evidence for the dta hypothesis ii: threatening self-esteem increases death-thought accessibility

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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 600–613

Evidence for the DTA hypothesis II: Threatening self-esteemincreases death-thought accessibility

Joseph Hayes *, Jeff Schimel, Erik H. Faucher, Todd J. Williams

University of Alberta, Department of Psychology, P-217 Biological Sciences Building, Edmonton, Alta., Canada T6G 2E9

Received 1 March 2007; revised 22 January 2008Available online 2 February 2008

Abstract

Three studies assessed the impact of self-esteem threat on death-thought accessibility (DTA). Increased DTA resulted from three dis-tinct types of self-esteem threat. Studies 1 and 2 employed negative feedback procedures in which participants were told that they scoredbelow average on an intelligence test (Study 1), or that their personality was incongruent for their desired career path (Study 2). In Study3, participants were led to believe that they would give an ill prepared speech in front of their peers. In Studies 1 and 2 DTA was assessedvia reaction times on a lexical decision task, while Study 3 employed a word-fragment completion task. Study 3 demonstrated the DTAbuffering effect of fortifying self-esteem via self-affirmation. Discussion focused on general implications for TMT, self-esteem, and mentalhealth.� 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Terror management theory; Self-esteem; Threat; Accessibility; Death

Introduction

A central motive to the development of terror manage-ment theory (TMT) was to explain why people need self-esteem (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schi-mel, 2004; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991).From the perspective of TMT, people strive to maintainhigh levels of self-esteem because doing so shelters themfrom deeply rooted thoughts and concerns about humanmortality. To put it another way, believing that our values,competencies, social identifications, and life goals aremeaningful and worthwhile provides us with the fortitudeto go on living despite the potential for anxiety resultingfrom the awareness that we may be no more significantor enduring than lizards, beetles, or any other form of life.According to this view, if self-esteem functions to protectpeople from thoughts and concerns about death, then sub-stantial threats to one’s bases for acquiring self-esteemshould lead to higher levels of death-thought accessibility.

0022-1031/$ - see front matter � 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.01.004

* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 780 492 1768.E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Hayes).

The goal of the current research was to assess thishypothesis.

Terror management theory

Terror management theory is based on the writings ofErnest Becker (1971, 1973, 1975) and emphasizes the cen-tral role of death awareness in our everyday lives. The the-ory posits that although we share with other life forms apervasive drive toward continued life, we differ from themsignificantly in terms of various cognitive abilities (e.g.,self-consciousness and the ability to contemplate futureevents). These skills clearly enhance our ability to survive;however, they also make us aware of our inevitable mortal-ity. In other words, we must live our lives knowing that wewill ultimately die. This knowledge of our mortality createsthe potential to experience overwhelming levels of anxietythat would render ongoing, goal-directed activity burden-some if not altogether impossible. Thus, in order to carryout the daily tasks of living with a modicum of equanimity,humans had to keep their existential anxiety under control.According to TMT, humans accomplish this through the

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J. Hayes et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 600–613 601

construction and maintenance of a cultural worldview,which provides people with an explanation of human exis-tence (e.g., who we are and where we came from), stan-dards and values to live by, and a promise of deathtranscendence for those who live up to the standards andvalues of their worldview. Self-esteem is therefore the beliefthat one is a valuable member of a meaningful culturalworldview. Together, faith in one’s worldview and self-esteem function to protect people from a deeply rooted fearof death.

Empirical assessments of TMT

Research conducted to assess the validity of TMT hastraditionally been guided by two general hypotheses (seeGreenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). The first ofthese has been termed the anxiety-buffer hypothesis, andstates that if self-esteem provides protection against anxi-ety, augmenting one’s sense of self-worth should reduceanxiety in response to subsequent threats. In support ofthis notion several studies have shown that when self-esteem is increased or is dispositionally high, people showless anxiety and defensiveness in response to the threat ofreceiving painful electric shocks or viewing graphic imagesof death (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; Greenberg et al.,1993).

A second hypothesis that has guided TMT research isreferred to as the mortality salience hypothesis. Thishypothesis states that if a psychological structure providesprotection against thoughts about death, then remindingpeople of their mortality should increase their need forthese psychological structures. In other words, remindingpeople of their mortality should, at least temporarily, ele-vate their need for self-esteem and faith in their culturalworldview. This hypothesis has received widespread sup-port from several empirical studies conducted in both lab-oratory and field settings (see Pyszczynski et al., 2004, for areview). For example, reminders of mortality have beenshown to increase liking for people who share similar reli-gious and political ideologies (Greenberg et al., 1990), andto increase attitudes and behaviors that are relevant for theindividual’s self-esteem such as driving ability (Taubman-Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999), physical strength(Peters, Greenberg, Williams, & Schneider, 2005), andmaterial wealth (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & Sheldon,2004; Pyszczynski et al., 2004, for a review).

The death-thought accessibility hypothesis

Although the majority of studies supporting TMT havefocused on the anxiety buffer and mortality saliencehypothesis, Schimel, Hayes, Williams, and Jahrig (2007)recently proposed that a third general hypothesis can bederived from TMT, namely, the death-thought accessibility

hypothesis. This hypothesis is essentially the inverse of themortality salience hypothesis and states that if a psycholog-ical structure provides protection from thoughts of death,

then weakening this structure should render death thoughtsmore accessible to consciousness. Initial support for thedeath-thought accessibility (DTA) hypothesis has beendemonstrated in a handful of recent studies. For example,Mikulincer, Florian and colleagues (Florian, Mikulincer, &Hirschberger, 2002; Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, &Malishkevich, 2002) found that having people think aboutproblems in their current romantic relationship, or havingpeople think about separation from their current partner,subsequently increased DTA. According to Mikulincer,Florian, and Hirschberger (2003), relationships allay con-cerns about death by providing a basis for achieving sym-bolic immortality through procreation and living onthrough one’s offspring (see also Hart, Shaver, & Golden-berg, 2005). Because relationships are linked with themeans of achieving symbolic immortality, threatening themincreases the accessibility of death thoughts. Other researchsupporting the DTA hypothesis has shown that threats tojust-world beliefs can increase DTA. For example, Hirsch-berger (2006, Study 4) recently found that having partici-pants read vignettes depicting innocent victims who wereseverely injured elicited more death-related cognitions thanvignettes about mildly injured victims, or victims who wereresponsible for their condition. Similarly, Landau et al.(2004, Study 6) found that people high in personal needfor structure (PNS; Neuberg & Newsome, 1993), had par-ticularly high DTA after reading an article about a goodperson who was the victim of a senseless crime. Accordingto Landau et al. (2004), evidence that bad things happen togood people is particularly threatening to individuals highin PNS, because it conflicts with their conception of theworld as a benevolently ordered place in which peopleare safe and secure as long as they do what is right. Otherstudies consistent with the DTA hypothesis have shownthat indirectly reminding people of their vulnerability todeath by priming them with thoughts of cancer (Arndt,Cook, Goldenberg, & Cox, 2007), exposing them to per-sons with disabilities (Hirschberger, Florian, & Mikulincer,2005), and reminding people of their animal nature (Cox,Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, & Weise, 2007; Goldenberg,Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999),increases the accessibility of thoughts about death.

Although these prior studies examined peripheral ver-sions of the DTA hypothesis, until recently, no researchhad examined TMT’s central proposition that threats tothe cultural worldview or self-esteem would bring deaththoughts closer to consciousness. In an effort to close thisempirical gap, Schimel et al. (2007) recently examinedDTA in response to worldview threat by exposing Cana-dian participants to a webpage that attacked fundamentalCanadian values or a webpage that attacked values thatwere irrelevant to their worldview (i.e., Australian values).Overall, Schimel and colleagues (2007) found (1) higherlevels of DTA (vs. negative-thought accessibility) amongthose who were exposed to the anti-Canada (vs. anti-Aus-tralia) webpage, (2) lower levels of DTA among partici-pants who were able to defensively dismiss the

602 J. Hayes et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 600–613

threatening content of the webpage, and (3) that the effectof worldview threat on DTA was not mediated by anger oranxiety.

According to TMT, faith in one’s cultural worldviewand self-esteem play a central role in assuaging concernsabout death. The DTA hypothesis maintains that threatsto either of these psychological entities should makethoughts of death more accessible to awareness. AlthoughSchimel et al. (2007; see also Hayes, Schimel, & Williams,in press) have shown increased DTA following worldviewthreats, our goal was to extend this research by examiningthe impact of a self-esteem threat on DTA. To this end, weconducted three studies in which we threatened partici-pants’ self-esteem and thereafter measured DTA.

Study 1

In order to address the impact of a self-esteem threat onDTA, we first conducted a study in which self-esteem wasexperimentally manipulated through false feedback on anintelligence (IQ) test. Participants indicating in a previousmass testing session that being intelligent is highly relevantfor their self-worth were selected to participate in the study.We had the participants complete an IQ test and thereaftergave them feedback that they had scored above average,below average, or gave them no feedback about their per-formance. Then, by assessing reaction times to words (vs.non-words) on a lexical decision task, we measured partic-ipants’ accessibility of death, negative, and neutralthoughts. We expected participants who received negativefeedback about their IQ to have a higher level of DTA rel-ative to those who received positive or no feedback. More-over, among those who received negative feedback, weexpected participants to have elevated levels of DTA rela-tive to the accessibility of negative and neutral thoughts.

Method

Participants and designSixty-two introductory psychology students at the Uni-

versity of Alberta participated in the study as partial fulfill-ment of course requirements, and were tested in groups ofthree or four. Participants were recruited on the basis oftheir responses to three questions included in a mass-test-ing session at the beginning of the semester. The questionswere designed to assess the extent to which participants’self-esteem was invested in being intelligent and read: (1)My self-esteem is influenced by how smart people think I

am. (2) I feel better about myself when I feel intelligent.

(3) I don’t care how smart I appear to other people (reversescored). Only students scoring 5 or above (on a 7-pointscale, where 1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely

agree) to all three questions were eligible to participate inthe experiment. Participants were randomly assigned toone of three conditions in a 3 (IQ feedback: positive vs.negative vs. none) � 3 (construct accessibility: death vs.negative vs. neutral) mixed factorial design. Of the 62 par-

ticipants, five were excluded for either misunderstanding,or suspecting the authenticity of the IQ feedback, leavinga total of 57 participants (18 males, 38 females, and 1unknown) for the data analysis.

ProcedureThe study was presented as an investigation of intelli-

gence and its relation to cognitive and motor skills(CMS). Participants were informed that they would takean IQ test, and then perform a CMS task. All materialswere presented on a Pentium III computer using e-primesoftware version 1.1, a program designed for the presenta-tion of stimuli for psychological research. Before begin-ning, participants completed 10 practice trials of theCMS task (which was the lexical decision task) to reduceany practice effects during the experimental trials. In pri-vate cubicles, each participant was seated in front of a15-in. computer monitor that was placed at a standard dis-tance of 25 cm from the edge of the desk. Upon completionof the practice trials, the experimenter ensured that eachparticipant had understood the task before proceeding tothe IQ test.

The IQ test consisted of 20 multiple-choice questions ofvarying difficulty. Participants were told that their scorewould reflect a combination of whether or not they gotthe question right, as well as the amount of time taken toanswer each question. Upon completion of the IQ test, par-ticipants were randomly assigned one of three feedbackmanipulations. In the positive feedback condition, partici-pants were informed by the computer program that theirIQ score was 139 and that in relation to other students,their score fell at the 92nd percentile. In the negative feed-back condition, participants were told that their score was91, which fell at the 35th percentile relative to other stu-dents. In the no feedback condition, participants weregiven no information regarding their score. Once partici-pants were finished viewing their feedback, they informedthe experimenter that they were ready to proceed to thenext phase of the study.

In this phase, participants performed the CMS task.This task, which was a lexical decision task, involved dis-tinguishing between words and non-words presented onthe computer screen. Participants were instructed to pressa key labeled ‘‘word” if they saw a word and a key labeled‘‘non-word” if they saw a non-word. The task was com-prised of 70 trials, presented in the same pseudo-randomorder to all participants, which consisted of 40 non-words,18 neutral words, 6 negative words, and 6 death words.Participants were instructed to proceed as quickly as possi-ble, while trying to answer each trial correctly. Unbe-knownst to participants, the computer recorded the speedwith which they responded to each of the 70 trials. To facil-itate a direct comparison of reaction times for each type ofword, we controlled for word length and frequency of usein the English language, such that they would be roughlyequal across word types (see Table 1). Upon completion

Table 1Frequency per million and word length (in characters) by word type

Death words Frequency Length Negative words Frequency Length

Buried 21.06 6 Suffer 24.21 6Dead 196.54 4 Wrong 212.80 5Skull 11.58 5 Jerk 12.00 4Killed 120.70 6 Fight 117.81 5Grave 29.11 5 Fail 28.49 4Coffin 4.43 6 Punish 6.64 7

M 63.90 5.3 M 66.99 5.0

Note: Mean frequency and length for neutral words were 64.26 and 5.7, respectively. Reprinted from Schimel et al. (2007).


of this task, participants again informed the experimenterthat they were ready to proceed.

In the final phase of the study, the experimenter handedeach participant an envelope that contained two manipula-tion check questions to assess participants’ impressions oftheir IQ feedback, and two questions measuring defensive-ness. The two manipulation check questions read: I per-

formed well on the IQ test; and I am happy with the result

of the IQ test. The defensiveness items were reverse codedand read: My score on the IQ test is an accurate reflectionof my intelligence; and I performed to the best of my abilities

on the IQ test. Participants were asked to rate their agree-ment with each question on a 7-point scale (where 1 = com-

pletely disagree and 7 = completely agree). Once completed,participants were probed for suspicion and fully debriefed.

Results

Manipulation check

To assess whether our feedback manipulation was suc-cessful, we summed the manipulation check items to forma composite of participants’ satisfaction with their perfor-mance such that higher scores denote higher satisfaction(a = .95). This composite was then subjected to a one-way ANOVA revealing a highly significant effect of feed-back condition, F(2,54) = 84.44, p < .001. Post hoc com-parisons revealed that satisfaction was significantly higherin response to positive feedback (M = 12.6, SD = 1.3) rel-ative to no feedback (M = 8.2, SD = 2.3), t(54) = 7.42,p < .001. Moreover, participants’ level of satisfaction wassignificantly lower in response to negative feedback(M = 4.6, SD = 1.8) relative to no feedback,t(54) = �6.05, p < .001.

Defensiveness

To assess defensiveness in response to the IQ feedback,we reverse scored their responses to the defensiveness itemsand summed them to form a composite where higher num-bers indicated more defensiveness (a = .81). We then sub-jected this composite to a one-way ANOVA, revealing asignificant effect of condition, F(2,54) = 31.96, p < .001.Post hoc comparisons revealed more defensiveness in thenegative feedback condition (M = 11. 3, SD = 2.1) thanin the no feedback condition (M = 8.0, SD = 2.5),

t(54) = 4.18, p < .001. Moreover, defensiveness was signifi-cantly lower in the positive feedback condition (M = 4.9,SD = 2.5) than in the no feedback condition,t(54) = �4.12, p < .001.

Construct accessibility

In order to assess the impact of self-esteem threat onconstruct accessibility, we first conducted some minortransformations to our reaction time data. In keeping withaccepted procedures for this type of data, we cropped out-lying response latencies such that any response greater than2000 ms was recoded to 2000 ms (Bargh & Chartrand,2000). In addition, any incorrect responses were excludedfrom the analysis. Mean reaction times (RT) were thencomputed for death, negative, and neutral words for eachparticipant. Although response latency data often violateassumptions of homogeneity of variance, after performingthe above mentioned minor transformations, our sampledid not encounter this problem, Fmax = 3.92, and theassumption of sphericity was also met, v2(2) = 2.14,p > .30. With the assumptions for data analysis acceptablymet, we performed a 3 (feedback: positive vs. negative vs.none) between-subjects � 3 (accessibility: death vs. nega-tive vs. neutral) within-subjects ANOVA on the meanRTs. This analysis revealed only the predicted feed-back � accessibility interaction, F(4, 108) = 2.66, p < .04.The cell means and standard deviations for this interactionare presented in Table 2.

Given that we had a priori predictions regarding the pre-cise pattern of results, we conducted planned comparisonsto assess these predictions. Within the negative feedbackgroup, we expected significantly faster RTs to death wordsthan both negative and neutral words. In contrast, weexpected no differences among word types within boththe positive and no feedback conditions. To assess thesepredictions, we first conducted three separate within-sub-jects ANOVAs for each level of feedback. These analysesrevealed only a significant effect in the negative feedbackcondition, F(2,32) = 5.02, p < .02. There was no differenceamong word types within the positive feedback condition,F < 1, ns, nor the no feedback condition, F < 1, ns. To fur-ther assess the nature of the effect in the negative feedbackcondition, we conducted two planned contrasts. In the firstcomparison we assigned contrast weights of 2, �1, and �1

Table 2Mean response latencies for the interaction of feedback by construct accessibility

Feedback Word type

Death Negative Neutral

Positive 613.4 (96.0) n = 19 604.9 (64.9) n = 19 612.8 (86.5) n = 19Negative 564.5 (72.3) n = 17 610.5 (63.0) n = 17 605.7 (100.0) n = 17None 613.9 (124.7) n = 21 605.9 (103.27) n = 21 603.2 (104.2) n = 21

Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Lower mean values represent faster reaction times (in milliseconds).


to the mean response latencies for the death, negative, andneutral words respectively, whereas in the second compar-ison these contrast weights were 0, +1, and �1. The firstcomparison was highly significant, t(16) = 3.54, p < .01,whereas the second comparison was not, t < 1, ns.

Discussion

In Study 1, higher levels of DTA were observed inresponse to a potent self-esteem threat, which accordingto the DTA hypothesis, supports the notion that self-esteem functions to protect individuals against thoughtsand concerns about death. Relative to participants whoreceived positive or no feedback, those who received nega-tive feedback had higher levels of DTA. Importantly, thisincrease in DTA was not the result of a general increasein the accessibility of negative thoughts. Within the nega-tive feedback condition, participants had significantly fas-ter reaction times to death words relative to negative orneutral words. This pattern, however, was not observedfor participants in the positive or no-feedback condition.Reaction times were essentially equal, regardless of wordtype, for participants in these two conditions.

Despite showing increased DTA in response to negativeintelligence feedback, support for the notion that self-esteem threat increases DTA might be questioned on thebasis that the results provide no direct evidence that self-esteem was manipulated by this feedback. Thus, whileDTA is clearly elicited by our negative feedback manipula-tion, one might nevertheless wonder if this increase resultedfrom threatened self-esteem. A number of considerations,however, support the notion that the negative intelligencefeedback affected participants’ self-esteem. First, weselected only participants who had previously stated thattheir self-esteem was contingent on the belief that theyare intelligent. A considerable body of theory and researchindicates that the more people’s self-esteem is invested in aparticular domain, the more their self-esteem will beaffected by events in that domain (Crocker & Wolfe,2001; James, 1890). For example, Crocker and colleagueshave shown that for people who indicated that academiccompetence was highly important to them, receiving badgrades or letters of rejection from graduate school pro-grams decreased their self-esteem, whereas receiving goodgrades or letters of acceptance into graduate programsincreased their self-esteem (e.g., Crocker, Karpinski,Quinn, & Chase, 2003; Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen,

2002). In light of this evidence, we are confident that theintelligence feedback affected participants’ self-esteem.

One way of potentially resolving the issue would havebeen to include a manipulation check of state self-esteemfollowing our threat manipulation. The reason that wedid not include this type of manipulation check, however,is that in some cases participants may defensively self-enhance on such measures (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; Brown& Smart, 1991; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Rudman,Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007), which would complicate assess-ments of participants’ reactions to the feedback. In order tocircumvent this type of motivated responding, we usedmanipulation check questions that first assessed whetheror not participants understood the feedback, and thenassessed defensiveness. If participants react to negativefeedback with increased defensiveness, it is reasonable toassume that they do so in the interest of defending theirself-esteem (Frey, 1978; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985).Thus, rather than seeking direct evidence of manipulatedself-esteem by means of a state self-esteem measure thatmight have produced ambiguous results, we sought indirectevidence of such a manipulation by means of items assess-ing self-esteem defense. Given prior research by Crockerand colleagues combined with the effect of increased defen-siveness in the negative feedback condition and decreaseddefensiveness in the positive feedback condition, there arestrong grounds on which to conclude that our feedbackprocedure was successful at manipulating participants’self-esteem.

Overall, the results of Study 1 provide support for thenotion that self-esteem helps keep thoughts of death fromentering consciousness. When people’s esteemed beliefabout their intellectual ability was undermined, thoughtsof death became more accessible. Although this study pro-vides compelling evidence in support of the DTA hypothe-sis, we conducted a second study in order to replicate andextend this finding using a different self-esteem threat.

Study 2

Although the belief that one is intelligent can no doubtmake up a significant portion of one’s self-worth, abroader conceptualization of self-esteem goes beyond themere belief that one possesses a particular valued trait.In fact, part of the reason why traits like intelligence areimportant is because having them qualifies one for pursu-ing a number of culturally valued life goals like becoming


a doctor, an architect, or an entrepreneur. Indeed, one’soverall self-evaluation is based not only on beliefs aboutwho one is in the here and now, but can also includebeliefs about what one might become. According toMarkus and Nurius (1986) these beliefs develop into pos-

sible selves, which include the ideal selves toward whichpeople strive. The extent to which individuals believe thatthey will be successful in becoming these ideal selves cantherefore contribute significantly to their overall feelingsof self-worth (cf. Higgins, 1990; James, 1890).

According to TMT, self-esteem is the belief that one is avaluable contributor to a meaningful world. In Westernsociety at least, becoming a valuable contributor in theworld involves a fair amount of preparation. From earlychildhood, we are encouraged to imagine what we mightbecome when we are older. Eventually, most peopledevelop a sense of who they would like to be, and overthe course of their lives, attempt to fulfill this projection.In other words, we are continuously working toward a lifeproject, and consistent with TMT, this project helps usbelieve that there is meaning and purpose to our lives.These life projects will most certainly take different formsat different points in our lives, but in order to maintainself-esteem we must believe that we are progressing towardsome desired end. Consistent with the DTA hypothesis,when people encounter a roadblock to fulfilling their lifeprojects, existential concerns may creep closer toawareness.

For most university students, the development of a lifeproject is yet in its infancy, and is often still relativelyinchoate. However, a good number of students havedecided on a career path with a fair degree of certainty.Thus, for these students, continued indicators of suitabilitytoward achieving their career aspirations (cf. Gollwitzer &Kirchhof, 1998) provide a sense that they are well on theirway to becoming valuable members of society. A potentway of threatening a student’s self-esteem would thereforeinvolve calling into question that student’s ability to suc-ceed in his or her career aspirations. Thus, in Study 2 wethreatened participants’ self-esteem by telling them theywere either well suited or ill suited to their desired careerchoice. To ensure that all of our participants were investedin the pursuit of a career, only students who were particu-larly focused on pursuing a specific career were eligible toparticipate in the study. After having these participantstake a career suitability test, they received feedback thattheir personality was either highly suited to their careerchoice or that it was not. We then measured the accessibil-ity of death, negative and neutral thoughts. We expectedhigher DTA for participants who received incongruent(vs. congruent) personality feedback. Moreover, consistentwith the results of Study 1, we expected this increase inDTA to be independent of a more general increase in theaccessibility of negative constructs. Thus, within the incon-gruent feedback condition we expected higher levels ofaccessibility of death thoughts relative to that of negativeand neutral thoughts.

Method

Participants and design

Thirty-one (12 males, 18 females, and 1 unknown)introductory psychology students at the University ofAlberta participated in the study as partial fulfillment ofcourse requirements, and were tested in groups rangingfrom two to four. Participants were recruited on the basisof their responses to three questions included in a mass-testing session at the beginning of the semester. The ques-tions were designed to assess the career path participantswere focused on pursuing. First, students were asked: If

you had to choose between becoming a stay at home

Mom/Dad or pursuing a professional career and you couldonly choose one, which one would it be? Only those whochose a professional career were eligible to participate.Furthermore, students were asked to indicate what careerthey hoped to pursue, and to indicate on an 8-point scale(1 = not at all and 8 = very much) (1) How important is it

for you to pursue this career. (2) To what extent are you

certain that you want to pursue this career. (3) How upset

would you be if you were unable to pursue this career. Onlystudents who reported 7 or higher to all three of thesequestions were eligible to participate in the experiment.Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-tions in a 2 (career feedback: congruent vs. incongru-ent) � 3 (construct accessibility: death vs. negative vs.neutral) mixed factorial design. Of 31 participants, onewas excluded for suspicion of the cover story, leaving atotal of 30 participants (11 males, 18 females, and 1unknown) for the data analysis.

Procedure

The procedure for Study 2 was nearly identical to thatused in Study 1. This time, however, the study was pre-sented as an investigation of career suitability and its rela-tion to CMS. Participants were told that they wouldcomplete a personality questionnaire, which was calledthe Personality-based Career Suitability Scale (PCSS),designed to assess career suitability, and then perform aCMS task. All materials were again presented on PentiumIII computers using e-prime software version 1.1. As inStudy 1, participants engaged in 10 practice trials of theCMS task before proceeding to the PCSS.

The PCSS consisted of 96 multiple-choice questionsthat were ostensibly designed to measure scores on theBig-Five personality dimensions (Norman, 1963). Regard-less of how participants responded to these questions,however, they all received the same set of relatively mean-ingless personality scores. Next, participants wereprompted to type their career choice into the computer.They were informed that the program would then displaythe ideal personality scores associated with that career sothat participants could compare these scores to their own.Regardless of what career choice was entered into thecomputer, participants were randomly assigned to oneof two feedback conditions (congruent vs. incongruent).


In the congruent feedback condition, the computer dis-played career-ideal personality scores that were quite sim-ilar to participants’ own scores, amounting to a totaldifference score of only six points across the five personal-ity dimensions. In the incongruent feedback condition,however, the career-ideal scores were quite divergent fromparticipants’ own scores, with a total difference of 47points. Participants were also given instructions on howto interpret their difference scores, indicating that theirpersonality was ‘very compatible’ with their career inthe congruent condition or ‘incompatible’ with theircareer in the incongruent condition (see Fig. 1).

After having viewed their career feedback, participantsproceeded to the CMS task, which was used to measureDTA in the same manner as in Study 1. Participants thenanswered four questions designed to assess individual per-ceptions of the career feedback. Similar to Study 1, two ofthese questions were designed to measure participants’impression of the feedback and read: I am happy with the

career suitability assessment made by the PCSS; and I was

satisfied with the results of the PCSS. The other two ques-tions assessed whether or not participants perceived theresults to be consistent with their career aspirations andread: The PCSS made an accurate assessment of my career

suitability; and My career suitability, as outlined by the

PCSS, is consistent with my career aspirations. Participantswere asked to rate their agreement with each item on a 7-point scale (where 1 = completely disagree, and 7 = com-

pletely agree). Upon completion, participants were probedfor suspicion and fully debriefed.

Your personality scores:

Openness to Experience: 36 Conscientiousness: 45 Extroversion: 41 Agreeableness: 37 Neuroticism: 21

Ideal personality scores associated with your caree

Congruent condition:Openness to Experience: 37 Conscientiousness: 43 Extroversion: 42 Agreeableness: 36 Neuroticism: 22

Total difference = 6

Difference: Compatibility:less than 10 Your personality is vbetween 10-20 Your personality is cbetween 20-30 Your personality is smore than 30 Your personality is i

Fig. 1. Career feedback manipulati

Results

Manipulation checks

To assess whether our feedback manipulation was suc-cessful, we computed two composites on the manipulationcheck items. The first two items were summed to constructa measure of participants’ overall impression of the PCSSassessment (a = .98), and the second two items weresummed to form a measure of perceived consistencybetween the PCSS assessment and participants’ career aspi-rations (a = .99). These composites were then subjected toindependent-samples t-tests, revealing a highly significantdifference for both the impression composite,t(28) = 11.53, p < .001, and the perceived consistency com-posite, t(28) = 13.42, p < .001. These differences indicatedthat participants in the congruent condition reported morepositive impressions of the career feedback (M = 13.4,SD = 1.0) than did participants in the incongruent condi-tion (M = 4.0, SD = 3.0). Likewise, participants in the con-gruent condition also perceived their PCSS assessment tobe more consistent with their career aspirations(M = 13.6, SD = 1.1) than participants in the incongruentcondition (M = 3.3, SD = 2.8).

Construct accessibility

In order to assess the impact of career suitability feed-back on DTA, we performed the same minor transforma-tions to our reaction time data as we did in Study 1.Mean reaction times (RT) were then computed for death,negative, and neutral words for each participant. The

r choice:

Incongruent condition:Openness to Experience: 47 Conscientiousness: 51 Extroversion: 56 Agreeableness: 44 Neuroticism: 12

Total difference = 47

ery compatible with this career. ompatible with this career. omewhat compatible with this career. ncompatible with this career.

on (congruent vs. incongruent).


transformed data met the assumption of homogeneity ofvariance, Fmax = 2.08, but did not meet the assumptionof sphericity, v2(2) = 12.03, p < .01. As such, in testingthe significance of our omnibus F value, we used the Geis-ser and Greenhouse (1958) adjusted degrees of freedom.Given that this adjustment is a more conservative test ofthe null hypothesis, if this procedure produces a significantresult, there is increased confidence that the outcome is sig-nificant when the assumption of sphericity is not met(Hays, 1994). We therefore conducted a 2 (career feedback:congruent vs. incongruent) between-subjects � 3 (accessi-bility: death vs. negative vs. neutral) within-subjectsANOVA on the mean RTs, revealing only the predictedfeedback � accessibility interaction, F(1.47,56) = 3.73,p < .05 (with Geisser–Greenhouse adjusted degrees of free-dom). The cell means and standard deviations for thisinteraction are presented in Table 3.

Given that we had a priori predictions, we conductedtwo separate within-subjects ANOVAs on each feedbackgroup. Specifically, we expected death RTs to be signifi-cantly faster than both negative and neutral RTs withinthe incongruent condition. Within the congruent condition,however, we expected no differences among RTs for eachword type. Accordingly, separate within-subjects ANOVAsrevealed a significant effect of word-type in the incongruentcondition, F(2,28) = 5.04, p < .02 (sphericity assumed,v2(2) = 2.10, p > .35), but not in the congruent condition,F < 1. To further assess the nature of the effect in the incon-gruent condition, we conducted two planned contrastsusing the same contrast weights as those assigned in Study1. More specifically, weights of 2, �1, and �1 to death,negative, and neutral RTs, respectively, were assigned inthe first contrast, while these weights were 0, +1, and �1in the second contrast. The first comparison was signifi-cant, t(14) = 2.74, p < .02, whereas the second comparisonwas not, t < 1, ns.

Discussion

Consistent with Study 1, the results of Study 2 showedthat threatening self-esteem increases DTA. This findingis consistent with the DTA hypothesis and provides furthersupport for the notion that self-esteem helps to keepthoughts of death out of consciousness. Participants whoreceived incongruent career feedback displayed faster reac-tion times to death words than participants who receivedcongruent feedback. Once again, the increase in DTAcould not be attributed to a more general increase in the

Table 3Mean response latencies for the interaction of feedback by construct accessibi

Feedback

Death

Congruent 650.3 (121.6) n = 15Incongruent 556.0 (84.3) n = 15

Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Lower mean values r

accessibility of negative thoughts. Within the incongruentcondition, death RTs were significantly faster than bothnegative and neutral RTs, while no such difference wasobserved in the congruent feedback condition.

The results of Study 2 not only replicate, but also add adegree of generality to the effect by showing increasedDTA in response to a different type of self-esteem threat.Moreover, Study 2 also highlights the importance of beliefsregarding one’s potential and future achievements in assuag-ing concerns about death. When participants were led tobelieve that their career aspirations were unrealistic,thoughts of death became more accessible to consciousness.Consistent with current conceptualizations of the self-con-cept, people’s belief that they will one day achieve theirdesired possible selves are an important component of theircurrent self-appraisal (e.g., Markus & Nurius, 1986) and thesystem through which people manage existential fear.

Study 3

Although Studies 1 and 2 provide converging supportfor the hypothesis that self-esteem threats increase DTA,we nonetheless conducted a third study to further test thegenerality of our findings and to address a number of lin-gering issues. First, both Studies 1 and 2 used the sameoperationalization of DTA: reaction times to death wordsin the context of a lexical decision task. The majority ofDTA studies, however, have employed a word-fragmentcompletion task as the dependent measure (see Greenberg,Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994). In the inter-est of methodological convergence, we adopted the word-fragment method in Study 3. Second, we sought to furthertest the generality of the observed effect by using a very dif-ferent type of self-esteem threat. While, the manipulationsemployed in Studies 1 and 2 involved the use of feedbackthat was specifically tailored to participants’ self-esteem,we used a more general threat in Study 3. Specifically, weplaced participants under the threat of public evaluationby leading them to believe that they would have to givean ill prepared speech in front of a small group of theirpeers. According to the symbolic interactionists (Cooley,1902; Mead, 1934), the self-system develops out of our abil-ity to take the perspective of others, and as a consequence,self-esteem rests firmly on the evaluations that we receivefrom other people. The prospect of appearing foolish inpublic by delivering a subpar speech can therefore pose asubstantial threat to one’s self-esteem. Indeed, Greenbergand Pyszczynski (1985) demonstrated that public failure

lity

Word type

Negative Neutral

637.6 (92.5) n = 15 635.3 (114.1) n = 15593.2 (101.8) n = 15 597.0 (106.1) n = 15

epresent faster reaction times (in milliseconds).


is more self-esteem threatening than private failure,because public situations increase the conditionality ofself-regard. Thus, in the moments leading up to the speech,participants’ self-esteem would be ‘on the line’, that is, theirself-esteem would be highly contingent on how they wouldperform in the upcoming speech. Indeed, recent researchhas shown that people often employ self-protective strate-gies such as self-handicapping prior to evaluative situationsin which their self-esteem is contingent on a public perfor-mance (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002;Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001; Spencer,Fein, & Lomore, 2001). In Study 3, we therefore threatenedparticipants’ self-esteem by placing them in a situation inwhich their self-worth was highly contingent on other’sevaluations and subsequently assessed their level of DTA.

Another purpose of Study 3 was to examine an aspect ofthe DTA hypothesis that was not directly addressed in theprior two studies. Although Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate thatthreatening self-esteem increases DTA, it also follows fromthe DTA hypothesis that increasing or strengthening self-esteem should decrease DTA. Based on the results of Study1, one might argue that increasing self-esteem does not seemto buffer against thoughts of death because we did notobserve a decrease in DTA in the positive feedback (vs. nofeedback) condition. Reduced DTA, however, was likelynot observed in this condition because baseline levels ofDTA were already low. In other words, as long as peopleare not particularly threatened, they should have relativelylow levels of DTA. Thus, positive feedback should have littleor no effect of reducing DTA in these circumstances.

Although positive feedback may not be expected toreduce DTA below baseline levels, we would still expectincreased or strengthened self-esteem to prevent subse-quent increases in DTA (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997).In other words, fortifying self-esteem should make it resis-tant to threat, thus reducing or eliminating the effects ofself-esteem threat on DTA. With regard to the threat ofpublic scrutiny employed in Study 3, affirming the intrinsicqualities of the self should reduce the threat posed by thishighly evaluative situation (Schimel et al., 2001; Spenceret al., 2001). Accordingly, we tested the DTA reducingeffects of fortified self-esteem by giving a subset of partici-pants in the threat condition a self-affirmation manipula-tion prior to completing the DTA measure in Study 3.Thus, participants were assigned to one of three conditions:threat/no-affirmation, threat/affirmation, and no-threat. Wehypothesized that giving participants an opportunity toaffirm themselves would eliminate the effect of self-esteemthreat on DTA, such that DTA would be no higher amongparticipants whose self-esteem was both threatened andaffirmed than among participants who received no-threat.

Method

Participants and designOne hundred and six introductory psychology students

at the University of Alberta participated in the study as

partial fulfillment of a course requirement and were testedin groups ranging from three to four. Four participantswere excluded for disbelieving that they would have to givea speech and two participants were excluded for havingpreviously participated in a study involving DTA. This left100 participants (26 men and 74 women) for the data anal-ysis. Participants were randomly assigned to one of threeconditions (threat/no-affirmation vs. threat/affirmationvs. no-threat) in a between-subjects design.

Procedure

On arrival, participants were greeted by a female exper-imenter who presented the study as an investigation of thepersonality trait conscientiousness and its relationship toverbal comprehension. The experimenter explained thatthe study consisted of two parts. First, participants wouldcomplete a few personality questionnaires that would(ostensibly) measure trait conscientiousness. Second, anindividual due to arrive shortly would deliver a speech,after which participants would be asked questions regard-ing its contents. In reality, there would be no speech andthere was no speech-giver due to arrive.

After delivering these general instructions, the experi-menter ushered the participants into private cubicles andadministered the initial personality packet, instructingthem to crack open their door when finished with thepacket. A few minutes after all the participants had finishedthe packet and opened their cubicle door, the experimentercould be heard pacing up and down the length of the hall-way adjacent to the cubicles. The experimenter thenopened the main door to the laboratory a few times andlooked outside, gave a sigh, and then made a call on her cellphone. Participants overheard the experimenter say the fol-lowing, ‘‘Hi, It’s me. No, they aren’t here yet, what shouldI do? Okay [pause] okay [pause], thanks, bye”. Followingthe scripted phone conversation, the experimenter enteredeach cubicle closing the door behind her.

Participants assigned to the threat/affirmation conditionwere informed that the speech-giver had not yet arrived,and that it had been decided by the project supervisor thatthe participant would give the speech. The experimenterthen gave the participant a questionnaire packet that wassupposed to be completed by the speech-giver and a writtenscript for the speech, which was a 376-word essay on howto classify volcanoes. The experimenter instructed partici-pants to complete the questionnaire packet before familiar-izing themselves with the essay, and that she would returnin approximately 15 min to check on them before theywould give the speech. The questionnaire packet containeda standard self-affirmation manipulation followed by aword-fragment completion task (e.g., Greenberg et al.,1994). The affirmation materials were patterned after Shr-ira and Martin (2005) and instructed participants to choosetheir most important value among a list of six potential val-ues, including business/economics/making money, art/music/theatre, science/pursuit of knowledge, social life/relation-

ships, social action/helping others, and religion/spirituality.


Thereafter they were instructed to write a paragraph aboutwhy the chosen value is important to them, how they haveacted consistently with this value in the past, and how theyplan to act consistently with it in the future. The word-frag-ment completion task was the same as that used in previousresearch (e.g., Schimel et al., 2007) and consisted of 20word-fragments, six of which could be completed with adeath word or a neutral word. For example, one fragmentconsisted of the letters COFF_ _ and could be completed asCOFFEE or the death-related word COFFIN. The possi-ble death related words were buried, dead, grave, killed,

skull, and coffin. The remaining fragments could only becompleted as neutral words.

Participants assigned to the threat/no-affirmation condi-tion were told that they would have to give the speech andwere given the same instructions and materials as partici-pants in the threat/affirmation condition. However, insteadof receiving the affirmation procedure, these participantswere given a parallel control task in which they wereinstructed to choose among the same six potential values,the one that was least important to them. They were fur-ther instructed to write a paragraph about how this valuemight be important to other people (Fein & Spencer,1997; Shrira & Martin, 2005). Following the control task,participants completed the word-fragment completionexercise.

Participants in the no-threat condition were told that thespeech-giver had not yet arrived, and so in the meantimethey should complete a questionnaire packet. The packetcontained the same control task as participants in thethreat/no-affirmation condition followed by the word-frag-ment completion task. After all participants indicated theywere done with the personality measures they were asked toreturn to the main room where they were probed for suspi-cion and fully debriefed.

Results

Death-thought accessibility scores were computed bysumming the number of fragments participants completedas a death word. This measure was then submitted to aone-way ANOVA revealing a significant effect of condi-tion, F(2, 97) = 3.93, p < .05. The means and standard devi-ations for this effect are displayed in Table 4. Given that wehad a priori predictions regarding the pattern of results, wethen conducted orthogonal planned comparisons to assessthese predictions. In the first comparison, we assigned con-trast weights of 2, �1, and �1 to the threat/no-affirmation,threat/affirmation, and no-threat conditions respectfully,

Table 4Mean DTA by condition

Condition DTA SD n

Threat/no-affirmation 1.97 0.88 33Threat/affirmation 1.31 1.02 35No-threat 1.63 0.98 32

whereas these contrast weights were 0, +1, and �1 in thesecond comparison. The first comparison yielded a signifi-cant difference, t(97) = 2.44, p < .05, such that participantshad significantly more death completions than those inboth the threat/affirmation and no-threat conditions com-bined. The second comparison revealed no reliable differ-ence, t(97) = 1.32, p = .19, indicating that DTA was notdifferent in the threat/affirmation and no-threat conditions.

Discussion

The results of Study 3 add further support for the notionthat self-esteem threat increases DTA. Study 3 showed thatwhen participants’ self-esteem was threatened by a loomingpublic evaluation, thoughts of death became more accessi-ble to consciousness. Moreover, the results of Study 3 dem-onstrate the buffering effect of strengthened self-esteem onDTA. When participants were given the opportunity tofortify their bases of self-worth through a self-affirmationprocedure, the threat of social evaluation had no effecton DTA.

General discussion

The results of the current set of studies demonstrate thatexperimentally induced threats to self-esteem causethoughts of death to become more accessible to conscious-ness, and that this effect is eliminated if self-esteem is forti-fied against threat. In Study 1, participants who indicatedthat intelligence is highly relevant for their self-worthshowed increased DTA after being told that they per-formed poorly on an IQ test. In Study 2, increased DTAresulted from threatening people’s career aspirations. Par-ticipants who were told that their personality was not sui-ted for their desired career showed significantly higherDTA relative to those who were told that their personalitywas well suited for that career. In Study 3, self-esteem wasthreatened by a looming public evaluation in which partic-ipants were required to give an ill-prepared speech, whichalso increased DTA. Studies 1 and 2 indicate that theobtained increases in DTA were not the result of a moregeneral increase in the accessibility of negative thoughts.In both studies, thoughts of death were more accessiblethan both neutral and negative thoughts in the self-esteemthreatening conditions. Study 3 demonstrated the DTAbuffering function of self-esteem. When participants werefortified against threat by affirming their values, self-esteemthreat had no effect on DTA. These results were obtainedusing three distinct types of self-esteem threat and two dif-ferent operationalizations of DTA. Taken together, thesestudies provide converging evidence that self-esteem helpsallay concerns regarding human mortality.

Although the current research supports the notion thatself-esteem serves a terror management function, one mightquestion this claim on the basis of the negative words usedin our comparison of death (vs. negative) thought accessi-bility in Studies 1 and 2. More specifically, one could argue


that the words used to measure negative-thought accessibil-ity were too obscure or unrelated to the threat manipula-tions to detect differences following self-esteem threat. Ifthis was the case, the observed increase in DTA could havebeen due to an increase in other types of negative thoughtsthat were aroused by the negative feedback.1 While thismay be a possibility, we feel that it is unlikely for severalreasons. First, great pains were taken to ensure that the fre-quency and length of the negative words were roughlyequal to those of the death words. In fact, as indicated inTable 1, a slight advantage with regard to these factorswas given to the negative words. Furthermore, death acces-sibility was only higher than negative accessibility in ourthreat conditions. In the positive and no feedback condi-tions of Study 1 and the congruent condition of Study 2,death and negative thought accessibility was essentiallyequal. Thus, it seems unlikely that RTs to negative (vs.death) words in the threat conditions were slower becausethey were more obscure. Second, two of the six negativewords that were employed made at least some referenceto participants’ test performance. The words ‘fail’ and‘wrong’ are directly related to poor performance on anintelligence test, and at least indirectly related to the beliefthat one’s personality is deficient for pursuing one’s desiredcareer. And moreover, none of the death words that weemployed are directly (or indirectly) related to negative testperformances, unless one considers the terror managementfunction of the beliefs that these test performances calledinto question. Thus, it seems equally doubtful that RTsto negative (vs. death) words were slower because they wereunrelated to participants’ performance on the tests.

Another question that emerges from this research is whythe self-esteem threatening manipulations used in each ofthe three studies increased DTA, whereas making similartypes of events salient have failed to increase terror man-agement defenses as control topics in prior TMT research.Indeed, previous mortality salience studies have employeda variety of generally negative control topics to demon-strate the specificity of death, rather than generally nega-tive events, in obtaining MS effects. The present research,however, demonstrates that some types of negative eventsmight be potent enough to elicit thoughts of death anddefensive reactions. Thus, if particular types of negativeevents can sometimes lead to thoughts of death, thenwhy have thoughts about such events been used as controltopics for thinking about death?

In particular, three studies that investigated the specific-ity of death in the production of MS effects (Greenberget al., 1995, Study 2 and 3; and Greenberg et al., 1994,Study 2) bear some relevance to the manipulations usedin the present research. The first (Greenberg et al., 1995,

1 One might also posit a negative mood alternative explanation for ourresults. Although negative mood was not assessed in the present research,it has been found to not mediate the effects of worldview threat on DTA(Schimel et al., 2007), nor the effect of ego-depletion on DTA (Gailliot,Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). See these papers for further discussion.

Study 2) was meant to compare death salience to the sal-ience of worrisome future events, such as taking an exam.This ‘exam salience’ condition is somewhat analogous tothe IQ threat employed in Study 1. Similarly, the secondstudy to this effect (Greenberg et al., 1995, Study 3) com-pared mortality salience to more general concerns aboutthe future, such as worries about career and financial suc-cess, which might likewise be analogous to our careerthreat in Study 2. Finally, Greenberg et al. (1994, Study2) asked participants to imagine giving a public speech toa large audience in one of their mortality salience controlconditions, which is similar to the self-esteem threat usedin Study 3.

We maintain, however, that these mortality saliencecontrol conditions are qualitatively different from ourmanipulations for at least two reasons. First, in Studies1 and 2, we selected only participants whose self-esteemwas contingent on success in both of these areas, whereasGreenberg et al. (1995) did not. Second, and most impor-tantly, Greenberg et al. (1994, 1995) had participantsimagine these events. The ‘exam salience’ condition didnot ask participants to imagine failing, but rather justto imagine taking the exam. Thus, some participantsmay not have been particularly bothered by thesethoughts. Similarly, in the ‘general concerns about thefuture’ condition, participants were merely asked toreport if they had concerns about the future. Likewise,in the public speech condition, participants were merelyasked to imagine what it would feel like to give a speechin front of a large audience. While these manipulationsmay have been successful at arousing aversive thoughts,they are nonetheless very different from the manipulationsthat we employed in our studies. Imagining hypotheticalfuture events that may (or may not) pose a threat to one’sself-esteem is not the same as putting participants in a sit-uation where they actually fail a test of intelligence. Like-wise, the career feedback led participants to consider thereal possibility that they will not succeed in their careeraspirations. In our public speech threat, participants werenot merely imagining a speech that they might have togive in the distant future, but rather the occasion wasimmediately upon them and they had very little time toprepare. Thus, the difference between our self-esteemthreats and these generally negative control topics ulti-mately boils down to a matter of degree. We suspect thatmerely imagining these events is not sufficient enough toweaken participants’ self-esteem and allow thoughts ofdeath to creep closer to awareness.

What types of threats increase DTA?

Based on the logic of TMT and the evidence that hasbeen accumulated thus far, we suggest that when peopleare exposed to information and events that undermine theirbelief that human existence is meaningful and that theirlives are filled with purpose and significance beyond thatof other creatures, thoughts of death leak through this pro-


tective shield and creep closer to awareness. Indeed, withthe addition of the research reported in this article, higherlevels of DTA have now been observed following threats topeople’s cultural worldview, belief in a just world, romanticrelationships, and self-esteem (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hir-schberger, 2002; Friedman & Rholes, 2007; Hayes et al., inpress; Hirschberger, 2006; Landau et al., 2004; Mikulinceret al., 2002; Schimel et al., 2007). Furthermore, exposingpeople to situations and events that remind them of the fra-gility of human existence such as cancer patients, personswith disabilities, and human creatureliness have also beenshown to increase DTA (Arndt et al., 2007; Cox et al.,2007; Goldenberg et al., 1999; Hirschberger et al., 2005).

Interestingly, recent research has also shown that deplet-ing ego resources using a thought suppression task can leadto higher DTA (Gailliot et al., 2006). For example, Gailliotet al. (2006, Study 2) found that when individuals wereasked to suppress thoughts about a white bear and thenindicate each time they failed to suppress thoughts of awhite bear, they subsequently had higher DTA relative tothose who were not asked to suppress thoughts of a whitebear. In another study Gailliot et al. (2006, Study 3) hadparticipants view a video of a woman talking, in whichshort, one-syllable words appeared at the bottom cornerof the screen. Participants who were instructed to refrainfrom looking at the words (and to refocus their attentionon the woman as quickly as possible if they failed to doso) had higher DTA than participants who were not toldto avoid looking at the words. These researchers argue thatself-regulatory resources are required to suppress thoughtsof death, and depleting these resources therefore increasesDTA. Thus, self-regulation plays a proximal role in themanagement of death anxiety (see Pyszczynski, Greenberg,& Solomon, 1999). In addition to this possibility, self-reg-ulation might also play a distal role in the managementof the potential for death anxiety, one that is directlyrelated to self-esteem. According to Becker (1971), a largepart of the socialization process involves turning oneselfover to the will of one’s parents and broader society. Inother words, we employ self-regulation to forgo activitiesthat may be immediately pleasurable, for those that willensure love and protection from our caregivers and imbueus with a sense of personal value. Indeed, this is preciselythe process by which we attain self-esteem. When we aresuccessful at self-regulation we are successful at bringingour actions in line with cultural standards, and when weare successfully living up to cultural standards, we attainself-esteem. These concepts might be conceptually related,in that self-regulation is required to attain and maintainself-esteem. Future research should therefore assess therelationship between self-regulation, self-esteem threatand death-thought accessibility.

Another avenue for future investigation is to assess theultimate consequences of having increased DTA. Theoret-ically, increasing DTA may produce downstream effectsconsistent with effects observed following mortality sal-ience. For example, Hayes et al. (in press) found that Chris-

tian participants with heightened DTA that resulted fromreading about the threat of Islam subsequently derogatedall non-Christian faiths. This research demonstrates a pat-tern of general worldview defense (a typical mortality sal-ience effect, e.g., Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon,Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), even though DTA wasincreased by the specific threat of Islam. Although thethreat and the defense in this research were within the samedomain (i.e., the cultural worldview), it seems plausiblethat threats to one domain that increase DTA could moti-vate defenses in another domain. Thus, increased DTAresulting from a potent threat to self-esteem may, in theory,promote worldview defense and other defenses stemmingfrom mortality salience, even if such defenses have littleor nothing to do with the original threat. Clearly, furtherresearch, perhaps with more sensitive measures of DTAand other potentially mediating processes (e.g., self-regula-tory resources), will be needed to specify the conditionsunder which death thoughts do and do not mediate defen-sive reactions in response to threats (see Pyszczynski,Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006, for further discus-sion of this issue).

Implications for self-esteem and TMT

The present research provides a number of implicationsfor the concept of self-esteem specifically and TMT moregenerally. First, although most social psychologists agreethat people have a need to maintain high levels of self-esteem, there has been little consensus on why we have sucha need. Theories attempting to answer this question havesuggested several possibilities (see Pyszczynski et al.,2004, for a review). However, while a few other theoreticalperspectives have a stake in answering the question of whypeople need self-esteem, the present research providesunique support for a terror management conceptualization.Apart from TMT, no other theoretical perspective wouldpredict increases in DTA (vs. negative construct accessibil-ity) following threats to self-esteem. Thus, in addition tothe current body of evidence outlined by Pyszczynskiet al. (2004), the present research adds further evidencefor TMT’s proposition that self-esteem functions specifi-cally to alleviate concerns regarding human mortality.

Conclusion

According to TMT our species has the same powerfuldrive to go on living as any other species, but unlike otherorganisms, we also possess the intellectual capacity tounderstand that this drive for continued life will eventuallycome to an end. The prospect of dying is therefore of par-ticular concern for human beings. The knowledge thatdeath ultimately awaits us creates a potential for anxietythat must be managed and controlled in order for humansto go about the business of day-to-day living. From theperspective of TMT, this anxiety is managed by sociallyconstructed beliefs that provide people with a sense of


meaning, self-worth, predictability, and a focus away fromour animal nature. In support of TMT, the current set ofstudies, along with prior research testing the DTA hypoth-esis, shows that when these psychological structures aredamaged or called into question, thoughts of mortalitycome closer to the surface.

Although research on the DTA hypothesis is uniquelysupportive of a TMT perspective, it also implies that peo-ple’s meaning-based psychological structures are especiallyimportant for the ongoing, adaptive, self-regulatory behav-ior of the individual. In other words, when people’s basesfor meaning and acquiring self-worth break down—andpeople are unable to sustain the belief that they are valu-able contributors to an ongoing meaningful world—theyexperience a variety of debilitating psychological problemsand are unable to function effectively. Although the theorywas not intended to be a theory of psychological disordersper se, clinical observations suggest that when people’smeaning structures break down they do indeed suffer frompsychological problems and are unable to function effec-tively. In fact, the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Associ-ation, 1994) criteria for major depression includesymptoms such as agitated or slowed down behavior, an

inability to think, concentrate or make decisions, thoughts

of worthlessness and low self-esteem, and even recurrent

thoughts of death, (p. 327). Indeed, people who suffer fromdepression are often unable to get out of bed, let alone facethe challenges of life. Consider also that situational ante-cedents to depression often include life events that under-mine people’s bases for meaning and self-worth such aslosing one’s job (e.g., Study 2 of current research), prob-lems with relationships such as divorce (e.g., Florianet al., 2002; Mikulincer et al., 2003), and legal problemsthat force people to acknowledge that the world is unjust(e.g., Hirschberger, 2006; Landau et al., 2004). We there-fore suggest the possibility that incapacitating psychologi-cal problems like depression may be due, at least in part,to people’s inability to sustain a sense of meaning and per-sonal value in their lives, which ultimately brings the prob-lem of death to the doorstep of consciousness.

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