down these actors and protect the localcommunity. The necessary balance requirescalculation on a case by case basis.

Around the clock surveillance on key bridge figuresis difficult, labour intensive and costly. For example,in the 2007 Sauerland case, 300 officers workedintensively for six months providing surveillance onFritz Gelowicz and his three accomplices. For everytargeted surveillance operation at least 20 officersneed to be allocated to sustain around the clockcover on the suspect. Pressures are added as formerprisoners are released and require rehabilitation (ifever possible) and intense surveillance in somecases.

PAGE 24

Jihadist �‘Rockstars�’

In addition to the bridge figures there has been theemergence of a class of jihadist �‘rockstars.�’ Becauseof their foreign fighter activity and experiences,these individuals have celebrity appeal with at riskpopulations.

These figures typically do not possess the eloquenceor charisma of bridge figures, but they do resonatewith groups at risk for radicalization. The salience oftheir message rests on perceptions of a sharedidentity.

Rockstars are critical to the cycle of radicalization;they provide a living example to which individualscan aspire. This in turn helps motivate and facilitatethe recruit through the process.

Omar Hammami

Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Alabamaand convert to Islam, travelled to Somalia to join alShabaab after his own radicalization. His trainingand experience helped seal his indoctrination ofextremist ideas. Hammami rose through the ranksof the Shabaab militia; he was quickly recognized byleaders for his value as a propaganda tool.Hammami�’s operational and leadership experiencein the field imbues him with a level of legitimacy inthe eyes of aspiring extremists.

In March, 2009, a thirty one minute video featuringthis American was released which was described byThe New York Times as a �“veritable homage toHammami.�” The video depicts him running in slow

motion followed by a group of fighters; a jihadist rapsong plays in the background. The scene is followedby another of him reading from the Koran in bothEnglish and Arabic.55 It concludes with Hammamioffering a lecture in colloquial American English.

Analysts contend that Hammami�’s identity as anAmerican cast against the backdrop of jihadistactivities provides at risk youth with an ideal type towhich they may aspire.

Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax presents a similar�‘rockstar�’ case. Faarax, a Somali born naturalizedAmerican citizen, attended meetings in theMinneapolis area where he encouraged others totravel to Somalia and fight. He lectured potentialrecruits that his jihad had allowed him to experiencetrue brotherhood. He assured them fighting wouldbe fun, said they should not be afraid, and promisedthey would get the chance to use firearms.56

Eric Breininger, a German convert to Islam, offered anarrative similar to Hammami�’s. Breininger joinedthe Islamic Jihad Union in the Afghanistan Pakistanregion and, like Hammami, was involved in combatoperations on the ground. Although he was notbelieved to have held an operational leadership rolelike Hammami he was featured in a number ofpropaganda videos as a means of eliciting popularsupport among other potential foreign fighters.

Breininger was reported killed in May, 2010 in abattle with Pakistani troops.57 Following his deathan unfinished memoir he penned entitled �“Mein

55 Cilluffo, Frank and F. Jordan Evert. 2010. �“Hammami theJihadist Pop Star �– Bridging Worlds: From Mobile to Mogadishu.�”Washington, DC; The Homeland Security Policy Institute. Elliott,Andrea. 2010. �“The Jihadist Next Door.�” New York, NY; The NewYork Times

56 Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax andAbdiweli Yassin Isse, (D. Minn. 2009). Temple Raston, Dina. 2010.�“Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon.�” MorningEdition. Washington, DC; NPR

57 Musharbash, Yassin. 2010. �“German Jihadist Eric BreiningerKilled in Pakistan, Group Claims.�” Hamburg, DE; Der Spiegel

PAGE 25

Weg nach Jannah�” (My Path to Paradise) wasuncovered. Der Spiegel wrote that the work offeredan �“account of the day to day life of radical jihadifighting in the Hindu Kush and an intimate look atthe thoughts of a radical who is certain he is in theright.�”58

Breininger�’s memoir is written in such a way that isaccessible to those who share his cultural and socialbackground. By evoking popular, cultural referenceshe relates to foreign fighter recruits: �“If the brotherswould buy one doner kebab less a week it would bepossible to buy almost 20 sniper bullets to fight thekuffar.�”59

The online publication of Breininger�’s memoir �–riddled with popular references and cultural nuances�–following his death helped reinforce his status as ajihadist rockstar. Seen as a martyr in the eyes ofextremists, Breininger has been cast as a model forfuture foreign fighters.

The Fighter

The foreign fighter himself �– the target of bridgefigures and the individual to whom the jihadist rockstar appeals �– plays a potentially indispensable rolein inspiring and facilitating future foreign fighteractivity.

Attempts by individuals to travel to jihadist conflictzones, whether successful or not, support theforeign fighter movement. By showcasing theattempts by individuals who share a perceivedcommon identity, these efforts promote a sense ofcommunity. This feeling of a unity of purposeperpetuates foreign fighter activity and reinforcesthe radicalization process of other individuals.

David Coleman Headley, an American of Pakistanidescent, was indicted and pled guilty (to avoid the

58 Musharbash, Yassin. 2010. �“The Memoirs of a GermanJihadist.�” Hamburg, DE; Der Spiegel

59 Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. �“Guest Post: The Story of EricBreininger.�” Website. Washington, DC; Jihadica

death penalty) to conspiring with Lashkar e Taiba(LeT), a Pakistani terrorist group, in the 2008Mumbai attacks in India. Headley conductedsignificant target surveillance in Mumbai prior to theattacks including the scouting of amphibious landingzones. He also compiled information andsurveillance on targets in Copenhagen, including theDanish newspaper responsible for printingcaricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.60

Headley travelled with ease between the UnitedStates, Pakistan, and India and reportedly receivedspecialized frogman training from members of thePakistani Navy, which allegedly supports LeT.Headley also maintained contact with al Qaedaoperatives in North Waziristan. The revelation ofthese facts following his arrest in October, 2009 castHeadley as a capable and formidable operative.Experts suggest that others seeking to emulate the�‘James Bond super spy�’ lifestyle which Headley livedmay prompt other potential foreign fighters to goabroad in search of adventure in the name of jihad.

David Coleman Headley

The case of the 20 Somali men who left their homesin Minneapolis, Minnesota and travelled to Somaliawith the intent to join al Shabaab represents thelargest group of American citizens yet who haveattempted to engage in foreign fighter activity.

60 Johnson, Carrie. 2010. �“U.S. citizen David Coleman Headleyadmits role in Mumbai attacks.�” Washington, DC; The WashingtonPost

PAGE 26

Officials assert that this fact alone acts as a powerfulmotivator for other likeminded youth.

These Somalis, some of whom have reportedly beenkilled in the fighting, have the ability to resonate

. e r

within diaspora communities like the one inMinneapolis. Officials worry that other at riskpopulations will draw parallels between themselvesand these men; identifying common denominatorssuch as social pressures, economic hardship,demographic divides, and a similar psychologicallandscape Ther exists a eal risk that othersseeking to assuage social pressures and serve agreater cause will follow in the men�’s footsteps andbecome active fighters. In August 2010, in helpingclose down this network and end recruitment fromthis community, the US Department of Justicebrought nineteen indictments against individualsaccused of supporting the provision of foreignfighters to al Shabaab.61

61Office of Public Affairs. 2010. �“Fourteen Charged with ProvidingMaterial Support to Somalia Based Terrorist Organization AlShabaab.�” Press Release. Washington, DC; US Department ofJustice. New York, NY; FOX News. Pantucci, Raffaello. 2009.�“American Jihad: New Details Emerge About al Shabaab

Just as perceived success fuels additional attempts,

The recent unsuccessful attempt by Zachary Adam

Because figures like Chesser lack the operational

is limited. Nonetheless, their exploits present a

failure too offers potential motivators and breedsfollow on efforts by others.

Chesser to travel to Somalia and join al Shabaabshowcases some of the effects of failure. Chesser,who chose to go by the name Abu Talhah AlAmrikee, acted as a jihadi �‘cheerleader�’ maintainingan extensive online footprint through Facebook,Twitter, blogs, and website profiles. Through thesemediums he engaged in open debate, including anexchange about jihadism with Jarrett Brachman, aformer Director of Research at West Point�’sCombating Terrorism Center. Chesser�’s arrest hascalled attention to his actions and makes him anexample to at risk populations, similar to jihadistrockstars.

experience which accords significant legitimacy,their impact, relative to rockstars and bridge figures

Recruitment in North America.�” Washington, DC; The JamestownFoundation

FIGURE 1: MANUFACTURING A FOREIGN FIGHTER �– AN ACTION EXPERIENCE RELATIONSHIP

PAGE 27

danger and serve to fuel the foreign fighterphenomenon.

Another failed operational attempt is found in thecase of five Virginian men who travelled to Pakistan

their efforts at jihad. The publicity surrounding the

with the intent to engage in jihad. Although themen, American citizens ages 19 to 25, were arrestedby Pakistani officials after making contact with LeTand the Pakistani militant group Jaish e Mohammad�– they never engaged in any foreign fighter activity.

Like Chesser, however, their arrest brought to light

case risks their actions being perceived as nobleattempts to support a worthy cause. Regardless ofwhether or not the men engaged in violent activityabroad, the perception of their intention to do soprovides legitimacy and rhetorical credence tobridge figures and propagandists who can use it tofuel the cycle of radicalization.

Zachary Adam Chesser

The failures of Chesser, the Virginiahave raised the issue of an implicit test presented to

awareness acts as a vetting process. Those who failo

oceedfar enough to successfully enter into the jihadist

ters�’ ultimate intention isan area which requires further study. Variations in

s are an issue of greatconcern to law enforcement and intelligence

demands closer examination. Toolittle is known about their effect on domestic

e profile of returnee fighters has beencreated. Among the profiles that have been

reign fighters whoreturn home following operations, or attempted

five, and others

potential foreign fighters. Those who attempt totravel to jihadi conflict zones must exercise theoperational security necessary to pass undetected.

The achievement of this level of operational

to pass undetected by security services r police areconsidered a threat to operational integrity of thejihadi network and will likely be turned away.

Individuals that trip security alarms do not pr

theatre of conflict and make physical contact withthe organization or they are interdicted along the

way by law enforcement or intelligence officials �– aswas the case with Shaker Masri. As a result, onlyminimally savvy recruits realize the opportunity tobecome foreign fighters.

The question of foreign figh

cases and a lack of statistical data make deducingpatterns difficult. It remains unclear whetherforeign fighters travel to jihadist theatres of conflictwith the intent to engage in indigenous operationsor to acquire training, operational experience, orsome combination thereof and then return to theirhomes to engage in hostilities. Moreover, little isknown about the precise inner processes of trainingforeign fighters while abroad, specifically the finalphase of indoctrination which completes the processof radicalization. As a result, it is not clear whetherrecruits alter their original intentions to engage inlocal operations upon completing training andinstead return home at the behest of leaders tocommit violent acts. As a result, it remains unclearhow best to detect, deter, and defend against thedanger presented by foreign fighters.

Foreign Fighter Veterans

Returning foreign fighter

agencies.

Still, the issue

populations. In addition, opportunities to use themto the advantage of security services, or to distilllessons for protecting at risk populations gounrealized.

No definitiv

produced, wide variations persist makingsubstantive conclusions elusive.

Some officials contend that fo

travel, are likely to be disillusioned and weary. As aresult, they argue, it cannot be assumed that

PAGE 28

returning fighters will be active in radicalization andrecruitment efforts.

Yet, regardless of whether or not such individuals

Veteran fighters who are active in facilitating foreign

In fact, Germany�’s Federal Intelligence Service

r

Developments in the Balkans are a major cause of

reW

RADICALIZATION

In recent years, there has been a significant amount

are active, their mere presence in the community isseen as a powerful motivating factor for at riskpopulations.

fighters play a predominant role. Their credibilityand charisma is a product of their exploits (real orinvented). Stories of their time abroad serve tobolster their appeal and notoriety. Such tales alsolegitimize and promote perceptions of the jihadistruggle.

(Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND) and otherintelligence services within EU warned thatreturnees have often a tremendous eputation withuncritical and unconditional support from those withwhom they come into contact.

security concern. There are signs of a rekindledtheatre where old foreign fighters (veterans fromwithin the 7th Muslim brigade in the Bosnian armywho decided to remain locally), are mixing with apool of returning fighters who have been to theFATA region for training. Recently Macedonianofficials warned they are monitoring �“up to 50 alQaeda volunteers recruited to fight inAfghanistan.�”62 Additionally the is a parallelconcern over expansion of ahhabi and Salafistfactions funded by Saudi organisations.

of research on radicalization, including work done bythe RAND Corporation and the New York Police

62 Pancevski, Bojan. 2010. �“Saudis fund Balkan Muslims spreadinghate of the West.�” London, UK; The Sunday Times

Department.63 MI5�’s behavioural science unittrawled through hundreds of cases in the UK andfound that there were strikingly differentradicalization trajectories. What united thesedifferent cases was that most individuals had somevulnerability in their background that made themreceptive to extremist ideology and that it wasalways influenced and driven by contacts withothers.64

While drawing firm causal conclusions based onclear evidence remains a challenge, it is nonethelesspossible to sketch a rudimentary radicalizationprofile of foreign fighters, both in terms of why theytravel and the potential implications of this travel ontheir decision making.

A kaleidoscope of factors, much like vectors, pushesindividuals towards radicalization and enables theirrecruitment. Dutch research has shown that threeaspects play an important role in radicalizationprocesses: the individual process, the interpersonaldynamic and the effect of circumstance.65 Researchinto radicalization processes in Europe haveunderscored the interplay between individualpsychological disposition; social factors; politicalfactors; ideological and religious dimensions; culturalidentity; traumatic experience and other triggeringfactors; and ultimately group dynamics (being thereal radicalization �‘engine�’).66

63 Hoffman, Bruce, William Rosenau, Andrew Curiel, and DoronZimmerman. 2007. �“The Radicalization of Diasporas andTerrorism.�” Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Silber, Mitchell, and ArvinBhatt. 2007. �“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.�”New York, NY: The New York Police Department IntelligenceDivision

64 This MI5 report is extensively referred to in: Travis, Alan. 2008.�“The Making of an Extremist.�” London, UK; The Guardian

65 Meah, Yousiff and Colin Mellis. 2008. Final Report EU ProjectRecognising Radicalisation (RECORA). Paris, FR; European Forumfor Urban Safety

66 2010. Understanding Violent Radicalisation. Magnus Ranstorp(ed). London, UK; Routledge

PAGE 29

Profiles of foreign fighters highlight cultural identityconfusion and conflict at the core, combined with asuperficial religious knowledge and political naivetyand other factors influenced by individualcircumstance. Conspiracy theory belief is anothercommon characteristic of foreign fighters. Attractionto convenient narratives centred on victimizationover an actual desire for seeking truth is indicative ofan unquestioning character. It is important todistinguish actual belief in an extremist narrativeover support for a conspiracy narrative purely asprovocation or sympathy to a cause. Individualstaking part in foreign fighter training are often onlyinspired to take part in action unlinked to a deeperpurpose of exploring the ideology, although theideological and social component of �“jihadi culture�”should not be dismissed as motivating factors.67

Boredom, intergenerational tensions leading torebellion against parents and local community,individual search for greater meaning in life,perceived adventure, attempts to impress the localcommunity or the opposite sex, desire for increasedcredibility amongst peers and local communitygranted by foreign fighters�’ experience, desire to�‘belong�’ and peer acceptance, revenge, misguidedconflict experience expectations, and promise ofmarriage within conflict area, are all recognizeddrivers of radicalization, though not all occur inevery instance.

Strong personal or family links to jihadist conflicttheatres increases individual or communityvulnerability to radicalization. Personal connectionsto conflict areas serve both to emotionalize reporteddevelopments and act as a strong guide for selectinga jihadist conflict zone in which to fight.

The role such connections play is illustrated by thesuccess al Shabaab has enjoyed in recruitingindividuals from the area around Minneapolis. A

the ultimate sanction.

gn fighters�’decision making within the host nation.

Travel and radicalization

not greater importance to international security to

67 Cozzens, Jeffrey B. 2009. �“The Culture of Global Jihad:Character, Future Challenges and Recommendations.�” FutureActions Series. London, UK; International Centre for the Study ofRadicalisation

number of US residents, including Shirwa Ahmed �–the first US suicide bomber (in modern times) �– havebeen recruited to fight in Somalia. Others havebecome willing to provide a US based network tosupport such efforts. Amina Ali, Hawo Hassan,Mohamud Said Omar, Abdiweli Isse, and CabdulaahiAhmed Faarax have been identified by the USDepartment of Justice as providing funds andencouragement to potential recruits.68

Individuals in vulnerable periods of their lives are atmost risk from radicalization if these periodscorrespond with meeting charismatic or extremistpersonalities that can adopt a leadership role in theindividual�’s life.69 In some cases, Somalicommunities in the EU are vulnerable to socialpressures exercised within the community withthreats of retribution against relatives in Somalia as

Investigated domestic cases of foreign fighteractivities have included a direct or indirect foreignlink, such as Internet based propaganda or supportinformation that has influenced forei

Beyond examining the dynamic and varied profiles ofthose who become foreign fighters, it is of equal if

68 2010. �“Al Shabaab�’s American Recruits: Introduction.�” NewYork, NY; Anti Defamation League. Office of Public Affairs. 2010.�“Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to SomaliaBased Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab.�” Press Release.Washington, DC; US Department of Justice. Associated Press.2010. �“Netherlands terror Suspect Fights U.S. Extradition.�” NewYork, NY; FOX News. Cilluffo, Frank J. and Daniel Kimmage. 2009.�“How to Beat al Qaeda at Its Own Game.�” Website. Washington,DC; Foreign Policy. Pantucci, Raffaello. 2009. �“American Jihad:New Details Emerge About al Shabaab Recruitment in NorthAmerica.�” Washington, DC; The Jamestown Foundation

69 Weine, Stevan, John Horgan, Cheryl Robertson, Sana Loue,Amin Mohamed, Sahra Noor. 2010. �“Combating the Radicalizationof U.S. Somali Refugee Youth: A Psychosocial Perspective onCounterterrorism.�” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. London, UK;Routledge

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examine the impact that travel itself has on theradicalization process.

First, travel from the West to a �‘zone of jihad�’ forcombat or training results from and contributes tothe establishment of the ghazi (�‘raider�’ or �‘warrior�’)archetype�—a concept that looms large in thebackdrop of contemporary jihadi �‘pop culture�’. TheBritish militant behind the infamous �“Gas Limos�”plot, Dhiren Barot, wrote, �“Simply interacting withghazis�…can help to alter one�’s outlook and influenceoneself to procure a taste for this noble path in theirblood, making it akin to their nature.�”70

Ghazis, who emigrate from the comforts of Westernlife on ribat�—that is, in defence of Islam and itsborders�—follow in the footsteps of theirpredecessor mujahideen and continue agenerational migratory pattern that began withAbdullah Assam and his contemporaries in the late1970�’s. Fulfilling their perceived obligation to �‘liftthe siege�’ on Islam in the face of overwhelmingWestern military power, and now, increasinglyexchanging the keyboard for the assault rifle orsuicide vest, ghazis exemplify to star struck aspiringfighters71 supreme dedication, obedience to Godand transformational action when the rest of theummah is accused of slumber.72 Given the lightspeed qualities of online martyr biographies andfootage from the front, the power of ghazis toinspire other Western militants cannot beoverstated.73 This �‘rock star�’ factor leads to a cyclicaldynamic, where new recruits are often inspired bythe mere presence of returnee foreign fighters in

70 al Hindi, Esa. 1999. The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.Birmingham, UK; Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications. p. 124.

71 For more on the impact of these �“heroes�” within the globaljihadi trend, see: Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2010. �“InsideAl Qaeda.�” New York, NY; Newsweek

72 The essay of Sayf ad Din Al Ansari (no title) in Majallat al Ansar(ed.) �“The real story of the raids on New York and Washington�” inBook commemorates September 11 'raid'.

73 Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2010. �“Inside Al Qaeda.�”New York, NY; Newsweek

their community and desire the same communityadoration.

Second, travel for training or combat also provides acatalyst within the radicalization process. By its verynature, making the transition between an urbanWestern context and Pakistan�’s FATA, for instance, isa rite of passage�—a liminal process whereinidentities are stripped down, interaction with fellowmujahideen takes place (supposedly) on an equalfooting, and ideas about what one can and should doare reformulated. Given the overall power of thisexperience, including the socialization with jihadinetworks involved in facilitating travel, training, orcombat, and the potential impact of these activitieson Western extremists�—especially those �‘lucky�’enough to make it to the combat zones�—preconceived ideas about front lines and legitimatetargets can shift quickly. In other words, like the 7/7bombers, who originally seemed intent on fighting inAfghanistan, a week spent praying in the ranks ofmujahideen and listening to hardcore global jihadisdiscuss dar al harb (the �‘abode of war�’) theory canshift the focus of fighting back to Europe, even if thiswas not the travellers�’ original intent. Such is theoften overlooked impact of entering into jihadibattlefield culture.

The explanation for the apparent contrast betweenlarge numbers of available extremists and the smallnumber of individuals who become active foreignfighters appears to be due to a set of inhibitingfactors: including, a lack of individual determinationto act beyond rhetoric, individual shortcomings, orsimply a lack of opportunity or resources.

The potential for an expansion in the scale of currentforeign fighters does exist, if jihadist networks candiscover new ways to reduce the impact of suchinhibiting factors.

The case of German recruits is instructive to thecomplexity of these issues. As Yassin Musharbash, aveteran terrorist reporter with Der Spiegel hasobserved, the German recruits have revealed twoinsights: firstly, while it was easy to convince recruitsthrough appealing recruitment videos, it seems

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these bonds are not firmly cemented by theexperience in situ. �“At least two alleged fighters havetried or succeeded in leaving their militant groups,many more are believed by authorities to bedisappointed by the circumstances they met.�”Secondly, there appears to be no �“typical foreignfighter identity. While most of them are eitherGerman converts or re born Muslims with a Turkishbackground, they also include radicals with anEastern European, Kurdish, Arab, Iranian Shiitebackground �– in addition to the fact that quite a fewof them chose to travel together with their wivesand even children. The only common denominatorseems to be a relatively homogenous age structure:few are younger than 20 or older than 30 years ofage.�”74

Recent Findings

In an attempt to identify patterns of key drivers ofradicalization, the United Kingdom�’s Joint TerrorismAnalysis Centre (JTAC) conducted a study identifyingextremist hotspots in the UK. The report, whichfocused on 20 regional areas, provided usefulinformation on the limitations of current knowledge.Furthermore, it reinforced existing beliefs regardingthe importance of bridge figures.

A key finding of the study was this: there exists noclear pattern to explain why extremism wasprevalent in some towns and not in others. Inaddition, there were no consistent patterns betweenurban density or size of the Muslim community andidentified locations of extremism. Moreover, thestudy identified no correlation between communitydeprivation or employment levels and extremism.

Studies conducted in Canada found a similar pattern.Canadian cases of foreign fighters also showed noconnection between urban density or poverty andhigher recruitment rates of foreign fighters.

74 Personal communication with Yassin Miusharbash, 23September 2010.

What the UK and Canadian studies did find was this:local perception of deprivation was a key factor inradicalization.

These studies and others have identified communityleaders as a key factor capable of decreasing levelsof extremism locally. However, charismatic extremistleadership figures were identified as a consistentelement present in all studied extremist areas ofconcern, illustrating that community leadership is apowerful tool for both sides. Thus, charismaticextremist leadership figures are recognised as keyintelligence targets and points of interventionagainst broader radicalisation.

Media

The Internet and various forms of social media haveplayed new and important roles in propagatingmessages of radicalism. Moreover, their ubiquity intoday�’s world allows bridge figures to connect to awide range of at risk societal subgroups.

In the past, recruitment to radical causes was alaborious process which required extensive one onone time. Now, the Internet and social media allowbridge figures to target and indoctrinate recruitsmuch more quickly.

For bridge figures, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter,blogs and message boards, audio recordings, DVDs,and websites, have become vital tools in theradicalization process. Often they operate hiddendiscussion forums inside open social forums whereentry is regulated and entirely based onintroductions to ensure security.

These tools provide forums through which bridgefigures can relate to social subgroups in a mediumthat is familiar, comfortable, and understood by thetarget audience.

Electronic media, joined with bridge figures�’eloquence and cultural adeptness, has allowed suchfigures to navigate transnational boundaries, spreadtheir message, and recruit followers much moreeffectively.

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Interestingly, there is a selective nature to extremistexploitation of propaganda opportunities. Manysuch opportunities are ignored.

A cursory search reveals a large pool of possibilitiesfor exploitation by extremists capable of generating�‘outrage�’ and gaining recruits; including, cartoonsdepicting the prophet Mohammad, controversialpolitical acts such as the banning of head scarves inFrench secular schools, or foreign policy issues suchas participation in the Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts.Potential propaganda is limitless and uncontrollable,as highlighted by recent Islamic �‘outrage�’ over asingle Facebook user website entry that encouragedusers to post cartoons of the Islamic prophetMohammad. The latter case led to wide scaleprotests and a temporary ban on Facebook.

A better understanding of why so manyopportunities for �‘outrage�’ are ignored, and whysome succeed in capturing international attentionand reaction is needed. Possibilities or answersinclude deliberate timing convenient to the politicsof the moment or simply chance.

Radicalization from abroad is a primary and effectivedynamic in which video propaganda often takendirectly from a conflict zone is delivered through theInternet to vulnerable individuals inside hostwestern nations. The power of video and Internetshould not be underestimated, with trendsindicating growing sophistication and quality ofextremists�’ multimedia skills and propagandaproducts. As Phil Mudd, a former senior CIA and FBIofficial, observed recently the velocity ofradicalization is today driven as much by ideology(which was very evident in driving the 9/11 plotters)as by al Qaeda�’s deliberate efforts to strike atemotions through powerful war zone videos andimagery designed to invoke intense moral shock formobilization purposes.

Current research shortcomings

Radicalization is a key part of the foreign fighterrecruitment cycle, but a better understanding of thedrivers of radicalization is necessary.

A combination of limited empirical foreign fighterdata and limited access to the classified data held bysecurity services, hinders research opportunities foracademia and outside experts.

Furthermore, there is a recognised danger thatcounter terrorism intelligence analysts are beingasked to fill anthropology and psychology researchroles for which they are not trained. Outsidecooperation with experts in these specialised areas istherefore necessary.

From a scientific perspective, even with full accessand sharing of data, the scale of recorded foreignfighter activity limits the potential of analysis andrisks incorrect conclusions. With so little data, itbecomes difficult to differentiate outlying cases fromtrue patterns. Because of the lack of evidence,extreme care is needed when forming policyrecommendations.

FUTURE TRENDS AND SCENARIOS

The proliferation and character of foreign fighterlinked plots in the West in 2009 2010, incombination with the trajectories of dogged�—and insome cases, waxing�—jihadi insurgencies in placeslike the FATA, Somali and Yemen, presents a sort ofwindow for assessing the future. What is importantto know about tomorrow�’s foreign fighter threat tothe West?

1. An enduring threat. The West will almost certainlycontend with the threat posed by Western foreignfighters so long as Western states and theirperceived surrogates are involved in militaryoperations in majority Muslim countries. Indeed, thenarrative of foreign fighters revolves aroundtravelling to aid co religionists perceived to besuffering at the hands of non Muslim forces. Thephenomenon of violent Western extremistsattempting to attack Western countries willtherefore continue for the foreseeable future. Herethe United States is as vulnerable to attack as theEuropean theatre �– hence there is common purpose

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to address this challenge jointly both in tactical andstrategic terms.

2. The lesser of two evils? Counter radicalizationefforts in Western countries are primarily gearedtowards preventing domestic attacks. Theseinitiatives work hand in glove with a pre existingframework from Islamic jurisprudence (�‘aqd alaman) that proscribes attacking the non Muslimstate under which Muslims live in a �“covenant�”relationship. Even some jihadists share thisperspective.75 However, the aspiration to fightabroad in the perceived defence of Muslim lands isan aspiration that generally accrues much greateracceptance than fighting at home in segments ofWestern Muslim communities. Indeed, not allforeign fighters share al Qaeda�’s worldview. In fact,some Islamists interviewed by the authors who arepresently enlisted by Western states to bolsterdomestic counter radicalization efforts will notdisavow the �“legitimate�” obligation to �“liberate�” and�“defend�” Muslims in foreign conflicts. Thisshowcases the difficulties inherent in a one size fitsall approach to counter radicalization in an age ofjihadi insurgency against the perceived sources ofMuslim �“oppression.�” As noted in Point 2 (above),foreign fighters will find legitimacy so long as thenarrative of victimization is alive�—despite apparentsuccess in Western counter radicalization programs.This is a �“wicked�” problem that will endure for theforeseeable future.

3. The price of success in the FATA. While Westernforces are successfully pressuring �‘core�’ hierarchicalnetworks associated with al Qaeda in the FATA, theresultant atomization of these factions due tovarious hardships creates other challenges. First,foreign fighters will be displaced to other jihadiconflict zones, fomenting additional instability inplaces like Somalia and Yemen. Their presence lendsboth legitimacy and operational capacity to jihadis

75 al Tartousi, Abu Baseer. (accessed 27 July 2008). �“Covenantsand Security in Islam.�” Website. Muhammad, Omar Bakri. 2004.The World is Divided into Two Camps. London, UK; Ad D�’awahPublications. pp 67 70

fighting regimes in these areas, raising the spectre offuture platforms for plotting against the West.Second, Western foreign fighters will find travel tothe FATA increasingly challenging, raising thepossibility that they will choose to strike at homerather than risk travel. Third, given that masscasualty plots against the West such as the 9/11attacks require operational space, time and usually,considerable training to develop�—assets that arelikely in short supply for Al Qaeda in the FATA�—thetrend for plots against the West emanating fromthat region will be smaller in scale, simpler in design,and increasing in frequency. Western foreignfighters will therefore be in increasing demand tostage such attacks, given their greater mobility(owing to their Western documents, and in the caseof converts, appearance), familiarity with targetedareas and their knowledge of the cultural andlinguistic dimensions of their operating environment.

4. The Madrid effect. There is a looming danger thatre directed Western foreign fighters could againfoment the �“Madrid effect�” in a Western nation�—the process by which a catalytic terrorist attackdirectly influences, or is perceived to directlyinfluence, a Western nation�’s election andsubsequent foreign policy. This happened in Madridin 2003. It has been an issue with the Germancontingent in IJU. Germany has been identified asthe weakest link in ISAF �– vulnerable to pressuresand threats in order to pull out of the coalition. Assuch, there were pressures around the Germanelections similar to that which occurred in Spain.

The failure of jihadis to secure the upper hand ininsurgent theatres plus the widely discussedcascading effects of the 2003 attacks in Spain risksinspiring (along with other stimuli) a refocus offoreign fighter (many are currently fighting overseas)targeting and operations back to their Westernnations of residence. Indeed, Ayman al Zawahiri�’soriginal strategic paradigm for al Qaeda�—strikingthe West to undermine regional regimes�—wasdeveloped after observing floundering andineffective jihadi insurgencies in the majority Muslimworld. The recent Times Square bombing attempt

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by an individual trained in Pakistan, supported byTaliban associated planners and funders may be anearly indicator of the re emergence of the Madrideffect, as might some of the other plots associatedwith al Aulaqi�’s inspiration. For now, most discussionof Western foreign fighters centers on their actions�“over there�”; the danger is that the discussion mightshift strategically to their actions �“over here.�”

ADVERSARY VULNERABILITIES &RECOMMENDATIONS

Though the primary intent of this paper is to discussthe threat posed by foreign fighters and to chart thefuture trajectory of the phenomenon, a few briefcomments on the vulnerabilities of the foreignfighter networks are in order.

First, though foreign fighter returnees pose asignificant radicalization threat in addition to anoperational threat, Western governments are notdoing enough to highlight the disillusioned returneeforeign fighters. These fighters represent a potentialcounter propaganda resource. Their story needs tobe relayed loudly and publicly in host nations.

Second, Western security services should notoverlook opportunities to infiltrate jihadist networkswherever and whenever these jihadist networks relyupon (or simply allow) foreign fighter groups to trainand fight alongside their own members. This shouldbe done to undermine and erode trust and fostersuspicion among members of jihadist networks.

Third, Western governments might also considerfinding ways to advertise the lack of operationalimpact foreign fighters have had in jihadist conflictzones. Such might be a way to increase the numberof individuals who, despite holding extremist views,elect not to act upon those views.

Fourth, Western governments should invest involuntary testimonies from former al Qaeda recruitsabout the harsh realities of life in the training camps.These testimonies should be broadcast in the mediawith a focus to de romanticize the notions of glory

and expectations of a triumphant welcomereception. As testified by Walid Othmani, a Frenchrecruit to Waziristan, �“what you see in videos on theNet, we realized that was a lie�…[our chief] told usthe videos . . . served to impress the enemy andincite people to come fight, and he knew this was ascam and propaganda."76

Fifth, Western security services should considerpaying close attention to how jihadist networksutilize homogenous groups of foreign fighters. Ifjihadists consistently use such groups for missionsinto third party countries and on missions having alow probability of success, it would present anopportunity for Western security services to exploitdifferences between the jihadist networks and theforeign fighters.

Sixth, backlash reactions within communities whenone of their own commits atrocities against innocentcivilians�—especially other Muslims�—can provideopenings for authorities to support vulnerablecommunities and improve relations. A case in pointis the 24 year old Somali Dane who carried out asuicide bombing in a Mogadishu hotel during agraduation ceremony in early December 2009, killing24 people including three Somali governmentministers. This �‘overkill�’ created a backlash againstal Shabaab recruitment in Denmark and neighboringstates. It also creates positive atmospherics toestablish trust between minority communities andauthorities and increased willingness to supportvulnerable individuals from falling prey to recruiters.

Seventh, from a legislative perspective, all 27 EUstates should adopt the EU Framework decision onterrorism incitement, training and recruitment intotheir national legislation and where possibleimplement appropriate legal measures to vigorouslyprosecute individuals violating this legislation. Oftensome EU states wait and observe illicit flows �– suchas terrorism financing efforts �– and do not interveneas a matter of urgency as the security problem is not

76 Rotella, Sebastian. 2009. �“Al Qaeda recruits back in Europe,but why?�” Los Angeles, CA; Los Angeles Times

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directed at them. This needs to change. EU statesmust do more to prosecute not just acts of terrorism�– but incitement and support for such as well.

Why do individuals choose to fight abroad? What arethe tipping points?

Is foreign fighter intention shaped by emotiveincidents such as the Red Mosque incident orprophet Mohammad cartoons? And to what degree?

Finally, there may be patterns that emerge fromtracking common failures�—specifically where mostindividuals fall off the foreign fighter recruitmentcycle. If such were done across Western countriesfor all of the jihadist conflict zones, it might revealactionable information for where future resourcesmight be best employed.

How can Western law enforcement and intelligenceservices effectively harness and employ the negative(rather than glamorous) stories of foreign fighterswho found their experiences abroad to be less thanideal? It seems these experiences might serves asvital weapons in the fight to erode the culture ofjihadi activism at the community level in theWestern context.CONCLUSIONS

The legacy of foreign fighter veterans returning tohost nations is the key danger of the foreign fighterphenomenon. Bridge figures and jihadi veterans arealso of concern, because they are major catalysts inthe transformation and radicalization of individualsinto foreign fighters, including those that threatenWestern nation states. Foreign fighter socializationwithin extremist facilitation and combat networks isalso worrisome for its explosive potential, in theevent these turn their sights on the West, as is theeven rudimentary operational education some ofthese individuals receive abroad. Foreign fighterscomprise a complex, systemic global threat thatneeds to be more comprehensively apprehendedand appreciated and more aggressively researched.To this end we offer the following concludingobservations and suggestions:

Capability and opportunity also remain key foreignfighter dynamics. Facilitation networks and fundingpipelines are therefore two very important factorson which Western intelligence services should focus.

2. Although the paper intentionally avoided alengthy discussion on radicalization, this is animportant component affecting both the �“recruiting�”and �“joining�” processes inherent to the foreignfighter cycle. True, factors driving radicalisation maybe at risk of over analysis. Some argue that both theideological and psychological dimensions, forexample, are accorded too much weight. However,it is evident that these factors and many othersapply as radicalization catalysts, and should bethoroughly examined as they apply to the decisionmaking of Western foreign fighters. Indeed, driversinclude a mixture of social, generational, andideological dynamics that demand comprehensiveanalysis by a range of experts. Extensive evidencebased transatlantic research is necessary to identifypotential universal factors or patterns of contrastalong the radicalization continuum across hostnations and communities. Committed multiyearresearch efforts of this phenomenon will also afforda strategic perspective that only time and extensivedata gathering can produce. Theory and bestguesses on the drivers and impact of foreign fighterradicalization and operational patterns need to begrounded in social scientific methods.

1. Academic research on Western foreign fightersoffers tremendous strategic value to Westernintelligence agencies. Western security servicesrequire a better understanding of the foreign fighterthreat both at the tactical and strategic levels. Thesecurity services do not have an adequate grasp ofthe �“value added�” of foreign fighters in particulartheatres, nor do they yet know the ceiling forstrategic scalability. Such research should beinitiated internationally and across disciplines andshould be vigorously supported.

Key themes identified for future research on foreignfighters include:

PAGE 36

3. We need to better understand the tactical foreignfighter threat as well as the strategic consequencesof currently limited levels of foreign fighter activityin the West. In other words, why do few of theseindividuals represent a kinetic problem when theyreturn, what are they doing now, and what does thisdata suggest? What prompted these individuals todisengage from violence upon their return home?Further, how do Western foreign fighters make useof and publicize their experiences and operationallearning acquired overseas? When and where dothey share this material and why? The findings willlikely have important implications for counterradicalization initiatives, especially at the communitylevel, and will also further our understanding of thepotential severity of the threat.

4. The number and impact of Western foreignfighters is limited, but remains essential to widerjihadist movements and propaganda. A significantbut undetermined number of these individuals areconverts, many of whom proceed directly to violentextremism, as opposed to expressions of�“mainstream�” Sunni Islam. These are extremelyuseful as props in the global jihadis�’ propaganda war.Other converts such as al Faisal are significant bridgefigures that dramatically impact the radicalizationprocess.

5. The legacy of accomplished and well connectedforeign fighter veterans returning to host nations is

onsidered the key danger and challenge of thecurrent foreign fighter phenomenon. Ghazis oftenbring charisma, a near mythic status and sometimes,operational know how to Western extremist milieus.They impact the radicalization process significantly,and are boons to the development of plots againstWestern states. Fortunately, there do not appear tobe too many of these individuals who make it backto the West (for a variety of reasons), but thisdimension of the threat is exceedingly difficult toquantify and cannot be overlooked.

6. There is no single pathway to becoming a ForeignFighter, nor is there a static profile of the fightersthemselves. Ideology, social circumstances,adventure seeking, political grievances, and so on.all appear to impact individuals�’ choices in thisregard. Foreign fighters�’ socio economiccircumstances also appear to be highly variablewhile not altogether unimportant to understandingwhy and how foreign fighters make the choices theydo. Plugging these variables into a social movementtheory approach might yield interesting insights withrespect to foreign fighter decision making.

Founded in 2003, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) is a nonpartisan�“think and do�” tank whose mission is to build bridges between theory and practice to advance homeland securitythrough an interdisciplinary approach. By convening domestic and international policymakers and practitioners atall levels of government, the private and non profit sectors, and academia, HSPI creates innovative strategies andsolutions to current and future threats to the nation.

The Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) trains and educates military and civilian personnel in leadingpositions, both nationally and internationally as part of the contribution to the management of crisis situations andsecurity issues. Its task is to contribute toward national and international security through research anddevelopment.