enemy. They killed nearly 500Japanese. Their own losses were 16killed and 18 wounded.

The Aola Bay venture, which hadprovided the 2d Raider Battalion astarting point for its month-long jun-gle campaign, proved a bust. The sitechosen for a new airfield was un-suitable, too wet and unstable, andthe whole force moved to Koli Pointin early December, where anotherairfield eventually was constructed.

The buildup on Guadalcanal con-tinued, by both sides. On 11 Novem-ber, guarded by a cruiser-destroyercovering force, a convoy ran in car-rying the 182d Infantiy another regi-ment of the Americal Division. Theships were pounded by enemy bom-bers and three transports were hit,but the men landed. General Van-degrift needed the new men badly.His veterans were truly ready forreplacement; more than a thousandnew cases of malaria and related dis-eases were reported each week. TheJapanese who had been on the island

any length of time were no better off;they were, in fact, in worse shape.Medical supplies and rations were inshort supply. The whole thrust of theJapanese reinforcement effort con-tinued to be to get troops and com-bat equipment ashore. The ideaprevailed in Tokyo, despite all evi-dence to the contrary, that one over-whelming coordinated assault wouldcrush the American resistance. Theenemy drive to take Port Moresby onNew Guinea was put on hold to con-centrate all efforts on driving theAmericans off of Guadalcanal.

On 12 November, a multifacetedJapanese naval force converged onGuadalcanal to cover the landing ofthe main body of the 38th Division.Rear Admiral Daniel I. Callaghan'scruisers and destroyers, the close-inprotection for the 182d's transports,moved to stop the enemy. Coast-watcher and scout plane sightingsand radio traffic intercepts had iden-tified two battleships, two carriers,four cruisers, and a host of destroy-

43

ers all headed toward Guadalcanal.A bombardment group led by thebattleships Hiei and Kirishima, withthe light cruiser Nagura, and 15 des-troyers spearheaded the attack.Shortly after midnight, near Savo Is-land, Callaghan's cruisers picked upthe Japanese on radar and continuedto close. The battle was joined atsuch short range that each side firedat times on their own ships. Cal-laghan's flagship, the San Francisco,was hit 15 times, Callaghan waskilled, and the ship had to limp away.The cruiser Atlanta (CL 104) wasalso hit and set afire. Rear AdmiralNorman Scott, who was on board,was killed. Despite the hammeringby Japanese fire, the Americans heldand continued fighting. The battle-ship Hiei, hit by more than 80 shells,retired and with it went the rest ofthe bombardment force. Three des-troyers were sunk and four othersdamaged.

The Americans had accomplishedtheir purpose; they had forced the

Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a com-bat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728

lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines cov-ered 150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.

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Japanese to turn back. The cost washigh. Two antiaircraft cruisers, theAtlanta and the Juneau (CL 52), weresunk; four destroyers, the Barton(DD 599), Cushing (DD 376), Mons-sen (DD 436), and Laffey (DD 459),also went to the bottom. In additionto the San Francisco, the heavy cruis-er Portland (CA 33) and the destroy-ers Sterret (DD 407)) and AaronWard (DD 483) were damaged. Onlyone destroyer of the 13 Americanships engaged, the Fletcher (DD 445),was unscathed when the survivors re-tired to the New Hebrides.

With daylight came the Cactusbombers and fighters; they found thecrippled Hiei and pounded it merci-lessly. On the 14th the Japanese wereforced to scuttle it. Admiral Halseyordered his only surviving carrier,the Enterprise, out of the Guadal-canal area to get it out of reach ofJapanese aircraft and sent his battle-ships Washington (BB 56) and SouthDakota (BB 55) with four escortingdestroyers north to meet theJapanese. Some of the Enterprise'splanes flew in to Henderson Field tohelp even the odds.

On 14 November Cactus and En-terprise flyers found a Japanesecruiser-destroyer force that hadpounded the island on the night of13 November. They damaged fourcruisers and a destroyer. After refuel-ing and rearming they went after theapproaching Japanese troop convoy.They hit several transports in one at-tack and sank one when they cameback again. Army B-17s up from Es-piritu Santo scored one hit and sever-al near misses, bombing from 17,000feet.

Moving in a continuous pattern ofattack, return, refuel, rearm, and at-tack again, the planes from Guadal-canal hit nine transports, sinkingseven. Many of the 5,000 troops onthe stricken ships were rescued byTanaka's destroyers, which were fir-ing furiously and laying smokescreens in an attempt to protect thetransports. The admiral later recalledthat day as indelible in his mind,with memories of "bombs wobblingdown from high-flying B-17s; of car-rier bombers roaring towards targetsas though to plunge full into thewater, releasing bombs and pulling

44

out barely in time, each miss send-ing up towering clouds of mist andspray, every hit raising clouds ofsmoke and fire:' Despite the intensiveaerial attack, Tanaka continued onto Guadalcanal with four destroyersand four transports.

Japanese intelligence had picked upthe approaching American battleshipforce and warned Tanaka of its ad-vent. In turn, the enemy admiralssent their own battleship-cruiserforce to intercept. The Americans, ledby Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in theWashington, reached Sealark Chan-nel about 2100 on the 14th. An hourlater, a Japanese cruiser was pickedup north of Savo. Battleship fire soonturned it away. The Japanese nowlearned that their opponents wouldnot be the cruisers they expected.

The resulting clash, fought in theglare of gunfire and Japanese search-lights, was perhaps the most signifi-cant fought at sea for Guadalcanal.VVhen the melee was over, the Ameri-can battleships' 16-inch guns hadmore than matched the Japanese.Both the South Dakota and theWashington were damaged badly

Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80G-21099

In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, heavy cruiser San Francisco (CA 38) took 15 major hits andRAdrn Daniel I. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the was forced to limp away in the dark from the scene of action.

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The Japanese Model 89 (1929)50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger

Born out of the need to bridge the gap in range be-tween hand grenades and mortars, the grenade dis-charger evolved in the Imperial Japanese Army from

a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defenseto an essential item of standard equipment with all Japaneseground forces.

Commonly called Juteki by the Japanese, this weaponofficially was designated Hachikyu S1ziki Jutekidarto, or1189 Model Heavy Grenade Discharger, the term "heavy"being justified by the powerful 1-pound, 12-ounce high ex-plosive shell it was designed to fire, although it also firedthe standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.

To the American Marines and soldiers who first encoun-tered this weapon and others of its kind in combat theywere known as "knee mortars," likely so named because theygenerally were fired from a kneeling position. Typically,the discharger's concave baseplate was pressed firmly intothe surface of the ground by the firer's foot to support theheavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term"knee mortar" suggested to some untutored captors of theseweapons that they were to be fired with the baseplate rest-ing against the knee or thigh. When a Marine fired oneof these dischargers from his thigh and broke his upper legbone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to edu-cate all combat troops in the safe and proper handling ofthese very useful weapons.

The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Dischargeris a muzzle-loaded, high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches in overall length. Its designis compact and simple. The discharger has three major com-ponents: the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel pedestalwith firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation ofthe Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with prac-tice its user could deliver accurate fire registered quicklyon target.

Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, theModel 89 Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, veryportable, and highly efficient weapon operated easily byone man. It was carried in a cloth or leather case with asling, and its one-piece construction allowed it to bebrought into action very quickly. This grenade dischargerhad the advantage over most mortars in that it could beaimed and fired mechanically after a projectile had been

placed in the barrel, projectile firing not being dependentupon dropping down the barrel against a stationary firingpin as with most mortars, where barrel fouling sometimescaused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneousfuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell res-tricted this shell's use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmen-tation grenade with its seven-second fuze made this dis-charger effective in a jungle or forest setting, with completesafety for the user from premature detonation of projec-tiles by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, andan incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunitionused with this versatile and effective weapon which wonthe respect of all who came to know it.—Edwin F Libby

enough to force their retirement, butthe Kirishima was punished to itsabandonment and death. OneJapanese and three American des-troyers, the Benham (DD 796), theWalke (DD 416), and the Preston(DD 379), were sunk. When the

Japanese attack force retired, Ad-miral Tanaka ran his four transportsonto the beach, knowing they wouldbe sitting targets at daylight. Most ofthe men on board, however, didmanage to get ashore before the in-evitable pounding by American

45

planes, warships, and artillery.Ten thousand troops of the 38th

Division had landed, but theJapanese were in no shape to everagain attempt a massive reinforce-ment. The horrific losses in the fre-quent naval clashes, which seemed at

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times to favor the Japanese, did notreally represent a standoff. EveryAmerican ship lost or damaged couldand would be replaced; everyJapanese ship lost meant a steadilydiminishing fleet. In the air, the losseson both sides were daunting, but theenemy naval air arm would neverrecover from its losses of experiencedcarrier pilots. Two years later, theBattle of the Philippine Sea betweenAmerican and Japanese carrierswould aptly be called the "MarianasTurkey Shoot" because of the inepti-tude of the Japanese trainee pilots.

The enemy troops who had beenfortunate enough to reach land werenot immediately ready to assault theAmerican positions. The 38th Div i-sion and the remnants of the variousJapanese units that had previouslytried to penetrate the Marine linesneeded to be shaped into a coherentattack force before GeneralHyakutake could again attempt totake Henderson Field.

General Vandegrift now hadenough fresh units to begin to replacehis veteran troops along the frontlines. The decision to replace the 1stMarine Division with the Army's25th Infantry Division had been

made. Admiral Turner had told Van-degrift to leave all of his heavy equip-ment on the island when he did pullout "in hopes of getting your units re-equipped when you come out." Healso told the Marine general that theArmy would command the finalphases of the Guadalcanal operationsince it would provide the majorityof the combat forces once the 1st Di-vision departed. Major General Alex-ander M. Patch, commander of theAmerical Division, would relieveVandegrift as senior American officerashore. His air support would con-tinue to be Marine-dominated asGeneral Geiger, now located on Es-piritu Santo with 1st Wing head-quarters, fed his squadrons forwardto maintain the offensive. And the aircommand on Guadalcanal itselfwould continue to be a mixed bag ofArmy, Navy, Marine, and Alliedsquadrons.

The sick list of the 1st Marine Di-vision in November included morethan 3,200 men with malaria. Themen of the 1st still manning thefrontline foxholes and the rearareas if anyplace within Guadal-canal's perimeter could properly becalled a rear area — were plain worn

46

out. They had done their part andthey knew it.

On 29 November, General Van-degrift was handed a message fromthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crux ofit read: "1st MarDiv is to be relievedwithout delay. . . and will proceedto Australia for rehabilitation andemployment.' The word soon spreadthat the 1st was leaving and whereit was going. Australia was not yetthe cherished place it would becomein the division's future, but any placewas preferable to Guadalcanal.

December and the Final Stages

On 7 December, one year after theJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor,General Vandegrift sent a message toall men under his command in the•Guadalcanal area thanking them fortheir courage and steadfastness, com-mending particularly the pilots and"all who labored and sweated withinthe lines in all manner of prodigiousand vital tasks." He reminded themall that their "unbelievable achieve-ments had made 'Guadalcanal' a syn-onym for death and disaster in thelanguage of our enemy:' On 9 Decem-ber, he handed over his command toGeneral Patch and flew out to Aus-

A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badlydamaged by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced

Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510

to run aground on Kokumbona beach after the naval Battleof Guadalcanal. Many enemy troops were killed in the attacks.

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tralia at the same time the first ele-ments of the 5th Marines wereboarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7thMarines would soon follow togetherwith all the division's supportLngunits. The men who were leavingwere thin, tired, hollow-eyed, andapathetic; they were young men whohad grown old in four months time.They left behind 681 dead in the is-land's cemetery.

The final regiment of the Amen-cal Division, the 132d Infantry, land-ed on 8 December as the 5th Marineswas preparing to leave. The 2d Ma-rine Division's regiments already on

As he tells it, "Too Many, Too Close, TooLong," is Donald L. Dickson's portrait ofone of the "little guys, just plain wornout. His stamina and his spirit stretchedbeyond human endurance. He has hadno real sleep for a long time .

And he probably hasn't stopped duck-ing and fighting long enough to discoverthat he has malaria. He is going to dis-cover it now, however. He is through."

Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

the island, the 2d, 8th, and part ofthe 10th, knew that the 6th Marineswas on its way to rejoin. It seemedto many of the men of the 2d Ma-rines, who had landed on D-Day, 7August, that they, too, should beleaving. These took slim comfort inthe thought that they, by all rights,should be the first of the 2d to departthe island whenever that hoped-forday came.

General Patch received a steadystream of ground reinforcements andreplacements in December. He wasnot ready yet to undertake a full-scaleoffensive until the 25th Division andthe rest of the 2d Marine Division ar-rived, but he kept all frontline unitsactive in combat and reconnaissancepatrols, particularly toward thewestern flank.

The island commander's airdefense capabilities also grew sub-stantially. Cactus Air Force, or-

47

ganized into a fighter command anda strike (bomber) command, nowoperated from a newly redesignatedMarine Corps Air Base. The Hender-son Field complex included a newairstrip, Fighter Two, which replacedFighter One, which had severedrainage problems. Brigadier GeneralLouis Woods, who had taken over assenior aviator when Geiger returnedto Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26December by Brigadier General Fran-cis P. Mulcahy, Commanding Gener-al, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Newfighter and bomber squadrons fromboth the 1st and 2d Wings sent theirflight echelons forward on a regularbasis. The Army added three fightersquadrons and a medium bombersquadron of B-26s. The Royal NewZealand Air Force flew in a recon-naissance squadron of LockheedHudsons. And the U.S. Navy sentforward a squadron of Consolidat-

U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898

Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches whilehis troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal's beaches on 8 December, theday before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division.

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The 'George' Medal

T he George Medal is legendary among 1st Ma­rine Division veterans of Guadalcanal. Onlyabout 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold

gave out.The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the

division during the early days on Guadalcanal, when am­munition, food, and heavy equipment were short and theJapanese plentiful. When the issue was no longer in doubt,Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy with­drawal in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks andsurface action which left the division in such a tight spot.

In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson,adjutant of the 5th Marines, the Division &3, then­Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B. Twining, resolved to com­memorate the occasion. Twining told artist Dickson ingeneral terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to workdesigning an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece todraw a circle on a captured Japanese blank militarypostcard.

Dickson's design was approved and when the divisiongot to Australia a mold was made by a local metal crafts­man and a small number were cast before the mold becameunserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one Australianpound for it and received a certificate as well. The medalsare now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recentyears, reproductions have been cast, and can be identifiedby the different metal and a poor definition of details.

The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve droppinga hot potato in the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of

a grateful Marine. In the original design the sleeve bore thestripes of a vice admiral intended to be either Vice AdmiralRobert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral FrankJack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, butthe final medal diplomatically omitted this identification.

Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous toArizona, not Guadalcanal, but representing the code namefor the island, "Cactus:' The obverse inscription is Facia Ge­orgius, "Let George Do It:' Thus it became known as theGeorge Medal.

The medal's reverse pictures a cow (the original designshowed a Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an elec­tric fan, and is inscribed: "In fond remembrance of the hap­py days spent from Aug. 7th 1942 to Jan. 5th 1943.U.S.M.C'

The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of thepale green herringbone twill from some Marine's utility uni­form. Legend has it that to be authentic the utilities fromwhich the ribbons were made had to have been washed inthe waters of Guadalcanal's Lunga River. Some medals wereprovided with the oversized safety pin used to identify laun­dry bags in Navy shipboard laundries.

Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not un­common in military circles and recall, among others, theSoochow Creek medals recognizing the defense of Shan­ghai's International Settlement during the Japanese inva­sions of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the MilitaryOrder of the Dragon medals of veterans of the China ReliefExpedition or Boxer Rebellion. - Brooke Nihart

48

ed PBY Catalina patrol planes whichhad a much needed night-flying capa-bility.

The aerial buildup forced theJapanese to curtail all air attacks andmade daylight naval reinforcementattempts an event of the past. Thenighttime visits of the Tokyo Expressdestroyers now brought only suppliesencased in metal drums which wererolled over the ships' sides in hopethey would float into shore. The menashore desperately needed everythingthat could be sent, even by t:hismethod, but most of the drums neverreached the beaches.

Still, however desperate the enemysituation was becoming, he wasprepard to fight. General Hyakutakecontinued to plan the seizure of theairfield. General Hitoshi Immamura,commander of the Eighth AreaArmy, arrived in Rabaul on 2 De-cember with orders to continue theoffensive. He had 50,000 men to addto the embattled Japanese troops onGuadalcanal.

Before these new enemy unitscould be employed, the Americanswere prepared to move out from theperimeter in their own offensive.Conscious that the Mt. Austen areawas a continuing threat to his inlandflank in any drive to the west, Patchcommitted the Americal's 132d Inf an-try to the task of clearing the moun-tain's wooded slopes on 17December. The Army regiment suc-ceeded in isolating the majorJapanese force in the area by earlyJanuary. The 1st Battalion, 2d Ma-rines, took up hill positions to thesoutheast of the 132d to increaseflank protection.

By this time, the 25th Infantry Di-vision (Major General J. Lawton Col-lins) had arrived and so had the 6thMarines (6 January) and the resi: ofthe 2d Division's headquarters andsupport troops. Brigadier GeneralAlphonse De Carre, the Marine di-vision's assistant commander, tookcharge of all Marine ground forceson the island. The 2d Division's com-

mander, Major General John Mar-ston, remained in New Zealandbecause he was senior to GeneralPatch.

With three divisions under hiscommand, General Patch was desig-nated Commanding General, XIVCorps, on 2 January. His corps head-quarters numbered less than a scoreof officers and men, almost all takenfrom the Americal's staff. BrigadierGeneral Edmund B. Sebree, who hadalready led both Army and Marineunits in attacks on the Japanese, tookcommand of the Americal Division.On 10 January, Patch gave the sig-nal to start the strongest Americanoffensive yet in the Guadalcanal cam-paign. The mission of the troops wassimple and to the point: "Attack anddestroy the Japanese forces remain-ing on Guadalcanal."

The initial objective of the corps'attack was a line about 1,000 to 1,500yards west of jump-off positions.These ran inland from Point Cruz tothe vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000yards from the beach. In order toreach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Di-vision attacked first with the 35thand 27th Infantry driving west andsouthwest across a scrambled seriesof ridges. The going was rough andthe dug-in enemy, elements of tworegiments of the 38th Division, gaveway reluctantly and slowly. By the13th, however, the American sol-

U.S. Half track Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzerand a .50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun

diers, aided by Marines of the 1stBattalion, 2d Marines, had wonthrough to positions on the southernflank of the 2d Marine Division.

On 12 January, the Marines begantheir advance with the 8th Marinesalong the shore and 2d Marines in-land. At the base of Point Cruz, inthe 3d Battalion, 8th Marines' sector,regimental weapons company half-tracks ran over seven enemy machinegun nests. The attack was then heldup by an extensive emplacement untilthe weapons company commander,Captain Henry P. "Jim" Crowe, tookcharge of a half-dozen Marine infan-trymen taking cover from enemy firewith the classic remarks: "You'll neverget a Purple Heart hiding in a foxhole. Follow me!" The men did andthey destroyed the emplacement.

All along the front of the advanc-ing assault companies the going wasrough. The Japanese, remnants of theSendai Division, were dug into thesides of a series of cross compart-ments and their fire took the Marinesin the flank as they advanced.Progress was slow despite massive ar-tillery support and naval gunfirefrom four destroyers offshore. In twodays of heavy fighting, flamethrow-ers were employed for the first timeand tanks were brought into play.The 2d Marines was now relievedand the 6th Marines moved into theattack along the coast while the 8th

Marines took up the advance inland.Naval gunfire support, spotted bynaval officers ashore, improvedmeasurably. On the 15th, the Ameri-cans, both Army and Marine,reached the initial corps objective. Inthe Marine attack zone, 600 Japanesewere dead.

The battle-weary 2d Marines hadseen its last infantry action ofGuadalcanal. A new unit now cameinto being, a composite Army-Marine division, or CAM division,formed from units of the Americaland 2d Marine Divisions. The direct-ing staff was from the 2d Division,since the Americal had responsibili-ty for the main perimeter. Two of itsregiments, the 147th and the 182d In-fantry, moved up to attack in linewith the 6th Marines still along thecoast. The 8th Marines was essential-

ly pinched out of the front lines bya narrowing attack corridor as the in-land mountains and hills pressedcloser to the coastal trail. The 25thDivision, which was advancingacross this rugged terrain, had themission of outfianking the Japanesein the vicinity of Kokumbona, whilethe CAM division drove west. Onthe 23d, as the CAM troops ap-proached Kokumbona, the 1st Bat-talion of the 27th Infantry strucknorth out of the hills and overran thevillage site and Japanese base. Therewas only slight but steady oppositionto the American advance as the ene-my withdrew west toward Cape Es-perance.

The Japanese had decided, reluc-tantly, to give up the attempt toretake Guadalcanal. The orders weresent in the name of the Emperor and

50

senior staff officers were sent toGuadalcanal to ensure their accep-tance. The Navy would make the fi-nal runs of the Tokyo Express, onlythis time in reverse, to evacuate thegarrison so it could fight again inlater battles to hold the Solomons.

Receiving intelligence that enemyships were massing again to thenorthwest, General Patch took steps,as Vandegrift had before him onmany occasions, to guard againstoverextending his forces in the faceof what appeared to be another ene-my attempt at reinforcement. Hepulled the 25th Division back to bol-ster the main perimeter defenses andordered the CAM division to con-tinue its attack. When the Marinesand soldiers moved out on 26 Janu-ary, they had a surprisingly easy timeof it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day

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and 2,000 the following day. TheJapanese were still contesting everyattack, but not in strength.

By 30 January, the sole frontlineunit in the American advance was the147th Infantry; the 6th Marines heldpositions to its left rear.

The Japanese destroyer transportsmade their first run to the island onthe night of 1-2 February, taking out2,300 men from evacuation positionsnear Cape Esperance. On the nightof 4-5 February; they returned andtook out most of the Sendai sur-vivors and General Hyakutake andhis Seventeenth Army staff. The fi-nal evacuation operation was carriedout on the night of 7-8 February,when a 3,000-man rear guard wasembarked. In all, the Japanese with-

drew about 11,000 men in those threenights and evacuated about 13,000soldiers from Guadalcanal overall.The Americans would meet many ofthese men again in later battles, butnot the 600 evacuees who died, tooworn and sick to survive their rescue.

On 9 February, American soldiersadvancing from east and west met atTenaro village on Cape Esperance.The only Marine ground unit still inaction was the 3d Battalion, 10thMarines, supporting the advance.General Patch could happily reportthe "complete and total defeat of Ja-panes forces on GuadaIcanal" No or-ganized Japanese units remained.

On 31 January, the 2d Marines andthe 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal.

As was true with the 1st Marine Di-vision, some of these men were sodebilitated by malaria they had to becarried on board. All of them struckobservers again as young men grownold "with their skins cracked and fur-rowed and wrinkled:' On 9 February,the rest of the 8th Marines and agood part of the division supportingunits boarded transports. The 6thMarines, thankfully only six weekson the island, left on the 19th. Allwere headed for Wellington, NewZealand, the 2d Marines for the firsttime. Left behind on the island as alegacy of the 2d Marine Divisionwere 263 dead.

The total cost of the Guadalcanalcampaign to the American groundcombat forces was 1,598 officers andmen killed, 1,152 of them Marines.

Japanese in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift,and the general's son, Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.

National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4

President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift theMedal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the

51

The wounded totaled 4,709, and2,799 of these were Marines. Marineaviation casualties were 147 killedand 127 wounded. The Japanese intheir turn lost close to 25,000 men onGuadalcanal, about half of whomwere killed in action. The rest suc-cumbed to illness, wounds, and star-vation.

At sea, the comparative losseswere about equal, with each side los-ing about the same number of fight-ing ships. The enemy loss of 2battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers,and 25 destroyers, was irreplaceable.The Allied ship losses, though cost-ly, were not fatal; in essence, all shipslost were replaced. In the air, at least600 Japanese planes were shot down;even more costly was the death of2,300 experienced pilots and aircrew-men. The Allied plane losses wereless than half the enemy's numberand the pilot and aircrew losses sub-stantially lower.

President Roosevelt, reflecting the

thanks of a grateful nation, award-ed General Vandegrift the Medal ofHonor for "outstanding and heroicaccomplishment" in his leadership ofAmerican forces on Guadalcanalfrom 7 August to 9 December 1942.And for the same period, he award-ed the Presidential Unit Citation tothe 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)for "outstanding gallantry" reflecting"courage and determination . . . ofan inspiring order." Included in thedivision's citation and award, besidesthe organic units of the 1st Division,were the 2d and 8th Marines and at-tached units of the 2d Marine Divi-sion, all of the Americal Division, the1st Parachute and 1st and 2d RaiderBattalions, elements of the 3d, 5th,and 14th Defense Battalions, the 1stAviation Engineer Battalion, the 6thNaval Construction Battalion, andtwo motor torpedo boat squadrons.The indispensable Cactus Air Forcewas included, also represented by 7Marine headquarters and service

52

squadrons, 16 Marine flying squa-drons, 16 Navy flying squadrons,and 5 Army flying squadrons.

The victory at Guadalcanalmarked a crucial turning point in thePacific War. No longer were theJapanese on the offensive. Some ofthe Japanese Emperor's best infantry-men, pilots, and seamen had beenbested in close combat by the Ameri-cans and their Allies. There wereyears of fierce fighting ahead, butthere was now no question of itsoutcome.

When the veterans of the 1st Ma-nne Division were gathered in thank-ful reunion 20 years later, theyreceived a poignant message fromGuadalcanal. The sender was alegend to all "Canal" Marines,Honorary U.S. Marine Corps Ser-geant Major Jacob C. Vouza. TheSolomons native in his halting En-glish said: "Tell them I love them all.Me old man now, and me no lookgood no more. But me never forget."

The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the fightingat Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erectedby his friends. The Marine's remains were later removed to

the division cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburialat war's end either in his hometown or the Punchbowl Na-tional Cemetery in Hawaii with the honors due a fallen hero.

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'I

SourcesThe basic source work for this booklet: is

the first volume in the series History of U.S.Marine Corps Operations in World War II,Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, written byLtCol Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,and Henry 1. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Histor-ical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used inwriting this narrative were: BGen Samuel B.Griffith II, The Battle for Guadalcaial(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963); CenAlexander A. Vandegrift as told to Robert: B.Asprey, Once a Marine: The Memoirs ofGeneral A. A. Vandegrift, USMC (New York:W. W. Norton, 1964); Col Mitchell Paige, AMarine Named Mitch (New York: VantagePress, 1975); Burke Davis, Marine: The l.ifeof Chesty Puller (Boston: Little, Brown,1962); George McMillan, The Old Breed. AHistory of the 1st Marine Division in WorldWar II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,1949); and Richard W. Johnston, Follow Me!:The Story of the Second Marine Division inWorld War II (New York: Random House,1948).

The correspondence of General Vandegriftwith General Holcomb and other senior Ma-rines, held at the Marine Corps Histor.calCenter, was helpful. Equally of value wereconversations that the author had had withGeneral Vandegrift after his retirement. In thecourse of his career as a Marine historian, theauthor has talked with other Guadalcanalveterans of all ranks; hopefully, this tasresulted in a "feel" for the campaign, essen-tial in writing such an overview.

The literature on the Guadalcanal opera-tion is extensive. In addition to the books cit-ed above, there are several which arepersonally recommended to the interestedreader: Robert Leckie, Helmet for My P11! ow(New York: Random House, 1957); HerbertMerillat, Guadalcanal Remembered (NewYork: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr.,The United States Army in World War II: TheWar in the Pacific; Guadalcanal, The FirstOffensive (Washington: Historical Division,Department of the Army, 1949); T. GradyGallant, On Valor's Side (New York: Double-day, 1963); Robert Sherrod, History of Ma-rine Corps Aviation in World War II(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952);Maj John L. Zimmerman, The GuadalcanalCampaign (Washington: Historical Division,Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949);RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, The Struggle forGuadalcanal: History of United States NavalOperations in World War II, Vol V (Boston:Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent, compre-hensive account, Richard B. Frank, Guadal-canal (New York: Random House, 1990).

About the AuthorH enry I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of

the History and Museums Division, was aMarine Corps historian from 1951-1990. He at-tended The Citadel, 1943-1944, and was gradu-ated with a bachelor of arts cum laude in historyfrom Hope College, Holland, Michigan. Hereceived a master of arts degree in history fromColumbia University. Mr. Shaw served as a Ma-rine in both World War II and the Korean War.He is the co-author of four of the five volumesof the official history of Marine Corps operationsin World War II and was the senior editor of mostof the official histories of Marines in Vietnam.

In addition, he has written a number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has writ-ten many articles on military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.

The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the Nautical andAviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps from BGen Samuel B.Griffith II's The Battle for Guadalcanal and by Doubleday Books and Jack Cog-gins for use of the sketches from his The Campaign for Guadalcanal. The authoralso wishes to thank Richard I. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission toreproduce their photographs.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a PurpleHeart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, IJSMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGilhivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-0580

1992PCN 190 003117 00