Exploration Advantage

1AC – Colonization AdvantageContention 1 is exploration: Every second we don’t colonize ends 1029 future human lives – outweighs literally any other impactBostrom3— Nick Bostrom, Nick Bostrom is a Swedish philosopher at the University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk, the anthropic principle, human enhancement ethics, superintelligence risks, the reversal test, and consequentialism. ("Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development", Utilitas, 2003, Available Online at http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes , and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale . These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives.

The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization .[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable.We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power needed to simulate one human life.

As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the potential for approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^29 potential human lives per second. While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the

literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization.

What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred

trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our supercluster.[6]

Mars colonization is possible and way better than moon colonization – resources, power generation, all of the scienceZubrin 11 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("Victory From Mars", Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, 3-7-2011, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=fF8Lql4ZTqYC, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

Among extraterrestrial bodies in our solar system, Mars is singular in that it possesses all the raw materials required to suppor t not only life , but also a new branch of human civilization. This uniqueness is illustrated most clearly if Mars is contrasted with the Earth's Moon, the most frequently cited alternative location for extraterrestrial human colonization.

Unlike the Moon, Mars is rich in carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen, all in biologically readily accessible forms such as carbon dioxide gas , nitrogen gas, water ice, and permafrost .2 Carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen are only present on the Moon in parts per million quantities. Oxygen is abundant on the Moon, but only in tightly bound oxides such as silicon dioxide, ferrous oxide, magnesium oxide, and alumina oxide, which require very high-energy processes to reduce.' Current

knowledge indicates that if Mars were smooth and all its ice and permafrost melted into liquid water, the entire planet would be covered with an ocean over 200 meters deep .' This scenario contrasts strongly with the Moon, which is so dry that if concrete were found there, lunar colonists would mine it to get the water out. Thus, if plants could be grown in greenhouses on the Moon (an unlikely proposition, as the Moon's 2-week-long dark spell is unsuitable for most plants, and the absence of any atmosphere would make necessary very thick glass for solar flare shielding), most of their biomass material would have to be imported.

The Moon is also deficient in about half the metals of interest to industrial society (copper, for example), as well as many other elements of

interest such as sulfur and phosphorus. Mars has every required element in abundance. Moreover, on Mars , as on Earth, hydrologic and volcanic processes have occurred that are likely to have consolidated various elements into local concentrations of high-grade mineral ore. Indeed, the geologic history of Mars has been compared to that of Africa , with very optimistic inferences as to its mineral wealth implied as a corollary.' In contrast, the Moon has almost no history of water or volcanic action, with the result that it is basically composed of trash rocks with little differentiation into ores that represent useful concentrations of anything interesting.

Power could be generated on either the Moon or Mars with solar panels , and here the advantages of the Moon's clearer skies and closer proximity to the Sun than Mars roughly balance the disadvantage of large energy storage requirements created by the Moon's 28-

day light/dark cycle. But if the desire was to manufacture solar panels so as to create a self-expanding power base, Mars holds an enormous advantage , as only Mars possesses the large supplies of carbon and hydrogen needed to produce the pure silicon required for making photovoltaic panels and other electronics. Also, there is no geologically purified source of silicon dioxide, such as sand, on the Moon. In addition, Mars has the potential for wind-generated power, while the Moon clearly does not. But both the Sun and wind offer relatively modest power potential—

tens or at most hundreds of kilowatts here or there. To create a vibrant civilization, a rich er power base is needed , and Mars has this both in the short and medium term in the form of its geothermal power resources , which offer the potential for large numbers of locally created electricity-generating stations in the 10 megawatt (10,000 kilowatt) class . In the long term, Mars will enjoy a power-rich

economy based upon exploitation of its large domestic resources of deuterium fuel for fusion reactors . Deuterium is five times more common on Mars than it is on Earth, and tens of thousands of times more common on Mars than on the Moon.'

But the biggest problem with the Moon, as with all other airless planetary bodies and proposed artificial free-space colonies, is that sunlight is not available in a form useful for growing crops. A single acre of plants on Earth requires 4 megawatts (MW) of sunlight power; a square kilometer needs 1,000 MW. The entire world put together would not produce enough electric power to illuminate the farms of the state of Rhode Island. Growing crops with electrically generated light is economically hopeless. But natural sunlight cannot be used on the Moon or any other airless body in space unless the walls on the greenhouse are thick enough to shield out solar flares, a requirement that enormously increases the expense of creating crop land. Even accomplishing this requirement would do no good on the Moon, because plants will not grow in a light/dark cycle lasting 28 days.

But Mars has an atmosphere thick enough to protect crops grown on the surface from solar flares. Therefore, thin-walled inflatable plastic greenhouses protected by unpressurized ultraviolet-resistant hard-plastic shield domes can be used to rapidly create crop land on the surface . Even without the problems of solar flares and a month-long diurnal cycle, such simple greenhouses would be impractical on the Moon as they would create unbearably high temperatures. On Mars, in contrast, the strong greenhouse effect created by such domes would be precisely what is necessary to produce a temperate climate inside . Such domes up to 50 meters in diameter are light enough to be transported from Earth initially, and they eventually could be manufactured on Mars out of indigenous materials. Because all the resources to make plastics exist on Mars , networks of such 50- to 100-meter domes could be manufactured and deployed rapidly, opening up large areas of the surface to both shirtsleeve human habitation and agriculture. Looking further into the future , it will eventually be possible for humans to thicken Mars' atmosphere substantially by forcing the regolith to outgas its contents through a deliberate program of artificially induced global warming . Once that has been accomplished, the habitation domes could be almost any size, as they would not have to sustain a pressure differential between their interior and exterior. In fact, once that has been done, it will be possible to raise specially bred crops outside the domes.

The point is that unlike colonists on any other known extraterrestrial body, Martian colonists will be able to live on the surface, not in tunnels, and move about freely and grow crops in the light of day . Mars is a place where humans can live and multiply to large numbers, supporting themselves with products of every description made out of indigenous materials. Mars is thus a place where an actual civilization, not just a mining or scientific outpost, can be developed . And it is this civilization, grown in size and technological potency on a frontier planet with a surface area as large as all the continents of Earth put together, that will both radically tip the balance among those who remain behind on Earth and provide the pioneers with the craft and outlook required to push the human reach much further.

Thus, for our generation and those soon to follow, Mars is the new world. The nation that settles it is one whose culture, values, social forms, and ideas will provide the point of departure for the further development of human civilization as our species expands outward from its planet of origin to the innumerable others awaiting us in the infinite reaches of space.

Human survival on Mars is possible- terraforming creates access to frozen water, we can alter the soil to grow food and spacesuits help avoid radiation poisoning. Williams 14 (Matt, is a frequent author for the website universetoday.com. http://www.universetoday.com/111462/how-can-we-live-on-mars/#//MTB)

In order to survive the lack of air pressure and the cold, humans will need pressurized and heated habitats. Martians, the terrestrial kind, will also need a spacesuit whenever they go outside. Every hour they spend outside will add to their radiation exposure, not to mention all

the complications that exposure to radiation brings. For the long term, we’ll need to figure out how to extract water from underground supplies , and use that to generate breathable air and rocket fuel . And once we’ve reduced the risk of suffocation or dying of dehydration, we’ll need to consider food sources, as we’ll be outside the delivery area of everyone except Planet Express. Care packages could be shipped up from Earth, but that’s going to come with a hefty price tag. We’ll need to produce our own food too, since we can’t possible hope to

ship it all in on a regular basis. Interestingly, although toxic, Martian soil can be used to grow plants once you supplement it and remove some of the harsher chemicals . NASA’s extensive experience in hydroponics will help. To thrive on Mars, the brave adventurers may want to change themselves, or possibly their offspring. This could lead to genetic engineering to help future generations adapt to the low gravity, higher radiation and lower air pressure. And why stop at humans? Human colonists could also adapt their plants and animals to

live there as well. Finally, to take things to the next level, humanity could make a few planetary renovations. Basically, we could change Mars itself through the process of terraforming. To do this, we’ll need to release megatons of greenhouse gasses to warm

the planet, unleashing the frozen water reserves .

International Cooperation is key to exploration and China says yesChina Daily 4-25 (Chinese national newspaper, "China open to Sino-US space cooperation", China Daily, 4/25/2016, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/25/content_24814214.htm)

BEIJING -- China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the United States, the heavyweights of China's

space program said on Sunday, the anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago.¶ "China will not rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States," said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut.¶ Payload has been reserved in the Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and foreign astronauts, said Yang on the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government.¶ Upon request, China will also train astronauts for other

countries, and jointly train astronauts with the European space station, Yang said.¶ "The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation . It's true for us, and for the U nited S tates too ," according to the senior

astronaut.¶ His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China's manned space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development."¶ "Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou added.¶ Citing security reasons, the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities and working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese

government entity or enterprise.¶ The ban remains in effect.¶ The U.S.-dominated I nternational S pace S tation, which unsurprisingly blocks China, is scheduled to end its service in 2024. China's space station could be the only operational one in outer space , at least for a while. ¶ Commenting on Sino-U.S. space relations earlier this week, Xu Dazhe, the head of China's National Space Administration, cites Hollywood sci-fi blockbuster "The Martian," in which a U.S. astronaut gets stranded on Mars and is eventually brought back to Earth by NASA, with help from China.¶ Xu Dazhe noted that China and the United States established a special dialogue mechanism last year and talks would continue this year.¶ For chief engineer Zhou, the movie

simply reflects what most people want. "Many American astronauts and scientists that I have met said they would like to work with us, if given the freedom of choice ." ¶ The China Space Day was designated to mark the launch of China's first satellite on April 24, 1970.

China is crucial – other international cooperation exists and Chinese capability is the missing piece of the puzzleNRC 14 (other authors: Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board; Space Studies Board; Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences; Committee on National Statistics; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Committee on Human Spaceflight; "Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration", http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18801/pathways-to-exploration-rationales-and-approaches-for-a-us-program)

International collab oration has become an integral part of the space policy of essentially all nations that participate in space activities around the world. Most countries now rarely initiate and carry out substantial space projects without some foreign participation. The reasons for collaboration are multiple, but countries, including the United States, cooperate principally when they benefit from it.¶ It is evident that near-term U.S. goals for human exploration are not aligned with those of our traditional international partners. Although most major spacefaring nations and agencies are looking toward the Moon, specifically the lunar surface, U.S. plans are focused on redirection of an

asteroid into a retrograde lunar orbit where astronauts would conduct operations with it. It is also evident that given the rapid development of China’s capabilities in space , it is in the best interests of the U nited S tates to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships. In particular, current federal law that prevents NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese serves only to hinder U.S. ability to bring China into its sphere of international partnerships and substantially reduces the potential international capability that might be pooled to reach Mars . Also, given the scale of the endeavor of a mission to Mars, contributions by international partners would have to be of unprecedented magnitude to defray a significant portion of the cost. This assessment follows from the detailed discussion in Chapter 4 of what is required for human missions to Mars.

Even if cooperation with other countries could be good, bans on US-China cooperation causes a focus on copycat research that collapses the budget and stunts innovation to get to space – the plan enables a new generation of tech to get to MarsDickerson 15 “Here's why NASA won't work with China to explore space” Kelly Dickerson - science reporter at Tech Insider, covering space and physics. graduated from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism with an M.A. in science and health reporting. B.S. degree in biology and a B.A. degree in communication from Berry College. previously written for Live Science, Space.com, and Psychology Today, Oct. 19, 2015, http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10

NASA could have much to gain in the future in working with China . China became the third country ever to

successfully launch humans into space, behind Russia and the US, and it's made much progress since. Two years ago, CNSA landed a small

telescope on the moon, which is still up there taking crystal-clear images of the cosmos (because Earth's dirty

atmosphere isn't in the way). The agency also operates its own space lab called Tiangong 1, is testing powerful new rockets, and has ambitious plans to land more probes on the moon and perhaps a colony there one day . If CNSA's progress in space exploration and tech development isn't a compelling enough reason to work with China, then NASA's stunted budget offers another . More international collaboration could only be positive for a space agency that has faced budget cut after budget cut . President John F. Kennedy committed to a moon landing by the end of the 1960s, then Nixon took the helm and slammed on the brakes after a handful of crewed lunar missions. As Logsdon writes in an article for NASA: "Nixon rejected NASA's ambitious post-Apollo plans, which included developing a series of large space stations, continued missions to the moon, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s," Logsdon writes. "By the time Nixon left the White House, the NASA budget had fallen from its peak of almost 4% of the total federal budget to less than 1%." Some argue that we would already have sent humans to Mars if NASA had kept its momentum. More collaboration could help get NASA back on track. NASA

administrator Charles Bolden event wrote in a recent blog post that he thinks more collaboration will help get us get boots on Mars : A Journey such as this is something that no one person, crew, or Agency can undertake alone . [...] A mission of this magnitude is made stronger with international partnership – the sort of spirit and cooperation that is demonstrated so vividly by the tens of thousands of people across 15 countries who have been involved in the development and operation of the International Space Station. In fact, NASA just announced a partnership with the Israel Space Agency that will allow the two agencies to conduct joint missions and share research facilities. I personally think it would be great to see a similar agreement with

China some day soon — especially since the nation announced it's seeking international partners to help build another space station in the 2020s (and the station sounds really cool). But again, current US law forbids NASA from helping out or getting involved at all. Russia will only support the $100 billion space station until 2024, and that's a huge problem because, right now, NASA relies on Russia's rockets to get its astronauts into space. It's unclear what NASA will do once Russia pulls out. Working with China and other nations to build a bigger and better space station would be a great option. Instead of two space stations, we could have one truly international station with the most brilliant scientists around the world working together. That kind of collaboration

would speed up tech development; instead of space stations just copying each other's rockets and space probes, we could start working together to advance tech nology at a much faster pace than we are right now. We'll need a new generation of space tech if we ever hope to get to Mars. It already seems

like the two agencies do want to collaborate, since discussion of that possibility has reached the White House several

times. US scientists have also openly criticized policy makers in the past for preventing Chinese scientists from attending space conferences. It seems like politics shouldn't get in the way of pure scientific pursuit, but the reality is US lawmakers won't allow collaboration with China because they are worried about national security and protecting state secrets. But

who knows, if the two space agencies started working together , it might open up enough lines of communication between the US and China for the two nations to defrost their icy relationship . In the meantime China will continue to expand its space exploration efforts. Unless a big policy shift happens, NASA might have to sit on the sidelines while an incredible new chapter of space exploration begins.

Other countries say no or are insufficient – China coop causes international follow onTiezzi 14 (June 5, 2014; Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum; “Report: To Reach Mars, NASA Must Work With China”; http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/report-to-reach-mars-nasa-must-work-with-china/ )

The U.S. space program should seek to expand its cooperation with China , a new report has found. The report by the National Research Council, titled “Pathways to Exploration – Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration,” laid out recommendations for the future of U.S. space agency NASA. Congress ordered the report in 2010; the results of the four-

year investigation were released Wednesday. NASA is banned from cooperating with China on projects under a 2011 appropriations law that states: None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act. The ban reflects congressional unease about high-tech cooperation with China in any field. There are also restrictions limiting the extent of mil-to-mil cooperation with China as well as a ban on certain high-tech exports. Frank Wolf, the Representative behind the anti-China clause, explained his reasoning. “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” he said back in 2011. He also cited moral concerns over working with the Chinese government: “Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?” Scientists, however, have been far less supportive of the ban. Last October, when it came to light that Chinese scientists had been banned from attending a NASA conference, the news sparked outrage and boycotts among American scientists. Geoff Marcy, a U.S. scientist considered to have been on the short-list for the 2013 Nobel Prize in physics, called the ban “completely shameful and unethical.” NASA eventually backtracked and re-invited the Chinese scientists, in part after Rep. Wolf said that NASA was not prohibited by law from interacting with

individual Chinese citizens. Though Wolf argued the law had been misinterpreted, he stood firm behind the blanket ban on cooperation between NASA and Chinese government entities. However, the backlash over the conference drew new attention to the ban, with many speaking out against it. Since then, there have been signs NASA is seeking a change. And such a change may be possible: with Rep. Wolf announcing he will not seek reelection this year, the ban on NASA-China cooperation will lose its strongest supporter. In January, officials from China’s National Space Administration were included in an international meeting hosted by the U.S. State Department. Because funding was provided by State, not NASA, it did not violate the 2011 law. The meeting was a rare opportunity for U.S. and Chinese officials to talk about potential space cooperation. Still, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden cautioned against too much optimism: “Human spaceflight is not something that’s going to happen with [the] U.S. [and] China in the foreseeable future, because we are forbidden from doing that by law,” he reminded reporters. Now,

the NRC’s report officially calls for a reexamination of the 2011 ban. “This policy, while driven by congressional sentiment, denies the U.S. partnership with a nation that will probably be capable of making truly significant contributions to international collaborative missions,” the report said. “Given the rapid development of China’s capabilities in space, it is in the best interests of the United States to be open to its inclusion in future international partnerships,” it continued. The report also recommended that NASA turn its focus to sending a manned mission to Mars , calling the red planet “the horizon goal for human space exploration.” Yet the NRC caut ioned that this goal co uld not be reached without more extensive international cooperation . “We’re really talking about international collaboration of a different scale than what has been conducted in the past,” Jonathan Lunine, co-chair of the NRC panel, told reporters. Even while the NRC

highlighted the need for international efforts, Russia is drastically scaling back its space coop eration with the U.S. in response to Western sanctions stemming from the Ukraine crisis. Russia has announced that it will withdraw from the International Space Station in 2020, and will cease selling the RD-180 engine that currently powers the U.S. Atlas

5 rocket. With Russia withdrawing (at least temporarily) from space cooperation with the U.S., coop eration w ith China becomes all the more vital . “Current federal law preventing NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese … reduces substantially the potential international capability that might be pooled to reach Mars ,” the report found.

Mechanics/AOs

2AC – China Cooperation Key – Diplomacy/AccessCapability can’t be harnessed absent effective diplomacy, and china takes over the ISS in 2020 – US access is keyPoladian 15 — Charles Poladian, Charles Poladian joined IBTimes in October 2012 and, when not reporting on all things topical, can be found reading or photographing concerts. ("The Future Of Space Policy Is Built On International Cooperation: NASA Administrator Charles Bolden", International Business Times, 11-16-2015, Available Online at http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasa-administrator-charles-bolden-2186627, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

NASA Administrator Charles Bolden says a manned mission to Mars will happen in the 2030s, but unlike the Apollo moon missions in the 1960s and '70s, it will take an international coalition -- including Russia and China -- to get there . America remains the unquestioned leader when it comes to space exploration,

but in a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday, Bolden said future efforts will look like the International Space Station, an international effort that has kept humans continuously living and working in space for the past 15 years. Meanwhile, current missions such as New Horizons, Cassini and the Curiosity rover are providing new

insights on the world beyond near-Earth orbit. "Yours will be a future where human beings, as President Obama has said, have pushed farther into the universe, not just to visit but also to stay. To me, public diplomacy and cooperation in space go together like peanut butter and jelly," Bolden said. That diplomacy, with NASA leading the charge, is important for the next phase of space exploration . Obama laid out the ambitious plans for NASA in an address from the John F. Kennedy Space Center in Florida on April 15, 2010. The roadmap to Mars includes the return of manned launches to the U.S., the development of a deep space spacecraft and the Asteroid Redirect Mission. The mission to Mars will require additional commercial and international support . Boeing and

SpaceX have been tasked with bringing manned launches back to the United States. The first commercial crew astronauts are training for the first flight to the ISS, with crew flight tests scheduled for 2017. SpaceX and Orbital ATK are currently sending cargo to the space station with the former's Dragon being the only craft capable of returning science investigations back to Earth. Despite individual launch failures, Orbital ATK in 2014 and SpaceX in 2015, the two companies are preparing for cargo missions in December. Aside from the Apollo missions, human exploration of space has been Earth-relian t -- astronauts have spent most of their time in space in low-Earth orbit, Bolden said. That will change in the 2020s when NASA attempts to capture a boulder from an asteroid and place it in a stable lunar orbit. The cislunar

-- athe area between the Earth and the moon -- phase of space exploration will take astronauts around the moon, but also serves as a test for international support. "When we go up to cislunar space, it’s going to give our international partners an opportunity to be with us , because no venture into deep space is going to be done by one nation . It’s just too difficult, it’s too expensive," Bolden said. Going to Mars would make space exploration Earth-independent for the first time since the Apollo missions. Despite the U.S.' current tensions

with Russia, NASA and the Russian Space Agency -- Roscosmos -- continue to have a strong working relationship . Through the funding of the ISS -- along with NASA's reliance on Roscosmos to send astronauts to low-Earth orbit -- the two space agencies continue to work cooperatively . That relationship could change once NASA becomes less reliant on Russia -- the space agency agreed to pay $81.6 million per seat aboard the Soyuz for six flights in 2018 -- with

the launch of its commercial crew program, but Bolden said he's committed to the partnership.

Conspicuously absent from NASA's international partners is China . Politics have stymied this relationship following a ban included in the 2011 U.S. Federal budget. There are some loopholes that

have allowed Bolden to collaborate with the Chinese Academy of Science on Earth science research. NASA also provided China with lunar imagery that helped the Chang'e 3 mission select a landing site. Air traffic management is another area of cooperation.

" It’s critical to partner with China ," Bolden said. Space exploration is peaceful, but the area above Earth could become a source of contention as more countries send satellites into orbit . More partnerships would lead to a safer orbit. "If we’re partnered with the Chinese, as we are with other nations,

I think they would be much less prone to do something that puts low-Earth orbit in jeopardy, like , you know, anti-satellite stuff . Now, that may be a naïve thought, but I think that's what gives me hope, that the more we can have many nations working toward a common goal, the better off we’ll be," Bolden said.

2AC – A2: No Space Col – Radiation Radiation isn't a deal-breaker for exploration-- radiation shielding solvesSmith 13 (Cameron M., Anthropologist at Portland State University, "Biological Evolution in Interstellar Human Migration", http://www.centauri-dreams.org/?p=26867)

Certainly radiation is an issue to be addressed, but it does not seem to be a showstopper for human space colonization. First, many shielding schemes have been devised. In interstellar craft some kind of radiation shielding will be necessary, but because shielding is heavy, designers will probably try to get away with as little as possible. How thin is too thin? This is difficult to answer; aside from clear cases of lethal exposure to high doses of radiation, its long-term effects are mysterious. One 1995 study tracked the health of over 70,000 children of parents who were within a kilometer of the nuclear bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War II. Surprisingly, there was no statistically significant difference between the study population and populations of children of non-irradiated parents, in terms of malignant tumors in early age, differences in sex of offspring, chromosomal abnormalities and other mutations. On the other hand, recent studies have shown highly elevated mutation rates in people living near the

Chernobyl disaster site. We have plenty to learn.¶ The second reason that radiation will not be a deal-breaker for interstellar voyaging is that mutagenesis itself has recently been found not to be largely the result of such ‘one-off’ ‘zaps’ from space, but rather more the result of the failure of DNA-repair mechanisms on the molecular level itself (over 300 such mechanisms and processes have been identified in the human

genome alone). Thus, DNA repair therapy will probably be a large part of mitigating radiation issues in interstellar voyages. ¶

2AC – Add On – EconomyMars colonization hugely boosts world economy – colonization will be driven by economic motives including asteroid mining and the Martian real estate marketAgu 15 — Eloka Agu, Eloka's interests include private equity, venture capital, industrial engineering and frontier markets and technologies. ("The Economic Case for Mars Colonisation", Market Mogul, 10-6-2015, Available Online at http://themarketmogul.com/economic-case-mars-colonisation/, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

Terraformation

Terraformation is the term attributed to the reworking of a planet’s entire biosphere to suit human needs. One potential method of terraforming Mars would be through locally producing artificial greenhouse gases and releasing them into the atmosphere en masse. The greenhouse effect and resulting change in atmospheric composition would induce a temperature rise of 40 – 50° C, a seasonal occurrence of liquid water on the planet and an increase in atmospheric pressure more amicable to human life. Plants can be grown and soil spread to create oxygen and a thriving ecosphere. The terraformation of the planet’s ecosystem would entail that inhabits only require the appropriate breathing equipment and clothing to operate within life sustaining town sized, dome like structures that could be erected. With Mars capable of supporting a thriving small communit y on its surface, the settlement would then be able to forge out its own competitive advantage as an interplanetary trading post .

The asteroid belt is known to have large supplies of high quality materials including certain rare platinum group metals that would be valuable if exported back to Earth. Due to the conditions within the main belt , asteroid miners would be unable to produce the supplies necessary to conduct their operations locally. Hence there would be a demand from either Earth or Mars to export the necessary manufactured equipment and food stuffs to support the mining industry . In such an occurrence, Mars would have a strong geographical advantage as a location from which to conduct such trade. This is because the mass ratio required to deliver materials to the asteroid belt from Earth is considerably grater than that which is required to deliver the same materials from Mars; Earth’s rockets would have to be remarkably efficient to consider such an undertaking, whereas Martian rockets would be able to fulfil such a task with standard level technology.

It is highly likely that any materials that need to be sent to the asteroid belt that are capable of being made on Mars, will indeed by made on Mars and exported there directly. This presents a clear commercial case for a triangular trade system where by Earth can supply high grade manufactured goods to Mars , Mars can supply low grade manufactured goods and food stuffs to the asteroid belt, and the asteroids send precious metals back to Earth . This form of trade has well documented precedent. During its colonial expansion, Britain would send manufactured goods to North America. The American colonies would send low technology manufactured goods and food stuffs required to produce goods in Caribbean, and the Caribbean colonies would send highly profitable crops such as sugar back to Britain.

Boosted by a source of income through interplanetary trade, a larger Martian colony would begin to form . Estimates from 2012 indicate that it would cost an average of $750,000 for a one-way ticket to Mars. Due to the small population of the colony and high cost of transport to Mars, the cost of labour on the planet will be considerably higher than on Earth. In turn, wages on Mars should be considerably higher on those on Earth. Due to the lack of supply and urgency of demand, an industrial engineer who might earn earn $80,000 on Earth per annum may earn in excess of $350,000 per annum doing the equivalent job on Mars. This wage differential will make economic emigration both viable and desirable to humans on earth . Again, this has historical precedent. During the economic expansion of the United States, families in Western Europe would collectively put together their savings to enable one of their members to emigrate to the United States. The wage differentials would then enable the emigrant to earn enough money to bring the rest of he family over in the long run. Consequentially, just as the population of the United States began to swell exponentially – the Martian colony will experience population growth.

Population Growth

Accompanying an increase in population on the planet, Mars will develop a burgeoning real estate industry. Martian real estate will be sorted into two group s. Developed and undeveloped. The developed , habitable real estate will be located within terraformed domes where settlers can live in typical Earth like conditions. The undeveloped land will be l ocated outside the domes. Both forms of real estate will be available for purchase and tra de. Assuming Moore’s law, transportation costs will drop exponentially over time. As this occurs, the combination of economic opportunity and cheaper travelling costs will drive higher numbers of settlers to Mars.

This activity, in turn, will increase demand for property and lead to a demand-pull inflation in real estate prices. If we assume that the developed real estate under the domes could enclose an area of about 5 acres, and that houses were apartments were built for 30 families, with each family willing to pay $50,000 for the land, then the total value of the land within a single developed dome would be $1.5 million . This price incentive would spread the creation of developed land quickly through the mass proliferation of domes to house trans-planetary emigrants, thus forming a large domestic source of wealth creation within the colony and birthing numerous industrial and service based industries required to build and manage new habitable domes across the planet.

However, perhaps the greatest value that a Martian colony could provide for Earth may be an influx of practical new technologies and ideas . Inevitably, the new colony will suffer labour shortages in its early stages. These shortages will drive the need to create innovative solutions to the problems faced on the planet. Many of these inventions will benefit the people of Mars and many of them will benefit the people of Earth, perhaps in the same way that the inventions of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries benefited both America and the global community. The Martian colony will innovate out of necessity, and it will be ready to do so. Those settlers who selected themselves as candidates for emigration and went through the necessary tasks to successfully do so will be practically minded, technologically astute, driven people. The kind of people who make ground breaking innovations.

It is almost impossible to state the economic impact of the invention of the light bulb, the automobile, the airplane or the iPhone on Earth. Likewise, the global economic impact of a technologically savvy, emerging Martian society c ontending with harsher conditions than those in Earth, will be incalculable in its value . It is this revelation that may ultimately be the greatest benefit that a colonised Mars can offer the people of Earth.

ExtinctionAuslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse . The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome

is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million

migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year.

A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability . The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with

China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic

largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing

threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets.

Europe as a whole will face dangerous ly increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do

not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn , let alone a collapse , would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries . Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States,

unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders

actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

2AC – Impact Framing – Moral ObligationMoral obligation to explore Mars – we have to explore it to discover technologies to improve life on EarthKumar 12 — Dr Alexander Kumar, Based in UK, Alex has lived, worked and travelled through over 70 countries and is an experienced expedition medic to remote areas of the world. ("Viewpoint: Should we send humans to Mars?", 9-22-2012, Available Online at http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-19666057, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

Should we be so frivolous by our excessive nature, and be trusted to visit, contaminate and perhaps colonise another planet when we seem so incapable of conserving and looking after our own home world?∂ Maybe this continuing lack of care for the planet and its people will one day become the reason we leave Earth for once and for all.∂ However, alongside my experiences as a doctor, I also travel the world as a scientific explorer.∂ On a large lonely wooden cross on top of a hill in Antarctica, overlooking a route taken to the South Pole, someone inscribed the words "to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield".∂ These words, borrowed from Sir Alfred Tennyson's Ulysses poem, had been left by the party who located Scott's tent in memory of the expedition team's legacy.∂ Among them, my own hero, the doctor Edward Wilson, whose dreams did not become a graveyard leave a blazing trail and legacy of science to inspire future generations.∂ Only by pushing mankind to its limits , to the bottoms of the ocean and into space, will we make discoveries in science and technology that can be adapted to improve life on Earth .∂ If the origin of life as we know it arose from a Big Bang in a distant area of the Universe, perhaps the solutions we seek to our problems on Earth may also lie there.∂ Failing to strive, seek or find would be an even greater tragedy - and represent a giant leap backwards for mankind.

Colonization Impact

2AC – Colonization Solves ExtinctionMultiple extinction threats within the next century – try or die to get off the rockSmith and Davies 2012 (Cameron M., Anthropology Professor, Evan T., Writer; "A Choice of Catastrophes: Common Arguments for Space Colonization", Emigrating Beyond Earth: Human Adaptation and Space Colonization, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4614-1165-9_4)

These limits are not entirely mythological. Even if humanity were to end war, ¶ overpopulation, disease and pollution, ensure global justice and build a network ¶ of defenses against such cosmic dangers as solar eruptions and wandering comets ¶ and asteroids, the Sun cannot be prevented burning out, at which time its plasma ¶ shell will expand and incinerate the Earth and all human works. The Sun's¶ expansion is

not expected to occur for another five billion years, and may be¶ thought of in a somewhat mythical way. But there are certainly serious and ¶ immediate threats to the human species that , we argue, make a compelling case ¶ for beginning the migration from Earth sooner rather than later.¶ We are not the first to point these out, of course; in his 1979 book A Choice of¶ Catllstrophes3 Isaac Asimov discussed a variety of plausible natural and culturally caused¶ events that could cause the

extinction of humanity, or at least collapse¶ global civilization. While humanity has taken action on some of these threats -¶

for example, an international effort now scans the sky for 'civilization-killer'¶ comets and asteroids4 - many of Asimov's proposed calamities could still occur ¶ today. Unfortunately, some are more likely today than in the past, such as the ¶ use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by individuals or small ¶ organizations, and the already- apparent effects of global over-consumption of ¶ natural resources, which defense organizations worldwide already recognize as ¶ likely leading to resource wars in the relatively short term. ¶ Asimov made many of these points nearly 40 years ago, but more recent¶ surveys of the possibility of relatively near-term human catastrophe have been¶ published, and they are not encouraging. A context for these projections has¶ been forwarded by philosopher Robert Heilbroner, who has argued in the book¶ Visions of the Future that from the time of early humans to the 17th century AD,¶ most of humanity saw its future as essentially changeless in its material and¶ economic conditions, a position that paints with quite a broad brush. Perhaps¶ more perceptively, he also argues that from the 18th century AD to the mid-¶ 1900s, Western civilization (at least) saw its future as essentially bright and¶ positive, to be achieved through the application of science, whereas since the¶ mid-1900s (significantly, after two World Wars and the invention of nuclear¶ weapons) there has been a more varied conception involving negatives resulting¶ from "impersonal, disruptive, hazardous and foreboding" factors,' though¶ including some positive hope.¶ Technology figures large in these conceptions, and it is clear that science and¶ the technologies that derive from it can yield great opportunities as well as¶ terrible risks. These were important issues to Asimov, and are more important¶ today. A recent review by

Oxford University philosopher and futurist Nick¶ Bostrom points out that three recent discussions of the near human future by ¶ prominent thinkers have highlighted significant threats to human existence within the next 1-5 centuries; john Leslie gives humanity a 30% chance of ¶ becoming extinct in the next five centuries, Astronomer Royal Martin Rees has ¶ weighed in with a figure of a 50% chance of extinction within the next 90 years, ¶ and Bostrom himself giving humanity a greater than 25% chance of extinction ¶ in the next century. Of course, these are speculations, but they are informed¶ speculations and they

reflect technological and other realities that could not¶ have informed earlier, mythical doomsday concepts we discussed above.¶ 6¶ Natural threats to humanity include impacts on Earth from extraterrestrial ¶ objects such as asteroids and comets.

Human-caused threats to humanity, or at ¶ least civilization (defined and discussed in Chapter 2), include ecological ¶ overexploitation and conflicts using nuclear, biological and/or chemical ¶ weapons. The magnitude of threats to humanity range widely (e.g. from¶ extinction to substantial reduction of the species population); we focus on the¶ levels of (a) the extinction of Homo sapiens sapiens or (b) the collapse of modem¶ civilization.¶ Extinction¶ Extinct species are those whose members have all died out; they may be known¶ to humanity in the fossil and/or DNA record of ancient life forms, but are no¶ longer living at present. Humanity has only been scientifically aware of the 4.5-¶ billion-year age of the Earth for about 100 years, and for much of humanity's¶ more recent history we have considered Earth to be a relatively safe and benign¶ home, at least between cyclic catastrophes. But palaeoenvironmental and fossil¶ records show that calamities and extinctions have been common through time.¶ In a comprehensive survey of the paleontological record paleontologist David¶ Raup has documented that over 99% of all species that have ever lived on Earth¶ have become extinct, and that most

species (e.g. sapiens) have a duration of¶ about four million years, while most genera (e.g. Homo) have a duration of about¶ 20 million years. 7 While these are fascinating figures, we must recall that, as we¶ will see through this book, such figures apply to life forms that do not know they¶ are evolving in the first place, and can therefore do nothing proactively about¶ significant threats to their selective environments- their habitats. Humanity, as¶ we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, however, is unique in its ability to both perceive¶ such changes and, if time allows, adapt to them. We return to this important¶ point at the end of this chapter.¶ Extinction normally takes place over multiple generations; millions of¶ generations for faster-reproducing species, thousands for slower-reproducing¶ species. It often results from changes in selective environments that are too rapid¶ for a given species to adapt biologically. For example, when a comet (or asteroid) struck the Earth around 65 million years ago , selective environments changed¶ due to the cloud of debris that was spewed into the atmosphere; the cloud¶ blocked sunlight, which caused changes in temperature, vegetation regimes and¶ so on. This was a change of selective environment so rapid that dinosaurs were¶ unable to adapt with the biological evolution of novel traits suitable to their new¶ selective pressures. Species can also become extinct if they are out-competed by¶ other life forms that are more proficient at life in a given selective environment,¶ as when North American mammals migrated south and replaced many South¶ American marsupials, starting around 3 million years ago.¶ The history of life on Earth includes several well-documented mass-extinction¶

events in which large percentages of Earth life - or some segment of Earth life -¶ became extinct. These events are so distinctive in the fossil record that the¶ disappearance of an established life form and the appearance of new one in the¶ paleontological record are often used to define the beginnings and ends of the¶ geological periods. Such events could occur again and it is clear that most¶ would either cause human extinction at least the collapse of modern¶ civilization.¶ Some mass extinctions occurred over millions of years due to gradual¶ changes in the environment, and some - as in the well-known comet or¶ asteroid impact that ended the reign of the dinosaurs - occurred, from the¶ perspective of life form adaptation, instantly. In each case, full recovery of the¶ Earth's biodiversity took tens of millions of years. We will examine some such¶ extinction events after considering another possible scenario: not extinction,¶ but civilization collapse. ¶

Extinction is inevitable – new planets are key to survivalSmith and Davies 2012 (Cameron M., Anthropology Professor, Evan T., Writer; "A Choice of Catastrophes: Common Arguments for Space Colonization", Emigrating Beyond Earth: Human Adaptation and Space Colonization, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4614-1165-9_4)The Only Way Out Is Up¶ In the words of Astronomer Royal Martin Rees, "Long before the Sun finally licks¶ the Earth's face clean, a teeming variety of life or its artifacts could have spread¶ far beyond its original planet; provided that we avoid irreversible catastrophe¶ before this process can even commence. "48 Humans have tremendous and even¶ unknowable potential. But, as the Han Chinese said, we live in "interesting"¶ times. Critical times, says Rees: "in the twenty first century humanity is more at¶ risk than ever before from misapplication of science. " 49 It is not only science that could be misapplied; an endless-growth model of commerce is of course¶ impossible, but that does not prevent us from pursuing it. Many fisheries today¶ are near collapse, after just a few decades of industrial fishing, and every fishery¶ ever discovered has been chronically over-fished. 50¶ In an interview with a Canadian television station in 1993, Carl Sagan¶ expressed his hope that space exploration and eventual colonization would¶ occur, as the costs continued to decline, and the urgency became clearer to¶ people. 51 In this chapter we have attempted to

impart that certain urgency,¶ though without hysteria. We have shown examples of natural calamities that ¶ could occur on Earth, and speculated on easily-imaginable human-made ¶ catastrophes, catastrophes that - in each case - could either bring about the ¶ downfall of global civilization or altogether extinguish the human species. ¶ For all of these reasons , as hard to imagine as they may be, we must begin to ¶ develop outposts of humanity outside of Earth, if we are genuinely concerned ¶ about our collective future. We buy insurance plans against our individual lives¶ to protect our families. We should do the same, by space colonization, for our¶ offspring. Plenty of others have given similar warnings, but today we write for a¶ new generation.¶ The future is simply the result of daily decisions, and if humanity is to¶ emigrate from the home planet, to expand geographically like any mature¶ species, some people of the next generation will have to make similar decisions¶ to those of the 'crazy dreamers' like Burt Rutan, the aircraft designer who build¶ the world's first privately funded and piloted spacecraft; Richard Branson, who¶ has established space tourism; Franklin Chang-Diaz, designer of the Variable¶ Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (V ASIMR) (an engine claimed to have¶ the potential to cut flight time to Mars to 40 days); or Dr Dava Newman, an MIT¶ professor who designs advanced life-support garments for the human exploration¶ of Mars (see Figure 8.3). None of these developments can be said to address¶ the immediate and legitimate concerns of humanity, but in the same way we do¶ not quit creating art, or give up on intangibles when things are materially¶ difficult; indeed it could be argued that in such times it is most important to¶ retain our dreams.¶ Responsible parents want success for their children; they want them to survive¶ and flourish, even at one's own expense. The risks

people take and the strides¶ they make today will determine where our descendants stand in the future. It ¶ makes sense for us to do all in our capacity to ensure that there will be abodes of ¶ humanity off of Earth, to ensure the survival our species, to continue life. It¶ makes fundamental sense to us to continue to expand our understanding of¶ ourselves and of our Universe, to continue grow in knowledge and wisdom, in¶ short, to continue to evolve.

2AC – Impact Framing – Extinction FirstEven if the plan results in death of 99% of the world solving long term extinction outweighsMatheny 7 Jason Matheny, Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, 2007 “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis, Volume 27, Number 5, Available Online at http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html, Accessed 04-13-2009In a similar vein, the philosopher Derek Parfit (1984) wrote: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much

worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes : 1. Peace 2. A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population 3. A nuclear war that kills 100% 2 would be worse than 1, and 3 would be worse than 2. Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 1 and 2. I believe that the difference between 2 and 3 is very much greater .... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history . The difference between 2 and 3 may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. Human extinction in the next few centuries could reduce the number of future generations by thousands or more. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It might be reasonable to take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same.19 To decide whether this is so requires more discussion of the methodological problems mentioned here, as well as research on the extinction risks we face and the costs of mitigating them.20

2AC – Space Col Possible – A2: No WaterMars colonization is possible-- reserves of water and resources on the planetWilliams 16 (Matt, Writer and Educator, "WILL WE EVER COLONIZE MARS?", Universe Today, 5-11-2016, http://www.universetoday.com/14883/mars-colonizing/#)

As already mentioned, there are many interesting similarities between Earth and Mars that make it a viable option for colonization. For starters, Mars and Earth have very similar lengths of days. A Martian day is 24 hours and 39 minutes, which means that plants and animals – not to mention human colonists – would find that familiar.¶ Mars also has an axial tilt that is very

similar to Earth’s, which means it has the same basic seasonal patterns as our planet (albeit for longer periods of time). Basically, when one hemisphere is pointed towards the Sun, it experiences summer while the other experiences winter – complete with warmer

temperatures and longer days.¶ This too would work well when it comes to growing seasons and would provide colonists with a comforting sense of familiarity and a way of measuring out the year. Much like farmers here on Earth, native Martians would experience a “growing season”, a “harvest”, and would be able to hold annual festivities to mark the changing of the seasons.¶ Also, much like

Earth, Mars exists within our Sun’s habitable zone (aka. “goldilocks zone“), though it is slightly towards its outer edge. Venus is similarly located within this zone, but its location on the inner edge (combined with its thick atmosphere) has led to it becoming the

hottest planet in the Solar System. That, combined with its sulfuric acid rains makes Mars a much more attractive option.¶ Additionally, Mars is closer to Earth than the other Solar planets – except for Venus, but we already covered why it’s not a very good option!

This would make the process of colonizing it easier. In fact, every few years when the Earth and Mars are at opposition – i.e. when they are closest to each other – the distance varies, making certain “launch windows” ideal for sending colonists.¶ For example, on April 8th, 2014, Earth and Mars were 92.4 million km (57.4 million miles) apart at opposition. On May 22nd, 2016, they will be 75.3 million km (46.8 million miles) apart, and by July 27th of 2018, a meager 57.6 million km (35.8 million miles) will separate our two worlds. During these

windows, getting to Mars would be a matter of months rather than years.¶ Also, Mars has vast reserves of water in the form of ice. Most of this water ice is located in the polar regions, but surveys of Martian meteorites have suggested that

much of it may also be locked away beneath the surface. This water could be extracted and purified for human consumption easily enough.¶ In his book, The Case for Mars, Robert Zubrin also explains how future human colonists might be able to live off the land when traveling to Mars, and eventually colonize it. Instead of bringing all their

supplies from Earth – like the inhabitants of the International Space Station – future colonists would be able to make their own air, water, and even fuel by splitting Martian water into oxygen and hydrogen. ¶ Preliminary experiments have shown that Mars soil could be baked into bricks to create protective structures, which would cut down on the amount of materials needed to be shipped to the surface. Earth plants could eventually be grown in Martian soil too, assuming they get enough sunlight and carbon dioxide. Over time, planting on the native soil could also help to create a breathable atmosphere.

2AC – Space Col Possible – A2: RadiationRadiation not an issue – pantry can serve as shelter and barely any impact anywayZubrin 10 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("Human Mars Exploration: The Time Is Now", Journal of Cosmology, 11-2010, Available Online at http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars111.html, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

4.1. Radiation: It is alleged by some that the radiation doses involved in a Mars mission present insuperable risk s, or are not well understood . This is untrue. Solar flare radiation , consisting of protons with energies of about 1 MeV, can be shielded by 12 cm of water or provisions , and there will be enough of such materials on board the ship to build an adequate pantry storm shelter for use in such an event. The residual cosmic ray dose , about 50 Rem for the 2.5 year mission, represents a statistical cancer risk of about 1% , roughly the same as that which would be induced by an average smoking habit over the same period.

2AC – Space Col Possible – A2: PsychologyPsychology not an issueZubrin 10 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("Human Mars Exploration: The Time Is Now", Journal of Cosmology, 11-2010, Available Online at http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars111.html, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

4.4. Human Factors: In popular media, it is frequently claimed that the isolation and stress associated with a 2.5 year round-trip Mars mission present insuperable difficultie s. Upon consideration, there is little reason to believe that this is true . Compared to the stresses dealt with by previous generations of explorers and mariners, soldiers in combat, prisoners in prisons, refugees in hiding, and millions of other randomly selected people, those that will be faced by the hand-picked crew of Mars 1 seem modest . Certainly psychological factors are important (Bishop 2010; Fielder & Harrison, 2010; Harrison & Fielder 2010; Suedfeld 2010). However, any serious reading of previous history indicates that far from being the weak link in the chain of the piloted Mars mission, the human psyche is likely to be the strongest link in the chain as Apollo astronauts have testified (Mitchell & Staretz 2010; Schmitt 2010).

2AC – Space Col Possible – A2: Dust StormsDust Storms not an issue – the atmosphere is super thin and we’ve done it before – only failures have been uncontrollable Soviet shipsZubrin 10 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("Human Mars Exploration: The Time Is Now", Journal of Cosmology, 11-2010, Available Online at http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars111.html, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

4.5. Dust Storms: Mars has intermittent local, and occasionally global dust storms with wind speeds up to 100 km/hour . Attempting to land through such an event would be a bad idea , and two Soviet probes committed to such a maelstrom by their uncontrollable flight systems were destroyed during landing in 1971 . However, once on the ground, Martian dust storms present little hazard. Mars’ atmosphere has only about 1% the density of Earth at sea-level. Thus a wind with a speed of 100 km/hr on Mars only exerts the same dynamic pressure as a 10 km/hr breeze on Earth . The Viking landers endured many such events without damage .

1AR – Add On – Ext – Colonization Solves The EconomyColonization is good for the Earth economy and reduces oppressive social structuresZubrin 96 — Robert Zubrin, Robert Zubrin is President of Pioneer Astronautics, an aerospace R&D company located in Lakewood, Colorado. He is also the founder and President of the Mars Society, an international organization dedicated to furthering the exploration and settlement of Mars by both public and private means. Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. ("The Economic Viability of Mars Colonization", July/August 1996, Available Online at http://pioneerastro.com/Team/RZubrin/The_Economic_Viability_of_Mars_Colonization.pdf, accessed 7-15-2016, JSO)

W e have examined the prospects for colonizing Mars, addressing the question of its∂ economic viability. We have shown, that of all bodies in the solar system other than Earth,∂ Mars is unique in that it has the resources required to support a population of sufficient size∂ to create a new branch of human civilization . We have seen that despite the fact that Mars∂ may lack any resource directly exportable to Earth, Mars’ orbital elements and other∂ physical parameters gives a unique positional advantage that will allow it to act as a∂ keystone supporting extractive activities in the asteroid belt and elsewhere in the solar∂ system. We have examined the potential of relatively near-term types of interplanetary∂ transportation systems, and shown that with very modest advances on a historical scale,∂ systems can be put in place that will allow individuals and families to emigrate to Mars at∂ their own discretion . Their motives for doing so will parallel in many ways the historical∂ motives for Europeans and others to come to America, including higher pay rates in a∂ labor-short economy, escape from tradition and oppression, as well as freedom to exercise∂ their drive to create in an untamed and undefined world. Under conditions of such large∂ scale and open immigration, sale of real-estate will add a significant source of income to the∂ planet’s economy . However the greatest source of Martian wealth, and the greatest benefit ∂ of its existence to the terrestrial world, will be as a pressure cooker for invention and ∂ innovation of every type. In analogy to frontier America but going well beyond it, Mars ∂ will be a society of self-selected immigrants, operating in a harsh, labor- short environment ∂ in which practical innovation and technological acumen will be at a premium . Licensing on∂ Earth of the inventions created under conditions of necessity on Mars will bring vast∂ amounts of income to support the development of the Red Planet, even as these same∂ inventions continue to raise terrestrial living standards and destabilize tendencies that would∂ otherwise exist on Earth towards technological and social stagnation .

What the Mediterranean was to the Greeks, what the New World was to the Western ∂ Europeans , Mars will be to the pioneering nations of the next several centuries; the engine∂ of progress of the coming era. As America showed in the 19th Century, such an engine of∂ can pull far more than its own weight .

Multilateralism Advantage

1AC – Multilateralism AdvantageContention 2 is Multilateralism:The wolf amendment stalls international cooperation in space Kohler 15 (Hannah Kohler, Research Assistant, Edward Bennett Williams Law Library at Georgetown University Law Center, March 2015, “The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.–Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International Cooperation in Space,” http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf // MH)

Although the 2011–2013 Wolf Amendment s severely constricted NASA’s ability to interact with other spacefaring nations (there are so few, after all), at the very least their application evinced careful consideration of a policy

balance between national security, morality, international cooperation, and practicality. That may have changed in 2014. Public Law 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014 ( 2014 Appropriations Act ), was signed by the President in January 2014 113 and contained a slight deviation from the core text of its three predecessors—a change so seemingly insignificant that it might not seem worth the effort to mention it. However, the potential repercussions are staggering. The relevant text in Sections 532(a), (c), and (d) is identical to Sections 535(a), (c) and (d) in the 2013

Appropriations Act. 114 However, the newly amended Section 532(b) states that “ [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may be used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA .” 115 Considering that the annual appropriations act dictates the spending of NASA’s entire

governmental budget, this change appears to categorically bar official Chinese visitors from NASA facilities (or even facilities “used” by NASA!) where any government-granted money is involved, whether the forum is a bilateral one or not . This could reasonably be read to exclude Chinese citizens from all multinational conventions or events with NASA , unless the events could be certified by the House Appropriations Committee as posing no national- or economic-security risk; that is, the 2014 Appropriations Act could conceivably be enacting the very restrictions that Congressman Wolf protested so vehemently in the wake of the 2013 Ames Conference debacle.

Absent a change in law, a space race is inevitableWeeden and He 4/26 (Brian Weeden, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation, and Xiao He, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 4/26/16, “Use Outer Space to Strengthen U.S.-China Ties,” http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/ // MH)

The U nited S tates and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development . Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international

prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship . The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of

the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the

United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by

the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship . Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national

security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine

international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both

countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges.

No tech sharing DA – cooperation is mutually beneficial and builds trustListner and Johnson-Freese 14 (Michael, is a an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law & Policy Solutions, a legal and policy think tank that identifies issues and offers practical solutions on matters related to outer space security, national security and outer space development, and Joan is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. //MTB)

The National Research Council ( NRC) recently released a report on the future of U.S. human spaceflight. Besides advocating a Mars mission the report also advocated pursuing more international collaboration, specifically to include China . That would require a distinct change in U.S. policy. There will likely be resistance to that recommendation from the small but powerful congressional enclave behind the legislatively imposed restrictions on U.S-Sino cooperation since

2011. But the realist approach advocated by the NRC report has a much better chance of serving U.S. security interests than the current ineffectual policy that attempts to isolate and “punish” China for domestic policies. President Barack Obama met with then-Chinese President Hu Jintao in January

2011. Part of their joint statement addressed the desire for deepened dialogue and interaction in space, which many people interpreted as a new willingness on the part of the United States to work with China, perhaps leading to a cooperative program.

U.S.-Sino relations had basically been moribund since the sensationalist 1999 Cox Committee report alleging theft of information on American thermonuclear weapons and transfer of sensitive missile technology by profit-hungry

American aerospace companies. Though nonpoliticized analysis from experts at institutions such as Stanford University largely discredited the report , congressional caterwauling successfully pushed the United States into the impossible position of trying to isolate Chinese space activities in a globalized world, and ended up primarily hurting U.S. aerospace companies through the draconian export control

measures issued consequent to the Cox Committee report. But cooperation was not to be. In April 2011, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the

House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time China hardliner , especially regarding freedom

of religion issues, inserted two sentences into funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the United S tates and China that involves NASA or is coordinated by the White House

Office of Science and Technology Policy ( OSTP ). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral activity with China. Though Wolf is retiring in January 2015, speculation regarding potential successors includes individuals

with views similar to his. Wolf’s rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011 interview, includes three key points . “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” Wolf said. “And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. … Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?” The three assumptions in that statement are , quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests. First, it assumes that working with the U nited S tates would give China opportunities not otherwise available and implies that the U nited S tates would be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space station program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own

space station soon. In fact, when China’s space station becomes operational around 2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station, given that the ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that China has already invited other countries to visit its facility. In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just slow them down. American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly work with and sell aerospace

technology to China. China has not been isolated. Second, Wolf’s rationale assumes the U nited S tates has nothing to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the U nited S tates could learn about how they work — their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and solve problems together, perhaps beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties can contribute

something of value, builds trust on both sides , trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the other’s cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal risk of technology sharing . From a practical perspective, working with China could diversify U.S. options for reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has become painfully apparent consequent to Vladimir Putin’s expansionist actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin subsequently stated, “I propose that the United States delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the help of a trampoline.” And finally, Wolf stated that the United States should not work with China based on moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with authoritarian regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime when it has served American interests. That is the basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with Putin when it benefits us to do so. Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few to work with at all in the Middle East. We live in a globalized world. Attempting to isolate Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China and other countries into developing indigenous space industries — totally beyond any U.S. control — that they might have done otherwise. High fences around areas of technology where the United States has a monopoly — and there are few of those left — combined with a realist approach to working with China when and were we can, will allow the U.S. to lead rather futilely playing whack-a-mole, trying to beat back anticipated Chinese space achievements.

That ban creates a space rivalry – cooperation leads to a space code of conduct that solves peaceful development, debrisZhao 14 (Zhao Weibin, Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations (CCADR) at the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), 7/9/14, “Sino-US Competition and Cooperation in Outer Space,” http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/sino-us-competition-and-cooperation-in-outer-space/ // MH)

Unfortunately, there is competition between China and the U.S. in outer space at the legal, military and diplomatic levels . At the legal level, negotiation and bargaining on the establishment of an international code of conduct to govern behavior in space is now the focus of Sino-U.S.

competition. In February 2008, China and Russia proposed a draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT). The EU has also put forward three versions of a code of conduct for behavior in space. For fear of restrictions and concessions on military uses of space, the U.S. has refused to accept both the EU and the China-

Russia versions. At the military level, control and the ability to counter control space will be the key to future Sino-U.S. confrontation. In the 14 versions of U.S. DoD annual reports on China’s military strength, the U.S. DoD has maintained consistent concern over the PLA’s space and counter-space capabilities. As mentioned in the Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations released on May 29, 2013, the U.S. has decided to negate adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction, thus

targeting an adversary’s space-related capabilities and forces by use of both lethal and nonlethal means. At the diplomatic level, winning international support is the hot point of Sino-U.S. competition . Due to U.S. obstruction, China now can only have limited international exchanges and cooperation on space technologies and activities . Nevertheless, both China and the U.S. can gain benefits from space cooperation . For

example, joint promotion of establishing a fair and reasonable space code of conduct can guarantee the peaceful, stable and sustainable development of outer space . Both countries should join hands to deal with common threats such as space debris. Furthermore, against the background of a U.S. rebalance

toward the Asia-Pacific region, space cooperation can help reduce suspicion, increase trust, and maintain strategic stability between the two countries. Possible areas for Sino-U.S. space cooperation may include an invitation by the U.S. for China to join efforts in international space exploration (as suggested by the NRC report), the sharing of space situation awareness (SSA) information, relief of a space technology blockade against China, establishing crisis management mechanisms to guard against miscalculations, as well as the beginning of bilateral and multilateral dialogues on sensitive issues such as space weaponization.

Space debris causes nuclear miscalcTyson 7 — Program Officer of the Global Security Institute (Rhianna, “Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space”, Global Security Institute, May 2007, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/05_07_space_brief.pdf)

Threats to space assets grow with our ever-increasing uses of outer space. At present, there are over 800 commercially used satellites in orbit.2 Orbital paths are further cluttered by deserted spacecraft, discarded rocket debris and other “space junk” shed from hardware. A piece of space debris, with an average impact speed of 36,000 kilometers per hour,3 could destroy a satellite . While a collision of two operating satellites is predictable (yet nonetheless worrisome), the overcrowding of orbital paths heightens the risk of radio frequency interference, causing harmful disruptions in communication . Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial satellite communications,

hostile actions in space can result in grave security threats, especially in times of war. Militaries rely on satellites for monitoring of and communication with troops on the ground. If a military satellite was deceived, disrupted, denied, degraded or destroyed , commanders lose their communication capabilities, resulting in mounting tensions and an escalation of conflict. A worst-case scenario could involve inadvertent use of nuclear weapons ; without satellite-enabled monitoring capability in a time of tension, or, if early warning systems give a false reading of an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons .

ASAT attacks are coming without cooperation - causes nuclear retaliation and collapses power projection - testing is sufficient to trigger our impactsGallagher 15 “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage,” Nancy, interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of

the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, May 29, 2015, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346 *modified

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out a nti sat ellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war . In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the

United S tates, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic a nti sat ellite weapon s , and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent

capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the U nited S tates depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites . They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support

arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation , for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites , nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be [ the ] an irrational response . But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked . Moreover,

disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war . It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the

countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult , and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase , if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If , for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict , leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear warO’Hanlon 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political

philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the U nited S tates is in a position to lead the way in counter ing major challenges to the global order . Let us highlight the threats and

their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia , or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of

international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—

government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea , of course,

has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear

in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino- Taiwan ese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan , Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on

offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the

recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this

international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this

dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions— including not only

deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea , the Taiwan Strait, and the

Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Mechanics/AOs

2AC – U – Multilateralism LowMultilateral institutions failing nowVoicu 7/13 (Ioan Voicu, Senior Financial Economist in the Compliance Risk Analysis Division within Economics at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 7/13/16, “Crisis of multilateralism,” http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=18370 // MH)

Today, we witness a different situation both at the regional and global levels. In an important address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, under the title “From Turmoil to Peace,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned the highest representatives of 193 member states that diplomacy is on the defensive. That situation is due primarily to a declining confidence in the merits of multilateralism, a dramatic

reality which has a negative impact on the very essence of multilateral cooperation. There is no doubt that multilateral diplomacy is more instrumental than bilateral one, as it is legitimately expected to function on the basis of universal values and principles. It embodies rules for greater and closer coordination and provides a higher effectiveness to international relations. From this perspective, the EU and ASEAN used to be normally considered and described as successful examples of multilateral diplomacy in action. Over the years the structure of world politics has been transformed beyond all recognition and it

generated a different political environment for all countries. Yet, multilateralism continues to be a remarkable process of evolution, as it involves today not only states, but also many non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, chambers of commerce and industry, regional bodies, provincial governments, local government organizations and professional experts. Under such new circumstances, multilateral diplomacy is practically covering the world community of nations as a whole and remains a perennial institution characterized both by continuity and change, as well as by waves of improvement and deterioration. International life demonstrates that diplomacy is able to assume greater or lesser importance and an increasing or decreasing role with the progress or regress of globalization, while its scope may further widen and deepen, as globalization simultaneously generates new challenges and conflicting situations. Globalization has a direct and unavoidable

impact on the very nature and agenda of diplomacy. Under the permanent pressure of the irreversible process of globalization, in order to remain viable and productive, diplomacy must fortify its role in world affairs and should avoid and combat an increasing amateurism, present today in many confrontational cases which, because of their complexity, demand action guided by genuine professionalism in order to reach sustainable solutions. This indisputable fact of life is even more detrimental today, when the multilateral approach to regional and global issues is increasingly being challenged by some countries as a result of a deplorable lack of trust among major international actors . A well-known example: The UN Security Council is in accordance with the Charter of the world organization the strongest multilateral body in the world, but its deadlock over Syria shows in a startling way its diminishing ability to function properly, as demanded by its extremely responsible mandate. On the economic arena, the crisis of the Bretton Woods institutions and of the W orld T rade Organization which could not finalize over decades negotiations on the Doha Development Agenda is another troubling chapter of the same crisis of multilateralism affecting the majority of international institutions.

2AC – IL – Wolf Amendment Blocks CooperationWolf amendment prevents effective multilateral coop. Kohler 15 — Hannah Kohler, Georgetown Law, J.D., 2015 ("The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.–Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International Cooperation in Space," Georgetown Law Journal, May 2nd, Available Online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf, Accessed 7-12-2016)

At this point, however, it must be considered that Congressman Wolf’s personal interpretation of the statute no longer controls; the plain language of Section 532 does restrict multilateral interaction. The widespread confusion and misapplication of the Amendment between 2011 and 2013

are damning evi- dence ; if the international space community could not parse the wording of the old legislation, it seems unlikely that they will be any less liberal in applying the new, stricter language . The heart of the problem lies in the misapplied focus that Wolf and other members of the House Appropriations Committee have

granted to the Amendment. Congressman Wolf, in many of his statements concerning the Amendment, emphasizes the bilateral/multilateral nature of a given activity to determine whether it should be considered prohibited .123 However, this is not the heart of the issue. Although bilateral coordination is unarguably banned in both the 2011 and 2014 versions of the Amendment, the true focus has consistently been on the issue of officialness, not number of parties or even the nature of the activity.

2AC – AO – China RelationsSpace cooperation solves relations across the boardWeeden and He 16 (Brian, the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., and Xiao, an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties///MTB)

With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China. The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests

and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship . The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could

lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present

opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the U nited S tates and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together , and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the

private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.

2AC – A2: China/Russia Alt CuaseChina-Russia cooperation will be unsuccessful – US-China relations key to check Cheng and Cohen 13 (Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, and Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 9/12/13, “How Washington Should Manage U.S.–Russia–China Relations,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/how-washington-should-manage-usrussiachina-relations // MH)

The Sino–Russian rapprochement coincides with the U.S. unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War, and has continued into the 21st century. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Beijing believe that American power represents a geopolitical challenge to them both . The prospect of formal or informal alliance that brings together the economic and political power of China and Russia would be a major problem for American interests, just as its Sino–Soviet predecessor was in the 1950s during the Cold War. For this reason, such an alliance has long worried American policymakers and analysts. Indeed, a long-standing concern throughout the

Cold War was the prospect that the United States would need to confront China and the Soviet Union simultaneously. However, while Chinese–Russian cooperation is continuing and even expanding, the two nations are linked more by shared aversions than by shared interests. While Moscow and Beijing agree on the need to counter American power and

have complementary economies, they are also geopolitical competitors. The U.S. should maintain an engaged American diplomatic, political, and economic presence in Asia and strong bilateral relations with Russia and China, using these to exploit their differences and ensure that they remain competitors. In particular, the U.S. should develop bilateral security cooperation programs with Central Asian countries aimed at strengthening the security environment after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 and preventing al-Qaeda and the Taliban from taking over Kabul and projecting power into Central Asia.

China-Russia relations are not a threat to the US – they only ally for their own benefitKotkin 9 (Stephen Kotkin, Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University, September/October 2009, “The Unbalanced Triangle,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/unbalanced-triangle // MH) Bobo Lo, a former Australian diplomat in Moscow and the director of the China and Russia programs at the Center for European Reform, in London, has written the best analysis yet of one of the world's more important bilateral relationships. His close examination of Chinese-Russian relations -- sometimes mischaracterized by both countries as a "strategic partnership" -- lays bare the full force of China's global strategy, the

conundrum of Russia's place in today's world, and fundamental shortcomings in U.S. foreign policy. China's shift in strategic orientation from the Soviet Union to the United States is the most important geopolitical realignment of the last several decades. And Beijing now enjoys not only excellent relations with Washington but also better relations with Moscow than does Washington . Lo calls the Chinese- Russian relationship a "mutually beneficial partnership" and goes so far as to deem Moscow's improved ties with Beijing "the greatest Russian foreign policy achievement of the post-Soviet period." Precisely such hyperbole drives the alarmism of many pundits, who believe that the U nited S tates faces a challenge from a Chinese-Russian alliance built on shared illiberal values. But as Lo himself argues, the twaddle about Russia being an energy superpower was dubious

even before the price of oil fell by nearly $100 in 2008. Even more important, Lo points out that the Chinese-Russian relationship is imbalanced and fraught: the two countries harbor significant cultural prejudices about each other and have divergent interests that are likely to diverge even more in the future. More accurately, the Chinese-Russian relationship is, as Lo puts it, an "axis of convenience" -- that is, an inherently limited partnership conditioned on its ability to advance both parties' interests. But even Lo does not go far enough in his debunking of the Chinese-Russian alliance: he argues that it "is, for all its faults, one of the more convincing examples of positive-sum international relations today." This is doubtful. The relationship may allow the Chinese to extract strategically important natural resources from Russia and extend their regional influence, but it affords the Russians little more than the pretense of a multipolar world in which Moscow enjoys a central role.

1AR – Ext – A2: China/Russia Alt Cause China-Russia relations fail because of mistrust – US cooperation key Clarke and Ricketts 2/1 (Michael Clarke, Associate Professor at the National Security College, and Anthony Ricketts, PhD at National Security College, 2/1/16, “Should America Fear the China-Russia Relationship?,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-fear-the-china-russia-relationship-15075 // MH)

With these considerations in mind, the Beijing–Moscow relationship faces many challenges that will inhibit progression to a formal alliance. Foremost is the lingering perception within Russia that China remains a threat to their security. Whilst this viewpoint stems from historical mistrust, the territorial integrity of Russia continues

to be viewed with a level of anxiety, due to heightened Chinese migration, coupled with an extensive shared border. Conversely, many analysts have pointed to China’s inherent understanding of Russia as an inefficient business partner. In this sense, China perceives Russian business laws as being unfavorable to China’s interests, thereby dissuading substantive economic collaboration. As Bobo Lo stated, “The Chinese regard the Russians as difficult business partners. They complain, first, that commercial ties are often hostage to geopolitical fortune. It seems there are always ulterior motives.” Indeed, such laws likely stem from the high levels of xenophobia within the Russian Federation, and the need to be receptive to the wave of discontent towards ethnic migration. Such

representations play into broader notions of Western relations. In this sense, Russia remains skeptical of China’s long game, and whether China legitimately views the West as an enemy —as supposedly Russia does — or a critical partner in their future success . Such an acquiescent Chinese view of the West would hamper China from becoming too close to Russia, as it would impede upon China’s capacity to be an “equal” global leader with America. Similarly, while Russia has strengthened their bilateral relations with China, there remain questions around Putin’s broader Asian policy. Putin has never attended the East Asia Summit, and prior to the imposition of European economic sanctions, prioritized engagement with Europe, over that of Asia. Such ambiguity leaves open the possibility that a future Russian president will pursue a policy of mending relations with the West, whereby the Russia–China axis would become obsolete. Indeed, Russia’s tumultuous oil industry may require Russia to saddle back up with the West. While Russian oil production is currently on the upside at 10.8 million barrels per day, this is forecasted to peak in the next twenty years. The growing global appetite for a green future, and the potential for China to tap into their own shale gas reserves, alongside the abating value of

oil, may ultimately mean that Russia will be required to reach out to the West for its economic survival. When viewed through this prism then, China and Russia share little in the way of a future vision, but rather their relationship is built upon achieving their own individual aims . And because of this, the U nited S tates is best served fostering dialogue with Russia and China. The U nited S tates needs their cooperation in many of the most pressing global issues of the day . The success of key international initiatives, such nuclear non-proliferation, the downing of flight MH17 and the ongoing crises in the Middle East, demands the partnership of China and Russia. And any global political fragmentation will only detract from resolving these critical issues.

Space War Impact

2AC – U – Space War/Space Race Wolf amendment prevents co-op and promotes arms race in space. Krepon & Thompson 13 — Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, worked previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, Capitol Hill, Julia Thompson, project associate focusing on defense and national security, 2013 ("Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations," Stimson September, Available Online at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf, Accessed 7-12-2016)

There has been little progress to date beyond the joint statement. China so far has been reluctant to engage in a space security-focused dialogue with the United States, and some in Congress oppose any form of bilateral space cooperation with

China. U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., had led efforts to restrict bilateral cooperation with China : The Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing Resolution prevents the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from spending any federal funds on participating, collaborating or coordinating in bilateral cooperation with China.2

Meanwhile, both countries continue to engage in national security and military space activities, including multiple tests of weapon systems that could be used to damage or destroy satellites, which have heightened concerns over a military competition in space.

US inaction spurs space race with ChinaDavid 15 (Leonard David, Space.com's Space Insider Columnist, 6/16/15, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?” http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html // MH)

The U.S. and China have a complex relationship, said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of

SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not like the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish." Smith pointed out that, as far as space cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the Richard Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under then-President Jimmy Carter after the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration, small programs — again, mostly in the biomedical area — were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight — the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership — waited for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible," Smith added. The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation, she said. "The door is not completely shut." A U.S.-China

space race? "It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space ," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. "The U nited States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space partnerships, " Johnson- Freese said . Refusing Chinese participation in the I nternational S pace S tation, at least in part , has spurred China to build its own station , Johnson-Freese said, "which could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited."

2AC – U – Chinese Space Mil China is militarizing space now in response to American actionGannon 14 (Megan Gannon, news editor for space.com, 4/14/14, “China's President Xi Wants More Military Use of Space: Report,” http://www.space.com/25517-china-military-space-technology.html // MH)

Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly asked his nation's air force to hasten its integration of air and space capabilities. During a visit to the air force headquarters of the People's Liberation Army in Beijing on Monday (April 14), Xi urged the development of a "new-type combat force" and told military leaders they need to be able to deal with air and space emergencies "swiftly and effectively," the English-language newspaper China

Daily reported. The news report gave few details on how Xi wanted to strengthen the military use of space. Some of the Chinese media framed Xi's request as a response to actions by the U nited S tates and other world powers . China

Daily quoted Wang Ya'nan, deputy editor-in-chief of Beijing's Aerospace Knowledge Magazine, as saying: "The U nited S tates has paid considerable attention and resources to the integration of capabilities in both air and space, and other powers have also moved progressively toward space militarization . Though China has stated that it sticks to the peaceful use of space, we must make sure that we have the ability to cope with others' operations in space."

2AC – U/I/L – Cooperation/Chinese ASATsWolf Amendment tanks cooperation and causes Chinese ASATs – Reversing the law solvesDaniels 2/18 (Laura Daniels, writer for a leading Washington, D.C., think tank where she specializes in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, 2/18/16, “Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space,” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248 // MH)

That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above. Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation, China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station. Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead. If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stage, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations, including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and

others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements. Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability , a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite ( ASAT ), command and control, and intelligence technology , in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. This has strong implications for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield. With growing military capacity comes the ability to contest freedom of movement in the global commons. In the expansive global commons of outer space, China’s ASAT technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets critical to the global economy. While these same developments unfolding in the South and East China Seas are of more immediate concern, free movement of satellites within space is vital, contributing to approximately $1.6 trillion of U.S. commercial revenue. The prescription for dealing with Chinese pressure on the international order is much the

same in space as on land: build on the order’s strengths, and adjust it for an increasingly multipolar environment. The U nited S tates should pursue cooperation with China on benign space research to better integrate China as a partner in the established order and to afford U.S. security strategists a window into Chinese decision making and intentions. The State Department’s recent cooperation initiative is a step in the right direction. Simultaneously, the United States should promote deterrence by improving on an array of resilience and counterspace abilities, but without growing alarmism—after all, often cited as the greatest threat to national security in space is floating junk. Finally, reviving the political will to maintain U.S. leadership in space and abroad will be a boon to national security. All this will help ensure that destabilization of the international order doesn’t fly over our heads.

2AC – IL – Coop Solves Space MilThe plan is necessary to prevent the placement of weapons in outer spaceWeibin 4/08 (Dr. Zhao Weibin is a Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations (CCADR) at the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS)Zhao Weibin “U.S. Space Deterrence Strategy’s Likely Target is China” http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/forthcoming-u-s-space-deterrence-strategy/#sthash.RGtru0QQ.dpuf)

Third, for the future U.S. space deterrence strategy to work, supportive measures might include formulating some rules of combat, enhancing space situational awareness, and gaining international support. The Report proposes five rules of war in space: (i) Being the first to carry war into space is escalatory and irresponsible; (ii) Kinetic attacks that cause lasting damage to humanity’s ability to exploit space abilities are prohibited; (iii) Attacks on or interruptions of strategic space assets would be construed as highly escalatory, and should be presumptively disfavored; (iv) Satellites and space assets not directly and substantially involved in a conflict are not legitimate targets for attack; (v) Attacks in space justify responses outside of space. As we see it, the first rule involves “no first shot”. As space-faring states are relying more and more on outer space, this rule will be a double-edged sword, constraining all sides. The second rule involves “the legitimacy of kinetic attacks”, which might be welcomed by the U.S. government, particularly by the U.S. military, since the latter has developed a lot of non-kinetic counter-space technologies. The third rule involves “setting a red line” between strategic and less-important space assets. It has been very controversial, since drawing a red line will encourage an adversary to attack those below the threshold, without escalating the space war. The fourth rule involves the “dual-use problem”, because it is hard to distinguish between a civilian satellite and a military one. Therefore, it is hard to implement the rule. The fifth rule involves “cross-domain deterrence”, which has been adopted by the newly released cyber deterrence strategy. Given the significance of outer space to U.S. national security and economic prosperity, the U.S. government might as well accept the whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach.

Space situational awareness (SSA) has been elevated to be the top priority of U.S. military space missions, as listed in the Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations (May 2013). The United States now has different layers of SSA capabilities, from the land-based Space Fence, to low-earth-orbit Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS) and Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), to low and high Space-Based Infra-Red Systems (SBIRSs), and to Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program

(GSSAP). Enhanced SSA will be a powerful deterrent to malicious space activities. The Obama administration has attached great importance to space cooperation, as stressed in recent official documents on space security, like the National Space Policy of the United States of America (June 2010), National Security Space Strategy (January 2011), and Department of Defense Directive No.

3100.10 Space Policy (October 2012). International space cooperation can not only make good use of such scarce space resources as electromagnetic spectra, but also increase the risks and costs of space attacks by a third party, thus effectively supporting space deterrence. China has always been strongly against the militarization and weaponization of outer space, and put forward , together with Russia, the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). With a U.S. space deterrence strategy around the

corner, space arms control will be harder and diplomatic competition will be fiercer. For China, the best way ahead is to proactively participate in the formulation of an international code of behavior for the interests of all space-faring countries and for the peaceful and sustainable development of outer space.

2AC – I/L – Cooperation Solves Accidents Cooperation with China is critical to solve space accidents – orbit overloadIB Times 15 — International Business Times citing NASA administrator Charles Bolden, 2015 ("The Future Of Space Policy Is Built On International Cooperation: NASA Administrator Charles Bolden," International Business Times, November 16th, Available Online at http://www.ibtimes.com/future-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasa-administrator-charles-bolden-2186627, Accessed 7-13-2016)

Conspicuously absent from NASA's international partners is China. Politics have stymied this relationship following a ban included in the 2011 U.S. Federal budget . There are some loopholes that have allowed Bolden to collaborate with the Chinese Academy of Science on Earth science research. NASA also provided China with lunar imagery

that helped the Chang'e 3 mission select a landing site. Air traffic management is another area of cooperation. "It’s critical to partner with China," Bolden said. Space exploration is peaceful, but the area above Earth could become a source of contention as more countries send satellites into orbit. More partnerships would lead to a safer orbit. " If we’re partnered with the Chinese, as we are with other nations, I think they would be much less prone to do something that puts low-Earth orbit in jeopardy, like, you

know, anti-satellite stuff. Now, that may be a naïve thought, but I think that's what gives me hope, that the more we can have many nations working toward a common goal, the better off we’ll be," Bolden said.

2AC – Impact – Space WarSpace is the highest risk flashpoint in the world – China, US and Russia have capabilities and using them escalates to a full nuke warBillings 8/10/15 Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The Scientific American, August 10, 2015, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a

clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.¶

The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare , space has become the ultimate high ground , with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own , the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple [ destroy ] the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure . And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth . ¶

The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible a nti- sat ellite weapons by China and Russia , as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the U nited N ations. ¶ Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat

to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “ developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict ,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the S outh China Sea

or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular , Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites , referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007.¶ There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack

transmissions to or from ground controllers.¶ In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at

least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program . The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy ,

although with minimal success ; in late July at the U nited Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China

and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly.¶ “The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.”¶ Offensive space weapons tested¶ The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It

even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit.¶ Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center

think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “ geosynchronous ” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks . But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth , both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the

other guy would, too.”¶ Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk , in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules —and they don’t have to , because the rules remain as yet unwritten. ¶ Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a “kinetic” method to destroy an adversary’s satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby.¶ In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That

test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude.¶

More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground- based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese

officials insist the tests’ only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.

Debris

2AC – U – Now KeySpace debris at a tipping point — now is key. Hildreth & Arnold 14 — Steven A. Hildreth, specialist in missile defense, Allison Arnold, research associate, 2014 ("Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal," Congressional Research Service, January 8th, Available Online at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43353.pdf, Accessed 7-15-2016)

Some observers have noted that the danger posed by orbital debris should be thought of fundamentally as a long-term environmental problem . Others perceive the danger as potentially affecting U.S. security interests, especially in its ability to interfere with consistent satellite support to U.S. military and intelligence organizations. However the issue is characterized, the space debris population, particularly in LEO, may have reached a tipping point. Catastrophic collisions are likely to continue to drive its growth, and the threat posed by orbital debris may be exacerbated by accidental or intentional debris-generating events . International compliance with mitigation measures is widely seen as critically important, but many experts believe that mitigation efforts alone are insufficient. For this reason, more aggressive measures, such as active debris removal, could be considered to protect U.S. national security interests in space and the long-term sustainability of the space environment.

*LEO is Low Earth Orbit

2AC – I/L – Coop Solves DebrisChinese co-op is required to combat space debris — Wolf amendment must be modified. National Space Society 16 — National Space Society, an American international nonprofit 501(c)(3) educational and scientific organization specializing in space advocacy, 2016 ("Orbital Debris: Overcoming Challenges," National Space Society, May, Available Online at http://www.nss.org/legislative/positions/NSS_Position_Paper_Orbital_Debris_2016.pdf, Accessed 7-12-2016)

Continuing to exclude China, the source of much orbital debris, from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities.39 Space weather, scientific research, exploration, disaster response , and global environmental monitoring are areas where the U.S. and China could collaborate with each other and other interested countries in a way that would lower tensions while achieving positive gains.

No country alone can affordably clean up debris sufficiently to remove the threat of catastrophic collisions , and both Russia and China are key players in cleaning up orbital debris. NSS therefore recommends that the United States actively seek to include Russia, China , and other nations in its international, public-private efforts to clean up orbital debris.

The 14-member Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), which already includes Russian and Chinese agencies and NASA, and which has already published voluntary orbital debris mitigation guidelines, may be a good starting place to develop voluntary remediation guidelines. However, all spacefaring countries (including the public and private space-related entities within their borders), space-related intergovernmental entities, and emerging and extant commercial satellite companies eventually need to be included.

To facilitate cooperation with China, NSS also recommends that the U.S . Congress modify the 2011 Wolf amendment , which bars the use of Federal funds to conduct bilateral science exchanges with China, to allow cooperation on matters related to orbital debris . Congress should also consider allowing exchanges in areas of overwhelming common interest such as planetary defense and space weather, in addition to space debris.

2AC – I/L – International Coop KeyMulitat is key – any nation alone is insufficientShackelford 14 — Scott J. Shackelford, Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, PhD in Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, 2014 ("Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach to Managing Space Weaponization and Debris," American Business Law Journal, April 16th, Available Online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ablj.12031/full, Accessed 7-15-2016)

This article has shown that multipolar international relations, interrelated national security considerations, advancing technology, and scarcity have collectively shaped space governance during and after the golden age of space law. The evolution of space law has also illustrated the growth of a space regime complex featuring a greater role for the private sector and national governments going forward. Instead of multilateral treaties negotiated through COPUOS, many nations are negotiating bilateral and regional agreements to regulate space . Where recent multilateral action has been taken , such as the space debris mitigation guidelines, so far it has been nonbinding . [480] Though the private sector has played an important role in tracking space debris, the problem cannot be solved without multilevel and multistakeholder cooperation. The lack of legally binding regulation has made addressing the pressing and interrelated problems of space weaponization and orbital debris difficult. This has exacerbated these collective action problems and underscores the need for instilling sustainable development policies at all regulatory levels.

This article has demonstrated some of the benefits and drawbacks of a polycentric approach to global collective action problems. Nations and the private sector working separately cannot effectively address global collective action problems, like space junk, weaponization, or piracy, without the support of the international community . [481] The results of this analysis highlight the gridlock that can result from certain regime complexes. The United States, being the dominant space power, should do more to engage other responsible spacefaring nations in a multilateral dialogue to sustainably develop the space commons and to increase organizational coordination.[482] Efforts should also continue to negotiate an Agreement on Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, given that space debris is a common problem and thus a better entry point than space weapons, which must overcome formidable national security concerns. On the whole, policy makers should consider moving toward a polycentric framework in addressing space weaponization and debris given current international geopolitical divides, while continuing complementary multilateral efforts.[483]

As Part III made clear, the ultimate redefinition of sovereignty in outer space will depend in part on relations between the main space powers , including the United S tates and China . Depending on future developments, this redefinition could either help usher in a second golden age of space law or a gilded age of serious problems , such as proliferating weapons and debris hidden beneath a veneer of cooperation, or even eventually the beginning of a second space race. The only question is whether new initiatives will occur proactively with the international community laying out effective legal regimes or retroactively by formalizing a suboptimal status

quo. The answer to this question turns on international politics and the changing conceptions of sovereignty over the global commons in the twenty-first century.

1AR – Ext – I/L – International Coop KeySpace debris is solvable — international coop is needed. Plumer 13 — Brad Plumer, senior editor at Vox, oversees the site's science, energy, and environmental coverage, 2013 ("Space trash is a big problem. These economists have a solution.," The Washington Post, October 24th, Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/10/24/space-is-filling-up-with-garbage-heres-why-we-should-tax-it/, Accessed 7-14-2016)

Here's the good news: Scientists have plenty of clever schemes to deal with orbital debris, like shoving the troublesome pieces high into “ graveyard orbit ." Engineers at the University of Colorado have even outlined a plan to haul away junk with static electricity . (The FCC requires all newer satellites to move into graveyard orbit at the end of their lifespan, but experts say we'll also have to remove older debris to avoid disaster.)

One problem, though, is that the world's nations can't always agree on how best to handle clean-up. Current international guidelines for debris mitigation are largely voluntary , with some agencies — like NASA — more careful than others. Everyone has an incentive to keep launching satellites into space. The incentives to tidy up the aftermath are weaker.

In their paper, economists Alexander and Cunningham, along with Nodir Adilov of Indiana University-Purdue University, propose a solution: Countries should impose a fee or tax on orbital launches. The fee would be set high enough that companies and nations don't over- populate space with objects. And the revenue could fund clean-up efforts . This, they say, would be preferable to the current system of ad hoc rules and regulations on space debris.

Space debris is solvable but the US can’t solve space debris alone.Washington Post 13 — Washington Post, 2013 ("Space trash is a big problem. These economists have a solution.," Washington Post, October 24th, Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/10/24/space-is-filling-up-with-garbage-heres-why-we-should-tax-it/, Accessed 7-14-2016)

Yet despite years of warning, the world's nations have never been able to agree on how to solve the problem. There are lots of bright ideas for cleaning up debris, but countries often wrangle over how to pay for them. So that's where economists come in.

In a recent paper, three economists argue that orbital debris is just a standard "tragedy of the commons" problem . Space is a precious commodity, and people tend to overuse it, since users don't pay the full price for the mess created by satellites. Similarly, no one country has the incentive to clean up the entire mess all by itself.

Economists typically solve this problem with what's known as a Pigouvian tax or user fee to better align those incentives. So, they ask, why not place a user fee on orbital launches to help pay for clean-up?

"User fees are a solution straight out of the Reagan era to deal with precisely these sorts of environmental issues," says Peter J. Alexander, an economist at the Federal Communications Commission and a co-author of the paper. (He helped write the paper in his spare time, not on behalf of the U.S. government.) "This is a classic commons problem."

Solvency

2AC – China Says YesChina says yes – previous requests, self-interest, and desire for US tech – that’s China Daily and Dickerson

Prefer Chinese quotes – they openly call for the planZolfagharifard 6-26-16 (Ellie, science and technology editor, "China to go to Mars by 2020: Nation takes another step towards red planet as it reveals it will launch second space station this year", Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3660534/China-schedule-launch-2nd-space-station.html)In April, Wu Weiren, the Chinese space agency's chief, admitted that the agency could have started its Mars mission earlier, instead of flagging behind the US, European and Indian agencies.¶ Alluding to the stringent nature of national decision-making in China, he said 'finally the country

has given its approval.'¶ 'We will orbit Mars, land and deploy a rover – all in one mission,' Mr Wu confidently told the BBC.¶ Current and future planned missions are showing there are clear benefits to be gained from collaborative efforts in space exploration . ¶ But while China may be seeking cooperative ventures , Nasa will not work with the CNSA due to its military status.¶ The US senate has frequently rejected calls for closer collaboration between the two agencies, with a 2011 agreement banning the US space agency from engaging in bilateral agreements with the Chinese, with vocal opponents in the US government referring to China as 'an evil empire'. ¶ The European space agency has had limited collaborated with CNSA, working on a sun-focused satellite, called Double Star, which launched in 2001.¶ And the Chinese have already collaborated with the Russian agency Roscosmos on a failed Martian

moon probe, which failed to make it out of low Earth orbit.¶ Commenting on the barriers ahead, Mr Wu said: 'We would like to cooperate with the US, especially for space and moon exploration . We would welcome this very much .' ¶ He added: 'We have urged the US many times to get rid of restrictions , so scientists from both countries can work together on future exploration.'

China is seeking multilateral space cooperation — the US is the only missing piece. Fernholz 15 — Tim Fernholz, reporter of state, business, and society for Quartz, 2015 ("NASA has no choice but to refuse China’s request for help on a new space station," Quartz, October 13th, Available Online at http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-request-for-help-on-a-new-space-station/, Accessed 7-13-2016)

The chief designer of China’s space program , Zhou Jianping, said his country would solicit international partners for a space station it plans to launch in 2022, with opportunities ranging from shared experiments

and spacecraft visits by foreign crews to building permanent modules to attach to the main station. The European and Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with China, but NASA will have to snub the project. The ban on cooperation between NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative lawmaker Frank Wolf , who cut off any funding for work with China in protest of

political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology; he retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And NASA is not a fan of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the US , for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old ban. “We will find ourselves on the outside looking in, because everybody…who has any hope of a human spaceflight program…will go to whoever will fly their people,” Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters.

CP Answers

PPWT Advantage CP

2AC Perm: do the CP then the aff – the CP solves Space Debris and cooperation but doesn’t cooperate in space – the aff is key to reap the benefits of space cooperationPerm: do bothCP can’t solve space debris: PPWT still allows for ASAT techMax M. Mutschler 21 October 2014 “Security Cooperation in Space and International Relations Theory” (Joined BICC as a Researcher in January 2015. Key expertise Arms control, the militarisation and weaponisation of outer space, missile defence, arms exports, international arms trade.) JM

There is a wide consensus in the literature that the U nited S tates is unequivocally ahead of other countries in the field of space technology . Other space-faring countries such as China have the capability to develop and procure comparatively simple ASAT weapons but they cannot match the technological base of the U nited S tates. Taking this into account, it makes perfect sense for Russia and China to make a proposal like the PPWT , which would ban the deployment of sophisticated, space-based weapons while allowing the development of ground-based ASAT technology. It

certainly also makes sense for the United States to oppose such an agreement (Hansel 2010, p. 97). We have already seen similar patterns of behavior during the Cold War when the Soviet Union proposed arms control measures that would have left existing Soviet ASAT capabilities untouched while eventually placing limits on the space shuttle program of the United States.

2AC – DA to CP – EMPsCP has a litany of problems – it’s definitionally imprecise and that means that there are loopholes and that China and Russia will cheat – leads to an EMP attackGertz 14 — Bill Gertz, Bill Gertz is the senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. ("U.S. Opposes New Draft Treaty from China and Russia Banning Space Weapons", Washington Free Beacon, 6-19-2014, Available Online at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-opposes-new-draft-treaty-from-china-and-russia-banning-space-weapons/, accessed 7-13-2016, JSO)

The United States believes that arms control proposals and concepts should only be considered by the international community if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of all ,” Rose told a June 10 session in Geneva of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament. ∂ The Chinese-Russian draft treaty “does not meet the necessary criteria ,” Rose said, adding that the U.S. opposition is based on a preliminary assessment that the new draft fails to address “significant flaws” in the 2008 draft. ∂ “Namely, there is no effective verification regime to monitor compliance, and terrestrially based anti-satellite systems posing the greatest and most imminent threat to space systems are not captured ,” Rose said .∂ Rose instead said the United States favors a less

formal “code of conduct” for space being promoted by the European Union. The code has come under fire from the Pentagon’s Joint Staff that stated in a 2012 assessment that the code would harm U.S. military space activities. ∂ A U.S. official said the Chinese-Russian treaty proposal would effectively kill international efforts on a code of conduct for space. ∂ China is engaged in a major space weapons development program that includes ground-based anti-satellite missiles, lasers and electronic jammers, and small maneuvering satellites that can attack orbiting satellites. ∂ Beijing’s January 2007 test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile to blast an orbiting weather satellite left tens of thousands of pieces of debris orbiting the earth. The debris threatens both manned and unmanned spacecraft with destructive high-speed collisions. ∂ Russia also is developing space warfare weapons.∂ Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon strategic analyst, said the administration’s opposition to the new space weapons treaty is one

of the few times he has agreed with the administration on an arms control issue.∂ “All U.S. administrations have rejected space control because there are serious definitional problems , such as what is a space weapon ,”

Schneider said. “And there are serious verification problems associated with it. ∂ Additionally, the space arms ban treaty is part of Russian and Chinese efforts to attack U.S. and allied missile defenses, which are heavily reliant on space sensors and weapons .∂ “At some point I believe we should put missile defense into space,” said Schneider who worked in the Pentagon on strategic defense, space, and verification policies.∂ Additionally,

“Russia is certain to cheat on any space treaty,” Schneider said. “They have announced that they are developing ASAT weapons. Moreover, they may be developing space offensive weapons.”∂ The Soviet Union in the 1960s deployed a nuclear space weapon system called the fractional orbital bombardment system. It used an orbiting strategic missile in low earth orbit that was designed to de-orbit and attack the United States by transiting southward from the South Pole to avoid radar detection.∂ Russian military writings have indicated recently that

Moscow may revive the orbiting southern polar missile attack system. Analysts have said that in addition to providing Moscow with a first-strike space nuclear weapon , the system could also be used in a devastating e lectro- m agnetic p ulse attack over U.S. territory that would destroy all electronics over a large area.∂ A State Department spokesman referred questions about the U.S. position on the space arms treaty to Rose’s statement.∂ Former State

Department China specialist John Tkacik said the draft treaty appears to be a ploy by Beijing and Moscow . ∂ “ The Chinese and Russians have no interest in actually abiding by any international treaty that

limits the militarization of space , but they are keen to get the United States to tie itself in knots over one,” Tkacik said.∂

EMP attack causes extinctionPry 10 — Peter Vincent Pry, Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, both Congressional Advisory Boards, and served on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. ("What America Needs to Know About EMPs", Foreign Policy, 3-17-2010, Available Online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/17/what-america-needs-to-know-about-emps/, accessed 7-13-2016, JSO)

EMP is not just a threat to computers and electronic gadgets, but to all the critical infrastructures that depend on electronics and electricity -- communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water -- and that sustain modern civilization and the lives of the American people. In 2008, the congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack delivered its final report to Congress, the Defense Department, and the Department of Homeland Security. The commission concluded that terrorist groups,

rogue states, China, and Russia are theoretically capable of launching a catastrophic EMP attack against the United States and either had contingency plans to do so or were actively pursuing the ability. Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia have scientific and military research programs dedicated to or supportive of EMP capability, and their military doctrinal writings explicitly describe EMP attacks against the United States.

Based on eight years of research and analysis, 50 years of data from nuclear tests and EMP simulators, and never-before-attempted EMP tests, the commission found that any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield one, could potentially pose a catastrophic EMP threat to the United States, mainly because of the great fragility of the electric grid. One scenario of particular concern is a nuclear-armed Iran transferring a short- or medium-range nuclear missile to terrorist groups that could perform a ship-launched "anonymous" EMP attack against the United States. Iranian military strategists have written about EMP attacks against the United States, and Iran has successfully practiced launching a ballistic missile off a ship and flight-tested its Shahab-3 medium-range missile to detonate at high altitude, as if practicing an EMP attack.

The commission also noted credible Russian claims that they had developed what the Russians call " super-EMP" weapons -- low-yield nuclear weapons specially designed to generate extraordinarily powerful EMP fields -- and that the Russian Duma had raised the prospect of a disabling EMP attack against the United States during NATO's bombing of Serbia in May 1999 .

1AR – Solvency Deficit - ASATsThe CP cannot solve for ASATsMichael Listner — February 19, 2016 “The continued debate about anti-satellite weapons, nine years after China’s test” (Michael is an attorney and the founder/principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions, which is a firm that counsels governmental and private organizations on matters relating to space law and policy, including issues surrounding space debris.)

Compounding the maneuvering of China and Russia is U.S. domestic policy — or lack thereof — that

appears to shun the issue of ASATs. Prominently, the 2014 and 2015 Annual Report to Congress on Military Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, while briefly addressing China’s counter space capabilities, does not include the term “ASAT .” Whether this was inadvertent, or motivated by policy concerns the term would provoke the Chinese government, is unclear. Abandoning the term in favor of other language, like

“information blockade,” does nothing more than distract policymakers from the issue of ASATs in the same manner both China and Russia use the “space weapons” debate to distract from their own ASAT development activities. Admittedly, options open to policymakers are limited , distasteful and may implicate U.S. national security operations in outer space . On the other hand, however unpalatable those policy options may be, the policy decision to avoid the issue through semantic s, understatement or to act as though ASATs are not an issue is unsupportable in of itself , especially with the increasing geopolitical challenges

and boldness of China and Russia. The U nited S tates is facing a change of presidential administrations, which

creates uncertainty regarding the future geopolitical tack the new administration will take, However, the issue of ASATs will certainly still be relevant for the next administration . Contrary to overtures, space-based assets, including GPS, communications and reconnaissance satellites, will be targets in the event of future hostilities . Addressing the threat ASATs pose through the use of clever vernacular, empty posturing, diplomatic overtures , codes of conduct or simply inaction is not an acceptable strategy to deal with the realities posed. Now is the time not to lament China’s actions and the current situation but, instead, to begin to sincerely explore policy options to address the issue of ASATs .

DA Answers

Elections

2AC – No LinkNo Link- Americans don’t care about China’s space programSmith, 12 (Marcia S., founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com and President of Space and Technology Policy Group, “U.S. Experts on China's Space Program Agree There Is No Race" 7/5/12 SpacepolicyOnline http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/u-s-experts-on-chinas-space-program-agree-there-is-no-race-LP) China's successful Shenzhou-9 mission seems to have stirred interest in what impact, if any, China's space program should have on the U.S.

space program. Several experts on Chinese space activities have spoken at public meetings or published op-ed pieces in the past

two weeks weighing in on the topic. One issue on which they all agree is that there is no U.S.-China space race . Some U.S. space program advocates have been attempting to reinvigorate NASA's activities by trying to resurrect the U.S.-Soviet space race paradigm of the 1960s that shaped the Apollo program. At a Marshall Institute-TechAmerica Space Enterprise Council symposium on June 29, hours after

Shenzhou-9 landed, Leslee Gilbert, Vice President, Van Scoyoc Associates , took the opposite view, pointing out that the American people do not seem to care about China's human spaceflight program. "China will have to do something new to get Americans' attention ," she said, perhaps building a base on the Moon, but just going there would not be sufficient. The former staff director for the House Science, Space and Technology committee argued that China is "not leading, but following." Noting that many people paint U.S.-China space relationships in an either-or framework -- either racing or cooperating -- she concludes neither is likely in the near future, especially with the strong opposition to cooperation voiced by Members of

Congress like Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA). Gilbert's major concern is that the American public lacks an "appetite for space" in general and "spurring a race with China won't fix it." That interest "has to come from within."

Espionage DA

2AC – Wolfe Amendment FailsWolf Amendment in SQ is uselessBeldavs 15 (Vid Beldavs, Founding Member at International Lunar Decade Working Group (ILDWG), 12/7/15, “Prospects for US-China space cooperation,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1 // MH)

Clearly sensitive technologies need to be protected. But, protecting US i ntellectual p roperty is not known to be a domain where the House Appropriations Committee of the US Congress has recognized expertise or where it

has been invested with any specific authority . Additionally, NASA is a relatively tiny domain in the vast territory of

advanced technology under development by the US. The Wolf Amendment , in fact, offers no protection of American technology but instead empowers members of a Congressional committee with no relevant expertise or authority to play a foreign policy role. Congressman Culbertson clearly recognizes that space

technology is key to addressing major challenges facing not only the US, but the entire world community. To bar the U nited S tates from participation in global initiatives in the peaceful uses of outer space because China is also involved is, at best, is an overemotional response to the potential for illicit technology transfer with a totally inappropriate instrument. Far more relevant to US national interests would be for Rep. Culbertson to support developing more effective strategies to advance US commercial interests in space. Otherwise, the Chinese, not bounded by ineffective legislation, will eat our lunch. No one has yet developed the technologies for ISRU whether on the Moon, the asteroids, Mars, or beyond. Yet ISRU technologies are central to the whole idea of asteroid and lunar mining. If the Chinese can work with everyone else on the planet, but the US can only work with a short list as approved by the Appropriations Committee, it should be expected that the Chinese, drawing on the knowledge base of the entire world, will advance more quickly. We have no lead in ISRU, and our lead in other domains of space technology may not be

particularly relevant to this challenge. It is time for Congress to wake up to the emerging commercial space future and work to fully unleash our commercial space potential rather than complaining about a very high level meeting in Beijing where common challenges in the peaceful uses of outer space were discussed with NASA experts present.

1AR – Wolfe Amendment FailsThe Wolf Amendment is ineffective and does the opposite of its intentionsListner and Johnson-Freese 14 (Michael Listner, the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions, Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, 7/14/14, “Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation,” http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/ // MH)

But cooperation was not to be. In April 2011, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time China hardliner, especially regarding freedom of religion issues, inserted two sentences into funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the United States and China that involves NASA or is coordinated by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). That legislation has endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral activity with China. Though Wolf is retiring in January 2015, speculation regarding

potential successors includes individuals with views similar to his. Wolf’s rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations , given in a 2011 interview, includes three key points . “We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them,” Wolf said. “And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. …

Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?” The three assumptions in that statement are, quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests . First, it assumes that working with the U nited S tates would give China opportunities not otherwise available and implies that the United States would be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the i nternational s pace s tation program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own space station soon. In fact, when China’s space station becomes operational around 2022, it could quickly become the de facto international space station , given that the ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that China has already invited other countries to visit its facility. In terms of the U.S. doing China a favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons, specifically, being accepted as part of the

international family of spacefaring nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the U nited S tates would just slow them down . American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further, other countries, including U.S. allies, regularly work with and sell aerospace

technology to China. China has not been isolated. Second, Wolf’s rationale assumes the U nited S tates has nothing to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the U nited S tates could learn about how they work — their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a

vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an actual project where people confront and solve problems together, perhaps beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties can contribute something of value, builds trust on both sides, trust that is currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the other’s cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with

minimal risk of technology sharing. From a practical perspective, working with China could diversify U.S. options for reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has become painfully apparent consequent to Vladimir Putin’s expansionist actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin subsequently stated, “I propose that the United States

delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the help of a trampoline.” And finally, Wolf stated that the United States should not work with China based on moral grounds. While clearly the U nited S tates would prefer not to work with authoritarian regimes, it has done so in war and in peacetime when it has served American interests. That is the basis of realism: Serve American interests first. While the United States would prefer not to work with Stalin, we continue to work with Putin when it benefits us to do so. Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have few to

work with at all in the Middle East. We live in a globalized world. Attempting to isolate Chinese space activities has

proved futile, and in fact pushed China and other countries into developing indigenous space industries — totally beyond any U.S. control — that they might have done otherwise . High fences around areas of technology where the United States has a monopoly — and there are few of those left — combined with a realist approach to working with China when and were we can, will allow the U.S. to lead rather futilely playing whack-a-mole, trying to beat back anticipated Chinese space achievements.

China just circumvents by getting tech from EuropeMessier 16 (Doug, Managing editor at Parabolic Arc. “Chinese Space Program Increases International Cooperation” 5/10/16 http://www.parabolicarc.com/2016/05/10/chinese-space-program-increases-international-cooperation – LP)

China’s growing space program is deepening its cooperation with Russia and Europe while partnerships with the United States remain severely limited due to Congressional restrictions. “It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development,” said Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China’s human space program. “Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind.” China’s Russia

Connection Russia and China are pursuing a broad range of cooperative programs. “Russia and China have good interaction mechanisms. We have a plan of cooperation in several dozens of projects that are successfully implemented,” said Xu Dazhe, China’s Deputy Industry and Information Technology Minister. The two sides are cooperating “in the fields of engine technology, electronics, joint research of the Universe, development of new technologies and optimized use of space resources,” he

added. Russia is trading its expertise in liquid fuel engine tech nologies for Chinese expertise in radiation-resistant electronic for use in satellites . The exchange will help China improve its launch vehicles while Russia can evade Western sanctions imposed over its military intervention in Ukraine. As a sign of the deepening cooperation, Roscosmos CEO Igor Komarov took part in China’s National Space Day on April 24 to

commemorate the 46th anniversary of the launch of the first Chinese satellite. European Cooperation Expands Meanwhile, ESA has been expanding its coop eration with China, with it has named one of its three strategic partners along with the United States and Russia. Last month, ESA Director General Johann-Dietrich Woerner completed a visit to China where he met with top space officials. “ Let’s open space. Space is beyond all borders so let’s also have the cooperation beyond border s ,” Woerner said during his visit. “When you ask astronauts, and I’m sure also the Chinese astronauts will tell you the same: they cannot see any border from space. So this is a very nice vision. We should use this and cooperate worldwide on different schemes, and I think Moon Village has its value for that.” Woerner’s Moon Village plan involves selecting a location on the lunar surface where different countries could place habitats and other elements for human exploration. The village would not be a single, integrated program like the International Space Station. The Moon Village remains a

concept that lacks any formal approval by ESA, NASA or any other space agency. For now, ESA and China are working together on a space-weather observatory . A European experiment flew aboard the Shijan-10 experimental capsule, which flew in orbit for 12 days last month before parachuting back to Earth. ESA has also sent personnel to visit Chinese human spaceflight training facilities. Several

European astronauts have been learning Chinese as part of a joint cooperation program. The long-term goal is for a European astronaut to fly aboard a Shenzhou spacecraft to a Chinese space station . China plans to launch the core module of a permanent multi-module space station around 2018, with completion set for 2022. Chinese officials are looking to use the space station to fly astronauts and experiments from multiple countries. U.S. Cooperation Remains Difficult Chinese officials say they would like to cooperate with United States in space.

2AC – UniquenessChina has been stealing US space technology for yearsWalcott 12 (John, National Security and foreign affairs correspondent for Bloomberg. “Chinese Espionage Campaign Targets U.S. Space Technology” 4/18/12 Bloomberg http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-18/chinese-espionage-campaign-targets-u-s-space-technology – LP)

China is stealing U.S. military and civilian space tech nology in an effort to disrupt U.S. access to intelligence, navigation and communications satellites, according to a report from the State and Defense Departments. “China’s continuing efforts to acquire U.S. military and dual-use technologies are enabling China’s science and technology base to diminish the U.S. technological edge in areas critical to the development of weapons and communications systems,” the report released yesterday found. “Additionally, the technologies China has acquired could be used to develop

more advanced technologies by shortening Chinese R&D cycles.” Two U.S. intelligence officials said that while the Chinese military isn’t preparing to fight a major land war, its goal is to deny the U.S. military access to the other four arenas in which a war might be fought -- the seas around China, the airspace surrounding the country,

space, and cyberspace. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because intelligence matters are classified. Because China’s closed political system discourages the independent thinking that spawns innovation, the Chinese rely heavily on stealing and reverse-engineering new tech nologies from Europe and America , both officials said . “Economic espionage, supported by extensive open-source research, computer network exploitation and targeted intelligence operations also enables China to obtain technologies to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts,” the State and Defense departments said in an appendix to yesterday’s report. The agencies said China should be excluded from recommendations they made to ease restrictions on exports of communications and remote-sensing satellites and equipment. Chinese Denial Chinese officials have denied their government is behind cyber espionage or hacker attacks on computer systems, calling such assertions a “Cold War ghost.” Citing the Pentagon’s Defense Security Service, the U.S. departments said yesterday that “countries from the East Asia and Pacific region” are focusing their efforts on information systems technology used in military command, control, communications, and computers, as well as in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance applications. In one episode cited, Chi Tong Kuok from Macau, China, was convicted in September 2010 of conspiring to export U.S. encryption technology used by U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to China through Hong Kong. ‘Blind

and Deafen’ The U.S. Departments of Commerce and Justice also have identified at least 26 major cases since 2006 in which China has tried to acquire power amplifiers with military applications, space-launch technical data and services, Delta IV rockets, information on cruise- missile design and military grade accelerometers, which are used in designing and testing aircraft, missiles, and other military equipment, according to the report. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s goals are clear, according to the report, which cited PLA writings about the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering” with reconnaissance and communications satellites in order to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and allied military operations says that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors ... will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and (make it difficult) for them to bring their precision-guided weapons into full play,” according to the U.S. report. Navigation Satellites In designing its constellation of navigation satellites, the PLA is using the same downlink frequencies as Europe’s Galileo Global Navigation System, according to the report, which said that doing so will enable China to jam the common satellite communications channels and global-positioning system

(GPS) receivers. Thanks in part to its successful espionage efforts, which included obtaining the plans to America’s now-retired space shuttle , China has made a great leap forward in space , the report found. China had a national record of 15 space launches in 2010, compared with 14 by the U.S ., including nine new remote-sensing satellites that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. This year, China is expected to complete work on the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center on the southern Hainan Island, the U.S. departments said. Beyond space technology, China has been cited by the U.S. as a center for computer hacking to steal information or compromise corporate and government systems. Two Chinese nationals were

charged by the U.S. for illegally exporting technology to their home country and pirating software from U.S. companies including Agilent Technologies Inc., federal officials said yesterday. Xiang Li, 35, and Chun Yan Li, 33, a married couple from Chengdu, China, were indicted by a federal grand jury in Wilmington, Delaware, according to a statement by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency.

2AC – Link N/ULink Non-Unique – naturalized US citizens from China just steal space information Hvistendahl 15 [Mara Hvistendahl; bachelor’s degree from Swarthmore College and a master’s of science from Columbia University School of Journalism; Feature: Chinese-American scientists in the crosshairs; Nov. 12, 2015, 2:00 PM; http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/11/feature-chinese-american-scientists-crosshairs//TPB]

But the U.S. government now sees China as the major foreign threat. Close to half of the indictments brought under the Economic Espionage Act since its passage in 1996 have involved China , Toren says.¶ In some cases, U.S. prosecutors have assembled reams of evidence. In 2010, Boeing engineer Dongfan Chung—a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in China and grew up in Taiwan—was sentenced to 16 years in prison for stealing trade secrets connected to the U.S. Space Shuttle program and Delta IV rocket on behalf of mainland China. When agents raided Chung’s home, they found more than 250,000 sensitive documents from defense contractors, some of them hidden in crawl spaces under the house. The FBI alleged that

documents in the stash showed Chung was acting at the direction of China’s Civil Aviation Administration.¶ Another successful prosecution came last year, when entrepreneur Walter Lian-Heen Liew was sentenced to 15 years in prison for conspiring to steal trade secrets related to titanium dioxide production from DuPont and sell them to state-owned companies in China. (Former DuPont engineer Robert Maegerle was also

convicted in the case.)¶ But a startling number of cases have unraveled. Last December, the U.S. government dropped charges against two former Eli Lilly and Company scientists in Indiana. The U.S. attorney’s office in Indianapolis had alleged that Guoqing Cao and Shuyu Li, both naturalized U.S. citizens and senior biologists at Eli Lilly, passed research on tailored therapies for cancer and drugs to treat diabetes, obesity, and other metabolic disorders to Jiangsu Hengrui Medicine, a company in Lianyungang, China.

2AC – International Efforts CheckInternational efforts check Chinese military espionagePuglises 16 (David, military specialist correspondence for Ottawa Citizen. “Owner of B.C. aerospace firm gets prison sentence for stealing information on F-35 fighter” 7/14/16 The National Post http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/owner-of-b-c-aerospace-firm-gets-prison-sentence-for-stealing-information-on-f-35-fighter)

A Chinese man who ran an aerospace firm with offices in British Columbia has been sentenced to nearly four years in jail for stealing confidential information on a U.S. military transport aircraft and the F-35 stealth fighter. Su Bin had pled guilty in federal court in Los Angeles to helping two Chinese military hackers . Among the targets of the hacking efforts was information on the U.S. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters as well as Boeing’s C-17 transport aircraft, which is also used by the Canadian air force. In a plea agreement, Su admitted to conspiring with the two hackers in China to gain unauthorized access to computer networks in the U.S. between October 2008 and March 2014. Su travelled to the U.S. on 10 occasions during that period, according to court documents. .A Canadian Forces members look at the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter, F-35 Lighting II in a hanger in Ottawa Friday July 16,

2010. He was arrested in Richmond, B.C., in June 2014 and a Canadian court ordered Su’s extradition to the U.S. in September 2015 . The 51-year-old has been sentenced to three years and ten months in jail. He was also fined $10,000 . Su, also known as Stephen Su and Steven Subin, is the owner of the aviation firm Lode Technology. Besides the office in Canada, it also had locations throughout China. His firm did business with companies in Canada, Switzerland, Germany, the U.S. and France. “Over the course of years, this defendant sought to undermine the national security of the United States by seeking out information that would benefit a foreign government and providing that country with information it had never before seen,” U.S. prosecutor Eileen Decker said in a statement. Ian Kucerak Ian KucerakA Royal Canadian Air Force C-177 Globemaster III cargo aircraft flies over the city's Glenora neighbourhood in Edmonton, Alta., on Wednesday March 16, 2016. Su did not carry out the actual hacking, which was done by his two co-conspirators, both members of the People’s Liberation Army in China. Instead, Su’s role was to identify technical data that the hackers could target, according to the charges filed by Decker. Su also admitted translating the stolen information, which was then offered to Chinese aviation firms. The theft of information on the C-17 aircraft made “important contributions to our national defense scientific research development,” one of the Chinese military officers wrote in an email intercepted by the U.S. Another email, sent by Su in 2009, outlined the names of U.S. aerospace executives that the hackers could target. Some in China have hailed Su as a hero. In March, the Global Times newspaper, which has close ties to China’s government, published an editorial highlighting Su’s role as a special agent. “We are willing to show our gratitude and respect for his service to our country,” the editorial said. “On the secret battlefield without gunpowder, China needs special agents to gather secrets from the U.S..” The hackers did not confine their activities to U.S. firms. One of Su’s emails noted an attempt to collect data on a missile being developed jointly by Russia and India. The U.S. also alleged he focused on military technology being developed by

Taiwan as well as information held by groups promoting democracy in China and independence in Tibet. Last year the Chinese government vowed it would crack down on cyber espionage aimed at U.S . businesses, after the U.S. government warned it would consider sanctions if China’s economic spying didn’t stop . American intelligence officials have nonetheless expressed doubt that China will ease up on its activities. The U.S. isn’t the only nation that has faced such Chinese-directed cyber operations. The computer systems of Canada’s National Research Council have been hacked a number of times, although the Chinese denied they were involved.

2AC – No MotiveChina lacks motive to steal US space technologyDavid ‘14 (Leonard David is a space journalist, reporting on space activities for over 50 years. He is co-author with Apollo 11’s Buzz Aldrin of Mission to Mars – My Vision for Space Exploration released in May 2013 and published by the National Geographic Society. Leonard is the first recipient of the American Astronautical Society’s (AAS) “Ordway Award for Sustained Excellence in Spaceflight History” in the category of journalism, to be presented in October 2015 in connection with the 8th AAS Wernher von Braun Memorial Symposium held in Huntsville, Alabama. Mr. David is the 2010 winner of the prestigious National Space Club Press Award, presented this honor during the Club’s annual Robert H. Goddard Memorial Dinner in April 2011 that was held in Washington, D.C. Currently, Leonard is SPACE.com’s Space Insider Columnist, as well as a correspondent for Space News newspaper and a contributing writer for several magazines. “China Has Big Plans to Explore the Moon and Mars,” 3 Dec 2014, http://www.space.com/27893-china-space-program-moon-mars.html – SY)

"China is continuing to pursue a number of goals it decided upon decades ago ," said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), based in Cambridge, Mass.¶ Like Cheng, Kulacki believes the launch facility on the island of Hainan is a key new capability.¶ "It has been on the drawing board for quite a long time, and has experienced numerous delays, but is now prepared to serve as the home space port for China's new generation of wider-bodied launch vehicles that can carry larger payloads," Kulacki told Space.com. "These new vehicles have also experienced some delays, but China has no fixed deadlines to meet."¶ "As these major new pieces of China's space infrastructure come online, including new satellite manufacturing facilities in Tianjin, the pace and scale of its activities in space will continue to grow," Kulacki said. "China already has considerable space assets on orbit, and its investment in space will continue to increase significantly over the next several decades."¶

People who claim China is pursuing an asymmetric space warfare strategy misread the nation's intentions, Kulacki said. Rather, " the strategic objective of Chinese space policy is not to exploit asymmetry between China and the U nited S tates, but to end it," he said.

2AC – Impact DHegemony isn’t key to peaceFettweis 11 – Christopher Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCOIt is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability . In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s,

the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the

defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific

trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable U nited States

military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races , and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in

U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the U nited S tates cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S.

defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained U nited S tates suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the

presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace – their data is flawed Preble 10 – Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some

scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power ; the

international economy is complex and resilient . Supply disruptions are likely to be

temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most.

Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling

Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama

bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states;

it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power , and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the

security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United

States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker , the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

No data suggests a causal link between unipolarity and peace Fettweis 10 – Christopher Fettweis, Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, 2010, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace, p. 172-174The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United S tates were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity. These problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon,

some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "redound to Americas detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons , however , to believe that U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability . First of all,

the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system . No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if

self-policing occurs , if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred , then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted . The 5 percent of the worlds population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States maybe patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental . In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence , whether physical or psychological, of the United S tates. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement , something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places

where no hegemony is present . Second, the limited empirical evidence we

have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability . During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in I990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."7' If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

A2: Huang Ev – 2NCLink should have been triggered already – Chinese have been spying since 2012 – see 2NC Huang

K Answers Current American views towards China are militaristic—cooperative space activities break free of this security dilemma.David 6 Leonard, Senior Space Writer, “U.S.-China Space Ties Weighed”, http://www.space.com/2318-china-space-ties-weighed.html

U.S.-China space relations are a classic security dilemma, where two states are drawn toward conflict though neither really wants that , Johnson-Freese explained. The reasons are fairly straightforward and strongly influenced by the technology involved, Johnson-Freese suggested. "Specifically, there is no distinction between space technology for civil or military use, since 95 percent of space technology is dual-use, and further--and really problematic--there is often little or no distinction between military technology that is offensive or defensive in nature," Johnson-Freese explained. "So, fear of being exploited drives countries to view actions of others in zero-sum terms." All this is further exacerbated when there is a predisposition by one state to view the other as an adversary ... or even a

"potential" adversary. While strategically the U.S. talks about working with China, there are still other voices that talk about China as a potential near-peer competitor, due to Taiwan, the growth of their military, resource competition, and other issues of alarm, Johnson-Freese explained. All that said, she added: "It is very likely that the lens through which the U.S.--as the currently dominate space power--will view any expansion of Chinese space power will be a military one." Security dilemmas , Johnson-Freese remarked, are by their nature difficult to deal with, but not impossible . A recent visit of the

bi-partisan Congressional delegation to China and talks about potential space cooperation in areas like astronaut rescue and environmental monitoring, was a good sign, she said. However, a change of policy to include cooperative space activities is still a White House call, Johnson-Freese said . A first step on this path , she counseled, is simply understanding the Chinese better and allowing them to know us better through dialogue.

Topicality Answers

T – Diplomatic

2AC DefinitionsCounter interpretation: Diplomatic engagement includes space cooperation Rose 16 (Frank A., Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, consultant on missile defense. “The Role of Diplomacy in Keeping Outer Space Safe, Secure, and Sustainable” 4/14/16 US Department of State http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/255834.htm-LP)

In this dynamic environment, diplomacy can assist in addressing the challenges of developing guidelines for space operations and orbital debris mitigation, and encouraging responsible behavior in space through the development of norms and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. Diplomatic engagements also provide an opportunity to enhance a common understanding of the goals and challenges related to the outer space environment, thus creating support for U.S. policy . Our diplomatic efforts are also focused on raising international understanding of the global consequences of conflict in outer space . Preventing or deterring such conflict is a global interest for all countries, because the resulting impacts of that conflict would not be limited to the militaries and countries involved, but would extend to all space-farers and all who depend upon space – which is pretty much everyone on this planet. In addition, diplomacy is an essential element in influencing countries’ calculus related to the development or employment of counterspace systems. The Department of State’s diplomatic efforts can be used to enhance and complement other U.S. Government activities to increase space mission assurance and

ultimately deny an aggressor the benefits of attacks in space. Our diplomatic efforts include specific engagements in both bilateral and multilateral fora, in bilateral space security dialogues, and in the various United Nations organizational entities and regional fora. We are committed to using these efforts to prevent conflict from extending into space. Bilateral Diplomatic Engagement We have made it a focal point of our diplomatic efforts to discuss space security issues with a range of countries – friends, allies, partners, and those who are interested in greater cooperation. The State Department has established over 15 formal space security dialogues with a number of partners, including: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Republic of Korea, Japan, India, South Africa and the UAE. We use these dialogues to discuss the challenges to the space environment, multilateral diplomatic initiatives, and opportunities for practical, bilateral cooperation. In addition to our formal space security dialogues with many governments, we have expanded our space security discussions with a range of other partners, such as Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Additionally, we are expanding our space security-related conversations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In many cases, our candid discussions have given the U.S. a better appreciation for our partners’ perspectives, and helped identify areas for cooperation and coordination.