fair allocation aims13_pp upload
TRANSCRIPT
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Fair Allocation of Multiple Resources Using a Non-monetary Allocation Mechanism
Patrick Poullie, Burkhard Stiller,1 Department of Informatics IFI, Communication Systems Group CSG,
University of Zürich UZH{poullie,stiller}@ifi.uzh.ch
AIMS 2013, Barcelona, Spain, June 26, 2013
Motivation/ProblemProportionality
Algorithm OutlineConclusions
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Motivation
Shared computing , e.g., (private) clouds or clusters, offer different resources to consumers– CPU, RAM, mass storage, bandwidth
If offered as predefined or at least static bundles– Drawback: Some resources of some consumers are idle– Advantage: guaranteed resources
If offered as shared resources– Drawback: No resources are guaranteed, when too many
consumers are active simultaneously– Advantage: flexible allocation
Can both advantages be combined?
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Problem Statement
To design an allocation mechanism, that– Scales with the number of consumers and resources
• Linear runtime designated
– Needs minimal input information• Complete preference function may not be available
– Does need no monetary compensation • Monetary compensation may not be possible or desired
– Allows to receive equal share and allocates leftovers/unused resources in a fair manner
To define fair leftover allocation– Complicated for multiple resources with different demands– Very different to scheduling
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Bundle: Share of resources a consumer receives If resources are received beyond equal share other
resources have to be released Greediness measures to which degree this is the case Equal greediness is fair
Proportionality of Bundles
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Formal Definition
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Greediness Alignment Algorithm
Round-based, where each round each consumer demands a bundle– Consumers only receive bundle after the last round
Greediness is calculated and fed back to consumers who should consider it for demand in the next round After last round every consumer receives demanded
bundle If resources are scarce, greediness is aligned: greedy
consumers are trimmed stronger– Incentive to consider feedback for next round/demand– Trimming to enforce fair leftover reallocation
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Trimming Example
1.5 X
-0.5 0.5
-2.5-1.52.51.5
2.5 X
6.5 X
5.5 X0 X 0
6.5 XX
5.5 XX0 X
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Formal Definition
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Conclusions and Future Work
Scalability– Computation of greediness is linear
Minimal input information– Only demands are submitted and adapted
No monetary compensation Equal share guarantee and fair leftover reallocation
– Allows to receive equal share and aligns greediness Future Work
– Trimming algorithm will be defined to optimize runtime– Game theory to evaluate incentive compatibility
efficiency of allocationand
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Thank You, for Your Attention!
Questions?
Comments?
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Related Work
A. Kumar et al “Almost Budget-balanced Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Resources”– allocation problem on the uplink multiple access channel – Only one resource and involves biddings
R. Jain et al: “An Efficient Nash-Implementation Mechanism for Divisible Resource Allocation“– auctioning bundles of multiple divisible goods (links)– Combined to path/ combination of multiple paths possible
S. Yang, B Hajek: “VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG […]”– network operator aims to select an outcome that is efficient
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Related Work in Scheduling
Traffic Scheduling– Andreas Mäder, Dirk Staehle “An Analytical Model for Best-
Effort Traffic over the UMTS Enhanced Uplink”– Dimitrova et al. “Analysis of packet scheduling for UMTS EUL
- design decisions and performance evaluation”– Focus on: time component, interference, location– Singe resource: Channel
Multi Processor Scheduling– Dan McNulty et al “A Comparison of Scheduling Algorithms
for Multiprocessors”– Focus on migrating task between processors– Interchangeable resources (processors)
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Related Work in Economics
S. Brams. “Mathematics and Democracy”: p. 271 et seq.: Adjusted Winner– No resource dependcies
S. Brams et al. “The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-free Division of Indivisible Items”– Two people constrained [TP, UC]
L. Schulman, V. Vazirani “Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences”– efficiency, incentive compatibility, and fairness properties – BUT lexicographic preference function
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI
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Definition of Fairness
Not to be understood as envy freeness– Collides with other desirable criteria
• Pareto efficiency
– Calculation likely not scalable Equality of defined greediness is considered fair
– Every consumer releases of his equal share what he receives from others
Strategy proofness is also not always desirable– Guarantees Pareto efficiency but cripples welfare
Mechanisms not need to be perfect but comprehensible
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Greediness Alignment Algorithm Outline
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Business Policy Management
Algorithm allows to dynamically allocate resources and to make equal/fixed share guarantees– Higher resource utilization while compliment with SLAs
Comprehensible framework to introduce dynamic resource allocation to general terms and SLAs– Service description for fair use
ManagedResource
Greediness
Other Metrics
BusinessIndicators
Actions, e.g., TrimmingBusinessPolicies
Monitoring