exhibit a - ligny1-#204354-v1-long beach interest ......terry o’neil, bond schoeneck & king,...

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STATE OF NEW YORK

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

X------------------------------------------------------------------X

In the Matter of the Interest Arbitration

-between-

Compulsory Interest Arbitration

LONG BEACH POLICE BENEVOLENT IA2017-009 M2016-218

ASSOCIATION, INC

“Petitioner or PBA”

-and-

CITY OF LONG BEACH

“Respondent or City”

X------------------------------------------------------------------X

BEFORE:

ARTHUR A. RIEGEL, ESQ., CHAIRMAN &PUBLIC PANEL MEMBER

TERRY O’NEIL, BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, EMPLOYER PANEL MEMBER

BRIAN WELLS, PRESIDENT, LONG BEACH PBA, EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION MEMBER

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PETITIONER:

LAVALLEE LAW OFFICES PLLC by ROGER F. WEBER, ESQ.

FOR THE RESPONDENT:

BOND SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC by RICHARD FINKEL & EMILY E. IANNUCCI, ESQS.

FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 12/17/2020 07:45 PM INDEX NO. 614726/2020

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 6 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/17/2020

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BACKGROUND

The parties are signatories to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the City of Long Beach

(Respondent) and the Long Beach Police Benevolent Association (Petitioner or PBA) that expired on June 30, 2015.

Negotiations for a successor agreement commenced and failed.

Accordingly, a Declaration of Impasse was filed with New York State Public Employment Relations Board

(PERB) by the PBA on January 22, 2017. The dispute was submitted to mediation. PERB appointed Karen R.

Kenny as the mediator. Despite Ms. Kenney’s best efforts, the mediation was unsuccessful.

Consequently, and pursuant to New York State Civil Service Law (CSL) §209.4 (The Taylor Law), Interest

Arbitration procedures were invoked. In that connection, on June 27, 2017 the PBA filed a Petition for Compulsory

Interest Arbitration with PERB. The City filed its answer to the petition on July 24, 2017.

On August 7, 2017, the PBA filed an Improper Practice (Scope) Charge. On April 25, 2017, City Labor

Counsel withdrew Item 2, Section 22(e) of Other Proposal. The PBA Improper Practice Charge was settled through

a stipulation dated December 13, 2017.

The PBA petitioned PERB to withdraw the Improper Practice Charge. In a letter dated February 15, 2018,

Melanie Wlasuk, Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation, approved the withdrawal request.

On August 22, 2017, PERB designated me to serve as the neutral Chair of the Panel. The PBA selected

Kenneth Apple, then PBA President, to serve as the Petitioner’s Panelist and the City chose Terry O’Neil, Esq. to

serve as the Respondent’s Panelist. The arbitration panel was established to hear and finally decide all relevant

issues.

The parties were represented by counsel and had a full and fair opportunity to present testimonial and

documentary evidence in support of their respective positions. A pre-hearing conference was held on March 21,

2018.

Hearings on this matter were held on May 30, June 12, July 24, August 7, September 26, and October 30,

2018.

The parties agreed to submit post-hearing briefs by March 11, 2019. The briefs were submitted in a timely

manner.

Executive sessions were held on May 20, June 7 and 28, July 23, October 24, November 26, and December

11, 2019 as well as January 14 and 21, April 17, May 27, June 2, July 24, August 14, September 2 and 3, 2020.



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POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

CONTENTIONS OF THE CITY OF LONG BEACH

Paramount amongst its demands, the PBA’s wage proposal calls for five percent (5%) increases in each of

the two (2) fiscal years before the Panel. This wage proposal is made despite the fact that PBA members already

earn the highest average pay of any city police force in New York State. Indeed, the average all-in cost per PBA

member in 2015-16 and 2016-17 was approximately $165,000. Approximately half of the Union’s members made

at least $175,000 (more than twice the median household income in Long Beach and approximately 3.75 times what

the average City employee makes) in the years at issue (2015-16 and 2016-17).

Further, the PBA members’ 2014 salaries already exceeded the average salary of other Nassau Police

Conference (“NPC”) members, none of which, given the City’s dire financial condition, are even appropriate

comparators. Moreover, the PBA members have benefitted from cumulative (without taking into account the

compounded value) raises totaling 85.35% between 1994 and 2014—an average of 4.064% per year. Across those

same years, they have never received an annual raise less than 3.15%.

The consequences of this extended history of salary increases, whether the result of negotiation or Interest

Arbitration Awards, have now come home to roost and are a substantial contributor to the City’s unprecedented and

indisputable fiscal crisis.

In 2011, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the City’s credit rating to just above junk bond status. By

the following year, the City was on the brink of bankruptcy. As of June 30, 2012, the City’s fund balance stood at

negative $5.7 million and its unrestricted fund balance stood at negative $12.2 million.

A few months later, Superstorm Sandy battered the City. The storm’s devastation was not without irony, as

the influx of non-recurring government aid that followed Sandy allowed the City to regain its financial footing for

a short period of time. However, the temporary relief provided by that “one-shot” revenue quickly dissipated.

City lawmakers, faced with ever-increasing personnel costs and a crippled infrastructure, then attempted to

shield their already devastated residents from further crushing tax increases and instead tapped into the City’s

reserves to cover expenses. However, with little to no increased revenue over the years that followed, the City was

forced into a cycle of significant tax increases, tax cap piercings, and depleted reserves. In 2017, the New York

State Financial Restructuring Board for Local Governments (“FRB”) designated the City a “fiscally eligible

municipality” because its average fund balance as a percentage of expenditures over five (5) years was less than

five percent (5%). Indeed, the City does not meet the fund balance guidelines set by Moody’s, the NYS Government

Finance Officers Association (“GFOA”), or its own fund balance policy.

By statute, the FRB’s act of designating the City a “fiscally eligible municipality” controls this Panel’s

determination. Section 209(6)(e) of the Civil Service Law explicitly states:

When such public employer has been found to be a fiscally eligible municipality,

the public arbitration panel shall, first and foremost, consider ability to pay by



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assigning a weight of seventy percent to that portion of the criterion contained

within [Civil Service Law § 209(4)(c)(v)(b)] that pertains only to the public

employer’s ability to pay. All other criteria contained in [Section 209(4)(c)(v)],

including that portion of [Section 209(4)(c)(v)(b)] that pertains to the interest and

welfare of the public, shall constitute an aggregate weight of thirty percent.

Additionally, with respect to the total monetary value of any determination, the

panel must recognize and take into account in its determination the constraints,

obligations and requirements imposed by the real property tax cap pursuant to

section three-c of the General Municipal Law upon the public employer involved

in the dispute before the panel.

The Office of the New York State Comptroller has also recognized the City’s precarious financial condition.

In 2018, the State Comptroller determined that the City is in “significant financial stress” and is in a worse financial

position than any other municipality in the State.

The City already shattered the 2% tax cap for 2018-19, imposing a 10.25% tax levy (with a commensurate

tax rate increase of 8.35% after a proposed tax rate increase of 12.3% was rejected). That was the second time in

the last three (3) years that the City pierced the tax cap.

Matters have only gotten worse. In April 2018, after the City failed to pass a bond to fund separation

payouts, the media reported that the City could: shut down; run out of money before the next budget; not make

payroll; and/or lay off employees.

In May of 2018, Moody’s revised the City’s outlook to “negative” and described its financial operations as

“structurally imbalanced resulting in annual draws on financial reserves.”

More recently, on February 20, 2019, Moody’s downgraded the City’s bond rating and affirmed its negative

outlook in recognition of “the challenges the [C]ity faces in returning to a structurally balanced budget, one that

does not rely on non-recurring revenues or expenses.” Among other things, Moody’s noted that the City’s total

operating fund balance at the end of 2018 was less than $700,000 (compared to $11.4 Million in 2015). Moody’s

also mentioned that further declines were expected in 2019.

To further complicate matters, the City has not been able to find and hire a permanent Manager or

Comptroller since the period around January 2018. The City’s seemingly hopeless condition has made it difficult

to attract interested, qualified applicants to permanently fill these positions.

Notwithstanding these dire and unrefuted circumstances, the PBA’s proposed comparators are four (4) of

the most fiscally sound villages in the State of New York, and a city that is in better financial shape than Long

Beach and where police raises were negotiated and agreed to by the city’s elected officials at a time in which its

wages and benefits expenses, as compared to revenues, had been receding. Moreover, as the Chairman observed,



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the PBA provided no evidence on its case to support a contention that the City has the ability to pay in relation to

its demands or that the City has the ability to pay for any retroactive raise or benefit.

As explained, the unique circumstances here warrant zero percent (0%) raises for each of the years at issue.

The City simply has no money for raises or for the other costly benefits and concessions requested by the Union.

Moreover, because it is already operating at a deficit, the City would likely have to bond the cost of any payments

due under the Award – a financing method for which Moody’s and the State have already admonished the City.

Finally, any increases awarded by this Panel will be borne by the taxpayers, many of whom earn

significantly less than the police, were recently hit with a 8.35% City tax hike (on top of county and school taxes),

are still recovering from the devastation wreaked by Sandy, and have very little control over the situation. Even a

modest increase in salary and/or benefits would likely require the City to pierce the tax cap again in 2019-20.

For these reasons, and those set forth infra, the City respectfully requested that the Panel issue an Award

that grants the City’s proposals and rejects the Union’s proposals.

THE PANEL’S AWARD MUST CONSIDER AND CONFORM TO THE STATUTORY CRITERIA SET

FORTH IN THE TAYLOR LAW

Section 209 of the Civil Service Law sets forth specific criteria which the Panel must consider in making

its determination. Section 209(4)(c)(v) first requires that the Panel’s decision be based upon the following:

a. comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the

employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours

and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar

services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and

with other employees generally in public and private employment in

comparable communities;

b. the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the

public employer to pay;

c. comparison of peculiarities in regard to other trades or professions,

including specifically (1) hazards of employment; (2) physical

qualifications; (3) educational qualifications; (4) mental qualifications; (5)

job training and skills;

d. the terms of collective agreements negotiated between the parties in the

past providing for compensation and fringe benefits, including, but not



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limited to, the provisions for salary, insurance and retirement benefits,

medical and hospitalization benefits, paid time off and job security.

The statute then provides additional mandates for circumstances when the public employer is designated a

“fiscally eligible municipality.”

An employer may qualify as a “fiscally eligible municipality” if, as is the case here, its average fund balance

percentage is less than five percent (5%). It is undisputed that the City meets that threshold and is considered a

“fiscally eligible municipality.” (C. Ex. 14).

Significantly, given the City’s designation as a “fiscally eligible municipality,” the Panel’s determination

is governed by Section 209(6)(e), which provides:

When such public employer has been found to be a fiscally eligible municipality,

the public arbitration panel shall, first and foremost, consider ability to pay by

assigning a weight of seventy percent to that portion of the criterion contained

within [Civil Service Law § 209(4)(c)(v)(b.

Accordingly, when considering the statutory criteria set forth in Section 209(4)(c)(v) of the Civil Service

Law (enumerated above), the Panel must assign a weight of seventy percent (70%) to the City’s financial ability to

pay and thirty percent (30%) to the remaining criteria. The statute requires such weighting regardless of how the

municipality arrived at its current financial state. The PBA’s allegations of financial mismanagement should not

even be considered by the Panel.

In addition, the Panel “must recognize and take into account in its determination the constraints, obligations

and requirements imposed by the real property tax cap. . . .”

The Panel will be allocating the City’s extremely limited financial resources among competing municipal

services, groups of public employees, and public interests. Thus, the Panel will be exercising a function traditionally

reserved to the City’s elected representatives. The Panel’s determination will, by history and practical application,

also affect the agreements made between the City and its other collective bargaining units, including, but not limited

to, the firefighters who have been without a contract since July 1, 2010. It is therefore incumbent upon the Panel

to exercise its enormous power with great caution. Its determination will bind not just the City as the employer, but

the citizens and residents of the City as well.



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THE CITY DOES NOT HAVE THE “ABILITY TO PAY” FOR ANY INCREASES TO UNIT MEMBERS’

SALARIES OR FRINGE BENEFITS

As explained, since the City is a “fiscally eligible municipality,” the Panel must give the City’s ability to

pay seventy percent (70%) weight when crafting an Award. See Civ. Serv. Law § 209(6)(e). This does not refer to

a theoretical, legal ability to pay, which will almost always exist, but rather to the practical ability of a municipality

to shoulder increased costs. Thus, the issue of “ability to pay” must be governed by what the City should reasonably

be expected to pay given: (i) its status as a fiscally eligible municipality; (ii) the financial makeup of its constituency;

(iii) the size of its tax base; (iv) the legislative intent behind imposition of the tax cap; (v) the City’s economic

status; and (vi) the City’s future financial obligations and the need to maintain stable infrastructure and provide

multiple municipal services (such police, fire, parks, highway, building safety and code compliance, etc.).

1. The City’s Dire Financial Condition

As mentioned, Moody’s downgraded the City to just above junk bond status in December of 2011. By

2012, the City was on the brink of bankruptcy. At that time the City had a staggering $14.7 million deficit and

suffered a bond rating downgrade. In a twist of fate, the aid received by the City after Superstorm Sandy helped

the City stay afloat financially. However, such “one-shot’ revenue is not sustainable.

By 2017, the FRB had designated the City a “fiscally eligible municipality.” Just one year later, the State

Comptroller determined that the City was in “significant fiscal stress.” Indeed, the City received the worst fiscal

stress score in the entire State.

The PBA’s expert detailed the City’s abysmal financial performance in each of the categories measured by

the State Comptroller. He agreed that the analysis utilized by the State Comptroller correctly “measure[s] things

that one would look at when we’re looking at the financial condition of a municipality” and he conceded that the

City had the worst fiscal stress score in the State.

Indeed, according to the State Comptroller, the City is in far worse shape than the Union’s proposed

comparators. Based on 2017 numbers, the City received a fiscal stress score of 80.8. The Union’s proposed

comparators received far lower scores.

Moreover, as the Panel Chairman observed in his January 18, 2016 Award in City of Newburgh, “[t]he most

relevant comparables are the ones that would ordinarily be comparable in a traditional sense but are also fiscally

eligible communities[.]”

Like the FRB and State Comptroller, Moody’s has described the City’s financial operations as “structurally

imbalanced.”

Indeed, as recently as February 20, 2019, Moody’s downgraded the City’s bond rating and affirmed its

negative outlook in recognition of “the challenges the [C]ity faces in returning to a structurally balanced budget,

one that does not rely on non-recurring revenues or expenses.” Among other things, Moody’s noted that the City’s

total operating fund balance at the end of 2018 was less than $700,000 (compared to $11.4 Million in 2015), and



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management predicts further declines in 2019.

The Realities Of The Tax Cap

This Interest Arbitration is taking place in the restrictive world created by New York State’s Tax Cap

legislation, which took effect in 2013-14.

The reality is that the tax cap has significantly hindered the City’s ability to generate revenue through taxes.

As a result of the tax cap, the City generally cannot increase its property tax levy by more than two percent (2%),

or the rate of inflation, whichever is lower.

Notwithstanding its diligent efforts to stay within the cap, the City has exceeded the tax cap in two (2) of

the last three (3) years. The City’s circumstances are so dire that residents have not been able to experience the

relief the tax cap legislation was designed to provide. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the City did not dedicate

any money in the 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18 or 2018-19 budget for retroactive raises for the police.

In brief, the cap on a municipality’s ability to increase its real property tax levy (with certain minor

exclusions) is an economic and political behemoth. The shadow this law casts on these proceedings cannot be

underestimated by the Panel. Indeed, given that the City is a “fiscally eligible municipality,” the Panel must take

into account the “constraints, obligations and requirements imposed by the” Tax Cap.

2. The Long-lasting Effects Of The Recession

This Interest Arbitration process cannot be impervious to the long-lasting effects of the economic downturn

the country, New York State and Nassau County took in 2008. While other, lower paid bargaining units accept low

wage increases or freezes and make concessions because they have to bargain for a contract in this new economic

world, police unions try to avoid difficult bargaining by coming to a Panel and essentially demanding immunity.

True collective bargaining demands accountability and burden sharing from all parties, even if that is reluctantly

achieved. This Interest Arbitration process must do the same if it is to truly consider the “interests and welfare of

the public” as it is required to do in Section 209 of the Taylor Law in the very same sentence as considering financial

ability to pay.

a. Staffing Cuts Have Had Little Impact On Personnel Costs

The City is made up of seventeen (17) departments. Since 2008-09, the total number of general fund full-

time employees in those departments has decreased by about 5.68% from 317 to 299.

Notwithstanding City-wide staffing reductions, personnel costs have increased dramatically. From 2008-

09 to 2018-19, the City’s total budget increased by $22,824,912. Approximately $17,716,673 of that increase was

attributable to personnel costs.

As explained by the City’s former Comptroller and current financial consultant, Kristie Hansen-Hightower,

the costs of employees’ salaries and benefits have increased a staggering 43.4% since 2008-09, even though the

budget itself has only increased about 38.32% in the same period. For every $100 an employee earns in salary, that



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employee’s benefits cost the City an additional $65.87.

In brief, the reduction in the total number of employees over the last decade has unfortunately had little

impact on the City’s budget. Personnel costs made up approximately 71% of the City’s most recent budget. This

was one of many factors leading to the City’s receipt of the worst fiscal stress score in the State in March 2018.

As explained below, rising personnel costs are due, in large part, to employee benefits like health insurance

premiums, workers’ compensation premiums and pension contributions, the costs of which are outside the City’s

control. Medical, dental and pension costs alone have increased approximately 123% over the last ten (10) years.

b. Exploding Pension Costs

One of the major factors leading to rising personnel costs is the fact that pension contribution rates have

increased approximately 151.92% since 2008-2009. As explained by Mr. Decker and Ms. Hansen-Hightower, the

City has no control over such contribution rates.

While employer contribution rates for the Employee Retirement System (“ERS”) (to which the City’s other

employees belong) have also risen, they have traditionally been much lower than those for the PFRS. Indeed, even

though less than 25% of the City’s employees are in the PFRS, the City budgeted $3,900,000 for PFRS contributions

this year compared to $2,850,000 for its ERS contributions.

c. Rising Health Care Costs

Like pension contributions, health and dental insurance rates have also played a major role in rising

personnel costs. Over the past decade, health and dental insurance costs have increased from about $6.6 million to

about $10.4 million, which accounts for approximately 17% of the increase in the City’s total budget during that

period.

d. Rising Workers’ Compensation Insurance Premiums

The City’s workers’ compensation premiums also rose drastically during the years at issue. By way of

example, the City paid approximately $578,148 in workers’ compensation premiums for PBA members in 2015-

16. It paid $1,000,659 the following year.

3. There Is No Money For Raises

The City respectfully requests that the Panel decline to award raises since it simply has no money to pay

them. Indeed, the City did not set funds aside for PBA raises in 2015-16, 2016-17 or 2017-18. By the end of 2017-

18 the City had a $4.6 million deficit and its total operating fund balance had fallen below $700,000 (compared to

$11.4 Million in 2015). Further declines are expected in 2019.

Given the City’s lack of funds, and the limitations imposed by the tax cap, the PBA will likely argue that

the City could finance raises the same way it funded the $6.5 million it was required to pay under the last Interest

Arbitration Award (i.e., by issuing a bond). However, Moody’s and the State Comptroller have already admonished

the City for bonding such costs.

Finally, it is quite telling that the PBA did not even ask Mr. Decker to opine on the City’s ability to pay.



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Instead, the PBA asked Mr. Decker to calculate and give an estimate on what a 1% raise would cost for one year

(not taking retroactivity into account). Mr. Decker provided such an estimate but did not testify as to whether the

City could pay for such a raise. Under such circumstances, the City urged the Panel to draw an adverse inference

and find that the City does not have the ability to pay any increases.

4. Potentially Devastating Legal Judgments

In addition to its normal operating expenses, which the City has struggled to manage, the “City is subject

to a number of lawsuits which, individually or in the aggregate, may have a material adverse effect on the financial

condition of the City.”

For example, in one lawsuit against the City, the plaintiffs are claiming approximately $55 million in

damages. The City defaulted in that lawsuit. Consequently, there is no question as to liability – the only remaining

issue is how much the City will be ordered to pay in damages.

In another lawsuit, the plaintiff is seeking $105 million in damages. As of June 29, 2018, the plaintiff’s

attorneys had already spent $12.2 million in connection with the lawsuit. It remains to be seen how much the City

will owe in damages and attorneys’ fees.

Either of these cases could obviously have a devastating impact on the City’s finances.

5. Whether the City Mismanaged Its Finances And/Or Misrepresented Its Financial Condition Is

Completely Irrelevant

In an effort to avoid the restrictions imposed upon the Panel by the Taylor Law and by the City’s dire

financial straits, the Union has argued that the City’s financial “predicament” was “self-inflicted”. However,

whether the City mismanaged its finances has no bearing upon the 70% weighting that the Panel must give to the

City’s inability to pay.

6. The Trump Administration’s Tax Reform Legislation Further Hinders The City’s Ability To Raise

Taxes

The state and local tax (“SALT”) deduction gives taxpayers the option of deducting real estate taxes as well

as either income taxes or sales taxes paid to state and local governments. The City urges the Panel to consider the

impact on its taxpayers of the Trump Administration’s Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which caps the SALT deduction at

$10,000.



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THE PROPER COMPARABLES Under Section 209(4)(c)(v)(a) of the Civil Service Law, the Panel shall consider:

comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the [Union

members] with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other

employees performing similar services or requiring similar skills under similar

working conditions and with other employees generally in public and private

employment in comparable communities.

The Union contends that the police in the villages of Freeport, Garden City, Lynbrook and Rockville Centre,

and in the City of Glen Cove, should be used for comparison. As set forth below, all except Freeport already carry

significantly lower unit salary costs than Long Beach.

Two (2) overriding principles must guide this Panel. First, as the Panel Chairman observed in City of

Newburgh, “[t]he most relevant comparables are the ones that would ordinarily be comparable in a traditional sense

but are also fiscally eligible communities[.]”

Second, as further observed by the Panel Chairman in City of Beacon, “towns and cities are not comparable”

because they are financed in very different ways. The same logic necessarily applies where an attempted

comparison is made between villages and cities.

With those principles in mind, and for the additional reasons set forth below, the police units in the

municipalities referenced by the PBA are not relevant or useful comparables.

With respect to “internal comparators”, the City’s firefighters have not received a raise since July 1, 2009

and the City’s CSEA members received a negotiated zero percent (0%) raise in 2017-18. While teachers are not

City employees, they are public employees in the same community, so it is also worth noting that the teachers in

Long Beach received almost no base salary raises over the last few years. (0% in 2015-16; 0.5% effective 4/1/17;

0.5% effective 7/1/17; 0.75% effective 7/1/18; 0.75% effective 7/1/19).

THE CITY’S PROPOSALS SHOULD BE AWARDED BY THE PANEL

Given the City’s expectation that the Panel will not impose any raises in either of the years at issue, the

City has limited the following discussion to address only those proposals for which it has compelling arguments

and considers matters of high importance. To the extent that the City does not address any of its proposals below,

such proposals have been withdrawn. The following are the proposals by the City:

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Delete The Requirement That Members Receive Two (2)

Hours Of Pay For Off-Duty Notifications

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Reduce The Court Recall Cancellation Notice From 72

Hours To 12 Hours



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• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Eliminate Employees’ Option To Be Assigned To The

Day Tour When Scheduled To Work The Night Tour But Required To Appear In Court During The Day

Tour

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Calculate The Rate For Overtime And Leave Accumulation

Based On A 261-Day Duty Chart Instead Of A 232-Day Duty Chart

• Limit The Maximum Payout For All Entitlements To Twice The Member’s Base Pay

• Capping Separation Payouts At Twice The Member’s Base Salary

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Eliminate Sick Leave for Family Illness And Reduce New

Hires’ Sick Leave Entitlement To Twelve (12) Days Per Year

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Require Members To Have Twenty (20) Years Of Service

To Be Paid Out For Sick Leave And Reduce Members’ Maximum Sick Leave Payout From 50% to 33.3%

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Charge Members On An Hour-For-Hour Basis When They

Go Home Sick After Reporting For Duty

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Reduce The Number Of Termination Leave Days Accrued

Per Year Of Service To Four And Require Members To Have Twenty (20) Years Of Service To Be Eligible

for Such Termination Leave Pay

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Require Members To Contribute Towards The Cost Of

Health Insurance During Employment and Into Retirement

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Delete The In-Service Training Provision

• The Panel Should Grant The City’s Proposal To Create A 10-Step Schedule For New Hires

The City proposes that the Panel make the following clarifications so the parties can focus their time and

attention on substantive issues in the next round of negotiations. With respect to the proposed clarifications that

leave be converted from days to hours, the unrefuted evidence shows that when the City implemented ten (10)-hour

tours, the parties converted days to hours in some parts of the contract but inadvertently failed to do so in other parts

of the contract. It is clear the parties intended for all leave to be converted from days to hours.

• Pg. 12, 7(d)(1)(f) - Subpoenaed on scheduled days off – delete

• Clarify all “days” are to be converted to hours based on 8-hours per day

• Pg. 18, 14(g)(1) – Personal Leave – Change 5 days to 40 hours

• Pg. 19, 14(h)(1) – Bereavement Leave – Change 4 working days to 32 hours

• Pg. 20, 14(i) – Incentive Days – Convert days to 8 hours

• Pg. 20, 14(j)(1) – Emergency Leave – Change 5 work days to 40 hours

• Pg. 20, 14(j)(2) – Trauma Leave – Change 5 work days to 40 hours



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• Pg. 22, 14(r) - Donation of leave – Convert days to hours

• Pg. 24, 15(d) – Summer Vacation - Change one week to 40 hours

• Pg. 24, 15(e) – Assignments on Return From Vacation – delete

• Pg. 47, 30(m) – Separate Checks - delete

• Pg. 48, 30(t) - Bullets – Change 54 to “50, or the number of bullets contained in the applicable

manufacturer’s box, subject to the approval of the Commissioner.”

THE CITY’S POSITION ON THE PBA PROPOSALS

1. There Is No Basis To Increase Salaries By 5% In 2015-16 And/Or 2016-17

Despite the difficulties imposed by the tax cap, the Federal tax reform bill and the City’s bleak financial

condition, the Union is seeking a salary increase of five percent (5%) per year.

For the reasons explained regarding the City’s ability to pay (or lack thereof), the Union’s proposed salary

increases are simply not realistic. Given the City’s unique circumstances, the City respectfully requested that the

Panel issue zero percent (0%) raises in the years at issue (2015-16 and 2016-17).

2. There Is No Basis To Grant Members Credit For Prior Service When Placing Them On The Salary

Schedule

The Union is proposing that members’ prior service be taken into account when determining their step

placement. There is no basis for this proposal. The City has not had any problems with recruiting qualified

personnel. More than half of the department had prior service credit before transferring to Long Beach. Such

individuals knew they would be starting at Step 1 and still decided to come to Long Beach.

Moreover, the comparative data provided by the Union shows that Muttontown is the only member of the

NPC which counts members’ prior service when determining where to place them on the salary schedule. One may

reasonably infer that Muttontown did so to attract members since it was a brand new police force.

3. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Increase Longevity Pay And/Or Grant Members Credit For Prior

Service When Calculating Their Longevity

The Union has proposed to increase longevity payments. The Union did not offer any evidence on how

much its proposal would cost but, as discussed at length supra, the City is not in a financial position to increase

longevity payments.

Moreover, the Union’s own comparative data shows that Long Beach already provides around the NPC

average for members with ten (10) to nineteen (19) years of service and is actually above average with respect to

members with at least twenty (20) years of service.

The Union did not offer any evidence as to why its members deserve the proposed increases. Accordingly,

the Union’s proposal should be rejected by the Panel.



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4. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Grant Members Who Work A 10-Hour Tour 50 Hours Of Personal

Leave Each Year

5. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Grant the Union’s Vacation Proposal

The Union is proposing that members be given the option of working up to two (2) weeks of vacation at

straight time compensation, and if a member exercises his/her right to work one week of vacation during the summer

months, he/she may work a second week of vacation at straight time during the remainder of the year. Based on

this, one may infer that members rarely, if ever, request to work more than one week of vacation at straight time.

If such a request were made, however, the Commissioner testified that that he would determine whether to grant or

deny it based on manpower.

6. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Add Police Memorial Day And Yom Kippur As Paid Holidays

7. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Increase the Uniform Allowance And/Or Cleaning And Equipment

Allowance

The Union is proposing to increase: uniformed employees’ uniform allowance from $775 to $1,075 per

year; and plainclothesmen and detectives’ uniform allowance from $975 to $1,275 per year. The City is not in a

financial condition to take on this additional cost.

Moreover, the comparative data provided by the Union does not justify its request. Indeed, almost every

other municipality for which data is supplied provides uniforms to its members rather than giving them an

allowance. It is not as though most departments receive higher uniform allowances.

The Union is proposing to increase the cleaning and equipment allowance from $900 to $1,500 per year.

However, the cleaning and equipment allowance was increased from $900 to $1,200 in the last Interest Arbitration

Award. The City has no objection to decreasing the cleaning and equipment allowance from $1,200 to $1,150.

8 There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Increase Dental, Orthodontia And Eyeglass Coverage

The Union is proposing to increase dental, orthodontia and eyeglass coverage. The City is not in a financial

position to take on these additional costs at the moment, especially given the fact that PBA members do not

contribute anything towards health insurance premiums.

9. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Delete Section 4 Of The Last Interest Arbitration Award Providing

For “Training Days”

The Union is proposing to delete paragraph 4 of the last Interest Arbitration Award (Section 11(c) of the

CBA), which provides:

All officers will receive two eight-hour training days without additional

compensation. One of these days must be a range day and the second day will be

at the discretion of the Chief of Police.

One of the City’s issues with this proposal is that members need a range day to complete annual firearm

training and it is impractical for members to attend such training while they are working. If the provision above is



15

eliminated, every member will likely seek overtime to attend firearm training while off-duty. The City is not in a

financial condition to take on this additional cost at this time.

10. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Amend Paragraph 4 Of Section 6 Of The Steady Tour Agreement

Section 6 of the Steady Tours Agreement (incorporated into the CBA) provides, in relevant part:

To ensure the ability of a member of squad 3 (2200 – 0800) to have time off, one

member of squad 3 shall be allowed to exercise their right of use of accumulated

time per tour of duty without denial of same, except in the case of a declared

emergency.

The Union is proposing to replace the language above with the following:

To ensure the ability of a member to have time off, one member of each tour shall

be allowed to exercise their right of use of accumulated time per tour of duty

without denial of same, except in the case of declared emergency.

Commissioner Tangney’s unrebutted testimony was that this proposal would create a severe hardship,

especially during the summer months. The Department has an unofficial five (5)-person minimum per tour.

Allowing one member to take off each tour regardless of manpower could generate tremendous overtime, which

the City cannot afford right now. The Union’s own witness acknowledged that their proposal could generate

overtime.

11. Absent Additional Information, There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Change The Existing Buyback

Payment

The Union is proposing to replace the existing buyback payment of $1,000 per year for individual plans or

$2,000 per year for family plans to $5,000 per year for those who choose not to be coverage by the health insurance

provided by the City. If the Union can guarantee that a certain number of members would take advantage of the

buyback (e.g., ten (10) members withdraw and remain out of the City’s plan) if it were increased, the City would

consider agreeing to this proposal.

12. There Is No Basis Or Evidence To Increase The Meal Period From 1 Hour To 75 Minutes And/Or

Increase The Meal Allowance From $7.50 To $12

When a member works at least twelve (12) hours in a row, that member automatically receives a $7.50

meal allowance and at least an hour of compensatory time. Between the meal allowance and compensatory time,

members are more than adequately compensated for when they work least twelve (12) hours straight (which, for

most members, is just two (2) hours longer than their usual tour). The City already spends about $210,000 per year

on these costs and is not in a financial condition to take on additional costs.



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CONTENTIONS OF THE PBA

PETITIONER-PBA's PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION The following list of proposals

were submitted by the Petitioner PBA to arbitration for the Panel's consideration. Proposal 7(b) was

withdrawn by the PBA and no evidence relating thereto was presented by the PBA at the hearing. Proposal

9 was deleted in accordance with the pre-hearing Stipulation entered into by the parties and is not before

the Panel for consideration. Detailed arguments supporting each argument are included in the following

section.

1. WAGE INCREASES:

5% increase for period July 1, 2015 — June 30, 2016

5% increase for period July 1, 2016 — June 30, 2017

9. PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT — SALARY SCHEDULE:

Amend section 3(d) of the expired CBA (7/1/03 — 6/30/08) (the "expired CBA") as follows:

(A) Delete the following fourth sentence of section 3(d): "However, if an officer is hired and it is

determined that he/she will not attend an academy, then that officer will be paid the Step 1

salary upon the hiring date".

(B) Replace the deleted fourth sentence of section 3(d) with the following new provision:

"A police officer hired by the City who has previously been employed as a sworn police officer

working in a NYS DCJS accredited police department shall be granted credit by the City commensurate

with the police officer 's prior years of service to the accredited police department and shall be placed

on the step of the salary step schedule equating to the number of years of prior completed service

performed by the police officer with the accredited police department."

10. LONGEVITY COMPENSATION:

(A) Amend section 3 of the Award (7/1/08-6/30/15) (the "Award") and corresponding section 4 of

the expired CBA (7/1/03-06/30/08) to provide for the following schedule of Longevity payments:

After 6 years $2,000 per year



After 16 years $1,000 additional per year with a cap at $24,500

(B) Add a new section "c" to provide as follows:

For purposes of calculating an employee's entitlement to longevity compensation and the corresponding

amount of longevity compensation payable to the employee, in addition to years of service employed by

the Long Beach Police Department, the employee shall also be credited with all prior years of service as

an employee of a NYS DCJS accredited police department located within the State of New York.



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11. PERSONAL LEAVE TIME:

Amend Section 14(g)(1) to add the following sentence between the existing first and second sentences:

An employee who works a ten (10) hour tour schedule shall be credited with fifty (50) hours of personal

leave time each year.

12. VACATION:

Amend Section 15(d) as follows:

a. amend "work up to a maximum of one (1) week of the employee's summer vacation" to read "work

up to a maximum of two (2) weeks of the employee's summer vacation"

b. delete second sentence: "All other requests to work more than the above one (1) week at straight time

pay, may be granted at the discretion of the Police Commissioner".

c. replace deleted second sentence with the following sentence: "Provided an employee has exercised

the employee's option and has worked one (1) week of the employee's summer vacation, the employee

shall have the option to work a second week of vacation at straight time pay at any time during the

remainder of the year."

1 3 . HO LI D A YS :

Amend Section 5(a) to add the following paid holidays:

Police Memorial Day;

Yom Kippur

14. CLOTHING AND UNIFORM ALLOWANCE / CLEANING AND EQUIPMENT ALLOWANCE:

(a) Amend Section 9 as follows:

Increase the uniform allowance paid to uniformed employees from $775 per annum to

$1,075 per annum and increase the uniform allowance paid to plainclothesmen and

detectives from $975 per annum to $ 1,275 per annum.

(b) WITHDRAWN

15. DENTAL & EYEGLASS COVERAGE:

Amend Section 22(a)(3) as follows:

(a) Increase per person per calendar year Dental coverage from $1,500 maximum to 3,500

maximum per person per calendar year.

(b) Increase maximum lifetime Orthodontia coverage per person from $2,000 to $5,000.

(c) Amend and increase Eyeglass coverage from $100 to $200 per person and change to per

calendar year from biannually.

16. DELETED PURSUANT TO STIPULATION



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17. TRAINING DAYS:

Delete/Eliminate section 4 of the Award providing for "training days".

18. STEADY TOUR AGREEMENT:

Delete the fourth (4th) paragraph of Section 6 of the Steady Tour Agreement and replace the deleted

paragraph with the following paragraph:

"To ensure the ability of a member to have time off one member of each tour shall be allowed to exercise

their right of use of accumulated time per tour of duty without denial of same, except in the case of

declared emergency."

19. "BUYBACK BENEFITS":

Amend section 22 (i) as follows:

Replace the existing buyback payment of "$1,000 per year individually or $2,000 per year per family"

with a singular payment of $5,000 per year to the individual and/or family choosing not to be covered by

the health insurance provided by the City.

20. MEAL ALLOWANCE:

(a) Amend Section 20(a) of the expired CBA to delete "one (1) hour meal period" and

replace/substitute with "seventy five (75) minute meal period".

(b) Amend Section 20(d) of the expired CBA to delete "Seven 50/100 ($7.50) Dollars" and

replace/substitute with "twelve ($12.00) dollars".

STATUTORY FACTORS GOVERNING THE AWARD

Duration of Award

Pursuant to New York State Civil Service law section 209(4)(c)(vi), "the determination of the public

arbitration panel shall be final and binding upon the parties for the period prescribed by the panel, but in no

event shall such panel exceed two years from the termination date of any previous collective bargaining

agreement or if there is no previous collective bargaining agreement then for a period not to exceed two years

from the date of determination by the panel."

Based upon the interpretation of Civil Service Law section 209(4)(c)(vi) appropriate under the circumstances,

and the fact that it has been almost four (4) years since the expiration of the last Award, it is respectfully submitted

that, absent an intervening agreement between the parties pursuant to Civil Service Law section 209(2), the Panel

should issue an Award of the full maximum statutory duration of two (2) years covering the period of July 1,

2015 — June 30, 2017.



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Award Criteria

Pursuant to New York State Civil Service Law section 209(4)(c)(v) the interest arbitration award to be issued

by this Panel should constitute a "just and reasonable" determination of the dispute. In the course of rendering

the determination relevant factors should be considered, however, the following statutory factors are required

to be specifically taken into consideration:

(a) comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the

arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing

similar services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and with other employees

generally in public and private employment in comparable communities;

(b) the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public employer to pay;

(c) comparison of peculiarities in regard to other trades or professions, including

specifically, (1) hazards of employment; (2) physical qualifications; (3) educational

qualifications; (4) mental qualifications; (5) job training and skills; and

(d) the terms of collective bargaining agreements negotiated between the parties in

the past providing for compensation and fringe benefits, including, but not limited to, the provisions for

salary, insurance and retirement benefits, medical and hospitalization benefits, paid time off and job

security.

The Petitioner-PBA respectfully asserts that the proposals that it has put forward during the course of the

proceedings are just and reasonable and that the Petitioner will hereinafter set forth compelling arguments

supported by the evidence in the record in favor of granting the PBA's proposals and denying the City's proposals.

It has been well settled that with respect to compulsory interest arbitration concerning the terms and conditions of

employment of police officers, statutory factor (c) [other trades or professions] set forth above is inapplicable due

to the uniqueness of the job descriptions and working conditions of police officers. Instead, the police officers

of the Long Beach PBA bargaining unit are most appropriately compared to other police bargaining units within

the general geographic vicinity of the City of Long Beach.

Fiscally Eligible Municipality

In addition to the statutory criteria set forth in Civil Service Law section 209(4)(c)(v) set forth above, the Panel is

required by Civil Service law section 209(6)(a) to make a determination as to whether the municipality is a

"fiscally eligible municipality" as part of its analysis of the financial ability of the public employer to pay. As

such, it is conceded by the Petitioner that the public employer is a fiscally eligible municipality under Civil Service

Law triggering a weighted analysis of the ability to pay factor in the statutory award criteria.



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However, it is critical for the Panel to be aware that the statutory provisions of Civil Service Law section 209(6)

only require the Panel to consider and give weight to the public employer's ability to pay when the employer is

a fiscally eligible municipal. Civil Service Law section 209(6) does not act to prohibit the Board from issuing

a just and reasonable award granting a salary increase and monetary benefits to the employee bargaining unit.

Therefore, while the Panel must be cognizant of its obligations to appropriately consider and weigh the fiscal

ability to pay of the City of Long Beach, the proposals submitted to arbitration by the Petitioner PBA and

hereinafter discussed must also be given due and proper consideration as required by the statute in order to reach

a just and reasonable award affecting the members of the PBA bargaining unit who have been working without

a contractual wage increase for almost four years at this point in time.

PBA PRESENTATION — ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR

The following section presents the individual PBA proposals, the evidence introduced with respect to the applicable

PBA proposals and sets forth the PBA's case and argument in support of the grant of its proposals.

PBA Proposal 1: Wage Increases

During the course of bargaining, the PBA proposed and sought to achieve annual wage increases for its

members of five (5%) percent per annum for each year of any agreement to be reached with the City. This

proposal remains open for consideration by the Panel during the course of considering an appropriate wage

increase during the term of the Award. The PBA acknowledges that the five (5%) percent increase was a figure

chosen for negotiation purposes but that during the course of this proceeding, the PBA is seeking the maximum

increase that the panel sees fit.

Pursuant to CSL Section 209(4)(c)(v)(d), the Panel is to consider and take into account the past bargaining history

of the parties with respect to compensation including salary. The PBA introduced evidence during the course of the

testimony of Sgt. Nielsen that the average annual wage increase for the PBA bargaining unit during the past

twenty-one (21) years was 4.064%. In short, for purposes of considering the past salary history as the Panel is

required to do, while the PBA has negotiated and/or achieved five (5%) percent annual increases during the

preceding twenty-one fiscal years, it has averaged over 4.0% during that time period and has never

achieved less than an annual increase of 3.15% during that time period.

It was ascertained, by the testimony of Sgt. Nielsen and a review of the NPC salary data, that the Long Beach

PBA was the only bargaining unit which did not have a new salary in place for the 2015 fiscal year. During the

2015 fiscal year the average salary increase across the bargaining units comprising the NPC was 2.81% which



21

was brought artificially lower by the 0% increase attributable to the Great Neck Estates bargaining unit (which

received a 6.9% increase in the subsequent year). At the conclusion of the preceding year (2014), the Long Beach

PBA top cop salary ranked #8 of the twenty bargaining units reporting to the NPC at $718.00 above the average

wage paid to police officers within Nassau County.

During fiscal year 2016, aside from the Long Beach PBA, there were only three (3) other NPC bargaining units

which did not have new salaries in place for that fiscal year. Of the NPC bargaining units with a new salary in

place for 2016, an average salary increase of 3.19% was experienced by those bargaining units during that

fiscal year placing the Long Beach PBA member earning over $6,700 less than the average police officer in

Nassau County. At that point in time, without the benefit of a salary increase in 2015 and/or 2016, there were

only two other departments who paid their police officers less than the police officers employed by the City of

Long Beach. Thus, without a reasonable salary increase being awarded by this Panel, increases achieved by

the other bargaining units during the applicable time period will result in members of the Long Beach PBA

rapidly progressing from being paid slightly above the median salary across Nassau County towards being the

lowest paid police officers in the County.

The PBA presented evidence to the Panel which sought to narrow down the comparison to specific bargaining

units which the PBA determined to be the most similar "apples" by which the Long Beach PBA should be

measured. Specifically, the Long Beach PBA determined that the PBA bargaining units most similarly situated

to the Long Beach PBA were the bargaining units in Freeport, Garden City, Rockville Centre, Glen Cove and

Lynbrook. In recognizing that no two particular bargaining units are exactly alike, the PBA considered factors such

as salaries, departmental size, municipal population, median housing values, median household income, and

geographic area amongst other factors.

In short, whether annual wage increases are viewed in the context of the historical pattern within the City of Long

Beach, or compared to other PBA bargaining units within the County of Nassau, the facts and circumstances

dictate that a reasonable wage increase is appropriate for the members of the PBA bargaining unit during each

year of the Award. Although the PBA-identified wage increase of five (5%) percent per annum may very well be

significantly more than this Panel deems appropriate, any wage increase of less than 3.15% would not only cause

the bargaining unit to regress amongst its comparative peers it would also be unprecedented over the course of

the last 20+ years.



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PBA Proposal 2: Prior Service Credit — Salary Schedule

PBA Proposal 2 relates to compensating newly hired police officers with a salary commensurate with his/her

prior service as a police officer with a NYS DCJS accredited police department. If an individual possesses

prior service with an accredited police department, the City may immediately deploy the individual into the

workforce as a police officer without a requirement that the individual attend the Police Academy. The ability

to immediately deploy a police officer without having to pay for training the officer is certainly a benefit to

the City and the fact that a newly hired police officer is not a true "rookie" but instead an experienced police

officer allows the City to get ahead of the learning curve.

Proposal 2 calls for the prior service of a police officer at the time of hire be taken into account when placing

the officer on the salary schedule. Rather than placing each officer at Step 1 of the salary schedule regardless

of whether they had one (1) year or ten (10) years of service does not adequately take into consideration the

value of the prior service brought to the City Police Department.

PBA Proposal 3: Longevity Compensation

The PBA presented Proposal 3 seeking to increase longevity compensation for its members by adding the sum

of $500 per year to each of the existing longevity steps payable under section 4 of the expired CBA as modified

by Paragraph 4 of the expired Arbitration Award.

Sgt. Nielsen testified that at the first longevity step (6 years), a Long Beach PBA member receiving $1,500 per

year in longevity pay is receiving less than the average longevity payment made to officers at the same step across

the nineteen departments comprising the Nassau Police Conference ($1,945.00).

If the Panel was not inclined to grant the Proposal 3 in its entirety ($500 increase across the board), the PBA urges

the Panel to consider that an increase of slightly less than $500 in the initial steps (6/10/15 years) of the longevity

scale would have a positive effect of moving the PBA members from below average to approximately average

across the NPC with respect to this benefit.

The second part of Proposal 3 concerning longevity involves granting employees credit for prior service with a

New York State accredited police department. The PBA proposes that for purposes of calculating an officer's

placement on the longevity pay scale, if the officer was employed by a police department prior to employment

with Long Beach, the officer's time served with the prior department should be added to the time employed by

Long Beach in order to determine the appropriate placement on the longevity pay scale (i.e., 6 years, 10 years,

15 years, 20 years, etc.). With respect to the current PBA members, employees average 3.8 years of service with a

previous department prior to being hired by the City of Long Beach. As such, based upon the longevity pay scale



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being set up in five (5) year segments, the average police officer with prior experience would advance only one (1)

segment on the longevity scale if prior service credit was taken into consideration as proposed by the PBA.

PBA Proposal 4: Personal Leave Time

PBA Proposal 4 seeks to provide officers who work a ten (10) hour tour with fifty (50) hours of personal leave

time. Section 14(g)(1) of the expired CBA provides that "an employee shall have personal leave not to exceed

five (5) days in any given year." Except for only four (4) officers, a work "day" for a Long Beach PBA member

is comprised of ten (10) hours. As such, five (5) days as provided for in Section 14(g)(1) would be equivalent

to fifty (50) hours for the predominant number of PBA members. However, the Department has interpreted a

"day" to be only eight (8) hours for purposes of this Section and as a result, PBA members are being credited

with only forty (40) hours of personal leave time. Therefore, Proposal 4 seeks to effectuate the proper

interpretation of Section 14(g)(1) as resulting in the granting of fifty (50) hours of personal leave time for ten

hour tour officers which would have the effect of requiring the City to grant an additional ten (10) hours of

personal leave time to those particular officers.

PBA Proposal 5: Vacation

PBA Proposal 5 does not seek an increase in the number of vacation days/hours afforded to its members, but

instead seeks to expand the right of a PBA member to work rather than utilize scheduled vacation time. Under

the terms of section 15(d), a PBA member has an absolute contractual right to forego a week of scheduled

summer (June/July/August) vacation and instead work during that week for straight time compensation. If an

employee desires to work a second week in lieu of taking scheduled vacation, the grant of the request to do so

is at the discretion of the Police Commissioner. Proposal 5 seeks to remove the discretionary element of the 2nd

week of vacation and to permit the employee the right to work any particular scheduled week of vacation (i.e.,

2nd week not limited to a scheduled summer vacation).

The PBA provided testimony that the expansion of the existing benefit would not likely lead to significant

widespread usage amongst the PBA members. Officer Corbett reviewed Departmental time records for fiscal

year 2017 and was able to determine that only thirteen (13) members actually worked during their scheduled

summer vacation and, of those thirteen members, only seven (7) members worked the full work of vacation

necessary to trigger the 2nd week that is desired by the PBA in Proposal 5.

In short, the grant of this proposal would provide the City with added flexibility to address manpower shortages

and would result in long term savings to the City by reducing accrued leave banks.



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PBA Proposal 6: Holidays

Under the current terms and conditions of employment, Long Beach police officers currently receive thirteen

(13) paid holidays during the course of a calendar year. PBA Proposal 6 seeks to increase the number of paid

holidays to fifteen (15) by adding "Yom Kippur" and "Police Memorial Day" as paid holidays.

The PBA also introduced evidence demonstrating that, although other departments comprising the NPC do not

presently include Yom Kippur or Police Memorial Day as paid holidays, there are other paid holidays recognized

by the NPC that the Long Beach PBA does not benefit from such as Good Friday, Day after Thanksgiving and

Election Day. In fact, the Long Beach PBA is the only PBA bargaining unit within the NPC that does not receive

Election Day as a paid holiday.

PBA Proposal 7: Clothing and Uniform Allowance

PBA Proposal 7(a) seeks to increase the clothing and uniform allowance by $300.00 per year. PBA proposal 7(b)

was withdrawn by the PBA and no evidence or testimony was presented relative thereto.

Sgt. Monahan testified that the Long Beach Police Department does not provide uniforms or clothing to its

employees and, instead, the employees are required to purchase their own uniform components (shirts, ties,

pants, boots, jackets, hats, jackets, etc.) and insignias including departmental patches and stripes and tailoring.

There are numerous types of uniform components based upon either weather (i.e., summer/winter) or job

assignment (i.e., bike, motorcycle, etc.). Additionally, since the officers work multiple days in a row, multiple

uniform components are necessary, especially if there are weather issues preventing the re-use of uniforms

components on successive days. In order to compensate for the demands and wear/tear on the clothing, Sgt.

Monahan testified that officers generally purchase at least one if not two or more uniforms per year. Sgt.

Monahan intentionally did not include the cost of purchasing a Class A (dress) uniform in his cost analysis but

was instead focusing on just day to day policing uniform costs.

Most significantly, Sgt. Monahan testified that although uniform costs have continuously increased on a going

forward basis, the clothing and uniform allowance benefit provided for in the CBA has not been addressed since

1991.

PBA Proposal 8: Dental & Eyeglass Coverage:

PBA Proposal 8 contains three separate components relating to amending Contract section 22(a)(3) providing

for Dental & Eyeglass Coverage benefits. Proposal 8(a) calls for an increase in the annual dental coverage

limits from $1,500 to $3,500 per person. Proposal 8(b) seeks an increase in per person maximum lifetime



25

orthodontia coverage from $2,000 to $5,000. Proposal 8(c) calls for eyeglass coverage to be increased from

$100 per person bi-annually to $200 per person on an annual basis.

With respect to PBA Proposal 8(a) (increase in annual dental coverage), Officer Corbett testified that although

the cost of dental work has increased exponentially over the years, the annual coverage benefit of $1,500 per

person per year afforded to PBA members had not been increased in the last nineteen (19) years when it was

increased from $1,000 to $1,500. Currently, the City provides a dental plan through Healthplex which pays up

to the $1,500 coverage limit and then the remainder of dental costs incurred in a year become an out of pocket

expense for the employee.

As such, while the PBA acknowledges that the grant of this portion of Proposal 8 would likely result in a cost

increase to the City, the PBA's inability to produce an actual cost estimate is not for a lack of attention or effort.

The PBA produced evidence that its review of a number of CBAs covering bargaining units within the NPC

revealed that many municipalities provided dental benefits significantly in excess of those provided by the City

of Long Beach to its police officers.

PBA Proposal 8(b) requesting an increase in the lifetime orthodontia coverage from $2,000 to $5,000 is not

requesting an arbitrary increase merely for the sake of an increase. In addition to providing personal anecdotal

evidence, Officer Corbett testified that he contacted three (3) local orthodontists to obtain cost estimates for

orthodontia work and was advised that the charges associated with orthodontia work cost on average a minimum

of between $5,000 and $7,500. Based on these amounts, the current orthodontia benefit afforded to Long Beach

PBA members only covers 35%-40% of the total cost of orthodontia work.

PBA Proposal 8(c) seeks an increase in the optical benefit from $100 every two (2) years to $200 per person per

calendar year. The City of Long Beach does not provide the PBA with an optical plan in which PBA members

participate. Instead, a PBA member incurs optical costs for exams, frames, lenses, contacts, etc. on their own and

then submits a claim for reimbursement directly to the City. In short, the current level of benefit afforded to PBA

members is wholly insufficient to cover the optical costs of a PBA member.

PBA Proposal 10: Training Days

PBA Proposal 10 seeks the elimination of the "training days" provision set forth in section 4 of the expired

Arbitration Award. The PBA asserts that the basis for the proposal is that the Department is not utilizing the training

days for their intended purpose.



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The May 2013 Arbitration Award granted the City the right to two (2) eight hour days for the purposes of

training, one of which must be utilized as a "range" day (for annual required firearm qualification). The two

days were essentially "give back" or "free" days meaning that the City was not required to compensate the PBA

members for attending the training whereas, previously, the Department was required to pay the officers in the

form of granting compensatory time on the books of the Department at the rate of time and one/half.

The City's stated purpose of seeking the imposition of the "training days" as set forth in the prior Award was to

"increase the effectiveness of the department". This stated purpose was accepted and adopted by the Arbitrator as

the basis for the grant in the prior Award. However, Officer Walsh testified that the Department has not actually

been utilizing the "training days" for their intended purpose. While the City has been utilizing one of the days for

its intended purpose (firearms training), the time needed for qualification purposes is only four (4) hours and not

the eight (8) hours granted to the City.

Officer Walsh testified that that PBA's objection to the training days is based upon the fact that rather than

increasing the effectiveness of the department by increasing training (without time cost to the City), the

City is actually deducting time from Police Officers' time banks if they do not send the officer to a training

session. Thus, the PBA's objection is not steeped in an aversion to being obligated to participate in training,

nor even, not being compensated for attendance at training at the rate of time and one-half comp time as they

were previously, but instead, if the Department fails to send the officers to training it is actually deducting time

from the officers. Aside from annual firearms qualification which is mandatory in order for a police officer to

carry a firearm, the Department maintains control over sending or not sending officers for training. Officers

have requested to attend training but have been denied by the Department and instead have had the time

deducted from their time banks.

Thus, the City has misapplied the benefit granted to it in the prior Award and is instead using the "training

days" provision as a cost saving provision to effectively steal time off of the books of police officers that it is

not sending to training. Since the City maintains control over the attendance of officers at training (aside from

firearms), this provision provides the City with an inequitable means of retroactively not paying an officer for

time actually worked (but banked as comp time when worked).

Based upon the foregoing, if the Panel is not inclined to grant Proposal 10 in its entirety, based upon the facts

presented, the PBA asserts that the Panel should modify section 4 of the prior Award but providing a restriction

against the City deducting the time from officers for whom it has failed to provide training. In other words, if

the City provides access to the training, the benefit may remain, but if the City fails to provide access to



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training, then the City should be prohibited from reaping the benefit of manipulating the training days provision

of the Award to disgorge actual time previously earned by an officer. Further, to the extent that only a four (4)

hour time slot is actually needed for firearm qualifications, the training day provision should be modified to provide

that the "training day" benefit is limited to one (1) four (4) hour non compensated day for each officer.

PBA Proposal (11): Steady Tour Agreement (time off for Tours 1 and Tour 2)

PBA Proposal 11 seeks to equalize the benefit of the right to take time off across each of the three patrol tours

of duty established by the Steady Tour Agreement contained in the expired Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The PBA's proposal seeks to amend the terms of the Steady Tour Agreement to provide that one member of

each squad (Tours 1, 2 & 3) shall have the right to utilize accumulated time and take the tour off. Accumulated

time off would be time off inuring to the officers that they have available to utilize and would necessarily

include unused vacation time, personal leave time, compensatory time and various other categories of time "on

the books" that the officer was entitled to under the contract or had earned and "banked".

The objective of the PBA in seeking to equalize the right to take time off across each of the three patrol tours is

based upon the fact that, under the current staffing composition of the Department, members of Tour 1 and Tour 2

are regularly unable to secure time off other than regularly scheduled vacation time. The Commissioner himself,

during the course of his testimony, acknowledged that "time off is not granted." The ability to take time off is

a significant quality of life issue.

PBA Proposal 12: Health Insurance "Buyback Benefits"

PBA Proposal 12 seeks to increase the existing health insurance "buyback" benefit contained in Section 22(i)

of the CBA from the current payment of $1,000 per individual and $2,000 per family to a $5,000 benefit

(whether individual or family). A "buyback benefit" is an economic incentive for PBA members to decline the

City's provision of medical insurance coverage (provided at the City's cost) in exchange for a payment to the

member of a portion of the savings achieved by the City in not having to provide medical coverage for the PBA

member (whether individually or pursuant to a family plan). The member's "opting out" of the City's provision

of medical coverage is a voluntary choice made by the member and would typically be considered by the

member where the member's spouse or other 3rd party may be in a position to cover the member with a similar

or better medical plan.

Thus, under the current contractual buyback benefit provision, if a member opts out of an individual plan the

member would be paid $1,000 and the City would not have to provide coverage to the member resulting in a net



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savings to the City of $11,179.76. If a member opted out of accepting the City's provision of family medical

coverage, the member would receive a $2,000 payment from the City and the City would in turn achieve a net

savings of $26,177.80.

The PBA seeks to increase the buyback payment from the current $1,000/$2,000 thresholds to $5,000 as a means

of increasing the incentive for its members to opt out of the plan coverage. The significance of the PBA

proposal is that it is mutually beneficial to both the PBA membership and the City.

PBA Proposal 13: Meal Allowance

Pursuant to Section 20, if an officer works twelve or more hours in a continuous tour (meaning 2 or more hours

of overtime in addition to the base tour of 10 hours), the officer is a paid a meal allowance of $7.50. The PBA

proposes to increase the meal allowance by $5.00 to $12.50. Sgt. Nielsen testified that the meal allowance

payment has been at $7.50 since at least as long as he has been an employee (over 15 years).

The PBA introduced evidence at the hearing that, in fiscal year 2017, the Department paid out a total of 1,675 meal

allowances totaling a cost of $12,562.50. If the meal allowance was paid at the rate of $12.50, rather than $7.50,

the total cost of the meal allowances would be $20,937.50 representing an increase of $8,375.00.

PBA POSITION ON CITY PROPOSALS

City Substantive Proposal 1: Holidays

City Substantive Proposal 1 seeks to combine paid holidays “Lincoln’s Birthday and Washington’s Birthday into

Presidents Day” and also to “delete Flag Day”. Thus, the City seeks to eliminate two (2) paid holidays currently

provided for in the CBA leaving PBA members with eleven (11) paid holidays.

The City did not offer any testimony or evidence that the proposal to eliminate two (2) paid holidays was based

upon an argument of comparative analysis to other NPC Departments. The PBA introduced evidence during its

direct case that the most common consistent number of paid holidays within the NPC was thirteen, which is the

number of paid holidays that the Long Beach PBA members currently enjoy. There are no police departments who

provide less than twelve (12) paid holidays. The Police Commissioner acknowledged on cross examination that

the impact of the City’s Proposal 1 would be to reduce the Long Beach PBA below any other bargaining units in

the NPC for this category of benefit.



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City Substantive Proposal 2: Delete Off-Duty Notification Pay

City substantive Proposal 2 seeks to eliminate CBA section 7(c) requiring the Department to compensate a PBA

member when it contacts a member who is off duty for purposes of transmitting an official departmental notification

or order.

City Substantive Proposal 3: (Court Recall Cancellation Notice):

City Substantive Proposal 3 seeks to change CBA section 7(d)(1)(a) to provide that the Department may cancel a

scheduled Court appearance up to twelve (12) hours prior to the Court date rather than the existing seventy two (72)

hours. At present, if a Court appearance is cancelled with less than seventy-two (72) hours prior to the scheduled

Court appearance, the officer has the option of working a minimum of four (4) hours at a straight time rate of pay.

If a police officer declines the option, he/she does not receive any compensation. If a police officer exercises the

option, the employee works and is compensated.

The PBA seeks to maintain the existing benefit because it involves a commitment by the PBA member to be

available for a scheduled court appearance and to decline to make other plans during what otherwise would be his

or her personal off duty time. If a PBA member declined an opportunity to participate in a personal activity based

upon an anticipated scheduled court appearance, and the Department was to be permitted to cancel the officer with

only twelve (12) hours of prior notice, the quality of life of the PBA members would be adversely impacted.

City Substantive Proposal 4: (delete option to switch to a day shift)

City Substantive Proposal 4 seeks to delete employee option language from CBA Section 7(d)(1)(e) such that an

employee may be mandatorily switched from a midnight tour on the eve of a Court appearance to work a day tour.

The Police Commissioner postulates that the conversion of this provision from optional to mandatory would save

the Department on overtime costs. However, the City did not present any testimony or evidence as to the frequency

that this provision presents itself, nor did the City present any evidence as to the financial savings that the City

might achieve if this proposal was granted. In support of its proposal seeking the right to move an officer from a

midnight tour to a day tour to avoid having to pay the officer for staying after his or her tour on overtime to appear

in court, the City did not present any information as to the amount of overtime that would be created by removing

an officer from a scheduled tour in a tightly staffed department. The City also did not present any information as

to what overtime costs would be incurred to cover the staffing needs of the Department during the period of time

that the switched officer was unable to patrol while tied up with Court duties. The provision exists at the employee’s

option because there may be scenarios where the exercise of the option is not practical for the employee.



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City Substantive Proposal 5:

City Substantive Proposal 5 is a two part proposal which seeks to (a) change the rate of time calculations for

overtime and all leave time accumulation from a 232-day (1856 hourly) basis to a 261-day (2088 hourly) basis

wherever applicable throughout the contract, and (b) cap payouts for all entitlements at retirement at a maximum

of two times (2x) base pay.

The rate of pay for overtime and leave accumulation for an officer can be expressed according to the following

equation: Regular Compensation/1856 hours = $X/hour. The City proposes to re-write the equation to read:

Regular Compensation/2088 hours = $X/hour. By increasing the denominator in this equation from 1856 to

2088 it has the impact of reducing the actual hourly rate of pay. Aside from the obvious objective of merely seeking

to save money for the sake of it, the City’s proposal is devoid of any sound reasoning or argument and is not

supported by any meaningful information or data.

The 232-day (1856) financial calculation was the product of a 1994 Compulsory Interest Arbitration Award

establishing the work year for financial computation purposes and all overtime earned and accrued leave time on

the books of the Police Department has been calculated in accordance with that Award since its issuance. As noted

above, the City’s proposal would not just affect the contractually mandated calculation of overtime pay, but would

also impact every single category of accrued time.

The City’s proposal, as written, is not limited to “future hires” or a prospective application to current employees

and no data whatsoever was introduced in this regard even if the Panel were to consider any form of this proposal.

In short, the Panel simply cannot engage in any serious consideration of this proposal without truly understanding

what it involves financially and the catastrophic impact that it would have upon every single component of time

and leave involved with policing in Long Beach.

With respect to the City’s proposal to cap payouts at retirement, the PBA introduced testimony at the hearing that

this proposal would constitute a $2.9 million dollar loss of accrued benefits to the PBA members adversely affected.

While it is understood that payment of deferred and accrued time at the time of retirement is a substantial cost to

the City, this draconian measure constitutes an unreasonable and disproportionate response to an issue that the City

has in large part created itself by understaffing the Police Department.



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The PBA submits that the more reasonable approach to managing and reducing the cost of separation payouts is for

the City to appropriately staff and operate the Department so as to permit the officers to utilize more leave time

throughout their career at a contemporaneous rate rather than denying the time off and subsequently paying it to the

officer at a higher rate at the time of retirement.

Moreover, based upon the imposition of measures taken in the previous Arbitration Award, the terminal leave time

of all officers was reduced from six days to five days (per year of service) prospectively from the date of the Award

and all officers hired after May 29, 2013 have already been made subject to reductions in the amount of accrued

time that may be paid out at the time of retirement. The prior Award reduced the maximum amount of compensable

leave time at retirement for new officers from 400 vacation hours to 300 vacation hours, payout of sick leave from

½ of 400 days to ½ of 200 days and capped personal leave time at 1200 hours.

City Substantive Proposal 8: Family sick & Sick leave

City Substantive Proposal 8 is a two-part proposal dealing with family sick and sick leave, both provisions of which

are very significant requests for this Panel to consider.

The first portion of Proposal 8 calls for the deletion of CBA section 7(e) which provides a member with time off

with straight time pay of up to five (5) days of sick leave per year for purpose of sickness in the employee’s

immediate family. However, it should be noted that Departmental sick leave records included sick leave attributable

to members of the other bargaining unit within the police department (Commanding Officers Association (COA))

and therefore the total amount of family sick leave time testified to by Commissioner Tangney is incorrect although

it is acknowledged that the subtraction of the COA data does not materially alter the general overall computation

of family sick leave utilized.

A review of City Exhibits 45-48 reveals that utilization of this benefit is not widespread across the PBA leading to

a conclusion that the benefit is not being abused by PBA members

The second portion of City proposal #8 involves reducing the annual number of sick days allotted to new hires from

26 days to 12 days. In support of this proposal, the City did not offer any financial data other than the proposition

that the grant of the proposal “would have a tremendous impact because it would directly impact the payouts.”

City Substantive Proposal 9: Increase years of service for eligibility for sick leave payout

Pursuant to Section 14(f), a member separating from service from the Police Department who has served a minimum

of ten (10) years is eligible to receive payment for one half of their unused sick days. The City proposes to raise the



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years of service eligibility threshold from ten (10) year to twenty (20) years. However, the true significance of this

proposal is that it would unfairly penalize police officers who were eligible to retire after twenty (20) years of police

service even if the officer served less than the full twenty (20) years of service with the Long Beach Police

Department.

For example, the Commissioner referenced two police officers who had “over ten years with New York City”.

Under the City’s proposal, not only would those individuals have taken a pay cut to start at Step 1 of the Long

Beach pay scale, further insult to injury would be imposed by effectively requiring these individuals to work at least

twenty (20) more years on top of their 10+ years with New York City [over thirty (30) years in policing] in order

to achieve the twenty (20) years of service with Long Beach that this proposal seeks.

The second portion of City Proposal 9 is itself a two-part sub-proposal. First, the City seeks to reduce the

compensation multiplier for unused sick leave for all members commencing June 30, 2017 from the current rate of

one half (50%) to one third (33.33%). Secondly, the City reiterates its objective as set forth in City Proposal 5 to

establish a maximum (cap) on all leave payouts (except compensatory time) of two times (2x) an officer’s annual

base salary.

In support of its proposal, City introduced examples of payouts made to retired Long Beach PBA Members but did

not provide any evidence that they were compensated at a greater rate for unused sick leave accumulation than

officers in other Police Departments. In short, the City failed to provide sufficient evidence for the Panel to review

this proposal in comparative context so as to warrant serious consideration of the merits of this proposal.

City Substantive Proposal 10: No Charge to Sick Leave after Reporting to Duty

City Proposal 10 seeks to delete a portion of CBA section 14(m) which provides that if an employee reports for

duty and then leaves due to illness, there shall be no charge made against the employee’s accumulated sick leave.

The City instead proposes that an employee shall be charged on an hour for hour basis for leaving before the end of

the shift.

In 2016, of the 55 instances where a PBA member left work early, fourteen (14) of those times were due to suffering

from a Line of Duty injury and two (2) instances were as a result of a family member becoming ill or injured. In

2017, of the 55 times that a PBA member left work early, eleven (11) of those times were as a result of the employee

suffering a line of duty injury and ten (10) times were as a result of a family member becoming ill or injured. In



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2018, of the 46 times that a PBA member left work early, eleven (11) times it was the result of suffering a line of

duty illness or injury and six (6) times it was a result of a family member becoming ill or injured.

Instances of line of duty injury must clearly be excluded from this proposal because not only is it is wholly

inequitable for a member to have his or her leave bank charged as a result of suffering illness or injury at work,

CBA section 14(d) mandates that a member not lose any benefits while suffering from a line of duty injury.

City Substantive Proposal 12: Termination Leave

As has been noted with a number of the City’s proposals, City Proposal 12 is another multi-part proposal to reduce

benefits afforded to PBA members. The first portion of the proposal is to require that a PBA member achieve

twenty (20) years of service to be eligible for termination leave pursuant to CBA Section 18. The second portion of

the proposal seeks to reduce termination leave payments to four (4) days per year effective June 30, 2017.

The PBA’s position opposing the first portion of this proposal (20 year eligibility) is as set forth in the commentary

relative to City Proposal 9. An officer is eligible to seek retirement under the twenty (20) year plan when combining

total years of service with the City of Long Beach PD together with years of service with a prior police department.

By raising the requirement to twenty (20) years of service exclusively with the Long Beach Police Department this

would have the effect of forcing an officer to work longer than twenty (20) year in order to be eligible to receive

termination benefits. While many officers certainly do work beyond twenty (20) years, the grant of this proposal

would add an incentive for officers to do so. However, since an officer nearing retirement is a more expensive

police officer (when factoring in top step salary, longevity, overtime rate, etc.), this begs the question as to whether

this proposal is actually beneficial or detrimental to the City.

With respect to the second portion of this Proposal (reduce terminal leave pay), the PBA points out that Section 18

was visited and awarded against the PBA in the prior interest arbitration proceeding. CBA Section 18 provides for

payment of six (6) days of terminal leave per year of service accrued by officers prior to the date of the Award and

accrual of five (5) days per year of service prospective from May 29, 2013 for all existing and newly hired police

officers. Based upon the recent reduction in this benefit, it is respectfully submitted that to revisit and further

reduce this benefit in this proceeding would be inequitable. Furthermore, terminal leave paid at the rate of five (5)

days per year is the predominant benefit accorded to police officers employed within the municipal police

jurisdictions of Nassau County.



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City Substantive Proposal 13: Health Insurance Contribution

City Proposal 13 is a multi-part proposal which seeks to impose a twenty (20%) percent contribution towards health

insurance costs on officers currently employed by the City, effective as of June 30, 2017 and a twenty five (25%)

percent contribution obligation towards health insurance costs on the part of new hires.

The City’s argument in favor of its health insurance contribution proposal was that exempt employees of the City

contribute as well as new hires within the CSEA bargaining unit contribute 10%. However, the (then) Acting City

Manager/Police Commissioner acknowledged that the CSEA health insurance contribution rate of 10% for new

hires was achieved through a negotiated collective bargaining agreement with that unit. The City introduced a copy

of that CSEA CBA0 and it should be noted that it is an 8-year agreement.

The cost of health insurance premiums has undoubtedly increased over time as testified to by former City

Comptroller Hansen-Hightower. While the City does not have any control over these premium costs, neither does

the PBA. In order to consider the City’s proposal, the Panel must view it in the context of other police bargaining

units.

It is clear from just the sampling of the other CBAs that either there is no requirement for contribution towards

health insurance coverage or it imposed only upon individuals who take the job knowing already what the existing

contribution levels are (new hires). Additionally, with respect to those departments mandating a contribution, the

contribution level is typically at/about 10% (or less in earlier years) and does not exceed 15% in any Department.

Thus, while the PBA strongly advocates against this Panel imposing any health insurance contribution obligation

whatsoever, if the Panel was inclined to consider imposing a contribution requirement it should only apply such an

obligation upon new hires prospective from the date of the Award. Finally, the PBA urges the Panel to reject the

City’s proposed contribution rates of 20% and 25% as being excessive and unequaled when viewed in the context

of the other bargaining units within the NPC.

City Substantive Proposal 14: In Service Training

City Proposal 14 seeks to delete CBA Section 30(r) requiring all employees to attend one week of in-service training

every two (2) years. The Police Commissioner testified that in-service training requires attendance at a structured

course run by an accredited academy and, as such, the Department can not comply with this contractual mandate.

However, the Police Commissioner acknowledged on cross-examination that, notwithstanding the contractual

obligation of Section 30(r), to his knowledge or recollection there have not been any actions taken by the PBA to

enforce this provision against the City. Since the mere existence of this provision does not cost the City any money



35

and the PBA has not taken any enforcement action relative to this provision, there is no tangible benefit to the City

by eliminating this provision. Conversely, if the impediment to the implementation of this section should be

removed, to wit, the County resumes offering the in-service training course, then in that instance the City is in a

position of arguing against providing its members with available training. It would seem that the prudent thing for

the Panel to do in this instance is to deny the proposal because it would not directly benefit the City in any way at

present or in the future.

City Substantive Proposal 15: Salary Schedule & Steps

City Proposal 15 seeks the implementation of a ten (10) step salary schedule using the current Step 1 with equal

increments to the top step. Currently, there is a six (6) step salary schedule in place for officers hired prior to the

date of the most recent interest arbitration Award (May 29, 2013) and a seven (7) step schedule in place for officers

hired after May 29, 2013. Thus, the most recent Interest Arbitration Award extended the salary schedule steps for

new hires and it is too soon to return to this subject matter for consideration. As of the close of the Record over

twenty (20%) of the PBA bargaining unit was subject to the seven step schedule and that percentage does not include

the new hires mentioned by the Police Commissioner in his testimony or any other hires made since the close of the

Record in this proceeding.

Since this issue has been recently awarded against the PBA in the last interest arbitration proceeding and because

the PBA is already subject to a step structure that is equal or greater than over two thirds of the NPC Departments,

the Panel should decline to revisit this issue at the present time.

PBA SUMMARY COMMENTARY

The PBA will not seek to insult the Panelists’ intelligence by arguing that the financial affairs of the City of Long

Beach are in ideal pristine condition. The evidence introduced at the hearing, including even from the PBA’s

retained financial expert, does not support such an argument. The PBA will not seek to persuade the Panelists to

disregard their statutory obligation to accord a weight of seventy (70%) percent to the “ability to pay” award criteria

as required by New York State Civil Service Law Section 209(6)(e). Instead, the PBA requests only that the Panel

seriously consider and honor, above all, its highest obligation, even superior to the obligation under Section

209(6)(e), which is to render “a just and reasonable determination of the matters in dispute.”

The City argued in its opening that the PBA sought to “avoid tough bargaining by going to interest arbitration and

essentially demanding immunity”. The City argued that the PBA sought the proverbial “safe port in the storm” by

seeking to proceed to interest arbitration to ostensibly avoid making any voluntary concessions during collective



36

bargaining. In actuality, nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, the PBA had no choice and was

compelled by the City to proceed to interest arbitration because of two overriding factors which were entirely out

of the control of the PBA. First, because City officials were seeking and then actually running for elected office

either within the Nassau County or the City itself, they refused to enter into any voluntary collective bargaining

agreement with the PBA to avoid being painted with any brush during election season regardless of the terms that

might have been contained within any such agreement. Second, not only did the City fail at all relevant times to

budget for any increases whatsoever to be allocated to the PBA, the City intended all along to use the municipal

bonding process to finance the costs of any increases to be given to the PBA. In order to utilize the municipal

bonding process to cover costs, they were prohibited from voluntarily reaching an agreement with the PBA and,

instead, needed to be legally compelled to pay the PBA by translating the financial obligation into the form of an

interest arbitration Award. Thus, because of the foregoing factors, the PBA simply could not achieve a voluntarily

negotiated agreement with the City regardless of any actual terms that may have been set forth in such an agreement.

As such, to portray the PBA as being reluctant to bargain in good faith with the City and/or unwilling to make any

concessions in favor of the City, is entirely untrue and unjust.

While the PBA had no choice in the matter to fulfill its obligations to its membership who have been working

without a contract since the expiration of the Award on June 30, 2015, the City did have choices in the matter and,

in each instance, City officials failed to make good choices. In fact, the financial circumstances that the City finds

itself in now are primarily a product of a series of consistently poor choices made by City officials. Instead of

seeking to take appropriate steps to rectify its financial mismanagement, the City now turns to this Panel to request

that the Panel save the City from its own incompetence and mismanagement by drastically slashing the employment

benefits of the PBA’s members. The City is essentially requesting that the Panel save the City from itself on the

backs of the PBA members who put their lives at risk every day to protect and serve the residents of Long Beach.

Instead, the “ability to pay” requires the Panel to take into consideration all resources available to the City to finance

the resulting Award. In this case, it is clear that not only does the City have a past history of bonding to pay for its

obligations, it seems to be the preferred method of operation, whether for interest arbitration awards, termination

payments, or financing of lawsuit costs. Regardless of cash flow, the City has the ability to pay for whatever should

result from this proceeding by securing bond financing.

Despite having been admonished by the State Comptroller in July 2013 for a host of financial missteps including

but not limited to, adopting unrealistic budgets containing unrealistic estimates of revenues and expenditures,

declining fund balances, failing to adequately budget for separation payments and failing to repay advances from



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fund balance transfers, the City failed to correct and/or maintain improvement in its operating habits. Instead of

learning from its past failings and complying with the advice of the State Comptroller, the City has reverted to

adopting unrealistic and structurally imbalanced budgets. By continually appropriating from its reserve fund to

create the illusion of a balanced budget and in turn failing to comply with its own fund balance policy, the City’s

mismanagement has catapulted itself into a situation qualifying it as a fiscally eligible municipal. The City has not

even employed a full time City Comptroller since August 2017.

Despite the City’s continued mismanagement, the City only recently became a fiscally eligible municipality based

upon the FYE 2017 fund balance levels falling below 5%. Prior to FYE 2017, despite drawing down its fund

balance, the City remained above the critical 5% threshold. For FYE 2018 the City remained below the 5%

threshold, however, according to the Moody’s Credit Opinion of February 2019 the City realized “improved

reserves and liquidity.” It is important to note that heading into fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the period of time to

be covered under this Award, the City was not suffering from insufficient reserves and had reduced property taxes

for FYE 2015. It is ironic and unsettling that the City is able to rely on its present financial state to seek to avoid

paying a reasonable wage increase to the PBA members for a period of time when they were actually better able to

pay such an increase and plan appropriately for the future.

Despite maintaining structurally deficient balances through the appropriation of reserve funds and failing to adopt

realistic budgets, during the relevant periods of time, the City continuously and loudly praised its alleged financial

achievements for the public. In actuality, the City was actively misleading its constituents and its bargaining units

regarding its mismanagement of City financial affairs. Nevertheless, despite this mismanagement, the City has

demonstrated that it has the means and the resilience to weather actual and proverbial storms and there is no reason

for the Panel to conclude that the City will not be unable to withstand the present short-term circumstances.

Ultimately, the PBA submits that the Panel has before it sufficient evidence to render a just and reasonable

determination on the issues presented herein and that a just and reasonable determination does not preclude the

Panel from granting the PBA’s proposals, in whole or in part.



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OPINION

Section §209 of the New York State Civil Service Law (Taylor Law) sets forth the parameters which an

Interest Arbitrator must utilize in deciding terms and conditions of employment. These criteria are as follows:

a. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the

arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of employment of other employees

performing similar services or requiring similar skills under similar working conditions and with

other employees generally in public and private employment in comparable communities;

b. the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public employer to pay;

c. comparison of peculiarities in regard to other trades or professions, including specifically, (1)

hazards of employment; (2) physical qualifications; (3) educational qualifications; (4) mental

qualifications; (5) job training and skills; and

d. terms of collective agreements negotiated between the parties in the past providing for

compensation and fringe benefits, including but not limited to, the provision for salary, insurance

and retirement benefits, medical and hospitalization benefits, paid time off and job security.

With these criteria in mind, I turn to the specific issues before me. The first such matter is the initial

criterion.

Criterion (a) is the first issue to be discussed. It concerns the list of appropriate comparators to Long Beach.

The PBA argued that some of the police departments in Nassau County are comparable to Long Beach and that

they should be used in connection with the first of four Taylor Law standards. It stated that the Long Beach wages

and longevity payments have left its police department behind comparable departments both in percentage increases

and top step salaries. The City vociferously objected to this analysis.

The matter of the comparators in this case will be discussed in conjunction with Criterion (c).

Criterion (b) concerns the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public employer

to pay for the costs associated with increases in wages and improvements in benefits. I will first address the interests

and welfare of the public.

It is unquestioned that the needs of the public are met by a properly maintained police force that operates

safely and efficiently. It is also clear that good morale within these units is important. Positive morale results in

higher productivity and a flow of high-quality candidates for available positions.

The issue of the City’s ability to pay requires a different kind of analysis.



39

The PBA acknowledged that the City had experienced significant deficits in recent years. It stressed,

however, that the City has been mismanaged that resulted in the City’s poor financial condition. It indicated that

the City has not reached its constitutional debt limit. Therefore, in the PBA’s view, the City has the ability to

borrow the funds needed to provide a reasonable package of economic benefits.

For its part, the City insisted that it does not have the ability to pay for wage increases. It pointed out that

it could not budget for wage increases for the years covered by this Award. It insisted that the City’s reserves have

been depleted and that, in 2011, Moody’s reduced the City’s bond ratings to just above junk bond status. It added

that by 2012, the City was near bankruptcy.

A further issue to be considered is the City’s designation as a Fiscally Eligible Municipality (FEM). This

designation originated in the office of the New York State Comptroller. The parties set forth the criteria for the

establishment of such a designation in their arguments above.

There is no question about the validity of the designation. Long Beach was properly defined as an FEM.

The City’s economic situation is highlighted by the fact that Long Beach is the MOST Fiscally Eligible

Municipality in New York State. In this regard, the economic problems of the City of Long Beach are singular.

This status has implications for financial matters as well as the designation of comparators. A fundamental

requirement of this designation is the requirement that my co-panelists and I give the ability to pay 70% weight and

all the other criteria combined a total of 30% weight. The matter of the designation of comparators is part of the

30% weight.

Further, in June 2018, the Long Beach City Council requested a comprehensive review of the City’s

finances by the New York State Financial Restructuring Board (FRB), an office under the aegis of the NYS

Comptroller. In June 2019, FRB issued a report of its findings.

The report states that, in March 2018, the Comptroller found that the City had the WORST score in the

State in the 2017 Fiscal Stress Monitoring System. The City had a score of 80.8%, a drastic increase from 58.3%

in 2016. It stressed the depletion and usage of the City’s fund balance in prior years was the result of a tendency

by the City to over-estimate revenues and several years of General Fund operating deficits.

While it is not within the purview of this panel to reform the City’s fiscal practices, it must make note of

the FRB’s reporting of the 2018/2019 separation payouts to Long Beach Police Officers with 30 years of service

upon retirement. On average, these payouts total $553,313. Current data are not readily-available but it must be

assumed that these payouts may have increased since June 2019.

I hasten to point out the Long Beach Fire Department Firefighters and Fire Lieutenants received separation

pay amounts of, at least $300,000 and $410,000, respectively. The issue of Fire Department separation pay amounts

is not before this panel. However, it highlights additional reasons for the City’s dismal fiscal condition. Moreover,

the cost of financing a paid fire department (probably the only one on Long Island) is a budgetary issue.



40

The report contains a chart stating the accruals of sick leave, terminal pay compensatory time and personal

time in the Long Beach Fire Department, Police Department hires before and after May 29, 2013, State Police, and

other state police units. The hours associated with senior Police Officers are staggering given that the separation

pay allowances are paid at the hourly rate of officers at retirement and not the hourly rate at the time of accrual.

Additionally, on June 21, 2020, Newsday published a chart of the tax liability of each resident for severance

pay in Long Beach, Nassau County, Suffolk County, and other municipalities on Long Island. It is striking that per

resident liability in Long Beach is about three times the liability of the other jurisdictions with the exception of the

City of Glen Cove. The taxpayer liability in Long Beach is only twice that of Glen Cove. The chart does not

consider the police department as a separate entity. It would appear that the fire department separation costs are

part of the Newsday analysis.

Finally, Governor Cuomo, in 2013/2014, established a cap on property taxes of the lower of 2% or the rate

of inflation. The record indicates that the City breached the cap twice in the last few years. The property tax

increases were much higher than both 2% and the rate of inflation. Tax increases of that magnitude are

unsustainable and have contributed to the fiscal crisis in Long Beach. Further, breaching the tax cap on a regular

basis is fiscally unacceptable.

Moreover, there are no data available at this time as to the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic. Increased

unemployment and businesses that are still shut down and which may never re-open must be considered when

discussing the Long Beach’s ability to pay. This issue will continue to contribute to depressed tax revenues and

increases in the number of unemployed Long Beach residents.

I am fully aware that the PBA does not bear the full responsibility for the City’s fiscal condition. However,

it bears some of it. I have frequently noted that the PBA negotiated for some of the excesses cited above. The FRB

is not kind to the City in terms of its management of its fiscal condition. It is obvious that the City agreed to the

conditions that have contributed to the current fiscal situation.

While this may be true, the role of the panel is to follow the path set down by the Legislature which is to

ascribe 70% of the weight of its decision-making to the City’s ability to pay. In short, the panel has the difficult

task of determining the financial components of a successor CBA that need to be consistent with the City’s ability

to pay and the legislative limits imposed on the City.

Having thoroughly reviewed the law related to FEMs, the data set forth in the report of the FRB, the

arguments of the parties and all of the relevant data concerning the City’s ability to pay for the PBA proposals, I

conclude that the City is unable to meet the PBA demands. I credit the City’s arguments about its economic

conditions and its status as an FEM. I am persuaded that the City is facing an extremely serious fiscal crisis at this

time.



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The fact that the parties opted to limit the panel’s authority to the issuance of a two-year award is a factor

that contributes to the conclusion stated above. Perhaps a longer term of the award would have provided greater

opportunities to address some of the bargaining issues over a longer time frame.

Criterion (c) is based upon a comparison of the peculiarities of the job of members of the unit involved in

the interest arbitration with other trades or professions, including specifically hazards of employment, physical

qualifications, educational qualifications, mental qualifications and job training and skills. It is clear that police

personnel are faced with serious and unique hazards. Law enforcement personnel, in general, and, in this case,

police officers, risk death and serious injuries regularly. I am acutely aware that these are difficult times and that

the challenges facing the law enforcement community are extraordinary. In many ways, law enforcement is unique

and cannot be compared with other trades and professions.

It goes without saying that police officers today face the same or greater public health issues that threaten

the general population. It is also apparent that there is greater unrest in the community at this time than existed less

than a year ago. As a consequence, there is possibly a greater reliance on law enforcement at this time. In sum,

law enforcement personnel have responsibilities that have always been unique and cannot be compared to other

occupations and professions. The above observation is even more so at this time.

The PBA listed several police departments in Nassau County as appropriate comparators for consideration.

The proposed comparators are the Villages of Freeport, Garden City, Lynbrook, and Rockville Center as well as

the City of Glen Cove.

I had the privilege of serving as the Public Member of the Interest Arbitration Panel in a proceeding

involving the City of Newburgh and its PBA. The date of the Newburgh Award was January 2016. Like Long

Beach, the City of Newburgh was, at the time, an FEM. In that Award I stated that relevant comparators need to be

jurisdictions that are also FEMs. The same reasoning is applicable here.

Applying that logic here, there are numerous reasons why each of the proposed comparators is not valid.

However, first and foremost, not a single one of them is an FEM, much less the most distressed jurisdiction in New

York State. Not one of the proposed comparatorsis facing the challenges faced by the City of Long Beach. When

put in that context, how can they be compared to Long Beach? In short, they cannot be.

The final statutory criterion, statutory criterion (d), requires a consideration of past collective bargaining

agreements between the parties with respect to compensation and fringe benefits. The record is replete with prior

Agreements and other relevant data. These documents were given appropriate consideration.

Before beginning the analysis of the parties’ proposals, I must note that I have frequently used the phrase

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively. That must be read to mean that officers hired between June 30, 2017

and the date of this Award will not be governed by that specific provision.



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TERM OF THE AWARD

Consistent with CSL §209(2), the parties agreed to authorize me to issue an award covering two years.

Thus, this award is a two-year award that covers the period of July 1, 2015-June 30, 2017.

PBA PROPOSAL 1: WAGES & CITY PROPOSAL 15: 10-STEP SALARY SCHEDULE

The PBA seeks 5% increases in each of the two years of this Award. The City argued that it is unable to

provide for any increases during the term of this Award. This analysis must consider that Long Beach is an FEM,

the findings of the FRB, and the tax burden of the residents of Long Beach. I have also considered the average

salary of PBA members during the two years of this Award. In addition, the salaries of PBA members exceeded the

average salaries of Nassau Police Conference (NPC) members. As noted above, none of the NPC members is found

in communities that have the same level of fiscal distress as does Long Beach. In sum, I am persuaded that there

can be no wage increases for the period of this Award.

However, in view of the above, all police officers who were employed by the Long Beach Police

Department on June 30, 2020 will receive a one time payment of $1,500. This sum will not be reflected in the

salary schedule and will be paid in equal installments of $750 on January 1, 2021 and July 1, 2021.

The City proposed a 10-step salary schedule, effective June 30, 2017. This change would apply to new hires

only.

The PBA observed that the current salary schedule is a six-step schedule, with officers hired after May 29,

2013 being placed on a seven-step schedule. The PBA argued that it is too soon to revisit this issue.

It is true that the 2013 Interest Arbitration Award established a seven-step salary schedule for officers hired

after May 29, 2013. However, the City’s economic condition has significantly worsened since the last Award. In

light of the current economic plight, I conclude that a 10-step salary schedule is appropriate with the following

conditions:

1. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, there will be a 10-step salary schedule for new hires.

2. The current Step 1 will be Step 1 on the new 10-step schedule. The current top step will be Step 10 of the

new 10-step schedule.

3. All steps will be of equal value with the exception of Step 5. Step 5 will be a $14,000 step. This will coincide

with the initiation of health insurance payments for officers hired on or after June 30, 2017, but not

retroactively. The $14,000 increase will include the step increase as well as funds for the payment of a

15% contribution toward the cost of health insurance for at least one year.

4. Current PBA members will remain on the schedule on which they were placed when hired.

Thus, the PBA’s wage proposal is denied but the City’s 10-step salary proposal as set forth above is granted.



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PBA PROPOSAL 2: PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT

The PBA proposed a modification of Section 3 (d) of the expired CBA such that an officer with prior

experience as a sworn police officer in a NYS DCJS be given credit for those years of service such that they would

be placed on the salary schedule step commensurate with the number of years of prior service. The current contract

language places an experienced new hire on Step 1 of the salary schedule.

The PBA urged that officers hired with prior experience are of great value to the department since they

need not be trained in the Academy and can hit the ground running. It stressed that this proposal recognizes the

asset of having experienced new hires join the department.

The City urged the denial of this proposal. It argued that this proposal, if granted, would be very costly, It

added that only one police department provides such a benefit and two others may take prior experience into

consideration when hiring new officers with prior experience but are not required to do so.

In effect, given the number of current steps in the salary schedule, new hires with six years of prior

experience in law enforcement would begin their careers in Long Beach on the top of the salary schedule. Such a

proposal is unaffordable. Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the City had difficulty in hiring new

police officers. Moreover, the new hires are aware that they will be placed on Step 1 and are willing to accept the

position. Lastly, even if NPC data are usable for comparative analyses, this is a practice that is not followed in the

vast majority of police departments in Nassau County

I find no basis for granting a proposal which can only exacerbate the City’s fiscal distress. Therefore, this

proposal is denied.

PBA PROPOSAL 3: LONGEVITY COMPENSATION

The PBA made a two-part proposal. The first part sought a change in the schedule of longevity payments

as follows: After 6 years- $2,000 per year, After 10 years- $3,500 per year, After 15 years- $5,000 per year, Years

16-35- $1,000 per year until Year 35. The second part of the proposal, officers with prior law enforcement

experience would get credit for those years when their longevity payments are calculated.

The PBA argued that the longevity payments in Long Beach are not competitive with those in other NPC

departments. It set forth a detailed analysis of the comparisons between Long Beach longevity payments per level

and other NPC members. It stressed that the cost of this proposal is $24,500 per year.

As to the second aspect of this proposal, the PBA’s assertions were very similar to those made in connection

with Proposal 2.

The City asserted that there is no basis for the approval of this proposal. It added that the longevity

payments to officers with 10-19 years of experience are about the average of NPC departments and are above

average for officers with at least 20 years of service.



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The City’s arguments in opposition of the second aspect of this proposal were largely the same as those

made in connection with Proposal 2.

I accept the PBA argument that the cost of this proposal is $24,500. That may be true for the first year.

However, the cost of the second year would be $49,000 and the cost of the third year would be $73,500 and so on.

Assuming the accuracy of the PBA’s calculation, the new cost of each succeeding year would be $24,500 but the

aggregate cost must reflect the cost of the prior years. The cost of this proposal over time is very expensive and is

well beyond Long Beach’s ability to pay for them.

Moreover, a large majority of the PBA members receive longevity payments that are the average or above

the average of those received by NPC members.

With respect to the proposal to grant credit for prior service for officers having performed law enforcement

duties before coming to Long Beach, the reasons for my denial of Proposal 2 are applicable here.

However, the schedule of longevity payments will be modified as follows:

1. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively,there will be no additional longevity payments after 25 years.

2. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively,Officers with 25 or more years of service will be capped at

their current rate.

3. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, officers with more than 20 years of service and fewer than

25 years of service will continue to receive their currently scheduled longevity payments until their 25th

year and the payments will be capped at that point.

4. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, Officers with fewer than 20 years of service will continue to

be paid current longevity payments until their 25th year, at which time the payments will be capped.

5. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, new hires will receive the following longevity payments:

a. In Years 11-15, they will receive a $3,000 longevity payment but these amounts will not be cumulative.

b. In Years 16-25, they will receive an additional $2,000 per year for a total of $5,000 per year but these

amounts will not be cumulative.

In short, both parts of PBA Proposal 3 are denied. However, the modifications to Section 3 are needed due

to the City’s economic conditions.

PBA PROPOSAL 4: PERSONAL LEAVE TIME

The PBA proposed that the officers working 10-hour tours be given 50 hours of personal leave. It posited

that the CBA grants officers five days of personal leave. It added that all but four officers work 10-hour tours and

that the five personal days granted in the CBA is the equivalent to 50 hours of personal leave for people who work

10-hour tours. It pointed out that a number of NPC members receive in excess of 40 hours of personal leave. It

indicated that the cost of this proposal is $41,405.22.



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The City stressed that the CBA grant of five days of personal leave applies to officers working either 8 or

10 hour tours. It added that it is undisputed that, when the 10-hour tour was implemented, many leave provisions

were converted to hours and that, inadvertently, personal leave was not so converted. It noted that officers working

10-hour tours make fewer appearances per year and this factor must be considered. Finally, it maintains that the

PBA calculation of the cost of this proposal does not take into account the overtime costs associated with this

proposal.

It is striking that only four NPC departments grant in excess of 40 hours of personal leave. It would appear

that the PBA should consider negotiating 8-hour tours if it is convinced that the 5 days (40 hours) of personal leave

is reflective of 8 hour tours.

As to the PBA’s calculation of the cost of this proposal ($41,405.22), I call attention to my previous analysis

of the cost of proposals. $41,405.22 is the first-year cost of this proposal. This cost escalates rapidly in Years 2, 3

and beyond.

This proposal is denied because of its costliness. Furthermore, the argument cannot be made that Long

Beach is an outlier in this connection. Moreover, the modifications to Section 14(g)(1) of the expired CBA are

based on the dire economic conditions in Long Beach.

The current personal leave payment schedule will be modified as follows:

1. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, all officers will receive 30 hours of personal leave per

year.

2. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, personal leave hours will not be accumulated. However,

officers will be paid for unused personal leave time in the second pay period following the end of the

fiscal year. Such payments will be based on the officer’s daily rate of pay as of June 30 of the prior

fiscal year.

3. However, officers who have accrued in excess of 30 hours of personal leave will retain those hours, but

the provisions of City Proposal 10 will apply such that the cap of $275,000 on Separation Pay will be

in force

PROPOSAL 5: VACATIONS

The PBA proposed that officers have the right to work and not utilize, two weeks of their vacation. The

proposal sought to have the ability to work a second week of vacation as a right and not be subject to the

Commissioner’s approval. Finally, it indicated that an officer who works one week of vacation over the summer

be able to work a second week of vacation during the rest of the year.

The PBA observed that granting this proposal would be a benefit to the City as well as to PBA members.

It added that very few members work one full week of vacation time and it is questionable as to how many would

want to work a second week of vacation. It suggested that the gross cost of this proposal is $22,390.



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The City challenged the need for this proposal. It maintained that very few officers need or want to work a

second vacation week. It asserted that those members who want to work a second week of vacation can do so with

the approval of the Commissioner. In addition, the City pointed out that only two police departments provide its

officers with the right to work two weeks of vacation.

The PBA failed to show a need for this proposal. A small number of officers opt to work one week of

vacation. Presumably, even fewer would want to work a second week of vacation and anyone who has an urgent

need to work a second week of vacation, can do so with the approval of the Commissioner. Further, of the 19 NPC

departments, only two offer the right to officers to work two weeks of vacation.

The undersigned concludes that this is a proposal in search of a problem. However, based upon the City’s

financial challenges, the following modifications to the vacation allocations will be made:

1. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, in Years 1-5, new hires will receive 120 hours of vacation

leave (15 days of 8-hour tours or 12 days of 10-hour tours) In Years 6 and beyond, new hires will

receive 160 hours of vacation leave (20 days of 8-hour tours or 16 days of 10-hour tours).

2. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, at the time of separation from the Long Beach

Police Department, officers with accumulated vacation leave will be paid out at separation

from service pursuant to City Proposal 4.

The PBA proposal is denied because of its costliness. Furthermore, the argument cannot be made that Long

Beach is an outlier in this connection. Moreover, the above modifications are based on the dire economic conditions

in Long Beach.

In short, the PBA proposal as stated is denied. However, the vacation schedule for new hires will be added

to the relevant provision in the CBA.

PBA PROPOSAL 6: HOLIDAYS

The PBA proposed increasing the number of paid holidays from 13 to 15. It indicated that the increase

would be the observance of Yom Kippur and Police Memorial Day.

It argued that Yom Kippur is the holiest day for Jewish people and that there are a number of Jewish police

officers in the Long Beach Police Department

As to Police Memorial Day, according to the PBA, a paid holiday on this day would give officers the

opportunity to reflect on the loss of police officers. It suggested that this paid holiday would be an appropriate

recognition of the risks faced by police officers.

It acknowledged that no other NPC departments give these days as police holidays. It added that other

departments have paid holidays not enjoyed in Long Beach.

It stated that the cost of this proposal would be at least $34,652.91 and that this amount could be increased

by about $7,716.80.



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The City argued that the Long Beach police officers receive 13 paid holidays per year. It added that only

one NPC member provides more than 13 paid holidays. It insisted that giving the PBA 15 paid holidays would be

greater than the number of paid holidays received by the City’s firefighters and every member of the NPC.

There is no justification to increasing the number of paid holidays from 13 to 15. No other police

department has 15 paid holidays. Thus, the Long Beach PBA has the same number of paid holidays as does virtually

every other police department

While the need to increase the number of paid holidays is, at best, dubious, the proposed specific days are

equally or more dubious. Any officer who wants to have these days off can do so by taking personal leave days.

Last, the cost of this proposal cannot be justified in Long Beach. The mid and long-term costs of proposals

have been previously analyzed and need not be repeated here.

This proposal is denied.

PBA PROPOSAL 7: CLOTHING AND UNIFORM ALLOWANCE

This proposal was initially comprised of two parts. The second part of the proposal was withdrawn before

the commencement of the hearing.

The remaining part of this proposal seeks a $300 a year increase in clothing and uniform allowance for

uniformed officers and detectives.

The PBA averred that its members need to buy their uniforms because the department does not provide

them. It added that officers need to buy at least one and possible two complete uniforms per year at a cost of about

$1,100 per uniform. As such, it posits that a $300 increase in this allowance falls short of what is needed. It stresses

that this issue has not been addressed since 1991.

The City observed that it cannot afford to absorb the cost of this proposal. It stated that comparative data

does not justify the cost of this proposal. It indicated that most other departments provide uniforms rather than an

allowance to purchase uniforms. In its view, it is not as if most other departments provide higher uniform

allowances.

I am persuaded that an increase in the clothing and uniform allowance is overdue. That being said, given

the term of this Award, it is likely that the parties will be back at the bargaining table in short order. With that in

mind, the $300 increase in the Clothing and Uniform Allowance will be approved as a one-time payment for officers

on Long Beach Police Department payroll as of the date of this Award. If this continues to be an issue, the parties

can discuss it in the next round of bargaining.

PBA PROPOSAL 8: DENTAL AND EYEGLASS COVERAGE

This proposal has three parts. The first calls for an increase from a $1,500 maximum per year to a $3,500

maximum per year for dental coverage. The second part seeks a lifetime per person increase for orthodontia from



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$2,000 to $5,000. The final section requests a per person increase in eyeglass coverage from $100 per person to

$200 and that the benefit be per calendar year rather than being bi-annual.

The PBA argued that the cost of dental work has increased exponentially over the years. It pointed out that

this benefit has not increased in 19 years.

With respect to the increase in lifetime orthodontia coverage, the PBA surveyed local orthodontists and

learned that orthodontia fees average between $5,000 and $7,000. It added that the current benefit covers 35-40%

of the cost of orthodontia, It noted that this benefit has not been addressed for at least 15 years.

With respect the optical benefit, the City requires individual officers to incur the cost of examinations,

frames and lenses. It stresses that the cost of an eye examination is $69-$135. The minimum cost of lenses is $120

and this does not address that cost of frames.

It argues that that the cost of this benefit to the City has been comparatively low. It asserts that the cost of

this benefit to the City is a small investment in the safety, performance, and quality of life of the police officers.

The City observed that it is not in the position to absorb the cost of this benefit. It added that this is

particularly true in light that PBA members do not contribute anything to the cost of health insurance.

I find that these proposals are costly. At a time when the City’s financial condition is extremely precarious,

this proposal is denied. This proposal might be given a more positive response in future rounds of bargaining.

PBA PROPOSAL 9: ELIMINATE TRAINING DAYS

The PBA sought the elimination of the two training days. It states that the City is not using the training

days for their intended purpose. The City has been using one of the days for firearms training, an activity which

takes four hours, not the eight hours granted to the City. It observed that rather than increasing the effectiveness of

the department, the City is actually deducting time from the officers’ banks if it does not send the officer for training.

The City stated that there is no basis to grant this proposal. It asserted that one of the days is used for

firearms training. It opined that, if this proposal were granted, officers would seek overtime to attend the training.

It added that there are multiple opportunities to participate in training and that requests for training are routinely

granted.

Staff training is vital and is evidently available, upon request. I find no reason to grant this proposal.

PBA PROPOSAL 10: AMEND THE STEADY TOUR AGREEMENT

This proposal seeks a change in the Steady Tour Agreement such that one member of every tour shall be

allowed to use accruals for time off without denial, except in the case of a declared emergency.

The PBA averred that this proposal is designed to provide that members of all three tours enjoy a benefit

enjoyed by only officers working on Tour 3. It stressed that the current staffing results in officers who work in

Tours 1 and 2 being unable to secure time off other than for regularly scheduled vacation time. It noted that the

Commissioner acknowledged that the time off at the core of this proposal is not granted. It posited that this time



49

off is a quality of life issue. It cited the number of hours taken for time off in 2017 and demonstrated that officers

assigned to Tours 1 and 2 were able to take 40-50 fewer hours of time as compared with those working Tour 3.

The City urged the denial of this proposal. It noted that the Commissioner testified that this proposal would

create severe hardship, particularly during the summer months. Moreover, stated the City, this proposal could

generate a great deal of overtime, a situation which is unaffordable at this time.

I am persuaded that there is value to this proposal. It provides the same benefit to all officers. In addition,

at a time when officers are being encouraged to utilize unused contractual time off provisions, the granting of this

proposal will facilitate that objective. Finally, the record suggests that this proposal is administratively manageable

by the City.

Therefore, effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, the fourth paragraph of Section 6 of the Steady

Tour Agreement is modified such that one member of each tour will be allowed to exercise his/her right to use

accumulated time without the denial of same, except in the case of a declared emergency.

PBA PROPOSAL 11: HEALTH INSURANCE BUYBACK BENEFITS

The current CBA permits individual officers to receive a $1,000 buyback if they substitute health insurance

benefits from an outside source in lieu of City-provided benefits and a $2,000 buyback for officers who have a

family plan. This proposal posits that there be a $5,000 buyback to officers with individuals or family plans.

The PBA observed that the cost of an individual plan is $12,179.76 while the cost of a family plan is

$28,177.80. Thus, in its view, the net savings for the City if this proposal is granted, will be substantial. Therefore,

the PBA posits, this proposal is beneficial to both PBA members and the City of Long Beach.

The City observed that the PBA stated that 22 of its members could be eligible for the buyback and that 8

of the 10 officers polled expressed interest in accepting the buyback. It indicated that it might be interested in the

proposal if the PBA would ensure that a defined minimum number of officers would take advantage of the proposal.

I agree that this proposal would be beneficial to both the officers and the City. In that vein, the proposal is

granted as follows:

1. Every officer must have health insurance provided either by the City or by an outside health insurance

provider.

2. There is no basis for, in effect, providing a greater benefit for individual health insurance recipients than to

those receiving family benefits.

3. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, officers receiving individual benefits will be eligible for a

$3,000 buyback.

4. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, officers receiving family benefits will be eligible for a $5,000

buyback.



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5. A minimum of four officers must opt for this buyback for the increased buybacks to be implemented and

continued.

PBA PROPOSAL 12: INCREASE OF MEAL PERIOD FROM 60 TO 75 MINUTES AND INCREASE OF

MEAL ALLOWANCE FROM $7.50 TO $12.50

The PBA observed that the meal money allowance has not been increase in many years. It stated that the

requested increase would represent an increase in cost of $8,375. It limited the increase in meal allowance to

situations in which an officer working a 10-hour tour works an additional two hours of overtime.

The City maintained that there is no basis for extending meal breaks to 75 minutes. As to the situation in

which an officer works 12 consecutive hours, the City notes that the officer receives a $7.50 meal allowance plus

one hour of compensatory time. It stresses that the cost of compensatory time under these circumstances has been

slightly less than $200,000 in 2016-17 and 2017-18. It asserts that increasing these costs is not possible under

current financial conditions.

I agree that lengthening meal breaks is not necessary. As to the increase in the meal allowance for officers

who work 12 consecutive hours, it is costly and is not appropriate under current fiscal conditions. Therefore, both

aspects of this proposal are denied.

Before addressing the City proposals, I note that the numbering of the City proposals is not clear. Thus,

for purposes of this award, I will rely on the City’s brief dated March 12, 2019.

CITY PROPOSAL 1: DELETE THE REQUIREMENT OF TWO HOURS OF PAY FOR OFF-DUTY

NOTIFICATIONS

The City proposed the deletion of Section 7(c)(i) of the expired CBA. It cited the Commissioner’s statement

that off-duty notifications are rare and when such notifications are made, the officer is inconvenienced for one or

two minutes.

The PBA, for its part, claimed that the existing language protects the sanctity of the officers’ off duty hours.

It agreed that that this issue arises with great infrequency.

It is not clear how much money would be saved by granting this proposal. However, since the City has

indicated that officers have not been and will not be unreasonably contacted when they are off duty, there is no

reason at this point to delete this element of the CBA. Further, since the parties will be engaging in collective

bargaining in the near future, if this issue becomes more significant, the City can raise it at that time. Therefore,

City Proposal 1 is denied.

CITY PROPOSAL 2: REDUCE COURT CANCELLATION NOTICE FROM 72 HOURS TO 12 HOURS

This proposal would delete Section 7 (d)(1) (a) from the expired CBA.



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The City argued that, currently, officers receiving the cancellation notice fewer than 72 hours in advance

of the court appearance have the option of reporting to headquarters to work four hours. It observed that the work

done during those four hours is not significant.

The PBA argued that officers are precluded from making personal plans when court appearances have been

scheduled. It added that the City produced no data indicating the frequency with which this situation arises and the

savings to be accrued from the granting of the proposal.

I conclude that, at a time of rapid communications, requiring 72 hours of notice of court cancellations is

unreasonable. At the same time, officers are entitled to reasonable notice of court cancellations. I conclude that 24

hours of notice of court cancellations is appropriate. Such notice provides sufficient time for officers to rearrange

personal calendars. Thus, the court notice cancellation notice found in Section 7(d)(1)(a) is reduced from72 hours

to 24 hours, effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively.

CITY PROPOSAL 3: ELIMINATE EMPLOYEE’S OPTION TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE DAY TOUR

WHEN SCHEDULED TO WORK THE NIGHT TOUR BUT REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN COURT

DURING THE DAY TOUR

This proposal seeks the deletion of the phrase at the employee’s option from Section 7(e) of the expired

CBA. The City seeks to have the assignment to the Day Tour become a management decision. It observes that this

modification to Section 7(e) would result in a reduction in overtime costs.

The PBA argued that the City failed to produce data as to the overtime savings that would result from the

granting of this proposal.

I have examined City Exhibits 40-41 and note that they in fact relate to overtime costs. Exhibit 40 outlines

total overtime costs in 2016-17 and Exhibit 41 indicates the overtime payments of a specific officer for a specific

period of time. I note that Exhibit 41 indicates the basis for each overtime payment.

I do not doubt that there might be overtime costs associated with the assignment of a Night Tour officer to

the Day Tour on days when s/he must appear in court during the Day Tour. However, the exhibits do not indicate

the frequency of the occurrences when officers opt for a Day Tour assignment on days of court appearances and the

overtime costs associated with same.

Exhibit 41 shows that the City has the ability to determine the overtime costs associated with the fact pattern

reflected by this proposal. I recognize that the City faces dire economic conditions. However, the panel is entitled

to know the overtime costs associated with this proposal. In the absence of such data, this proposal must be denied.

CITY PROPOSAL 4: CALCULATE THE RATE FOR OVERTIME AND LEAVE ACCUMULATIONS

BASED ON A 261 DAY CHART INSTEAD OF A 232 DAY CHART AND LIMIT MAXIMUM PAYOUTS

FOR ALL ENTITLEMENTS TO TWICE THE OFFICER’S BASE PAY



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This proposal relates to Section 8 of the expired CBA. The contract language states that leave

accumulations accrued prior to July 1, 1994 will be paid out based on a 261-day chart and all accumulations accrued

after July 1, 1994 will be paid out based on a 232-day chart. The issue at hand does not have anything to do with

pre-July 1, 1994 accruals.

The City’s proposal seeks to have post-July 1, 1994 accruals paid out based on a 261-day chart. It posited

that the requested change in the manner in which accumulated overtime and accumulated leave is paid out would

produce a great deal of savings for the City.

It observed that the history of the calculation of payouts for members of the Nassau County Police

Department (NCPD) shows that, since January 1, 2009, the payouts for overtime and other benefits have been based

on a 261-day chart. It stressed that the current difficult times require this change.

In addition to the above, the City proposed limiting separation payouts to twice the officer’s base pay. It

maintained that such an approach is followed in the NCPD.

The City insisted that, in recent years, many payouts exceeded $500,000 with two such payouts being about

$650,000 and $680,000. It pointed out the City has resorted to issuing bonds in order to finance the separation

payouts. It added that the State Comptroller has admonished the City for having done so.

The PBA argued that the change in the basis for calculating separation payouts from a 232-day chart to a

261-day chart is devoid of sound reasoning and argument and is not supported by meaningful data. It pointed out

that the current payout schedule was the result of a 1994 arbitration award. It stressed that the public member of

that panel pointed out the officers work a 232-day schedule but are paid overtime and for other benefits based on a

261-day chart. The PBA observed that the public member found the variation to be significant and that it makes no

sense.

It argued that the ripple effect of such a change would be enormous. It added that it would result in a multi-

million-dollar compensation reduction imposed on the PBA. It added that this proposal is not limited to future hires

or a prospective application of this change to current police officers.

I have given this matter intense consideration and find that the proposal to change the calculation for

payouts of a variety of accrued benefits to be of such importance to the parties that there needs to be renewed face

to face bargaining over the subject. It is apparent that the CBA resulting from this proceeding will have expired on

the date of its issuance. Accordingly, the parties will be back at the bargaining table virtually immediately after this

Award is issued. If the City contends that this change is required, it needs to engage in face to face bargaining.

This is not to say that I conclude that the underlying issue of payouts at the time of separation from the

Department is not of inestimable importance. The FRB report indicating the level of such payouts cannot be

ignored. Payouts in the police department that, on average, exceed $500,000 and may be as high as $700,000 are

unsustainable. As the public member of this panel, I must address this matter.



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The second aspect of the City’s proposal caps on Separation Payouts at twice the officer’s base pay at the

time of retirement. I must grant this proposal in principal. However, I find that the more appropriate cap on

Separation Payouts should be $275,000. It is a very significant sum and it begins to set limits on the City’s fiscal

liability when officers separate from the Department.

The implementation of this proposal requires comment. As noted above, it would be improper to hold the

PBA entirely responsible for the current situation. It represented its members in seeking these benefits. However,

it is not clear that it could not foresee the current status.

However, City representatives sitting on the opposite side of the table agreed to the current level of accruals.

Those representatives knew or should have known that a day of reckoning would come. Instead of addressing these

matters forthrightly and responsibly, they opted for double digit tax increases and bonding to pay for the payouts.

They had to know that the bonding was improper. The NYS Comptroller admonished them for doing so. Further,

the City leadership knew that there was a 2% cap on property taxes and then, on two occasions, levied taxes that

were five times greater than the 2% tax cap.

To the extent that both the City and the PBA are faced with a fiscal crisis of enormous complexity, the

implementation of the cap on separation payouts at $275,000 must be accompanied by guidelines to be followed.

1. Officers hired after June 30, 2017 will be bound by the cap on separation payouts of $275,000 at the

time of retirement.

2. Officers hired before June 30, 2017 who have fewer than 20 years of total service but have a minimum

of 15 years of total service in the Long Beach Police Department will be excluded from the cap on

separation payouts until the first day of their 21st year of service either totally in the Long Beach Police

Department and in a prior police department. In addition, all accruals of any type will be capped at

their current levels and the daily rate of pay used in calculating the separation payouts will be capped

at the daily rate of pay as of the date of this Award.

3. The City will waive the contract provision requiring 15 years of service in the Long Beach Police

Department in order for officers to retire with retiree health insurance in instances in which the officers

have 20 years of credited service but have fewer than 15 years of service in the Long Beach police

Department.

4. Officers currently eligible to retire are exempt from the $275,000 cap provided they have

submitted their retirement papers on or about the date of this Award and retire within 90 days

of the submission of the retirement papers.

The current level of accruals is very large and unsustainable. The foregoing provisions will reduce the size

of the separation payouts. This is not a small change to the CBA.

However, once it is done, the officers with large leave balances will have been dealt with equitably and



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fairly while the above-described cap will help to provide long term stability for the City

I read the PBA brief numerous times and commend the author of the document for the clarity of his writing.

The brief effectively lays out the history of the bargaining as well as the relationship of the Long Beach Police

Department to the members of the NPC in general and its proposed comparators in particular.

I would be remiss if I did not also express my admiration for the City’s brief. It was well-written and clearly

laid out the relevant and compelling data that must be considered at this time.

In its discussion of the matter of the cap described above, the PBA accurately set forth the changes in leave

accruals that resulted from the last Interest Arbitration Award. While there were many changes in the accruals of

officers hired after the issuance of the 2013 Award, there was no cap established on separation payouts. The officers

hired with reduced benefits took the job knowing the content of the benefits package. They now know the limits of

their accruals and have ample time to address the cap. The more senior officers with 15 years or more of service

deserve and will receive appropriate consideration relative to the $275,000 cap on separation payouts.

Last, once the separation payouts are calculated pursuant to the above, these payouts will be made in

bi-weekly equal installments over a five-year period.

In sum, the proposal to calculate separation payout based on a 261-day chart is denied. However, the

proposal to establish a cap of $275,000 on separation payouts is granted.

CITY PROPOSAL 5: ELIMINATE SICK LEAVE FOR FAMILY ILLNESS AND REDUCE THE SICK

LEAVE ENTITLEMENT OF NEW HIRES TO TWELVE (12) DAYS PER YEAR

The first part of this proposal would require the elimination of Section 14(e) of the expired CBA. The City

argued that the use of Family Sick Leave is very costly. It added that PBA members already receive 26 days of

sick leave and that there is no need for additional leave for family illnesses.

The PBA asserted that its members have not abused this element of Section 14 (e) of the CBA. It argued

that PBA members who availed themselves of this provision have used fewer than three family sick days in 2015,

2016, and 1207. It added that it is difficult for officers to secure time to attend to family illnesses.

I note that the records cited by the PBA are unrebutted. The contract allows for five days per year for

family illness. The record shows that the bulk of the Department takes no family sick leave days and that those

who take such leave have taken between two and three days.

I am persuaded that, in the scope of the City’s financial distress, the use of family sick leave days is not a

major problem at this point. That is not to say that the City has no recourse if a problem along these lines develops.

It can propose contract changes in future negotiations should the problem require addressing.

As to the reduction of the number of sick leave days for new hires from 26 days to 12 days, Commissioner



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Tangney observed that officers rarely use 26 sick leave days in a single year. The City contends that the granting

of this proposal will reduce the number of unused sick leave that must be paid out at the time of separation.

The PBA argued that, to the extent that this proposal affects only new hires, in the last Interest Arbitration

Award, the sick leave accumulation and subsequent payouts for new hires was reduced from 50% of 400 unused

sick leave days to 50% of 200 unused sick leave days. It concluded that the City did not provide evidence to warrant

this aspect of City Proposal 5.

To the extent that the record suggests that, in most instances, 26 sick leave days are neither needed nor

taken, must be carefully considered. Thus, the result of the sick leave allotments has contributed to the very large

payouts when officers either retire or otherwise separate from service. The issue of said payouts has been a recurring

theme in this Award.

The focus of sick leave allotments must be on the needs of officers and not on payouts at the time of

retirement. Thus, officers hired after June 30, 2017 will receive 100 hours of sick leave in Years 1-5 of their service

in Long Beach and will receive 120 hours of sick leave after their fifth year of service. Given that most officers

work 10-hour tours, the new hires will receive 10 sick leave days in their first five years of service and 12 days of

sick leave beginning in Year 6. This provision will not be imposed retroactively to officers hired between June 30,

2017 and the date of the issuance of this Award.

Therefore, the proposal to eliminate sick leave days for family illness is denied. The proposal to reduce the

number of sick, leave days is granted, as modified above.

CITY PROPOSAL 6: REQUIRE MEMBERS TO HAVE 20 YEARS OF SERVICE TO BE PAID OUT FOR

SICK LEAVE & REDUCE MEMBERS’ MAXIMUM SICK LEAVE PAYOUT FROM 50% TO 33.3%

Under Section 14(f), members with a minimum of 10 years of service may be paid for 50% of their unused

sick leave upon termination of employment (except for discharge for cause). It proposed that the officers in question

be required to have served in Long Beach for 20 years in order to be eligible for the payout for sick leave days. In

addition, it proposed that members, including those hired after May 29, 2013, be paid out upon separation for service

for 33.3% of their unused sick leave.

The PBA asserted that the Commissioner stated that it is uncommon for officers with 10-19 years of service

to leave the Department and that this proposal would have a limited effect on the majority of the Department. It

noted that the Commissioner stressed that it would be unfair to officers who are eligible to retire after 20 years of

service, even if some portion of the 20 years was not in the service of the Long Beach Police Department. It added

that 58% of the Department had almost four years of service elsewhere before being hired in Long Beach. It added

that the City has not provided any support of this proposal. Further, stated the PBA, it is unfair to change the rules

of employment after leaving previous jobs before coming to Long Beach.

With respect to the reduction of the payout for unused sick leave from 50% to 33.3%, the PBA asserts that



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the City produced no financial data in support of the reduction. Further, the PBA argued that there is no evidence

that the sick leave payout in Long Beach is greater than that of other police departments.

I credit the argument regarding the Commissioner’s estimate of scope of the problem, (i.e., it is uncommon

for officers to separate from service with 10-19 years of service). Furthermore, given the limited advantage to

granting this proposal, one must weigh the effect of this proposal in the hiring of officers with prior experience. The

scattergram indicates that there will be increasing numbers of retirements. While there are advantages to hiring

officers newly out of the Academy, there are also advantages to hiring officers with prior experience.

I conclude that, on balance, the Long Beach Police Department may be in superior hiring position if this

proposal is denied. Moreover, it appears that the limited financial advantage to the City makes this proposal less

meritorious.

The second aspect of this proposal, reducing the payout for unused sick leave, from 50% to 33.3%, is

premature. This Award reduces the cap on separation payouts to $275,000. I opine that one needs to see the

effectiveness of this change on the reduction of the size of the separation payouts to an affordable level. If the

aforementioned change is inadequate, the City has the option of bringing this proposal back into future negotiations.

In short, both elements of City Proposal 6 are denied.

CITY PROPOSAL 7: MEMBERS WHO COME TO WORK AND GO HOME SICK SHOULD BE

CHARGED ON AN HOUR-FOR-HOUR BASIS

The City proposed the deletion of Section 14(m). This provision provides for no charge to sick leave when

officers report to work and subsequently leave because of the onset of an illness.

The PBA observed that, on many occasions, officers leave work early due to line of duty injuries. It added

that the frequency of incidents when officers leave work early for sickness is insignificant in the context of the

number of shifts worked on a daily basis.

The City stressed that officers leave work early due to illness regularly. It noted that this happened 171

times in 2016, 2017, and 2018. It maintained that the acceptance of this proposal would be fair and would reduce

the sick leave accruals paid out as part of the separation payouts.

There is no reason to permit officers to leave work early due to illness without being charged for sick leave

when they might stay out of work for the exact same reason, with their sick leave bank being charged.

The PBA argument about officers going home early due to line of duty injuries ignores the availability of

General Municipal Law Section 207-c. Officers suffering line of duty injuries that are causally connected to the

performance of their duties may be eligible for hour-for-hour leave under the statute.

I am convinced that this proposal is meritorious. Thus, City Proposal 7 is granted.



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CITY PROPOSAL 8: TERMINAL LEAVE DAYS SHOULD BE REDUCED TO FOUR SUCH DAYS PER

YEAR OF SERVICE AND THE OFFICERS MUST HAVE 20 YEARS OF SERVICE IN ORDER TO

RECEIVE TERMINATION LEAVE PAY

The City proposed the modification of Section 18 of the expired CBA such that officers with a minimum

of 20 years of service would be granted four days of terminal leave per year of service. It posited that the granting

of this proposal would have a sizeable effect on separation payouts.

The PBA urged the denial of both elements of this proposal. With respect to the reduction of the number

of the number of terminal leave days from five per year to four, it recalled that this proposal was considered during

the last Interest Arbitration and was denied. It observed that the number of terminal leave days per year was reduced

in the last Interest Arbitration Award and that a further reduction at this time would be inequitable. It added that

most police departments provide five days of terminal leave.

As noted above, I have imposed a cap of $275,000 for a retiring officer when separation pay is calculated.

I assert that it would be prudent to wait and see the results of this change with respect to separation payouts before

considering the reduction of a benefit enjoyed by the most senior members of the Department. However, that is not

to say that there is no need for modifications to Section 18 of the CBA.

Thus, Section 18 of the expired CBA will be modified as follows:

1. For officers hired before June 30, 2017, termination pay will be capped after 25 years of service. The

termination pay benefit is on a par with other departments located in communities that are in no way

comparable to Long Beach’s level of financial distress. Accordingly, capping the level of termination

pay at the level achieved five years after the officer becomes eligible to retire with a full pension is

equitable and contains the cost of this benefit.

2. This provision will not be applied to officers who are currently eligible to retire and have submitted

their retirement papers on or before the date of the issuance of this Award and retire within 90 days of

the submission of their retirement papers. There will be no recalculation of separation payouts for

officers who retired after June 30, 2017 and before the date of this Award.

3. Officers hired after June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, will accrue one (1) terminal leave day per year.

I need to stress that cost containment is necessary. The affected officers will have many years of credit

for terminal leave. In short, at retirement, these officers will be handsomely rewarded for their years

of service.

With respect to the proposal’s requirement that officers need to have 20 years of service in Long Beach, I

would note that I denied a similar proposal concerning the payout for unused sick leave (see City Proposal 6). My

thinking in this instance is the same as it was in City Proposal 6.



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CITY PROPOSAL 9: REQUIRE OFFICERS TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE COST OF HEALTH

INSURANCE DURING THEIR YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INTO RETIREMENT

The City proposed that, effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, officers contribute 20% toward the

cost of health insurance. The proposal requires new hires to contribute 25% toward the cost of health insurance.

It argued that the City has no control over the cost of health insurance. It has increase dramatically over

the years. It observed that, as of June 30, 2018, the annual cost of a family plan is $28,178.

It observed that other City employees who earn far less than police officers contribute toward the cost of

their health insurance. PBA members who make much more than other City employees contribute nothing toward

the cost of their health insurance.

It stressed that the only avenue for the City to obtain some relief from the spiraling costs of employee

benefits is through health insurance contributions.

The PBA argued that, while it may be true that the City has no control over the cost of health insurance, it

also has no such control. It stated that some other departments have no required contributions for health insurance

and others require health insurance contributions from new hires. It added that the contributions in those

departments were in the range of 10%-15%.

It added that, while the PBA advocates against any health insurance contributions, it asserted that if such a

contribution is necessary, it could be imposed on new hires.

The cost of health insurance has bedeviled public sector employees for many years. In this case, the only

avenue for the City to mitigate the cost of health insurance is through employee contributions.

There is no question about the spiraling costs of health insurance. These costs have increased for many

years. At the same time, PBA members have made no contributions toward the cost of health insurance.

Unfortunately, that situation cannot continue.

When introducing a provision of this type in the CBA, it is commonly done by imposing the associated

costs on new hires. The PBA argued that such a cost should not be imposed on people who were hired when there

were no such costs imposed on them. As has been previously noted, the following modification to the CBA will

not be imposed on officers hired after June 30, 2017 and the date of the issuance of this Award.

In short, the City proposal relative to contributions by employees hired before June 30, 2017 is denied.

However, the following will become part of the CBA going forward:

1. Officers hired after June 30, 2017 but will not be retroactive, will pay 15 % of the cost of their health

insurance.

2. The affected officers will begin to make said contribution in Year 5 of their service in Long Beach. They

will continue to make such payments into retirement. It is apparent the officers earn less in Years 1-4 of

their employment in Long Beach and that contributions to the cost of health insurance are less affordable



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during those years. Accordingly, a review of the 10-step salary schedule for new hires reveals a larger

salary increase at Step 5. This larger step was designed to facilitate the inception of health insurance

contributions.

In sum, City Proposal 9 is denied with respect to officers hired before June 30, 2017 but is granted with

respect to new hires, as explicated in items 1 and 2 above.

CITY PROPOSAL 10: DELETE THE IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROVISION

The City proposed the deletion of Section 30(r) of the expired CBA. It stated that the training has been

provided by Nassau County. However, notes the City, Nassau County has not provided said training in 10-15 years.

As a consequence, in the City’s view, it cannot comply with Section 30(r).

For its part, the PBA did not disagree with the City’s description of Nassau County’s inability to provide

the training. However, it posited that the PBA has not taken any action related to the City’s failure to comply with

the terms of the CBA in this regard. Therefore, it favored maintaining the terms of this section of the CBA since

the county may be able to offer the training at some point in the future.

I contend that it is not proper to keep contract language in the Agreement when both parties recognize that

it cannot be implemented. The PBA was correct when it stated that, at some point in the future, the County may be

prepared to offer the required training. The solution to such a development is for the parties to confer and address

the availability of the training.

However, at this time, the CBA should reflect the actual obligations of the parties. Thus, City Proposal 10

is granted.

CITY PROPOSAL 11: CREATE A 10-STEP SALARY SCHEDULE FOR NEW HIREES

This proposal was discussed in connection with PBA Proposal 1. It would redundant to repeat it here

CITY PROPOSAL 12: PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS OF EXISITING CONTRACT LANGUAE

The City proposed the clarification of 11 contract provisions. It called for the deletion of Section 7 (d)(1)(f),

Section 15(e) and Section 30 (m). Section 30(t) deals with bullets. The existing language refers to 54 bullets per

box and the proposed clarification of the language would indicate 50 bullets (per box) or the number of bullets

contained in the applicable manufacturer’s box, subject to the approval of the Commissioner. The balance of the

clarification change references the substitution of 8 hours for each working day. Thus, City Proposal 12 is granted.

CONCLUSION

These are exceedingly difficult times. This award is reflective of the need to balance the needs of employees

who render valuable and quality service against the financial pressures experienced by the City and the requirement

for the City to operate its police force in an efficient and appropriate manner. This panel was obligated to give 70%

of the weight of costs associated with the police department to the City’s ability to pay and, in good faith, did so. It



60

was forced to make certain contract changes to costs that have grown over the years to unaffordable and

unsustainable levels

It is the hope that this Award will contribute to efforts that the City needs to make if the fiscal climate of

Long Beach is to be restored. Under those conditions, future CBAs and/or interest arbitration awards may reflect

the restored financial health of the City of Long Beach.

In sum, I have carefully considered the relevant statutory criteria, as well as the pertinent prior interest

arbitration awards in arriving at my findings. I am persuaded that this Award is consistent with the Taylor Law

and the legislation attached to fiscally eligible municipalities. Thus, based on the above, I make the following:

AWARD

1. TERM - The term of the CBA resulting from this Award shall be July1, 2015 through June 30, 2017.

2. WAGES - Amend the salary schedule of the CBA as follows:

1.Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, for officers hired after June 30, 2017, there will be a 10-

step salary schedule for new hires.

2. The current Step 1 will be Step 1 in the new 10-step schedule. The current top step will be Step 10 of

the new10-step schedule.

3. All salary steps will be of equal value except Step 5 which will have a $14,000 step.

4. Current PBA unit members will remain on the salary schedule on which they were placed when hired.

5. All police officers who were in the employ of the Long Beach Police Department on June 30, 2020 will

receive a one time payment of $1,500. This sum will not be reflected in the salary schedule and will

be paid in equal installments of $750 on January 1, 2021 and July 1, 2021.

3. LONGEVITY PAYMENTS- Amend the schedule on Longevity Payments as follows:

1. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, officers with 25 or more years of service will be capped

at their current rate of longevity payments.

2. Effective as of June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, officers with more than 20 years of service but with

fewer than 25 years of service will continue to receive their currently scheduled longevity payments until

their 25th year and their longevity payment will be capped at that point.

3. Effective as of June 30, 2017, but not retroactively officers with fewer than 20 years of service will

continue to receive their currently scheduled longevity payments until their 25th year and their longevity

payments will be capped at that point.

4. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, new hires will receive the following longevity payments:

a. In Years 11-15 of their service in the Long Beach Police Department, they will receive $3,000

longevity payment.



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b. In Years 16-25 of their service in Long Beach Police Department, they will receive an additional

$2,000 longevity payment for a total of $5,000.

4. PERSONAL LEAVE TIME

1. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, all officers will receive 30 hours of personal leave.

2. Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, personal leave hours will not be accumulated. Officers

will be paid for unused personal leave time in the second pay period following the end of the fiscal year.

Such pay will be paid at the rate at which it was earned.

3. Officers with a balance in excess of 30 hours as of the date of this Award will retain these hours but the

provisions of Item 10 of this Award will apply such that the cap on Separation Pay of $275,000 will be in

force.

5. VACATIONS

Amend the vacation provisions as follows:

1. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, in Years 1-5 of their service on the Long Beach Police

Department, new hirees will receive 120 hours of vacation leave (15 days of 8-hour tours or 12 days of

10-hour tours).

2. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, in Year 6 and beyond of their service on the Long Beach,

Police Department, new hirees will receive160 hours of vacation leave (20 days of 8-hour tours or 16

days of 10-hour tours).

3. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, new hirees with accumulated vacation leave will be paid

out at separation from the Long Beach Police Department pursuant to Item 10 of this Award.

6. CLOTHING AND UNIFORM ALLOWANCE

Amend the Clothing and Uniform allowance as follows:

As of the date of this Award, all officers will receive a one-time increase of an additional $300 allowance

in Clothing and Uniform allowance.

7. STEADY TOUR AGREEMENT

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, the Steady Tour Agreement will be modified as follows:

One member of each tour will be allowed to exercise their right to use accumulated time without the

denial of same, except in the case of a declared emergency.

8. HEALTH INSURANCE BUYBACK BENEFITS

Health insurance benefits will be modified as follows:

1. All officers must have health insurance provided either by the City of Long Beach or by an outside

health insurance provider.



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2. Effective as of June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, all officers receiving individual health insurance

benefits will be eligible for a $3,000 buyback.

3. Effective June 3, 2017, but not retroactively, all officers receiving family health insurance benefits will

be eligible for a $5,000 buyback.

4. A minimum of four officers must opt for the increase in buybacks to trigger the implementation and

continuation of the buybacks.

9. REDUCTION OF COURT CANCELLATION NOTICE

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactvely, amend Sections 7(d)(1) and 7 (d)(2) of the CBA as follows:

The court notice cancellation notice is reduced from 72 hours to 24 hours.

10. REDUCTION OF MAXIMUM PAYOUTS TO $275,000

Effective June 30, 2017, Section 8 of the CBA is modified as follows:

1. For officers hired after June 30, 2017, Separation Pay will be capped at $275,000.

2. For officers hired before June 30, 2017, who have between 15 and 19 years of service will be

exempted from the cap on Separation Pay until the first day of their 21st year of service in the Long

Beach Police Department or in a combination of service in the Long Beach Police Department and an

earlier law enforcement position in a different police department. In addition, all of their leave

accruals will be capped at their levels as of the date of this Award and will be calculated at the daily

rate of pay as of the date of this Award.

For officers with a total of 20 years of service but with fewer than 15 years of service in the Long

Beach Police Department, the City will waive the rule requiring a minimum of 15 years of service in

the Long Beach Police Department in order to be eligible for retiree health insurance. It will also

waive the terms of Section 22(b)(1) of the collective bargaining agreement which requires 15 years of

service in the Long Beach Police Department in order to be eligible for the retiree health benefits set

forth in Section 22(b) of the collective bargaining agreement.

3. Officers eligible to retire as of the date of this Award will be exempted from the $275,000 cap on

Separation Pay provided they have submitted their retirement papers on or before the date of this

Award and retire within 90 days of the submission of the retirement papers.

4. Effective June 30, 2017 but retroactive July 1, 2020, all payments of Separation pay will be in equal

bi-weekly installments over a five year period.

11. SICK LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, Section 14 (e) of the CBA is amended as follows:

1. New hires in Years 1-5 of their service in Long Beach will receive 100 hours of sick leave.



2.New hires in Year 6 and thereafter of their service in Long Beach will receive 120 hours of sick leave.

12. HOUR FOR HOUR SICK LEAVE CHARGE FOR OFFICERS WHO GO HOME SICK

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactive, Section 14(m) of the CBA will be modified as follows:

All officers who report to work and then go home early because they are ill will have their sick leave

banks charged hour for hour.

13. TERMINAL LEAVE DAYS

Effective June 30, 2017, but not retroactively, Section 18 of the CBA will be modified as follows:

l. For officers hired before June 30, 2017, termination pay will be capped after 25 Years of service.

2. This provision will not be applied to officers who are currently eligible to retire and have submitted

their retirement papers and retire within 90 days of the submission of the retirement papers on or before

the date of the issuance of this Award.

3. Officers hired after June 30, 2017, but not retroactive, will accrue one day of terminal leave per year.

14. .HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS

With regard to health insurance contributions, the CBA will be modified as follows:

1. Effective June 30, 2017 but not retroactively, new hirees will pay 15% of the cost of their health

insurance.

2. The affected officers will begin to make such contributions in Year 5 of their service in Long Beach

and will continue to do so into retirement.

15 .IN-SERVICE TRAI G PROVISIONS

Effective June 30, 2017, Section 30(r) of the CBA is deleted.

16. A 10-STEP SALARY SCHEDULE FOR NEW HIRES

City Proposal 11 is granted as specified in Item 2 above.

17 .CLARIFICATIONS OF EXISTING CONTRACT LANGUAGE

Effective June 30, 2017, sections 7(d)(1)(f), 15(e), and 30(m) are deleted from the CBA and Section 30(t)

is modified to delete 50 bullets and will be replaced by 50 bullets (per box) or the number of bullets

contained in the manufacturer 's box, subject to the approval of the Commissioner.

18, OTHER PROPOSALS - All proposals not referenced herein are denied.

Dated: September 18, 2020

Hewlett Harbor, NY

ARTHUR A. RIEGEL

ARBITRATOR

63



AFFIRMATION

STATE OF NEW YORK)

COUNTY OF NASSAU)

I, Arthur A. Riegel, Esq., affirm that I am the individual described in and who executed the foregoing

instrument which is my Opinion and Interest Arbitration Award.

ARTHUR A. RIE EL, ES( .

64



POSITIONS OF THE PANELISTS

I, Brian Wells, Petitioner member of the Interest Arbitration Panel, concur with/dissent from the nmbered

elements of the Interest Arbitration Award as follows:

1. Award item # 1 Di

2. Award item # 2 Concur


4. Award item # 4 Concur sse

5. Award item # 5 Concur sse

6. Award item # 6 on Dissent

7. Award item # 7 Cone Dissent


9, Award item # 9 Concur

10 Award item # 10 Concur

11.Award item # 11 Concur


13 Award item # 13 Concur



16 Award item # 16 Concur 1ssen


18.Award item # 18 Dissent

BRIAN WELLS

PETITIONER PANELIST

6



POSITIONS OF THE PANELISTS

I, Terry O'Neil, Respondent member of the Interest Arbitration Panel, concur with/dissent from the

numbered elements of the Interest Arbitration Award as follows:

1. Award item # 1 Dissent



4. Award item # 4 . Dissent

5. Award item # 5 n Dissent

6. Award item # 6 Concur iss

7. Award item # 7 Concur ss



10 Award item # 10 Dissent








18.Award item # 18 fnne Dissent

TERRÝ O'NEIL

RESPONDENT PANELIST

66



Dissent of P.B.A. Panel Member Brian M. Wells

The Award reached by the majority of this Panel has exceeded its authority and created an

imminent danger to the public it proclaims to herald the interests of. The"Neutral"

arbitrator's

declaration that he was, "forced to make certain contractchanges"

which negate deesdes of hard-

won, negotiated benefits of Long Beach P.B.A. members and reward a corrupt and incompetent

City administration is both frightening in its shortsightedness and devastating to the integrity of

the arbitration process. The irrationality of the conclusions reached by the majority of the Panel,

the blatant disregard for the safety of the public and the officers who faithfully serve it, and the

overreach of an"independent"

arbitrator who came to see himself not as a Panel member but as

man who must govern in place of elected officials, should serve as a cautionary tale to any labor

union forced to participate in this difficult and costly process now debased by such a biased and

unbalanced Award. The majority ignores the fact that the P.B.A. was forced into pursuing

interest arbitration because the City refused to negotiate a voluntary C.B.A. due to election

concerns of its officials and to avail itself of the bonding process that the City consistently must

resort to because of iitsfsical incompetence.

Indeed, it seems the only course a municipality must undertake to relieve themselves of the

obligation to justly compensate employees who faithfully report for work and diligently perform

their duties, is to simply not budget for raises, allow revenue to "go missing", and reward

themselves with improper payments. Then, after a thorough fleecing of the municipality has been

completed, hire an outside counsel at the cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars per year and

fight these employees tooth and nail, rather than simply sitting and bargaining in good faith.

Even a fraction of the amounts spent by both sides during the course of this process would have

been better allocated to even a meager wage increase for the City's police officers.

As a reward for years of fiscal mismanagement, the City found a sympathetic ear turned in its

direction, while a deaf one was pointed at the P.B.A. The"neutral"

arbitrator had only to hear

three words, "fiscally distressed municipality". Once spoken the words became a mantra to be

thrown in the face of every sound and reasonable argument the P.B.A. made. The words became

the sword used to slash decades ofmembers'

negotiated benefits. The magic wand waved to

grant the City not only their proposals, but also IN EXCESS OF THEIR PROPOSALS. They

became the rationale for the irrational and the justification for the unjust. It would seem,

according to the majority of the panel, that with those three words there need not even be a

negotiation, or arbitration, just the ability of the City's representative to rewrite existingcollective bargaining agreements as he or she sees fit, irrespective of the law or the public's

welfare.

The majority is wrong. And while the almighty words, "fiscally distressedmüñicipãlity,"

may

grant the Panel consideration of, "...ability to pay by assigning a weight of seventypercent,"

it

does not give the majority the power to exceed its jurisdiction by destroying a police department

from the top down.



This Award violates the Panel's mission to reach a "just and reasonable determination of the

matters indispute."

This Award has made no effort to be just and reasonable. It was crafted by

an out of control arbitrator who believes himself to be the savior of a city at the expense of its

police officers and the public's safety. The arbitrator became so fixated on his quest to single

handedly solve the City's most recent, "fiscalcrisis"

that he exceeded his authority,

enthusiastically granting the City above and beyond its original proposals:

Award#3 Longevity

The City made NO proposals with respect to longevity. The P.B.A. sought a reasonable increase

in keeping with comparable bargaining units. The"neutral"

arbitrator, in his overzealous

embrace of his self-appointed savior of the city role, CUT longevity for existing and new hires

DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY CITY PROPOSAL TO DO SO.

Award#4 Personal Leave

The only proposal made by the City with respect to personal leave was a "housekeepingclarification"

to change existing personal leave from 5 days to 40 hours. The P.B.A. sought to

make personal leave 50 hours which is arguably an increase. Instead, the"neutral"

arbitrator

donned his red cape and came to the City's rescue once again, crushing the existing benefit by

prohibiting members from further accumulating personal time AND reducing the existing benefit

of 40 hours annually to 30 hours annually.

Award#5 Vacations

The P.B.A. did NOT seek an increase of vacation allotments. The City did NOT seek a

reduction. Nevertheless, the"neutral"

arbitrator felt compelled to further destroy the current

C.B.A. and reduce vacation time for new hires (a) Years 1-5 200 hours reduced to 120 Hours. (b)

Years 6 and beyond 240 hours to 160 hours.

Award#10 Termination Payouts

The"neutral"

arbitrator's decision to cap the separation payouts at $275,000 is in excess of the

City's proposal. The City sought a cap of twice the members base salary and misrepresented to

the Panel that Nassau County maintains such a system when the City representatives clearly

knew that the compensation factors included in the County's formula were far more expansive

than simply"base"

salary. It is unclear how the"neutral"

panel member arrived at this number as

it disproportionally affects members of higher rank or designation. Perhaps this was the intent.

Either way, no rationale was offered other than that he found it "appropriate". The result is that

nine sergeants and detectives (and their families) were forced to make a choice in a matter of

days, "Leave now, or I will take hundreds of thousands of dollars from you. Money you have

worked for. Money you have earned. Money you been countingon."

These were days that the

officers sacrificed for and did not use during the course of their careers knowing that the

sacrifices of their earlier years would be repaid at the time of retirement. Instead, all of the

vacation days that were skipped, personal days denied due to short staffing and not used for

family affairs, or worse, compensatory time that officers were conned into taking in"time"



instead of being paid in cash for became a practical financial barrier to continued employment as

they have become effectively unexpectedly laid off. Take it and go, or stay and be robbed.

This decision was made in spite of the fact that there are a grossly inadequate number of police

officers already. There was no consideration given to the reality that there are no qualified

candidates currently available to hire for police officers and the city is MONTHS away from the

ability to hire new officers. And no attention was given to the quandary created by these forced

retirements, specifically they are the most knowledgeable members of the department and their

experience is not replaceable, nor will they have time to adequately train their eventual

replacements. Moreover, with the implementation of the new pay scale, contribution to health

insurance and reduced benefits, the City will be hard pressed to attract any police officers from

other jurisdictions willing to take a pay cut only to have to wait ten years to achieve a salary that

may (after factoring the zeros awarded herein) ultimately be less than that where they are

currently employed. The majority's zeal to destroy existing benefits will have long term adverse

impacts to the Department that they are just not taking into proper account.

Finally, the majority of the Panel ignored the obvious danger posed to the 33,534 Citizens of

Long Beach (2018 Census data numbers) who will now be protected by a Department of 53

sworn officers, down from 70, when these negotiations began, and well below the FBI's

recommended number of 80 officers (Nationwide average of 2.4 officers per 1,000 residents).

These dangers were pointed out to the majority but, as with all other arguments, fell flat in the

face of a familiar refrain, "fiscally distressedmunicipality"

Award#11 Sick Leave Entitlements

The City proposed reducing sick leave entitlements for new hires from the existing 26 days to 12

days per year. The"neutral"

arbitrator gratuitously created a new bifurcated and drastically

reduced, sick leave entitlement for new hires as follows: Years 1-5 (100 hours) Years 6 (120

hours) once again EXCEBDING the proposal made by the City.

Award#13 Terminal Leave Days

The City sought a reduction from 5 days per year to 4 days per year. The Chairman slashed this

benefit for new hires to 1 day a year and capping current members at 25 years of service, once

again, above and beyond the City's proposal. Further, the commentary found in both the Opinion

Award sections reveals that the Chairman simply does not understand the subject matter

distinction between "Terminal LeaveDays"

and Termination Leave.

It is impossible to read this Award and come to the conclusion that there was any attempt to deal

fairly with the P.B.A. This implicit bias of the"neutral"

panel member leaps forth from every

page. He goes into excruciating detail about the need to reduce the payouts. He cites section

209(6)(e) of the Civil Service Law ad nauseam, but when it comes to Civil Service Law

209(4)(c)(v)(d), which states past agreements between the parties must be considered, he limits

his remarks to one sentence, "These documents were given appropriateconsideration."



I find this difficult to believe given the end result. No wage increases, coupled with such a

massive reduction in benefits is unprecedented in the city of Long Beach and in the State of New

York. This Award is not reflective of a 70%/30%, 80%/20% or even 99%/1%, calculation. This

is a 100% gift to a City that will inevitably squander whatever savings are achieved by it and a

slap in the face to the hardworking members of the P.B.A.

If the majority applied Civil Service Law sections 209(4)(c)(v) and 209(6)(e) as they were

intended, it is acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence in the record calling into question

the City's "ability topay"

for some or even many of the increases in benefits sought by the PBA.

However, rather than merely relying on the City's broken finances as justification to deny

increases in benefits, the Chairman misapplied the "ability topay"

criteria as a justification to

run rampant and carve up and destroy existing benefits far beyond any reductions even sought by

the City during the bargaining and arbitration process. It is imagined that the City's

representatives must be flabbergasted (albeit ecstatic) that the Chairman decided to thoroughly

hijack their role in the process in order to implement his personal vision of municipal

governance. A comparison of the Award versus a review of the City's proposals arguments (not

to mention the record) reveals that time and time again the Chairman exceeded the parameters of

the issues before him and went out of his way to give the City more than it asked for while the

P.B.A. remained a hostage to process.

"Just andreasonable"

is no where to be found in this Award. While it is conceded that the City's

dismal finances may have precluded an otherwise hard earned and well-deserved wage increase

for the City's police officers, the Chairman has gone so far out of his way to eliminate existing

benefits that is patently unjust, entirely unreasonable and exceeded the scope of his authority.

The City walked into the process carrying a mere shopping bag and the majority has instead

wheeled out an overloaded shopping cart paid for by the dedicated and hard-working P.B.A.

members.

Brian M. Wells

President, Long Beach P.B.A.



CONCURRING OPINION

Having reviewed the PBA PanelMembers'

Dissent, I feel it is necessary to

address some of the issues raised therein.

The majority of the Panel rejected a number of City proposals that would

have reduced benefits for current employees. Instead of imposing such

reductions we examined other options that applied only to new hires.

We also addressed areas not necessarily covered by City proposa!s where

the benefits for the active employees were in my opinion extremely generous.

These discussions took place with the current Panel Member as well as

with the prior Panel Member who resigned in January. No objections were raised

by sither Panel Member to this process at that time in order to preserve existingbenefits for current members.

The neutral arbitrator was also familiar with this process having been the

author of the prior 7-year Interest Arbitration Award covering the same parties.

I belisys this explanation should be included in the Award to address someconcerns raised by the PBA Panel Member.

TerryO'

eil

204088 1 9/22/2020



exhibit a - ligny1-#204354-v1-long beach interest ......terry o’neil, bond schoeneck & king,...

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