file no.: 32172 in the supreme court of canada …robert e. houston, q.c. telephone: (6 13) 236-9665...
TRANSCRIPT
S.C.C. File No.: 32172
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (APPEAL FROM THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL)
B E T W E E N :
THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY (Formerly the SOLICITOR GENERAL)
and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
Appellants (Respondents)
- and -
THE CRIMINAL LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION
Respondent (Appellant)
- and -
TOM MITCHINSON, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO
Intervener (Respondent)
- and -
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MANITOBA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR,
THEATTORNEYGENERALOF NOVA SCOTIA AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC, CANADIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA, CANADIAN NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION, AD IDEMICANADIAN
MEDIA LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION AND CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS, BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION
Interveners
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP 100 Queen Street - Suite 1 100 Ottawa, ON KIP 1 J9
Guy J. Prattemadia Effendi Tel: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (613) 230-8842
Counsel for the Intervener, Federation of Law Societies of Canada
TO:
REGISTRAR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
AND TO:
ATTORNEYGENERALOF ONTARIO 7TH Floor 720 Bay Street Toronto, ON M5G 2K1
Daniel Guttman Telephone: (41 6) 326-4460 Fax: (41 6) 326-40 1 5
Counsel for the Appellants
HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP P.O. Box 185, Suite 2600 200 Bay Street Toronto, ON M5J 254
David Stratas Telephone: (41 6) 360-6336 Fax: (416) 360-8425
Counsel for the Respondent
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER/ONTARIO 2 Bloor Street East Suite 1400 Toronto, ON M4W 1A8
William S. Challis Telephone: (41 6) 326-3921 Fax: (416) 325-9186
Counsel for the Intervener, Tom Mitchison, Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
BURKE-ROBERTSON 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, ON K2P OA2
Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Telephone: (6 13) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430
Agent for the Appellants
HEENAN BLAIKIE LLP 55 Metcalfe Street Suite 300 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5
Judith Parisien Telephone: (61 3) 236-4673 Fax: (613) 236-9632
Agent for the Respondent
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP World Exchange Plaza 100 Queen Street, Suite 1 100 Ottawa, ON KIP 1 J9
Carole J. Brown Tel: (61 3) 237-5 160 Fax: (613) 230-8842
Agent for the Intervener, Tom Mitchison, Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA 900-840 Howe Street Vancouver, BC V6Z 2S9
Jeffrey G. Johnston Telephone: (604) 666-3549 Fax: (604) 666-63 14
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Canada
ATTORNEYGENERALOF BRITISH COLUMBIA 100 1 Douglas Street Victoria, BC V8W 957
Craig Jones Telephone: (250) 387-3 129 Fax: (250) 356-9154
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia
ATTORNEYGENERALOF MANITOBA 1205-405 Broadway Avenue Winnipeg, MN R3C 3L6
Deborah L. Carlson Telephone: (204) 945-0679 Fax: (204) 945-0053
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Manitoba
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK
3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Bank of Canada Building - East Tower 234 Wellington Street, Room 1212 Ottawa, ON KIA OH8
Christopher M. Rupar Telephone: (6 13) 94 1 -23 5 1 Fax: (613) 954-1920
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Canada
BURKE-ROBERTSON 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, ON K2P OA2
Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Telephone: (6 1 3) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin Street Box 466, Station D Ottawa, ON KIP 1 C3
Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Telephone: (61 3) 786-01 07 Fax: (61 3) 788-3500
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Manitoba
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin Street Box 466, Station D Ottawa, ON KIP 1 C3
Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Telephone: (6 13) 786-01 07 Fax: (613) 788-3500
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of New Brunswick
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NOVA SCOTIA P.O. Box 7 400-5 15 1 Terminal Road Halifax, NS B3J 2L6
Edward A. Gores, Q.C. Telephone: (902) 424-4024 Fax: (902) 424- 1730
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Nova Scotia
ATTORNEYGENERALOF QUEBEC 1200, route de 1 'hglise, 2e Ctage Sainte-Foy, QC GI V 4M1
Dorninique A. John Telephone: (41 8) 643-1477 ext. 20788 Fax: (4 1 8) 644-7030
Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec
4 BURKE-ROBERTSON 70 Gloucester Street Ottawa, ON K2P OA2
Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Telephone: (6 13) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP 2600 - 160 Elgin Street Box 466, Station D Ottawa, ON Kl P 1 C3
Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Telephone: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (61 3) 563-9869
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Nova Scotia
NOEL & ASSOCIES 1 1 1, rue Champlain Gatineau, QC J8X 3R1
Pierre Landry Telephone: (8 19) 771 -7393 Fax: (819) 771-5397
Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec
CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place Toronto, ON M5X 1B8
Mahmud Jamal Telephone: (4 16) 362-2 1 1 1 Fax: (4 16) 862-6666
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Bar Association
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA Place de Ville - Tower B 1 12 Kent Street, 22"d Floor Ottawa, ON KIA 1H3
Daniel Brunet Telephone: (6 1 3) 943-24 1 1 Fax: (61 3) 947-5252
Counsel for the Intervener, Information Commissioner of Canada
CANADIAN NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION, Ad IDEM I CANADIAN MEDIA LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION AND CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP P.O. Box 25, Commerce Court West Toronto, ON M5L 1A9
Paul B. Schabas Telephone: (416) 863-5849 Fax: (416) 863-2653
OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP 340 Albert Street, Suite 1900 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L2
Patricia J. Wilson Telephone: (6 13) 787- 1009 Fax: (613) 235-2867
Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Bar Association
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA Place de Ville - Tower B 112 Kent Street, 22nd Floor Ottawa, ON KIA lH3
Daniel Brunet Telephone: (6 1 3) 943-24 1 1 Fax: (61 3) 947-5252
Agent for the Intervener, Information Commissioner of Canada
BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP World Exchange Plaza 45 OYConnor Street, 2oth Floor Ottawa, ON Kl P 1 A4
Gordon K. Cameron Telephone: (61 3) 788-2222 Fax: (613) 788-2247
Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Newspaper Association, Ad IDEM / Canadian Media Lawyers' Association and Canadian Association of Journalists
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Newspaper Association, Ad IDEM / Canadian Media Lawyers' Association and Canadian Association of Journalists
BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Box 25, Commerce Court West Toronto, ON M5L 1A9
Catherine Beagan Flood Telephone: (41 6) 863-2269 Fax: (416) 863-2653
Counsel for the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
6 BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP World Exchange Plaza 45 07Connor Street, 2oth Floor Ottawa, ON KIP lA4
Nancy K. Brooks Telephone: (61 3) 788-2200 Fax: (613) 788-2247
Agent for the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.............................................................................................................. Part I . Statement of Facts 1
............................................................................................................................. A . Overview 1
..................................................................................... B . Federation's Interest in the Appeal 1
...................................................................................... C . Federation's Position on the Facts 2
Part I1 - Statement of the Questions in Issue .................................................................................. 3
Part I11 - Statement of Argument ................................................................................................... 3
A . Historical Function of Solicitor-Client Privilege ................................................................ 3
i . Pre-Charter: Solicitor-Client Privilege is a Fundamental Civil and Legal Right ........... 4 . . 11 . Solicitor-Client Privilege as a Substantive Principle and Fundamental Right ............... 5 ... ill . Solicitor-Client Privilege as a Sword .............................................................................. 6
iv . Solicitor-Client Privilege in the Access to Information Context .................................... 7
................................. B . Section 23 of FIPPA Does Not Infringe Section 2(b) of the Charter 7
C . If There is an Infringement of Section 2(b), it is a Reasonable Limit under Section 1 of
the Charter ........................................................................................................................... 9
Part IV - Submissions as to Costs .............................................................................................. 10
.................................................................................................................. Part V - Order Sought 10
Part VI - Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... 11
......................................................................................... Part VII - Statutes, Regulations, Rules 12
PART I - STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Overview
1. The Ontario Court of Appeal's majority decision threatens the raison dJe^tre and
constitutional status of the solicitor-client privilege (the "Privilege"). By essentially ignoring the
impact of its novel and expansionist interpretation of section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedom (the "Charter"), the majority effectively trivializes the Privilege as a cornerstone of
our legal system.
2. A coherent interpretation of the right to freedom of expression protected by the Charter
must take into account the central place which the Privilege has played in our legal system as
well as the constitutional status which this Court has afforded it in recognition of its pivotal role.
The existence of the solicitor-client privilege as a constitutionally protected right undermines any
attempt by the Criminal Lawyers' Association ("CLA") to create an access to information right
under the Charter. Further, the Federation intends to challenge the proposition that the impugned
legislative provisions do not minimally impair the CLAYs freedom of expression, considering the
constitutional status of the Privilege.
3. However important the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the Charter, neither
our Constitution's framers nor the relevant jurisprudence could justify the abrogation of the
Privilege at the discretion of an administrative body in the "public interest". Such wide-open
discretionary power is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional protection afforded to
the Privilege. It can neither be required as a proper delineation of section 2 of the Charter, nor
amount to a minimal impairment pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.
B. Federation's Interest in the Appeal
4. The Federation is the umbrella organization of the 14 governing bodies of the legal
profession in Canada. Its members have statutory authority in their provinces or territories to
regulate the 95,000 lawyers in Canada and the 3,500 notaries in Quebec. The Federation's
members are required by law to govern the legal profession in the public interest. Critical to that
role is the upholding of the independence, integrity and honour of the legal profession for the
purpose of advancing the cause of justice and the rule of law.
5. The member societies are familiar with the cardinal importance of the Privilege for those
lawyers and the members of the public they are called to represent as clients.
C. Federation's Position on the Facts
6. By Order dated July 31, 2008, the Federation was granted leave to intervene in this
Appeal.
7. The Federation accepts the facts as agreed to by the parties, and takes no position on any
factual disputes between the parties.
8. This appeal flows from an access to information request made by the CLA seeking access
to the records relating to the Ontario Provincial Police's ("OPP") investigation into the conduct
of police and prosecutors involved in the prosecution of Graham Rodney Court and Peter Denis
Monaghan, who were charged in the murder of Dominic Racco. In 1996, these charges were
stayed by a judge of the Superior Court, who held that the rights of the accused under sections 7
and 11 (d) of the Charter had been violated as a result of abusive conduct by state officials.
Following that judgment, the OPP was asked to review the conduct of the investigation and
prosecution. Nine months later, the OPP issued a press release stating that it had found no
evidence of any attempts to obstruct justice. Subsequently, the CLA made the aforementioned
request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
("FIPPA"), R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31. The Solicitor General declined to produce the documents
invoking, inter alia, the exemptions for law enforcement (section 14) and solicitor-client
privilege (section 19).
RecdojtkeAppeZZants, Reasons for Judgment of the Court of Appeal, dated May 25, 2007 ("Reasons of the Court of Appeal"), Tab 6, pp. 124-127, paras. 5-14.
9. Section 10 of the FIPPA provides a general right of access to a government record unless
the record falls within one of the exemptions set out in sections 12 to 22 of the Act. Some
exemptions are mandatory while others afford the head a discretion not to disclose. The
exemptions include records subject to solicitor-client privilege (section 19). Section 23 of the
FIPPA provides a so-called "public interest override" to most of the categories of exempted
records. It does not apply, however, to solicitor-client privilege documents.
Fieedam of In fo~matcon andProtectlbn of Privacy Act ("F/PPM'), R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, sections 10,12-23 [Part VII of this Facturn].
10. The CLA unsuccessfully appealed the government's decision to the Assistant Information
and Privacy Commissioner and to the Divisional Court claiming that section 23 of FIPPA was
unconstitutional by failing to extend the public interest override to the solicitor-client privilege.
1 1. The CLA was subsequently successful at the Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of the
Court of Appeal found that statutory provisions of FIPPA (i.e. sections 10, 14, 19 and 23), which
afforded the government discretion to refuse to disclose a police report and two solicitor-client
privileged documents to the CLAY violated the CLAYs freedom of expression as guaranteed by
section 2(b) of the Charter and were not justified under section 1 of the Charter.
~ecu~duf/~eAppe//a~~/s, Reasons of the Court of Appeal, Tab 6, pp. 122-138.
PART I1 - STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
12. The following constitutional questions as stated by the Chief Justice, on February 14,
2008, are to be determined in this appeal:
(a) Does s. 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31 infringe s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to extend the public interest override to the exemptions found in ss. 14 and 19 of the Act?
(b) If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
(c) Does s. 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31 offend the constitutional principle of democracy?
13. The first two questions are of particular importance for the Federation, as they relate to
the Privilege, and are addressed in more detail below. The Federation submits that the answer to
the first question should be no. Should the Court answer the first question in the affirmative,
however, the answer to the second question should be yes.
PART I11 - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
A. Historical Function of Solicitor-Client Privilege
14. An appreciation of the historical function of the Privilege and its integral role in the fair
and effective administration of justice is necessary to recognize and grasp its importance in our
constitutional system, and thus the harmful impact of the Court of Appeal's decision.
15. When determining whether section 23 of the FIPPA inhnges section 2(b) of the Charter
by failing to extend the "public interest override" to the solicitor-client privilege exemption, the
Court must interpret section 2 in its original context. In this regard, it is inconceivable that the
Charter, which necessarily implied widespread litigation between public authorities and citizens
and provided for express litigation rights, should have sought to undermine one of the
cornerstones of the very legal system relied upon to resolve such disputes. The breadth of the
freedom of expression protected under the Charter must be ascertained and delineated to take
account of other constitutional values, such as the Privilege, so that the Canadian Constitution
subsists as a coherent whole.
Reference re: Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (OnL), 119871 1 S.C.R. 1148 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 51.
16. The Privilege has evolved from a simple rule of evidence, which acted as a shield to
prevent privileged materials from being tendered in evidence in a court room, to its status as a
substantive legal principle and fundamental right, to its most recent elevation to a
constitutionally guaranteed right under the Charter and even a "super-constitutional" right, as is
argued by some authors.
M. Jamal and B. Morgan, The Co~sfz2utzbna/Iia~ion ofSo/c20r-C/ient PrivYege, (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. at 213 ["Jamal"] [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 9).
A. Dode k, Cunstz2utzbnaI Hierarchy: Sohc12or- Ckent PrivzYege as Super- Constz2utiunaZ Rzght, OBA Continuing Legal Education, Oct. 9, 2003 at 2 ["Dodek"] [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 101.
i. Pre-Charter: Solicitor-Client Privilege is a Fundamental Civil and Legal Right 17. The singular status of the Privilege was recognized by this Court prior to the introduction
of the Charter. In Solosky v. The Queen, which concerned the censorship of inmates' mail and
the right of an inmate of a federal penitentiary to communicate in confidence with his lawyer,
Justice Dickson, for the Court, recognized that the Privilege is no longer regarded merely as a
rule of evidence used as a shield but is fundamental to the due administration of justice.
SoIosky v. T h e e m , [I9801 1 S.C.R. 821 at 836 and 839 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 81.
18. The protection of the solicitor-client relationship evolved from a privilege to a right. In
Desc6teaux v. Mierzwinski, this Court confirmed that "a person has a right to communicate with
a legal adviser in all confidence, a right that is 'founded upon the unique relationship of solicitor
and client.' It is a personal and extra-patrimonial right which follows a citizen throughout his
dealings with others". The Court also recognized that the Privilege protecting from disclosure
communications between solicitors and their clients is a fundamental right, as fundamental as the
right to counsel itself since the right can exist only imperfectly without the privilege.
Descdteaux v. Mzerzwzhskz; [I9821 1 S.C.R. 860 at 871, 880-881 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 21.
ii. Solicitor-Client Privilege as a Substantive Principle and Fundamental Right 19. In 1999, this Court examined in Smith v. Jones the circumstances in which the Privilege
could be set aside in the interests of protecting the safety of the public. The majority of the Court
concluded that the Privilege should only be set aside in exceptional situations where the facts
raise real concerns that an identifiable individual or group is in imminent danger of death or
bodily harm.
Sml2h v. Jmes, 119991 1 S.C.R. 455 at para. 85 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
20. Indeed, in Smith v. Jones, the majority recognized that the Privilege had long been
regarded as fundamentally important to our judicial system. Clients seeking advice must be able
to speak freely to their lawyers, secure in the knowledge that, subject to clearly defined
exceptions, what they say will never be divulged without their consent. Without this privilege
clients could not be candid and furnish all the relevant information that must be provided to
lawyers in order to obtain the best advice. It is an element that is integral to the functioning of the
legal system.
Sml2h v. lanes, $supra, at paras. 45-46 and 85 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
21. Justice Major (dissenting in Smith v. Jones) went even further, specifically recognizing
that the Privilege was founded on constitutional principles such as the right to full answer and
defence, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination and the presumption of
innocence.
Smt2h v. Jones, supra, at para. 7 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
22. As is evident from the long line of cases which follow Smith v. Jones, Justice Major's
position has now become the applicable law. Thus, in 2001, in R, v. McClure, this Court
explicitly confirmed that the Privilege falls within the constitutional ambit, declaring that, while
it is personal, it is also broader and is important to the administration of justice as a whole and
therefore a principle of fundamental justice within section 7 of the Charter.
R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 at paras. 31 and 41-42 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
23. The Court went on to conclude in McClure that, while the Privilege is not absolute, any
impediment to open candid and confidential discussion between lawyers and their clients will be
rare and reluctantly imposed. The privilege will only yield in certain clearly defined
circumstances (such as an accused's right to full answer and defence, the imminent risk of death
or bodily harm to another person and criminal communications) and does not involve a balancing
of interests on a case-by-case basis. "[S]olicitor-client privilege is the privilege 'which the law
has been most zealous to protect and most reluctant to water down by exceptions."'
R. v. McC/ure, supra, at paras. 33-37 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
See also Smz2h v. Jone~; supra, at para. 50 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
Recard afthe Appe//anrs, Reasons for Judgment of the Divisional Court, dated March 25,2004, Tab 4, p. 112, para. 95.
24. In McClure, the Court also elaborated a stringent two-part "innocence at stake test"
allowing the privilege to be infringed only where core issues going to the guilt of the accused are
involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful conviction. This test was later reaffirmed in R.
v. Brown where the Court emphasized that the Privilege was so fundamental to Canada's justice
system that it will yield only in rare circumstances.
R. v. McC/ure, supra, at para. 47 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
R. v. Brown, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 185 at paras. 1,47,89,95 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 61.
iii. Solicitor-Client Privilege as a Sword 25. In what some authors have described as an important milestone, in Lavall&e, Rachel &
Heintz v. Canada, the Court used the Privilege to strike down a provision of the Criminal Code.
While confirming that it was a principle of fundamental justice, the Court extended the
protection of the privilege under section 8 of the Charter, stating that a client has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in all documents in the possession of hisher lawyer.
Lava//& Racke/ 152 HezkL. v. C a d (ALLorney Genera&. Fhz& Ottenhezher & Baker v. Canada flrrorney Gene~a8.R. v. Fzkk, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 at para. 16,35 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 31.
Jmal supra, at 227 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 91.
Dodek, supra, at 22,24-25 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 101.
See also Marando v. Rzcher, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193 at paras. 11-12 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 41.
26. Particularly relevant to the present appeal, this Court in Pritchard v. Ontario confirmed
that the Privilege applies equally to advice given by in-house government lawyers to their client,
a government agency.
Prz2chard v. Ontartb fHi/man Rights Cutmmzj.szbn), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809 at paras. 19-21 [Appellants' Authorities, Volume 11, Tab 331.
iv. Solicitor-Client Privilege in the Access to Information Context 27. This Court also recently examined the constitutional principle of the solicitor-client
privilege in the context of access to information legislation.
28. In Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services), the Court stated that records
subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege may be ordered disclosed only where absolutely
necessary, a test just short of absolute prohibition.
Guudzj. Y. Ontarzb fMzhzj.try ufCurrectzbnaZServztes/, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32, at para. 20-25 [Appellants' Authorities, Volume I, Tab 151.
29. Finally, in the most recent case of Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe, this
Court once again confirmed the paramount nature the Privilege, concluding that even for the
limited purpose of determining whether the privilege is properly claimed, the Privacy
Commissioner did not have the right to access solicitor-client documents.
Canada (Privacy Cotmmzj.siuner/ v. BluudTrzBe Department ofleakk, [2008] S.C.J. No. 45, at para. 10-11,17,21-22 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 11.
30. It is clear fiom the line of cases emanating fiom this Court in the past two decades that
the Privilege holds a virtually inviolable place in the Canadian legal system which can yield only
in rare, clearly defined circumstances defined by courts of law as the Privilege's ultimate
guardian.
Canada (Privaqv Cotmmzj.szbner/ v. Blood TrzBe Department ofl/ea/tk, supra, at paras. 17,21-22 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 11.
B. Section 23 of FIPPA Does Not Infringe Section 2(b) of the C h a m
3 1. The Federation agrees with the Appellants' submissions that there is no right of access to
information under section 2(b) of the Charter and therefore no constitutionally protected
expressive activity has been violated.
32. A constitutionally sound and coherent section 2 analysis must also encompass a
consideration of the Privilege in determining whether section 2(b) of the Charter has been
breached.
33. With but scant analysis, the majority of the Court of Appeal's findings are premised on
the incorrect and unsupported view that the Privilege is trumped by its expansive interpretation
of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter.
34. Indeed, when examining the scope and breadth of the allegedly constitutionally protected
expressive activity, the majority of the Court of Appeal effectively ignored the concept and
fundamental value of the Privilege found at the heart of our legal system. The Court of Appeal's
decision failed to strike the appropriate balance between freedom of expression on the one hand
and, on the other, solicitor-client privilege as a principle of fundamental justice (section 7 of the
Charter), a right protected under the reasonable expectation of privacy (section 8 of the Charter)
and one necessarily implied by the right to counsel (section 10(b) of the Charter).
35. As evidenced from the history of the Privilege outline above, the Privilege is rarely, if
ever, set aside in favour of other rights, and this even in cases where another fundamental
constitutional right is at stake, such as an accused's right to full answer and defence.
R. v. McCZure, supra [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
R. v. Brown, supra [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 61.
36. In the present case, the decision of the majority in the Court of Appeal would obliterate
the Privilege, a constitutionally recognized right part of the principle of fundamental justice and
the tenet of our legal system, in an attempt to create what it claims is a constitutional right of
access to information. This position, which is advocated by the Respondent, goes against this
Court's teachings of when and how the Privilege can be superseded.
37. The "public interest override" not only strikes at the heart of this Privilege, but does so in
a most ill-defined way. If freedom of expression entails the right to have access to all
information relevant to the matter upon which one wants to express a view, then the very
existence of the Privilege would be threatened since nothing would be more valuable and
informative to one's freedom to express oneself on public issues than access to relevant solicitor-
client privilege documents. By the majority's logic, the virtually absolute Privilege would be
replaced by an ad hoe balancing exercise conducted by an administrative official based on the
loose criterion of "the public interest". The resulting uncertainty would mean that the very
expectation of near-absolute confidentiality which the Privilege is designed to instil and protect
would be fatally undermined.
R. v. Gruenke, [I9911 3 S.C.R. 263 at 289 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 71.
See also SrnzZh v. Jones supra, at para. 47 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
38. The Federation submits that the inclusion of a public interest override for solicitor-client
privileged information in the access to information legislation in the provinces of British
Columbia, Alberta and Nova Scotia is not evidence that it is a constitutional imperative as
implied by the Respondent. To the contrary, the decision of these legislatures to include the
Privilege in the public interest override provision is a legislative choice subject to the
constitutional review.
Facturn ofthelespondent, at paras. 17 and 18.
Facturn ofthe/ntervener, The Attorney GeneralofBrz2zj.h CoZurnbzb) at para. 5.
C. If There is an Infringement of Section 2(b), it is a Reasonable Limit under Section 1 of the Charter
39. Should the Court find that the right to freedom of expression encompasses an obligation
on the government to provide access to the information requested by the CLA and that this
freedom has been violated, the Federation submits that the failure to extend the "public interest
override" to the Privilege exemption is justified by section 1 of the Charter.
40. In light of the sacrosanct nature of the Privilege, the Federation submits that the
impugned legislative provision in the FIPPA minimally impairs the CLA's freedom of
expression as it is a reasonable option which reasonably accommodates the objective of the
FIPPA and the imperative need to recognize and enforce the Privilege. This is highlighted by the
fact that this Court has recognized that the Privilege should not involve the balancing of interests
on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether it should be displaced, as its inclusion in
section 23 of the Act would require, and that any inhngement of the Privilege should be rare and
minimal.
R. v. McCZure supra, at para. 35 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
M a d a v. Rzcher, supra, at paras. 16 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 41.
Descdfeaux v. Mie~zw~hskz; ssupra, at 875 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 21.
LavaZZ&c Rackel h Hiezhtz v. Canada (Attorney Genera&. WAzZe, Ottenhezher h Baker v. Canada (Atorney Genera&. R. v. FzirkW supra, at para. 36 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 31.
SrntZh v. Jones supra, at paras. 5-6 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume IX, Tab 851.
Prz2chard v. Ontarb (Human Rzghts CommzM~, supra, at para. 18 [Appellants' Authorities, Volume 11, Tab 331.
41. Further, the Act has achieved an appropriate legislative balance in protecting a key
principle to the administration of justice. This is evident when one considers the harmful effects
that would ensue should the Information and Privacy Commissioner be called upon to weigh the
public interest and solicitor-client privilege in each case, an exercise this Court has clearly
warned against.
R. v. McChe, supra, at para. 35 [Respondent's Authorities, Volume VII, Tab 641.
42. Finally, the legislative scheme is perfectly consistent with the decision in Blood Tribe
where this Court confirmed that the federal Information and Privacy Commissioner could not
access privileged documents even for the purpose of determining whether the privilege is
properly claimed. If it is inappropriate for an Information Commissioner to determine claims of
privilege, a fortiori it must be impermissible for an Information Commissioner to balance claims
of privilege against the "public interest" in disclosure.
Canada /Privacy Cmmzj.sioner/ v. BZooa'Trz8eDepartment of Heakh, supra, at 17, 21- 22 [Authorities of FLSC, Tab 11.
PART IV - SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS
43. The Federation seeks no costs and asks that none be awarded against it.
PART V - ORDER SOUGHT
44. The Federation submits that constitutional question #1 should be answered negatively.
Should the Court answer that question in the affirmative, however, constitutional question #2
should be answered affirmatively.
45. The Federation seeks leave of this Court, pursuant to rule 59(2) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Canada, to present oral argument at the hearing of this appeal.
Rules ofthe Supreme Court ofCanada, SORl83-74, as amended, Rule 59(2) [Part VII of Factum].
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 24th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2008.
OTTOlU541380\2
1 1
PART VI . TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases . Paragraph Nos . Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v . Blood Tribe Department of Health. [2008] S.C.J No . 45 ............................................................................................................ 2 30. 42
Desc6teaux v . Mierzwinski. [I9821 1 S.C.R. 860 ................................................................... 18. 40
Goodis v . Ontario (Ministry of Correctional Services). [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32 ................................. 28
Lavallie. Rackel & Heintz v . Canada (Attorney General); White. Ottenheimer & Baker v . Canada (Attorney General); R . v . Fink. [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 .............................. 25. 40
Maranda v . Richer. [2003] 3 S.C.R. 193 ................................................................................. 2 40
Pritchard v . Ontario (Human Rights Commission). [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809 ............................... 26. 40
.......... Reference re: Bill 30. An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.). [I9871 1 S.C.R. 1 148 15
R . v . Brown, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 185 ...................................................................................... 2 4 35
............................................................................................... R . v . Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263 37
R . v . McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 ................................................................. 22, 23, 24, 35, 40, 41
................................................................ Smith v . Jones. [I9991 1 S.C.R. 455 19. 20. 21. 23. 37. 40
.................................................................................. Solosky v . The Queen. [I9801 1 S.C.R. 821 -17
Secondary Sources Paragraph Nos . M . Jamal and B . Morgan. The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege (2003). 20 S.C.L.R. 213 ........................................................................................................... 16. 25
A . Dodek. Constitutional Hierarchy: Solicitor-Client Privilege as Super- Constitutional Right OBA Continuing Legal Education. Oct . 9. 2003 ................................... 16. 25
PART VII - STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1 , section 10, 12-22, 23
Rules of Supreme Court of Canada, SORl83-74, as amended, Rule 59
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER F.3 1
10. (1) Every person has a right of access to a record or a part of a record in the custody or under the control of an institution unless,
(a) the record or the part of the record falls within one of the exemptions under sections 12 to 22; or
(b) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious. 1996, c. 1, Sched. K, s. 1.
Severability of record (2) If an institution receives a request for access to a record that contains
information that falls within one of the exemptions under sections 12 to 22 and the head of the institution is not of the opinion that the request is frivolous or vexatious, the head shall disclose as much of the record as can reasonably be severed without disclosing the information that falls under one of the exemptions. 1996, c. 1, Sched. K, s. I.
Cabinet records 12. (1) A head shall rehse to disclose a record where the disclosure would reveal
the substance of deliberations of the Executive Council or its committees, including,
(a) an agenda, minute or other record of the deliberations or decisions of the Executive Council or its committees;
(b) a record containing policy options or recommendations submitted, or prepared for submission, to the Executive Council or its committees;
(c) a record that does not contain policy options or recommendations referred to in clause (b) and that does contain background explanations or analyses of problems submitted, or prepared for submission, to the Executive Council or its committees for their consideration in making decisions, before those decisions are made and implemented;
(d) a record used for or reflecting consultation among ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy;
(e) a record prepared to brief a minister of the Crown in relation to matters that are before or are proposed to be brought before the Executive Council or its committees, or are the subject of consultations among ministers relating to government decisions or the formulation of government policy; and
(f) draft legislation or regulations. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 12 (1).
Exception (2) Despite subsection (I), a head shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose
a record where,
(a) the record is more than twenty years old; or
(b) the Executive Council for which, or in respect of which, the record has been prepared consents to access being given. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 12 (2).
Advice to government 13. (1) A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure would reveal
advice or recommendations of a public servant, any other person employed in the service of an institution or a consultant retained by an institution. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 13 (1).
Exception (2) Despite subsection (I), a head shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose
a record that contains,
(a) factual material;
(b) a statistical survey;
(c) a report by a valuator, whether or not the valuator is an officer of the institution;
(d) an environmental impact statement or similar record;
(e) a report of a test carried out on a product for the purpose of government equipment testing or a consumer test report;
(f) a report or study on the performance or efficiency of an institution, whether the report or study is of a general nature or is in respect of a particular program or policy;
(g) a feasibility study or other technical study, including a cost estimate, relating to a government policy or project;
(h) a report containing the results of field research undertaken before the formulation of a policy proposal;
(i) a final plan or proposal to change a program of an institution, or for the establishment of a new program, including a budgetary estimate for the program, whether or not the plan or proposal is subject to approval, unless the plan or proposal is to be submitted to the Executive Council or its committees;
Cj) a report of an interdepartmental committee task force or similar body, or of a committee or task force within an institution, which has been established for the purpose of preparing a report on a particular topic, unless the report is to be submitted to the Executive Council or its committees;
(k) a report of a committee, council or other body which is attached to an institution and which has been established for the purpose of undertaking inquiries and making reports or recommendations to the institution;
(1) the reasons for a final decision, order or ruling of an officer of the institution made during or at the conclusion of the exercise of discretionary power conferred by or under an enactment or scheme administered by the institution, whether or not the enactment or scheme allows an appeal to be taken against the decision, order or ruling, whether or not the reasons,
(i) are contained in an internal memorandum of the institution or in a letter addressed by an officer or employee of the institution to a named person, or
(ii) were given by the officer who made the decision, order or ruling or were incorporated by reference into the decision, order or ruling. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 13 (2).
Idem (3) Despite subsection (I), a head shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose
a record where the record is more than twenty years old or where the head has publicly cited the record as the basis for making a decision or formulating a policy. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 13 (3).
Law enforcement 14. (1) A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could
reasonably be expected to,
(a) interfere with a law enforcement matter;
(b) interfere with an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;
(c) reveal investigative techniques and procedures currently in use or likely to be used in law enforcement;
(d) disclose the identity of a confidential source of information in respect of a law enforcement matter, or disclose information furnished only by the confidential source;
(e) endanger the life or physical safety of a law enforcement officer or any other person;
(f) deprive a person of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication;
(g) interfere with the gathering of or reveal law enforcement intelligence information respecting organizations or persons;
(h) reveal a record which has been confiscated from a person by a peace officer in accordance with an Act or regulation;
(i) endanger the security of a building or the security of a vehicle carrying items, or of a system or procedure established for the protection of items, for which protection is reasonably required;
Cj) facilitate the escape from custody of a person who is under lawful detention;
(k) jeopardize the security of a centre for lawful detention; or
(1) facilitate the commission of an unlawful act or hamper the control of crime. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 14 (1); 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 1 (1).
Idem (2) A head may refuse to disclose a record,
(a) that is a report prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law;
(b) that is a law enforcement record where the disclosure would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament;
(c) that is a law enforcement record where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose the author of the record or any person who has been quoted or paraphrased in the record to civil liability; or
(d) that contains information about the history, supervision or release of a person under the control or supervision of a correctional authority. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 14 (2); 2002, c. 1 8, Sched. K, s. 1 (2).
Refusal to confirm or deny existence of record (3) A head may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a record to which
subsection (1) or (2) apply. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 14 (3).
Exception (4) Despite clause (2) (a), a head shall disclose a record that is a report prepared in
the course of routine inspections by an agency where that agency is authorized to enforce and regulate compliance with a particular statute of Ontario. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 14 (4).
Idem (5) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a record on the degree of success
achieved in a law enforcement program including statistical analyses unless disclosure of such a record may prejudice, interfere with or adversely affect any of the matters referred to in those subsections. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 14 (5).
Civil Remedies Act, 2001 14.1 A head may refuse to disclose a record and may refuse to confirm or deny the -
existence of a record if disclosure of the record could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ability of the Attorney General to determine whether a proceeding should be commenced under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, conduct a proceeding under that Act or enforce an order made under that Act. 2001, c. 28, s. 22 (1); 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 2; 2007, c. 13, s. 43 (1).
Prohibiting Profiting from Recounting Crimes Act, 2002 14.2 A head may refuse to disclose a record and may refuse to confirm or deny the -
existence of a record if disclosure of the record could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ability of the Attorney General to determine whether a proceeding should be commenced under the Prohibiting ProJiting from Recounting Crimes Act, 2002, conduct a proceeding under that Act or enforce an order made under that Act. 2002, c. 2, ss. 15 (I), 19 (4); 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 3.
Relations with other governments 15. A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably -
be expected to,
(a) prejudice the conduct of intergovernmental relations by the Government of Ontario or an institution;
(b) reveal information received in confidence from another government or its agencies by an institution; or
(c) reveal information received in confidence from an international organization of states or a body thereof by an institution,
and shall not disclose any such record without the prior approval of the Executive Council. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 15; 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 4.
Defence 16. A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably
be expected to prejudice the defence of Canada or of any foreign state allied or associated with Canada or be injurious to the detection, prevention or suppression of espionage, sabotage or terrorism and shall not disclose any such record without the prior approval of the Executive Council. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 16; 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 5.
Third party information 17. (1) A head shall refuse to disclose a record that reveals a trade secret or
scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations information, supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly, where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to,
(a) prejudice significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly with the contractual or other negotiations of a person, group of persons, or organization;
(b) result in similar information no longer being supplied to the institution where it is in the public interest that similar information continue to be so supplied;
(c) result in undue loss or gain to any person, group, committee or financial institution or agency; or
(d) reveal information supplied to or the report of a conciliation officer, mediator, labour relations officer or other person appointed to resolve a labour relations dispute.R.S.0. 199OYc.F.31,s. 17(1);2002,c. 18,Sched.K,s.6.
Tax information (2) A head shall refuse to disclose a record that reveals information that was
obtained on a tax return or gathered for the purpose of determining tax liability or collecting a tax. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 17 (2).
Consent to disclosure (3) A head may disclose a record described in subsection (1) or (2) if the person to
whom the information relates consents to the disclosure. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 17 (3).
Economic and other interests of Ontario 18. (1 _2 A head may refuse to disclose a record that contains,
(a) trade secrets or financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that belongs to the Government of Ontario or an institution and has monetary value or potential monetary value;
(b) information obtained through research by an employee of an institution where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to deprive the employee of priority of publication;
(c) information where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the economic interests of an institution or the competitive position of an institution;
(d) information where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the financial interests of the Government of Ontario or the ability of the Government of Ontario to manage the economy of Ontario;
(e) positions, plans, procedures, criteria or instructions to be applied to any negotiations carried on or to be carried on by or on behalf of an institution or the Government of Ontario;
(f) plans relating to the management of personnel or the administration of an institution that have not yet been put into operation or made public;
(g) information including the proposed plans, policies or projects of an institution where the disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in premature disclosure of a pending policy decision or undue financial benefit or loss to a person;
(h) information relating to specific tests or testing procedures or techniques that are to be used for an educational purpose, if disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the use or results of the tests or testing procedures or techniques;
(i) submissions in respect of a matter under the Municipal Boundary Negotiations Act commenced before its repeal by the Municipal Act, 2001, by a party municipality or other body before the matter is resolved. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 18 (1); 2002, c. 17, Sched. F, Table; 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 7; 2005, c. 28, Sched. F, s. 2.
Exception (2) A head shall not refuse under subsection (1) to disclose a record that contains
the results of product or environmental testing carried out by or for an institution, unless,
(a) the testing was done as a service to a person, a group of persons or an organization other than an institution and for a fee; or
(b) the testing was conducted as preliminary or experimental tests for the purpose of developing methods of testing. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 18 (2).
Information with respect to closed meetings 18.1 (1) A head may refuse to disclose a record that reveals the substance of
deliberations of a meeting of the governing body or a committee of the governing body of an educational institution if a statute authorizes holding the meeting in the absence of the public and the subject-matter of the meeting,
(a) is a draft of a by-law, resolution or legislation; or
(b) is litigation or possible litigation. 2005, c. 28, Sched. F, s. 3.
Exception (2) Despite subsection (I), the head shall not refuse to disclose a record under
subsection (1) if,
(a) the information is not held confidentially;
(b) the subject-matter of the deliberations has been considered in a meeting open to the public; or
(c) the record is more than 20 years old. 2005, c. 28, Sched. F, s. 3.
Application of Act (3) The exemption in subsection (1) is in addition to any other exemptions in this
Act. 2005, c. 28, Sched. F, s. 3.
Solicitor-client privilege 19. A head may refuse to disclose a record, - (a) that is subject to solicitor-client privilege;
(b) that was prepared by or for Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation; or
(c) that was prepared by or for counsel employed or retained by an educational institution for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation. 2005, c. 28, Sched. F, s. 4.
Danger to safety or health 20. A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably
be expzted to seriously threaten the safety or health of an individual. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 20; 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 8.
Personal privacy 21. (1) A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other
than the individual to whom the information relates except,
(a) upon the prior written request or consent of the individual, if the record is one to which the individual is entitled to have access;
(b) in compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual, if upon disclosure notification thereof is mailed to the last known address of the individual to whom the information relates;
(c) personal information collected and maintained specifically for the purpose of creating a record available to the general public;
(d) under an Act of Ontario or Canada that expressly authorizes the disclosure;
(e) for a research purpose if,
(i) the disclosure is consistent with the conditions or reasonable expectations of disclosure under which the personal information was provided, collected or obtained,
(ii) the research purpose for which the disclosure is to be made cannot be reasonably accomplished unless the information is provided in individually identifiable form, and
(iii) the person who is to receive the record has agreed to comply with the conditions relating to security and confidentiality prescribed by the regulations; or
(f) if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 21 (1).
Criteria re invasion of privacy (2) A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information
constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether,
(a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the Government of Ontario and its agencies to public scrutiny;
(b) access to the personal information may promote public health and safety;
(c) access to the personal information will promote informed choice in the purchase of goods and services;
(d) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of rights affecting the person who made the request;
(e) the individual to whom the information relates will be exposed unfairly to pecuniary or other harm;
(f) the personal information is highly sensitive;
(g) the personal information is unlikely to be accurate or reliable;
(h) the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence; and
(i) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to in therecord. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 21 (2).
Presumed invasion of privacy (3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified
invasion of personal privacy where the personal information,
(a) relates to a medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation;
(b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation;
(c) relates to eligibility for social service or welfare benefits or to the determination of benefit levels;
(d) relates to employment or educational history;
(e) was obtained on a tax return or gathered for the purpose of collecting a tax;
(f) describes an individual's finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness;
(g) consists of personal recommendations or evaluations, character references or personnel evaluations; or
(h) indicates the individual's racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation or religious or political beliefs or associations. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 21 (3).
Limitation (4) Despite subsection (3), a disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion
of personal privacy if it,
(a) discloses the classification, salary range and benefits, or employment responsibilities of an individual who is or was an officer or employee of an institution or a member of the staff of a minister;
(b) discloses financial or other details of a contract for personal services between an individual and an institution;
(c) discloses details of a licence or permit or a similar discretionary financial benefit conferred on an individual by an institution or a head under circumstances where,
(i) the individual represents 1 per cent or more of all persons and organizations in Ontario receiving a similar benefit, and
(ii) the value of the benefit to the individual represents 1 per cent or more of the total value of similar benefits provided to other persons and organizations in Ontario; or
(d) discloses personal information about a deceased individual to the spouse or a close relative of the deceased individual, and the head is satisfied that, in the circumstances, the disclosure is desirable for compassionate reasons. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 21 (4); 2006, c. 19, Sched. N, s. 1 (2).
Refusal to confirm or deny existence of record (5) A head may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a record if disclosure of
the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 21 (5).
Fish and wildlife species at risk 21.1 (1) A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could
reasonably be expected to lead to the killing, capturing, injuring or harassment of fish or wildlife that belong to a species at risk or to interference with the habitat of fish or wildlife that belong to a species at risk. 1997, c. 41, s. 118 (1); 2002, c. 18, Sched. K, s. 9.
Definitions (2) In this section,
"fish" and "wildlife" have the same meanings as in the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1997. 1997, c. 41, s. 118 (1).
Note: Effective June 30, 2008 or on an earlier day to be named by proclamation of the Lieutenant Governor, section 21.1 is repealed by the Statutes of Ontario, 2007, chapter 6, section 61 and the following substituted:
Species at risk
21.1 A head may refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure could reasonably be - expected to lead to,
(a) killing, harming, harassing, capturing or taking a living member of a species, contrary to clause 9 (1) (a) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007;
(b) possessing, transporting, collecting, buying, selling, leasing, trading or offering to buy, sell, lease or trade a living or dead member of a species, any part of a living or dead member of a species, or anything derived from a living or dead member of a species, contrary to clause 9 (1) (b) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007; or
(c) damaging or destroying the habitat of a species, contrary to clause 10 (1) (a) or (b) of the Endangered Species Act, 200 7.2007, c. 6, s. 6 1.
See: 2007, c. 6, ss. 61,63 (1).
Information soon to be published 22. A head may refuse to disclose a record where, - (a) the record or the information contained in the record has been published or is
currently available to the public; or
(b) the head believes on reasonable grounds that the record or the information contained in the record will be published by an institution within ninety days after the request is made or within such further period of time as may be necessary for printing or translating the material for the purpose of printing it. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 22.
Exemptions not to apply 23. An exemption from disclosure of a record under sections 13, 15, 17, 18,20,21 -
and 2 1.1 does not apply where a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 1, s. 23; 1997, c. 41, s. 118 (2).
Loi sur l'acci?~ ii l'information et la protection de la vie priv6e L.R.O. 1990, CHAPITRE F.3 1
10. (1) Chacun a un droit d'accks a un document ou une partie de celui-ci dont une institution a la garde ou le contrble, sauf dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants :
a) le document ou la partie du document fait l'objet d'une exception aux termes des articles 12 9 22;
b) la personne responsable est d'avis, fonde sur des motifs raisonnables, que la demande d'accks est hvole ou vexatoire. 1996, chap. 1, annexe K, art. 1.
Extrait du document (2) Si une institution reqoit une demande d'accks a un document qui contient des
renseignements faisant l'objet d'une exception aux termes des articles 12 a 22 et que la personne responsable de l'institution n'est pas d'avis que la demande est frivole ou vexatoire, elle divulgue la partie du document qui peut raisonnablement en etre extraite sans divulguer ces renseignements. 1996, chap. I, annexe K, art. 1.
Documents du Conseil exCcutif 12. (1) La personne responsable refuse de divulguer un document qui aurait pour
effet de reveler l'objet des deliberations du Conseil exkcutif ou de ses comites, notamment :
a) l'ordre du jour, le procks-verbal ou un autre relev6 des deliberations ou des decisions du Conseil exkcutif ou de ses comites;
b) le document qui relate un choix de politiques ou des recommandations qui ont kt6 ou qui seront presentees au Conseil executif ou a ses comites;
c) le document qui ne relate pas le choix de politiques ou les recommandations visees a l'alinka b) mais qui contient les donnkes de base ou les etudes menkes sur certaines questions qui ont kt6 ou qui seront presentees au Conseil executif ou 9 ses comites comme guides dans l'klaboration de leurs decisions avant que ces decisions ne soient prises ou mises 21 effet;
d) le document consulte ou qui est le h i t d'une consultation entre ministres de la Couronne sur des questions relikes a l'elaboration de decisions gouvernementales ou 9 la formulation de politiques gouvernementales;
e) le document destine a un ministre de la Couronne et qui concerne des questions qui ont Cte ou qui seront presentees au Conseil executif ou a ses comitks ou qui font l'objet d'une consultation entre les ministres relativement aux decisions gouvernementales ou a la formulation des politiques gouvernementales;
f) les projets de loi ou de rkglement. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 12 (1).
Exception (2) Malgre le paragraphe (1)' la personne responsable ne doit pas refuser de
divulguer un document en vertu de ce paragraphe si, selon le cas :
a) le document date de plus de vingt ans;
b) le Conseil exkcutif concern6 donne son consentement a la divulgation. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 12 (2).
Conseils au gouvernement 13. (1 _2 La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document qui aurait
pour effet de reveler les conseils ou les recommandations emanant d'un fonctionnaire, d'une personne employke par une institution ou d'un expert-conseil dont les services ont kt6 retenus par cette institution. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 13 (1).
Exceptions (2) Malgre le paragraphe (I), la personne responsable ne doit pas refuser, en vertu
de ce paragraphe, de divulguer un document qui comporte l'un des elements suivants :
a) de la documentation portant sur des faits;
b) un sondage statistique;
c) le rapport d'un estimateur, que ce dernier soit ou non un dirigeant de l'institution;
d) un rapport sur d76ventuelles rkpercussions sur l'environnement ou un document semblable;
e) le rapport qui porte sur l'essai d'un produit relie a la mise a 1'6preuve de pieces d'equipement appartenant au gouvernement ou le rksultat d'un test mene a l'intention des consommateurs;
f) le rapport ou le resultat d'une etude relative au rendement ou a l'efficacite d'une institution, que ce rapport ou cette ktude soient d'ordre general ou portent sur un programme ou une politique en particulier;
g) une etude de faisabilite ou autre ktude technique, y compris une estimation des cofits, reliee a une politique ou 9 un projet gouvernementaux;
h) le rapport qui comporte les rksultats d'une recherche effectuee sur le terrain prealablement a la formulation d'une politique proposke;
i) la proposition ou le plan dkfinitifs en vue de la modification d'un programme existant ou de l'ktablissement d'un nouveau programme d'une institution, y compris son estimation budgktaire, que cette proposition ou ce plan soient subordonnks ou non a une approbation quelconque, sauf s'ils doivent etre presentes au Conseil exkcutif ou ses comites;
j) le rapport du groupe de travail d'un comite interministhiel ou d'une entit6 semblable ou celui d'un comite ou d'un groupe de travail internes d'une institution charges de dresser un rapport sur une question precise, sauf si ce rapport doit ttre present6 au Conseil exkcutif ou a ses comites;
k) le rapport d'un comite, d'un conseil ou d'une autre entitk liks a une institution et constituks dans le but de mener des enquCtes suivies de rapports ou de recommandations destinks a cette institution;
1) les motifs it l'appui de la dkcision, de I'arrCtk, de l'ordonnance, de l'ordre ou de la directive definitifs du dirigeant d'une institution et rendus 9 la fin ou au cours de l'exercice d'un pouvoir discrktionnaire confkrk par un texte lkgislatif ou un projet mis en application par cette institution, ou en vertu de ceux-ci, qu'il soit permis ou non aux termes du texte lkgislatif ou du projet d'interjeter appel de ces dkcisions, arrCtes, ordonnances, ordres ou directives. Ce qui prkckde s'applique, que ces motifs :
(i) figurent ou non dans une note de service qui kmane de l'institution ou dans la lettre d'un dirigeant ou d'un employk de cette institution, destinke B une personne donnke,
(ii) aient ktk ou non exposks par le dirigeant qui a rendu cette dkcision ou directive ou cet ordre que ces motifs y soient incorpores par renvoi ou non. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 13 (2).
Idem (3) Malgrk le paragraphe (1)' la personne responsable ne doit pas refuser, en vertu
de ce paragraphe, de divulguer un document si le document date de plus de vingt ans ou si la personne responsable l'a publiquement citk comme ayant servi de fondement a une decision ou A la formulation d'une politique. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 13 (3).
ExCcution de la Loi 14. (1) La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est
raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet, selon le cas :
a) de faire obstacle a une question qui concerne l'exkcution de la loi;
b) de faire obstacle 9 lYenquCte menee prkalablement a une instance judiciaire ou qui y aboutira vraisemblablement;
c) de rkvkler des techniques et procCdks d'enquCte qui sont prksentement ou qui seront vraisemblablement en usage dans l'exkcution de la loi;
d) de divulguer l'identitk d'une source d'information confidentielle relike B l'exkcution de la loi ou de divulguer des renseignements obtenus uniquement de cette source;
e) de constituer une menace a la vie ou 9 la skcuritk physique d'un agent d'exkcution de la loi ou d'une autre personne;
f) de priver une personne de son droit a un procks kquitable ou B un jugement impartial;
g) de faire obstacle ii l'obtention de renseignements secrets reliks ti l'exkcution de la loi a l'kgard de certaines organisations ou de certaines personnes ou de les rkvkler ;
h) de rkvkler un document qui a kt6 confisquk a une personne par un agent de la paix, conformkment A une loi ou B un rbglement;
i) de compromettre la sCcuritC d'un irnrneuble ou d'un v6hicule servant au transport de certains articles ou au systeme ou mode de protection de ces articles, dont la protection est normalement exigee;
j) de faciliter 1'Cvasion d'une personne legalement dktenue;
k) de compromettre la sCcuritC d'un centre de detention legale;
1) de faciliter la perpetration d'un acte illegal ou d'entraver la repression du crime. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 14 (1); 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, par. 1 (1).
Idem (2) La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document, selon le cas :
a) qui constitue un rapport dress6 au cours de I'exCcution de la loi, de l'inspection ou de l'enqu6te menCes par un organisme charge d'assurer et de reglementer l'observation de la loi;
b) qui est relie a 1'exCcution de la loi et dont la divulgation constituerait une infraction 9 une loi du Parlement;
c) qui est relie a lYexCcution de la loi s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet d'exposer la responsabilite civile l'auteur du document ou la personne qui y est citCe ou paraphrasee;
d) oG figurent les renseignements relies aux antecedents, a la surveillance ou ti la mise en libertk d'une personne confike au contr6le ou la surveillance d'une administration correctionnelle. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 14 (2); 2002, chap. 1 8, annexe K, par. 1 (2).
Refus de confirmer ou de nier l'existence d'un document (3) La personne responsable peut refuser de confirmer ou de nier l'existence du
document vise au paragraphe (1) ou (2). L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 14 (3).
Exception (4) MalgrC l'alinea (2) a), la personne responsable divulgue le document qui
constitue un rapport dresse dans le cadre d'inspections de routine effectukes par un organisme autorise a assurer et a rkglementer l'observation d'une loi particuliere de lYOntario. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 14 (4).
Idem (5) Les paragraphes (1) et (2) ne s'appliquent pas au document qui a trait au degre
de succes atteint dans le cadre d'un programme d'execution de la loi, y compris les analyses statistiques, sauf si la divulgation de ce document est susceptible de nuire, de faire obstacle ou de porter atteinte ti la poursuite des objectifs vises a ces paragraphes. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.31, par. 14 (5).
Instances introduites en vertu de la Loi de 2001 sur les recours civils 14.1 La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document et peut -
refuser de confirmer ou de nier l'existence d'un document s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que sa divulgation ait pour effet de faire obstacle a la capacitk du procureur general de decider si une instance devrait Gtre introduite en vertu de la Loi de 2001 sur les recours civils, de conduire une instance en vertu de cette loi ou d'executer
une ordonnance rendue en application de cette loi. 2001, chap. 28, par. 22 (1); 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 2; 2007, chap. 13, par. 43 (1).
Loi de 2002 interdisant les gains tire's du re'cit d'actes criminels 14.2 La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document et refuser de -
confirmer ou de nier l'existence d'un document s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que sa divulgation ait pour effet de faire obstacle a la capacite du procureur gknkral de dCcider si une instance dewait 6tre introduite en vertu de la Loi de 2002 interdisant les gains tirBs du rkcit d 'actes criminels, de conduire une instance en vertu de cette loi ou d'executer une ordonnance rendue en application de cette loi. 2002, chap. 2, par. 15 (1) et 19 (4); 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 3.
Rapports avec d'autres autoritCs gouvernementales 15. La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est -
raisonnable de s'attendre ce que la divulgation ait pour effet, selon le cas :
a) de nuire 9 la poursuite des rapports intergouvernementaux entretenus par le gouvernement de l'ontario ou par une institution;
b) de reveler des renseignements confidentiels confiks a une institution par un autre gouvernement ou par l'un de ses organismes;
c) de reveler des renseignements confidentiels confiks a une institution par une organisation internationale d '~ t a t s ou l'une de leurs entitks.
La personne responsable ne doit pas divulguer ce document sans l'autorisation prealable du Conseil executif. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, art. 15; 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 4.
DCfense 16. La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est -
raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet de nuire a la defense du Canada ou d'un tat Ctranger qui est alliC ou associk au Canada ou d'entraver la dktection, la prevention ou la repression de l'espionnage, du sabotage ou du terrorisme. Elle ne doit pas divulguer ce document sans l'autorisation prealable du Conseil exkcutif. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, art. 1 6; 2002, chap. 1 8, annexe K, art. 5.
Renseignements de tiers 17. (I) La personne responsable refuse de divulguer un document qui rkvkle un
secret industriel ou des renseignements d'ordre scientifique, technique, commercial, financier ou qui ont trait aux relations de travail, dont le caractkre confidentiel est implicite ou explicite, s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet, selon le cas :
a) de nuire gravement a la situation concurrentielle ou d'entraver gravement les nkgociations contractuelles ou autres d'une personne, d'un groupe de personnes ou d'une organisation;
b) d'interrompre la communication de renseignements semblables a l'institution, alors qu'il serait dans lYintCr6t public que cette communication se poursuive;
c) de causer des pertes ou des profits indus a une personne, un groupe de personnes, un comite, une institution ou un organisme financiers;
d) de divulguer des renseignements foumis a un conciliateur, un mkdiateur, un agent des relations de travail ou une autre personne nommke pour rkgler un conflit de relations de travail, ou de divulguer le rapport de l'une de ces personnes. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 17 (1); 2002, chap. 1 8, annexe K, art. 6.
Renseignements sur l'imp6t (2) La personne responsable refuse de divulguer un document qui rev6le des
renseignements qui ont kt6 relevks dans une dkclaration dYimp8t ou recueillis des fins dyktablissement de l'assujettissement B lYimp8t ou de perception fiscale. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 17 (2).
Consentement a la divulgation (3) La personne responsable peut divulguer un document visk au paragraphe (1) ou
(2) si la personne concernke par les renseignements y consent. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 17 (3).
IntCrSts 6conomiques et autres de I'Ontario 18. (1 La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document qui
comporte :
a) des secrets industriels ou des renseignements d'ordre financier, commercial, scientifique ou technique qui sont la propriktk du gouvernement de lYOntario ou d'une institution et qui ont une valeur pkcuniaire actuelle ou eventuelle;
b) des renseignements rksultant d'une recherche effectuee par l'employk d'une institution s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre ce que leur divulgation ait pour effet de retirer 9 l'employk la primautk de la publication;
c) des renseignements s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre ce que leur divulgation ait pour effet de nuire aux intkr6ts Cconomiques d'une institution ou B sa situation concurrentielle;
d) des renseignements s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre 9 ce que leur divulgation ait pour effet de nuire aux intkr6ts financiers du gouvernement de lYOntario ou B sa facultk de diriger l'kconomie de la province;
e) des positions, projets, lignes de conduite, normes ou instructions devant 6tre observks par le gouvemement de lYOntario, l'une de ses institutions ou pour son compte dans le cadre d'une nkgociation actuelle ou kventuelle;
f) les projets relatifs la direction du personnel ou ii la gestion d'une institution qui n'ont pas encore ktk mis en application ou rendus publics;
g) des renseignements, y compris les projets, les politiques ou les entreprises proposks d'une institution, s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre ce que leur divulgation ait pour effet d'entrainer la divulgation prematurke d'une dkcision de politiques qui est en instance ou des pertes ou avantages financiers indus pour une personne;
h) des renseignements concernant des tests prkcis ou des mkthodes ou techniques d'kvaluation prkcises devant servir a des fins kducatives, s'il est raisonnable
de s'attendre 9 ce que leur divulgation ait pour effet de nuire 9 l'utilisation ou aux rksultats des tests ou des mkthodes ou techniques d'kvaluation;
des observations relatives 9 une question viske par la Loi sur les nbgociations de limites municipales soumise avant son abrogation par la Loi de 2001 sur les municipalitbs qui sont faites par une municipalitk en cause ou par une autre entite avant sa rksolution. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 18 (1); 2002, chap. 17, annexe F, tableau; 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 7; 2005, chap. 28, annexe F, art. 2.
Exceptions (2) La personne responsable ne doit pas refuser aux termes du paragraphe (1)' de
divulguer le document qui donne le rksultat de l'essai d'un produit ou d'essais relatifs B l'environnement effectuks par une institution ou pour son compte, sauf si ces essais, selon le cas :
a) ktaient effectuk moyennant rkmuneration 9 titre de service en faveur d'une personne, d'un groupe de personnes ou d'une organisation qui n'est pas une institution;
b) ktaient de nature prkliminaire ou expkrimentale en vue de l'elaboration de nouveaux modes d'essais. L.R.O. 1 990, chap. F.3 1, par. 1 8 (2).
Renseignements concernant les reunions a huis clos 18.1 (1) La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document qui
rkvele l'essentiel des dklibkrations du corps dirigeant d'un ktablissement d'enseignement ou d'un comitk de ce corps dirigeant lors d'une rkunion si une loi autorise la tenue de cette rkunion en l'absence du public et que l'objet de la rkunion est, selon le cas :
a) un projet de reglement administratif, de rksolution ou de loi;
b) un litige ou un litige kventuel. 2005, chap. 28, annexe F, art. 3.
Exception (2) Malgre le paragraphe (1)' la personne responsable ne doit pas refuser de
divulguer un document en vertu de ce paragraphe si, selon le cas :
a) les renseignements ne sont pas dktenus de fagon confidentielle;
b) l'objet des dklibkrations a fait l'objet d'une rkunion ouverte au public;
c) le document date de plus de 20 ans. 2005, chap. 28, annexe F, art. 3.
Application de la Loi (3) L'exception prkvue au paragraphe (1) s'ajoute aux autres exceptions prkvues
par la prksente loi. 2005, chap. 28, annexe F, art. 3.
Secret professionnel de l'avocat 19. La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document qui, selon le -
cas :
a) est protkgk par le secret professionnel de l'avocat;
b) a kt6 klabork par l'avocat-conseil de la Couronne, ou pour le compte de celui- ci, qui l'utilise soit dans la communication de conseils juridiques, soit a l'occasion ou en prkvision d'une instance;
c) a kt6 klabork par l'avocat-conseil employ6 ou engagk par un ktablissement d'enseignement, ou pour le compte de cet avocat-conseil, qui l'utilise soit dans la communication de conseils juridiques, soit a l'occasion ou en prkvision d'une instance. 2005, chap. 28, annexe F, art. 4.
Menace la santC ou a la sCcuritC 20. La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est -
raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet de compromettre gravement la santk ou la skcurite d'un particulier. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, art. 20; 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 8.
Vie privCe 21. (1) La personne responsable ne divulgue des renseignements personnels qu'au
particulier concernk par ceux-ci, sauf, selon le cas :
a) a la demande kcrite ou du consentement prkalables du particulier concern6 si ce dernier a lui-meme le droit d'y avoir acces;
b) lors d'une situation d'urgence ou il existe un risque immkdiat pour la sante ou la skcurite d'un particulier, si un avis de la divulgation est ensuite envoy6 par courrier au particulier concernk par les renseignements a sa derniere adresse connue;
c) les renseignements personnels recueillis et conservks dans le but prkcis de constituer un document accessible au grand public;
d) en vertu d'une loi de lYOntario ou du Canada qui autorise expresskment la divulgation;
e) a des fins de recherche si les conditions suivantes sont rkunies :
(i) la divulgation est conforme aux conditions ou 9 l'utilisation envisagkes au moment ou ces renseignements ont kt6 divulgues, recueillis ou obtenus,
(ii) les fins de recherche B l'origine de la divulgation ne peuvent &re raisonnablement atteintes que si les renseignements sont divulguks sous une forme qui permette l'identification individuelle,
(iii) la personne devant recevoir le document a accept6 de se conformer aux conditions relatives ti la skcuritk et au caractbre confidentiel qui sont prescrites par les rbglements;
f) la divulgation ne constitue pas une atteinte injustifike a la vie privke. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 21 (1).
Critcres : atteinte injustifibe a la vie privCe (2) Aux fins de dkterminer si la divulgation de renseignements personnels
constitue une atteinte injustifike a la vie privke, la personne responsable tient compte des circonstances pertinentes et examine notamment si :
a) la divulgation est souhaitable parce qu'elle permet au public de surveiller de prks les activitks du gouvemement de l'ontario et de ses organismes;
b) l'accks aux renseignements personnels peut promouvoir une amklioration de la santk et de la skcuritk publiques;
c) l'accks aux renseignements personnels rendra l'achat de biens et de services susceptible d'un choix plus judicieux;
d) les renseignements personnels ont une incidence sur la juste dktermination des droits qui concement l'auteur de la demande;
e) le particulier visk par les renseignements personnels risque dYCtre injustement lksk dans ses intCrt5ts pkcuniaires ou autres;
f) les renseignements personnels sont d'une nature trks dklicate;
g) I'exactitude et la fiabilitk des renseignements personnels sont douteuses;
h) le particulier visk par les renseignements personnels les a communiques l'institution a titre confidentiel;
i) la divulgation est susceptible de porter injustement atteinte a la reputation d'une personne dont il est fait mention dans le document. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 21 (2).
Atteinte prCsumCe A la vie privCe (3) Est prksumke constituer une atteinte injustifike la vie privee, la divulgation de
renseignements personnels qui, selon le cas :
a) sont relatifs aux antkckdents, au diagnostic, a la maladie, au traitement ou l'kvaluation d'ordre mkdical, psychiatrique ou psychologique;
b) ont kt6 recueillis et peuvent Ctre identifiks comme partie du dossier d'une enquCte relike a une contravention possible a la loi, sauf dans la mesure ou la divulgation est necessaire aux fins d'instituer des poursuites judiciaires ou de continuer I'enquCte;
c) sont relatifs 9 l'admissibilitk aux prestations d'aide sociale ou de service social ou a l'ktablissement du niveau des prestations;
d) ont trait aux antkckdents professionnels ou acadkmiques;
e) ont kt6 relevks dans une dkclaration d'imp6t ou recueillis a des fins de perception fiscale;
f) prkcisent la situation financikre, le revenu, l'actif, le passif, la situation nette, les soldes bancaires, les antkckdents ou les activitks d'ordre financier ou la solvabilite d'un particulier;
g) comportent des recommandations ou des evaluations personnelles, des renseignements ayant trait 9 la moralitk ou a des kvaluations de personnel;
h) indiquent la race, l'origine ethnique, l'orientation sexuelle ou les croyances ou allkgeances religieuses ou politiques du particulier. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 21 (3).
Restrictions (4) Malgr6 le paragraphe (3), ne constitue pas une atteinte injustifike a la vie
privee, la divulgation portant sur les renseignements suivants :
a) le classement, les barkmes de traitement et d'avantages sociaux ou les responsabilitk professionnelles d'un particulier qui est ou a kt6 dirigeant ou employ6 d'une institution ou membre du personnel d'un ministre;
b) les modalitks d'ordre financier ou autres d'un contrat de louage de services personnels intervenu entre un particulier et une institution;
c) les modalit6s d'une licence, d'un permis ou d'un autre avantage financier semblable que l'institution ou la personne responsable accorde ii sa discretion au particulier dans des circonstances oh :
(i) d'une part, ce particulier represente 1 pour cent ou plus de l'ensemble des personnes et organisations de l'ontario qui bCn6ficient d'un avantage semblable,
(ii) d'autre part, l'avantage pour le particulier represente 1 pour cent ou plus de la valeur totale des avantages semblables procures ii d'autres personnes et organisations de lYOntario;
d) des renseignements personnels concernant un particulier dCcedC qui sont divulguks 9 son conjoint ou ii un de ses proches parents, si la personne responsable est convaincue, compte tenu des circonstances, que la divulgation est souhaitable pour des motifs de compassion. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, par. 21 (4); 2006, chap. 19, annexe N, par. 1 (2).
Refus de confirmer ou de nier l'existence d'un document (5) La personne responsable peut refuser de confirmer ou de nier l'existence d'un
document dont la divulgation constituerait une atteinte injustifike B la vie privee. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.31, par. 21 (5).
Espkces de poisson et d'animaux sauvages en peril 21.1 (1) La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est
raisonnable de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet que soient tues, captures, blesses ou harceles des poissons ou animaux sauvages qui appartiennent B une espkce en peril ou que soit perturb6 leur habitat. 1997, chap. 41, par. 11 8 (1); 2002, chap. 18, annexe K, art. 9.
DCfinitions (2) Les definitions qui suivent s'appliquent au present article.
((animal sauvage)) et (cpoisson)) S'entendent au sens de la Loi de 1997 sur la protection dupoisson et de la faune. 1997, chap. 41, par. 11 8 (1).
Remarque : Le 30 juin 2008 ou a la date antCrieure que le lieutenant-gouverneur fme par proclamation, l'article 21.1 est abrogC par l'article 61 du chapitre 6 des Lois de 190ntario de 2007 et remplacC par ce qui suit :
Espbces en peril
21.1 La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document s'il est raisonnable - de s'attendre a ce que la divulgation ait pour effet, selon le cas :
a) que soit tu6, harcelk, capture ou pris un mernbre vivant d'une espkce, ou qu'il y soit nui, contrairement i I'alinCa 9 (1) a) de la Loi de 2007 sur les espkces en voie de disparition;
b) que soit possCd6, transporte, collectionne, achete, vendu, loue ou Cchange, ou soit vise par une offre d'acheter, de vendre, de louer ou d'6changer un mernbre, vivant ou mort, d'une espkce, une partie d'un membre, vivant ou mort, d'une espkce ou quoi que ce soit qui est derive d'un membre, vivant ou mort, d'une espkce, contrairement 9 l'alinCa 9 (1) b) de la Loi de 2007 sur les espBces en voie de disparition;
c) que soit endomrnage ou dktruit l'habitat d'une espkce, contrairement 9 l'alinka 10 (1) a) ou b) de la Loi de 2007sur les espkces en voie de disparition. 2007, chap. 6 , art. 6 1.
Voir : 2007, chap. 6, art. 61 et par. 63 (1).
Publication prochaine des renseignements 22. La personne responsable peut refuser de divulguer un document si, selon le -
cas :
a) le document ou les renseignements qu'il comporte ont dkja CtC publies ou sont accessibles au public;
b) la personne responsable a des motifs raisonnables de croire que le document ou les renseignements seront publies par une institution dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours de la demande ou au cours de la periode de temps additionnelle nkcessaire a leur impression ou a leur traduction cette fin. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, art. 22.
Non-application des exceptions 23. L'exception a la divulgation visCe aux articles 13, 15, 17, 18'20'21 et 21.1 ne
s 'applFe pas si la nkcessitC manifeste de divulguer le document dans 1'intk.d public l'emporte sans conteste sur la fin visCe par l'exception. L.R.O. 1990, chap. F.3 1, art. 23; 1997, chap. 41, par. 1 18 (2).
Rules ofthe Supreem e Court of Canada
(in force on October 13,2006)
59. (1) In an order granting an intervention, the judge may
(a) make provisions as to additional disbursements incurred by the appellant or respondent as a result of the intervention; and
(b) impose any terms and conditions and grant any rights and privileges that the judge may determine, including whether the intervener is entitled to adduce further evidence or otherwise to supplement the record.
(2) In an order granting an intervention or after the time for filing and serving all of the memoranda of argument on an application for leave to appeal or the facta on an appeal or reference has expired, a judge may, in their discretion, authorize the intervener to present oral argument at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal, if any, the appeal or the reference, and determine the time to be allotted for oral argument.
(3) An intervener is not permitted to raise new issues unless otherwise ordered by a judge.
R2gles de la Cour suprzme du Canada.
(en vigueur le 13 octobre 2006)
59. (1) Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir, le juge peut :
a) prevoir comment seront supportes les dkpens supplementaires de l'appelant ou de l'intime resultant de l'intervention;
b) imposer des conditions et octroyer les droits et privilkges qu'il dktennine, notarnment le droit d'apporter d'autres klkments de preuve ou de complkter autrement le dossier.
(2) Dans l'ordonnance octroyant l'autorisation d'intervenir ou aprks l'expiration du delai de dCp8t et de signification des memoires de demande d'autorisation d'appel, d'appel ou de renvoi, le juge peut, a sa discretion, autoriser l'intervenant a presenter une plaidoirie orale a l'audition de la demande d'autorisation d'appel, de l'appel ou du renvoi, selon le cas, et determiner le temps allou6 pour la plaidoirie orale.
(3) Sauf ordonnance contraire d'un juge, l'intervenant n'est pas autorise a soulever de nouvelles questions.
