fire protection approaches and experiences in nuclear · pdf file · 2015-06-05fire...

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SPATIAL PLANNING

SLOVENIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Fire Protection Approaches and Experiences in Nuclear Power Plants

Darko Pavlin

Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration




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Contents

• General overview of the Krsko NPP

• Fire protection program (FPP)

– Slovenian legislation, U.S. NRC legislation and standards

– Fire Hazard Analysis

– Explosion Hazard Analysis

– Training and fire brigade

• Good practices and challenges

• Fire events in Krsko NPP

• Feedback on draft IAEA publication with fire protection guidelines




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Krsko NPP

• PWR reactor (Westinghouse); 1 unit

• Reactor Thermal Power: 1994 MWt

• Gross electrical output:

• 727 MWe

• Operating: since 1983

• Ownership: Slovenia (50%) and Croatia (50%)




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Fire protection program – Slovenian legislation

Fire protection (FP) program should be in compliance with:

• Nuclear legislation

– Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act

– Rules on radiation and nuclear safety factors (JV5)

• Requirements based on WENRA reference level: Issue S

– FP objectives, FP design bases, Building fire safety, Fire hazard analyis (FHA), FP systems,

– Fire-safety surveillance and maintance,

– FP organisational arrangements.

– Rules on operational safety of radiation or nuclear facilities

• reporting,

• performance indicators,

• OPEX




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Fire protection program – Slovenian legislation

• Industrial legislation

– Fire protection Act

– Rules on training and authorization for the implementation of fire protection measures

– Rules on inspection and testing the fire detection, fire suppresion systems

– Rules on explosion protection




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Fire protection program – U. S NRC legislation

Fire protection program rev. 0 (1990) was prepared according with U.S. NRC legislation, because of the following reason:

• Krsko NPP is “Westinghouse plant” and consequently all fire systems (fire detection, fire supression, hydrants) are designed and tested according to U.S. NRC legislation and NFPA standards

• 10 CFR Appendix R “Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979”

• NUREG 800, Standard Review Plan, Section 9.5.1

• Tehnical specification (LCO, SR)




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Fire protection program – Standards

• Krsko NPP is divided into two parts:

– Technical part (reactor building, auxiliry building, turbine building, diesel degenerator building, bunkered building…)

– Non- Technical part (administrative buildings, fire brigade buildings, simulator, warehouses, workshops…)

• Fire protection systems installed in tehnical part of Krsko NPP are designed according with US standards (NFPA standards)

• Fire protection systems installed in non-tehnical part of Krsko NPP are designed according with European standards (EN 54, VdS…)




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Fire protection program – Fire Hazard Analysis

• Fire Hazard Analysis is one of the most important document in Fire protection program.

• Krsko NPP Fire Hazard Analysis is divided into the following volumes:

• Fire protection program review (Vol. 1)

• 110 fire compartments/areas for tehnical part of NPP

• Fire compartment (general description, fire barriers, equipments, safe shutdown equipment, combustibles load, fire detection, fire suppression systems)




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• Post-fire shutdown analysis, safe – shutdown cable schedule (Vol. 2)

– In this volume the routing of safe-shutdown cables is represented




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• Post-fire shutdown analysis, safe – shutdown component index (input data to Safe shutdown Separation Analysis) –Vol. 3




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• Safe-shutdown separation analysis (SSA) – Vol. 4

– The purpose of SSA analysis is to perform and document a comprehensive analysis of the separation between redundant safe-shutdown components and cables in the context of postfire shutdown system separation requirements defined by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, and Rules on radiation and nuclear safety factors (JV5), Appendix I, Section 3.




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• Fire protection program findings – Vol. 5

– Fire Load in Building and Fire Areas (eg. substantial amount of polyurethane foam)

– Compartment and Equipment Separation (eg. no boundary between some Fire Areas)

– Protective Trains Separation (eg. Protective train A & train B in some cases are not separated)

– Protection Fire Barriers Openings (eg. openings for instance duct penetrations in the same areas are not protected, either provided with fire dampers.)




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Fire protection program – Explosion Hazard Analysis

Contects:

• General overview about explosion protection in Krsko NPP

• Tehnical description of the systems, structures and components (SSK) where explosion atmosfhere can appear

• Technical data about gases, liquids (e.g. hydrogen, propane…) which can cause the explosion atmosfhere

• Determination Ex zone

• Explosion protection measures (e.g. Ex qualified equipments, admanistrative procedures, organization measures…)




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Fire protection program - Training and fire brigade Internal Fire Brigade

• Each operating shift of Fire Brigade consists from three

professionals fire fighters. Local operators (4 per shift) are qualified for fire fighting of small fires and helping to Fire Brigade members. In case of emergency Fire Protection Squad could be activated. Fire Protection Squad made up of 16 fire fighters trained in accordance with ADP-1.0.500 “Fire Protection Program".




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Fire protection program - Training and fire brigade

External fire brigade (PGE Krsko)

• PGE Krsko is located 3 kilometers from NPP Krško

• three professional fire fighters and equipments should be always available for fire fighting purposes in NPP Krško.

Training in Fire Protection is defined in ADP-1.0.500 “Fire protection program" for several groups:

• all plant personnel

• fire brigade members

• fire protection squad members

• local fire department members

• person assigned to a fire watch




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Fire protection program – Good practices

Good practices:

• In 2012 fire detection systems were modernized and partlly fire supression systems (eg. fire detectors, fire centrals, network connections…) and all plant rooms are covered with fire detection system (1300 detectors).

• In 2009 Explosion Hazard Analysis and corrective actions were performed

• After Fukushima accident in 2011, in the scope of Stress test a lot of new fire fighting equipments were bought:

– portable hydraulic driven submersible pump with floating device (flow: 4000 l/min at 2,5 bar; featuring access to any open water source at distances of up to 60 meters horizontally and 30 meters vertically)

– 500kW diesel hydraulic power pack pump with floating device (flow: 11000 l/min at 12 bar; featuring access to any open water source at distances of up to 60 meters horizontally and 30 meters vertically)




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Fire protection program – Good practices

– two movable high pressure pumps (flow: 500 l/min at 32 bar)

– two movable fire fighting pumps (flow: 2000 l/min at 3 bar)

– two electric submersible pumps (flow: 1170 l/min at 0,5 bar)

– special fire fighting truck (reservoir with 8500 l of water, 1500 l of foam, water pump 8000 l/min at 10 bar, high pressure water pump 300 l/min at 40 bar, 40 m hydraulic arm)

– building for all movable fire fighting equipment (safe against seismic and flood event)

– fuel for 3 days of operation of fire fighting equipment on site




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Krško NPP’s latest acquisition

Fire truck with a hydraulic fire-fighting arm (40 m)

Tanks: 8500 l of water & 1500 l of fire-extinguishing foam




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Fire protection program – challenges and issues

NPP Krsko has the following important challenges and issues:

– Protective Trains Separation (e.g. Protective train A & train B in some cases are not separated). This issue will be solved by 2018.

– Protection Fire Barriers Openings (e.g. openings for instance duct penetrations in the same areas are not protected, either provided with fire dampers.). This issue will be solved by 2017.

– Fire protection systems (fire detection, fire suppresion, hydrants, fire hose station…) are not seismically qualified. This issue will be considered in the scope of Periodic Safety Review.




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Fire events in Krsko NPP

In last 10 years there was no fire in Krsko NPP.

In 1999 it was fire in simulator in non-tehnical part of Krsko NPP.




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication - Glossary

I recommend to add the following terms in Glossary:

• Explosion - The explosion is very fast reaction of oxidation or decomposition, which results in an increase in temperature or pressure or both at the same time.

• SSC Important to safety (currently is not clear, which SSC are important to safety? What is the difference between safety-related SSC and SSC important to safety?)

• Fire events, event of fire – this issue is specialy important on the reporting of fire event (e.g. to regulator, WANO, IAEA). It should be clear what actualy is fire event, because the fire could be very small/big, inside/outside the NPP, occure on safety/non-safety SSC, without any consequences/safety important consequences.




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication - Glossary

What do the following terms mean :

• Fire Needs Analysis

• Fire Response Needs Analysis (page 151)

• Fire Hazard Assessment = Fire Hazard Analysis (page 151), I recommend to use only one term




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication – Fire compartment and fire area

Chapter 3.2.1.2 defined terms Fire compartment and Fire Cell

Issue:

- If Fire area is the same term as Fire compartment -> All Fire area terms should be replaced with Fire compartment -> May be WENRA Fire compartment definition is better.

- If Fire area is not the same term as Fire compartment -> In glossary should be add definition for Fire area




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication – Fire compartment and fire area

Fire area (NFPA 805) – An area that is physically separeted from other areas by space, barriers, walls, or other means in order to contain fire within that area.

Fire compartment (draft IAEA) - A fire compartment is defined as

that portion of a building or plant that is separated from other areas by

fire barriers,…

Fire compartment (WENRA) - A fire compartment is a building or part

of building that is completely surrounded by fire resistant barriers of sufficient rating so that a total combustion of the fire load can occur without breaching the barriers (barriers comprise doors, walls, floors

and ceilings).




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication – Standards

• Currently draft IAEA publication mentiones mostly NFPA standards and examples (e.g. Classification of Fires – NFPA 10, Manual Foam – NFPA 11, Inspection and Testing…)

• I recommend to show some examples on other standards (EN 54, VdS, IAEA…) and prepare comparison with above mentioned NFPA standards

• Draft IAEA document mentioned different kind of terms for the same term - standard (e.g. International or national fire Code and Standards, national standards, industry standards, adequate standards …). I recommend to use only one term.




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Feedback on draft IAEA publication – Seismic incident

• In chapter 6.3.1.3 International feedback on fires caused by seismic incident in NPP , the seismic events are not enough described in details.

• On seismic events should be IRS number on IRS link

– Onagawa, March 11th 2011 (IRS 8256) -> https://irs.iaea.org/IncidentReport.aspx?ReportType=0&ReportNumber=10903

– Kashiwazaki Kariwa, Japan 2007 (IRS 7922) ->

https://irs.iaea.org/IncidentReport.aspx?ReportType=0&ReportNumber=11142



fire protection approaches and experiences in nuclear · pdf file · 2015-06-05fire...

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