fellows - oco nfu neg

Offensive Cyber Operations Neg Offensive Cyber Operations Neg..................................1 Solvency Answers.............................................. 3 Congressional Oversight Fails................................4 Declaratory Policy Fails.....................................5 No Effective Check...........................................6 No First Use Makes Us More Vulnerable........................7 No First Use Fails – China Says No...........................8 Patriotic Hackers Mean No Solvency...........................9 Cyber War Adv................................................ 10 OCOs Limited Now............................................11 Pre-Emption Good—Key to Prevent Attacks.....................14 A2: China War...............................................16 Can’t Solve Modeling and Squo Treaties Solve................19 A2: U.S. Usage Causes Modeling..............................20 Deterrence Prevents Modeling................................21 A2: Cyberwar—Hype...........................................23 A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Happen.................................24 A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Escalate...............................27 A2: Deterrence Doesn’t Apply to Cyberwar....................28 A2: Surprise Attacks........................................29 A2: Kills Heg/Soft Power....................................30 A2: Cyberterror.............................................31 Separation of Powers Advantage...............................33 Interbranch Conflict Inevitable.............................34 OCO Doesn’t Hurt SOP........................................36

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Page 1: Fellows - OCO NFU Neg

Offensive Cyber Operations Neg

Offensive Cyber Operations Neg.....................................................................................................1

Solvency Answers.......................................................................................................................3

Congressional Oversight Fails.................................................................................................4

Declaratory Policy Fails...........................................................................................................5

No Effective Check..................................................................................................................6

No First Use Makes Us More Vulnerable................................................................................7

No First Use Fails – China Says No..........................................................................................8

Patriotic Hackers Mean No Solvency......................................................................................9

Cyber War Adv..........................................................................................................................10

OCOs Limited Now................................................................................................................11

Pre-Emption Good—Key to Prevent Attacks.........................................................................14

A2: China War.......................................................................................................................16

Can’t Solve Modeling and Squo Treaties Solve.....................................................................19

A2: U.S. Usage Causes Modeling...........................................................................................20

Deterrence Prevents Modeling.............................................................................................21

A2: Cyberwar—Hype............................................................................................................23

A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Happen...........................................................................................24

A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Escalate..........................................................................................27

A2: Deterrence Doesn’t Apply to Cyberwar..........................................................................28

A2: Surprise Attacks..............................................................................................................29

A2: Kills Heg/Soft Power.......................................................................................................30

A2: Cyberterror.....................................................................................................................31

Separation of Powers Advantage..............................................................................................33

Interbranch Conflict Inevitable.............................................................................................34

OCO Doesn’t Hurt SOP..........................................................................................................36

Presidential Flexibility Terrorism Turn..................................................................................38

SOP Collapse Inevitable........................................................................................................41

SOP Fails...............................................................................................................................43

SOP Fine Now.......................................................................................................................45

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SOP Impact Turn – Hegemony..............................................................................................46

SOP Won’t Collapse..............................................................................................................51

Strong Executive Solves SOP.................................................................................................53

A2: Econ Collapse..................................................................................................................54

A2: Pres Powers Bad.............................................................................................................56

A2: Tyranny...........................................................................................................................57

DA Links....................................................................................................................................58



UN CP........................................................................................................................................63


2NC Solvency Cards..............................................................................................................65

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Solvency Answers

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Congressional Oversight Fails

Congressional oversight over the declaratory policy fails – too fragmented and controlled by lobbyists.Clarke and Knake ‘12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)Congress is a federation of fiefdoms, subject to the vicissitudes of constant fund raising and the¶

lobbying of those who have donated the funds. That situation has two adverse consequences with regard¶ to congressional involvement in cyber war oversight. First, everyone wants his or her own fiefdom. ¶ Congress has resisted any suggestion, such as was made by Senator Bob Bennett (Republican of Utah),¶ that there be one committee authorized to examine cyber security. As a result there are approximately ¶ twenty-eight committees and subcommittees involved in the issue and none with jurisdiction to think ¶ holistically . Second, Congress “eschews regulation” and spits it out. The influential donors

from the¶ information technology, electric power, pipeline, and telecommunications industries have made the idea of ¶ serious cyber security regulations as remote as public financing of congressional campaigns or meaningful ¶ limits on campaign contributions .

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Declaratory Policy Fails

Declaratory policy can’t solve – doesn’t spillover and multiple other factors overwhelm it.Kanuck, ‘10 (Sean, J.D. from Harvard University, “Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law”, Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, 2010, RSR) This Article will expand the Symposium’s dialogue on law, information ¶ technology, and national security in two ways: first, by examining the intersection of those three subjects through the optic of public international law ¶ versus domestic statutes, regulations, or case law; and second, by providing ¶ broader context for the related legal and policy challenges that are

simultaneously confronting many countries. A global perspective on these issues is ¶ essential because no single nation’s declaratory policy or legal interpretations ¶ will be binding on the international community. Moreover, law will be but ¶ one factor in determining how nation-states ultimately manage cyber conflicts among themselves in the future.

Declaratory policies fail – no deterrence and they’re not ends in themselves.Lukasik, ‘10 (Stephen, Georgia Institute of Technology, “A Framework for Thinking About Cyber Conflict and Cyber Deterrence with Possible Declaratory Policies for These Domains”, Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, 2010, RSR) Deterrence, on the Cold War retaliation model, is unlikely to be effective in dealing with cyber force. ¶ This model is a dead-end and continuing to pursue it simply distracts from doing something more ¶ useful. Deterrence itself is not

impossible, but it must be based on broader concepts than retaliation ¶ and punishment.¶ Sub-state actors are not subject to deterrence based on threats of retaliation. They currently attack ¶ sovereign states, nuclear and non-nuclear, with impunity. Treating states and sub-state groups with a ¶ one-size-fits-all approach will result in addressing neither as well as they might. Sub-state groups are, ¶ for example, susceptible to cost-imposing measures.¶ Defense in cyber conflict is a critical part of cyber deterrence. It includes strategic and tactical ¶ warning, situation awareness, cyber order-of-battle, and the collection, retention, and analysis of cyber ¶ incident forensics. ¶ Cyber force is quite unlike conventional and nuclear force. It can be “soft” in its effects, extended in ¶ time, and cumulative in its impact. Cyber attacks are not simply to be seen as the equivalent of strategic ¶ bombing without aircraft or missiles.¶ An important element of cyber defense will be real-time control of network connectivity. The cyber ¶ security problem arises from connectivity. Control of connectivity will be part of the solution.¶ Shared voluntary private efforts can contribute to cyber situation awareness and

can provide a useful ¶ element of real-time cyber defense.¶ Declaratory policies are not ends in themselves .

They are a beginning to a lengthy campaign to further a vision of a desired future. Declaratory policies are only useful to the extent that they leverage other ¶ forces and mechanisms to encourage beneficial use of the cyber commons. They are seeds, not trees.

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No Effective Check

Congress cannot effectively enforce the declaration – can’t appropriately check the executive. Lorber 2013(Eric, J.D. Candidate at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Ph. D candidate at Duke University, January, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?”, Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 15:3)

The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at

most eight).235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified

nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.

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No First Use Makes Us More Vulnerable

No first use fails with cyber operations – leave us defenseless and no clear definition of use.Clarke and Knake ‘12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)However, forswearing the use of cyber weapons until they have been used on us could mean ¶ that if a conventional war broke out, we would not defend our forces by such things as cyber ¶ attacks on our opponent’s antiaircraft missile systems. The initial use of cyber war in the South ¶ China Sea scenario was a psychological operation on China’s internal military network, sending a ¶ harassing e-mail with a picture of a sinking Chinese ship. Should that be considered a first use of ¶ cyber war? ¶ Moreover, the scenario presented a problem that if you do not go first in cyberspace, your ¶ ability to conduct cyber attack may be reduced by the other side stepping up both its defensive ¶ measures (for example, China cutting off its cyberspace from the rest of the world) and its ¶ offensive measures (including attacks that disrupted U.S. networks that may be necessary for¶ some of the U.S. attacks to be launched). Whether we say it publicly or maintain it as an

internal¶ component of our strategy, if we were to accept the concept of No First Use in cyber war we ¶ would require a clear understanding of what constitutes “use.” Is penetration of a network a ¶ cyber war act? When the network penetration goes beyond just collecting information, does the ¶ act then move from intelligence operations to cyber war? Any ban on “first use” would prils obably¶ only

apply prior to kinetic shooting. Once a war goes kinetic, most bets are off.

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No First Use Fails – China Says No

No first use fails – China will say no.Austin and Gady ‘12 (Greg (former Vice President for the Worldwide Security Initiative) and Franz-Stefan (fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative), “CYBER Detente¶ BETWEEN THE UNITED¶

STATES AND CHINA:¶ SHAPING THE AGENDA”, EastWest Institute, 2012, RSR)A CICIR participant raised the issue of a “nofirst- ¶ use” agreement among major cyber¶ powers by

referring to an American article on¶ the subject, but a Chinese military source asserted ¶ later to the authors of this paper that ¶ such a position is not something that China ¶ would officially endorse . A CICIR participant¶ also raised the “idea of civilian sanctuaries,¶ and a prohibition of cyber attacks against¶ purely civilian targets.” In

response, a CSIS¶ participant reverted to the view that the existing ¶ laws of armed conflict, including the need¶ for

proportionate response and discrimination¶ in targeting, already provided the necessary ¶ framework for protecting civilians, even ¶ though the “line between civilian and military ¶ infrastructure is blurred.”

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Patriotic Hackers Mean No Solvency

Aff can’t solve – patriotic hackers make crisis management impossible

Owens et al 9(William A. Owens, as an Admiral in the United States Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **Kenneth W. Dam, served as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003, where he specialized in international economic development, **Herbert S. Lin, Senior Scientist and Study, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities” 4/27/2009, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf, KB)

Past experience strongly indicates that conflict or increased tension ¶ between two nations will result in the “patriotic hackers” of both nations ¶ (and perhaps their allies) taking action intended to harass or damage the ¶ other side. Such activities are not under the direct control of the national ¶ government, and as discussed in Section may well interfere with ¶ the efforts of that government to manage the crisis vis-à-vis the other ¶ side.4¶ Indeed, the government of a targeted nation is likely to believe ¶ that a cyberattack conducted on it is the result of deliberate adversarial ¶ action rather than the actions of “unauthorized” parties. Thus, unauthorized activities of the patriotic hackers of Zendia against the United States ¶ may lead the United States to believe that the Zendian government has ¶ launched a cyberattack against it. A U.S. cyberattack against Zendia may ¶ be seen by the

Zendian government as a cyber first strike against it.¶ Yet another complication involving patriotic hackers is the possibility ¶

that they might be directed by, inspired by, or tolerated by their government (or a rogue section within it), but in ways in which the government’s ¶ hand is not easily visible . Under such circumstances, hostile acts with ¶ damaging consequences could continue to occur (with corresponding ¶ benefits to the nation

responsible) despite official denials. At the very ¶ least, the possibility that patriotic hackers may be operating could act as ¶ a plausible cover for government-sponsored cyberattacks, even if there ¶ were in fact no patriotic hackers doing anything.

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Cyber War Adv

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OCOs Limited Now

Offensive cyber operations are limited now, but mobility is key to prevent national security threats Fisher 2013(Max, Washington Post Staff, 2013, "Leaked documents hint at Obama’s emerging cyberwar doctrine", http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/07/leaked-documents-hint-at-obamas-emerging-cyberwar-doctrine/)

President Obama has tasked senior national security and intelligence officials with preparing a list of potential overseas targets for U.S. cyber attacks, the Guardian reports, the latest in a series of stories

sourced to leaked documents. The story offers a rare glimpse into the Obama administration’s cyber offensive planning and the contours of when it is and isn’t willing to use those capabilities. The

leaked government documents portray the Obama administration as willing to hack foreign targets to preempt perceived threats against U.S. interests. Attacks in foreign countries without that country’s consent are permissible, they say, when “U.S. national interests and equities” are at stake or as “anticipatory action taken against imminent threats.” According to the

Guardian, the documents reference offensive cyber capabilities by the U.S. military and state “several times that cyber operations are to be used only in conjunction with other national tools and within the confines of law.” And it’s worth noting that preparing a potential target list is not the same thing

as planning to strike those targets; for many years, the Pentagon maintained worst-case-scenario plans for invading Canada. The Obama administration, based on these documents, seems to see offensive cyber attacks as most appropriate when used to preempt a possible incoming attack. In this sense, their cyber doctrine bears a striking resemblance to Obama’s case for the use of drone strikes, which he articulated in a recent speech. Drones, he argues, are justified on the one hand by the need to remove impending national security threats and, on the other, by the fact that all other options would be much costlier. Of course, as with drone strikes, preemptive cyber attacks risk collateral damage and mistakenly targeting someone who was not actually a threat. The document does not appear to reference any planned or recent attacks. But the most famous U.S. cyber attack is of course Stuxnet, the virus developed and deployed in conjunction with Israel to set back Iran’s nuclear program. The virus was a remarkable success, sending Iranian centrifuges spinning out of control, before it began spreading across the Internet by mistake, ultimately outing the program. Stuxnet appears consistent with the contours of a cyber doctrine hinted at in these documents. It was meant to preempt an impending national security threat – Iran’s nuclear program – worked in secret and was certainly offensive. It was part of a larger effort that included diplomacy, sanctions and the threat of physical strikes. It’s also worth noting what Stuxnet was not: a revenge attack meant to punish Iran. The virus was meant to work in secret; ideally, the Iranians were not even to know it had been deployed. Similarly, the Obama administration has insisted that it deploys drone strikes only against people who pose an ongoing threat to the U.S. rather than as “revenge” strikes. (Many critics of the drone

program doubt this.) This apparent cyber doctrine of quiet, drone-like preemption differs widely from another cyber strategy that many observers have believed the U.S. would or should take: deterrence. In this thinking, the U.S. would counter the growing threat of foreign hackers by, essentially, scaring them away from even trying. This would mean developing offensive cyber capabilities that could be used to hit back at hackers who attempt to breach U.S. systems and then making sure that foreign hackers understand they’re putting themselves at risk by even trying. In this way, offensive cyber capabilities would be kind of like nuclear weapons, which exist primarily to deter adversaries from using their weapons first. After all, preemptive cyber attacks might be able to slow Iranian centrifuges but they’re much less suited to, say, shutting down Chinese military hackers. Nor are simple cyber defenses up to that task; because foreign hackers risk little in trying to tap into sensitive U.S. servers; merely building more protections is only going to extend the time it takes them to finally succeed. This is why many U.S. companies already want to develop “hacking back” capabilities, something that is forbidden under U.S. law.

Status quo solves limits for cyber aggression Nakashima 2012(Ellen, Washington Post staff writer, November 14, "Obama signs secret directive to help thwart cyberattacks", http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressive-military-role/2012/11/14/7bf51512-2cde-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html)

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President Obama has signed a secret directive that effectively enables the military to act more aggressively to thwart cyberattacks

on the nation’s web of government and private computer networks. Presidential Policy Directive 20 establishes a broad and strict set of standards to guide the operations of federal agencies in confronting threats in cyberspace, according to several U.S. officials who have seen the classified document and are not authorized to

speak on the record. The president signed it in mid-October. The new directive is the most extensive White House effort to date to wrestle with what constitutes an “offensive” and a “defensive” action in the rapidly evolving world of cyberwar and cyberterrorism, where an attack can be launched in milliseconds by

unknown assailants utilizing a circuitous route. For the first time, the directive explicitly makes a distinction between network defense and cyber-operations to guide officials charged with making often-rapid decisions when confronted with threats. The policy also lays out a process to vet any operations outside government and defense networks and ensure that U.S. citizens’ and foreign allies’ data and privacy are protected and international laws of war are followed. “What it does, really for the first time, is it explicitly talks about how we will use cyber- operations,” a senior administration official said. “Network defense is what you’re doing inside your own networks. . . . Cyber-operations is stuff outside that space, and recognizing that you could be doing that for what might be called defensive purposes.” The policy, which updates a 2004 presidential directive, is part of a wider push by the Obama administration to confront the growing cyberthreat, which officials warn may overtake terrorism as the most significant danger to the country. “It should enable people to arrive at more effective decisions,” said a second senior administration official. “In that sense, it’s an enormous step forward.” Legislation to protect private networks from attack by setting security standards and promoting voluntary information sharing is pending on the Hill, and the White House is also is drafting an executive order along those lines. James A. Lewis, a cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, welcomed the new directive as bolstering the government’s capability to defend against “destructive scenarios,” such as those that Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta recently outlined in a speech on cybersecurity. “It’s clear we’re not going to be a bystander anymore to cyberattacks,” Lewis said. The Pentagon is expected to finalize new rules of engagement that would guide commanders on when and how the military can go outside government networks to prevent a cyberattack that could cause significant destruction or casualties. The presidential directive attempts to settle years of debate among government agencies about who is authorized to take what sorts of actions in cyberspace and with what level of permission. An example of a defensive cyber-operation that once would have been considered an offensive act, for instance, might include stopping a computer attack by severing the link between an overseas server and a targeted domestic computer. “That was seen as something that was aggressive,” said one defense official, “particularly by some at the State Department” who often are wary of actions that might infringe on other countries’ sovereignty and undermine U.S. advocacy of Internet freedom. Intelligence agencies are wary of operations that may inhibit intelligence collection. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has defined cyberspace as another military domain — joining air, land, sea and space — and

wants flexibility to operate in that realm. But cyber-operations, the officials stressed, are not an isolated tool. Rather, they are an integral part of the coordinated national security effort that includes diplomatic, economic and traditional

military measures. Offensive cyber actions, outside of war zones, would still require a higher level of scrutiny from relevant agencies and generally White House permission.

Cyber operations won’t be the first line of defense—no risk of cyber preemptionNakashima 2012(Ellen, Washington Post staff writer, November 14, "Obama signs secret directive to help thwart cyberattacks", http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressive-military-role/2012/11/14/7bf51512-2cde-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html)

But repeated efforts by officials to ensure that the Cyber Command has that flexibility have met with resistance — sometimes from within the Pentagon itself — over concerns that enabling the military to move too freely outside its own networks could pose unacceptable risks. A major concern has always been that an action may have a harmful unintended consequence, such as shutting down a hospital generator.

Officials say they expect the directive will spur more nuanced debate over how to respond to cyber-incidents. That might include a cyberattack that wipes data from tens of thousands of computers in a major industrial

company, disrupting business operations, but doesn’t blow up a plant or kill people. The new policy makes clear that the government will turn first to law enforcement or traditional network defense techniques before asking military cyberwarfare units for help or pursuing other alternatives, senior

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administration officials said. “We always want to be taking the least action necessary to mitigate the threat,” said one of the senior administration officials. “We don’t want to have more consequences than we intend.”

Status quo limitations are sufficient—models armed conflict Brennan 2012(John, Lieutenant Cololel, March 15, "United States Counter Terrorism Cyber Law and Policy, Enabling or Disabling?", http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/Brennan_UNITED-STATES-COUNTER-TERRORISM-CYBER-LAW-AND-POLICY.pdf)

While Congress was pursuing legislative change, DoD leadership began to codify a list of pre-approved cyber weapons that can be employed on foreign networks without garnering the nod from national decision-makers. Although the details of this policy directive are classified, it is potentially a step in the right direction to put a valuable capability into the hands of the commanders who are engaged in combat operations.

Anonymous media sources have described the general theme of the proposed DoD approach a s one that more closely models the law of armed conflict, as opposed to one that resembles a policy to govern the use of weapon s of mass destruction . 69

New doctrinal changes solve—especially in context of ChinaAustin 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the East West Institute, senior visiting fellow at King’s College, October 15, "America's Challenging Cyber Defense Policy", http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/10/15/americas-challenging-cyber-defense-policy/)

The DoD foreshadowed some time ago that it would produce a new set of rules of engagement to cover cyber operations. Panetta has characterized this as “the most comprehensive change to our rules of engagement in cyberspace in seven years”. He said that these would make the “department more agile and provide us with the ability to confront major threats quickly.” He foreshadowed strengthening of Cyber Command, a move reported by US sources to include

having it stand alone as an independent unified command compared with its current position under Strategic Command. This will be a positive move since it will disassociate it from its current co-location with the command responsible of strategic nuclear forces, a relationship that has caused China some considerable consternation.

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Pre-Emption Good—Key to Prevent Attacks

Preemption solves—we can prevent foreign attacks, and new tech prevents miscalcAustin 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the East West Institute, senior visiting fellow at King’s College, October 15, "America's Challenging Cyber Defense Policy", http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/10/15/americas-challenging-cyber-defense-policy/)

United States Pre-emptive and Deterrent Capability? Panetta talked of some amazing and hitherto unrevealed capabilities. He said

that US agencies could now “hunt down the malicious code before it harms our systems.” The

statement has surprised specialists in the United Kingdom. If true, and perhaps we should not doubt it, this gives the United States some useful capability and should impact the net assessment of U.S. and Chinese military cyber capability. In a similar vein, and equally surprising to some analysts, he said that the United States has made “significant advances” in solving the attribution problem. He said that this made it “far less likely” that adversaries of the United States would attack it: “Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate them and to hold them accountable for their actions”. Pre-emptive Capability and Nuclear Deterrence? Panetta specifically talked of the need to be able to pre-empt “an imminent threat of attack that will cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill American citizens.” He said that DoD has “developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in cyberspace.” Since cyber operations include the full gamut of digital command and control arrangements for strategic nuclear forces, we probably could use some explanation form Panetta whether this pre-emptive capacity and policy affects the nuclear deterrence calculation of potential adversaries of the United States, such as China, or a country like Russia, which while less likely to be an adversary, still maintains a large military nuclear force. China will be looking to Panetta to offer some clarifications on this in the talks he discussed in his speech. Panetta said he “underscored the need to increase communication and transparency” on both sides.

Limitless offensive cyber operations key to deter threats—prevents warBaker 2012(Stewart, first Assistant Secretary for Policy at the United States Department of Homeland Security under the Presidency of George W. Bush, October 19, "Law and Cyberwar-The Lessons of History", http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess1.html)

So, why do today’s lawyers think that their limits on cyberwar will fare better than FDR’s limits on air war? It beats me. If anything, they have a much harder task. Roosevelt could count on a shared European horror at the aerial destruction of cities. He used that to extract an explicit and reciprocal understanding from both sides as the war was beginning. We have no such understanding, indeed

no such shared horror. Quite the contrary, for some of our potential adversaries, cyber weapons are uniquely asymmetric—a horror for us, another day in the field for them. It doesn’t take a high-tech infrastructure to maintain an army that is ready in a pinch to live on grass. What’s more, cheating is easy and strategically profitable. American compliance will be enforced by all those lawyers. Our adversaries can ignore the rules and say—hell, they are saying—”We’re not carrying out cyber attacks. We’re victims,

too. Maybe you’re the attacker. Or maybe it’s Anonymous. Where’s your proof?” Even if all sides were genuinely committed to limiting cyberwar, as all sides were in 1939, we’ve seen that the logic of airpower eventually drove all sides to the horror they had originally recoiled from. Each side felt that it had observed the limits longer than the other. Each had lawyerly justifications for what it

did, and neither understood or gave credence to the other’s justifications. In that climate, all it took was a single error to break the legal limits irreparably. And error was inevitable. Bombs dropped by desperate pilots under fire

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go astray. But so do cyber weapons. Stuxnet infected thousands of networks as it searched blindly for Natanz. The

infections lasted far longer than intended. Should we expect fewer errors from code drafted in the heat of battle and flung at hazard toward the enemy? Of course not. But the lesson for the lawyers and the diplomats is

stark: Their effort to impose limits on cyberwar is almost certainly doomed. No one can welcome this conclusion, at least not in the United States. We have advantages in traditional war that we lack in cyberwar. We are not used to the idea that launching even small wars on distant continents may cause death and suffering here at home. That is what drives the

lawyers. They hope to maintain the old world. But they’re driving down a dead end. If we want to defend against the horrors of cyberwar, we need first to face them, with the candor of a Stanley Baldwin. Then we need to charge our military strategists, not our lawyers, with constructing a cyberwar strategy for the world we live in, not the world we’d like to live in. That strategy needs both an offense and a defense. The offense must be powerful enough to deter every adversary with something to lose in cyberspace, and so it must include a way to identify our attacker with certainty. The defense, too, must be realistic, making successful cyber attacks more difficult and less effective because we have built resilience and

redundancy into our infrastructure. Once we have a strategy for winning a cyberwar, we can ask the lawyers for their thoughts. We can’t do it the other way around.

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A2: China War

No cyber war with China—interdependence checksAustin and Gady 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the EastWest Institute and senior visiting fellow in the department of War Studies at King’s College London, and Franz-Stefan, associate and foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute, "Cyber Detente Between the united States and China: Shaping the Agenda", http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)

That said, the two countries’ economies, though very different in many respects, are each highly dependent on a global Internet and shared communications platforms and hardware. While the Chinese

economy is not as dependent on the Internet as the U.S., economy is, the difference between the two is fast shrinking. China’s export-driven economy and its trade in financial services make it as vulnerable to cyber attack as the United States. This interdependence—despite occasional outbursts of confrontational rhetoric coming from both Beijing and Washington— can be leveraged to promote stability in bilateral relations. In fact, this is already happening. We can think of this interdependency as a bal-ance of cyber power. If one accepts that both governments make rational calculations, than this new interconnectedness can be exploited to make conflict less likely. In today’s interconnected, digitalized world, the “opportunity cost” associated with embarking on a confrontational course will deter both parties from engaging in open hostile actions. This of course does not preclude cyber espionage, intellectual property theft, or even what some analysts have called the “long game,” i.e. the slow and gradual infiltration of strategically significant economic ICT systems by hackers on both sides.

Interdependence is amplified in cyber war—the potential impacts prevent any potential conflict Austin and Gady 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the EastWest Institute and senior visiting fellow in the department of War Studies at King’s College London, and Franz-Stefan, associate and foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute, "Cyber Detente Between the united States and China: Shaping the Agenda", http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)

China and the United States do have a com-plementary interest in cooperating on many aspects of cybersecurity. The most significant argument to support a claim for cooperation in China’s international behavior in cyberspace is mutual dependence among the major economic powers (including China, the United States, Japan and the European Union) in the economic sphere, in a situation where trillions of dollars of transactions occur through networked digital communications each day. In speaking of the U.S.’s economic reliance on digital networks and systems, former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell observed in 2010: “The United States economy is $14 trillion a year. Two banks in New York City move $7 trillion a day. On a good day, they do eight trillion... All of those transactions are massive reconciliation and accounting. If those who wish us ill, if someone with a different world view was successful in attacking that information and destroying the data,

it could have a devastating impact, not only on the nation, but the globe.” 31 The cost to global economic stability would likely be very high if there were a major confrontation between China and the United States. Sustained or repeated interruptions in connectivity, corruption of transaction data, or deletion of commercial records on a large scale could have major negative repercus-sions for the global economy. Whether confidence after such attacks could be restored remains an open question. These costs would be so high that they should at least dampen if not fully deter states from resorting to cyber war. Cyberspace only amplifies traditional interdependence in trade.

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No US-China cyber warFox 2011 (Stuart Fox, Assistant Editor, July 2, 2011, “Why Cyberwar Is Unlikely,” Tech News Daily, http://www.technewsdaily.com/6962-cyberwar-unlikely-deterrence-cyber-war.html)Even as more and more countries invest in the idea of cyberwarfare, cyberspace remains largely peaceful insofar as actual war is concerned.¶ In the two decades since cyberwar first became possible, there hasn't been a single event that politicians, generals and security experts agree on as having passed the threshold for strategic cyberwar . ¶ In fact, the attacks that have occurred have fallen so far short of a proper cyberwar that many have begun to doubt that cyberwarfare is even possible.¶ The reluctance to engage in strategic cyberwarfare stems mostly from the uncertain results such a conflict would bring, the lack of motivation on the part of the possible combatants and their shared inability to defend against counterattacks . ¶

Many of the systems that an aggressive cyberattack would damage are actually as valuable to any potential attacker as they would be to the victim.¶ The five countries capable of large-scale cyberwar (Israel, the U.S., the U.K., Russia and China) have more to lose if a cyberwar were to escalate into a shooting war than they would gain from a successful cyberattack. ¶ "The half-dozen countries that have cyber capability are deterred from cyberwar because of the fear of the American response. Nobody wants this to spiral out of control," said James Lewis, senior fellow and director of technology and public policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

No US-China cyber war and no impactSanders 7/6 (Doug Sanders, author and journalist, “Our Computers Are Not Going to Kill Us: Cyber War is Military Fiction,” http://dougsaunders.net/2013/07/our-computers-are-not-going-to-kill-us-cyber-war-is-military-fiction/)We tend to believe them. To those of us who grew up in the early decades of the Internet, reading William Gibson and watching Tron, the idea of a distinct and tangible “cyberspace,” as Mr. Gibson coined it, seems believable. If war is hell in meatspace, then imagine what it will be like when it moves into the online world, where all our communications and private data are stored, where

the machines that control our entire lives can be hacked. If the Internet is everywhere, wouldn’t a cyberwar be a total war?¶ Once we started believing this, the whole world seemed to confirm it. An online virus was used by Israel and

the United States to disable a uranium-enrichment facility in Iran. China uses a facility to steal data from the West. France, Britain and the United States, as we’ve recently learned, are mass-harvesting the online communications and phone calls of foreigners (and possibly their own citizens), and the man who revealed this, Edward Snowden, is in the midst of a globe-trotting flight across the settings of vintage James Bond movies. If this is what cyber cold war looks like, how horrid would real

cyberwars be?¶ We can imagine them, and make movies about them, but the reality is far more mundane and less threatening.¶ That’s the conclusion made by Thomas Rid, an expert on cybersecurity and intelligence at the department of war studies at London’s King’s College. His forthcoming book’s straight-up title, Cyber War

Will Not Take Place, is a call for sanity: There is no distinct “online world,” and the many forms of online crime and mischief are not a threat to our existence or our civilization.¶ “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb our future,” Mr. Rid writes.¶ Instead, he says, “the opposite is taking place: a computer-enabled assault on violence itself. All past and present political cyberattacks – in contrast to computer crime – are sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as human conflict itself: sabotage, espionage and subversion … In several ways, cyberattacks are not creating more vectors

of violent interaction; rather, they are making previously violent interactions less violent.Ӧ People who understand distributed systems and networks realize this: It may be possible, if hundreds of people work on the

problem for years, to damage a single centrifuge facility using a virus – but still only if there’s also a human sabotage agent placed on site. To destroy or disable an entire country’s or region’s infrastructure using lines of code or electromagnetic pulses would be impossible – or, at least,

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given the need for human agents at each target, it would be the same as using bombs to do so (and bombs would be quicker and easier).

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Can’t Solve Modeling and Squo Treaties Solve

US can’t solve modeling – the development of offensive capabilities is inevitable.Libicki 2009(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877.pdf)

Historically, arms control has always gone hand in hand with deter- rence and crisis stability, but it would be difficult to be optimistic about its prospects in cyberspace. A good deal depends on what one means by arms control. If the model were to be something like the treaties signed between the United States–NATO and the Soviet Union– Warsaw Pact, which limited certain classes of weapons and banned others, there is little basis for hope. 1 If, instead, the goal were a framework of international agreements and norms that could raise the diffi- culty of certain types of cyberattacks, some

progress can be made. Why is it nearly impossible to limit or ban cyberweapons? First, although the purpose of “limiting” arms is to put an inventory-based lid on how much damage they can do in a crisis, such a consideration is irrelevant in a medium in which duplication is instantaneous. 2 Second, banning attack methods is akin to banishing “how-to” information, which is inherently impossible (like making advanced

mathematics illegal). The same holds for banning knowledge about vulnerabilities. Third, banning attack code is next to impossible. Such code has many legitimate purposes, not least of which is in building defenses against attack from others. These

others include individuals and nonstate actors, so the argument that one does not need defenses because offenses have been outlawed is unconvincing. In many, per- haps most cases, such attack code is useful for espionage, an activity that has yet to be banned by treaty. Furthermore, finding such code is a hopeless quest. The world’s information storage capacity is immense; much of it is legitimately encrypted; and besides, bad code does not emit telltale odors. If an enforcement entity could search out, read, and decrypt the entire database

of the world, it would doubtless find far more interesting material than malware. Exhuming digital informa- tion from everyone else’s systems is hard enough when the authorities with arrest powers try it; it may be virtually impossible when outsiders try. The only barely feasible approach is to ban the activity of writing attack code, then hope that the fear of being betrayed by an insider who goes running to international authorities prevents governments

from organizing small groups of elite hackers from engaging in such nefarious activities. If the international community had the manpower and access to enforce such norms, it could probably enforce a great many other, and more immediately practical, norms (e.g., against cor- ruption). Such a world does not exist.

Treaties now solve and cyber war has passed a threshold of legitimacyLibicki 2013(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf)

All that noted, cyberwar has probably already passed the legitimization threshold. It may have done so, at least against military targets, back in 1999. 18 The United States and similarly capable countries are discussing efforts to delegitimize the use of cyberwar against certain

classes of targets (e.g., hospitals). International consensus or even a treaty may result. If so, brandishing a capability to cross these norms would be problematic.

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A2: U.S. Usage Causes Modeling

Cyberwarfare is different—usage causes defensive buildup, not offensiveLibicki 2012(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1215.pdf)

Nevertheless, the logic that states have to develop offensive cyber-weapons because their rivals do has little basis in theory or fact. First, states have little knowledge of exactly what weapons, as such, are in the

arsenal of their rivals. 13 Indeed, if they actually knew precisely what weapons their foes had, they might well know what vulnerabilities such weapons targeted and would fix such vulnerabilities, thereby nullify-ing these weapons. Second, as noted, the best response to an offensive weapon is a defensive weapon, not another offensive weapon. Third, the whole notion of offense-versus-offense requires that the underlying dynamic of attack and retaliation actually makes sense as a warfight-ing and war-termination strategy. Were that so, deterrence would be primary. But deterrence is a very difficult notion in cyberspace. 14 States wanting to hide their own tracks in a cyberattack have a wealth of ways to do so and, often, more than enough motive. Incidentally, it is hard to imagine how an arms race in cyberspace could come close to having a major economic impact. The intellectual skills required to compete in this contest are so specialized that states will run out of such people well before they run out of money paying them.

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Deterrence Prevents Modeling

Use is key to prevent attacks on anyone—also is key to hegLibicki 2013(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf)

Because the potential for cyberattacks arises from the target’s vulnerabilities coupled with the attacker’s ability to exploit them, is the desired effect of brandishing cyberattack capabilities to look powerful or to make the other side look powerless? Of course, the answer could be both, and both may be useful, but if the brandishing is part of an overall strategic communications campaign, it may help to decide what to

emphasize in such a campaign. Looking powerful is the more efficient option. It induces caution in actual or potential opponents. The demonstration does not have to be repeated for each one. Looking large also serves to deflect potential attackers away from one state toward others.

Finally, there is glory in it; success reflects well on other sources of national power. But concentrating instead

on exposing another state’s weaknesses also has its virtues. It serves to deter troublesome states by reminding them of their vulnerabilities. It also deflects the accusations of self-promotion (“look at how powerful I am”) by turning the focus toward others. After all, a state shown to be vulnerable to one attacker in cyberspace may be presumed vulnerable to others. Even if the state retaliates, its systems will still be vulnerable and perceived as such.

Attacks deter—create doubt potential aggressors Libicki 2013(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf)

An uncertainty-and-doubt strategy may work to the U.S. advantage by persuading other states to be very careful in pursuing a network-centric high-technology force to counter U.S. military capabilities. This means it may be dissuasive. A lot depends on how other states react to the idea that hackers have penetrated their military systems and left behind implants, which, when triggered, could generate rogue messages, alter sensor data, create network dropouts, and even make weapons fail. 4 It is possible to conclude that, if the target state believes that (1) it has been so hacked, (2) has no alternative but the systems and equipment it has, (3) its estimate of war’s outcomes are decidedly worse as a result, and (4) it has a choice on whether to go to war, the state’s desire to go to war would decrease. How

might such doubt and uncertainty be induced? The most straightforward way is to hack into such systems and then make it obvious that they have indeed been hacked. Claiming responsibility is unnecessary because the point is to emphasize not U.S. power but the vulner-ability of targeted systems to cyberattacks in a way that leaves their owners doubting their own systems. But if the point is not to provide proof but to instill uncertainty, making the result obvious beforehand is unnecessary. In fact, it may be unwise if the first demonstration makes the next one harder to accomplish. Thus, proving a system was, is, and will stay hacked may be impossible. However, the hint of an attack leaves no specific trace and hence no specific fix. Even if system owners react to rumors by making general fixes, such as selective disconnection or the installation of anti-malware guards, there will be nothing that suggests which of these general fixes worked.

OCO’s deter international development of capabilities—destroys confidence in systemsLibicki 2013(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities",

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A great deal depends on what others are predisposed to believe about U.S. capabilities with technology in general. U.S. cyberwarriors need never reveal the techniques of this or that manipulation but just ensure

there are enough hints out there that say they do have the requisite skills. Subjecting that belief to a test could lead to failure and break the spell they may be under. It cannot be overemphasized that the target of the attack is not the system itself but confi-dence in that system and any other system an adversary depends on . What helps is the ability to convince others that they cannot protect their systems even after painstaking attention to their security. They may have checked everything three

times. Yet the cyberwarriors find their way in. The effect is necessarily prospective rather than ret-rospective; it is rare these days that people are attacked; the attack makes the news; and yet there is no good

idea how the attack was carried out or at least what vulnerability was exploited to enable the attack. 5 Many of the instruments of the attack remain with the target system, nestled in its log files, or even in the malware itself. Even if the targets of the attack (e.g., the Iranians) cannot figure out what was done or how it was done (e.g., Stuxnet), there may be others who can (e.g., the Belarus firm, VirusBlokAda). The number of prominent attacks whose workings, notably penetration and propagation methods, remain a mystery is small, perhaps zero. To be sure, certain attack methods, notably distributed denial of service, contain no prospective, let alone retrospective, mystery as to how they work; they rely primarily on brute force. Furthermore, anyone who follows the news will understand the ubiquity of hack-ing. It is no great exaggeration to posit that any information of interest to a sophisticated state sitting on a system connected to the Internet has long ago escaped. At this juncture, there are too many vulnerabilities associated with web scripting (e.g., Java) and document-presentation programs to feel very secure.

U.S. cyber attacks are more likely to prevent use of offensive cyber attacks against the USLibicki 2013(Martin, Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation, "Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf)

Can brandishing help dissuade other states from pursuing a network-centric high- technology force to counter U.S. military capabilities? The best way to demonstrate the risk of network-centricity is to hack into military systems to show their fragility (claiming responsibility is unnecessary; the point is to emphasize not U.S. power but the vulnerability of the enemy’s network-centric systems). In other circumstances, making what is vulnerable clear may be unnecessary, perhaps unwise. Every hack leads to fixes that make the next exploitation much harder. But the hint of an attack that leaves no

specific trace leaves nothing specific to fix. The point is to convince others that they cannot protect their systems even after paying close attention to their security. The vulnerability of less sophisticated states to unseen manipulation may be higher when the target does not really understand the technology behind its own weapon systems. Often, the target’s lack of access to others’ source code and not having built any of its own complicates figuring out what went wrong and how to fix it. Not all states will throw up their hands, though. Some may reason that, because the effects of cyberattacks are temporary and difficult, their systems can survive the initial exchange and recover for subsequent rounds. So, they pursue high technology and ignore the demonstrated possibility that high-technology military campaigns might last days rather than months or years. A subtler counterstrategy is to network warfighting machines (configured not to touch the Internet) and forget about networking people; isolation avoids some of the pesky vulnerabilities arising from human error (notably those associated with authentication, such as pass words and tokens). Or they simply renounce network-centric warfare and conclude that they avoided the pitfalls of depending on technology.

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A2: Cyberwar—Hype

Cyber war doesn’t happen—their evidence is all hypeGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

A blitz of media, punditry and public pronouncements inform interested observers and policy makers that the next war is likely to be won or lost on the internet. Indeed, events such as the coordinated cyber attacks on Estonia and the Stuxnet worm seem to indicate that cyberwar has already begun. The sense of urgency surrounding cyberwar appears to be tied to perceptions that internet conflict is the newest phase in the ongoing revolution in military affairs, only this time the threat is directed at the sophisticated technological

civilizations of the West, rather than at poor developing states or the recipients of inferior second-world military hardware. 1 To believe a growing number of pundits and practitioners, cyberwar threatens to render existing military advantages impotent, exposing those nations most dependent on comprehensive information infrastructures to devastating and unpredictable attacks. If powerful states largely immune to terrestrial invasion can have their military might blunted and their factories and cities idled by foreign hackers, then perhaps this latest technological revolution really does presage a “Pearl

Harbor" in which the United States and other great powers will be targets, rather than perpetrators, of shock and awe. There is a problem with the growing consensus of impending cyber apocalypse, however: it is far from clear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war. Discussions of cyberwar commit a common fallacy of arguing from opportunity to outcome, rather than considering whether something that could happen is at all likely, given the motives of those who are able to act. Cyber pessimism rests heavily on capabilities (means), with little thought to a companion logic of consequences (ends). Much that could happen in the world fails to occur, largely because those capable of initiating action discern no benefit from doing so. Put another way, advocates have yet to work out how cyberwar actually accomplishes the objectives that typically sponsor terrestrial military violence. Absent a logic of consequences, it is di cult to believe that cyberwar will prove as devastating for world affairs and for developed nations in particular as many seem to believe.

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A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Happen

Cyber war is comparatively unlikelyGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Even the most successful forms of cyberwar (such as cyber espionage) do not presage much of a transformation. Just as innovations in artillery and small arms made closed formations untenable, militaries, governments and societies will adapt. It would be ludicrous to suggest to modern infantry that their res would be

more concentrated if they stayed in formation while on the march. Contemporary field commanders have become comfortable with the idea that perimeters are partial or notional, that air-land battle (and naval warfare for a much longer time) necessarily involves not fronts, but mobility; not frontal assaults, but

maneuver. Similar concepts will pervade discussions of cyberwar. Static security is insecurity. It does not follow, however, that being vulnerable means one will be attacked, or that there is much that can be done to

prevent aggression if it is initiated. Security in a modern, integrated world—both in terrestrial and cyber—Is a function more of the motives of opponents than of the ability to attack. Nations or groups that strike through the internet in minor ways may be ubiquitous. Those that threaten critical national security goals will be rare if for no other reason than that cyberwar is not really war in grand strategic terms. In this regard, the next Pearl Harbor is much more likely to occur at Pearl Harbor than in cyberspace.

Cyberwar won’t happenGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Since it is difficult to share operational details of planned attacks without compromising military effectiveness, cyberwar must be practiced more often than threatened. Here too, however,

there are critical limitations to what can be achieved via the internet. It is one thing for an opponent to idle a country's infrastructure, communications or military capabilities. It is quite another to ensure that the damage inflicted translates into a lasting shift in the balance of national capabilities or resolve. Cyber attacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand strategic terms unless they are accompanied by terrestrial military force or other actions designed to capitalize on temporary weakness effected over the internet. Perpetrators must therefore be prepared to

exploit windows of opportunity generated by internet attacks through other modes of combat. Otherwise, there are few compelling reasons to initiate cyberwar in the first place. The chief beneficiaries of cyberwar are thus less likely to be weak or rising powers than those states that already possess important terrestrial military advantages. Conceived of in

this way, the internet is less a revolution in military a airs than it is yet another set of technologies that extend existing disparities in power and influence.

Cyberwar won’t escalate to war—the only reasons to advance a cyber attackGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

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U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta's warning that “the next Pearl Harbor” could well occur over the internet appears designed to evoke strong emotions, rather than prompt clear thinking about the likely nature and limitations of cyberwar. No event in the twentieth century did more to realign U.S. public opinion, mobilizing the nation psychologically for entry into the Second World War. The analogy may in fact be apt, but almost certainly not in the manner

imagined by the Secretary. The situation in 1941 actually serves as a useful point of comparison with a surprise internet attack. To understand why a cyber Pearl Harbor is not as threatening as it sounds, it will help to review what the air raids on December 7, 1941 were meant to accomplish and what they actually achieved. Before diving into Panetta's Pearl Harbor analogy, however, I first discuss the nature of war and how key attributes of warfare

(mal)function over the internet. Nations and non-state actors make war to further their interests when incompatibilities exist between those interests, and when would make war inevitable alternative methods of conflict resolution are deemed inefficient or ineffective. While many conflicts are conceivable, most do not occur precisely because prospective participants recognize that threats or uses of force are futile, violence often cannot achieve the objectives for which nations strive. If futility is a problem for terrestrial conflict, it is an even more encompassing barrier to cyberwar.

Cyber attacks won’t start until war will already happen—and damage is temporary and minimalGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Beyond questions of means and motive, two basic features make cyber warfare different from other types of conflict. First, the bulk of damage contemplated by cyberwar is in all likelihood temporary. The assumption among many cyber-pessimists that the potential for creating harm is sufficient to make cyber space

a suitable substitute for, or at least an alternative to, terrestrial conflict is simply incorrect. Shutting down the power grid, or preventing communication could be tremendously costly, but most such damage can

be corrected quickly and with comparatively modest investment of tangible resources. Regardless, damage of this type is

sunk. Losses experienced over a given time interval cannot be recovered whatever one's reactions and so should not have much direct impact on subsequent policy behavior. Harm inflicted over the internet or through any other medium will matter politically when it involves changes to the subsequent balance of power, or when it indicates enemy capabilities that must be taken into

account in future plans. Precisely because cyberwar does not involve bombing cities or devastating armored columns, the damage inflicted will have a short-term impact on targets. 10 To accomplish meaningful objectives, cyber attacks must contribute to other aspects of a more conventional war effort. In order to affect the long-term balance-of-power, for instance, cyberwar must be joined to other, more traditional, forms of war. Temporary damage can be useful in two circumstances. First, compromising or incapacitating networks might afford an enemy valuable tactical, or even strategic, advantages. An opponent that cannot shoot, move, resupply or

communicate will be easier to defeat. However, this still requires the advantaged party to act through some medium of combat to seize the initiative. Notions that cyber attacks will themselves prove pivotal in future war are reminiscent of World War I artillery barrages that cleared enemy trenches, but which still required the infantry and other arms to

achieve a breakout. Whether an actor can benefit from cyberwar depends almost entirely on whether the actor is willing and able to combine a cyber attack with some other method—

typically kinetic warfare—that can convert temporary advantages achieved over the internet into a lasting blow. Internet attacks thus other an assailant a “soft kill” that is valuable only when attackers intend and prosecute follow-on attacks with traditional military force to permanently weaken an enemy.

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Cyberwar only augments traditional warfare—it doesn’t cause conflictGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

There is no reason to believe that cyberwar will be any more useful as an isolated instrument of coercive foreign policy. An attack that causes temporary harm will inevitably be followed by countermeasures and heightened vigilance, as has happened for example in Estonia in the after- math of the 2007

attacks. For cyber aggression to have lasting effects, a virtual attack must be combined with physical intervention. Knocking out communications or power infrastructure could cause tremendous disruption, but the ability to quickly recover from such attacks implies that the consequences in terms of the balance of national power would be negligible. The need to follow virtual force with physical force in order to achieve lasting political effects suggests that the application of cyber warfare independent of conventional forms of warfare will be of tertiary importance in strategic and grand strategic terms. If one cannot foresee circumstances where physical aggression is plausible independent of cyberwar, then cyberwar is also unlikely to constitute a critical threat. A second element of the logic of cyberwar has to do with influence. Rather than attacking directly, an actor can use the potential to harm (deterrence or compellence). The ability to shut down the U.S. energy grid, say, might be used to compel U.S. officials to refrain from aggressive policies or actions, or to persuade the United States to make diplomatic concessions. Yet, the problem with the standard deterrence or compellence logic in the context of potential cyber attacks, as I have already pointed out, is that revealing a given set of cyber capabilities heavily degrades their usefulness. Deterrence or compellence are therefore marginal as “pure” actions in cyberspace. Indeed, concerns that nations will not be able to deter cyber aggression amount to a recognition

that neither will cyber threats prove very effective as threats or inducements. Again, actions in cyberspace can be combined with initiatives in physical space, but this just reinforces the fact that, rather than a distinct form of conflict, cyberwar is basically tied to conventional forms of warfare.

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A2: Cyberwar—Doesn’t Escalate

Traditional deterrence models check escalationGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

An open question exists in any crisis about how far competitors are willing to escalate, but an ability to counter cyber attack with other, more kinetic forms of military violence serves alternately to deter or to facilitate the use of cyber capabilities, giving those nations with terrestrial military power yet another

option that, even if available to their opponents, may prove extraordinarily dangerous to practice. As we see today with U.S. drone attacks and special operations raids on foreign sovereign territory, the power to do much more ensures that an opponent maintains a level of discretion in its response to provocation. Few can doubt the reaction of the United States, for example, if Pakistan were to attempt to conduct a commando

raid on U.S. territory. Nations that can physically punish others for transgressions in any domain,

electronic or otherwise, are better able to operate in all domains. Once one distinguishes between simple

vulnerability and actual threats, terrestrial capabilities become pivotal in determining who exercises cyber capabilities.

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A2: Deterrence Doesn’t Apply to Cyberwar

Their analysis of deterrence is wrong—deterrence still holds for cyber war, even if MAD isn’t applicableGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Perhaps with reason, but not with considerable clarity, experts on cyber security have failed draw the same conclusions from the inability to protect that strategists drew from the Cold War. Mutual assured destruction may not exist in cyberspace, as it did in the terrestrial world of the 1950s through early

1990s. However, what remains to be explained is why the internet is such a different strategic setting, and what this means for what nations can and cannot accomplish, both in terms of deterrence and compellence. Indeed,

while the Cold War is remembered as the ideal deterrence environment, strategic thinkers and government officials struggled with how they could exercise influence in such a world. The mere potential for imposing harm did not imply that harm would be imposed, or even that, when imposed or threatened, nations would respond in an obliging manner. Few could doubt in retrospect that citizens and leaders on both sides of the iron curtain felt vulnerable, especially during the early years of the post-World War II period. It does not follow, however, that a heightened sense of insecurity was reflected in actual behavioral conflict. Whether warfare in the cyber era will depart radically from previous patterns, or will mimic, in part or in whole, conflictual politics from earlier eras, will depend on the degree to which the strategic logic of cyberwar accommodates the objectives of political actors in contemplating or exercising

coercion. Nor do students of cyberwar seem much concerned with implications of Nixon's Hanoi bombing campaign. The threatened use of force in this, and most other instances, is intended to alter behavior through the prospect of long-term damage. To the degree that harm can be quickly and easily repaired, there is not much leverage in such threats. Conversely, details injurious to attackers or to the effectiveness or potency of an attack are typically concealed from an opponent, even when this information would significantly increase the credibility of coercive threats. Flight plans, bomb loads and electronic countermeasures used by U.S. B-52s, for example, were not shared with Hanoi, since this would have

deeply compromised the capacity of U.S. forces to carry out Nixon's threat. Nations, groups or individuals with the ability to inflict harm must ask, not just how much can be inflicted at what cost, but also what is to be achieved through force, and whether these ends are justified in terms of price and availability of alternative, typically cheaper, mechanisms. Force, or the threat of force, is useful as punishment to the degree that the harm imposed is substantial and durable. Damage that can be quickly or easily undone will not do much to deter or compel, but it will alert an enemy to vulnerabilities, and also antagonize an opponent, increasing the danger of counter attack and/or future

opposition. The threat or realization of physical conquest can be effective provided the perpetrator finds it worthwhile to engage in the costliest form of politics. Here again, the simple ability to act aggressively is not itself sufficient to rationalize or predict aggression. The United

States could probably conquer Canada if it chose to, and yet Canada remains (by all accounts) sovereign and independent. Most states, groups and individuals persist in peace because they can conceive of no benefit from force, even if violence, and victory, are feasible. The fact that harm can be propagated over the internet does not suffice to predict that cyberwar will become a substitute for terrestrial conflict, or even that it will be an important domain of future warfare.

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A2: Surprise Attacks

Cyberattacks won’t influence decisions for a surprise attackGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

The notion of a devastating surprise attack is a particularly baroque aspect of cyberwar paranoia, and is certainly frightening to the degree that such scenarios are accurate. However, the idea of a surprise attack over the internet is in fact extremely misleading and relies on a fundamental misconception of the role of internet-based aggression. It has seldom been the case in modern times that any one element of combat proves pivotal. Instead, it is the ability to combine elements into a complex whole that increasingly distinguishes adept utilization of military force (Biddle 2004).

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A2: Kills Heg/Soft Power

Cyber attacks can’t create long term power shiftsGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Even if cyber attacks are available to weaker actors, their effectiveness will be stymied where these actors lack the ability to prosecute advantages generated by cyberwar, and where weakness in more traditional modes of diplomatic, economic, and military competition ensure that these actors are exposed to

countermeasures. The intractable nature of vulnerabilities ensure that cyberwar will not fundamentally transform either warfare or world affairs. Despite a dependence on high technology, developed nations will and that they are better able to exercise cyberwar as a political tool. Attacks against prosperous western powers, if well publicized and the source of considerable anxiety, will turn out to be epiphenomenal. While other forces may well transform contemporary hierarchies, cyberwar will most likely function to perpetuate existing inequalities of influence.

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A2: Cyberterror

No risk of cyberterror—anonymity makes it uselessGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

Again the focus is on the potential for harm, while ignoring the motives and operational logic of perpetrators. If internet anonymity is awkward for targets of attacks, it is certainly also a problem for initiators. Terrorists spend as much time trying to market their exploits as they do fighting, bombing, assassinating, etc. Where anonymity protects an aggressor from retribution, it also dilutes credit for the deed. Vandals often “tag” their handiwork—creating an identity where none need exist—precisely because anonymity has both advantages and drawbacks. Internet vandals also brand their exploits, presumably in an effort to

counteract, rather than maximize, anonymity. Just as ongoing cyber attacks from unidentified sources do not give the target a way to retaliate, they also do not give the target a ready way to accommodate an attacker's demands. Demands from an anonymous cyber warrior will tend to be ignored or reneged on, once vulnerabilities are identified and addressed. Demands might also come from a source that did not, or even was not capable of, mounting a cyber attack. As with the use of identifying symbols in war,

it is in the interest of the attacker to “brand” its efforts in order to elicit concessions from a target. Indeed, even if demands are complied with, it will be difficult for an attacker to obtain sustained compliance, given the impossibility of demonstrating future capabilities and the temporary nature of harm. Discussion of attribution problems in cyber space also reflects a subtle but telling shift in framing. Libicki's simple calculus of deterrence, for example, involves “getting caught,” something more often characteristic of crime than war. Some aspects of international relations involve anonymity. Espionage, covert operations and certain kinds of political theft or murder function most effectively when the perpetrators are unknown, or indeed when the operations themselves remain undisclosed. Strategic or tactical advantage can also stem from anonymity and surprise in terrestrial military missions, though nations and groups often sacrifice surprise and advertise their role in contests in order to exercise advantages in the form of foreign concessions or tacit or formal admission of defeat. How does one surrender to no one in particular? The advantage of anonymity will persist for peripheral forms of warfare on the internet, just as it has played a role in terrestrial competition and conflict. But most forms of warfare or potential warfare actually invite disclosure of an initiator's identity. As I have already noted, coercion requires attribution, not of the target but by the initiator. Similarly, threats designed to elicit concessions or deter aggression are already problematic in physical space (Powell 1990, Nalebu 1991). This “credibility problem” mirrors the attribution problem and is likely to make internet aggression all the more problematic for initiators.

No impact to cyber terrorismGartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar_12062012.pdf)

The events of September 11, 2001 animated the specter of insecurity in the western world; how are governments to protect their citizens in an age where the enemy is concealed and where an attack may come at any time or place? The temptation has been both to treat terrorism as an

existential threat (because it is frightening) and to assume that the best response is a vigorous defense. Yet, as we have seen, one of the most effective mechanisms of protection is not to remove capabilities, but to puncture resolve, first and foremost by ensuring adversaries that their objectives will not be realized. A big bank vault does less to deter bank robbers than the presence of countermeasures (die packs, numbered bills, the FBI) that deny

the robbers the fruits of their plunder, even when successful. Terrorism is a marginal business, not because airports and diplomats are too well protected or because guns or bombs are hard to come by, but because most people, even if very unhappy, do not believe that bombings, hijackings or assassinations will effect change. Incapable of achieving key objectives directly, terrorist organizations seek

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to mobilize fear and over-reaction. The fact that terrorists may resort to cyberwar does not imply that cyberwar is an important threat to national security, any more than the fact that the poor or financially desperate are more likely to play the lottery implies that the odds of winning are inversely tied to one's income. Indeed,

the rise of cyberterrorism may say more about the impotence of both agent and structure than about either in isolation. Cyber terrorism may be relatively ineffective, not unlike terrorism generally. Nevertheless, terrorists may adopt cyberwar

even though internet attacks are unlikely to sway national policies or public opinion. The mere fact that terrorists adopt a method of attack does not mean that their actions represent an existential threat to national security, any more than do crime or corruption. Most societies treat the latter activities as separate from national

security, not because they are unimportant or fail to harm people, but because they do not directly threaten the state. Countries may experience a growing number of cyber attacks in the future, but unless attackers have the ability to prosecute temporary advantages through physical force, it is unclear that cyber terrorism requires a particularly elaborate or concerted national security response. Terrorism is a form of compellence. Lacking the ability to impose their will on others, terrorists rely on the prospect of harm to influence a target's behavior. Indeed, because their ability to harm is quite limited, the terrorist relies on psychology (fear and uncertainty) to multiply

the impact of relatively finite capabilities on opposing populations or governments. Cyberwar is arguably especially poorly suited to the task of fomenting terror. In particular, in addition to the problems in credibly threatening cyber attacks that have already been discussed, it is difficult to see how internet attacks will be able to instill the quality of fear needed to magnify the terrorist's actions. How terrifying is a cyber attack? No one will be happy when the power goes out or when one's bank account is locked down, However, attacks of this type evoke feelings if anger, frustration, even resignation, not terror. Terrorism relies on generating a particularly visceral emotion (the “terror” in terrorist), one that is not often effected through the actions of cyber warriors, at least (again) not directly. The old journalistic adage that “if it bleeds, it leads,” implies the need for graphic trauma and lurid imagery. The very attributes that make cyberwar appealing in abstract—the sanitary nature of interaction, the lack of exposure to direct harm, striking from a remote location—all conspire to make cyber terrorism less than terrifying. White collar terrorists are unlikely to prove any more effective, perhaps less, at shaping hearts and minds than the traditional model. This is even more the case with long-duration, low-intensity conflicts that are a key component of both non-western attempts at resistance and western e orts to protect the status quo international order. From the perspective of the insurgent, asymmetric warfare has never been about attacking to diminish an opponent's strengths, but is instead focused on maximizing one's own strengths by targeting the enemy's weaknesses (Mao 1961). Insurgency seeks out kinetic close physical combat where sophisticated technology is at its least effective (and decisive). Damaging the technology may draw an enemy into direct contact, but it might also cause that enemy to withdraw and reschedule operations. Mobility dominates every battle field for this very reason. Internet attacks in the midst of close contact make little sense as it is here that the comparative advantage of cyberwar (distance and asymmetry) are least potent. The ability of internet-dependent armies to perform in superior ways on existing dimensions means that this is generally a process of leveling, not revolution.

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Separation of Powers Advantage

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Interbranch Conflict Inevitable

Inter branch conflict is non-unique and it inevitably balances out.Rottinghaus ‘6 (Brandon, Assistant Professor in Political Science and Director of the Bureau of Public Affairs Research at the University of Idaho, “Putting the 2006 Bellwood Lecture in Context: Reflections on Executive-Legislative Power Sharing in Modern Foreign Policy Making,” 43 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 2006)In particular, three historical peaks in the 20th Century characterize the ebb and flow of the dynamic relationship, including the "isolationists" in the aftermath of World War I, n15 the "revisionists" during the height

of the Cold War and the "new internationalists" during the Vietnam War. The "isolationists" in Congress were powerful (and savvy) enough to block Woodrow Wilson's proposed League of Nations and force the administration to withdraw troops from revolutionary Russia. n16 During the beginnings of the Cold War, congressional power was again enlarged, with congressional "revisionists" as "players on virtually every key issue of the day, in a bipartisan foreign policy where formal and informal powers seamlessly intersected." n17 Because of strong sentiments from the Republican leadership (and a relatively ineffectual Democratic leadership), several factions of the Republican [*4] Party were permitted to continue their ideological goals to limit the spread of Communism, both at home and abroad. Riding in the wake of the

"imperial presidency," Congress again reasserted its power in the mid-1970s. n19 The "new internationalists," who had coalesced years earlier as critics of foreign aid policies that supported anti-Communist regimes in

the 1960s, challenged presidential supremacy during the Vietnam War. n20 Stalwart Senators, including Stuart Symington, Edward Kennedy, John Tunney, Dick Clark, Frank Church and members of the "Watergate class of 1974," led the charge with legislation limiting covert assistance, convening hearings on human rights abuses and cutting off aid to governments deemed reckless with power. n21 These idealistic changes prompted many to argue for more transparency in national security affairs and the justification of American international actions to the public, culminating in the War Powers Act of 1974 n22 that ostensibly limited formal presidential war-making power. n23 The most dramatic of these post-Watergate moments, and central for

purposes of reflection in the 2006 Bellwood Lecture, was Senator Frank Church's investigation of the United States' intelligence community (including the FBI, CIA and other intelligence agencies) from 1975 to 1976 through the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activity. The "Church Committee" (as it

came to be known) investigated some of the many abuses of the United States during this time, including assassination plots against foreign leaders and the overthrow of democratically elected governments in Latin America. n24 Out of these proceedings emerged significant legislation restricting presidential power in covert operations by requiring court-granted warrants for international surveillance (called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). n25 The Ford White House largely viewed the Committee as resultant from the [*5] power shift during Watergate, suggesting emerging political energy (even if temporary) in the legislative branch on foreign policy. n26 As is clear from these examples, this power-sharing relationship is not

static. And, as we have seen in the past, this dynamic relationship bends and reforms as function of the political will expended by the political actors involved and as international events unfold. Even as this preface goes to press, the pendulum of power-sharing continues to sway back and forth on contemporary issues, primarily the "war on terror." In advance of the 2006 elections, the White House and Congress, after key congressional Republicans questioned the White House's blanket authority to detain prisoners, negotiated a compromise on rules for trials for "enemy combatants." Under new rules, detainees have some expanded rights to fair trials where the President is able to establish military tribunals without potential review from federal courts. n27 In addition, while

these legislative determinations give the executive more power to classify military detainees, the Congress, even members of

the President's party, have been periodically willing to challenge this executive authority. Senator Specter went so far as to initiate Judiciary Committee hearings to investigate President Bush's use of signing statements to interpret laws or statutes as he signs them into law, particularly on the

President's ability to interpret Article 3 (regarding "cruel treatment and torture") of the Geneva Convention.

Inter branch conflict is inevitable and cyclical. Rottinghaus ‘6 (Brandon, Assistant Professor in Political Science and Director of the Bureau of Public Affairs Research at the University of Idaho, “Putting the 2006 Bellwood Lecture in

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Context: Reflections on Executive-Legislative Power Sharing in Modern Foreign Policy Making,” 43 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 2006)The events of September 11, 2001 ushered in a complex reorganization of the nation (and perhaps the world) but were an understandable part of a long and incessant struggle in the balance of power in American government between the legislative and executive branches. Indeed, dramatic national events that seek out a national leader tend to allow for a tuning of the thorny relationship between the two lawmaking branches of government.

Interestingly, we have witnessed this pattern of inter-branch tension in similar past dramatic events: the Civil War, the Great Depression, and Pearl Harbor (and now 9/11). All have pushed the pressure points of political power. However, because of Constitutional design, political energy among these

American political institutions cannot be destroyed-only displaced. In truth, one branch can only absorb so much of this energy before the other branches demand redistribution of these important shared powers. Concerns over these inter-branch tensions are not new and distinct patterns emerge governing how the relationship evolves over time; scholars for generations have labored to describe the complicated and tenuous relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Woodrow Wilson, the most famous scholar and practitioner of the science, suggested in Congressional Government that Congress was ill-equipped to legislate and the president must have a more significant and formal role. n1 Corwin's prescient description of the separated powers as an invitation to struggle, framed scholars' thinking about the Constitutional interaction between the presidency and Congress. n2 Neustadt's concept of the president and the legislature as "separated institutions sharing powers" intellectually echoed Corwin's [*2] finding. n3 He argued separated but shared powers sets the stage for "that great game" where both sides must lobby and bargain with each other "much like collective bargaining, in which each seeks to profit from the other's needs and fears."

Inter-branch conflict is inevitable. The struggle for power created by the status quo prevents the domination of a single branchMoe and Howell 99 (Terry (Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution) and William (Associate Professor in the Government Department at Harvard University, “Unilateral Action and Presidential power: A theory”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1999)It was also inevitable, however, that there would be a struggle for power over the framework itself. The Constitution sets out the entire design of American government in just a few brief pages and is almost entirely lacking in

detail. It does not define its terms. It does not elaborate. It does not clarify. While some of the powers it allocates are straightforward--the president's power to veto legislation, for instance--many of the others, including powers that are quite fundamental, are left wholly ambiguous. The actual powers of the three branches, then, both in an absolute sense and relative to one another, cannot be determined from the Constitution alone. They must, of necessity, be determined in the ongoing practice of politics. And this ensures that the branches will do more than struggle over day-to-day policy making. They will also engage in a higher order struggle over the allocation of power and the practical rights to exercise it. Throughout the course of American history, this higher order struggle has been reasonably well contained. No single actor has dominated, decisions have been made for the nation, and the same formal Constitution has prevailed. Nonetheless, the reality of the governing structure has changed substantially over the years, to the point that the Founders would barely recognize the system that now governs our nation. Who has power, and how that power gets exercised, looks dramatically different today than it did two hundred years ago. The struggle has transformed it.

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OCO Doesn’t Hurt SOP

Lack of OCO oversight doesn’t disrupt SOP and plan makes OCO’s ineffectiveLorber ‘13[Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB]This Comment provides an initial answer to the question of whether ¶ current U.S. law can effectively govern the Executive’s use of OCOs.17 It ¶ explores the interaction between this new tool and the current statutory ¶ limits on presidential war-making authority, with a particular focus on ¶ whether the two current federal laws meant to restrict executive power in ¶ this field—the War Powers Resolution18 and the Intelligence Authorization ¶ Act19—apply to a wide range of potential offensive cyber operations ¶ undertaken by the executive branch. Beyond suggesting that neither the ¶ War Powers Resolution nor the Intelligence Authorization Act can

effectively ¶ regulate most types of offensive cyber operations, this Comment suggests ¶ that while marginally problematic for a proper balance of war-making power ¶ between the executive and legislative branches, this lack of oversight does ¶ not fundamentally shift the current alignment . It does argue, however, ¶ that—given this lack of regulatory oversight—the President now has another ¶ powerful war-making tool

to use at his discretion. Finally, the Comment ¶ suggests that this lack of limitation may be positive in some ways, as laying ¶ down clear legal markers before having a developed understanding of these ¶ capabilities may problematically limit their effective use.

OCO’s don’t undermine SOP, but plan kills presidential flexibility Lorber ‘13[Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB]

This analysis suggests that, given inherent weaknesses in the underlying ¶ statutory schemes, excluding offensive cyber operations from their scope ¶ does not substantially shift the balance of war-making authority between the ¶ President and Congress . This exclusion does, however,

provide the ¶ President additional, powerful means by which to conduct military action ¶ without congressional oversight. ¶ Based on analysis of the War Powers Resolution, the lack of oversight for ¶ OCOs does not radically shift the balance between the legislative and ¶ executive branches’ war-making authority. Most notably, because the War ¶ Powers Resolution itself has proven ineffective in providing Congress with a ¶ powerful tool to govern presidential use of force, bringing OCOs under the ¶ War Powers Resolution’s statutory umbrella likely would not provide the ¶ possibility of such oversight. However, insofar as the President has ¶ increasingly turned to covert action since the passage of the War Powers ¶ Resolution to avoid its reporting requirements,233 offensive cyber operations provide the President another means

by which to continue this trend. ¶ OCOs therefore may give the President substantially more flexibility than he ¶ already has under the War Powers Resolution by adding what will become an ¶ increasingly frequent tool of warfare to his option-set. The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under ¶ the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the ¶ balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The ¶ reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence ¶ Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the ¶ non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a ¶ “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small ¶

number of Congressmen (at most eight).235 Thus even if the President had ¶ to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have ¶ to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports ¶ would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be ¶ able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other ¶ members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of ¶ these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential ¶ flexibility ; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization ¶ Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased ¶

congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop ¶ deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes

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do not cover offensive ¶ cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign ¶ policy tool outside congressional reach.

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Presidential Flexibility Terrorism Turn

Plan hurts presidential flexibilityLorber ‘13[Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB]

Despite falling into this category, however, such an offensive operation, ¶ for the reasons discussed above, likely satisfies the congressional test for a ¶ traditional military activity. First, because General Alexander is the ¶ commander of both CYBERCOM and the head of the National Security ¶ Agency and because many of the personnel are dual-hatted

at the respective ¶ organizations, any offensive cyber operation conducted independently of a ¶ kinetic assault will be commanded and executed by military personnel.230¶ Second, because the President can launch offensive cyber operations ¶ without congressional notification if they are in anticipation of hostilities,231 ¶ he also has great flexibility in deciding whether to report his activities. For ¶ example, if the President were to order the launch of a Stuxnet-style attack ¶ against Iran to degrade its nuclear enrichment capability, such an activity ¶ would—assuming it was done with the Secretary of Defense’s consent—¶ necessarily constitute approval by the National Command Authority. In ¶ addition, because the definition of operational planning—another element ¶ required in fulfilling the TMA exception to the definition of covert action—¶ is so broad, such an attack would likely fall within its purview. The President ¶ would simply argue that approval has been given for operational planning of ¶ future combat operations with Iran (which it almost certainly has in the U.S. ¶ military)232 and therefore the activity was taking place in the context where overt hostilities are anticipated. Indeed, only in a situation where no ¶ contingency planning has occurred—such as with an ally or a country that ¶ the United States takes little interest—would this exception not apply. ¶ As a result, it becomes evident that even a Stuxnet-type of attack likely ¶ will not trigger the requirements set forth in the Intelligence Authorization ¶ Act. Given the dual-hatted nature of many NSA and CYBERCOM personnel, ¶ as well as the fact that action approved by the President and the Secretary of ¶ Defense necessarily constitutes approval by the National Command ¶ Authority, all the executive branch must realistically show is that it ¶ undertook the operation in a context where operational planning had ¶ occurred for potential hostilities at some undefined point in the future. ¶ This hurdle is very low and the executive should have little problem clearing ¶ it.

Presidential flexibility is key to solve terrorism.Royal 11JOHN PAUL ROYAL, Institute of World Politics, “War Powers and the Age of Terrorism,” Center¶ for the Study of the Presidency & Congress The Fellows Review, 2010-2011

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, into the hands of ¶ these terrorists is the most dangerous threat to the U nited States. We know from the 9/11 ¶ Commission Report that Al Qaeda has attempted to make and obtain nuclear weapons for at ¶ least the past fifteen years. Al Qaeda considers the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction ¶ to be a religious obligation while “more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursing ¶ CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials” (National Commission 2004,

397). Considering these¶ statements, rogue regimes that are openly hostile to the United States and

have or seek to develop nuclear weapons capability¶ such as North Korea and Iran, or extremely unstable

nuclear countries such as Pakistan, pose a special threat to¶ American national security interests . These nations were not necessarily a direct threat to the Unite d States in the¶ past. Now, however, due to proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, they can inflict damage at considerably higher¶

levels and magnitudes than in the past. In addition, these regimes may pursue proliferation of nuclear

weapons and missile¶ technology to other nations and to allied terrorist organizations. The United States must pursue condign ¶ punishment and appropriate, rapid action against hostile terrorist organizations, rogue nation ¶ states, and nuclear weapons proliferation threats in order to protect American interests both ¶ at home and abroad. Combating these threats are the “top national security priority for the ¶ United States... with the full support of Congress , both major

political parties, the media, and the American¶ people” (National Commission 2004, 361). Operations may take the form of pre-emptive and sustained ¶ action against those who have expressed

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hostility or declared war on the United States. Only ¶ the executive branch can effectively

execute this mission , authorized by the 2001 AUMF. If the national¶ consensus or the nature of the

threat changes, Congress possesses the intrinsic power to rescind and limit these powers.

Terrorism causes extinctionHellman 8 (Martin E, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING, THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war,

yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion

dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has

estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but

extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not

inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component

would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are

annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it

a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War

III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might

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eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the

ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on

whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that

preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

Flexibility is key to defeat al-QaedaLi 09(Zheyao, JD Georgetown 2009; “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare,” 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373, Lexis – JAK)

By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power

targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" is a struggle for survival and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy

the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible

distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme.¶ As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should [*399] consider the implications of the OODA Loop:

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. n144 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries." n145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their

heavy equipment and becoming more like police." n146 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the

Framers' design) slows down decision-making. [*400] In circumstances where war is undesirable

(which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute.¶ In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a fatal hindrance to achieving the initiative necessary for victory. As a slow-acting, deliberative body, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with fast-emerging situations in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch must have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because only the executive branch is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourth-generational opponents.

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SOP Collapse Inevitable

Information disparity between the president and congress inevitably decreases SOPMarshall ‘8[William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Boston Law Review 88:505. http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf ETB]6. Presidential Access to and Control of InformationIf, “[i]n the information age, information is power”62 then most of that ¶ power rests with the executive. Because of its vast resources, the executive ¶ branch has far greater access to information than do the co-branches of ¶ government .63 In addition, the executive branch has far greater ability and ¶ expertise to gather, examine, and cull that information than do the transitory ¶ legislative staffs in the Congress. Congress , for example, does not have at its ¶ disposal the information gathering capabilities of the intelligence agencies or ¶ the technical expertise of the military in determining when there is a threat to ¶ national security. 64 Instead, it must rely on the executive for that appraisal and ¶ therefore must continually negotiate with the executive from a position of ¶ weakness and dependence .65 Moreover, this disparity in access and control of ¶ information is only likely to worsen as the world becomes more complex, because complexity necessarily requires increasingly sophisticated methods of ¶ information collection, analysis, distillation, and dissemination. And because ¶ only the executive branch is likely to have the expertise and the resources to ¶ perform these functions, its relative powers will again increase.

Party polarization makes effective SOP impossibleMarshall ‘8[William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Boston Law Review 88:505. http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf ETB]11. The Inceasingly Polarized Two-Party SystemThe final reason why presidential power has increased relates to the rise of a ¶ highly polarized two-party system in which party loyalty trumps institutional ¶ concerns. The beginnings of this polarization can be traced to the enactment of ¶ the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 The passage of that Act ended an era that had ¶ effectively been a three-party system in the United States: the northern ¶ Democrats, the southern Democrats, and the Republicans. During this “threeparty” era, members of Congress needed to work across party lines to develop ¶ working majorities on particular issues.83 Their political

fortunes and ¶ reputations, therefore, were closely tied to the success of Congress as an ¶ institution.¶ In contrast, in the highly polarized two-party system currently dominating ¶ national politics, a member’s political success depends more on the fortunes of ¶ her particular party than on the stature of Congress. This means members of ¶ Congress have a greater personal interest in the President’s success as leader of their party than they have in Congress as an institution.

Correspondingly, ¶ because the President is the leader of his or her political party, the President ¶ can expect greater loyalty and discipline from party members than occurred in ¶ previous eras. The result of this is that when the President’s party controls the ¶ Congress, he or she can proceed virtually uncontested.84 Consequently, in an ¶ era of highly polarized parties, there no longer exists the constitutional balance ¶ purportedly fostered by separation of powers . Rather, the constitutional ¶ balance becomes what Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes term a “separation ¶ of parties.”85 The problem, of course, is that

separation of parties serves as no ¶ balance at all when both the Presidency and the Congress

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are controlled by the ¶ same party. In those circumstances, the power of the Presidency is effectively ¶ unchecked.

Military and intelligence control will expand prez powers at congress’ expenseMarshall ‘8[William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Boston Law Review 88:505. http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf ETB]9. Military and Intelligence CapabilitiesThe President’s power is also enhanced by the vast military and intelligence ¶ capabilities under his command. In his roles as Commander-in-Chief and head ¶ of the Executive Branch, the President directly controls the most powerful ¶ military in the world and directs clandestine agencies such as the

Central ¶ Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency.75 That control provides ¶ the President with immensely effective, non-transparent capabilities to further ¶ his political agenda and/or diminish the political abilities of his opponents. 76¶ Whether a President would cynically use such power solely for his political ¶ advantage has, of course, been the subject of political thrillers and the ¶ occasional political attack. President Clinton, for one, was accused of ordering ¶ the bombing of terrorist bases in Afghanistan to distract the nation from the ¶ Lewinsky scandal,77 and President Nixon purportedly used the Federal Bureau ¶ of Investigation to investigate his political enemies.78 But regardless whether ¶ such abuses actually occurred, there is no doubt that control of covert agencies ¶ provides ample opportunity for political mischief, particularly since the ¶ inherently secretive nature of these agencies means their actions often are ¶ hidden

from public view. And as the capabilities of these agencies increase ¶ through technological advances in surveillance and other methods of ¶ investigation, so does the power of the President.

Media coverage means the executive overpowers other branches Marshall ‘8[William P. Marshall, Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Boston Law Review 88:505. http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/MARSHALL.pdf ETB]7. The Media and the PresidencyAs Justice Jackson recognized in Youngstown, the power of the Presidency ¶ has also been magnified by the nature of media coverage. This coverage, ¶ which focuses on the President as the center of national power,66 has only ¶

increased since Jackson’s day as the dominance of television has increasingly ¶ identified the image of the nation with the image of the particular President ¶ holding office .67 The effects of this image are substantial. Because the ¶ President is seen as speaking for the nation, the Presidency is imbued with a ¶ unique credibility . The President thereby holds an immediate and substantial ¶ advantage in any political confrontation .68 Additionally, unlike the Congress ¶ or the Court, the President is uniquely able to demand the attention of the ¶ media and, in that way, can influence the Nation’s political agenda to an extent ¶ that no other individual, or institution, can even approximate.

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SOP Fails

SOP fails- can’t contain presidential powerMansfield ‘11[Harvey Mansfield is a professor of government at Harvard and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/books/review/book-review-the-executive-unbound-by-eric-a-posner-and-adrian-vermeule.html?pagewanted=all ETB]*Eric Andrew Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School** Adrian Vermeule, John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law @ Harvard

According to Posner and Vermeule, we now live under an administrative state providing welfare and national security through a gradual accretion of power in executive agencies to the point of dominance. This has happened regardless of the separation of powers. The Constitution, they

insist, no longer corresponds to “reality.” Congress has assumed a secondary role to the executive, and the Supreme Court is “a marginal player.” In all “constitutional showdowns,” as

they put it, the powers that make and judge law have to defer to the power that administers the law.

No impact- the system is self correctingShane ‘9[Peter M. Shane is the Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law at the Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law, where he regularly teaches administrative law, constitutional law, law and the presidency, and courses at the intersection of law, democracy, and new media. Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy. http://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/749396.html ETB]The attack on checks and balances between 1981 and 2009 can very much be seen as an assault on a constitutional culture built on

checks and balances norms. Each branch has been deploying its powers with increasing disrespect for its coequal branches, and the escalating institutional conflict between President and Congress most especially has created a level of mutual disregard that would have been essentially unthinkable at any prior moment in modern times. It is important to be

clear on what is new about this. It is not unprecedented for one branch of government to chafe against restraints imposed by others or even to undertake initiatives pressing the edges of its constitutional prerogatives. The overall system has some capacity to self-correct for such tensions. If, however, one looks at the historic points of greatest tension among the branches—Andrew Jackson’s battle against the National Bank, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, or the attempted court-packing of President Franklin Roosevelt—they have generally been characterized by an impulse that is absent from the current trend. In refusing to sign legislation that would recharter the Bank, Jackson was standing fast against an institution widely regarded as supporting the interests of creditors against the interests of the more numerous, but less moneyed classes. Congress enacted the Tenure in Office Act hoping to provoke Andrew Johnson into a violation of law that would provide formal grounds for impeachment, but its plain motivation was Johnson’s opposition to Reconstruction, which Congress had helped impose in order to end white caste rule in the South. Roosevelt proposed court-packing, an obvious challenge to the political independence of the Supreme Court, in response to what he regarded as the Court’s unwillingness to legitimate legislative and executive measures designed to relieve the Depression and for which the elected branches enjoyed a popular mandate. Thus, each of these earlier assaults on conventional ways of doing business was arguably in the attempted service of more democracy. Even though checks and balances were compromised by such earlier interbranch battles, the challenges to business as usual tended to be supportive of the very aspirations for democratic legitimacy that checks and balances are also supposed to advance.

Complete SOP impossible; it’ll never be sufficient to solve their impactShane ‘9[Peter M. Shane is the Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law at the Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law, where he regularly teaches administrative law, constitutional law, law and the presidency, and courses at the intersection of law, democracy, and new media. Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy. http://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/749396.html ETB]

To put this point another way, no paper plan for the operation of government can ever be sufficient in and of itself to guarantee the responsible exercise of power, even if it is a plan built on thoughtfully designed checks and balances. A paper plan for government can operate in vastly different ways depending on its participants’ commitment to the values that animate that

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plan and their allegiance to those values in the form of norms or implicit, but widely recognized, rules and customs. Consider, for example, if Congress had early determined on a custom that legislative votes to override presidential vetoes would be automatic—that all members of Congress, on pain of expulsion, would agree to override any presidential veto, irrespective of which members actually voted for the original bill. Such a custom would have all but eliminated the President’s capacity to influence the design of legislation. Likewise, what if Presidents automatically pardoned all criminal defendants of their particular party or Congress decided that judges who rendered unpopular decisions were, for that reason alone, guilty of a “high crime or misdemeanor,” warranting removal from office? Such practices would have enervated what

we now think of as judicial independence. When we bring these possibilities to mind, it becomes evident that it is not only or even primarily the existence of checks and balances on paper that preserves liberty against government ambition; it is the web of attitudes, beliefs, and informal practices surrounding implementation of the Constitution that gives life to the document’s underlying purposes. We can call this web of attitudes, beliefs, and practices our “constitutional culture.”

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SOP Fine Now

Squo doesn’t hurt SOPLorber ‘13[Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB]

This analysis suggests that, given inherent weaknesses in the underlying ¶ statutory schemes, excluding offensive cyber operations from their scope ¶ does not substantially shift the balance of war-making authority between the ¶ President and Congress. This exclusion does, however, provide the ¶ President additional, powerful means by which to conduct military action ¶ without congressional oversight.

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SOP Impact Turn – Hegemony

Presidential power is critical to sustain the vital functions of American leadership Mallaby 2K (Sebastian, Member, Washington Post’s Editorial Board, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb) Finally, some will object that the weakness of the presidency as an institution is not the main explanation for the inadequacies of American diplomacy, even if it is a secondary one. The ad hominem school of thought argues instead that Bill Clinton and his advisers have simply been incompetent. Others make various sociological claims that isolationism or multiculturalism lies at the root of America's diplomatic troubles. All of these arguments may

have merit. But the evidence cited by both camps can be better explained by the structural weakness of the presidency. Take, for example, one celebrated error: President Clinton's declaration at the start of the Kosovo war that the Serbs need not fear NATO ground troops. This announcement almost certainly cost lives by encouraging the Serbs to believe that America was not serious about stopping ethnic cleansing. The ad hominem school sees in this example proof of Clinton's incompetence; the sociological school sees in it proof of isolationist pressure, which made the option of ground troops untenable. But a third explanation, offered privately by a top architect of the Kosovo policy, is more plausible. According to this official, the president knew that pundits and Congress would criticize whichever policy he chose. Clinton therefore preemptively took ground troops off the table, aware that his critics would then urge him on to a ground war -- and also aware that these urgings would convince Belgrade that Washington's resolve would stiffen with time, rather than weaken. The president's stand against

ground troops was therefore the logical, tactical move of a leader feeling vulnerable to his critics. Other failings of American diplomacy can likewise be accounted for by the advent of the nonexecutive presidency. Several commentators, notably Samuel Huntington and Garry Wills in these pages, have attacked the arrogance of America's presumption to offer moral leadership to the world. But American leaders resort to moral rhetoric largely out of weakness. They fear that their policy will be blocked unless they generate moral momentum powerful enough to overcome domestic opponents. Likewise, critics point to the hypocrisy of the United States on the world stage. America seeks U.N. endorsement when convenient but is slow to pay its U.N. dues; America practices legal abortion at home but denies funds to organizations that do the same abroad. Again, this

hypocrisy has everything to do with the weak executive. The president has a favored policy but is powerless to make Congress follow it. Still other critics decry American diplomacy as a rag-bag of narrow agendas: Boeing lobbies for

China trade while Cuban-Americans demand sanctions on Cuba. Here, too, presidential power is the issue. A strong presidency might see to it that America pursues its broader national interest, but a weak one cannot. This is why Clinton signed the Helms-Burton sanctions on Cuba even though he knew that these would do disproportionate harm to U.S. relations with Canada and Europe. What if America's nonexecutive presidency is indeed at the root of its diplomatic inadequacy? First, it follows that it is too optimistic to blame America's foreign policy drift on the weak character of

the current president. The institution of the presidency itself is weak, and we would be unwise to assume that a President Gore or Bradley or Bush will perform much better. But it also follows that it is too pessimistic to blame America's foreign

policy drift on cultural forces that nobody can change, such as isolationism or multiculturalism.

Hegemony solves extinction---every other alternative fails---retrenchment fosters transitional conflictsBradley A. Thayer 6 is an associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, “In Defense of Primacy,” November/December 2006, Issue 86, National Interest, p.32, EBSCOHost, Accessed Date: 5-7-13 y2kA grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the U nited S tates stays the world's

number one power --the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the

U nited S tates should retrench, either because the U nited S tates lacks the power to maintain its primacy and

should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In

the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.(FN1)¶ Those arguing for a grand

strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists , who want no foreign military commitments; selective

engagers , who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers , who want a modified form of selective

engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.¶ But

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retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided . If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a

profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world,

imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.¶ There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment

acknowledge this.¶ So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on

the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of

primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. ¶ A GRAND

strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected.

Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see

NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United

States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the U nited S tates less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy.

This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international

politics . Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they

are terrorists , rogue states or rising powers , history shows that threats must be

confronted . Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or

making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will

respect American wishes to retreat . To make such a declaration implies weakness and

emboldens aggression . In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that

confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies

overseas , away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in

other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that

cannot be achieved by offshore balancing .¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because

America, at present, commands the "global commons "--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the

U nited S tates to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies.

As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States'

conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased .(FN2) This is not an advantage that should be

relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously

on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the U nited S tates. Of course, this is not out of any sense of

altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--

their own protection, or to gain greater influence. ¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with

America --their security is tied to the U nited S tates through treaties and other informal

arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17

to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never

before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶ U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the U nited S tates to shape the behavior of states

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and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's

ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo , stabilize Afghanistan, invade

Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the U nited S tates to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington.¶ Only the "Gang of Five" may be

expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly

challenging U.S. power . China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric

strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those

strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the

foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. ¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a

dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. ¶ Everything we think of when we consider the

current international order-- free trade , a robust monetary regime , increasing respect for human rights , growing

democratization --is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think

that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they

are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when

international orders collapse . The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded

the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country

and western great Ral Donner sang: " You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." ¶ Consequently, it is important to note

what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many

positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world . During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany.

Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned-- between Greece

and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia

and Australia . This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's

interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's

likelihood , particularly war's worst form : great power wars. ¶ Second, American power gives the

United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the

countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the U nited S tates and be sympathetic to the American worldview.(FN3) So, spreading

democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any

type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is

because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.¶ Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.¶ Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question.

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Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The U nited S tates has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban

forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq

on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style

democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all

accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive.¶ Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the

world has been the growth of the global economy . With its allies, the U nited S tates has labored to create

an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and

commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and

labor markets . The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a

global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created

this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.¶ Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth,

Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are

facilitated through American primacy .(FN4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest

academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.¶ Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its

power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The U nited S tates is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in

nature . Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force "--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the U nited S tates assists

the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing

some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical

aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have

accomplished this Herculean effort . No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.¶

American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for

the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.¶ THERE IS no other state, group of states or

international organization that can provide these global benefits . None even comes close. The

U nited N ations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient

issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems . Does anyone expect

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Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do

not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only

practical hope of solving the world's ills. ¶ While the benefits of American primacy are

considerable, no country can ever escape from the iron law of Economics 101 --there is

no free lunch. American primacy is no exception. Leadership requires that the U nited S tates incur costs and run risks not borne by other countries. These costs can be stark and brutal, and they have to be faced directly by proponents of primacy. It means that some Americans will die in the service of their country. These are the costs, and they are significant. Americans should be conscious of them and use them in their contemplation of the value of primacy. Additionally, the costs of primacy must impose upon American policy-makers a sharp focus and prudence concerning how they wield American power. Equally, all Americans should be aware of the benefits that flow from primacy and that they enjoy.¶ While primacy's advantages and costs must be weighed objectively and

solemnly, the scholars who are proclaiming that the sky is falling, primacy is doomed and America must retrench have to confront the reality of U.S. power. The world is a long way from

seeing the end of American primacy, and it is in America's interest--and the world's--

to have it last as long as possible .¶

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SOP Won’t Collapse

SOP will never collapse- 4 reasons

Shane ‘9[Peter M. Shane is the Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law at the Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law, where he regularly teaches administrative law, constitutional law, law and the presidency, and courses at the intersection of law, democracy, and new media. Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy. http://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/749396.html ETB]

Ordinarily, at least four factors in the American system coincide to produce the culture of self-restraint that averts any serious breakdown of government. One is the internalization within each institution of norms of deference for the core capacities of the other two branches. The history of federal court jurisdiction provides a powerful case in point. The past two centuries are replete with examples of the federal judiciary rendering decisions antagonistic to the views and interests of the elected branches of government. The judicial invalidation of President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills and the overturning of anti-flag-burning laws are two well-known historical illustrations. Yet, the elected branches have rarely retaliated in any significant way. The President has rarely—and never in modern history—refused to enforce or recognize judicial orders. Congress, despite numerous proposals to do so, has never ousted the courts from all jurisdiction to decide a category of cases in which Congress, for a political

standpoint, would probably prefer judicial silence. It seems impossible to explain the forbearance of the elected branches from substantially curtailing federal jurisdiction in such controversial areas as abortion, school prayer, or desegregation unless we regard that self-restraint as a sign of our elected officials’ allegiance to the near inviolability of the judicial function as conveyed by Article III of the Constitution. This is what I mean by a habit or a norm of deference. ¶ A second factor is a common belief in the legitimacy and necessity of active, problem-solving government. Frequently, even amid deep policy disagreement between the executive and legislative branches, public policy compromises emerge in the solution of public problems because both elected branches are committed to demonstrating their capacity to respond in some constructive way to public challenges. Powerful examples from the 1990s include tax and budget reform under President George H. W. Bush and welfare reform under President Clinton. In each case, an ideologically reluctant President went along with

congressional initiative out of a felt imperative to respond to a widely perceived public problem and to share in the credit for its solution.¶ Third, each branch—but each of the elected branches especially—has historically been motivated to represent a broad range of public opinion on critical issues. Even when the elected branches disagree significantly on public policy, each has usually been motivated to seek the approval of a wide spectrum of American voters. This impulse was significantly evident in President Clinton’s judicial nominating strategy, in which he worked with a Republican-controlled Senate to confirm potential judges who were notably centrist in their views, and in the Republican Congress’s 1996 enactment of line-item veto authority, which threatened to empower a Democratic President, but which was perceived to be widely popular

among the national electorate.¶ Finally, each branch of the government is structured internally so as to promote deliberation, thus increasing the likelihood that multiple points of view will be heard and given time to help shape long-term policy outcomes. Congress, for example, is divided into two houses, which must concur in a legislative proposal in order that it be enacted. The length of terms and the geographical basis of representation is different in the two houses, which, originally, were also selected by different methods. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court and lower courts through which legal interpretation evolves in a highly formal, multivocal way. Article III of the Constitution gives those judges who officiate over the courts authorized by that article lifetime tenure, insuring that, at any given moment, the judiciary is populated by judges whose prejudicial careers exhibit a variety of ideological and political predispositions. Even the constitutional text describing the executive branch, the most unitary of the three branches, contemplates that the President may seek advice from the heads of “departments.” Deliberation was an intended feature of the new government

through and through.¶ Government lawyers, if they perform their jobs well, play a central role in maintaining the ethos of deliberation that was the Framers’ hope. Decision making is most effectively deliberative if it involves a wide variety of perspectives, each shedding light on whatever issue is under discussion. In formal deliberative settings, such as an argument before the Supreme Court or debates on the floor of Congress, contending perspectives are literally embodied in different human beings, all physically present and asserting their various points of view. Decisions within the executive branch, however, are most frequently made in a potentially more insulated environment. The only voices literally present in a particular policy conversation may be those of a high-level presidential appointee, some lower-level presidential appointees, and civil servants who are most directly accountable to these presidential appointees. In such settings, it would require some form of special self-discipline for those immediately involved in the decision to actually concern themselves with perspectives and interests other than the partisan agenda they likely all share. This is especially so for the vast majority of decisions that will never be reviewed in Congress because they are too low-visibility and that will never be reviewed in court because they do not affect the specific interests of identifiable individuals in a way that would

ordinarily entitle them to call those decisions into question through litigation.¶ Seen in this light, a critical function of the law in

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operation—the law as embodied for the executive branch in judicial opinions rendered by the courts and statutes enacted by Congress—is to make manifest the range of interests and concerns that would not otherwise be vigorously articulated when key decisions are made. It is precisely in this way that the rule of law is a fundamental day-to-day check on the spirit of faction in government affairs. Executive branch lawyers, residing in every agency of government, make this check real because they advise on virtually every important administrative decision and focus decision makers’ attention on whatever law is relevant. When the executive branch in 2009 attends, for example, to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act or the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in United States v. Nixon, the Administration can, in a sense, hear the multiple voices of earlier times that themselves had to reach consensus in order to create binding public policy. These voices are virtually, even if not physically present, and their recognition can serve as a buffer against the more immediate passions of partisanship or the undisciplined pursuit of self-

interest. Conscientious lawyering insures that contending perspectives are brought to bear whenever current decision makers act, and is thus a critical element in preserving the democratic legitimacy of American government.

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Strong Executive Solves SOP

A strong president is the only way to ensure correct separation of powersCalebresi ’95 (Stephen, Law Professor at Northwestern, Alabama Law Review, 1995, pp. 45-46)A final argument from The Federalist, which implicitly supports the idea of a unitary executive, is that such an executive is necessary to maintain the delicately calibrated system of checks and balances which the Constitution contemplates. In his [or her] four papers, from The Federalist No. 47 to The Federalist No. 51, James

Madison forcefully defended the normative desirability of a system of constitutionally separated and shared powers. In doing so, he [or she]argued against a rigidly pure separation of powers, prefering

instead some intermixing of powers to permit the creation of "checks and balances." The goal, of course, is to ensure that "ambition [will] be made to counteract ambition." This is accomplished in two ways. First, it is necessary to ensure that each department will have a will of its own. This can be done in part by creating separate electoral channels for each of the three departments back to the ultimate "fountain of authority, the people ...."

Second, it is necessary to guarantee that "those who administer each department," will have "the necessary constitutional means and personal motives, to resist encroachments." Thus, the personal interests of the occupants of the various offices must be linked to the defense of the constitutional powers of those offices and "the provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack." This in turn, leads necessarily to the idea of a unitary executive. The reason for this is because "it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self defense" as "in republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates." Madison explained that "the remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit." But just as key to Madison as the weakening of the legislature was the concomitant strengthening of the executive. Thus, he [or she]stated that "as the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified." Madison defended this in Federalist No. 51 by arguing in favor of giving the President a qualified veto, i.e., a veto that Congress can override.

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A2: Econ Collapse

Countries turn inward – creates peaceLloyd deMause, director of The Institute for Psychohistory, “Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy” Updated December 18th 2002, http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/nucsex.htmThe nation "turns inward" during this depressed phase of the cycle. Empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that major economic downswings are accompanied by "introverted" foreign policy moods, characterized by fewer armed expeditions, less interest in foreign affairs in the speeches of leaders, reduced military expenditures, etc. (Klingberg, 1952; Holmes, 1985). Just as depressed people

experience little conscious rage--feeling "I deserve to be killed" rather than "I want to kill others" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 393)--interest in military adventures during the depressed phase wanes, arms expeditures decrease and peace treaties multiply.

Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – no causal connectionThomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspxWhen the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past

year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for

that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v.

South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin

America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for

example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's

acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts

across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing

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disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting

evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited --

and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like

between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

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A2: Pres Powers Bad

Presidents won’t abuse prez powers – multiple warrants– no risk of any negative impact.Goldstein 99 (Joel, Professor of Law at St. Louis University, “The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations”, St. Louis Law Journal, Vol. 43, Summer 1999) Would these concessions to executive interpretive autonomy leave us naked before a Chief Executive prone to self-aggrandizement? Do we jeopardize the Rule of Law once we allow the President this leeway to apply the Constitution as he, not the Court, sees it? I

think not. Protection would come from several sources. First, Presidents like other officials, could be expected to consider respectfully the constitutional arguments of judges and legislators. The people who hold public office and staff those two institutions are neither fools nor traitors; generally their conclusions will be reasonable and persuasive. Even when the President disagrees he [or she]will need to decide whether the benefits of acting on his [or her] different interpretation justify the costs of defiance. Departure from legislative and judicial interpretations, though possible, would require some articulated rationales which would, of course, be subject to discussion, analysis and scrutiny. Second, customs of presidential interpretive humility could be expected to develop. Many of the restraints on the judiciary - justiciability doctrines, immunities, Article I bodies - were created or endorsed by courts. Similar patterns of presidPresidents ential deference should be encouraged. n342 [*848] For instance, might proceed cautiously in areas where no other institution is likely to review their interpretation. It may be appropriate

to expect Presidents to articulate a strong constitutional rationale in such cases. A third set of democratic restraints - public opinion and elections - would provide incentive for measured presidential conduct. A President will think at least twice about taking a constitutional position at odds with the Court or Congress if it will cause him to be pilloried by the New York Times or on Larry King Live, will cost him dearly on his [or her] approval ratings, or will jeopardize his [or her] legislative program. Finally legislative controls would check the President. Congress could use its control of the purse and legislative hearings in response to presidential interpretations. Impeachment and removal would be available to redress any presidential actions deemed to constitute "high crimes and misdemeanors ."

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A2: Tyranny

Democratic checks prevent their impact from escalatingO’Kane 1997 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust.

Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror,

harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s

USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political

institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies,

exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’

attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

No SOP impact – built-in checks prevent tyranny, and Redish’s data is flawed. Jack Beermann, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Case Western Reserve University, 1990, 40 Case W. Res. 1053Professor Redish's attack on "democracy bashers" is overstated in a way symptomatic of his unwillingness to take sophisticated separation of powers analysis seriously. In place of analysis he offers an apocalyptic vision of unelected judges acting as philosopher kings, repealing legislation such as Title

VII or the anti-trust laws. However, the slope is not that slippery. Professor Redish gives no example of anyone who has advocated granting an unlimited veto power over legislation to judges. Political and cultural realities temper judicial activism in much the same way that the President finds it impossible to veto every piece of legislation with which he disagrees. Professor Redish errs here by focusing on logic to the exclusion of reality. Besides, as I noted earlier, interaction between the courts and Congress allows ample opportunity for correction of judicial mistakes and arrogance. Although it is true that under the representational principle Congress ought never be forced to correct the courts except in rare cases of good-faith judicial error, Professor Redish has not demonstrated that an active judicial role in interpreting and applying statutes violates separation of powers.

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DA Links

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The military has empirically backlashed to encroachment upon the ability to conduct offensive cyber operations. Gjelten ‘13 (Tom, Correspondent for NPR, “First Strike: US Cyber Warriors Seize the Offensive”, World Affairs Journal, January/February 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/first-strike-us-cyber-warriors-seize-offensive, RSR) In fact, the news that the U nited S tates had actually developed and used an offensive cyberweapon gave new significance to hints US officials had quietly dropped on previous occasions about the

enticing potential of such tools. In remarks at the Brookings Institution in April 2009, for example, the then Air Force chief of staff, General Norton Schwartz, suggested that cyberweapons could be used to attack an enemy’s air defense system. “Traditionally,” Schwartz said, “we take down integrated air defenses via kinetic means. But if it were

possible to interrupt radar systems or surface to air missile systems via cyber, that would be another very powerful tool in the tool kit allowing us to accomplish air missions.” He added, “We will develop that—have [that]—capability.” A full two years before the Pentagon rolled out its “defensive” cyber strategy, Schwartz was

clearly suggesting an offensive application.¶ The Pentagon’s reluctance in 2011 to be more transparent

about its interest in offensive cyber capabilities may simply have reflected sensitivity to an ongoing dispute within the Obama administration. Howard Schmidt, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator at the time the Department of Defense strategy was released, was steadfastly opposed to any use of the term “cyber war” and had no patience for those who seemed eager to get into such a conflict. But his was a losing battle. Pentagon planners had already classified cyberspace officially as a fifth “domain” of warfare , alongside land, air, sea, and space. As the 2011 cyber strategy noted, that designation “allows

DoD to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support national security interests.”

That statement by itself contradicted any notion that the Pentagon’s interest in cyber was mainly defensive. Once the US military accepts the challenge to fight in a new domain, it aims for superiority in that domain over all its rivals, in both offensive and defensive realms. Cyber is no exception . The US Air Force budget request for 2013 included $4 billion in proposed spending to achieve “ cyberspace superiority ,” according to Air Force Secretary Michael Donley.¶ It is hard to imagine the

US military settling for any less, given the importance of electronic assets in its capabilities. Even small unit commanders go into combat equipped with laptops and video links. “We’re no longer just hurling mass and energy at our opponents in warfare,” says John Arquilla, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. “Now we’re using information, and the more you have, the less of the older kind of weapons you need.” Access to data networks has given warfighters a huge advantage in intelligence, communication, and coordination. But their dependence on those networks also creates vulnerabilities, particularly when engaged with an enemy that has cyber capabilities of his own.

Military planners believe that OCOs are super effective.Gjelten ‘13 (Tom, Correspondent for NPR, “Pentagon Goes On The Offensive Against Cyberattacks”, NPR, 2-11-13, http://www.npr.org/2013/02/11/171677247/pentagon-goes-on-the-offensive-against-cyber-attacks, RSR) In some cases, offensive cyberattacks are being conducted within the parameters of conventional military operations. In Afghanistan, soldiers and Marines depend heavily on video and data links when they go into combat. As part of the process of "prepping the battlefield," commanders may want to launch pre-emptive attacks on the adversary's cybercapabilities in order to make sure their data networks do not get interrupted.¶

Marine Lt. Gen. Richard Mills, in a rare acknowledgment that the military engages in offensive cyber operations, discussed

just such a situation during a military conference in August 2012.¶ "I can tell you that as a commander in Afghanistan in the

year 2010, I was able to use my cyber operations against my adversary with great impact ," Mills

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declared. "I was able to get inside his nets, infect his command and control, and in fact defend myself against his almost constant

incursions to get inside my wire."¶ Another reference to the military's use of cyberattacks as part of a traditional

combat operation came in 2009, during a presentation at the Brookings Institution by Air Force Gen. Norton

Schwartz. Now retired, Schwartz at the time was serving as Air Force chief of staff. He told his audience that his airmen were prepared to carry out cyberattacks on another country's radar and missile installations before launching airstrikes against that country.¶ "Traditionally, we take down integrated air

defenses via kinetic [physical] means," Schwartz said. "But if it were possible to interrupt radar systems or surface-to-air missile systems via cyber, that would be another very powerful tool in our tool kit." Schwartz hinted that the Air Force already had that capability, and in the nearly four years since he gave that speech, such a capability has certainly matured.

Air Force loves OCO’sMagnuson ‘9[Stew, National Defense Magazine. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/June/Pages/USPlanstoDestroyEnemyComputerNetworksQuestioned.aspx ETB]

The Air Force is undergoing a deliberate process to not only train experts in the field, but to recruit them as well. That includes military and civilians, Lord said. This will “require new core competencies, new ways to

acquire stuff at the speed of need rather than acquisition cycles measured in years or decades,” he added.¶ The National

Research Council report identified the Air Force as the main advocate for cyber-offense in the U.S. government. The operational agency is U.S. Strategic Command’s joint functional component command for network warfare.

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U.S. cyber operation mobility is key to solve terrorismBrennan 2012(John, Lieutenant Cololel, March 15, "United States Counter Terrorism Cyber Law and Policy, Enabling or Disabling?", http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/Brennan_UNITED-STATES-COUNTER-TERRORISM-CYBER-LAW-AND-POLICY.pdf)

Even at the onset of the war against terrorism during the early days of the Bush Administration, the threats posed from cyberspace were duly recognized--and the responses to cyber threats to U. S. National Security were publicly stated. In his 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, President Bush proclaimed that, “When a nation, terrorist group, or other adversary attacks the United States through cyberspace, the U. S. response need not be limited to criminal prosecution. The United States reserves the right to respond in an appropriate manner.”17 As time has passed, the same tact can be seen in President Obama’s International Strategy for Cyberspace, where he similarly refers to Article 51 of the U. N. Charter in the cyber realm by stating, “Consistent with the United Nations Charter,

states have an inherent right to self defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.”18 One would assume that this declaration applies to international terrorists who use the internet for malevolent purposes. Both strategies clearly imply that an attack on the United States from cyberspace could lead to a wide range of responses-- not excluding kinetic military operations. Additionally, in his 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, President Obama states that, “…together with our partners, we will degrade the capabilities of alQa‘ida’s local and regional affiliates and adherents, monitor their communications with al-Qa‘ida leaders, drive fissures between these groups and their bases of support, and isolate al-Qa‘ida from local and regional affiliates and adherents who can augment its capabilities and further its agenda.” 19

Given that al-Qa’ida and its adherents communicate voluminously from within cyberspace, it is inferred that in order to disrupt their communications and isolate the organizations, the U. S. Government should exercise its inherent right to self-defense as stated in Article 51 of the United

Nations Charter, and attack al-Qa’ida from within cyberspace.20 The opportunities to adversely impact terrorist organizations through the use of cyber operations are limited only by the imaginations of its executors, and they can be accomplished with only a few key strokes. Classic military doctrine would label such activities as deception, defined by DoD as: “Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.” 21 Intercepting al Qa’ida digital communications and modifying them in order to obtain possible locations of its members is potentially a highly effective CT tactic. Unfortunately, due to the current state of play that is promulgated by current cyber policies, executing this type of action in Afghanistan requires the approval of a major general.22 Although most international terrorists do not typically disclose their personal information on social media sites, they do, however; use social media (albeit using pirated or anonymous accounts) and thereby leave their digital fingerprints in cyberspace.

This window into terrorists’ computer networks provides CT professionals with ample opportunity to manipulate their devices, accounts and information in ways which causes them to expose both individual and collective organizational vulnerabilities to CT cyber professionals. A preview of the use of cyber deception is indicated within DoD’s own cyber strategy documents.

Offensive cyber operations key to disrupt terrorist attacks and catch terroristsBrennan 2012(John, Lieutenant Cololel, March 15, "United States Counter Terrorism Cyber Law and Policy, Enabling or Disabling?", http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/Brennan_UNITED-STATES-COUNTER-TERRORISM-CYBER-LAW-AND-POLICY.pdf)

Although indentifying international terrorists in cyberspace is critical to successful counterterrorism operations, it is only half of the

battle in bringing them to justice. Monitoring terrorists’ electronic communications is extremely important, but further work is required by the CT community to isolate, and eventually kill or capture the terrorists overseas. Manipulation or disruption of a terrorist organization’s computer networks is a potential means to this end, and it is also a possible tactic that is

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employed to preempt a cyber or kinetic terrorist attack. 37 The laws that govern the actual manipulation of terrorists’ electronic accounts and devices in order to make them more targetable, are not explicit or simply do not exist. The primary document that gives the President of the United States the authority to conduct offensive CT cyber operations overseas is the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, which

gives the president the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force” to protect the country for further attacks.38 The extrapolation of this authority which permits the targeting of al-Qa’ida and its adherents, was employed in order to legally kill Anwar al Awlaki (an American citizen) in Yemen, and was invoked in permitting the planned (but not executed) computer network attack against his online magazine, Inspire. 39

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The United Nations should pass a resolution banning the preemptive use of large-scale offensive cyber operations.

International agreements are the best way to deter cyberwar – fosters norms that constrain conduct. Beidleman ‘9 (Scott, Lieutenant Colonel with the US Air Force, “Defining and Deterring Cyber War”, Strategic Research Project, 2009, RSR)Over and above offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, a robust, ¶ international legal framework that addresses cyber aggression is the most critical ¶ component of a comprehensive approach to deter cyber attack. International law and ¶ norms are fundamental to deterrence because states “share an interest in adopting or codifying common standards for the conduct of international transactions…or in¶ promoting or banning specific kinds of behavior by” states.99

Multilateral agreements ¶ provide the most efficient way of realizing these shared interests .100

The common ¶ acceptance of norms moderates state interaction and makes state behavior

more¶ predictable , which leads states to “combine to insist on respect for specific norms¶ of…conduct by those who violate

their consensus.”101 In this way, international law ¶ builds the framework that guides how and when states employ offensive and defensive ¶ cyber capabilities and forms the foundation of cyber

deterrence . International law adds ¶ certainty to punitive actions and amplifies the costs of cyber attack by engendering a ¶ negative response from the international community , not just from the

attacked state.¶ Moreover, it adds credibility to the threat of reprisal by providing legitimacy to retaliatory ¶ actions and by increasing the potential to isolate the aggressive state . Also,¶

international law provides a measure of protection to states that lack robust defensive ¶ and offensive cyber capabilities and serves as their first and possibly only line of ¶ deterrence .

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2NC Solvency Cards

The UN is a comparatively better actor – individual country regulations are insufficient to solve the threat of cyberwar.Beidleman ‘9 (Scott, Lieutenant Colonel with the US Air Force, “Defining and Deterring Cyber War”, Strategic Research Project, 2009, RSR)The U.S. should lead a multilateral effort in conjunction with the UN to adapt the¶ existing international regime of laws and norms

governing warfare to address aggression in cyberspace, or build a new regime for the new warfighting domain. Only ¶ the UN has the “membership and capability to address these issues in a meaningful ¶ way that will

have a global impact” to this global problem.112 Regulation within individual¶ countries alone

will prove ineffective .113 Already the world has seen “Internet activities ¶ considered to be legitimate in one country violate the laws in another.”114 Additionally,¶ the U.S. should lead a United Nations effort to establish an institution to “…serve as a¶ clearinghouse and coordination center…” to pool international cyber security

initiatives¶ and maintain standards.115 The regime and institution would define international ¶ relations within cyberspace and provide a mechanism for the international community to ¶ initiate sanctions or punitive actions for noncompliance. The knowledge that a cyber ¶ attack is an act of war provoking a severe, costly reprisal from the global community ¶ would serve as a strong

deterrent to would-be cyber aggressors. This regime change ¶ proposal fully supports the U.S. National Security Strategy, in which the President¶ urges, “where existing institutions and regimes can be reformed to meet new ¶ challenges, we…must reform them . Where appropriate institutions do not exist,¶ we…must create them.”116

Treaties solve – even if they’re violated, empirics prove they still function as a deterrent.Schneier ‘12 (Bruce, internationally renowned security technologist and author, “An International Cyberwar Treaty Is the Only Way to Stem the Threat”, US News and World Report, 6-8-12, RSR)The cyberwar arms race is destabilizing . International cooperation and treaties are the only

way to reverse this . Banning cyberweapons entirely is a good goal, but almost certainly unachievable.

More likely are treaties that stipulate a no-first-use policy, outlaw unaimed or broadly targeted

weapons, and mandate weapons that self-destruct at the end of hostilities. Treaties that restrict tactics and limit stockpiles could be a next step. We could prohibit cyberattacks against civilian infrastructure; international banking, for example, could be declared off-limits.¶ Yes, enforcement will be difficult. Remember how easy it was to hide a chemical weapons facility? Hiding a cyberweapons facility

will be even easier. But we've learned a lot from our Cold War experience in negotiating nuclear, chemical, and biological treaties. The very act of negotiating limits the arms race and paves

the way to peace . And even if they're breached, the world is safer because the treaties exist .