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FINAL PAPER:

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSABILITY TO PROTECT (R2P):

THE CASE OF LYBIA AND SYRIA

Travail réalisé par

Marcos Enrique Romero Tejada

Code cours

LSPRI2320

Intitulé du cours

Nadim Farhat

Année académique

2015-2016

Master et finalité

Science Politique, orientation Relations Internationale, finalité Diplomatie et Résolution des

conflicts

Références portfolio : ROMERO_14-15_SPRI2320_R2P_LYBIA_SYRIA_EU _PAPER

Adresse html : http://tinyurl.com/k4nfmzx (voir point 2.3. du vade mecum portfolio)

Place Montesquieu, 1 bte L2.08.05, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique www.uclouvain.be/psad

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication (ESPO)

Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Sociales (PSAD)

http://www.uclouvain.be/psad

1

PLAN

I-INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………2

II-THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) DOCTRINE……………………………….………..3

III-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSABILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) IN THE CASE OF

LIBYA…………………………………………………………………………………………………….5

IV-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSABILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) IN THE CASE OF

SYRIA…………………………………………………………………………………………………….8

4.1-Legal and Principles perspective…………………………………………………………………8

4.2-Strategic Perspective…………………………………………………………………………..…9

4.3-Pragmatic Perspective………………………………………………………………………..…10

V-THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT IN LYBIA AND SYRIA …………………………………………………………………...11

5.1-The EU and the implementation of the R2P in the case of Libya……………………………….11

5.2- The EU and the implementation of the R2P in the case of Syria……………………………….12

VI-THE R2P AND THE BELGIAN POSITION……………………………………………………….13

VII-CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………….……….14

2

I-INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the international community was confronted with the prospect of large-scale civilian casualties

as a consequence of the struggle for power between government and rebel forces in Libya. The UN

Security Council, therefore, was confronted with the dilemma of whether to authorize an intervention to

avert what seemed likely to be a humanitarian catastrophe. In this particular case, the UN Security

Council sanctioned an intervention by NATO forces in accordance with the R2P´ doctrine. Soon after, the

Syrian rebellion took hold and civilians began to be killed and injured in their thousands. In that case, the

Security Council was paralyzed. Neither sanctions nor military intervention could be agreed upon. In this

senses, we should be asking why the international community's responses has been so different and which

is the current R2P doctrine´s standing and practice1. This will be done according a multidisciplinary

approach that related each case to a particular international context, law and norms interpretation, as well

as the struggle of power and politics at national and international level.

So, the principal goal of this paper would be to underline the principals‟ characteristics of each approach,

focusing on the questions that define the R2P interpretations and implications in the case of Libya and

Syria. Furthermore, I will briefly define which are the EU´s and Belgium´s approach concerning the R2P

doctrine. Accordingly, this paper could be divided by three basic parts: first, I will explain the

Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, then the studies cases of Libya and Syria, and finally I will highlight

some considerations about the R2P implementation by the European Union and Belgium.

1 ZIFCAK Spencer, The Responsibility to Protect after Lybia and Syria, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Volume No.

13,, 2012. Pp. 59

3

II-THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) DOCTRINE

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is defined as an “emerging norm”2

of international law that seeks to

provide means for the international community to prevent mass atrocity crimes occurring within the

boundaries of a sovereign state.

De Franco, Meyer and Smith3 consider R2P to be an emerging norm

because it sets standards of appropriate behavior by indicating what states „ought‟ to do. R2P is based in

existing international law, but it is novel in its reframing of state sovereignty as entailing the

responsibility to meet a limited set of duties4.

Since its emergence in 2001, at the same time of the tragedies in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur,

R2P has been acknowledge as a way of resolving these human tragedies.

Under R2P, nevertheless, the use

of force is reserved for actions within the UN Charter‟s Chapter VII framework. This position continues

to obstruct efforts by the international community to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes5.

The protection and promotion of human rights featured as one of the United Nations‟ principal purposes6,

the UN Charter both generally prohibited the use of force

and guaranteed a state‟s right to be free from

intervention, except for measures authorized by the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers or

through state actions taken in self-defense.7

The concerns of human rights and national sovereignty led to

uncertainty about how far the international community could go to intervene in a sovereign state in the

face of major human rights violations8.

Consequently, the international community‟s ability to prevent mass atrocities was handicapped. This

situation led to the death of nearly one million in Rwanda and Bosnia.

It was evident that the

international community lacked a framework to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Eventually, in the

2 The Secretary-General‟s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared

Responsibility, 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2004) (describing the Responsibility to Protect as an “emerging norm”)

[hereinafter A More Secure World]. See also S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (“Reaffirm[ing] the

provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect

populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity[.]”). Cited by WILLIAMS Paul

R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the

Syria Crisis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 45, Issues No. 1 and 2, Fall 2012. P.474 3 DE FRANCO Chiara, MEYER Christoph O. and SMITH Karen E., „Living by Example?‟ The European Union and the

Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) Volume 53. Number 5.

2015. P.995-996 4 Ibid

5 WILLIAMS Paul R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to

Protect and the Syria Crisis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 45, Issues No. 1 and 2, Fall 2012.

P.474 6 U.N. Charter art. 1, paragraph. 3 “To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,

social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental

freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 7 Art. 2 paragraph 7 UN Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in

matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters

to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under

Chapter VII.”); id. art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-

defence. . . .”. 8 WILLIAMS Paul R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, op. cit. P.477

4

aftermath of NATO‟s controversial (but legitimate) military intervention to prevent mass human rights

abuses in Kosovo9.

Under the circumstance, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked if humanitarian intervention is an

unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how the UN should respond to gross and systematic violations of

human rights. Thus, in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

(ICISS)10

,

an independent commission, that responded by publishing a report about the right of

humanitarian intervention.

The ICISS report concluded that the concept and understanding of state

sovereignty must entail a state‟s responsibility to protect its own citizens (Chapter XI).

ICISS found sovereignty entailed the responsibility to protect populations from mass human rights

violations. As part of the responsibility to protect, ICISS proposed that states had three separate, but

interlinked duties: First, individual states were primarily responsible for protecting their populations

(Chapter XI).

ICISS categorized this aspect of the R2P as a state‟s “responsibility to prevent,” in other

words, a state‟s obligation to eliminate the root causes of mass atrocities.

Second, ICISS found that

where a state fails to protect its population, the responsibility to protect shifts to the international

community.51

ICISS categorized this aspect of R2P as the “responsibility to react,” stating that in

responding to mass atrocities, the international community must first exhaust peaceful options,

considering which force can be used in extreme circumstances.11

Third, ICISS found that after the use of

force to prevent mass atrocities, states should help in the post-conflict states rebuilding. In doing so,

ICISS held that states should provide full assistance to support recovery efforts, reconstruction, and

reconciliation12

. To ensure these principles were adhered to, ICISS provided a six-part test for

determining whether the use of force for humanitarian purposes is warranted. According to ICISS, for

intervention to be legitimate: (1) “just cause” must exist; (2) the assistance must be provided as a last

resource; (3) the acting states must have rightful intentions; (4) the action must be proportional to the

humanitarian crisis; (5) the action must have a reasonable chance of success; and (6) the action must be

authorized by a legitimate authority.13

In 2009, the UN codification of R2P continued when UN

Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon presented a report that could be implemented in a “fully faithful and

consistent manner.”14

According to the Secretary-General‟s Report, R2P should be understood as

comprising three conceptual pillars.

First, each state has the responsibility to provide security for their

populations and protect them from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Second, when a

state lacks the capacity to protect its populations from these crimes, the international community has the

9 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, KOSOVO REPORT (2000), available at

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56 FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm. cited

WILLIAMS Paul R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan. Ibid. 10

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

VII (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT], available at http://responsib ilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 11

ICISS discussed the meaning of “extreme” stating that the use of force should be confined to “cases of violence which so

genuinely „shock the conscience of mankind‟ or which present clear and present danger to international security, that they

require coercive military intervention.” P. 31. 12


J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, Op. Cit.. P.481-482 13

Part XII (applying the principles to “military interventions” cited by WILLIAMS Paul R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

&

WORBOYS Jonathan, Op. Cit. P.483 14

U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). At the subsequent

General Assembly debate, over fifty states explicitly endorsed the Secretary-General‟s three-pillar formulation. cited by Ibid.

5

responsibility to provide assistance, helping states to meet their obligations.

Third, if a state manifestly

fails in its protection responsibilities, the international community should respond in a timely and decisive

manner, by taking a range of peaceful, coercive, or forceful measures in accordance with the UN Charter.

With time, the Secretary-General‟s “three pillar” approach has become widely accepted, having been

endorsed by more than fifty states.15

III-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE LIBYA

CASE

The rebellion against the Gaddafi regime commenced in February 2011, following a series of

revolutionary changes that were occurring in Tunisia and Egypt. Nonetheless, Gaddafi declared war on

the Libyan uprising. Soon, the number of protestors killed climbed from the hundreds to more than a

thousand. Then the Gaddafi forces gained strength and territory, and the opposition was weakened to the

extent that it appeared that it might be swept away in Benghazi, the city at the epicenter of the rebellion. It

was at that point that Gaddafi threatened the population. The prospect that some thousands of citizens

may be killed was no longer distant but imminent16

. The Colonel Muammar Gaddafi said that protesters

would be 'hunted down door to door and executed'.17

According to Spencer Zifcak18

it is probable that

the responsibility to protect' ('R2P') was born from that usage of language.

The prospect of massacre and atrocity in Libya at the hands of the regime's military forces was increasing.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights declared her concern and urged the UN's

Security Council and Human Rights Council to act. On 25 February, the Human Rights Council

established a fact-finding committee to examine the unfolding events and urged the General Assembly to

expel Libya from Security Council membership. On 26 February, the Security Council debated and

agreed to Resolution 197019

. This condemned widespread and systematic attacks on civilians and it

recalled the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population. The resolution demanded an

immediate end to hostilities; the observance of human rights; access for human rights monitors; and safe

passage for humanitarian and medical workers and supplies into the country. It also set in place a set of

coercive measures20

. In acting, the Security Council made it clear that the action derived from the

15

See GLOBAL CENTER FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT: THE 2009 GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 5–6 (Aug. 2009). Cited by WILLIAMS Paul

R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the

Syria Crisis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Volume 45, Issues No. 1 and 2, Fall 2012. P.486 cited by


J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan,Op. Cit. P.483 16

ZIFCAK Spencer, The Responsibility to Protect after Lybia and Syria, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Volume No.

13,, 2012. Pp. 60 17

ABC Radio National, 'Defiant Gaddafi Issues Chilling Threat', The World Today, 23 February 2011

http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011 /s3146582.htm cited by op. cit. P. 60 18

Ibid 19

SC Res 1970, UN SCOR, 66t' sess, 6491't mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) cited by ZIFCAK Spencer,Op.

Cit. Pp. 61 20

It imposed an arms embargo; a travel ban on key figures in the Libyan administration; a freeze on their assets overseas; and it

called for a review of progress with respect to these measures within 120 days.

http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011%20/s3146582.htm

6

responsibility of the Libyan Government to protect its own people. The first coercive intervention

authorized by the Security Council and undertaken pursuant to R2P had begun.21

Even more, the key regional organizations joined the chorus of international protest and made

recommendations for immediate ameliorative action. The last week of February of the year 2011, the

Security Council of the League of Arab States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation (OIC) and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union all issued statements

condemning the violence in Libya and calling for the establishment of immediate talks between the

contending parties to arrange a ceasefire and to work towards a mediated solution of the conflict22

. As

well, the Arab League suspended Libya's membership of the League23

. In addition, the Gulf Cooperation

Council released called upon the Security Council to 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians,

including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya' and further condemned the state-sponsored violence,

endorsed by the OIC and the Arab League.24

.

On March 17, the Security Council reviews the situation and determined what further action was required.

The outcome was the Resolution 197325

. The resolution deplored the failure of the Libyan authorities to

comply with Resolution 1970, expressed grave concern at the deteriorating human rights situation and

escalating violence in the country and reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan Government to protect

the Libyan population. It recalled the condemnation of the Libyan regime by the Arab League, the

African Union and the OIC, and their demand for the creation of a no-fly zone and of safe havens for

civilians under threat of shelling. As a consequence, the Security Council, for the first time, authorized

coercive military intervention in a sovereign state without the consent of that state's governing authorities.

Resolution 1973 strengthened and extended the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel restrictions

imposed in Resolution 1970. Most importantly, the Security Council resolved that 'all necessary

measures' could be taken to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. The

measures could not include the deployment of any 'foreign occupation force of any form on any part of

Libyan territory'. Secondly, the Security Council determined that a no-fly zone should be established over

Libya in order to protect civilians and authorized NATO to take 'all necessary measures' to enforce the

ban on flights. The aim of all these measures was to force the Libyan regime to desist from grievous

abuses of human rights and humanitarian law.26

21


13,, 2012. Pp. 61 22

UN Security Council, above n 10; Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 'OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the

Excessive Use of Force against Civilians in the Libyan Jamahiriya' (Press Release, 22 February 2011); African Union Peace

and Security Council, Communiqud, 261I mtg, AUDoc PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI) (23 February 2011). Cited by ZIFCAK

Spencer, Op. Cit. p. 63 23

Alex J Bellamy, 'Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm' (2011) 25 Ethics & InternationalA

ffairs 263, 266. Cited by ZIFCAK Spencer, The Responsibility to Protect after Lybia and Syria, Melbourne Journal of

International Law, Volume No. 13,, 2012. Pp. 63 24

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. p. 64 25

SC Res 1973, UN SCOR, 66tt' sess, 6498tt' mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011)Preamble para 12 ('Resolution 1973)

cited by ZIFCAK Spencer,Op. Cit. p. 64 26

Ibid

7

Two days after Resolution 1973 was adopted, a military coalition under the leadership of NATO began

bombing Libyan Government positions from which attacks upon civilians were likely to be launched.27

The NATO strategy morphed progressively into one that embraced regime change. The argument was

that the protection of civilians could not be achieved without military victory. Finally the conflict arrived

to an end in late August 2011. Subsequently, on 16 September, the UN´s Security Council adopted the

Resolution 200928

. This resolution established the mandate for a UN Support Mission in Libya

('UNSMIL'). It lifted the arms embargo and since then, it has been in charge of restoring security and

public order and to promote the rule of law; to undertake the task of constitution-making and to promote

national reconciliation; to promote and protect human rights and to support transitional justice29

.

Nevertheless, Chinese and Russian officials were upset by the overstepping that they vowed to never

approve such kinds of intervention again. NATO‟s broad and expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973

did not bode well for the future of this new doctrine. After all, the Responsibility to Protect is far from

widely accepted and still must overcome severe political, legal, and pragmatic obstacles to action. Thus, if

the very first use of the Responsibility to Protect resulted in a regime change, states will be hesitant to use

it again30

.

In general Grahan Cronogue31

explained three major considerations in Libya, when he said that: “First,

Libya looked like the ideal time and place for intervention. Gaddafi‟s tactics were indiscriminate, he

made it clear that he intended to kill more civilians, he was isolated politically, he lacked strong

economic ties to key countries, and his forces were weak and already facing a strong rebel force. Second,

once the Responsibility to Protect is implemented it is very difficult to limit its scope. After all, if the

mandate is to protect civilians and the regime is bent on killing civilians, how can we ensure that civilians

are protected yet also allow a murderous leader to remain in power? Finally, since Russia and China are

both concerned about sovereignty and are extremely power actors in the international system, it will be

important to convince them that Libya is the exception rather than the rule. All of these considerations cut

against intervention in Syria”.

27


13,, 2012. Pp. 65 28

SC Res 2009, UN SCOR, 66h sess, 6620 mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2009 (16 September 2011) 29

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit.. Pp. 66-67 30

CRONOGUE Graham, Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of Humanitarian Intervention Post-

Libya. International Humanitarian Legal Studies Volume 3, (2012) P.145 31

Ibid

8

IV-THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE SYRIA

CASE

Like Libya, protests in Syria followed those that had occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. In February 2011,

demonstrations against the government occurred in relation to issues such as poverty, inequality,

restrictions upon freedom of speech, the desire for democracy and the demand that human rights be

respected.32

After this, the protests spread in the cities of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Idlib. On March

30, the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, denounced the cumulative protests, alleging that Syria was

facing a conspiracy by imperialist forces. Moreover, on April 16, President al-Assad, swore to lift the

state of emergency that had been in place since 1963, abolished the High Security Court and recognized

the right to peaceful protest33

. On 22 April, the largest demonstrations occurred across the country.

Protesters accused the government of providing too little too late34

. More than 100 people were killed by

government forces in the immediate aftermath of the demonstrations. As the protests endured, the

government deployed the army backed by armored personnel carriers to quell them. The first systematic

military deployment occurred on 25 April in Dar'a35

. By the end of 2015, the peaceful Arab Spring in

Syria had mutated into a bloody armed uprising and then a full-/fledged civil war that already have a

death toll of 400,000 Syrians36

.

Most international organizations and states condemned the violence in Syria. The E.U., the Arab League,

Qatar, and the United States are among the most notable critics of Assad. These actors have been

successful in imposing sanctions on the regime, but the Security Council has not even been able to pass

resolutions “condemning” the regime‟s violence. What the international community seemingly wants to

do in Syria and what it actually is doing could be explained through different perspectives that takes into

account the law, politics, and the pragmatism of post-Libya intervention37

.

4.1 Legal-Principles´ perspective

The Security Council negotiations and debates was that of respect of the principle of sovereignty,

territorial integrity and independence of Syria. These principles related to nonintervention in the domestic

affairs of states, stand in stark contrast to the interventionist character of the R2P´s Pillar 3-interventions

by the international community-.38

But even more, the Libyan case has concerned the allegation of

'mission creep'. Those members of the Security Council who abstained from the vote on Resolution 1973

have attacked forcefully what they have seen as the abuse of the Security Council's mandate. In their view

there was no way in which the relevant resolution could have permitted the extension of the conflict

32


13,, 2012. Pp. 76 33

Nicholas Blanford, 'Repeal of Hated Emergency Law is "Too Little Too Late"', The Times (London), 22 April 2011, 29.

cited by ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. p. 73 34

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. p.p. 78 35

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. p.p. 67 36

THAKUR Ramesh, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, Center for Strategic and International Studies,

The Washington Quarterly, Volume 36, No. 2. Spring, 2013 P. 70 37

CRONOGUE Graham, Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of Humanitarian Intervention Post-

Libya. International Humanitarian Legal Studies Volume 3, (2012) P.146 38

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. p. 86

9

beyond the protection of civilians and towards the objective of regime change39

. All the BRICS countries

(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) objected strongly to the shift from the politically neutral

posture of civilian protection to the partial goal of assisting the rebels and pursuing regime change. 40

That

is one of the motives which explain, in the case of Syria, why China and Russia remain opposed to any

resolution which could set off a chain of events leading to a 1973-/type authorization for outside military

operations in Syria41

. India and South Africa have emphasized the primary responsibility of the Security

Council to resolve internal differences through peaceful means, while Brazil has played a more

constructive role by tabling a possible compromise paper.42

4.2 Strategic perspective

Grahan Cronogue43

explains that even assuming the Security Council and international community, on on

side, accept the R2P as e legal basis for the use of force and, on the other hand, the factual scenario in

Syria could satisfied the criteria, there are some obstacles to its application in Syria. The first issue

concerns the interplay of law and politics in the Security Council. Since the voting structure of the

Security Council affords each of the P5 a veto, every Resolution must be politically acceptable to all five

countries on the council for it to have legal effect. Though China and Russia do not seem to

fundamentally reject the Responsibility to Protect there are several strong political and self-interested

reasons why they will not approve in the case of Syria44

.

The clearest example is Russia, who has been the principal opponent of any direct international action

against Syria. Frequently, its arguments against an R2P intervention have been delivered at the level of

principle. However, Russia has political, economic and strategic investments in Syria.45

Russia is Syria

top provider of weapons and military supplies. Russia has major economic investments in Syria,

principally in the business of natural gas extraction. These include a pipeline and a liquefied natural gas

processing facility 200 kilometers east of Homs46

. Russia has continued to send weapons to Syria

throughout the period of the recent crisis. On the other side, China is among Syria‟s chief export

recipients and the second largest non-Arab investor in their economy47

.

Second, both states see Syria as an important strategic ally. For instance, Russia currently leases a

naval facility in Tartus. The port in Tartus is Russia‟s only military base outside the old Soviet Union and

39


13,, 2012. Pp. 69 40

THAKUR Ramesh, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, Center for Strategic and International Studies,

The Washington Quarterly, Volume 36, No. 2. Spring, 2013 P. 70 41

THAKUR Ramesh, Op. Cit. P. 71 42

Ibid 43

CRONOGUE Graham, Op. Cit. P.148 44

Ibid 45

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. P. 90 46

ZIFCAK Spencer, Op. Cit. P.. 91 47

„Syria-China-Trade Partners‟, Executive, 3 May 2012, http://www.executivemagazine .com/getarticle.php?article=9819 (last

accessed 6 October 2012). Cited by CRONOGUE Graham, Op. Cit. P..150

10

a critical point of access to the Mediterranean48

. This facility provides it with the capacity to maintain and

repair Russian ships that cross the Mediterranean. Syria is also in an important military location near

Turkey and Israel and trading route between the Central Asia and Africa. China and Russia see continued

good relations with the Assad regime as a military and strategic benefit. Third, China and Syria enjoy a

close political alliance. Both states support each other on contentious political issues. For instance, Syria

supports China‟s position on contentious Tibet and Taiwan49

. Russia and Syria share similarly close

political ties. These two states, the last two members of the Warsaw Pact, have been allies since the Cold

War.

Finally, domestic politics the United States also play strong roles in the decision to not intervene.

President Obama faces strong domestic pressure against intervention, even though he openly criticizes the

regime. First, the NATO intervention in Libya, which installed an untested and unstable regime, was far

from a complete success. Complicating this factor even more are the fact that Islamic States is involved in

the fight. In short, the international political implications of intervening in Syria are much stronger than

in Libya. While the moral and legal argument under the Responsibility to Protect is just as strong in Syria,

if not stronger, nevertheless the key players in the international system have robust political disincentives

to authorization. For these political reasons, they are unlikely willing to authorize force50

.

4.3 Pragmatic perspective

There was less prospect of sectarian violence breaking out as a consequence of intervention in Libya than

in Syria. The establishment of the “National Transitional Council” was a reasonable prospect that these

could be overcome in the interests of establishing an alternative, unity government. In Syria, it was

exceptionally difficult to predict what might occur if the Alawite al-Assad regime, representing only 12

per cent of the population, against the 75 per cent Sunni Muslim population. In addition to an increased

hostility towards the Christian population and other religious minorities, including Palestinian refugees,

Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Turkomens and Jews, were all distinct possibilities51

.

Moreover, the principal regional organization in the Middle East, the Arab League, became involved with

the Libyan crisis almost from its commencement. It became more critical of the actions of the regime and

pressed the Security Council to impose sanctions and then intervene in the interests of protecting Libya's

citizens. The League was more hesitant to intervene in Syria, because many of its members had close

political, economic and personal ties with Al-Assad Government. It was not until November 2011 that the

League condemned al-Assad outright, expelled Syria and insisted upon its monitors visiting Damascus. In

the absence of a strong lead from the League, the Security Council had plainly been less willing to take

adverse action52

.

48

„Wait and Sea‟, The Economist, 14 January 2012, http://www.economist.com/ node/21542793 (last accessed 6 October

2012). Cited by CRONOGUE Graham, Op. Cit. P.150 49

H. Yan, „Why China, Russia Won‟t Condemn Syrian Regime‟, CNN, 5 February 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-

5/middleeast/world_meast_syria-china-russia -relations_1_syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-syrian-government-syrian-

regime?_s=PM :MIDDLEEAST (last accessed 6 October 2012).cited by Ibid. 50

CRONOGUE Graham, Op. Cit. P.152 51


Ibid

11

V-THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT IN LYBIA AND SYRIA

R2P emerged at the same time when the EU‟s foreign affairs structures were implementing the Lisbon

Treaty‟s provisions, especially establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) while EU was

facing external crises and a decline in the political support of some of its members. As a result, the EEAS

had hardly any resources available to take on board new tasks such as interpreting and operationalizing

R2P. However, EU actors had strong incentives to declare that R2P required almost any adjustments of

their current policies, procedures or instruments. This stance was facilitated by the ambiguity of the norm

itself and, until recently, the lack of external or internal pressure for its full implementation53

. But, the EU

has taken rather limited and slow-paced efforts to implement the norm even though it has accepted it, and

despite existing capabilities that could be deployed to operationalize it (Task Force on the EU Prevention

of Mass Atrocities, 2013)54

.

5.1.-European Union and R2P implementation in the case of Libya

BROKMEIER, KURTZ and JUNK, explain that for the European position on R2P, the Libyan crisis is

revealing for three reasons. First, it demonstrated the way in which France and Britain understood R2P, as

a more acceptable term than humanitarian intervention, to justify their national priorities. Second, with

Germany just having taken its 2011 –2012 seat on the Security Council, Libya woke up a broader public

in Germany to the existence of R2P and expanded the Government‟s interpretation of the concept. Third,

the crisis shows the extent of disagreement between major European governments about R2P, and the

resulting paralysis of the European Union as a whole to support or implement R2P in practice55

.

The deep division between the UK and France, on the one side, and Germany, on the other side, over

whether and how to use military force to address the situation in Libya reflected the key differences

between their strategic cultures. The diverging strategic cultures also shaped their different interpretations

of the responsibility to protect. France and Britain led the charge for military intervention in Libya. For

France, Libya was a clear-cut case of an acute humanitarian emergency that screamed for intervention56

.

In addition, Libya‟s location on the southern shore of the Mediterranean made it part of an important zone

of influence for France. For London, the crisis in Libya passed the „five tests‟ that Tony Blair had laid

out in the Chicago speech, including evidence, military feasibility and national interest. In addition, the

British Government‟s experience from Bosnia and Iraq led to a concerted effort to seek a UN Security

Council mandate and regional support57

.

53

DE FRANCO Chiara, MEYER Christoph O. and SMITH Karen E., „Living by Example?‟ The European Union and the

Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) Volume 53. Number 5.

2015. P.1006 54

DE FRANCO Chiara, MEYER Christoph O. and SMITH Karen E., Op. Cit. P..997 55

BROKMEIER Sarah, KURTZ Gerrit & JUNK Julian, Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to

protect, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, No. 4, 2014. Pp. 445 56

Ibid. 57

BROKMEIER Sarah, KURTZ Gerrit & JUNK Julian, Op. Cit. P.. 446.

12

Germany argued against military intervention in Libya and abstained on Resolution 1973, joining Brazil,

Russia, India and China on the Security Council. In line with the German „culture of restraint‟, however,

the German Government and the German public were much more skeptical about the chances for success

and afraid of the dangers of a military mission in Libya. The German abstention led to a surge of

discussions on the responsibility to protect in Germany as an emerging international law and, for the first

time, as a moral principle that demanded practical concepts and real-world action58

.

5.2.-European Union and R2P implementation in the case of Syria

Between 2011 and the summer of 2013, all European members of the Security Council acted in concert to

table resolutions that threatened UN sanctions to address the ever escalating crisis in Syria, when the

initial crackdown of protests by the Assad regime developed into a full-scale civil war. The European

drive for sanctions and diplomatic initiatives were blocked by Russia and China. In the meantime France

supported air strikes in Syria despite the lack of a Security Council mandate. The British Government

demonstrated that for them, R2P had never replaced their interpretation of „liberal interventionism‟59

.

Sarah Brockmeier et al. 60

have shown, while European governments have a positive attitude towards

R2P, they never shared a truly consensual interpretation of its most important properties and functions.

Based on their distinct strategic cultures, France and Britain, on the one hand, have supported a much

broader interpretation of R2P than Germany and the EU. For example, France traces its own position to

humanitarian assistance and the notion of a “droit d‟ingerence” as a legal right to interfere in sovereign

territories for humanitarian reasons, building on its imperial mission “civilisatrice” in its strategic culture.

These persistent differences among some of the most important supporters of R2P demonstrate the need

to disentangle „the‟ European position on R2P. Unsurprisingly, differences in their strategic cultures mean

that there are diverging interpretations and practices regarding a responsibility to protect. These should be

taken into account for further researches concerning EU‟s engagement with the concept61

.

58

BROKMEIER Sarah, KURTZ Gerrit & JUNK Julian, Op. Cit. P. 447 59

BROKMEIER Sarah, KURTZ Gerrit & JUNK Julian, Op. Cit. P. 449 60


protect, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, No. 4, 2014. P. 451 61


protect, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, No. 4, 2014. P. 451

13

VI-THE R2P AND THE BELGIUM´S POSITION

Since beginning, Belgium asserted its support for the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' to save

populations from the worst human rights violations and estimates that the concept is firmly anchored in

the well-established principles of international law, such as the obligation to warn against and suppress

such crimes. Belgium attaches great significance to the three pillars underlying the concept, which are all

equally important. This view is shared by the European Union, which supports developments within the

UN in this connection. The EU and its Member States are currently focusing on the

concept's implementation62

. In Libya Belgium has actively participated in NATO's Operation Unified

Protector, carried out according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. During the post-

revolutionary period around one hundred wounded Libyans were medically treated in Belgium. Like the

international community, Belgium acknowledges the elected government, whose seat of government is in

Tobruk, and supports the pursuit of a political solution for Libya63

. In the case of Syria, Belgium has

declared that the international community has not, to date, been in a position to shoulder its responsibility

to protect civilian populations massacred day after day by the Syrian regime. And have recalled that the

primary responsibility for this protection resides with the Syrian authorities, whereas they are going so far

as to use violence against their own population. From the Belgium´s position the responsibility to protect

against the gravest violations cannot thus be disqualified. Since inaction, as far as Belgium sees it, is not

an option64

.

62

Action by Belgium and the European Union

http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/human_rights/specific_issues/prevention_of_genocide 63

http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/world_regions/middle_east 64

Statement delivered on behalf of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations General Assembly informal,

interactive dialogue on the “Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response” 5 September 2012 (UNOFFICIAL

TRANSCRIPTION)http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Belgium%20Statement%20_Transcribed_.pdf

http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/human_rights/specific_issues/prevention_of_genocidehttp://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/world_regions/middle_east

14

VII. CONCLUSION

Libya and Syria stand on opposite ends of a spectrum. In Libya, the international community rapidly

reached consensus on the appropriate response: an external intervention aimed at protecting civilians. In

Syria, despite a shared concern for the civilian population, the UN Security Council has been deeply

divided on the way forward. While it is indisputable that power in the international system is diffusing,

the almost concomitant occurrence of the two crises suggests that the ongoing systemic power shift

cannot account for such radically different results. The exercise of compulsory, structural, institutional,

and productive variants of power contribute to explaining why the international response to the two crises

has been so different. Once we move beyond a systemic, one dimensional, and fungible understanding of

power, we can begin to delineate the causes for the two juxtaposed outcomes65

. The case of Libya has

been hailed as a crowning moment for R2P. It was an incontrovertible piece of evidence in favor of R2P

as a universal norm. The case of Syria has been highlighted by skeptics as proof of persisting

international divisions, as well as, the BRICS´s assertiveness and their pluralist worldviews.66

I could said that the Libyan intervention can be considered a successful application of R2P because the

military campaign succeeded in protecting Libyan citizens from the commission of further and certain

crimes against humanity and grave human rights abuses. However, the self-interest of nations has also

played its part in discouraging Security Council endorsed intervention in Syria. No member of the

Security Council on either side of the debate will have neglected its strategic interests entirely to assume a

purely humanitarian stance. The closer a Security Council member's ties with the al-Assad regime, the

less likely it is that that member will favor an external intervention into the country's domestic affairs67

.

Furthermore, by the European Union, the problems of moving from acceptance to implementation are

magnified, because its members have divergent interpretations in how, where and when to act.68

In so

doing, the intervention lent legitimacy and weight to the appropriateness of Pillar 3 -intervention in

emergency circumstances-. Finally, rather than being a product of widespread international concerns from

the implementation of Resolution 1973 on Libya, the Security Council‟s failure to act in the case of Syria

is therefore best understood as a product of decision making and interest.

65

TOCCU Nathalie, On Power and Norms? Libya, Syria, and the Responsibility to Protect; Transatlantic Academy Paper

Series, 2013-2014 Paper Series, No. 2. April 2014. P. 21 66

TOCCU Nathalie, Op. Cit.. P. 7 67


DE FRANCO Chiara, MEYER Christoph O. and SMITH Karen Op. Cit.P.1006

15

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. SENIOR THESIS

-DE LA BRETHONIERE Arno Hamar, The Responsibility to Protect principle in European foreign

Policy, A critical analysis of EU Foreign Policy towards Libya before, during and after the 2011 Arab

Spring, under the supervision: BIALASIEWICZ Mvr. Dr. L. A. (Thesis Chair), thesis Submitted for the

Degree MA in European studies, Graduate School for Humanities The Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Amsterdam, Holland, March 2013.

-BLACKFORD William R., The Responsibility to Protect and International Law: Moral, Megal and

Practical Perspectives on Kosivo, Lybia and Syria, under the supervision: KINSELLA David(Thesis

Chair), thesis Submitted for the Degree Master of Arts in Political Science, The Portland State Univerty.

Portland, Oregon, United States, Summer 2014.

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Academy Paper Series, 2013-2014 Paper Series, No. 2. April 2014. Pp. 25

IV. ACADEMICS ARTICLES

-BELLAMY Alex J. “From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson learning and the implementation of the

Responsibility to Protect, International Politics Volume 51, No. 1, 2014. Pp. 23–44

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responsibility to protect, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 14, No. 4, 2014. Pp. 429-460.

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Intervention Post-Libya. International Humanitarian Legal Studies Volume 3, (2012) P. 124–159

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Union and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Journal of Common Market Studies

(JCMS) Volume 53. Number 5. 2015. Pp. 994–1009

16

-MORRIS Justin, Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum, International Affairs

Volume 89, No. 5, 2013. Pp. 1265–1283

- O‟DONNELL Chelsea, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An examination of the Debate

over the Legality of the Humanitarian Intervention, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law

Volume 24, No. 557, 2014. Pp. 558-588

-THAKUR Ramesh, R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 36, No. 2. Spring, 2013 Pp. 61-76

-WILLIAMS Paul R.,ULBRICK

J. Trevor,

& WORBOYS Jonathan, Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes:

The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,

Volume 45, Issues No. 1 and 2, Fall 2012. Pp. 473-503

-ZIFCAK Spencer, The Responsibility to Protect after Lybia and Syria, Melbourne Journal of

International Law, Volume No. 13,, 2012. Pp. 59.-93

INTERNET SOURCES

-Kingdom of Belgium, Foreign Affairs , foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Middle East-

Relations between Belgium and the Mahggreb

http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/world_regions/middle_east (consulted on May 10, 2016)

-Kingdom of Belgium, Foreign Affairs , foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Prevention of

genocide - Responsibility to Protect

http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/human_rights/specific_issues/prevention_of_genocid

e (consulted on May 10, 2016)

-Statement delivered on behalf of the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations General

Assembly informal, interactive dialogue on the “Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive

Response” 5 September 2012 (UNOFFICIAL

TRANSCRIPTION)http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Belgium%20Statement%20_Transcribed_.pdf

(consulted on May 10, 2016)
http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/world_regions/middle_easthttp://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/human_rights/specific_issues/prevention_of_genocidehttp://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas/human_rights/specific_issues/prevention_of_genocidehttp://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Belgium%20Statement%20_Transcribed_.pdf

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