final draft term paper done
TRANSCRIPT
Lindsey Lee November 23rd 2015Term Paper POS 524
Humanitarian Intervention: The Question of Sovereignty and Humanitarian Crisis
Following the catastrophes in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990’s, discussions in the
international community blazed on how to justly react when human rights are grossly and
systematically violated in the world. The question of whether states have unconditional
sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international community has the right to intervene in
a country for the sake of humanitarian purposes was, and still is to this day, seriously debated.
The discussions today surrounding the ethics of humanitarian intervention are surprisingly
uncontroversial, although incredibly powerful for justification. For a majority, the debates
address the issue of whether or not a body representing the ‘international community’, such as
the UN or NATO, is permitted to intervene in another country, breaching their sovereignty, in
the interest of protecting human rights. While actors on both sides of the humanitarian
intervention debate have provided undoubtedly powerful arguments, I align with those that
contend that in either situation- when a state is momentarily incapable of protecting individual
rights for various reasons later to be explained or is an active violator of those rights- it has
consequently forfeited its right to state sovereignty and the right to demand outside actors be
uninvolved. Furthermore, when one recounts violent eras in our world’s history, they cannot
deny wars that involved the state-making process involved violation of human rights. This
violence was historically understood as another part of the struggle to legitimize their state.
Consequently, I argue that it is absolutely crucial to determine whether violence is a consequence
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of state-making, or whether the rights are being violated in a state that is already legitimate,
sovereignty has been established and recognized by the international community as such and is
violating mass human rights. Finally, above all, I believe that the international community needs
to put rest to the debates focusing on sovereignty being the utmost important factor in
determining whether humanitarian intervention is just or unjust. Rather, I propose that the
international community start embracing a more humanistic approach, focusing on the human
rights being violated in world crisis areas. However, when a discussion like this surrounding
morals and ethics arises, the question of whether or not it will ever be resolved is obviously
solicited. In retrospect, the question of whether abortion is morally right or wrong, or legally
just or unjust, has been circulating for decades, to no end. Likewise, the question of
humanitarian intervention being justified through moral obligation, or through legal justification
will without question continue to penetrate international relations debates for years to come.
In order to better understand why the notion of humanitarian intervention is such a
controversial topic in the international community, a brief overview of what it is and the origins
must be further explained. For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘intervention’ involves
unauthorized coercive interference in the domestic affairs of another state in turn infringing that
state’s sovereignty. Furthermore, when referring to ‘humanitarian’ interventions, I am referring
to gross or systematic violation of human rights, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
politicide for example.
Humanitarian intervention as a formal legal definition does not exist. However, scholars
Kelly K. Pease and David P. Forsythe writing in Human Rights Quarterly published by Johns
Hopkins University states that it is “a foreign actor to use force within the territorial jurisdiction
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of a state, without the consent of the ruling authority, to ameliorate or terminate violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”1 From this very basic definition, the notion of
humanitarian intervention is immediately recognized as being ambiguously problematic. The
international community recognizes state sovereignty to be one of the highest priorities on its
agendas.2 The fact that humanitarian intervention involves interference into another country
without that countries consent, consequently infringing upon that state’s sovereignty, makes this
incredibly controversial to a globalized world that cherishes the notion of sovereignty. However,
some argue that this infringement of sovereignty is justified due to gross violations of human
rights occurring in that country that are recognized by the international community. In the most
basic, simple terms, should states be able to coercively intervene in another country in an attempt
to stop violations of human rights from happening? Do those mass violations of human rights
make it politically just for the international community to infringe on a states sovereignty in
order to terminate human rights violations such as genocide, or ethnic cleansing? In short, some
say yes, it is a moral obligation for a country to save another counties citizen if their rights are
being violated. Others say no, that intervening in another country infringes on national
sovereignty, which the international community guaranteed they could have. However, another
controversy is based not on the above mentioned issues, but whether such an authority exists that
1 Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly 48 (1993): 290. 2 The Charter of the United Nations is available online at the URL: http://www . un . org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index . html . Article 2 of Chapter I in the charter explains “1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Chapter I is considered the section explain the purposes and principles of the United Nations organization. Of course, maintaining international peace and security is also within this chapter. This is why humanitarian intervention is so controversial, when two goals that have such high prominence and importance clash, what should the community do?
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is able to claim they have a legal right at all to intervene in another country, such as the UN or a
military alliance such as NATO.3 Moreover, these controversies are just the tip of the iceberg.
There are numerous reasons why scholars and international actors argue for and against
humanitarian interventions. For this reason, it makes sense to examine the origins of the concept
itself.
The history of humanitarian intervention is complex. In dating legal violations of human
rights, I agree with scholars Kelly K. Pease and David P. Forsythe once again. They argue that
historically speaking, gross violations of human rights that were dealt with by treaty in the
international community stem from slave trading and international armed conflict.4 When trying
to explain the over all history of humanitarian interventions it begins to become quite the task.
Some may argue that the first example of a state intervening in the domestic affairs of another on
the grounds of humanitarian concerns was in the early 19th century during the Greek War of
Independence. Russia, France, and Great Britain intervened in the Ottoman Empire to help
Greek citizens seek independence from the Ottomans.
During the 20th century, after World War I, organizations like the League of Nations
attempted to mediate and settle international disputes and conflicts, yet the tension of the Great
Powers rising in the world led to a lack of will in the international community to enforce
anything ‘legally’. Aggressive actors were condemned by the international community, prior to
the outbreak of World War II, but they remained just that. However, upon the Allied forces
3 Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and International Society,” Global Governance 7 (2001): 225-27.4 Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics,” 295.
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discovery of the Holocaust and the catastrophes in Eastern Europe in World War II, attitudes
toward humanitarian interventions changed drastically. And so, it was the creation of the United
Nations organization in 1945 that extensively internationalized human rights and humanitarian
interventions. Articles 55 through 60 in Chapter IX of the UN Charter promote human rights as
a principal purpose of its members.5 In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was published by the General Assembly of the United Nation was published on December 10th
1948. The document contains 30 articles detailing the “equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family” in the world. Ironically, the Charter of the United Nations is also
used by critics as evidence against humanitarian intervention for sovereignty arguments. For
example, Chapter 1 Article 2 Section 7 states “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matter to settlement under
the present Chapter.”6 This is precisely why it is so important to remember that a main priority
of The Charter, even before stating Chapter 1 Article 2 Section 7, is to maintain international
peace and security. The entire idea and theory of the United Nations organization mimics the
idea of an international ‘peace keeper’, which is ironically what the UN military forces are
labeled. Therefore, when a nation has not maintained peace and security to its citizens, the UN’s
reason for being created in the first place, it has forfeited its right to sovereignty and ability to
deny outside nations from interfering in its internal affairs. It is first and foremost the duty of
5 “CHAPTER IX: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION,” Charter of the United Nations, accessed November 12, 2015, http://www . un . org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ix/index . html . 6 “The Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter 1 Article 2, http://www . un . org/en/sections/un- charter/chapter-i/index . html .
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the UN members and the international community, as stated by the Charter, to maintain peace in
the world. So first, let us examine at when the international community does and does not
intervene in domestic affairs.
At the 2005 world summit, the UN community of states hailed the concept of
“responsibility to protect” (R2P) that was originally promoted by the Canadian Government.
The states committed to “take collective action, in a time and decisive manner, through the
security council, in accordance with the charter, including chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”7 This is, essentially, the terms in
which an intervention is planned. In the twentieth century, there have been a few cases of
unilateral humanitarian intervention, despite hundreds of other cases where the regimes have
been guilty of human rights violence, and no interventions occurred. Examples include India’s
intervention in East Pakistan, Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda, Vietnam’s intervention in
Cambodia, and the intervention cases of Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.8
Of course it is not possible to examine humanitarian intervention without a reference to
World War II and the Holocaust. In 1944 Allied troops moved across Europe against Nazi
Germany and encountered Nazi concentration camps in which prisoners where suffering from
acts of massive genocide, ethnic cleansing, and politicide. The liberation made most public was
7 Catherine Lu, “Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints,” International Journal 62 (2007): 942.8 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia Compared,” International Political Science Review 18 (1997):71-93.
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the liberation of the concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau by the Soviets in January of 1945.
There was abundant evidence of mass murder at the camp, and the Soviets liberated only a
couple thousand prisoners that were left behind. In addition to the surviving prisoners which
were for the most part Jews, the Soviets also found thousands of items of clothing, shoes, and
thousands of other personal items such as toothbrushes and glasses all of which were evidence of
the mass genocide. Historians estimate that anywhere between 2.1 and 4 million people were
murdered systematically at Auschwitz-Birkenau, and for a large majority those people were
Jewish.9 In this specific publicized case, the Allied forces were sweeping across Europe in a war
with Nazi Germany so there was no action or policy on behalf of the Allied troops prior to
liberation of the death camps, signaling that their actions were on behalf of humanitarian
intervention. The Allied forces of course had been told of the horrors occurring in Europe
through hearsay, but had never seen it personally, much of their discovering came as horrific
surprises. However, the case of what is now understood as the Holocaust, has been consistently
used as an example to explain when humanitarian intervention is just and is possibly the most
well known. I maintain that this case, the Holocaust, is an absolutely justified case of what
humanitarian intervention should be. Now, in recent years, when humanitarian intervention has
been the hot topic for debate, tragedies like the Holocaust have not been repeated on such a mass
scale, fortunately. However, that is not to say that other cases in the world proving to be equally
as tragic have not occurred, because most would agree they certainly have. The question is
should the international community depend on political and legal constraints when deciding to
intervene? Or should the focus be more centered on a moral approach? 9 “Auschwitz-Birkenau: History and Overview,” Jewish Virtual Library, accessed November 21, 2015, http://www . jewishvirtuallibrary . org/jsource/Holocaust/auschbirk . html .
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There are two specific types of humanitarian intervention of which the moral question of
right and wrong as well as having the authority to do so, is not important and are rarely ever
challenged. The first, when governments have agreed to accept UN peacekeeping forces or
peace keepers or when a cease-fire agreement has been reached and secondly, when there is a
state-failure case when there is essentially no state government existing anymore because it has
failed to keep authority and thus, there is no sovereignty to infringe upon. When the latter case
occurs, humanitarian intervention is considered to be a good option if authority in that country
has collapsed.10 These cases of intervention are rarely debated as being illegitimate and unjust.
The cases where intervention involves the use of uninvited, violent force and therefore violates a
state’s claim to sovereignty, are where debates arise. At this debate’s core stands the issue of the
extent and the source of an actor’s authority to infringe a state’s sovereignty in order to protect
that states citizens from harmful human abuses. Examining a few past cases where the UN has
sanctioned interventions in countries in responses to humanitarian crises will now be shown to
show an example of when the international community has taken action.
A majority of people would agree that the United Nations is the closest organization we
have to a world authority. Thus, I will concentrate on this organization for a majority. In order
to “get the green light” on a humanitarian intervention the United Nations looks to the Security
Council for approval to authorize the use of military force. Drawing from examples of prior
military interventions in the last century, some observers have pointed out that cases of
10 Eric A. Heinze, “The Moral Limits to Humanitarian Intervention: Reconciling Human Respect and Utility,” Polity 36 (2004):543-58.
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interventions before the Cold War have essentially no contemporary significance.11 Therefore, I
will concentrate on the years after the Cold War had ended and the United Nations had a
predominant role in international interventions.
Somalia was one of the first cases of which the Security Council and the United Nations
played a large role in a sanctioned intervention with humanitarian purposes. In 1991, Somalia’s
dictator, Said Barre, was overthrown in a coup which lead to various power struggles amongst
different groups who were then fighting for control of the country. At the same time, there was a
terrible drought occurring that showed it could potentially lead to mass starvation. With such
severe fighting in the country’s capital, and exceedingly difficult conditions for delivering aid
and food, the Security Council declared Somalia’s condition a humanitarian crisis being that it
threatened international peace and security. The nations that make up the United Nations were
reluctant and slow in response to the situation, fearing an intervention would infringe Somalia’s
sovereignty that was protected by the UN Charter. However, after repeated requests from
numerous aid agencies the Security Council adopted small operations to help combat the crises.
The situation grew exceedingly worse and the Security Council decided to implement more
radical actions. In 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 which launched 500
peacekeepers to provide security and aid, guard food depots, and oversee the ceasefire in
Somalia’s capital Mogadishu. The crisis in Somalia escalated quickly and became increasingly
worse during the year. The United States requested to lead an operation that called on multiple
nations to join forces to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief as quick as
11 Thomas G. Weiss, “Researching Humanitarian Interventions: Some Lessons,” Journal of Peace Research 38 (2001): 420. Weiss also notes that other observers are David A. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, “UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned,” Global Governance.
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possible. This lead to “Operation Restore Hope”, which mandated the use of military force if
necessary. Although the environment for dispersal of humanitarian assistance was secured,
Operation Restore Hope failed to provide security in the country, as violence persisted. The UN
Security Council’s mission changed, focusing more on rebuilding Somalia as a nation, rather
than strictly providing humanitarian aid. Various failures of the UN and the Security Council
have been argued by the international community that lead to the violent conflicts with Somali’s
militaries. These clashes lead to drastic changes in the situation in Somalia, which went from a
peaceful intervention supplying aid and security, to a militarized focus impacted by social,
economic and political factors. As the environment grew more hostile to UN forces in Somalia,
the infamous incident of three U.S marines being killed in a Black Hawk helicopter being
downed was made highly publicized. Public opinion towards American participation in Somalia
was then in a downward spiral. President Bill Clinton of the U.S withdrew troops in 1994, and
the termination of the United Nations operation in Somalia was ended in 1995.12 The case of
Somalia is often referred to as a failed intervention by the international community.
The Rwandan genocide and civil war of 1994 is another intervention after the cold war
that is often brought up around discussions concerning humanitarian intervention.
Unfortunately, this too, it is often referred to as case of failing intervention on behalf of the UN
and international community. However, it is an important case study to focus on when explain
how the international community has intervened in a foreign state on humanitarian grounds. 12 “The Humanitarian Interventions of the UN,” The Politic, accessed November 21, 2015, http://thepolitic . org/the-security-councils-humanitarian-intervention/ . “Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S Troops From Somalia,” U.S Government Accountability Office, accessed November 21, 2015, http://www . gao . gov/products/NSIAD-94-175 .
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Rwanda has been plagued with a long history of inter-ethnic conflict amongst the
countries two main ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus. The ethnic majority, Hutus, being
85 percent of the country and the minority, Tutsis, comprising approximately 14 percent of the
country have both demonstrated their willingness to oppress one another in order to enjoy power.
However, the Tutsis have occupied power and influence for a majority of the countries conflicted
history. After gaining Independence in 1962, a military coup gave the Hutus control of the
country for around three decades. In 1988, Hutus in opposition to the government as well as
exiled Tutsis established the Rwandan Patriotic Front, or the RPF, of which the aim was to
establish a new government based on cooperation from both ethnic groups with shared power.
Shortly thereafter, armed conflict between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu
Rwandan government escalated quickly, turning violent. In mid-1993, the RPF and the Hutu-
dominated government requested UN peacekeeping forces to assist the country with
implementing a new peace agreement they negotiated called the Arusha Accords. The Security
Council passed resolution 872 on October 5th 1993 sanctioning “United Nations Mission for
Rwanda”, UNAMIR, which involved a peacekeeping force with the aim of establishing a secure
environment for a transitioning government and elections, assist with compliance of the Arusha
Accords, and organize humanitarian activities. However, because of the countries historical
background of power struggles amongst the Hutus and the Tutsis, cooperation for a transitional
government was extremely difficult from the onset of UNAMIR. Furthermore, information was
passed on that Hutu extremists affiliated with the current government were militarizing, arming
themselves in bulk, and plotting to murder large numbers of Tutsis. Violence continued
throughout the country and in April of 1994 the Security Council ruled to extend the mandate of
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UNAMIR. The very next day, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi traveling back to the
Kigali Airport were killed as their plane was shot down with a rocket. As tensions peaked, the
government controlled radios called all Hutus to seek revenge on the Tutsi population for what
they had allegedly done, although it was not certain at the time who was responsible. This
sparked what is now the well known Rwanda Genocide, where systematic and orchestrated
murders of any and all identified Tutsis and opposition Hutus spread across the country at an
alarmingly rapid pace. The Security Council finally publicly acknowledged and condemned the
systematic killings, and declared the magnitude of human suffering in Rwanda a threat to
international peace and security, authorized protected humanitarian operation zones and
increased the UN forces to 5,500 troops. However, this did not stop the already in motion
genocide and academics estimate that as many as 800,000 people were systematically murdered
in Rwanda within the course of one year. Although The Security Council had expanded
UNAMIR’s mandates in various resolutions, the Rwandan government asked the UN and
UNIMIR to leave blaming them for not doing more to stop the genocide. Eventually the new
government of Rwanda secured peace in the country by driving out the Hutu extremists.13 Now,
if the United Nations had seriously looked into the deteriorating conditions of Rwanda when the
initial stress calls of human massacring happened, perhaps this could have ended differently.
The Rwanda intervention has received much criticism over the years, with overwhelming early
evidence that the Hutu population was systematically and methodically performing acts of
genocide and did not intervene until too late.
13 Ibid. and D.R.L Ludlow, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 19 (1999): et all.
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The next question that needs addressing is how has the notion of humanitarian
intervention has evolved since these examples? The earlier mentioned notion of “Responsibility
to Protect” or commonly referred to as R2P has been slowly shaped into and alongside
humanitarian interventions for quite some time now. R2P, or the mandate that when a state fails
to protect its people the responsibility shifts from the state to the international community, was
endorsed by the “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” in the Security Council
of the UN. At this report in 2004, the panel proposed fundamental criteria in order to receive the
authorization to use force in an intervention. Of those criteria, the level and seriousness of the
threat to the international community, the size of the response by the community, as well as it
must be determined as a last resort. Fast-forwarding to September of 2005, the United Nations
World Summit was held. This particular summit is monumental when examining the evolution
of humanitarian interventions over time. It was at this meeting that all of the member states
formally accepted their own responsibility of each and every state to protect its citizens from war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.14 Additionally, the member nations also agreed
that when any member state fails to provide that security and uphold that responsibility, all other
nations have the responsibility to protect people in that failed state that are threatened with such
stated crimes. The summit furthermore stated that the decisions and actions surrounding an
intervention should be timely and decisive. Finally, the last important notion to add to the
history of humanitarian intervention came in 2009 from a report from the Secretary General of
which a strategic three pillar approach to the R2P doctrine was outlined. The report states that,
14 “Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect,” The United Nations Website, accessed November 24, 2015, http://www . un . org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility . shtml .
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“1. The state carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. The international
community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility; 3.
The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian
and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to
protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to
protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter.”15 It is because of this that I argue
when a state has failed to provide its citizen’s peace, security, and protection from human rights
violation, its sovereignty has been forfeited. Not only have most states agreed to this doctrine of
R2P but now have severe international consequences if they do not abide by the UN Charter.16
Because the evolution of humanitarian intervention has slowly grown towards a more humanistic
approach, such as focusing much more of the types of crime being committed and the level of
cooperation on behalf of the States in order to terminate the wrongdoings, I argue that we
embrace the approach and evolve the same within the international political atmosphere.
One facet needs to be addressed. Because the concept of sovereignty is such an essential
and crucial part of this argument, it is important to address it. I agree with scholar Jack Donnelly
that “states may possess sovereign rights with respect to certain activities but not others. And
the range of those activities can, has, and will continue to change with time and place.”17
Sovereignty is still a crucial component to the UN Charter and I’m certain it will be for as long
15 Ibid., et al. 16 Ibid., et al. 17 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Invention,” International Journal 48 (1993):614-15.
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as the charter is in place. However, it should not be used as a tool that makes the world ripe for
war and conflict. The world is not a monopoly game board where people (states) claim as much
land as they can, and when someone wants it, passes through it, or threatens it there is conflict.
Rather, sovereignty should be understood as being compatible with responsibilities to other
states, as well as international organizations that are often created by states, such as the United
Nations. When examining sovereignty in this light, it is important to remind ourselves that
humanitarian intervention is aimed at stabilizing the state where conflict and violence is
occurring, not to dominate and take over power from the nation. Of course issues of cost,
resources, indirect consequences, support from other nations, and proportionality all need to be
considered before partaking in any intervention. But, the UN claims to embark on these
practical details prior to any decision making or policy actions. Even if the international
community embraces the notion of non-intervention as resting on respect of state sovereignty,
the moral justification case for humanitarian intervention remains incredibly powerful. The
innocent victims of a humanitarian crisis that make the interventions morally justified, cannot be
imagined to have chosen or consented to their fate. For example, the millions of victims of the
Nazi Regime in WWII, Jewish peoples, homosexuals, handicap peoples, etc. did not chose to be
systematically exterminated. Nor can we understand the Tutsi people of Rwanda as choosing to
be victims of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and politicide. And so, whether a Nation is
momentarily unable to provide protection from human rights violations, or whether a State is an
active violator it has in the very least, lost its moral authority to demand that outside nations
remain uninvolved.
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By utilizing a human rights based view of humanitarian intervention it forces the
international community to deal with the specific types of rights that are being violated, and the
specific manner of which they are being violated. After drawing the conclusions to those
factors, and using the R2P 3 guidelines, the question as to whether or not the use of force in
humanitarian interventions is justified should be clear and self spoken.
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