PHIL 306: Philosophy of Mind Fall 2016, MWF, 8:35—9:25, Currie 408/9 (Note: Conferences will replace the Friday lecture starting the week of Sep 12-16) Instructor: Robert Stephens Email: robert.stephens@mcgill.ca Office: LEA916 Office hrs: Fridays 13:00-15:00, or by appointment Teaching assistants: Karina Vold Andre Martin karina.vold@mcgill.ca andre.martin2@mail.mcgill.ca Introduction: In this course, we will examine some of the major questions concerning the nature and functioning of the mind, as discussed in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. What exactly is a mind? Where is it located? What is it composed of? How is it organized? How does it work? What are its limitations? We will look at a number of theories that attempt to answer various aspects of these questions, and we will zero in on a number of current philosophical debates that have grown out of and intertwined with these discussions. Some of the specific issues we will encounter include:

o Is the mind something physical or not? Is my mind simply my brain? Or is it a product of my brain? Or is it something more than my physical brain?

o Where does the mind fit into our scientific understanding of ourselves and our world? o What is the relationship between mind and behavior? How does mental causation work? o Do minds require brains? Or could there be many different sorts of minds? Artificial minds? o What is required for thinking? Language? Perception? Memory? Sensation? o Is the mind like a sort of computer? Or is that a misleading metaphor? o What are the different sorts of mental states? What characterizes and/or constitutes them? o What are concepts? How are they formed? How are they stored? How are they accessed? o How do we explain consciousness? Is consciousness necessarily subjective? o What role does the body play in the composition of mind? What about the environment? o What can delusions and other pathological mental states teach us about the nature of mind?

Course Requirements: The reading load in this course is fairly demanding. Students will be expected to keep up with the required readings according to the schedule and attend all classes. Additionally, there are (optional) supplemental readings that you may find helpful, and which in some cases may be necessary, depending on the paper topics you select. We may often focus on short passages from the day’s assigned text together, so please bring the text(s) under discussion with you to class each day (either in print or electronic form) so that you can participate. Students are also expected to actively discuss the material in weekly conferences, and there is a 10% grade for regular attendance and participation in conferences, to be determined by your TA. There will be 2 papers on topics relevant to the material, as well as a final take-home exam covering the breadth of the course. Materials: All readings for the course will be available through MyCourses.

Evaluation: 2 papers – 25% (1500-2000 words) and 30% (2000-2500 words) Final exam (take-home) – 35% Conference participation – 10% McGill Policies: In accord with McGill University’s Charter of Students’ Rights, students in this course have the right to submit in English or in French any written work that is to be graded.

McGill University values academic integrity. All students must understand the meaning and consequences of cheating, plagiarism and other academic offences under the code of student conduct and disciplinary procedures (see www.mcgill.ca/integrity for more information).

As the instructor of this course I endeavor to provide an inclusive learning environment. However, if you experience barriers to learning in this course, do not hesitate to discuss them with me and the Office for Students with Disabilities, 514-398-6009. In the event of extraordinary circumstances beyond the University’s control, the content and/or evaluation scheme in this course is subject to change. Reading schedule: you will be expected to have read the following before the date indicated. NOTE: Readings that are bulleted and marked “[supp]” are supplemental texts: they are recommended, in many cases helpful as background or further explanation, but they are not required reading and are left to your discretion. Depending on the paper topic(s) you select later on, some of those supplemental texts may be necessary for your paper. Wed Sep 7 Dualism Rene Descartes (1641) – Meditations, II, VI Rene Descartes (1649) – The Passions of the Soul (Excerpts)

• [supp] Ian Ravenscroft (2005) – Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide, Ch.1 Dualism Fri Sep 9 Problems with Dualism Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1643) – Correspondence with Descartes (excerpts) Jen McWeeny (2011)– Princess Elisabeth and the Mind-Body Problem

• [supp] Barbara Montero (2006) What Does Conservation of Energy Have To Do With Physicalism? Mon Sep 12 Mind/Brain Identity J.J.C. Smart (1959) – Sensations and Brain Processes (excerpt) U.T. Place (1954) – Is Consciousness a Brain Process?

• [supp] Louise Anthony (2007) – Everybody’s Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism Wed Sep 14 Behaviorism Carl Hempel (1935) – The Logical Analysis of Psychology

• [supp] John Watson (1913) – Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It

Mon Sep 19 Behaviorism Hilary Putnam (1961) – Brains and Behavior

• [supp] Noam Chomsky (1959) – Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior • [supp] Daniel Dennett (1978) – Skinner Skinned

Wed Sep 21 Functionalism David Lewis (1978) – Mad Pain and Martian Pain

• [supp] David Lewis (1972) – Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications Mon Sep 26 Functionalism Hilary Putnam (1967) – The Nature of Mental States

• [supp] Ned Block & Jerry Fodor (1972) – What Psychological States Are Not • [supp] William Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1999) – Multiple Realizability Revisted

Wed Sep 28 Artificial Intelligence Alan Turing (1950) – Computing Machinery and Intelligence

• [supp] Brian Christian (2011) – Mind vs. Machine Mon Oct 3 Artificial Intelligence John Searle (1980) – Minds, Brains and Programs

• [supp] Margaret Boden (1987) – Escaping the Chinese Room Wed Oct 5 Modularity of Mind Jerry Fodor (1983) – Modularity of the Mind (excerpt)

• [supp] David Marr (1982) – Vision (Ch. 1)

Wed Oct 12 (Massive) Modularity of Mind H.C. Barrett & R. Kurzban (2006) – Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate

• [supp] Jesse Prinz (2006) – Is the Mind Really Modular? Mon Oct 17 The Frame Problem Jerry Fodor (1987) – Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs and the Music of the Spheres Daniel Dennett (1987) – Cognitive Wheels (Excerpt)

• [supp] Peter Carruthers (2003) – On Fodor’s Problem Wed Oct 19 Consciousness Ned Block (1978) – Troubles with Functionalism Susan Blackmore (2006) – Conversation with Ned Block

• [supp] M. Nida-Rümelin (1993) – Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion? Mon Oct 24 Consciousness Susan Blackmore (2003) – Consciousness: An Introduction, Ch. 2, What Is It Like To Be... Thomas Nagel (1974) – What Is It Like to Be a Bat (excerpt)

• [supp] Kathleen Akins (1993) – A Bat Without Qualities?

FIRST PAPER DUE IN CONFERENCE (Week of Oct 3-7)

Wed Oct 26 Consciousness Frank Jackson (1982) – Epiphenomenal Qualia

• [supp] Frank Jackson (1986) – What Mary Didn’t Know Mon Oct 31 Consciousness David Chalmers (1995) – Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (excerpt) Patricia Churchland (1996) – The Hornswoggle Problem

• [supp] Joseph Levine (1983) – Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap Wed Nov 2 TBD TBD

Mon Nov 7 Eliminativism P. M. Churchland (1982) – Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes

• [supp] Susan Blackmore (2006) – Conversation with Patricia and Paul Churchland Wed Nov 9 Eliminativism Lynne Rudder-Baker (1987) – Cognitive Suicide

• [supp] P.M. Churchland (2007) – The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Mon Nov 14 Alief Tamar Gendler (2008) – Alief in Action

• [supp] Eric Schwitzgebel (2010) – Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs Wed Nov 16 Extended Cognition Andy Clark & David Chalmers (1998) – The Extended Mind

• [supp] Brie Gertler (2007) – Overextending the Mind Mon Nov 21 Embodied Cognition Andy Clark (2008) – Supersizing the Mind (Excerpts)

• [supp] Jerry Fodor (2009) – Where Is My Mind? Wed Nov 23 Embodied Cognition Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2008) – The Phenomenological Mind (Ch. 7)

• [supp] Rodney Brooks (1991) – Intelligence Without Reason Mon Nov 28 Situated Cognition L.W. Barsalou, et al. (2003) Grounding Conceptual Knowledge in Modality-Specific Systems

• [supp] J.J. Gibson (1979) – The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception

Wed Nov 30 Rationality and Delusion Lisa Bortolotti (2010) – Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (Excerpts)

• [supp] Anne A.M. Davies & Martin Davies (2009) – Explaining Pathologies of Belief Mon Dec 5 Rationality and Delusion Elizabeth Pacherie (2010) – Perceptions, Emotions and Delusions: The Case of the Capgras Delusion

• [supp] H.D. Ellis & M.B. Lewis (2001) – Capgras Delusion: A Window on Face Recognition

SECOND PAPER DUE IN CONFERENCE (Week of Oct 31-Nov 4)

Links: Useful background reading from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online.

• Dualism (H. Robinson) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/

• Behaviorism (G. Graham) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/

• Mind/Brain Identity Theory (J.J.C.Smart) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

• Physicalism (D. Stoljar) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

• Functionalism (J. Levin) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/

• Multiple Realizability (J. Bickle) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/

• Mental Causation (J. Heil & D. Robb) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/

• Computational Theory of Mind (M. Rescola) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/

• The Frame Problem (M. Shanahan) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frame-problem/

• Mental Representation (D. Pitt) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/

• Modularity of Mind (P. Robbins) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modularity-mind/

• Consciousness (R. van Gulick) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

• Qualia (M. Tye) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

• Consciousness and Intentionality (C. Siewert) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/

• Phenomenal Intentionality (A. Mendelovici & D. Bourget) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/

• Eliminative Materialism (W. Ramsey) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/

• Embodied Cognition (L. Foglia & R. Wilson) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/

• Intentionality (P. Jacob) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

• Cognitive Science (P. Thagard) o http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/