executive notes

7/27/2019 Executive Notes

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SALIENT POINTS AND EN BANC DECISIONS1

ON POWERS AND STRUCTURE OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT(Articles VI, VII, VIII of 1987 Constitution)

ARTICLE VI

The Legislative Departmenfsectt

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines whichshall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved tothe people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation,GR No. 180643, Mach 25, 2008 (En Banc)- Congress has legislative and oversightpowers.

Puno, Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. Comelec- the power of oversight is intrinsicto the grant of legislative power. It embraces all activities undertaken by Congressto enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislationit has enacted.

Santiago vs. Comelec, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (En Banc)- the provision onthe right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is not self-executory. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential termsand conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.

Lambino vs Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006 (En Banc)- In Californiawhere the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution

just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitativetest and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed changeis "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of theconstitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The courtexamines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degreeof the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in theconstitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such farreaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to arevision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a propersubject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its

1Prepared for the exclusive use of Barrister Law Review Center by Joan S. Largo, Professor, USC College of Law,

Cebu City


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Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includeschanges that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of checkand balances."

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separableprovisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific

parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or tosuppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to bedangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plancontemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of thedocument which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determinehow and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from thepresidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of itsover-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from abicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other importantprovisions of the Constitution.

On the proposed amendment by initiative, that the proposed amendment must beincorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people.

In view of the flaws in the Lambino petition, the Court did not revisit the Courtsruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essentialterms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. Itdeclaredthat it must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statuteif the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Suchavoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will notpass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on someother grounds.

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be electedat large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to readand write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two yearsimmediately preceding the day of the election.

Art. IV, Section 2

In Re Aplication for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching petitioner, BMNo. 914, October 1, 1999 (En Banc)- Under Section 1 of CA No. 625, legitimatechildren born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing suchintention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned beforeany officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civilregistry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath ofallegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.


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Bengson vs. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001 (En Banc)- Under the 1973Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were notconsidered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born beforeJanuary 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considerednatural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform

an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before theeffectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-bornbecause they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. Thepresent Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers beforethe effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship uponreaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-borncitizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippinecitizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemednatural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered notnatural-born citizens.

Altarejos vs. Comelec, GR No. 163256, November 10, 2004 (En Banc)- The law isclear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic ofthe Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau ofImmigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic ofthe Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civilregistry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriationof a citizen. [But] The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections thatrepatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists.

Valles vs. Comelec, GR No. 137000, August 9, 2000 (En Banc)- In order thatcitizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.

Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an aliencertificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issuewas put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case ofMercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that themere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an

American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for analien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippinecitizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the factthat respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau ofImmigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22,1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati,

were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of hisAmerican citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that one was a holder of an Australianpassport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting aneffective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipinocitizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the samemust be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an applicationfor an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation orrepudiation of one's citizenship. The application for an alien certificate of registration,and the holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano,


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were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectivelyrenounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Mercado vs. Manzano, GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999 (En Banc)- Dual citizenship isdifferent from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent

application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneouslyconsidered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arisewhen a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principleof jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such aperson, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrentlyconsidered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of ourConstitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines topossess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers inforeign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in thePhilippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' countrysuch children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws

of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act oromission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following theirelection.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of theoffice for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity ofhis service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than twohundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected fromlegislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manilaarea in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of auniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected througha party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Mariano, Jr. vs Comelec, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (En Banc)- In the case ofTobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that

reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such asin the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearlyprovides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did notpreclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than ageneral reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress inenacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a generalapportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local


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government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new cityor province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for anindeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of anew city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of anykind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total numberof representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after theratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representativesshall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urbanpoor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may beprovided by law, except the religious sector.

Read RA 7941

Veterans Federation vs. Comelec, GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000 (En Banc)- Todetermine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and

Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-listcongressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the Houseof Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of twopercent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have aseat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votesit actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party isentitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

CIBAC vs. Comelec, GR No. 172103, April 13, 2007 (EN Banc)- The parties,organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votescast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that thosegarnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additionalseats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parametersto determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by theConstitution and R.A. 7941.

In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2%threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement toextra seats. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats


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of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated inVeterans.

Bantay Republic Act or BA- RA 7941 vs. Comelec, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007( En Banc)- Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of

the nominees of the party-list groups.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compactand adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, oreach province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make areapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Tobias vs. Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994 (En Banc)- reapportionmentof legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a

new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congressshall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unlessotherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congressfrom increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a generalreapportionment law.

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-fiveyears of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registeredvoter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of notless than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term ofthree years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtiethday of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutiveterms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered asan interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators andthe Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, aspecial election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but theSenator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for theunexpired term.

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take


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effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and theHouse of Representatives approving such increase.

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in alloffenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrestwhile the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any

other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall,upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests.They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise fromthe filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold anyother office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or theirsubsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any

office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the termfor which he was elected.

Bitonio vs. COA, GR No. 147392, March 12, 2004 (En Banc)- Cabinet Secretaries,Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold othergovernment offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receivecompensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides.The presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity asrepresentative of the Secretary of Labor. There was no separate or specialappointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited fromreceiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition

likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretaryof Labor.

SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives maypersonally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals,or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, beinterested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted bythe Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including anygovernment-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. Heshall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniarybenefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday ofJuly for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to bein session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the openingof its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. ThePresident may call a special session at any time.

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.


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Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smallernumber may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Membersin such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members fordisorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend orexpel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, GR No. 127255, August 14, 1007 (En Banc)- Cases, bothhere and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power toinquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to complywith its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of aconstitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, itwas held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberativebodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body

adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merelyprocedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may bewaived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure toconform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberativebody) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 128055, April 18, 2001 (En Banc)- The orderof suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power ofCongress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspensioncontemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that isimposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the

case may be, upon an erring member.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publishthe same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and theyeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, beentered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, supra. - The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respectto matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of theother, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the twoHouses shall be sitting.

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have anElectoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall becomposed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be


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designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate orthe House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizationsregistered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in theElectoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Guerrero vs. Comelec, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000 (En Banc)- The contentionthat the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of theConstitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6of the Constitution was rejected. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot becircumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by theterm "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is therule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courtsshould not distinguish. Moreover, the argument that HRET assumes jurisdictiononly if there is a valid proclamation of the winning candidate is likewise without merit.In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidatewho has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised,

that issue is best addressed to the HRET.

Barbers vs. Comelec, GR No. 165691, June 22, 2005 (En Banc)- The allegedinvalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to theelection returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of suchdispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.

Javier vs. Comelec, GR No. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986 (En Banc)- Thephrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality asreferring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it isnecessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,

including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the castingand counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and theproclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of theboard of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications"to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimedwinner, such as his delivery or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate ofcandidacy.

SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of thePresident of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members ofthe House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it withinthirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by amajority vote of all the Members.

Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 (En Banc)- An ad interimappointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately andcan no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into


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office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointmentsdoes not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interimappointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by theCommission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The adinterim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The

Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment,and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can atonce assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining tothe office.

SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall beconstituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall havebeen organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on

Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairmanor a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are hereinconferred upon it.

SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preservedand be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by theCommission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to andexpenses incurred for each Member.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respectivecommittees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly publishedrules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio,GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006 (En Banc)- The 1987 Constitution recognizes thepower of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." Thisis significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon thecommittees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in orderto effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with theconsent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each Houseshall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to theirdepartments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the

Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduledappearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover mattersrelated thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and thePresident so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En Banc)- Sections 21 and 22,therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not beconsidered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates tothe power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit


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information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power toconduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit ofCongress' oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads areimplementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not asimperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such departmentheads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may onlyrequest their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requirestheir appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance ismandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory processonly to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent withthe intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officialsunder Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle

of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of thelegislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing tocomply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads toexempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exemptby the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may beexempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. Itis based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the duerespect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-

standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this powerof inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers butalso on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 (En Banc) - May the Presidentprevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of herpower as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who

defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also holdthat any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a militaryofficer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law tocompel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testifybefore it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not soinclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel theattendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of theland which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. The refusal of thePresident to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject


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to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature'sfunctions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advisedfor Congress to interfere with the President's power as commander-in-chief, it issimilarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress's right toconduct legislative inquiries.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,supra.- Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, itsaim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22 pertainsto the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtaininformation in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Simply stated, while bothpowers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectivesare different. This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to theuse of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel theappearance of executive officials under Section 22.

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint

session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence ofa state of war.

Gudani vs. Senga, supra.- Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy overthe military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the legislative andexecutive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Militaryappropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as isthe power to declare the existence of a state of war. Congress is also empowered torevoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.The approval of the Commission on Appointments is also required before thePresident can promote military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain.

Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over themilitary, the Constitution is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which isfertile in meaning and implication as to whatever inherent martial authority thePresident may possess.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorizethe President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, toexercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unlesssooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the nextadjournment thereof.

David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (En Banc)- President Arroyo couldvalidly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence ofa Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as thetaking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally, Congressis the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),

Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a bodycannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during graveemergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and


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exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allowCongress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions,thus: (1)There must be a war or other emergency; (2) The delegation must be for alimited period only; (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions asthe Congress may prescribe; and (4) The emergency powers must be exercised tocarry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Agan vs. PIATCO, GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003 (En Banc)- In the 1986Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency" was defined to includethreat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes"unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government service."

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of thepublic debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in theHouse of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005 (En Banc) - it is notthe law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originateexclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in theSenate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what isimportant to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may beproduced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated thelegislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially bethe same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concurwith amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate thecoequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make theHouse superior to the Senate.

SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommendedby the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form,content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations billunless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision orenactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994 (En Banc)- As theConstitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in anappropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows thatany provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in itsoperation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriateprovision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in thecategory of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisionswhich are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have noplace in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation moreappropriately dealt with in separate enactments.


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(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow theprocedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, andshall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or tobe raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, thePresident, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, theChief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, bylaw, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for theirrespective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only forpublic purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines asmay be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the generalappropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for thepreceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect untilthe general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subjectwhich shall be expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed threereadings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have beendistributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President

certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity oremergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and thevote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in theJournal.

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, GR No. 115455, August 25, 1994 (En Banc)- Thepresidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but alsothat of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the Presidentcertifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifiedthe two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed threereadings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed

three days before it is finally approved.

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003 (En Banc)-Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Houseand the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses ofCongress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Court findsno reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularitiesalleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This


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profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin,the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, thelower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At theend of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profitmargins that is always hardest hit. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not reallyprohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that

Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, andsubject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and exportquotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework ofthe national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall beexempt from taxation.

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004 (En Banc)- Under the1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to theexemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that(a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLYand EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive" is defined aspossessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation orenjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying aprivilege exclusively." If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes,it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. Thewords "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be substituted for the words "used

exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely issynonymous with exclusively. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use ofthe property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actualapplication of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution isorganized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinativeof whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of amajority of all the Members of the Congress.

SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of

an appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or otherreligious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, ordignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or governmentorphanage or leprosarium.


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(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as aspecial fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund wascreated has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to thegeneral funds of the Government.

SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998 (En Banc)- Section 27 ofRepublic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Courtfrom decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitutionagainst a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of

initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directlypropose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by theCongress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by atleast ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislativedistrict must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

ARTICLE VII

Executive Department

SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989 (En Banc)- Althoughthe 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of thePresident, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of


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"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to belimited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. ThePresident's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people [is] foundedon the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the dayof the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediatelypreceding such election.

SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications andterm of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may beremoved from office in the same manner as the President.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003 (EnBanc)- If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of

Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that theHouse "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable publicofficial is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with animpeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court. The "impeachmentproceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trialbecause that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of anotherproceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated whenthe House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, becausesomething prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already afurther step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceedingis initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee

on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps thatfollow.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointmentrequires no confirmation.

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of thepeople for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June nextfollowing the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six yearsthereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who hassucceeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified

for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciationof the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-Presidentshall be held on the second Monday of May.


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The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the boardof canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to thePresident of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of theSenate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates inthe presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, andthe Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the

manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in casetwo or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwithbe chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may

promulgate its rules for the purpose.

SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties asPresident (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defendits Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to theservice of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will beomitted.)

SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the Presidentand Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during theirtenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of theterm of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receiveduring their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152259, July 29, 2004 (En Banc)-Executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could notbe used to shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal actsdone while sitting in office.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability, supra- In In re: Sealed Case, the U.S.Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executiveprivilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is thedeliberative process privilege. The former pertains to communications,documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making anddeliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. Thelatter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberationscomprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policiesare formulated. Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions.


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Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of thePresident while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making ofexecutive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separationof power and the Presidents unique constitutional role; the second on commonlaw privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidentialcommunications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers

final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As aconsequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidentialcommunications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of thedeliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidentialcommunications privilege, In Re Sealed Case confines the privilege onlyto White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidentialdecision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only thosefunctions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court

characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power, suchas commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the powerto grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadorsand other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties etc.

For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim ofprivilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over thematter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a preciseand certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.

Senate of the President vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 (En

Banc)- The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It hasbeen used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of

American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined andused in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government towithhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly,Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branchofficers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately thepublic."

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has

encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it iscustomary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be moreaccurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals tofurnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds ofconsiderations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in thecontext of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilegeinvoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that


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the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucialmilitary or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer's privilege, orthe privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons whofurnish information of violations of law to officers charged with theenforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberationshas been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory

opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process bywhich governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to theordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to thedischarge of highly important executive responsibilities involved inmaintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military anddiplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exerciseof the executive' domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is,those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or thepublic, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of asensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, aclaim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify itand the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition thatexecutive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by themere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character ofthe exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily againstexecutive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall assume office at thebeginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act as President until thePresident-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect shall act as Presidentuntil a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shallhave become permanently disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, orwhere both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senateor, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act asPresident until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.


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The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as Presidentshall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death,permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation ofthe President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both thePresident and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, theSpeaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President orVice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death,permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until thePresident or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to thesame restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the

term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from amongthe Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume officeupon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,voting separately.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day afterthe vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene inaccordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law callingfor a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier thanforty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling suchspecial election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this

Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriationsand shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of thisConstitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special electionpostponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen monthsbefore the date of the next presidential election.

SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate andthe Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable todischarge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a writtendeclaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-

President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of theSenate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration thatthe President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-Presidentshall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speakerof the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall


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reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all theMembers of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to theSpeaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President isunable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide theissue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eighthours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not insession, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds voteof both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers andduties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the Presidentshall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informedof the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security andforeign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not bedenied access to the President during such illness.

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and theirdeputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold anyother office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directlyor indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financiallyinterested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by theGovernment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict ofinterest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the

President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the ConstitutionalCommissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlledcorporations and their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896, February 22, 1991 (EnBanc)- Does the prohibi

tion in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made forappointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy

reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primaryfunctions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office oremployment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality blicofficials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exceptionapplicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, theirdeputies and assistants. In order that such additional duties or functions may nottransgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary


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functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officiocapacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principaloffice, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additionalcompensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services

are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principaloffice. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meetingof the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legalcontemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policyin monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of hisdepartment. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extracompensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or anallowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective,

unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption orreassumption of office.

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and upto the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, excepttemporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein willprejudice public service or endanger public safety.

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commissionon Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, otherpublic ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, orboards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of theCongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective onlyuntil after disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment ofthe Congress.

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006 (En Banc)- Under Section 16,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers.The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors,other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank ofcolonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in thePresident by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the Presidentmay be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of theGovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the


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the Constitution enjoy local autonomy subject only to limitations Congress mayimpose by law. Local government units are subject to general supervision by thePresident.

The Cultural Center of the Philippines does not fall under the Legislative or Judicialbranches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional

bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus,the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised AdministrativeCode of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under anyspecific department" falls "under the Office of the President." Section 6(b) and (c) ofPD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,runs afoul with the President's power of control. By stating that the "President shallhave control of all the executive . . . offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers thePresident not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,

bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 96409, February 14, 1992 (En Banc)- It is afundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the President has controlof all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Equally well accepted, as acorollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of QualifiedPolitical Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his controlpowers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them tohis Cabinet members, who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus andother offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, GR No. 164171, February 20,2006 (En Banc)- Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, withinconstitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfareof society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation oflegislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrativeboards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including thebarangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power whichmay be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to theadministrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out theprovisions of the law and implement legislative policy. On the propriety ofchallenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding, in Commission on Audit of

the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, the Court entertained a suit fordeclaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of theconflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected.

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces ofthe Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces toprevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,


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when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspendthe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof undermartial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspensionof the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person orin writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of allits Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,

which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of thePresident, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation orsuspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shallpersist and public safety requires it.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, supra.- The President, as Commander-in-Chief, isnot a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under theCommander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposedupon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position as a civilianCommander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutionalprinciple that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military."

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (EnBanc)- When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solelyvested in his wisdom. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution tobestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and todetermine the necessity for the exercise of such power. The full discretionary powerof the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling outpower is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII.Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may reviewthe sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent

provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call outthe armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different categoryfrom the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simplylumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and reviewwithout any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of theaforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leewayand broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as thelesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involvethe curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,

and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of thepower to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law,two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and,(2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of thepower to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomesnecessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full


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discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to thetwo other powers.

Sanlakas vs. Reyes, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (En Banc)- The aboveprovision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduatedpower[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power todeclare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requiresthe concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and thatpublic safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed inIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required inthe exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomesnecessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion.'" Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18,

Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state ofrebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The President's

authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chiefexecutive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chiefpowers.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamationor suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, thesufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of theprivilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereonwithin thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant thefunctioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of

jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able tofunction, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged forrebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detainedshall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

In Re: Ferdinand Arguelles, Jr. vs. Baladia, Jr., GR No. 167211, March 14, 2006(En Banc)- A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement ordetention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightfulcustody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential objectand purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve aperson from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition forhabeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.


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Compare: Writ of Habeas Data (AM No.08-1-16-SC); Writ of Amparo (October 24,2007)

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remitfines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all theMembers of the Congress.

People vs. Salle, GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995 (En Banc)- The reason theConstitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment" requirement,reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the pardoningpower, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent thePresident from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power.

Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of theappellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powersdemands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected andkept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "convictionby final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without theknowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in goodfaith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied thatunder the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on thepardoning power which did no require conviction, the President had unimpededpower to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at

any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In eithercase, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration ofthe system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction ofthe trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by theConstitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidentialfolly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in theimposition of "convict ion by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. Thenew Constitution did it. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon,he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction mustfirst be brought to finality.

SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of theRepublic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subjectto such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty daysfrom the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a completereport of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by theGovernment or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effectof increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.


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SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unlessconcurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Bayan vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (En Banc)- Ratification isgenerally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of thegovernment, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty

is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process ofratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressedby ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwiseestablished that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c)the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) theintention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the fullpowers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 158088, July 6, 2005 (En Banc)- Thepower to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,

or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President torefuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for itsratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty whichhas been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, suchdecision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot beencroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction overactions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. TheCourt, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners asit is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government totransmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. In our jurisdiction, thepower to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the

legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withh

executive notes

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