europeâ€™s troubles sebastian rosato - harvard - belfer center for

For a decade after theend of the Cold War, observers were profoundly optimistic about the state ofthe European Community (EC).1 Most endorsed Andrew Moravcsik’s claimthat the establishment of the single market and currency marked the EC as“the most ambitious and most successful example of peaceful international co-operation in world history.” Both arrangements, which went into effect in the1990s, were widely regarded as the “ªnishing touches on the construction of aEuropean economic zone.”2 Indeed, many people thought that economic inte-gration would soon lead to political and military integration. Germany’s min-ister for Europe, Günter Verheugen, declared, “[N]ormally a single currency isthe ªnal step in a process of political integration. This time the single currencyisn’t the ªnal step but the beginning.”3 Meanwhile, U.S. defense plannersfeared that the Europeans might create “a separate ‘EU’ army.”4 In short, thecommon view was that the EC had been a great success and had a brightfuture.

Today pessimism reigns. When it comes to the economic community, mostanalysts agree with former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s claimthat it is “in a moment of a very severe crisis.” The conventional wisdom, notesthe European Union’s ambassador to the United States, João Vale de Almeida,is that the EC “is dying, if not already dead.”5 At the same time, hardly anyonestill predicts political or military integration. Journalist Steven Erlanger offers

Sebastian Rosato is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame.

The author is grateful to Paul Avey, Michael Desch, Charles Fagan, Kirstin Hasler, RobertL’Arrivee, Keir Lieber, seminar participants at the Security Policy Workshop Series at the ElliottSchool of International Affairs at George Washington University, and the anonymous reviewersfor their helpful comments and suggestions.

1. With the signature of the Treaty on European Union on February 7, 1992, the European Com-munity came to be known as the European Union (EU). For simplicity, I refer to the EuropeanCommunity, the Community, or the EC throughout.2. Andrew Moravcsik, “Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union,” Foreign Affairs,Vol. 80, No. 3 (May–June 2002), pp. 114, 121.3. Quoted in Christopher Booker and Richard North, The Great Deception: Can the European UnionSurvive? (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 435.4. Seth G. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2007), p. 5.5. Steven Erlanger, “Economy Shows Cracks in European Union,” New York Times, June 9, 2009;and João Vale de Almeida, “E.U. Achievements Refute Critics’ Claims of Failure,” Washington Post,October 9, 2010.

Europe’s Troubles

Europe’s Troubles Sebastian Rosato

Power Politics and the State of theEuropean Project

International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 45–86© 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

45

a neat summary of the situation: “[T]he continent’s most devoted advocatesare scaling down their ambitions. Few speak any longer of a Europe that is asigniªcant political or military counterweight to the United States.”6

Why has the European project run into trouble and where is it headed? To bemore speciªc: Why have the Europeans not created a full-blown political ormilitary community? Why has the economic community started to fray? Andwhat does the future hold for political, military, and economic integration inEurope?

To address these questions, one needs a theory of institutions. That theorymust account for two developments. First, it must explain why the Europeansbuilt and maintained an economic community—the EC—in the Cold War(1945–90). This task is fundamental because the EC is a remarkable institution,one that is often described as “unique” or “exceptional.”7 What makes it standout compared with other institutions is that it involves integration rather thancooperation: not only did the West European states agree to coordinate theirefforts, but they also gave up part of their sovereignty—the authority to makepolicy autonomously—to a central actor.8 Second, the theory must account forwhat has happened in Europe in the post–Cold War era (1991–present). It mustexplain why, contrary to most commentators’ expectations, the Europeanshave made no real attempt to establish a political or military community sincethe Cold War ended. In addition, it must explain why the economic commu-nity endured in the 1990s, but has been fraying since the turn of the century. Ifit can perform these tasks, the theory can then be used to predict the future.

According to my theory, institutions largely reºect the distribution of power.States confronting a common, powerful adversary can cooperate or integrate.If their opponent is a great power and they are also great powers, then theycooperate—they pool their assets and coordinate their policies.9 But if their op-ponent is a great power and they are minor powers, then they realize that theymust organize their efforts as efªciently as possible, and they consider integra-tion. This is not a welcome prospect, because it involves surrendering sover-eignty. But if they cannot devise an alternative strategy that does not impinge

International Security 35:4 46

6. Erlanger, “Economy Shows Cracks in European Union.”7. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina toMaastricht (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 1; and Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea ofEurope (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 1–2.8. For this deªnition of sovereignty—he refers to it as “Westphalian” sovereignty—see Stephen D.Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999),pp. 20–24.9. This deªnition of cooperation is based on David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American ForeignPolicy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 25.

on their sovereignty, they grudgingly accept integration. Once they have de-cided whether to cooperate or integrate, states then establish institutions to en-sure that their agreements operate as smoothly as possible. It follows thatas long as the underlying distribution of power endures, so too do the institu-tions associated with it; and when the power architecture changes, theinstitutions do as well.

The making of the EC is best understood as a response to the postwar distri-bution of power. After World War II, the Soviet Union was the only greatpower in Europe: none of the states east of the Elbe could balance Moscow byitself. Moreover, the Europeans worried that the United States, which hadstepped in to defend them after the war, would eventually withdraw its forcesfrom the region. Therefore, they concluded that they would have to be ready tobalance against the Soviet Union on their own and created the EC. The think-ing behind their decision was straightforward: in an age when economicpower was the key determinant of military might, they had to build an eco-nomic coalition; and because the Soviet Union was so powerful, that coalitionhad to take the form of a single regionwide economy governed by a central au-thority. Of course, this meant surrendering sovereignty, but the Europeans feltthat they had no other option if they wanted to ensure their security withoutU.S. help. Similar thinking prompted them to consider building a militarycommunity as well. But because the power-enhancing effects of integrationtake hold more quickly in the military than in the economic realm, they choseto retain their military sovereignty and wait to form a military communityin the event that the United States actually withdrew its forces and left them tocontain the Soviet Union on their own.

No major changes in the European power architecture occurred between1960 and 1990. Accordingly, the Europeans did not alter the arrangements thatthey had crafted in the 1950s in any meaningful way. To be sure, they cooper-ated in political and military affairs, but they did not take any serious steps to-ward establishing a political or military community. Meanwhile, the ECevolved considerably but did not undergo a fundamental transformation.

The collapse of the Soviet Union radically altered the balance of power: since1991 the Europeans have not confronted an overwhelmingly powerful adver-sary. This has had profound implications for post–Cold War Europe. It hasmeant that the EC member states have not attempted to establish a politicalor military community. At the same time, the demise of the Soviet Union hasmeant that the Europeans have not had a compelling geopolitical reason topreserve their economic community. The effects of this structural change didnot manifest themselves in the 1990s because these were years of great pros-

Europe’s Troubles 47

perity in Europe. Since the turn of the century, however, the economic situa-tion has worsened, and the EC has shown unmistakable signs of strain.

Mine is not the only explanation of what has happened in Europe since 1945.Others have attributed developments in Europe’s institutional landscape tothe U.S. military presence, high levels of economic interdependence, or a de-sire to transcend the nation-state system. As I explain, however, these argu-ments are not convincing.

As for the future, my theory predicts that the Europeans are unlikely to takeany real steps toward establishing a political or military community as long asthere are no signiªcant changes in the balance of power. They will also con-tinue to have no compelling reason to preserve their economic community.Consequently, further economic crises are likely to lead to the further frayingof the community, and if those crises are deep enough, the EC may become ashadow of its former self. Indeed, the best-case scenario is that the economicsituation improves and the Community continues to muddle along.

The rest of this article proceeds as follows. I begin by describing my theoryand the three alternatives. Next, I show that my theory offers a compelling ac-count of the making and maintenance of the EC. After that, I demonstrate thatmy theory does equally well at explaining events in Europe since the end ofthe Cold War. Then I consider how well the alternative theories account for thehistorical record and ªnd them wanting. Finally, I use my theory to predictthe future of European integration.

Explaining Institutions

A theory of institutions must address a series of questions: Why do states es-tablish institutions? How can one explain the form those institutions take?And what accounts for their endurance, transformation, and dissolution? Mycentral argument is that the answers to these questions are largely to be foundin the distribution of power.

a balance of power theory

States are aware that there is no international sovereign to protect them andthat they cannot know one another’s intentions. Consequently, they fear oneanother and pay careful attention to how much power they have comparedwith their competitors. The reason for this concern is obvious: more powerfulstates have the means and may have the motive to hurt weaker ones.10


10. This is the basic argument of Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York:

“Power” in this context refers to material resources and organizational effec-tiveness, which together determine a state’s ability to deter or defend againstactual or potential opponents. The resources that matter most are military andeconomic: a state must have a large, well-equipped military to remain secureand, at the same time, it must have a large, advanced economy because eco-nomic might is the fundamental basis of military might.11 Although resourcesare crucial, organizational quality is equally important because it determineshow well a state can muster and deploy its military and economic assetsagainst its competitors.12 In short, states understand that they must attend toboth their organizational effectiveness and their resource base.

This concern about the balance of power means that states confronted by acommon opponent have an incentive to join forces and balance against it. Bybuilding a balancing coalition, they improve their chances of deterring a morepowerful rival and, if deterrence fails, defeating it in war.13 The ease withwhich they can establish a viable countervailing coalition depends on the rela-tive power of their opponent. If they are great powers and it is also a greatpower, then building a viable coalition is a fairly easy task. The reason is thatgreat powers are “approximate equals.”14 Simply by agreeing to coordinate itsefforts, a group of weaker great powers can array enough assets against astronger great power to deter or defeat it. If, however, the aspiring balancersare minor powers and their opponent is a great power, then forming a viablecountervailing coalition is a tougher proposition. One problem is that the greatpower may be so strong that they have no chance of deterring or defeating iteven in combination. In such situations, there is no point in trying to form a co-alition. Then there is the matter of execution: the great power is unlikely tostand by idly as the weaker powers join forces against it and, because it has a


McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 102–128; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NewYork: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 29–36.11. For a comprehensive discussion of power, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,pp. 55–137.12. On the importance of military organization, see João Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and theModern Mass Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 9–13, 62–66. On the effectof organization on economic growth, see Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, “An Eco-nomic Theory of the Growth of the Western World,” Economic History Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (April1970), pp. 1–17.13. On balancing, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 156–157; and Waltz, The-ory of International Politics, p. 118.14. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 132. For other deªnitions, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedyof Great Power Politics, p. 5; and Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. 16. The logic outlined here holds even usingthese alternative deªnitions. For a list of the great powers, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of GreatPower Politics, p. 404.

large power advantage over each of them, it can put a stop to their coalition-building efforts relatively easily.

Given these difªculties, minor powers confronting a great power can con-sider building a counterbalancing coalition only under certain conditions.They must have the combined material means to balance their opponent effec-tively. I estimate that a coalition at less than a 3:1 power disadvantage stands areasonable chance of deterring or defeating an adversary.15 Furthermore, theprospective balancers must have an opportunity to get their coalition up andrunning. There must be some practical reason that the great power cannotproject its power against them and stymie their coalition-building efforts. Forexample, the great power may be weaker than usual because it has recentlyfought a war and is exhausted. Alternatively, it may be temporarily preoccu-pied with domestic unrest or another threat. Finally, a great power may be un-able to derail the formation of an opposing coalition whose prospectivemembers are temporarily protected by a competing great power sponsor.16

cooperation and integration. Whether threatened states cooperate orintegrate depends on the balance of power between them and their commonopponent. If one or more of them are great powers and their rival is a greatpower, they cooperate; the coalition members agree to coordinate their efforts,but they do not surrender the right to autonomous decisionmaking. One rea-son for this is that their opponent has only a modest advantage over the stron-gest coalition member, and therefore a straightforward agreement to joinforces is enough for the weaker states to balance its power. Another reason isthat integration entails surrendering sovereignty, something states are ex-tremely reluctant to do unless they have no alternative. Part of this reluctancederives from the conviction that they can ensure their security only if they re-tain the authority to make decisions in what they believe are their best inter-ests.17 Moreover, sovereignty is inextricably linked to nationalism, anespecially powerful political ideology that holds that nations—groups of indi-viduals with an explicit and peculiar character—should have their own inde-pendent states.18


15. On this point, see Sebastian Rosato, Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the EuropeanCommunity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 26–27, 231–234.16. Only temporary opportunities push weak states to build coalitions. If the great power werepermanently weakened or the great power sponsor offered permanent protection, the aspiringbalancers would not have a strong motive to form a balancing coalition.17. Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits ofNeoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealismand Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 315.18. This deªnition is based on Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” Interna-tional Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), p. 6.

The situation is different when a group of minor powers confronts a greatpower. In theory, such a group may be so strong that its members can securethemselves simply by cooperating. In practice, however, every group of minorpowers in the modern period has been markedly weaker than the great pow-ers in its region of the world.19 This relative weakness leads groups of minorpowers confronting a great power to place a premium on organizing their co-alitions as efªciently as possible. Because they are inferior to their adversary,even in combination, they understand that even a slight increase in its powercould leave them at its mercy. Also, they have already maximized the assetsavailable to them by joining together. So they turn to improving their organi-zation, fearing that poor organization could be the difference between life anddeath.20

All else being equal, the efªciency requirement pushes minor powers to gobeyond cooperation and opt for integration. Simple calculation suggests thatan integrated military establishment is likely to be more efªcient and thereforemore powerful than a decentralized one, not least because a central authorityprovides members with enhanced strategic, operational, and tactical coordina-tion. Likewise, minor powers understand that they can beneªt from the econo-mies of scale and innovations that go with large single markets only byestablishing a single economy.21 Integration can also be the product of imita-tion. In seeking to increase its power, a coalition is likely to copy the organiza-tional features of the most powerful actors in the system—in this case, thegreat powers.22 Of course, no two great powers are alike, but they share onefeature by virtue of their being states: they have a central governing author-ity.23 As a result, groups of minor powers conclude that they, too, must estab-lish a central authority if they are to compete with the great powers.

Although balance of power reasoning points to the need for integration,states are extremely reluctant to go down this road because it means surren-dering sovereignty. This is especially true in the military realm because statesare more attached to autonomy in areas that clearly impinge on their security.Therefore, minor powers confronting a great power rival look for alternative


19. Rosato, Europe United, pp. 232–233.20. For a similar argument, albeit with reference to equally matched states, see Waltz, Theory of In-ternational Politics, pp. 171–172.21. On economies of scale, see Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics:Theory and Policy, 4th ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 121–158. On market size andinnovation, see Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 2d ed. (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1982).22. For the claim that states imitate the practices of the most powerful among them, see Waltz,Theory of International Politics, p. 127.23. On this point, see Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” Interna-tional Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 240.

arrangements that offer to establish a favorable balance of power without re-quiring them to give up their sovereign prerogatives. If they cannot come upwith a solution that is preferable to integration on power and sovereigntygrounds, however, they conclude that they have no choice but to establish anintegrated coalition. After all, they understand that if they do not integrate,they may not survive.

institutions. Having decided how they are going to join forces, states thenestablish institutions—rules that prescribe and proscribe acceptable and unac-ceptable forms of behavior.24 The reason is simple: if they are to achieve theircommon goal, they need to know what issues are covered, what is expected ofthem, what they can expect from their partners, how decisions are going to bemade, and so on.

In this way, institutions reºect the distribution of power. The power gap be-tween a group of states and a common adversary largely determines whetherand how those states come together, and they then establish institutions to en-sure that their joint endeavors run as smoothly as possible. It follows that aslong as the distribution of power that generated a particular set of institutionsendures so, too, do those institutions. Likewise, an alteration in the power ar-chitecture that gave rise to a set of institutions is likely to be accompanied by atransformation of them.25

alternative explanations

Scholars have advanced several other theories to account for developments inthe European institutional landscape since World War II. The “paciªer” argu-ment attributes the creation of the EC to the U.S. presence in Europe duringthe Cold War. After World War II, so this realist story goes, the United Statesmoved to prevent the extension of Soviet power into Western Europe by com-mitting troops to the continent and creating a powerful alliance system. TheU.S. presence did more than contain the Soviet Union, however; it meant thatthe Europeans no longer had to fear one another and could cooperate for mu-tual gain. As Josef Joffe explains, “Once the issue of security was dispatched,


24. This deªnition is based on Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in theWorld Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57–61; and John J.Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3(Winter 1994/95), pp. 8–9.25. For similar arguments, see Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power:Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336–344, 360–366;Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” pp. 13–14; and Kenneth N. Waltz,“Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000),pp. 18–27.

collective gain could overwhelm the logic of rivalry and relative gain.”26 This,in turn, led the Europeans to establish the EC.

Liberal theorist Andrew Moravcsik attributes integration to high levels ofmilitary or economic interdependence. When states are highly interdependent,domestic interest groups demand integration, and their governments respondby striking integrative bargains with other states. As Moravcsik puts it, deci-sions to integrate can be viewed as “pragmatic responses to economic andgeopolitical interdependence.”27 It follows that communities will endure aslong as their members remain interdependent and that they will fray as theirmembers become less interdependent.

Arguing from a constructivist perspective, Craig Parsons attributes the cre-ation of the EC to a desire to transcend the nation-state system. Key decision-makers believed that independent nation-states were bad for welfare: they“tended inevitably toward conºict; they also divided Europe’s economic mar-kets into small, inefªcient pieces.” Therefore, they concluded that some func-tions “needed to be organized above the national level” and, in response, builtthe EC. Parsons further argues that, over time, decisionmakers who did notoriginally support supranational solutions came to embrace “pro-community”ideas because of their repeated interaction with EC institutions. Indeed, by themid-1990s, elites in the major European states agreed that a “quasi-federalEurope” was in their “interests.”28

European Integration, 1945–90

My theory explains why the Europeans built an integrated economy and con-sidered, but ultimately rejected, political and military integration in the1950s.29 Also, it accounts for events between 1960 and 1990. Speciªcally, it ex-plains why the Europeans maintained their economic community and contin-ued to refrain from political and military integration.

origins, 1945–60

Developments in Europe’s institutional landscape in the early Cold War canlargely be understood as the product of balance of power politics. Indeed,


26. Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Paciªer,” Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984), p. 73. See alsoJohn J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” InternationalSecurity, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 47; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 70–71.27. Moravcsik, “Despotism in Brussels?” p. 117. My description of the argument relies onMoravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 3–4, 18–77.28. My description of the argument relies on Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 1–28, at pp. 26,44.29. For evidence that the theory accounts for the creation and shape of dozens of other institu-

power considerations explain both why the Western Europeans decided tobuild a balancing coalition and why that coalition took the virtually unprece-dented form that it did.

motive, means, and opportunity. The distribution of power between1945 and 1960 gave the Europeans the motive, means, and opportunity to es-tablish a balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. France and WestGermany had a powerful incentive to cooperate in the early Cold War period.The reason was that World War II had left the Soviet Union as the only greatpower on the continent, and neither France nor West Germany had the powerto balance effectively against the Soviets on its own. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs ofStaff put it, the Soviet Union was “the sole great power on the Continent—aposition unique in modern history.”30 The Joint Intelligence Committee wor-ried that “none of these [European] countries is capable singly of waging asuccessful defensive war against the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-lics].”31 This was not to say that observers believed an invasion was imminent.The material cost of ªghting World War II and its rapid postwar demobiliza-tion meant that the Soviet Union was unlikely to attack in the near future.32

But as historian Melvyn Lefºer notes, it had the potential to dominate—it had“overwhelming power on the Eurasian land mass.”33 There is good evidencefor this claim. In 1946 the Soviet Union had a 6:1 military advantage and 3:1economic advantage over France. Little had changed a decade later: theSoviets now had almost a 7:1 military advantage over the French, and theireconomic advantage had increased to almost 4:1. In overall (military plus eco-nomic) terms, the Soviet Union was ªve to six times more powerful thanFrance throughout the period. West Germany was even weaker by compari-son. It had no military before 1955 and only a token force in the second half ofthe 1950s. At the same time, it was at a 2:1 to 3:1 economic disadvantage to theSoviet Union throughout the period in question (see table 1).

West European planners were deeply concerned about this gross power im-balance. French fears that the Soviet Union had the material capability to dom-inate Europe surfaced early in the postwar period and persisted throughout


tions, including alliances, trade pacts, communities, and unions, see Rosato, Europe United,pp. 233–240.30. Quoted in Melvyn P. Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administra-tion, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 67.31. Joint Intelligence Committee, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, 1948–1955, Janu-ary 2, 1946, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pt. 2, 1946–1953, The Soviet Union (Lanham, Md.: Uni-versity Publications of America, 1979), reel 2.32. On these points, see Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 5–6; and Matthew A. Evangelista,“Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83),pp. 112–115.33. Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power, p. 3.


Table

1.

The

Euro

pean

Bala

nce

of

Pow

er,

1946–95

1946

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1970

1980

1985

1995

Ratio

of

Sovie

tM

ilitary

Pow

er

to:

Fra

nce

5.6

9.7

8.8

8.1

8.0

6.6

6.2

6.5

10.3

7.2

11.7

2.2

Germ

any

——

——

—24.4

28.8

12.2

10.5

7.7

12.2

3.0

The

Six

1.8

2.9

3.0

2.8

2.8

2.4

2.3

2.4

3.6

2.5

4.0

0.7

Ratio

of

Sovie

tEconom

icPow

er

to:

Fra

nce

2.6

2.4

3.0

3.1

3.6

3.9

4.4

4.6

3.3

2.4

3.9

0.7

Germ

any

3.7

2.6

2.1

2.1

2.3

2.2

2.7

2.5

2.6

1.9

3.2

0.6

The

Six

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.2

1.1

1.0

0.7

1.2

0.2

Ratio

of

Sovie

tO

vera

llPow

er

to:

Fra

nce

4.1

6.1

5.9

5.6

5.8

5.3

5.3

5.6

6.8

4.8

7.8

1.5

Germ

any

——

——

—13.3

15.7

7.3

6.6

4.8

7.7

1.8

The

Six

1.4

1.8

1.9

1.8

1.9

1.7

1.7

1.7

2.3

1.6

2.6

0.5

SO

URC

ES:

Corr

ela

tes

of

War,

“N

ational

Mate

rialC

apabilitie

s,

1816–2001,”

htt

p:/

/ww

w.c

orr

ela

tesofw

ar.

org

;and

Brian

R.

Mitchell,

Inte

rna-

tionalH

isto

ricalSta

tistics:Euro

pe,1750–1993,4th

ed.(L

ondon:M

acm

illa

n,1998);

and

The

Military

Bala

nce

(London:In

stitu

tefo

rStr

ate

-

gic

Stu

die

s,

1963–).

NO

TE:To

genera

teth

em

ilitary

pow

er

ratios,Icalc

ula

ted

the

ratio

of

Sovie

tm

ilitary

pers

onneland

expenditure

toth

at

of

Fra

nce,G

erm

any,or

the

Six

and

avera

ged

the

pers

onneland

expenditure

ratios.

Igenera

ted

the

1946–60

econom

icpow

er

ratios

inth

esam

ew

ay

usin

gdata

for

ste

elpro

duction

and

energ

yconsum

ption

(ele

ctr

icenerg

youtp

ut,

1947–54).

Igenera

ted

the

1970–95

econom

icpow

er

ratios

inth

e

sam

ew

ay

usin

ggro

ss

nationalpro

duct

data

.Fin

ally,

Icalc

ula

ted

overa

llpow

er

by

avera

gin

gth

efigure

sfo

rm

ilitary

and

econom

icpow

er.

West

Germ

any

did

not

have

am

ilitary

befo

re1955.

The

Six

refe

rsto

Belg

ium

,Fra

nce,

Germ

any,

Italy

,Luxem

bourg

,and

the

Neth

erlands.

The

calc

ula

tions

for

the

Six

from

1946

to1960

assum

eth

at

West

Germ

any

would

be

able

tom

ake

the

sam

em

ilitary

eff

ort

as

Fra

nce

(ad-

juste

dfo

rpopula

tion).

Fig

ure

sre

port

ratio

of

Sovie

tpow

er

toFra

nce,

Germ

any,

or

the

Six

.For

the

arg

um

ent

that

this

isan

appro

priate

way

tom

easure

pow

er,

see

John

J.

Mears

heim

er,

The

Tra

gedy

of

Gre

at

Pow

er

Politics

(New

York

:W

.W.

Nort

on,

2001),

pp.

60–67,

133–134.

the 1950s. It was because of this that they formed the Dunkirk (1947) andBrussels (1948) treaties with other West European states, and worked hard tosecure a U.S. security commitment in the shape of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) in 1949. These efforts continued even after the creationof the Atlantic alliance: Paris sought further assurances of U.S. supportthroughout the following decade.34 Indeed, French concerns about Sovietpower were so strong that France was an early and consistent supporter ofWest Germany’s rehabilitation and its incorporation into the Western alliancesystem.35 The Germans saw things much the same way. Chancellor KonradAdenauer, who dominated German foreign policy making between 1945 and1963, was obsessed with the threat posed by Moscow.36 As Winfried Beckerhas pointed out, the “dominant factor” in his worldview during this periodwas “the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union.”37

Although no West European state could deter or defeat the Soviet Union on


34. For the claim that the Dunkirk and Brussels treaties were directed against the Soviet Union,see Michael Creswell, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Eu-rope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 11. More generally, see Sean Green-wood, “Return to Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo-French Treaty of March 1947,” Journal ofStrategic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 49–65; and John Baylis, “Britain, the BrusselsPact, and the Continental Commitment,” International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn 1984),pp. 615–629. On France’s role in the creation of NATO, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United Statesand NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); Georges-HenriSoutou, “La sécurité de la France dans l’après guerre” [The security of France in the postwar peri-od], in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri, and Frédéric Bozo, eds., La France et l’OTAN [France andNATO] (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996), pp. 21–52; and Irwin M. Wall, “France and the North At-lantic Alliance,” in Francis R. Heller and John R. Gillingham, eds., NATO: The Founding of the At-lantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), pp. 45–56. On Frenchefforts to gain assurances after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Michael Creswell,“‘With a Little Help from Our Friends’: How France Secured an Anglo-American ContinentalCommitment, 1945–54,” Cold War History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 2002), pp. 1–28.35. On this point, see Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, “France and the German Ques-tion, 1945–1955,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 7–13; and Georges-Henri Soutou, “France and the German Rearmament Problem, 1945–1955,” in R. Ahmann, AdolfM. Birke, and Michael E. Howard, eds., The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security,1918–1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 487–512.36. On Adenauer’s domination of foreign policy, see Sabine Lee, “German Decision-Making Elitesand European Integration: German ‘Europolitik’ in the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Ne-gotiations,” in Anne Deighton, ed., Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and EuropeanInstitutions, 1948–63 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995), pp. 40–43.37. Winfried Becker, “Views of the Foreign Policy Situation among the CDU Leadership, 1945–1957,” in Ennio Di Nolfo, ed., Power in Europe? Vol. 2: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy andthe Origins of the EEC, 1952–1957 (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1992), p. 357. For evidence that thiswas Adenauer’s view in his own words, see Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, trans. Beate Ruhm vonOppen (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966); Konrad Adenauer, Journey to America: Collected Speeches,Statements, Press, Radio, and TV Interviews (Washington, D.C.: German Diplomatic Mission, 1953);and Konrad Adenauer, World Indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for All, trans. Richard and ClaraWinston (New York: Harper, 1955).

its own, a hypothetical coalition comprising France, Germany, Italy, and theBenelux states—the “Six”—would be powerful enough to balance against it ef-fectively. Assuming that the Germans would be brought back on line and al-lowed to devote the same fraction of their population as France to buildingmilitary forces, a six-state coalition of this kind would possess roughly thesame amount of economic power as the Soviet Union and be at less than a 3:1military disadvantage to it. In terms of overall (military plus economic) power,the coalition would be at less than a 2:1 disadvantage throughout the 1950s,well within the parameters for effective balancing (see table 1). In fact, WesternEurope had so much potential that U.S. policymakers were convinced it couldbecome a “third force” in the world alongside the superpowers.38

The problem was that Moscow opposed the creation of a countervailing co-alition in the western half of Europe. As Vladislav Zubok observes in his anal-ysis of the documentary record, “The consensus was that the USSR shouldremain an unchallenged land power in Europe, without even a shadow ofcountervailing power represented by another state or group of states.”39 In-deed, the Soviet Union was openly hostile to every major integration initiativebetween 1950 and 1960.40

It was therefore the U.S. commitment to containing the Soviet Union in theshort term that gave the Western Europeans the opportunity to put some kindof balancing coalition into place. At ªrst, the United States did not balance par-ticularly vigorously and, in fact, it withdrew many of the forces it had sent toEurope during World War II. But following the Prague coup and Berlin block-ade in 1948, Washington moved to solidify its commitment to the continent,culminating in the creation of NATO.41 Then, fearing that the Korean War,which began in 1950, was the prelude to Soviet action in Europe, the United


38. James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 2002), pp. 11, 16, 258; and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making ofthe European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 114, 147–148.39. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev,”Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996), p. 85.40. See, for example, Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, trans. P.S. Falla and A.J.Ryder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 102; Creswell, A Question of Balance, p. 31; Marie-Pierre Rey, “L’URSS et la sécurité européenne, 1953–1956” [The USSR and European security,1953–1956], Communisme, Nos. 49–50 (1997), pp. 128–129; and Marie-Pierre Rey, “Le retour àl’Europe? Les décideurs soviétiques face à l’integration ouest-européenne, 1957–1991” [The returnto Europe? Soviet decisionmakers confront Western European integration], Journal of European Inte-gration History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 8–9.41. On the creation of NATO, see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981); Kaplan, The UnitedStates and NATO; and Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 66–86.

States began to send forces to the region in great numbers. The number of U.S.troops assigned to European Command increased from approximately 80,000in 1950 to 350,000 in 1954, and remained at approximately that level for the restof the decade.42

Despite this growing engagement, the United States did not intend to main-tain a permanent presence in Europe. Between 1946 and 1954, notes MarkSheetz, “U.S. leaders pursued three successive grand designs for postwarEuropean security, none of which was based on a permanent American mili-tary commitment.” President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration (1953–61)was equally determined to withdraw from the continent. As Francis Gavin ar-gues, the president “strongly believed that America’s conventional-force com-mitment was a temporary remedy to Western Europe’s weakened state after theSecond World War.” James McAllister summarizes the evidence: “Americanpolicymakers from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Dwight Eisenhower strenu-ously tried to avoid having the future of Europe dependent on a permanentU.S. military presence on the continent.”43 Crucially, ofªcials continued to holdthis view even after the United States established NATO and ostensibly madea long-term commitment to Europe. As Peter Foot has observed, policymakerswere determined that NATO would be “unnecessary in the long-run.” It was“seen as a holding measure.” John Lewis Gaddis concurs: “[N]either [NATOnor the Military Assistance Program] contemplated, at that time, the perma-nent stationing of U.S. ground troops in Europe.”44

The Europeans clearly believed they could not count on the United Statesindeªnitely. “Throughout the postwar period,” notes John Ikenberry, the Euro-peans, and especially the French, “were more concerned with American aban-donment than with domination.” In fact, the French were so worried about thedurability of the U.S. commitment that plans emanating from Washington


42. Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987),pp. 45, 81.43. Mark S. Sheetz, “Exit Strategies: American Grand Designs for Postwar European Security,” Se-curity Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1999), p. 39; Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Poli-tics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,2004), p. 40 (emphasis in original); and McAllister, No Exit, p. 16. For further evidence, see MichaelCreswell, “Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense Com-munity, 1950–54,” Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Summer 2002), pp. 89–124; and Hubert Zimmer-mann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop Presence in Europeduring the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 3–27.44. Peter Foot, “America and the Origins of the Atlantic Alliance: A Reappraisal,” in Joseph Smith,ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter, U.K.: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p. 91; and John LewisGaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 73. On this point, see also Creswell, “With a Little Helpfrom Our Friends,” pp. 2, 6–7; and Sheetz, “Exit Strategies,” p. 6.

were deemed “acceptable only if the United States also bound itself toEurope.”45 The West Germans also had little faith in U.S. staying power. AsAdenauer’s chief biographer, Hans-Peter Schwarz, has pointed out, the chan-cellor was “convinced . . . that the presence of American forces on the conti-nent did not at all represent the natural order of things, but was rather a longeror shorter intermediate phase that would one day belong to the past.”46

This situation gave the Western Europeans an incentive and an opportunityto construct some kind of balancing coalition. Absent the U.S. guarantee, theremay have been no coalition building at all: given the overwhelming power ad-vantage of the Soviet Union, France and West Germany would likely havebeen deterred from building a counterweight to it. At the same time, however,the fear that the United States might withdraw in the future meant they hadgood reason to provide for their own security, something they could do onlyby joining forces. The question now was what kind of coalition they wouldbuild.

economic integration. France and West Germany responded to this ex-traordinary situation by taking the virtually unprecedented step of integratingtheir economies. Their decision was driven by balance of power thinking.Given the magnitude of the Soviet threat, they concluded that they had to gobeyond cooperation and integrate if they were to have any chance of contain-ing the Soviet Union in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from the region.This kind of reasoning led them to establish the European Coal and SteelCommunity (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and theEuropean Monetary Agreement (EMA)—the three pillars of an integratedWest European economy.

Although the terminology varied—they referenced federation, integration,union, and the United States of Europe interchangeably—most French ofªcialsand politicians agreed that any European coalition must be integrated.47 This


45. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order afterMajor Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 165–166. For the claim that evenNATO did not entirely reassure the French, see Creswell, A Question of Balance, pp. 10–13.46. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Erbfreundschaft: Adenauer und Frankreich [Hereditary friendship:Adenauer and France] (Bonn: Bouvier, 1992), p. 101. I focus on Adenauer because of his excep-tional inºuence, but his views were widely shared. See, for example, Creswell, A Question of Bal-ance, p. 143; Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and theWest, 1949–1966 (New York: Berghahn, 2003), p. 89; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: AGerman Politician and Statesmen in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction, Vol. 1: From the Ger-man Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952 (Providence: Berghahn, 1995), p. 488.47. For a representative sample of statements to this effect by key ofªcials and political ªgures, seeWalter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth, eds., Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3: TheStruggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries,1945–1950 (hereafter DHEI) (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 65, 67, 68, 80, 87, 103; Memoran-

view derived from balance of power thinking and, speciªcally, from the beliefthat only an integrated coalition could balance against the Soviet Union ef-fectively. Speaking soon after the end of World War II, Charles de Gaulle as-serted that the Europeans had to unite in “a single system” if they were towithstand “any possible claim to hegemony.”48 Raymond Aron, a prominentphilosopher, agreed, arguing that Western Europe had to resemble a “multina-tional, continental” state to ensure its security.49 A decade later, Foreign Minis-ter Antoine Pinay endorsed integration as the only “way to save Europe’seconomy and its freedom.”50 His successor, Christian Pineau, declared that“European organizations” were crucial to Europe’s “political independence.”51

This commitment to integration caused the French to endorse the ECSC andthe EEC. According to its chief architect, Jean Monnet, the virtue of the coaland steel pool was that it would lay the foundation for a “federation” thatwas essential if Europe was not “to remain almost exclusively dependent onAmerican . . . strength for . . . [its] security.”52 Prime Minister Guy Mollet tookFrance into the common market based on similar considerations. As far as hewas concerned, the EEC would help bring about a “united Europe whichwould become a third, independent power” between a United States that was“too slow to comprehend danger” and a “menacing” Soviet Union.”53


dum from Merchant to Dulles, April 12, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS),1955–1957, Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce, 1986), p. 279; Summary of Con-versation between Pinay and Macmillan, April 21, 1955, Documents diplomatiques français [Frenchdiplomatic documents] (hereafter DDF), 1955, Vol. 1, Annexes (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987),p. 28; and Guy Mollet, The New Drive for European Union (Paris: American Committee on UnitedEurope, 1955), p. 9.48. Lipgens and Loth, DHEI, p. 50.49. Ibid., p. 31.50. Hervé Alphand, L’étonnement d’être [The wonder of being] (Paris: Fayard, 1977), p. 270.51. Jeffrey W. Vanke, “Europeanism and the European Economic Community, 1954–1966,” Ph.D.dissertation, Harvard University, 1999, p. 65. This kind of reasoning was widespread in the earlypost–Cold War period. See, for example, the statements made by key actors in Lipgens and Loth,DHEI, pp. 55, 93–94, 104, 114–115; and Di Nolfo, Power in Europe? pp. 83, 349, 507, 515; as well asthe personal testimonies in Guy Mollet, “Le Front Républicain et l’Europe” [The Republican Frontand Europe], Le Monde, December 28, 1955; Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 272–273; and Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe [For Europe] (Paris:Editions Nagel, 1963), pp. 153, 156–157. French policy was also inºuenced by concerns about Ger-man power. Germany did not pose an immediate threat in the 1950s because it had recently beendefeated and divided, but French ofªcials worried that it might pose a future threat. Therefore,they worked hard to ensure that France and Germany would have an equal say in running the EC.In other words, the German threat affected the shape of the agreement. See Rosato, Europe United,pp. 63–71, 187–197.52. Monnet, Memoirs, pp. 272–273.53. Mark S. Sheetz, “Continental Drift: Franco-German Relations and the Shifting Premises of Eu-ropean Security,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2002, p. 255. See also Gérard Bossuat,“The French Administrative Elite and the Uniªcation of Western Europe, 1947–58,” in Deighton,Building Postwar Europe, p. 31. In these cases and throughout the 1950s, policymakers would often

In discussions that paralleled those in France, West German ofªcials agreedthat any European coalition must be integrated if it was to provide an effectivecounterweight to Soviet power. As Adenauer told American journalistBenedict Kingsbury-Smith in 1950, he favored integration because it was theonly way Europe would be able to balance against the Soviet Union. Just asthe German states had united to form a formidable great power in 1871,Franco-German integration would lead to the creation of a third great powerin the Cold War. Five years later, Adenauer asserted that the European stateshad been “outstripped both economically and militarily by two great powersformed by the amalgamation of great land-masses,” and had to follow the su-perpower example if they hoped to ensure their “welfare, freedom and territo-rial integrity.”54

Given these views, Germany was enthusiastic about both the ECSC and theEEC. The German cabinet quickly concluded that it “must not say no” to thecoal and steel initiative because it promised to lead to the creation of a “federa-tion.” The U.S. State Department reported that the Germans endorsed thecommon market on virtually identical grounds: it would enable the Europeansto “advance beyond cooperation arrangements to Federal institutions with[the] necessary transfer of sovereign power.”55

The Western Europeans took it for granted that the coal and steel pool andthe common market had to be buttressed by a ªxed exchange rate system ifthey were to survive. The reason, Sima Lieberman explains, was that currencyºuctuations were thought to lead “to trade wars, increased protectionism anda general fall in national income.” Ofªcials feared that exchange rate instabilitywould jeopardize the achievements of the 1950s.56 Early on, the stability they


refer to their wish to be independent of both superpowers. In the case of the United States, the Eu-ropeans wanted to be independent in the sense of not having to depend on the Americans for theirsecurity. In the case of the Soviet Union, independence meant deterring the Red Army. In otherwords, independence from both great powers boiled down to being able to balance against the So-viet Union without U.S. help.54. Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 246–247, 256; and Adenauer, World Indivisible, with Liberty and Justicefor All, pp. 51–53. For evidence that others shared Adenauer’s views, see Lipgens and Loth, DHEI,pp. 467, 504, 511–512, 514, 536; and Sheetz, “Continental Drift,” pp. 235–236.55. Cabinet Meeting Minutes, May 9, 1950, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung [The cabinetminutes of the federal government], Vol. 3, 1950 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1986), p. 68;and Dulles to Embassy in Germany, July 1, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. 4, p. 308.56. Sima Lieberman, The Long Road to a European Monetary Union (Lanham, Md.: University Pressof America, 1992), p. 6. For this argument, see also Emmanuel Apel, European Monetary Integration,1958–2002 (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 29; Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945:Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 189; andFrancesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The European Mone-tary System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 1–7.

were looking for was provided by their countries’ common membership in theBretton Woods ªxed exchange rate system. Economist Horst Ungerer madethe point well: “When the negotiations on the . . . [common market] started,there existed a global monetary framework . . . that did not seem to require, ona regional basis, speciªc obligations for the coordination of monetary and ex-change rate policies.”57 However, because they believed the Bretton Woodsrules allowed for unacceptably large exchange rate ºuctuations that mightdamage the EC, the Europeans established the EMA, which required partici-pating states to limit exchange rate movements to three-quarters of the spreadallowed by Bretton Woods.58

By the late 1950s, then, balance of power calculations had pushed theEuropeans to establish an integrated economy. Fearing they might be left tocontain the Soviet Union without U.S. help and cognizant that their long-termpower rested on an economic base, they constructed a multistate economic co-alition. This was no ordinary arrangement, however. Given the Soviet Union’smassive power advantage, the Europeans understood that they could competeeffectively only if they built a single regional economy governed by a centralauthority.

the limits of integration. In the early 1950s, the Europeans consideredpolitical and military integration and signed the European Defense Commu-nity (EDC) treaty, which, had it gone into effect, would have established anintegrated European military and triggered discussions regarding the creationof a European political community.59 The Germans ratiªed the treaty on thegrounds that it would form the basis for an integrated military that could bal-ance effectively against the Soviet Union.60 The French National Assembly re-jected it in August 1954, however, thereby ending Western Europe’s ºirtationwith military and political integration. An alternative was soon in place. By theterms of the Paris agreements of October 1954, Germany became a member oftwo interrelated alliances: NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).


57. Horst Ungerer, A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: From EPU to EMU (Westport,Conn.: Quorum, 1997), p. 46. On Bretton Woods, see Michael D. Bordo, “The Bretton Woods Inter-national Monetary System: A Historical Overview,” in Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, eds., A Retro-spective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 3–108.58. Apel, European Monetary Integration, pp. 24–25; and Ungerer, A Concise History of European Mon-etary Integration, pp. 29–30.59. On the creation of a European political community, see Edward Fursdon, The European DefenceCommunity: A History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980), pp. 156, 212–217.60. This thinking comes through clearly in Adenauer, Memoirs; Adenauer, Journey to America; andKonrad Adenauer, For Europe—Peace and Freedom (Cologne: Press and Information Ofªce of theFederal Government, 1954).

French decisionmaking throughout the affair was based on balance of powerand sovereignty calculations. France found itself in the EDC negotiations be-cause of circumstances largely beyond its control.61 Once discussions began,however, French ofªcials resorted to power calculations. Speciªcally, they con-cluded that if there was going to be a European military force, then it wouldhave to be integrated if it was to contain the Soviets effectively. Monnet laidout the logic clearly for his colleagues. To balance effectively against the SovietUnion, the various European states had to abandon “juxtaposed national ar-mies” and form “a European Army with a single High Command, a single or-ganization, uniªed equipment and ªnancing, and under the control of a singlesupranational authority.”62

Sovereignty concerns and power considerations involving the United States,however, also meant that the defense community was never particularly popu-lar in France. As Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France explained, the problemwith the EDC was its “supranational character,” which impinged on Frenchautonomy.63 The preexisting NATO system was far preferable on this score: al-though it was tightly organized for operational purposes, the United States,Britain, and France retained sovereignty over their own forces.64 And becauseit added U.S. capabilities to the European effort, NATO was also superior tothe defense community in power terms. As Marc Trachtenberg argues, thepresence of U.S. forces on the continent did a lot to “protect western Europefrom Soviet aggression.”65 This did not mean the French were entirely comfort-able with the NATO option—they worried about the permanence of the U.S.presence—but they welcomed the deployment of U.S. power on the continentas enhancing their security.


61. For the claim that the French were forced into the negotiations by the United States, see DavidClay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: Univer-sity of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 97.62. Philippe Vial, “Jean Monnet, un père pour la CED?” [Jean Monnet, a father for the EDC?], inRené Girault and Gérard Bossuat, eds., Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée: Nouvelles réºexions sur l’unitéeuropéenne au XXe siècle [Europe ruined, Europe rediscovered: New reºections on European unityin the 20th century] (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1994), p. 213; and Monnet, Memoirs, p. 346.See also the views of socialist deputy André Philip in Lipgens and Loth, DHEI, pp. 120–121.63. Mendès France to Diplomatic Representatives, September 18, 1954, DDF, 1954, p. 396. On thispoint, see also F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945–1967 (Stanford, Calif.: Stan-ford University Press, 1968), pp. 168–169; Creswell, A Question of Balance, p. 137; William I. Hitch-cock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 171; and McAllister, No Exit, pp. 242–243.64. Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2001), p. 6. For a similar claim—he refers to the NATOsystem as being “anarchic” in form—see Lake, Entangling Relations, pp. 131–142.65. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 77.

Fortunately for France, it could reject the EDC without compromising its se-curity. The reason lay in the nature of the U.S. commitment to Europe. In 1954the United States had 350,000 troops on the continent.66 This meant that theFrench would have ample time to form an integrated military in the event thatthe United States decided to pull out. After all, it had taken a little more than ayear to conclude the EDC negotiations, and it would take at least that long forWashington to effect a complete withdrawal from the European theater. More-over, if and when it happened, integration would quickly increase Europe’smilitary power by enhancing coordination at the tactical, strategic, and opera-tional levels. Thus, France could afford to wait until the United States actuallyannounced that U.S. troops were leaving before surrendering sovereignty andestablishing a West European military. This logic does not apply in the eco-nomic realm, which explains why the French created an integrated Europeaneconomy in the 1950s. The key here is that it takes much longer for the power-enhancing effects of integration to take hold in the economic arena. It takes along time for the competition that results from the creation of a large inte-grated market to engender larger-scale production and technological innova-tions. Consequently, the Europeans had to build an integrated economy assoon as possible if they did not want to ªnd themselves at a severe disadvan-tage in the future. If they did not build this economy, they would fall furtherand further behind the Soviet Union, which would beneªt from its possessionof a vast integrated economy in the interim.

The problem with the NATO alternative—as had been the case all along—was that it could not prevent a U.S. withdrawal from the region later on, atwhich point the Europeans might have to defend themselves. Therefore, theFrench proposed the WEU, a purely European organization comprising the Sixand Britain that would be subordinate to NATO. Their reasoning was straight-forward: in the event that the United States left the Europeans to provide fortheir own security, the WEU could be converted into an integrated militaryforce capable of containing the Soviet Union. As Mendès France explained tohis colleagues, the WEU would be the “political and military basis of the fu-ture Europe.”67 Until the United States withdrew, however, France would re-tain its military sovereignty and simply engage in cooperation with the otherWestern powers within the framework of the Atlantic alliance.68


66. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 45.67. Mendès France to Bonnet, September 19, 1954, DDF, 1954, p. 405. On this point, see also Dillonto the Ofªce of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, September 16, 1954, and FinalAct of the Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 5, pp. 1198, 1200, 1346.68. For the claim that it was the French who came up with the WEU plan, see Creswell, A Question

This policy remained in place even as the military balance of power increas-ingly became a nuclear balance in the second half of the 1950s. The U.S. viewduring this period was that the Europeans should establish an integrated nu-clear force.69 France, however, was determined to retain its sovereignty and itsadvantage over West Germany, which had no nuclear weapons as a resultof the NATO-WEU arrangement, and therefore pursued a national nuclearforce within NATO.70 For now, the United States would defend Europe,and France would retain its sovereignty. If and when the United States with-drew from the region, France would have to entertain the prospect of an inte-grated European nuclear force. Such a force could be put in place fairlyquickly: Britain and France were acquiring nuclear capabilities, and by the endof the decade, approximately 500 U.S. nuclear weapons were effectively underEuropean control.71 Until the United States deªnitively rescinded its securityguarantee, however, military integration was not an option.

maintaining the status quo, 1960–90

From 1960 to 1990, Europe’s power architecture looked a lot like it did in the1950s. The Soviet Union was the only great power on the continent. Its overall(military plus economic) power advantage over France and Germany hoveredbetween 5:1 and 8:1 throughout the period. It was an overwhelmingly power-ful adversary. At the same time, the Six clearly had enough combined assets tobalance against the Soviet Union effectively. Even in 1985, the year of theirgreatest relative weakness, they were at less than a 3:1 disadvantage in overallpower (see table 1).

There was also little change in the way the United States factored into thebalance of power. Although Washington maintained a formidable presence onthe continent, the Europeans continued to worry that the United States mightone day leave them to contain the Soviet Union on their own. This may nothave been as great a fear as it had been in the 1950s, but there were still goodreasons to be concerned. In August 1966, for example, a group of inºuentialsenators introduced the Mansªeld resolution, which called for large troop re-ductions in Europe, and in doing so ignited a ªerce debate about withdrawal


of Balance, p. 157; Hitchcock, France Restored, pp. 195–198; and Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace,p. 124.69. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 146–215; and Steve Weber, Multilateralism in NATO:Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power, 1945–1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991),pp. 39–69.70. Jean Delmas, “Military Power in France, 1954–1958,” in Di Nolfo, Power in Europe? pp. 238–253; and Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 222–230.71. The nuclear weapons ªgure is from Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 194.

that would last a decade. Once the debate ended, observes historian HubertZimmermann, “New debates about U.S. forces in Europe arose at variouspoints in the late 1970s and 1980s.”72 In short, the possibility of abandonmentwas ever present.

The absence of signiªcant changes in the power architecture meant thatthere were no major alterations to the system that had been put in place in the1950s. Given the unchanging strategic environment, the Europeans made noserious move toward political or military integration. Take the 1961 Fouchetplan that called for the creation of a “Union of the European Peoples.”The plan never went beyond the drafting stage; negotiations ground to a haltin a matter of months. Moreover, despite lofty rhetoric to the contrary, propo-nents of the plan were not thinking in terms of integration. As Seth Jonesexplains, the plan “was explicitly not supranational.” A similar judgment ap-plies to the plan for European political cooperation that was launched at theEuropean summit held in The Hague in 1969. The report that emerged fromthe summit merely advised EC member states to focus on the “coordination offoreign policies.” Subsequent revisions—in 1973, 1981, and 1986—did little toenhance the scope of the project. Indeed, as one British diplomat observed,European political cooperation was ultimately “not a serious attempt at coop-eration.”73 In short, in political and military matters, the Europeans did nottake any meaningful steps toward cooperation, let alone integration.

Even as they refused to entertain the prospect of political or military integra-tion, the Europeans endorsed the Atlantic alliance and the U.S. force presenceit implied. As Jones notes, “Most European leaders supported a substantialAmerican presence in Europe and believed that NATO was the only viablesecurity institution for the future they foresaw.” This was even true ofPresident de Gaulle, who withdrew France from the joint military arm ofNATO in 1966. “The General,” observes Frédéric Bozo, “never seriously ques-tioned the Atlantic Alliance . . . nor did he contest the need for U.S. involve-ment on the Old Continent.” Indeed, a year after their withdrawal, the Frenchsigned the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements and thus “laid the foundation for anew military cooperation between France and NATO.”74 Given the choice, theFrench preferred to cooperate in the context of the Atlantic alliance rather thansurrender their sovereignty and form an integrated European military.


72. Zimmermann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment,” pp. 13–27, at p. 25.73. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, pp. 71–81, at pp. 73 (emphasis in original), 78,80.74. Ibid., p. 80; and Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, pp. xii–xiii.

The unchanging power architecture also meant that the Europeans main-tained the economic community they had built in the 1950s. Needless to say,they did make some changes over the course of three decades, but they did notfundamentally alter the trading and monetary arrangements worked out be-fore 1960. The most consequential change in the area of trade was the SingleEuropean Act (SEA), which went into effect on July 1, 1987. Although it wasgreeted with great fanfare, the SEA did not mark a radical departure in the in-tegration process. As Emmanuel Apel notes, it merely “reinforced the originalprovisions of the Treaty of Rome.” Similarly, Michael Gehler describes an“evolution from customs union to internal market that took decades.”75

Maintenance was also the watchword in monetary matters. The ªrst revi-sion of the 1950s regime came after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system,when the former EMA participants sought to establish a purely Europeanªxed exchange rate system to replace it. Their efforts spawned two agree-ments: the European Exchange Rate Agreement, known as the Snake, and theEuropean Monetary System (EMS). Both essentially replicated the BrettonWoods and EMA arrangements. As Barry Eichengreen explains, the Snaketried “to recreate the Bretton Woods system on a regional basis.” Meanwhile,Ungerer observes that “it has often been said that the EMS was not much morethan an enlarged snake and a regional Bretton Woods system.”76

Even the move to monetary union—which began in the late 1980s—was arevision rather than a transformation of the existing order.77 The crowningevent in this process was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Mone-tary Union, which laid out a process culminating in the creation of a single cur-rency and an independent European Central Bank (ECB). Clearly, the singlecurrency was a stricter arrangement than the ªxed exchange rate systems thatpreceded it. As political economist Jeffry Frieden argues, however, the differ-ence between it and its predecessors was one of degree, not of kind.78 A similarargument applies to the central bank. Member states certainly gave up moremonetary sovereignty than they had done to that point when they established


75. Apel, European Monetary Integration, p. 81; and Michael Gehler, “From Paneurope to the SingleCurrency: Recent Studies on the History of European Integration,” Contemporary European History,Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 2006), p. 283.76. Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945, p. 247; and Ungerer, A Concise History of Euro-pean Monetary Integration, p. 164.77. For the claim that the process began in the 1980s, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 381,386.78. Jeffry A. Frieden, “Economic Liberalization and the Politics of European Monetary Integra-tion,” in Miles Kahler, ed., Liberalization and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,1997), p. 239.

the ECB.79 The politically consequential act of giving up sovereignty in the ªrstplace, however, had been taken in the 1950s, when they established the EMAand pegged their currencies. Like the euro, then, the ECB involved the evolu-tion of an existing system, not a fundamental change of it.

The Post–Cold War Era, 1991–2010

The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 radically altered the distribution of powerin Europe. In 1985 the Soviet Union was much more powerful than any of theEuropean states. It held a 12:1 military and 4:1 economic advantage overFrance, and a 12:1 military and 3:1 economic advantage over Germany. Thepower architecture looked much like it did during the 1950s. In 1995, the yearafter Russia removed its last troops from what used to be East Germany, it wasstill the most powerful state on the continent, but only just. It held a 2:1 mili-tary advantage over France and a 3:1 military advantage over a reuniªedGermany, but it was economically weaker than both of them (see table 1).

This transformation in the European power architecture has had a profoundeffect on cooperation and institution building. Just as the onset of the Cold Warpushed the Western Europeans to consider building a political-military com-munity and to undertake economic integration, the demise of the Soviet Unionhas deprived them of a compelling geostrategic reason to pursue political ormilitary integration or to preserve the integrated economy they built between1950 and 1990. The Europeans have reacted in a predictable fashion: since theend of the Cold War, they have made no real effort to construct a political ormilitary community, and their economic community has slowly started to fray.

political integration

The post–Cold War distribution of power has given the Europeans little incen-tive to pursue political integration and, consequently, they have taken nomeaningful steps toward creating a political community. Because it involvessurrendering sovereignty, states consider political integration only if they arefaced with an adversary so powerful that it threatens their survival, and eventhen the importance they attach to sovereignty means that they go to greatlengths to come up with alternative arrangements to safeguard their security.This is what happened in the early Cold War period: the Europeans consideredpolitical integration in the face of the Soviet threat, but they quickly opted


79. William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark, “The Political Economy ofMonetary Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Fall 2002), p. 695.

for the NATO-WEU alternative. The collapse of the Soviet Union has meantthat the Europeans no longer need to consider integration, let alone actuallypursue it, and they have responded accordingly.

This may seem like a controversial claim. Just a few years ago, self-styledfuturologist Jeremy Rifkin suggested that we should begin to think ofEuropean states “as part of the European Union, just as we think of the ªftyAmerican states as part of the United States.” At roughly the same time, politi-cal scientist Charles Kupchan averred that the Europeans were “slowly butsurely building a political union.” Journalist T.R. Reid went a step further, de-claring the existence of a “United States of Europe.” This kind of thinking per-sists today. Consider the comments of Steven Hill of the New AmericanFoundation: “Is Europe a single nation or a union of individual nations? In-creasingly the answer is: both.” After all, Europe now possesses “a single, su-pranational government led by the European parliament.”80

The truth of the matter, however, is that the EC member states have made noreal move toward political integration in the post–Cold War period. AsMoravcsik points out, the issues that would fall under Community control ifthe Europeans actually were to engage in political integration—especially de-fense and taxes, but also education, health, pensions, crime, infrastructure, andimmigration—remain ªrmly under national control. Tony Judt put the pointwell in his magisterial history of postwar Europe: “The European Union . . . isnot a state. It does not raise taxes and it has no capacity for making war.”81

Although the European constitution—signed by the twenty-ªve EC memberstates in Rome in 2004—was widely heralded as a decisive step toward politi-cal union, it does not contradict my view. The constitution was rejected byvoters in France and the Netherlands and would have been rejected in severalother states had it been put to a vote. More important, however, a close read-ing reveals that it was not a serious attempt at political integration at all,despite lofty rhetoric to the contrary. As legal scholar Joseph Weiler pointsout, there was a substantial disconnect between the constitution’s “pompousself-celebratory Preamble” and its substance, namely, “a far from radical


80. Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing theAmerican Dream (New York: Tarcher, 2005), p. 65; Charles A. Kupchan, “The Travails of Union: TheAmerican Experience and Its Implications for Europe,” Survival, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2004–05),p. 109; T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy(New York: Penguin, 2004); and Steven Hill, Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way Is the Best Hopein an Insecure Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), p. 4.81. Andrew Moravcsik, “A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said ‘No,’” Current History, Vol. 104,No. 685 (November 2005), p. 356; and Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York:Penguin, 2005), p. 797.

amendment of the institutional architecture and decision-making processes . . .non-radical nods towards further democratization . . . and some sensible clean-ing up of language.” Moravcsik concurs, arguing that the constitution was a“conservative text” that merely “sought to marginally improve the EU’sefªciency and transparency while retaining its basic structure.” Judt reached avirtually identical conclusion: “After two years of deliberations, the Conven-tion remitted something that was more than a draft but decidedly less than aconstitution. Shorn of its portentous . . . preamble . . . [the] document offeredlittle by the way of classic constitutional proposals.”82

The rejected constitution was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which wasªnally ratiªed by all the member states in 2009. Like its predecessor, it con-tained nothing that could be called a meaningful move toward political inte-gration. In fact, many experts have noted the remarkable similarities betweenthe two documents. Perry Anderson describes the treaty as being the constitu-tion plus some “cosmetic alterations.” Andrew Glencross agrees, describingit as a “slimmed down” constitution. The effect of these changes, argues politi-cal scientist Simon Hix, was “probably the least signiªcant treaty the EU hasever signed.” Indeed, as the Economist observes, not even the treaty’s one realinnovation—the creation of the position of EC president—is evidence that po-litical integration is just around the corner: “The job is not ‘President ofEurope,’ as some call it, but president of the European Council, the bit of theEU controlled by national governments.”83

military integration

The post–Cold War power architecture has also meant that the Europeans havenot seriously attempted to pursue military integration. As is the case in politi-cal affairs, states consider constructing an integrated military force only whenthey are confronted by an overwhelmingly powerful adversary. During theearly Cold War, the Soviet threat drove the Europeans to consider military in-tegration. Even then, however, their reluctance to give up sovereignty droveFrance to kill the EDC and opt for the NATO-WEU alternative. The collapse


82. Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Editorial: Marking the Anniversary of the Universal Declaration; TheIrish No and the Lisbon Treaty,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 4 (September2008), pp. 650–651; Moravcsik, “A Too Perfect Union?” pp. 356–357; and Judt, Postwar, p. 721.83. Perry Anderson, The New Old World (London: Verso, 2010), p. 59; Andrew Glencross, “TheGrand Illusion Continues: What the Lisbon Treaty Means for the European Union and Its GlobalRole,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2010, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201002.glencross.grandillusion.html; Simon Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It(Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 183; and “Unwelcome, President Blair,” Economist, August 1, 2009,p. 48.

of the Soviet Union has removed the incentive to consider or pursue militaryintegration, and the Europeans have, in fact, made no real moves in thatdirection.

It might look like there is some evidence to contradict this claim. The French,in particular, appear to have given serious thought to military integration. AsFinancial Times journalist Wolfgang Münchau observed in 2003, the Americaninvasion of Iraq “unleashed a debate about a political and military counter-weight to the U.S.” President Jacques Chirac went so far as to declare his desireto bring about a “multipolar world.” A few analysts have treated these com-ments and others like them as serious statements of intent. At the turn of thecentury, Samuel Huntington suggested that a “truly multipolar” world mightbe only one or two decades away, with Europe acting as one of those poles. Afew years later, Jeffrey Cimbalo suggested that the constitution would create a“powerful federal national security apparatus.” According to ChristopherLayne, U.S. decisionmakers were so concerned about this eventuality that theywere dedicated to ensuring that “the EU’s ‘state-building’ process fails—thereby heading off the emergence of a united Europe that could become anindependent pole of power in the international system.”84

A close look at the evidence, however, reveals that the Europeans have madehardly any effort to form a viable defense community since 1991. To be clear,they have certainly cooperated in military affairs, but they have not attemptedto create a single military actor capable of being another pole in the world. Thecommon foreign and security policy, which was one of the three pillars of theMaastricht treaty, is a case in point. It aimed at regular cooperation—memberswere urged to come up with “common positions” and implement “joint ac-tions” when they had shared interests—rather than integration. The sameapplies to the European security and defense policy (ESDP), launched byBritain and France at Saint-Malo in 1998. ESDP, which was meant to givethe Europeans “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by crediblemilitary forces,” is an intergovernmental arrangement. The rapid reactionforce that it created is not a standing force, but rather a pool of national unitsthat the EC can draw on only if member states unanimously agree to use force.


84. Wolfgang Münchau, “Time to Abandon the ‘Core Europe’ Fantasy,” Financial Times, November3, 2003; Jacques Chirac, “European Security and Defense,” speech to the Presidential Committee ofthe WEU Assembly, May 30, 2000, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2000/1699.html; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs,Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 37; Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, “Saving NATO from Europe,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December 2004), p. 112; and Christopher Layne, “America asEuropean Hegemon,” National Interest, No. 72 (Summer 2003), p. 25.

In other words, ultimate authority rests with the member states, all of whomhave a veto, rather than with the EC. Nor has the creation of a high representa-tive for foreign affairs and security policy, also known as Europe’s “foreignminister,” altered the situation in any meaningful way. All consequential for-eign policy and defense decisions are subject to unanimity, which means thatthe member states are in control.85

This interpretation of events is widely shared. According to Robert Art,there is “as yet no single entity called Europe that speaks with one voice onforeign, security, and defense matters.” Similarly, John McCormick is con-vinced that Europe is unlikely to “match the United States” because it doesnot have “a common security policy and a uniªed command and controlstructure.” Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth concur: “Neither the au-thority nor the ability to act decisively in Europe’s name exists. . . . Ultimateauthority rests with the member states, all 27 of which must agree to any deci-sion on defense and security policy. This requirement of unanimity ‘placesprofound limits on the potential for decisive EU security policies.’” Even SethJones, who sees a marked increase in European security cooperation since theend of the Cold War, is forced to admit that “major foreign policy and defensedecisions are still made in European capitals. The European Union is not onthe verge of becoming a supranational state, nor is a European army immi-nent.”86

economic integration

Perhaps most important, the transformation of the European distribution ofpower has also led to the fraying of the economic community, as memberstates have put their own national interests ahead of its preservation in waysthat we did not see during the Cold War. To a large extent, the EC and its con-stituent institutions are the product of the Cold War balance of power. Fearingthat they might one day have to balance against the Soviet Union withoutU.S. help, the Europeans built an integrated economy. It follows that the de-mise of the Soviet Union removed the core geostrategic rationale for maintain-


85. Glencross, “The Grand Illusion Continues”; Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation,pp. 81–85, 197–202; “The Ins and Outs,” Economist, March 17, 2007, pp. 12–15; and AndrewMoravcsik, “Don’t Know? Vote No!” Prospect, June 26, 2008, pp. 14–15.86. Robert J. Art, “Europe Hedges Its Security Bets,” in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and MichelFortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, Calif.: StanfordUniversity Press, 2004), p. 183; John McCormick, The European Superpower (New York: Palgrave,2007), p. 81; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Rela-tions and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008),pp. 30–31; and Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, p. 5.

ing the community. This is not to argue that the end of the Cold War has giventhe Europeans a reason to dismantle the EC—only that it has removed their in-centive to preserve it. As a result, whenever member states have faced a choicebetween abiding by Community rules and pursuing national interests, theyhave tended to prioritize the latter at the expense of the former.

Critics might argue that the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of theeuro, which occurred after the Cold War ended, contradict my claims aboutthe fraying of the EC and instead show the opposite. Upon closer inspection,they would be wrong. For example, it is important to note that the SovietUnion did not break up until 1991, and that Russian forces were not fully with-drawn from Germany until 1994. In other words, the change in the balance ofpower occasioned by the end of the Cold War was not immediately or clearlyapparent. Even if it was, however, it is worth bearing in mind that structuralchanges rarely have an immediate impact. It took almost ªfteen years for theEC to form under intense pressure, and it should therefore not surprise us thatit was a decade before it began to fray. Finally, as already noted, the train ofevents that led to Maastricht and, ultimately, the euro, began in the late 1980s.Therefore, the appropriate question is not why Europe embarked on deeperintegration in the 1990s, but why it maintained the momentum generatedbefore then.

The answer is simple: Europe kept moving toward monetary union despitethe end of the Cold War because of prosperous economic conditions. In theªve years leading up to the Maastricht treaty, Germany’s economy grew at4 percent per year and France’s grew at 3 percent per year. The U.S. economy,meanwhile, grew at 2.5 percent annually.87 Given this state of affairs, theEuropeans had no incentive to kill the Community. It was not just prosperitythat generated support for the EC, however: the Europeans believed that theintroduction of the euro would perfect the single market and increase intra-European trade, thereby making everyone even wealthier. To be sure, condi-tions worsened in the middle of the decade, but they improved markedlybetween 1997 and 2000, which was just when the Europeans were scheduled tolock their currencies and introduce the euro. During this period, France’s econ-omy grew by more than 3 percent per year and German growth hit 3 percent in2000, which was its best year since 1991. In short, prosperity was enough tosustain the EC in the short term.


87. For the data on economic growth and unemployment in this paragraph and the next, seeWorld Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

The goose stopped laying golden eggs at the turn of the millennium. Be-tween 2001 and 2007, French economic growth slowed to less than 2 percentannually, and Germany fared even worse with annual growth of around 1 per-cent. Worse still, both countries have experienced almost 10 percent unem-ployment over the last decade, compared with 5 percent in the United States.Per capita growth also slowed considerably, and productivity growth halvedbetween 1999 and 2008.88 Even its supporters acknowledge that the euro,which was supposed to boost Europe’s economy, has had a “very small effecton the area’s growth rate or even level of output.”89 When it comes to the sin-gle market, the so-called Lisbon Agenda “has singularly failed in its aim ofmaking the EU ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based econ-omy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more andbetter jobs by 2010.’”90

As soon as the economic situation worsened, France and Germany started toviolate EC rules at will. Without an overarching reason to maintain the eco-nomic community and to abide by its regulations, they began to act as sover-eign states pursuing national interests. Beginning in 2001, Paris and Berlinroutinely refused to obey the EC’s competition policy, which is “at the core ofthe Rome treaty,” and is designed to promote the achievement of a single mar-ket by forbidding states from aiding their own industries.91 France’s bad be-havior, including its assistance to companies such as Groupe Bull, Alstom, andAventis, did not go unnoticed. Experts noted a willingness “to bend EU rules”and engage in “protectionism.” The German government’s behavior was evenworse: Berlin consistently provided more state aid to national companies thanany government in Europe.92 Then in 2006 both states moved aggressively toprotect their oil and gas companies from foreign takeover. As Walter Laqueurobserves, “[I]t was as if the Common Market no longer existed.”93

Because France and Germany have started to prioritize their national inter-ests, they have also killed attempts to advance the single market. In 2005 theEuropean Commission tried to enact the Services Directive (SD), which was


88. Anderson, The New Old World, p. 508.89. Barry Eichengreen and Andrea Boltho, “The Economic Impact of European Integration,”CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 6820 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, May 2008), p. 38.90. Glencross, “The Grand Illusion Continues.”91. John Gillingham, Design for a New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),p. 19.92. John Rossant, “The Pernicious Rise of ‘Core Europe,’” Business Week, May 10, 2004, p. 57;Tobias Buck, “Decline in EU State Subsidies Grinds to a Halt,” Financial Times, April 19, 2005; andCarl Mortished, “EU States Renege on Promises to Reduce State Aid,” Times, April 21, 2005.93. Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: ThomasDunne, 2007), p. 200.

designed to establish a single market in services, a sector that accounts for ap-proximately three-quarters of the EC’s gross domestic product (GDP). Servicesare such a large component of the European economy that the SD would have“done more to promote the single market than any measure since the SingleEuropean Act.” The problem, however, was that it “threatened entrenchedinterests across the board.” As a result, Paris and Berlin quickly “trashed”the project “beyond repair.”94

The major players have also consistently broken the rules underpinning theeuro when it has suited their national interests. Prior to the introduction ofthe single currency, aspiring members promised to run budget deªcits of nomore than 3 percent of GDP and to hold their public debt to no more than60 percent of the same. The view at the time was that member states would beable to ensure the stability of the common currency only if they adhered to theterms of this “stability and growth pact.” Despite the pact’s purported impor-tance and their prominent role in putting it into place, however, France andGermany violated the rules with impunity, running up deªcits and accumulat-ing debt in excess of the agreed levels for every year from 2002 to 2005.95 Then,rather than trying to fulªll their obligations, they forced their partners tochange the terms of the pact. As journalist Anatole Kaletsky observed at thetime, there was simply a “refusal [on the part] of national politicians (and pre-sumably their voters) to treat economic policy on a continental scale, instead ofviewing it in a narrowly national perspective.”96

Predictably, European publics have supported their governments’ efforts toprotect the home front at the expense of the Community. They have doneso partly because of dissatisfaction with the EC’s performance. According tothe European Commission’s own polls, the proportion of French and Germancitizens who thought that their countries’ membership of the EC was a “goodthing” fell from approximately two-thirds between 1980 and 1991 to less than ahalf (and, in some years, just one-third) between 1992 and 2004. This is onlypart of the story, however. European publics have also backed their govern-ments because they have become more nationalistic since 1991. They almostinvariably think in terms of what is good for their country rather than forEurope as a whole. Data for 2004, which are similar to data for every otheryear since the Cold War ended, show that 83 percent of French respondents


94. Gillingham, Design for a New Europe, p. 23.95. For details of the breaches, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ªnance/publications/. See alsoGillingham, Design for a New Europe, p. 69.96. Anatole Kaletsky, “Stability Pact Reform Stirs New Misgivings,” Times, September 7, 2004.

saw themselves as French “only” or primarily French. The numbers inGermany were even higher.97

The reemergence of economic nationalism came into even sharper focus in2008 as the ªnancial crisis took hold. France and Germany took the lead, feud-ing about how to deal with the emergency. French President Nicolas Sarkozywanted a large stimulus and called on the ECB to take an active role in reviv-ing lending across the euro zone. In stark contrast, German Chancellor AngelaMerkel resisted a stimulus, criticized the ECB for reducing interest rates, andvetoed a common fund to bail out banks. At the same time, both Franceand Germany rushed to protect their own industries and workers, often at theexpense of those elsewhere.98 Anderson summarizes the situation well: “Eachnational government took its own steps to deal with the emergency, with adhoc measures to bail out banks, feed auto industries or prop up the labourmarket.”99 Former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was appalled,condemning this selªsh and contentious behavior as “retrograde,” and vainlyurging governments to “see the European market as a whole” or risk puttingthe single market in jeopardy.100

The 2010 Greek debt crisis provided further evidence of an increased trendtoward national rather than community thinking. Writing in the New YorkTimes, Steven Erlanger and Matthew Saltmarsh observed that “every decision”leading to the bailout package was “a painful, time-consuming bargain amongthe different national governments, with their own political requirements andconcerns, and their own view of economic virtue.” For Simon Tilford, chiefeconomist at the Center for European Reform, the crisis exposed “the myth ofEuropean integration and solidarity . . . as wishful thinking.”101 The Germanswere particularly vocal, asserting that they were “tired of supporting countriesthat . . . [did] not, to their mind, try hard enough.”102 Other EC member stateslamented Germany’s “egregious lack of solidarity.”103 According to sociologistUlrich Beck, the affair showed that Germany was a state “that downplays its


97. Eurobarometer, Interactive Search System, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm.98. “Those Selªsh Germans,” Economist, May 2, 2009, p. 55; Anderson, The New Old World, p. 507;and Steven Erlanger, “Economy Shows Cracks in European Union,” New York Times, June 8, 2009.99. Anderson, The New Old World, p. 507.100. Erlanger, “Economy Shows Cracks in European Union.”101. Steven Erlanger and Matthew Saltmarsh, “Greek Debt Crisis Raises Doubts about the Euro-pean Union,” New York Times, May 7, 2010. Tilford is quoted in the article.102. Simon Johnson and Peter Boone, “The Greek Tragedy That Changed Europe,” Wall StreetJournal, February 13, 2010.103. Steven Erlanger, “As Greek Drama Plays Out, Where Is Europe?” New York Times, April 29,2010.

European duties and ties.”104 Germany’s interior minister did not deny this de-scription, admitting that there had been a “change in our mentality.” Germanywas committed to pursuing “its national interest with a lot of vigor.”105 Francealso acted in accordance with national interests. At the height of the crisis,Spain’s El Pais newspaper reported that Sarkozy threatened to pull France outof the euro if Germany opposed a Greek bailout.106 Then there was the Frenchplan to establish an “economic government” to coordinate national economicpolicies and thereby avert future crises. Although the proposal may havesounded like a recipe for further integration, Paris envisaged an organizationthat would be run by the member states and act as a counterweight to the in-dependent central bank.107

Alternative Explanations

My claim that developments in the European institutional landscape sinceWorld War II are best understood as a product of balance of power politics isfurther strengthened by the absence of persuasive competing explanations. Iconsider each of these in turn.

the u.s. paciªer

The paciªer argument that attributes European integration to the U.S. presencein Europe during the Cold War is unconvincing. Take, ªrst, the logic. Althougha powerful paciªer may give states an opportunity to cooperate, it does notprovide a motive for doing so. Even more importantly, it does not provide areason to surrender sovereignty and engage in integration. In other words,proponents of the argument have not offered a logic that explains how thepresence of a paciªer causes states to integrate. There is another problem withthe paciªer argument. It cannot explain why all of the major integration initia-tives occurred in the 1950s, which was when the Europeans believed that theUnited States was likely to withdraw from the continent rather than remainand act as a paciªer.


104. John Vinocur, “Pondering the German Question,” New York Times, May 3, 2010.105. Stephen Castle, “E.U. Ministers Hoping Crisis Brings Closeness,” New York Times, May 20,2010.106. Reported in “President Nicolas Sarkozy ‘Threatened to Pull France Out of Euro,’” Telegraph,May 14, 2010.107. John Lichªeld, “Franco-German Relations Cool over Eurozone Crisis,” Independent, June 9,2010; Paul Taylor, “Deep Divisions in Europe over Closer Economic Union,” New York Times, June14, 2010; and Steven Erlanger, “Two Competing Visions of a European Economy,” New York Times,July 1, 2010.

An amended version of this argument—in addition to guaranteeing their se-curity, the United States actively encouraged the Europeans to integrate—doesnot perform much better.108 There is some evidence for the claim that theUnited States promoted integration and that this helped move the process for-ward. But given the enormity of the Soviet threat, the Europeans would havebuilt a community anyway. Moreover, although Washington promoted theECSC, EDC, EEC, and a European nuclear force, only the ECSC and EEC ini-tiatives produced integration. Thus, U.S. encouragement was neither a neces-sary nor a sufªcient condition for integration. Finally, it is important to notethat the argument is sui generis: it cannot be used to explain the constructionand shape of other institutions in other places and in other historical periods.

interdependence and interest groups

The historical record lends little support to the liberal explanation for integra-tion. If integration is the product of high levels of interdependence and themaking of the EC was the ªrst example of integration in modern European his-tory, then the Europeans must have been unusually interdependent in the1950s. Yet they were not, even by Moravcsik’s own measure of interdepen-dence: export dependence. The founding Six were less, not more, interde-pendent in the 1950s than they were in the ªrst half of the twentieth century.Germany and France were less export dependent on their EC partners in 1950–54 than in 1909–13 or 1926–30 (see table 2). The military integration claim isalso unconvincing. Because the Soviet Union was so powerful, France andGermany were highly militarily interdependent: only together could they bal-ance against the Soviet Union effectively, and neither could balance against italone. Yet, contrary to the predictions of the theory, they did not integrate theirmilitaries.

There is also not much evidence for the causal claim that interdepen-dence pushed interest groups to embrace integration and these, in turn, per-suaded their governments to pursue integrative bargains. The Frenchgovernment came up with the ECSC idea on its own and was not lobbied bybusiness interests. Then, when the plan became public, most producer groupslined up against it. A similar story applies in Germany, where Adenauer ac-cepted the proposal without consulting producer groups.109 Moreover, as John


108. See, for example, Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1998).109. On these points, see Henry W. Ehrmann, “The French Trade Associations and the Ratiªcationof the Schuman Plan,” World Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (July 1954), pp. 453–481; and Werner Bührer,“German Industry and European Integration in the 1950s,” in Clemens A. Wurm, ed., Western Eu-

Gillingham observes, “German manufacturers were no more willing to sac-riªce their basic industries or entrust their fortunes to a supranational author-ity than were the French.” Indeed, even Moravcsik admits that the position ofFrench industry was one of “opposition to the ECSC” and that the head ofthe Federation of German Industries described the coal and steel pool as a“typical example of how not to do European integration.”110

Nor was the common market the result of pressure from business groups.French producers were not involved in the initial proposal and expressed con-


rope and Germany: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945–1960 (Oxford: Berg, 1995), pp. 87–114.110. John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French fromRuhr Conºict to Economic Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 285; andMoravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 97, 108 (emphasis in original).

Table 2. European Interdependence, 1909–54

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 Average

Germany with Other EC States 3 4 4 4 4 3.6

France with Other EC States 2 2 2 2 2 1.8

Region 4 4 3 4 4 3.7

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Average



Region 8 8 8 8 8 8.0

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 Average



Region 5 5 5 5 5 5.2

SOURCES: Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer, The Making of Global Finance, 1880–1913

(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004); Susan B. Carter et

al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States, http://hsus.cambridge.org/; Brian R.

Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750–1993, 4th ed. (New York:

Macmillan, 1998); Annuario statistico italiano [Italian statistical annual] (Rome: Tipografia

Elzeviriana, 1878–); Annuaire statistique de la France [Statistical annual of France] (Paris:

Statistique général, 1878–); International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics

(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1981–); and World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://

worldbank.org/.

NOTE: To generate each state’s interdependence (export dependence) figures, I summed its

exports to the other members of the Six and divided this figure by its gross domestic prod-

uct (GDP). I generated regional interdependence figures by summing exports from European

Community members to other EC members and dividing this figure by the EC’s combined

GDP. Figures report exports as a percentage of GDP.

siderable hostility toward the Spaak report, which provided the blueprint forthe EEC. Moreover, although Moravcsik shows that French producers became“cautiously and conditionally supportive” of the common market in thesummer of 1956, this is not the same as demonstrating that they pushed for in-tegration as his theory predicts.111 As for German producers, they clearly pre-ferred a free trade area (FTA) without supranational institutions to anintegrated common market. Moravcsik acknowledges this: German industryhad a “preference for an FTA” and “consistently if somewhat unenthusiasti-cally endorsed Adenauer’s efforts to secure a customs union.” In fact, he ad-mits that what support there was for the chancellor’s agenda rested on“geopolitical” considerations.112

The EDC affair also casts doubt on the liberal argument. Important domesticactors in France, including the executive, the military, and major producergroups, recognized that the West European powers were highly militarily in-terdependent. Yet instead of pursuing military integration, as the liberal argu-ment would predict, they chose cooperation. Germany was rearmed andincorporated into the NATO system.113

Finally, the liberal argument does not provide a good explanation of devel-opments in the post–Cold War era. Moravcsik asserts that the West Europeaneconomies have been, “and are still, extremely interdependent.” This being thecase, the establishment of the single market and the creation of a single cur-rency in the 1990s are consistent with his theory. High levels of interdepen-dence coincided with integration. His theory, however, cannot explain why theEC has run into trouble in the 2000s. For example, Moravcsik cannot accountfor the failure of the constitution, which, he argues, contained only “incremen-tal improvements that consolidate[d] EU developments of the past 20years.”114 Nor can he explain why France and Germany have killed the SD, re-fused to integrate their services and energy sectors, and routinely violated therules underpinning the single market and single currency.

transcending the nation-state

There is scant empirical support for the constructivist argument that the ECshould be understood as a reaction against the nation-state system. To be sure,


111. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 102–109; and Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 110.112. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 97.113. Rosato, Europe United, pp. 163–165.114. Andrew Moravcsik, “European Integration: Looking Ahead,” in Karen M. Rohan, ed., GreatDecisions, 2008 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2008), p. 18; and Moravcsik, “A Too PerfectUnion?” p. 356.

there is some evidence that in the lead-up to the ECSC, European “federalists”endorsed integration as a means to replace the nation-state system with an al-ternative political setup. Key decisionmakers did not subscribe to this kind ofthinking, however. There is no clear-cut evidence in any of the major accountsof the federalist movement that the most important supporters of integrationsaw it as a means to transcend the nation-state.115 Indeed, based on an exten-sive analysis of the historical record, historian Alan Milward rejects the claimthat French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Adenauer were “less com-mitted to the nation-state” than their contemporaries as a “persistent cliché,”and he describes Monnet as a “begetter of the French nation-state’s . . . resur-gence.” Parsons’s own analysis does little to respond to these claims. For ex-ample, his summary of Schuman and Monnet’s motives in proposing theECSC makes no reference to a desire to eliminate the nation-state.116

France and Germany do not appear to have endorsed the EEC because itprovided an organizational alternative to the nation-state. Parsons and histo-rian Jeffrey Vanke show that most of the key actors in the mid-1950s were in fa-vor of integration and endorsed the EEC as a step in that direction.117 They donot, however, show that this support for integration derived from a belief thatit would enable Europe to transcend the nation-state system. In fact, Parsonsdoes not even attempt to investigate the reasons behind their support for inte-gration.118 Meanwhile, Vanke describes the development of a “Europeanspirit” based on a rejection of the nation-state, but he does not provide evi-dence that the major protagonists acted on the basis of that spirit.119 It is, then,hard to sustain the claim that policymakers viewed the common market as astep toward eliminating European nation-states.

The constructivist argument also runs into trouble in trying to explain thefailure of the EDC. If French ofªcials were intent on transcending the nation-state system, then they should have been enthusiastic about giving up militarysovereignty and forming a defense community. As Parsons observes, the EDCwas a “huge step in federal-style uniªcation.” In fact, it would go further than


115. Hendrik Brugmans, L’idée européenne, 1920–1970 [The European idea, 1920–1970], 3d ed.(Bruges: De Tempel, 1970); and Lipgens, A History of European Integration.116. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1992),pp. 327, 334; and Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 51, 55.117. Vanke, “Europeanism and the European Economic Community,” pp. 15–16, 59, 93; and Par-sons, A Certain Idea of Europe, pp. 97, 108.118. For evidence that Parsons describes almost all of the key actors in France as being pro-integration but does not address the source of their pro-integration ideas, see A Certain Idea of Eu-rope, pp. 56, 64, 74, 77, 79, 97, 108, 114–115.119. Vanke, “Europeanism and the European Economic Community,” pp. 15–16, 31–32, 92–93.

the ECSC toward transcending the European nation-state system. Given this,Parsons cannot explain why, by his own admission, there was so much vehe-ment opposition to the defense community in France. Ofªcials should haveembraced it, not excoriated it.120

Parsons’s theory fares little better when it comes to the post–Cold War peri-od. The Europeans’ establishment of the single market and single currency inthe ªrst post–Cold War decade lends some support to his claim that most deci-sionmakers held “pro-community” ideas by the 1990s. Parsons cannot, how-ever, explain the resurgence of nationalism since the turn of the century. Ifthere is a pro-community consensus, then why have France and Germany con-sistently put national interests ªrst during the past decade?

Europe’s Future

What does the future hold for Europe? How likely are the Europeans to con-struct a political community? What are the chances that they will establish anintegrated military force? And what will happen to the economic communityand, speciªcally, to the single market and the single currency?

Predictions about the future of Europe’s institutional landscape should bebased on general theories about the creation, endurance, and dissolution of in-stitutions. If scholars are to have any conªdence in their predictions, they needto use a compelling theory, which is to say one that is logically consistent, thatdoes a good job at explaining the historical record, and that accounts for thepast better than extant alternatives.121 Accordingly, this section uses my theoryto predict the future of political, military, and economic integration in Europe.Even this approach can yield erroneous forecasts—the complexity of politicalphenomena and the effects of unanticipated events virtually guarantee it. AsAnderson observes, “The long-run outcome of integration remains unforesee-able. . . . Even without shocks, many a zigzag has marked its path. With them,who knows what further mutations may occur.”122 That said, predictions gen-erated from compelling theories are more likely to be correct than those basedon pure speculation or the extrapolation of current events into the future.

The key point to note is that, for the foreseeable future, there is no reason tothink that the existing balance of power is going to shift, and therefore the


120. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, p. 69.121. On this point, see Charles Tilly, “Reºections on the History of European State-Making,” inTilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1975), p. 3.122. Anderson, The New Old World, p. 78.

Europeans are not going to confront an overwhelmingly powerful adversary.Today power is distributed fairly evenly in Europe; no state has an over-whelming power advantage over its neighbors. Germany is the strongest stateon the continent, but it has less than a 2:1 overall power advantage overBritain, France, Italy, and Russia.123 This is likely to remain the case for sometime. If we assume that population is a reasonable indicator of a state’s poten-tial power, Russia will be Europe’s most powerful state in 2050, but it will haveless than a 2:1 advantage over its neighbors.124

This state of affairs means that there is hardly any chance that the Europeanswill take any real steps toward political or military integration. The geo-political architecture does not and likely will not provide an incentive for ei-ther course of action.

Absent an overwhelmingly powerful rival, the Europeans will also continueto have little reason to preserve their economic community. This is not tosay that they will seek actively to disband it; only that they will not be commit-ted to maintaining it. Therefore, the Community’s future depends on thehealth of the European economy. In the best-case scenario, the economic situa-tion will improve and the EC will muddle along. In the worst-case scenario,the economic situation will not improve and the EC will continue to fray, per-haps to the point where it becomes a community in name only. Speciªcally,member states may eventually reassert national control over the matters oftrade and money.

There is a good chance that the economic situation is not going to improve.There is little debate that the single market is not delivering prosperity in itscurrent form and that attempts to ªx it, including the Lisbon Agenda, havefailed. This was, in fact, the common view even before the global ªnancial cri-sis.125 Consequently, as Hix notes, there is a clear consensus that the EC “needsto undertake reforms to make the European economy generate more jobs andincrease growth.”126 Many analysts argue that these reforms should includemore integration: the Europeans must integrate their services and energy sec-tors and create an internal market for ªnancial services.127 Above all, warns theEuropean Commission, members must “resist protectionist temptations andreject measures that promote national interests at the expense of the single


123. See table 1 for the sources and methods used to calculate overall power.124. For the population projections, see http://esa.un.org/UNPP/.125. See, for example, “The Quest for Prosperity,” and “Europe’s Mid-Life Crisis,” Economist,March 17, 2007, pp. 6–9 and 13 respectively.126. Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, p. 2.127. Ibid., pp. 31, 48; and Gillingham, Design for a New Europe, p. 70.

European market.”128 The problem is that further integration is liable to createwinners and losers, and because member states have no overarching reason topreserve the EC, those who stand to lose out are likely to prioritize national in-terests and kill initiatives designed to integrate the services, energy, andªnancial sectors. Simply put, reform may be badly needed, but it is highlyunlikely.

A similar story applies to the single currency. As several commentators pre-dicted, the Europeans have been feeling the strain of membership since theeuro’s inception.129 Its one-size-ªts-all monetary policy has proved too tightfor some and too loose for others. Fiscal policy has been another source of fric-tion, pitting states that want to run greater deªcits against proponents oftighter ªscal discipline. More recently, it has become clear that given the rulesconstraining monetary and ªscal autonomy, members that get into trouble canbe rescued only through ªnancial transfers from their more fortunate partners,which may not want to bail them out. One way to mitigate these problems—one favored by many economists—is to push forward with political integra-tion. If Europe becomes a single state, rather than a collection of separate stateswith a single currency, these troubles will simply not arise, just as they do notarise within the United States. Paul de Grauwe, an adviser to CommissionPresident José Manuel Barroso, makes the point clearly: “Without a politicalunion, in the long run, the euro zone cannot last.”130 The problem, of course, isthat absent a major league adversary, political integration is highly unlikely.

Given that reforms are unlikely, economic crises and therefore the furtherfraying of the Community are virtually inevitable. At that point, even the de-mise of the EC is not out of the question. If the crisis is serious enough, for ex-ample, the Europeans could roll back the single market. After all, there is goodevidence that a simpler setup, one that involves fewer rules and impinges lesson state sovereignty, may yield similar economic results, and perhaps betterones.131 As Anderson notes, the “standard objectives of inter-capitalist statecooperation” can be achieved with “free trade agreements of a conventionalkind, [and] without creation of any complex of supranational institutions orderogations of national sovereignty.”132 The Europeans may come to the same


128. Tony Barber, “Europe Expected to Suffer Long-Term Loss of Potential Economic Output,” Fi-nancial Times, July 3, 2009.129. For a clairvoyant statement regarding the problems of membership, see Josef Joffe, “TheEuro: The Engine That Couldn’t,” New York Review of Books, December 4, 1997, pp. 26–31.130. Landon Thomas Jr., “Is Greece’s Debt Trashing the Euro?” New York Times, February 6, 2010.On this point, see also Paul Krugman, “The Making of a Euromess,” New York Times, February 14,2010.131. Gillingham, Design for a New Europe, pp. 76, 225–227.132. Anderson, The New Old World, p. 86.

conclusion, at which point the EC will resemble a regular free trade area ratherthan an integrated trade bloc.

The euro could go the same way. Another debt crisis, especially if it in-volved a large economy such as Spain or Italy, could cause Germany to aban-don the euro and return to the Deutschmark rather than bail out the offendingparty. According to economists Simon Johnson and Peter Boone, “A Germanexit from the euro zone, in a huff, cannot be ruled out.”133 Exiting the eurowould, of course, be costly even for Germany, but not prohibitively so. Mem-ber states still have their own central banks, which are responsible for issuingtheir own euro notes and coins, and which hold most of their foreign reserves.Alternatively, France may get its way and establish a European “economicgovernment.” At that point, the euro might still exist, but it would be managedby sovereign national governments.

Conclusion

There have been two profound shifts in the European balance of power since1945, both of which have had far-reaching effects on Europe’s institutionallandscape. The ªrst shift came as a result of World War II. Before the war, therewere several great powers on the continent; after it, only the Soviet Union wasa great power. This change triggered an institutional revolution. Before thewar, relatively weak great powers only needed to form alliances to balanceagainst stronger great powers. They could ensure their security simply by co-operating. After the war, the West European states understood that they couldonly hope to balance effectively against the Soviet Union by taking the virtu-ally unprecedented step of surrendering their sovereignty and integrating.This realization prompted them to consider several integration initiatives andto construct the EC.

Just as the emergence of the Soviet Union as the only great power on thecontinent pushed the Europeans to make the EC, its collapse removed the in-centive for integration. Suddenly, they did not have to think about establishinga political or military community. Nor was there a compelling geopolitical rea-son for them to maintain the economic community they had built during theCold War. Therefore, as soon as it became clear that the EC was not deliveringprosperity, France and Germany began to prioritize national interests, violate


133. Johnson and Boone, “The Greek Tragedy That Changed Europe.” See also Alan Cowell,“Memo From Berlin: More Germans Look Back at the Mark with Fondness,” New York Times, De-cember 24, 2010.

Community rules, and consider replacing the EC with an alternative that didnot require them to relinquish their sovereignty.

Provided there are no further shifts in the distribution of power and the eco-nomic situation does not pick up—both fairly safe bets—the slow fraying ofthe Community that has been going on for a decade now will probably con-tinue. This is not to say that the Europeans will stop cooperating with one an-other. After all, there are plenty of reasons for them to continue workingtogether. The current distribution of power, however, means that it is unlikelythe EC will continue to survive in its current form. As time passes, it is likely tolook more like other international institutions, and less like the exceptionalcase that it seemed to be for so long.
