five-factor personality description

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Psychological Bulletin

1995 Vol 117, No. 2, 187-215

Copyright 1995 by

the

American Psychological Associat ion, Inc.

0033-2909/95/S3.00

A Contrarian View of the Five-Factor Approach to

Personality Description

Jack Block

University

of California, Berkeley

The

5-factor approach

(FFA) to

personality description

has

been represented

as a

comprehensive

and

compelling rubric

for

assessment.

In

this

article,

various misgivings about

the FFA are

delin-

eated. The algorithmic method of factor analysis may not provide dimensions that are incisive. The

discovery

of th five

factors

may be influenced by

unrecognized constraints

on the

variable sets

analyzed. Lexical

analyses

are

based

on

questionable conceptual

and

methodological assumptions,

and

have achieved uncertain results. The questionnaire version of the FFA has not demonstrated the

special

merits

and

sufficiencies

of the five

factors settled upon. Serious uncertainties have arisen

in

regard to the

claimed 5-factor structure

and the

substantive meanings

of the

factors. Some implica-

tions of

these problems

are

drawn.

During

the last decade, the Big-Five approach has begun

to loom large in the field of personality psychology. It is being

said that rapid progress has been made toward a consensus

on personality structure

(Costa

& McCrae, 1992d, p. 344).

Goldberg (1992) has talked of a quiet revolution occurring in

personality

psychology.... An

age-old scientific

problem has

recently begun to look tractable.. . . Gradually, agreement has

been growing about the number of orthogonal factors needed

to

account

for the

interrelations among English-language trait

descriptors

(p.

26). The contention is that, via the mathemat-

ical method of factor analysis, the basic dimensions o f person-

ality

description have been

discovered : Their

number is five,

and their nature can be summarized by the broad concepts of

Surgency, Agreeableness,

Conscientiousness, Emotional Stabil-

ity

versus Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience (John,

1990,

p.

96).

Digman (1990),

reviewing

the field, also cele-

brates the emergence of the five robust factors of

personality.

Personality psychologists

are

being asked

to

accept this spe-

cific set of five

orthogonal factors

and to use

these factor dimen-

sions as the conceptual structure for descriptively representing

different personalities. Widely,

frequently,

and enthusiastically

promulgated by vigorous, resourceful, talented, ingenious ad-

herents,

and with

support mustered

from

many

and

various

studies, the five-factor approach (FFA) has achieved apprecia-

ble

popularity; a tide seems underway in the field. Adoption of

the FFA as the universal

framework

for personality description

This article benefited greatly

from the

counsel

of a

number

of

col-

leagues.

I must exculpate them regarding

its rema ining deficiencies.

M y

especial thanks go to Lew Goldberg,

David Harrington, Robert Hogan,

Oliver

John, Robert McCrae, Philip Shaver,

and Auke

Tellegen, among

others.

Preparation

of this

article

was

supported

in

part

by

National Institute

of

Mental Health

Grant MH

16080.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jack

Block,

Department

of

Psychology,

University of

California, Berkeley,

California 94720-1650.

would,

of course, fundamentally shape the subsequent course of

thinking and

research.

In

the words of advocates of this argument, the five factors

are both necessary and reasonably sufficient for describing at

a global level the major features of personality (McCrae &

Costa, 1986,

p. 1001); the five-factor approach

provides

a

uni-

versal descriptive fr am ew or k. . . for the comprehensive assess-

ment

of

individuals (McCrae, 1989,

p.

243); the

five-factor

model developed in studies of normal personality is fully ade-

quate to account for the dimensions of abnormal personality as

well (Costa & McCrae, 1992d, p.

347).

Why are there five and

only

five

factors?

We

believe

it is an

empirical fact, like

the

fact that there are seven continents on earth or eight American

presidents

from

Virginia (McCrae

& John, 1992, p. 194).

The claims of an emerging consensus about the FFA have

also, after a lag, prompted some expression of concerns about

the FFA

(cf.,

e.g., Ben-Porath &

Waller,

1992a, 1992b; Eysenck,

1992;

Hough, 1992; McAdams, 1992; Mershon & Gorsuch,

1988; Tellegen, 1993; Waller & Ben-Porath,

1987),

about the

claims of the approach, its nominal empirical basis, and its sci-

ence-directing implications. What is meant by the phrase, ma-

jor

features

of

personality,

and

what criteria should serve

to

ensure their identification? What does

the

term,

global,

de-

note?

How

does

one

conclude that

a

description

is

reasonably

sufficient or comprehensive or

fully

adequate ? How com-

pelling

and indisputable were the procedures by which the five

factors were discovered and settled upon? What is the role of

concept

and

theory

in the field of

personality psychology?

The present article tries to make explicit and bring together

some of the reasons—methodological, empirical, semantic, the-

oretical—underlying my own discontent with the FFA. Some

prefatory remarks are necessary in order to convey the personal

perspective from which I shall be speaking of the FFA. Not all

personality psychologists

will

subscribe to my views.

My concern is, like the concerns of FFA advocates, with the

problem—it is really an ideal—of establishing a set of con-

structs for the scientific description of personality (see, e.g.,

Block, 1961; Block & Block, 1980). For a set of constructs to be

187


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188

JACK BLOCK.

scientifically

sufficient,

a number of criteria will need to be

jointly served. Th e psychological constructs—often primitive

terms—should receive sufficient elaboration (necessarily, of

course,

via

words)

so

that their meaning

can

attain consensual-

ity among psychological scientists. Th e constructs should be

sufficient in number so that th e personalities of individuals and

the

dynamics

of

behaviors

can be

represented

in

articulated

ways a nd discriminating explanations and predictions may be

formulated. They should

demonstrate

a

superior

usefulness in

prediction or in economy of conceptualization over competing

sets of constructs. Th e constructs should be theory-reflecting

rather than constructs issued

a nd

controlled

b y

confounded

so-

cietal evaluations. As scientific constructs, they should be for-

mulated with no necessary regard fo r their usability and under-

standability by laypersons. These several criteria constitute a

tall order

of

achievement

and it is not

suggested that their

achievement is

imminent; rather, they serve

as a

guiding

aspiration.

Some words are also d ue about the terminology used in this

essay.

The Big

Five

are often

called the

five-factor mo el of

personality

and are

referred

to as

providing

an

understanding

of

the

structure

of

personality.

As the

term model

is

used

in conventional parlance among psychologists, it means a theo-

retically based, logically coherent, working representation

or

simulation that,

in

operation, attempts

to

generate psychologi-

cal phenomena of interest. However, no identifiable hypotheses,

theories, or models guided the emergence of or decision on this

five-fold space (although some have been offered post hoc).

There is no theoretical reason why it should be these five [ factors]

rather than some other

five. . . .

[There were]

no a

priori predic-

tions

as to what factors should emerge, and a coherent an d falsifi-

able explanation for the five factors has yet to be put forward.

(Briggs, 1989, p. 249)

Because the Big Five formulation was entirely atheoretical, us-

age of the term

model

may be premature.

Moreover, Big Five research has been based only on the re-

lations among

a set of

variables across individuals, what Cattell

(1946) ,

in his incisive formulation of the data box, termed

the R-technique (or

variable-centered )

approach

to the

anal-

ysis

of

personality data.

As he

observed, although

the

R-ap-

proach

to

data analysis

is

important, there

are

other important

ways of looking at personality. In particular, it should b e recog-

nized that no matter ho w

satisfying

on descriptive or other

grounds

the variable-centered factor structure of the FFA may

be, it cannot represent a personality structure. Personality

structures lie within individuals (see also Block, 1971, p. 13;

John, 1990,

p.

96).

It is the

personality structure

of an

individ-

ua l

that, energized by motivations, dynamically organizes per-

ceptions, cognitions,

and

behaviors

so as to

achieve certain sys-

tem goals. No functioning psychological system, with its

rules and bounds, is designated or implied by the Big

Five

formulation;

it

does

not offer a

sense

of

what goes

on

within

the structured, motivation-processing, system-maintaining

individual.

On this analysis, it

follows

that a more appropriate, and more

limiting,

label for the Big Five body o f work is something like

the inordinately cumbersome phrase, the five-factor,

variable-

centered

approach

to personality descriptions. Of

practical

ne-

cessity, in the following discussion reference will be made to the

five-factor

approach, but it should be understood that this

phrase is shorthand for a lengthier, more awkward, but perhaps

more

fitting,

wording.

In

what follows,

I

often deliberately write

in the first

person

instead of using the traditional third person. In much of the

literature presenting

and

evaluating

the

FFA,

opinions—in-

formed opinions bu t nevertheless opinions—inevitably have

been, are,

and

will continue

to be

offered.

In my own

remarks,

rather than using

the

seeming objectivity

of

third-person phras-

ing,

the

egocentric

I

will serve

to

identify personal views.

Be-

cause previous interpretations of the FFA have come primarily

from its proponents, it may be useful to provide a more dubita-

tive

reckoning.

FFA

advocates certainly will wish

to and are en-

couraged to dispute my interpretive account. The ensuing dia-

logue can only be constructive and advancing regarding the is-

sues involved.

No apologies are offered for the specifics to be presented. Of-

ten slighted, they provide a basis for evaluating certain central,

highly influential studies. If the shaping of the field of personal-

ity

is to be

based

on

reasoning

and

evidence rather than claim

and

counterclaim,

we

must

be

religious about

the

details.

The structure of this essay is as

follows.

Because it has been

said that the five-factor theoretical

model.

. . [is]

rooted

in

factor analysis

(McCrae &

Costa,

1989a, p.

108), some forgot-

ten or

slighted knowledge regarding this extraordinarily

useful

method

is

brought forward.

I

maintain that

the

task

o f

evolving

the theoretical constructs necessary for the scientific study of

personality cannot be entrusted solely to the pervasively useful

method of factor analysis. The origins and early history of the

FFA are

then reviewed. Concerns

and

questions

are

raised

re-

garding th e origins of the FF A in the work, primarily, of Cattell

(e.g.,

1943a, 1943b, 1945), Tupes

and

Christal ( 1992) ,

and

Norman (1963). I will suggest that, to the extent this early work

on ratings

is

said

to

provide

a

foundation

for the

FFA, subse-

quent edifices

may be

shakier than

is now

recognized.

The ex-

tensive lexical labors

of

Goldberg (e.g., 1977, 1981, 1982, 1990,

1992)

are

then considered.

The

widely ranging research

of

Costa and McCrae (e.g., 1985, 1992b; McCrae & Costa, 1985,

1987), which brought the FFA, until then based exclusively on

lexical

analyses

and

adjective ratings

of

self

or

others, into

the

questionnaire realm, is next examined. It is primarily these last

two research programs, vigorously pursued and promoted, that

have moved

the FFA

toward

its

current prominence

in

person-

ality psychology. On the basis of this series of evaluations,

largely methodological in nature, th e current status of the FFA

is appraised,

its

logical

and

psychological problems discussed,

and

some positively oriented suggestions

offered. It

should

be

noted that

a

number

of the

ideas brought forward

in

this

effort

are not

novel; many come

from

others, generally cited

but

some-

times perhaps

not

because

I do not

remember their origin.

A

Viewpoint Regarding

the

Method

and

Possibilities

of

Factor Analysis

Because

the FFA is

acknowledged

to be

rooted

in the

method

of

factor analysis,

an

evaluation

of the

approach must

be predicated upon an understanding of the method, its

strengths

and its

vagaries. Although factor analysis

is a

method


3/29

A CONTRARIAN

VIEW

OF THE FIVE-FACTOR APPROACH

189

usable in diverse ways in a variety of contexts to analyze the

correlations

among a set of

variables,

the problems or

arbitrari-

ness

of the

method

are

often

not

given sufficient recognition.

The mathematics of the method generates a succession of la-

tent variables or factors that, subsequently, can be used, in re-

verse,

to regenerate the initial

correlation

matrix to any desired

degree of precision.

If

as many principal component factors are

extracted

as

there

are

variables

in the

beginning variable set,

the

reproduction of the initial correlation matrix i s perfect.

There would be little point to the factor analytic method,

however, if all it

provided

was as

many factors

at the end of the

process

as one had

variables

at the outset. It is

because

the

seri-

ally

extracted

factors

necessarily decrease in

their influence

on

reproducing

the initial matrix that the method can offer cogni-

tive

economy.

If the

extraction

o f

relatively

fe w

factors permits

the reproduction of the initial correlation matrix reasonably

well,

then one may consider the information contained in the

starting correlation matrix to be expressible or

explained

in

terms

of

these relatively

few

factors.

One can

then seek

to

pro-

vide

psychological meaning (usually

via

factor

rotation) for

these

summarizing

latent variables.

As

a method of data reduction, exploratory factor analysis

can often simplify and make reportable masses of data—net-

works

of interrelations—otherwise

cognitively

unencompass-

able.

For some, the promise of factor analysis has seemed to be

that the method would permit easy empiricism rather than

tough theory to develop our scientific constructs. However, it is

necessary to know and to remember the rigid logic of the

method

and its

consequent quirkiness when

it is

unwarily

set

down in the real world. The method can issue marvelous, pre-

viously obscure

connections,

it can also issue

mindless results

(e.g., see

discussion

of

this issue

by

Armstrong, 1967; Lykken,

1971).

In considering the results

afforded

by factor analysis, one

must

be

mindful

o f the

ways

the method may suggest more than

is supportable. Herewith are some cautionary remarks

about

factor

analysis that derive

from

long-available knowledge

in the

fiel

The correlations analyzed by factor analysis

reflect

what is

traditionally

and honorifically called communal or common

v ri nce But

communal variance

may

also

be

called, less con-

ventionally

and more pejoratively,

redundant variance

To the

extent

a

variable

correlates

with

other variables, it has

commu-

nal

or redundant variance: it is said to be

explainable

by these

other variables

and

conveys

no

unique information.

To the ex-

tent

a

variable does

not

correlate

with

other variables

but is

itself highly reliable,

that

variable is indexing some quality not

otherwise

being captured.

Redundancy

has its

usefulness.

In

factor analysis, redun-

dancy provides

multiple

indicators and, therefore, more reliable

indices of

underlying factor dimensions. However,

the

commu-

na l

or redundant variance observed to exist within the particu-

lar set of

variables subjected

to factor

analysis

may or may not

be

important

in

other

domains or other

settings. Therefore,

the

factors

summarizing this communal

or

redundant variance

may

or may not be important when they are brought out into

the

larger world.

As

a

contrived

but

instructive example,

consider a correlation

matrix

based on 100 variables, 99 of which intercorrelate be-

cause they are all fully reliable manifestations of the latent vari-

able, shoelace-tying competency,

in one

form

or

another. Vari-

able 100 is a fully

reliable, fully

valid but anonymous or unrec-

ognized measure of the latent variable, general intelligence,

which

is presumed here to not correlate at all with the first 99

measures. Factor analysis of this matrix will issue one general

factor explaining

all of the

communal variance.

An

unsophisti-

cated enthusiast of factor analysis would be impressed by the

finding

of

so

powerful

a factor explaining so much of the co-

variance. Further, the lonely, nameless, intelligence measure

would

likely be viewed as a

residual

and dismissively con-

signed

to obscurity. Yet, relating these factor analytic findings

to the wider, external world beyond the mathematical solipsism

of the particular

factor analysis would reveal that

the power-

ful

general factor

has no or

trivial implications, whereas

the ignored residual variable has momentous behavioral

significance.

Of course, this example is a contrived extreme. But the point

made applies

to the

real world

of

data

to an

unrecognized

or

unacknowledged extent:

the

amount

of

variance

explained

internally by a factor need not

testify

to the external psycholog-

ical importance

of the

factor.

The mix of variables submitted to factor analysis can be var-

ied

with

the

consequence

that the factors then obtained will, in

effect, be entailed rather than represent

substantive

findings. A

small factor can be

made large,

a

large factor

can be

made small,

residuals can be made into factors (or discarded as

irrelevant). One can

make

for a

simple structure

by

dropping

factorially

complex

( interstitial )

variables or prevent

simple

structure

(and even create a circumplex configuration) by

adding factorially complex variables that

blend different

sources

of variance.

If

the

locations

of

axes

in one

simple struc-

ture are not satisfying, it is possible by judicious selection and

deletion

of

variables

to

relocate

the

axes

and

have quite another

simple structure. One can

achieve such ends

by just

varying

the degree and the

location

of redundancy within the variable

set. In particular, a set of variables can be

prestructured.

That

is, wittingly or unwittingly, the set of variables subjected to fac-

tor analysis may have been previously selected so as to contain

several quite different subsets or

clusters

of redundant vari-

ables. Such

prestructuring

preordains the factors subse-

quently

found by the algorithmic operations of factor

analysis.

It is my view

that

the

frequent

presence and the powerful

effects of prestructuring are

often

no t sufficiently recognized

by

those using the method of exploratory factor analysis. In par-

ticular, it will be suggested later that, in crucial ways, influential

demonstrations

of the sufficiency of the FFA may

have been

un-

duly influenced

by prior prestructuring of the personality vari-

ables used in these analyses.

1

If so, then the

recurrence

and

robustness

over diverse samples of factor structures may be

attributable more to the sameness of the variable

sets

used than

to the intrinsic structure of the personality-descriptive domain.

Although

the method of

factor

analysis

has been

used

for al-

1

Protagonists of the FFA recently have been acknowledging the cru-

cial

influence

on factor solutions of the particular sets of measures used.

For

example, Costa and

McCrae

observe that the axes chosen by a

varimax rotation will depend completely on the selection of variables

(1992a, p. 661) . Goldberg (1993) also acknowledges this problem.


4/29

190

JACK BLOCK

most a century, there is still not a clear, unequivocal basis for

deciding on the number of factors to extract in a factor anal-

ysis or how to obtain an optimum rotation of the particular

set of factors

settled

upon. Various rules exist for these conse-

quential

decisions, based on various arguable assumptions or

aesthetic preferences. One can debate th proper number of fac-

tors; is a ma trix under-factored or over-factored? Wha t are

the dangers of un derfactorin g as compared to overfactoring?

How

should

one

rotate

to

achieve psychological meani ng

and

who

is to be the judge? Should a

rotational

method be used that

destroys a general factor (varimax), em phasizes a general fac-

tor,

or

seeks

to

conform

to a

priori, perhaps theoretical, expec-

tations? Should one impose math ematic al orthogonality on the

rotated factors, or is this cognitively economical way of repre-

senting factors psychologically inappropriate?

Is an

oblique

ro-

tation, which inevitably

fits the

data po ints better, truly

a

fairer

representation of the u nde rlyin g reality, or is it a better fit only

because of the fitting of error? Should one inject unancho red,

spurious variance into th e analysis by c onsidering al l variables

to be fully

reliable,

or should the

analysis

employ more

realistic

communality

estimates that set more constraints on subsequent

rotations and produce less striking factor structures? When ro-

tating factors, should one build up a weak factor or residualize

it? Is a given factor really only a bloated specific (Cat tell,

1973)

or

tautological

(Eysenck & Eysenck,

1969)

facto r war-

ranting residualization? Or is the factor a

primary

factor or a

merging of prim ary factors into a complex or combinato-

rial

factor w ith broader but c onflated behavioral significance?

Since

complex, prim ary, and tautological factors can all emerge

simultaneously in a given factor analysis (Comrey, 1978; Guil-

ford,

1975; Lykken, 1 9 7 1 >

how does one

recognize

and re-

spond to their

different

nature s and implications? These issues

are of foundational importance because, with the method of

factor

analysis, the psychological nature of the factors ob-

tained very

frequently

changes

fundamentally

as the

number

of

factors changes and as the rotational criteria are varied. Intu-

itively

and

conceptually, these transmogrifications should

not

occur: A

real

factor should not change in meaning when an-

other factor

is

introduced

or

when rotations

are

shifted.

But in

fact,

this happens

in the

arbitrary hyperspace

of

factor analysis

and is unse ttling as one tries to i mp ute psychological meaning

to the factors robotically issued by the workings of the method.

As

Cliff

(1983) remarks in a more general context,

There

a re

typically

an

infinity

of

alternative sets

of parameters [e.g.,

factor

loadings] which

are

equa lly consistent with

th e

data, many

of

which

would lead

to

entirely

different

conclusions concerning

the

nature

of the

latent variables (pp. 122-123).

The

method

of factor analysis cannot choose among the

infinity

of possibili-

ties. The decision requires conceptual

argument

and empirical

work; one

must return

to the

task

o f

being

a

psychologist.

To

further encourage a wary perspective on the results issued

by fac tor analysis, it is also

useful

to consider the starting basis

or grist for the method. Because factor analysis processes corre-

lation

matrices, all the psychometric problems that afflict

cor-

relation coefficients have effects on the subsequent results

afforded by the

method. Thus, computed correlation

coeffi-

cients

are seriously

influenced

by the degree of relation linearity

that is present; by scaling

considerations;

by the validities of the

measures used;

by the

reliabilities

of the

measures being corre-

lated;

by

truncations , restrictions,

or

extensions

of

range

on the

variables used; by the form s of the score distributions for the

variables

being correlated; by maverick observations that may

improperly raise or lower correlations; by method variance; by

merging

different

kinds of samples m anifesting different covar-

iance

patterns (e.g., males and

females)

into one large, hodge-

podge sample wherein

the

resultant correlations

are an

irrele-

vant function

of the

relative sizes

of the

samples being inapp ro-

priately

combined; by heterogeneity with respect to a third

variable (e.g.,

measures x and y m ay be

unrelated

but

because

each correlates with age, x and y

will

correlate and appear on

the

same factor unless age is

partialed);

by whether the variables

being correlated are represented by differential scores or by cu-

mulative scores (Loevinger, 1948); and much more. The

downstream findings issued by

factor

analysis may be

funda-

mentally

affected

by these

often

unevaluated upstream

influences.

For example, it appears th at the B ig Five factors are reason-

ably orthogonal when data from a homogeneous sample of sub-

jects are evaluated, but when data from a more heterogeneous

sample are factored, the consequent factor structure may ap-

preciably lose its orthogonality (see, e.g., Costa & McCrae,

1992c; Goldberg, 1992,

p. 37;

Mroczek,

1992). For

another

ex-

ample, consider that introspectiveness and impulsivity

correlate quite negatively in a sample of Air Force jet pilots bu t

quite positively in a sample of male graduate students, with the

consequence that a factor analysis

will

locate these two impor-

tant variables differently, depending on the whether the data be-

ing

evaluated are

from

the first sample, the second sample, the

samples combined, or the two samples in various proportions

(Block,

1955).

Because of the man y kinds of unrecognized or

unattended-to influences on correlation

coefficients—notably,

in my

view,

the usage of psychologically different subject sam-

ples— the findings of factor analysis, especially with regard to

the factors emerging later in the factoring sequence,

often

do not

replicate

from

one analysis to another or

will

appear in

different

form.

I n

p articular,

on e

mu st guard against easy

and

convenient

dismissal of factors that may not replicate or have not yet been

replicated. The

factors being

dismissed may

well

be

reliable,

im -

portant within each of the analyses, and may well be crucial to

recognize when the aspiration is to develop a comprehensive set

of

constructs for the description and understanding of

personality.

At a

deeper,

conceptual

level, there

is the question of

whether

the ubiquitously used correlation coefficient is, by its nature,

able

to

represent pivotal features

of

personality functioning.

For

example, correlation coefficients

fail

to adequately represent

asymmetricality

of

relations (e.g., although wittiness

and

intelligence correlate,

and wittiness necessarily entails intel-

ligence, intelligence

does no t

entail wittiness; although

a talk-

ative

person

is

necessarily

gregarious, a

gregarious person

need

not be talkative).

There

is

also

th e

complication

of

condi-

tionality o f relations (e.g., agreeableness with other individu-

als may be

m anifested

if and

only

if the

individuals involved

are

at the

same

or

higher status

or

social level; spontaneity

may be

manifested

only in safe conte xts). Correlation

coefficients

imperfectly

reflect

such relations. To the extent these relations

exist,

the

psychological interpretation

of

subsequent factor anal-

ysis

findings

will

be

misdirected.

Of course, recognition of the


5/29

A

CONTRARIAN

VIEW OF THE

FIVE-FACTOR APPROACH

191

insufficiencies of

correlation

coefficients

should

n ot

cause their

abandonment. Rather,

there needs

to be

more

awareness of their

inadequacy

for various conceptual

purposes.

For reasons such as these, and others, a new look in factor and

covariance

structure analysis may be emerging. MacCallum

and Tucker (1991) have presented a more realistic framework

for

the common-factor model, on e that recognizes the differ-

ence between

measured

variables and

modeled

variables. Their

approach, which awaits

further

development, respects the non-

linear

influences

of common factors on measured variables or

the presence of large numbers of minor common factors (p.

503). Cudeck and

Henly

( 1991) discuss various sources of dis-

crepancy between models

of

covariance structures

and the

sam-

ple matrices

from

which these models are derived. They present

sobering remarks on the model selection problem and re-

mind

us that such models are only descriptive or summarizing

devices. Their concluding paragraph is worth quoting here:

Yet

even with

models that are intended to describe or summarize,

the problem of making comparisons inevitably arises when two or

more structures apply

to the same data and one

wishes

to

evaluate

their

relative performance.

Often

the

best that

can be

done,

which

is

actually

a

useful accomplishment whose value should

not be

minimized, is to

state

clearly the criteria that are used in the com-

parison, in conjunction with descriptions of the models, character-

istics of the

data,

and the

purpose

for

which

the

models were con-

structed. Evaluations of this kind inevitably include elements o f

prior

experience

and

individual preference. These personal points

of view should

be

articulated.

Many

believe such

subjectivity in

model development is somehow unscientific and undesirable, as if

it

could

be

avoided

by

pretending

it

does

no t

exist.

(p .

518)

Finally,

as an anthropological observation, an unremarked

oddity in the field of

factor

analysis warrants noting: Regardless

of

the

content domain being evaluated,

the

great majority

of

published

factor

analyses report relatively few

factors—three

through perhaps six or seven factors. Rarely does the

factor

an-

alyst

settle

on more factors in

reporting

substantive

results.

There

can be

valid reasons

for

such

findings:

There

may

indeed

be only

a small number of latent dimensions underlying the

starting

correlation matrices. But the underlying motivation of

many

factor analysts should be considered as well. They wish

to

achieve latent dimensions explaining large amounts

of the

covariance present. Otherwise, the method could be said to lose

its raison d'etre. Unfortunately, however, this ambition of the

factor analyst

is

opposed

by

logical constraints residing

in the

nature of the

procedure.

To

have many factors would necessar-

ily diminish

the

explanatory power

of

each

and

result

in a

cognitively complicated

picture of the

world.

To

enhance

the

importance of the factors in an

analysis,

it is

therefore prag-

matically preferable to restrict their number and to discourage

the existence of numerous, small factors. If one allows for the

level of communality

usually

existing in empirical matrices

(attenuated by unreliability and by the specific variance of the

measures being analyzed), each of five factors would be con-

strained to explain on the average not more than

about

8% or

10 of the total variance. This is on the verge of explaining

too

little

variance to be

satisfying

to many factor analysts. The

human preference for schematizing the world a t a certain level

of

complexity (Miller, 1956)

may be

operative here. Such cog-

nitive preferences,

subsequently

firmed

into commitments,

may

underlie

the

motivation

of

some factor analysts toward sparse

solutions rather than solutions involving more numerous and,

therefore, more

complicating latent

dimensions.

The preceding disquisition is by way of saying that factor

analysis is a highly useful technique for the study of personality,

but it is not a method for all reasons. As Costa and McCrae

(1992a) say, Used intelligently,

it can

yield valuable insights

(p. 654). But abject deference to the method and the results

it

issues is not warranted (see, especially, Lykken, 1971). It is

unlikely indeed that

the

logical structure

and

sequence

of

oper-

ations underlying the method of factor analysis and correla-

tional data can reflect the way individuals evolve, articulate, and

conditionally

use

descriptive terms

to

characterize themselves

and others. To the extent that the method of factor analysis, per

se,

is said to provide

sufficient

or strong justification for the five-

factor approach to the description of individual differences in

personality, we must remember to look for and evaluate the un-

acknowledged assumptions

or restrictions that in fact undergird

the

data

used, the correlation

coefficients

subsequently gener-

ated, the factor analytic logic, the factor analytic heuristics, and

the interpretations of the consequent factor analytic findings.

The

faith

of

FFA

adherents—their premise and their prom-

ise—that

the field of personality psychology can confidently rely

on the factor analytic algorithm as an appropriate and

sufficient

basis

for

objectively deciding

on the

theoretical constructs

to be

used by personologists is, in my

view,

unwarranted, naive, and

limiting.

Certainly,

the

results afforded

by

factor analysis

thoughtfully

and fairly applied should

often

be

influential.

But

also influential should be understandings gained

from

experi-

mental investigations,

from

intimate and prolonged observa-

tions of other people,

from neurophysiological

recognitions,

from

psychiatric insights,

from

personal introspections,

from

formal cognitive efforts to

create

a theoretical system that en-

compasses a chosen domain of phenomena, from the thoughts

flicking

through

one's mind as one

drifts

toward sleep,

from

any

and

all possible

contexts

of discovery (Reichenbach, 1951).

None of these sources

will

be fully dependable in the seeking of

incisive, generative, and coherently related concepts, but all can

contribute to a context of theory construction that then

warrants

the context of

justification (i.e.,

validation)

(Reichenbach,

1951)

and, in a helical process, takes the science

onward

to a new context of discovery.

A

Revisionist History of the Discovery of the Big Five

Approach to Personality Description

Previous historical accounts of the FFA have come only

from

proponents of the FFA. Therefore, it may be

useful

to provide a

more skeptical rendering of the chronology. In focusing on the

several foundational studies of the FFA, I

will

suggest

that,

if

the

footings of the FFA are less than secure, the structure subse-

quently

erected may not be a house all

will

wish to enter.

Role ofAllport

The FFA approach in America may be said to have begun

with Allport and

Odbert's

(1936) onerous compilation of all

the

terms

in the

1925 unabridged, 400,000 word edition

of

Webster s

Ne w

International ictionary

they judged as usable

to distinguish the behavior of one human being

from

that of


6/29

192

JACK BLOCK

another (p. 24). They came up with 17,953 single-word de-

scriptor terms. T o this enormous collection, Allport and Odbert

applied their definition of

trait

as generalized and personal-

ized determining

tendencies—consistent and

stable modes

of

an individual's adjustment to his environment (p. 26) and

came up with a primary

list

of only

(

sic 4,504 nonjudgmental

trait-names,

still

a

very large set. They

suggested that

their

alphabetical listing of

trait-names might prove

to be a useful

resource

for

psychologists developing rating scales

and the

like.

However, Allport warned that common speech is a poor guide

to psychological subtleties (Allport,

1961,

p. 356).

RoleofCattell

Next on the

scene

was

Raymond Cattell

(1943a,

1943b,

1947). Cattell subscribed

to

what subsequently

has

become

known as the lexical hypothesis: All aspects of hum an person-

ality which

are or

have been

of

importance, interest,

or

utility

have already become recorded in the substance of language

(1943b, p. 483). He began with the Allport and Odbert trait-

name listing but , noteworthy and

often

no t noted

(but

see John,

Angleitner, &

Ostendorf,

1988), he

deemed

it insufficient.

To

make

the list o f

traits

as

complete

as

possible.

. . in

addition

to

all

that could

be

obtained

from the dictionary, the substance of

all syndromes and types which psychologists have observed and

described

in the

past

century or so [were added]. (Cattell, 1943a,

p.

491)

Thus, he made sure that terms reflecting aspects of personality

he

deemed to be important—introversion/extraversion, emo-

tional

maturity,

his

construct

of cyclothymia/schizothymia

(the essence of the agreeableness factor, according to French,

1953, p. 222), ascendance/submission, Thurstone's radical-

ism/conservatism variable, McDougall's

temper

variables,

and

many

more—were

included

in his

starting list.

Cattell's considered additions to the dictionary listing pro-

vided

by Allport and Odbert may

well

have been heuristically

beneficial.

B ut a consequence of his decision to introdu ce terms

to represent a ccumulated psychological insights was to depart

significantly from the

dictionary

offerings of

Allport

and Od-

bert; he was no

longer entitled

to

claim that

his

selected

set of

variables was a

truly representative

list. . .

derived

from

lan-

guage (1945, p. 70).

Cattell

then proceeded through an a mbitious, retrospectively

unspecifiable

sequence of semantic

decisions

to

abbreviate this

list. Applying his personal judgment at various stages in the

elimination sequence, he first

proffered

17 1 terms

(4%)

of the

Allport and Odbert adjectives as

sufficiently

representin g the

personality sphere. But because

171

traits were still too

many at the time for his computational capabilities, the terms

were further clustered via correlational analysis aided by Cat-

tell's sema ntic understanding of the terms, producing about 60

clusters (194 3a, 1945). These were still too many, and so a fur-

ther reduction was enforced to achieve a computationally man-

ageable

set of about 35 bipolar rating scale dimensions

based

on clusters

of

variables

and

termed

by

Cattell

as the

standard

reduced personality sphere (1945, 1947). Cattell went on to

factor

ana lyze some peer ratings based on these 35 variables

and concluded that

12

primary factors underlay personality.

These factors do not match

well

w ith the factors subsequently

known

as the Big Five. For a

fuller

description of the sequence

by

which Cattell evolved

his

lexical reductions, consult John,

Angleitner,

and Ostendorf (1988).

More tha n 99% of the 4,504 trait-name adjectives of Allport

and Odbert and those first added by Cattell had been eliminated

along

Cattell's

way.

This final set of 35 distilled variables

proved

to be u nusu ally consequential because of its acceptance and fre-

quent

use, in one

form

or another, by later researchers. Al-

though Cattell's 35 variables certainly represented his own best

judgment

at the

time

o f

what

the

most important variables

of

personality were, he also acknowledged that his reductions

could

well

have eliminated personality features

of

relevance

(Cattell, 1945, p. 7 1 ) .

It

is no denial of Cattell's brilliance, psychological acumen ,

and many scientific contributions

to

recognize, along with

Joh n, Angleitner, and Ostendorf, that a n ultimate set of vari-

ables for a scientific theory of personality should not be so de-

pendent on any one person functi oning in a private, conve-

nience-emphasizing,

and

subse quently unevaluated way.

In

par-

ticular,

one must wonder to what extent Cattell's prior

theoretical notions regarding personality, however valid,

influ-

enced

his

sequential n arrowin g

of

possibilities

and his

construc-

tion

of variables by clustering terms. D id he introduce semantic

structures th at subsequently would underlie and even entail the

results

afforded

by subsequent empirical usage of his variable

set? I believe so and illustrate this possibility in my discussion

of

the

work

of

Tupes

and

Christal (196 1/199 2).

Role of Tupes and Christal

Tupes

and

Christal, personnel selection psychologists

em -

ployed by the Air Force to im prove

officer

selection and promo-

tion procedures, reported

a set of

analyses subsequently hailed

by FF A

advocates

as

the discovery

of the Big

Five dimensions

and as the pivotal work tha t . . . laid the foundations

for.

. .

the five-factor model

(McCrae, 1992,

p.

217). Their internal

technical report has been

often

c ited over the years, but, because

it was not

published

in an

archival journal until recently,

it was

difficult

to find.

Because their study

has

been

so

often

and

widely hailed,

it is

useful

to

consider

the

Tupes

and

Christal

contribution in closer detail than it usually has received.

In their very brief account (a bit more than eight pages of

text in the

original),

Tupes and Christal described eight factor

analyses of Cattell's rating variables. A ll the subjects rated were

in their early 20s.

Six of the

analyses involved peer ratings,

two

were based on ratings of subjects provided by older, status-supe-

rior raters. There were

five

male samples

and one

female sam-

ple. Four of the analyses derived

from

Air Force

data,

two anal-

yses

were of data earlier analyzed by Cattell

(1947, 1948),

and

two analyses employed data previously factored

by

Fiske

(1949).

The analyses of the Air Force samples initiated and were cen-

tral

to the

Tupes

and

Christal

report.

Therefore, details

of data

gathering in the Air Force context assume special importance.

For example, the individuals in one sample knew each other as

little

as 3

days;

in

three other

Air

Force

samples, the

length

of

acquaintance was 2, 3, 8, or 26 weeks.

Th e

raters

were untrained, psychologically naive subjects, and little


7/29

A CONTRARIAN VIEW OF THE FIVE-FACTOR APPROACH

193

time could b e made available fo r training them a s raters. Therefore

the

rating procedure must

be simple,

requiring

a

minimum

of

trained judgment. Only

about

two hours [in one sample, only one

hour] were available

for

the rating. . . [of] 2 5 to

30

subjects on 30

or 35 traits. (Tupes, 1957, p. 4)

An issue must

b e

raised here that will

be

more fully consid-

ered

later

in

this article.

Can the

psychological perceptiveness

of

Air Force officers and

officer candidates,

as quickly expressed

by 3-point ratings

on 30 or so

scales

in an

officially

required

research

p rogram regarding 12

to 30 of

their peers know n

fo r

such

short periods, provide

a

fundam ental data basis

for

dis-

cerning

the essential dimensions for the scientifically

sufficient

description

of

personality?

In

six of the analyses, 8 orthogonal factors were extracted; 5

factors

were extracted in another analysis and

12

factors were

extracted in the analysis of the

female

sample. Summarizing

their

findings, Tupes and Christal concluded that in each of the

eight analyses based upon the Cattell variables, five fairly

strong and

recurren t factors emerged. They were impressed,

and later other psychologists were impressed, by the marked

congruence among the five-factor patterns derived in so many

analyses.

suggest tha t, fo r technical reasons, the degree of recurrence

of

this

five-factor

structure over their eight analyses

may not be

so striking as has been assumed. Although the analysis of their

first Air Force samp le used the centroid method of

factor

anal-

ysis prevalent

at the

time, followed

by

subjective rotation,

the

remaining seven

factor

analyses

all

employed

the

multiple-

group

method

of

factor analysis.

The

multiple-group method

of

factor

analysis (see, e.g., Harm an, 1967, chap.

11),

now long-

abandoned and mostly forgotten, was frequently used in the

precomputer era to lessen the laborious calculation centroid

factor

analysis

o therwise required.

The


permitted the extraction of a number of factors in one labor-

saving

operation. The

centroid method,

on the other hand, ex-

tracted factors

serially and

involved protracted computations

of successive residual matrices. To lessen the subsequent com-

putations, the multiple-group factor analyst first had to parti-

tion the set of

variables into

a

number

of

groups (i.e., antici-

pated factors) according to preconceived hypotheses. All these

preconceived factors then were extracted simultaneously, fol-

lowed by the calculation of a residual matr ix. This residual ma-

trix,

if its elements were sizable, might then be subjected to fur-

ther analysis, usually by the centroid method.

In

the first of the Tupes and Christal factor analyses, eight

factors were arduously extracted

via the

centroid method.

These factors were then subjectively rotated toward orthogonal

simple structure so as to residualize three o f them (i.e., via ro-

tation, the loadings of variables on three factors were deliber-

ately m ade generally low enough so that these factors could be

said to be

unimportant, thus justifying their elimination

from

subsequent consideration). However,

in the

subsequent seven

factor analyses, wherein

the


was

used,

the variables were grouped into five subsets p restructured so as

to correspond to the five rotated factors decided upon in the first

study.

That

is, the

orthogonal factor structures

of the

last seven

analyses were created to conform

insofar

as possible with the

factor structure solution settled upon in the first analysis. In

effect, Tupes and Christal used their first factor solution as the

target matrix for all their subsequent analyses. Factors repre-

senting other than these five pregrouped sets of variables were

residualized, except in the female sample in which the fifth fac-

tor was split into two

subfactors.

A s Horn (1967) has compel-

lingly observed, Procrustean rotations to fit a target matrix can

show seemingly impressive congruence with the target even

when random variables are involved. Inevitably, then, the pre-

structured solutions used in the last seven Tupes and Christal

multiple-group factor analyses fitted the target matrix at least in

part because of fitting

error.

The extent to which capitaliza-

tion on chance w as involved h as never been evaluated, but it

certainly underlies a portion of the factor recurrence

observed.

A more im portan t concern to register, however, is that the

semantic structure underlying the Cattellian variables used in

all

the

analyses

by

Tupes

and

Christal

may

have intrinsically

predestined the facto r solutions subsequen tly observed. For ex-

ample,

their first factor was defined by variables

labeled

as se-

cretive, silent, self-contained

or

reclusive

as

opposed

to

sociable, and

talkative. Referring

to

Soule s D ictionary of

English Synonyms

(Sheffield,

1959), under the term

secre-

tive, there is the

following

entry (cited completely): reserved,

reticent, close, uncomm unicative, cautious, wary, taciturn (p.

470).

As these synonyms attest, the variables identifying the

first

factor

of

Tupes

and

Christal were highly

redundant. There-

fore, if the subjects providing the basic data were not responding

incoherently,

there is no problem in understanding how such

redund ant rating scales will, in a facto r analytic context, gener-

ate a factor dimension. A second factor was defined by such

variables labeled

as

composed, calm, placid,

and

poised. Again referring to Soule, under the heading com-

posed is the following: calm, quiet,

unruffled,

undisturbed,

unmoved,

tra nq uil , placid, sedate, collected, self-possessed, im -

perturbable, cool

(p .

109). Although

no t

included under

composed,

the

term

poised

when referenced identifies

composure as a synonym. It is obvious how such virtually

synonymous

rating scales will generate

a

mathematical factor.

A third factor

was

based

on

such ratings

as

good-natured,

cooperative, and

mild;

a fou rth factor stemmed

from

rat-

ings

of artistic, imaginative, and intellectual; a fifth fac-

tor emerged from ratings of the eq uivalent scales responsible,

scrupulous,

and

seeing

a job

through

in

spite

of difficulties

or temptations.

It is not

surprising when semantically related

variable sets prove to load on the same factor; as these terms are

used

by

often inarticulate

or

language-insensitive raters, their

redundancies are great. Consequently, their factorial equivalen-

cies

may

only

testify to the

reliability

and

coherence

of the

rat-

ings

made of the subjects. Rather than representing trul y sub-

stantive findings, the Tupes and Christal

factor

findings may

simply reflect the prestructuring that somehow crept into and

characterizes the Cattell-specified variables. Therefore, al-

though

five

factors

may

well characterize

the data sets

Tupes

and Christal created or used, this finding may not be of great

moment.

2

2

The preceding discussion does not reintroduce the Shweder

(1975)

argument that personality judgments are no more than statements

about

how

respondents classify things

as

alike

in

meaning (p. 482).

As

Block, Weiss, and Thorne (1979) observed, in no way whatsoever is it


8/29

194

JACK BLOCK

Factor interpretation

and

factor naming

is

always

a difficult

problem and usually cannot be done quickly or

satisfyingly (but

see Meehl, Lyk ken,

Schofield,

& Tellegen,

1971).

As personnel

selection psychologists w orkin g in the

unfamiliar

field of per-

sonality,

Tupes and Christal did not elaborate conceptual un-

derstandings of their five factors. Instead, guided by earlier work

of French (1953), they sim ply entitled their five factors, without

any elaboration

of

their

meaning

whatsoever,

as

Surgency

or

Extroversion, Agreeableness, Dependability, Emotiona l Stabil-

ity or the

Opposite

of Emotionality, an d

Culture.

These terse

Tupes

and

Christal

labels have been extrao rdinar-

ily

durab le over

the

years

and

have shaped

thinking and

research

interpretations.

It is of

historical

and

evidential interest

to ex-

amine more closely the original basis in French's work for one

of these perduring and portentous factor labels.

French, a psychometrician at the Educational Testing Ser-

vice, had reviewed 6 8 factor analyses of personality variables

and issued a laconic, cau tious report presented as a reference

source on

factorial

studies

rather than as a theoretical

exposi-

tion . .

.

(p.

8). Abstracting

from

these

68

studies, French

offered

a

total

of 49

factors, presented alphabetically from

Agreeableness

to Will

Control,

as

having been observed

in

at least two studies. The French review was a careful evaluation

of a

body

of

literature

he

recognized

as deficient in

ma ny ways.

Often,

the

factor analyses available

to

French were based

on

data conceptually or methodologically unacceptable even by

the prevailing standards

of the

time. Consequently,

the

resulting

factors were of ambiguous meaning or implication and French's

effort to identify or

summarize reproducible factors

was se-

verely limited, as he was

fully

aware.

The

very

first

factor presented

by

French

as

perhaps replica-

ble, Agreeableness (on e of the Big Five ), was predicated on

10

factor analyses,

as

follows: Lovell (1945) factor analyzed

13

Guilford

qu estionnaire variables. Thurstone

(1951)

reanalyzed

Lovell's

matrix. Baehr

(1952)

factored

a

variation

on the

Guil-

ford

variables. Bolanovich (1946) factored ratings b y supervi-

sors of field engineers on such variab les as personality,

sales

ability, and desire for self-improvement. Brogden's (1944)

paper, A Multiple-Factor Analysis of the Character Trait

In -

tercorrelations Published

by

Sister Mary McDonough

was

based on religiosity ratings of early adolescents attending paro-

chial

school during

the

1920s (McDonough,

1929).

Tschech-

telin (1944)

factored ratings

of

children

by

their classmates

with

regard to such variables as

good sport,

punctuality,

and sense of humor. Rey burn and Taylor (1939) factored rat-

ing

data

previously published by Webb

(1915).

And three fac-

tor analyses by Cattell

(1945,

1947, 1948) were scrutinized as

well.

I suggest that, although these several studies were respectable

products of their

times

and although French was diligent in

seeking common denominators across analyses, an everlasting,

overarching, theoretically useful psychological

concept cannot

be extracted

from

this empirical melange. Instead, we have a

broad, bland, impressively unincisive umbrella of a label—

possible to proceed from specific semantic similarity judgments. . .to

a specification of just which individuals are rated high or low on a par-

ticular rating

dimension

(p. 1057).

Agreeableness—under which

any

number

of

importantly dis-

tinguishable personality qualities

may

escape analysis.

I

further

suggest, on similar grounds, that the other

four far-flung,

allu-

sive

labels taken over by Tupes and Christal should not have

entered the personality firmament on the basis of this early fac-

tor an alytic review.

Role

of

orman

The

unpublished

Air

Force technical report

by

Tupes

and

Christal might well have languished, unattended and without

consequence, had not Norman (1963) picked up the baton.

Norman

had

taxonomic concerns.

He

noted that the con-

struction of more

effective

theories of the development, struc-

ture,

and

functioning

of

personality will

be

facilitated

by

having

available

an

extensive

and

well-organized vocabulary

by

means

of

which

to

denote

the

phenotypic

attributes of persons

(p .

574). And he accepted the

Allport

and Odbert

argument

that

perceptible differences between persons in their characteristic

appearance or mann er of behaving or changes over time and

situations

of

single individu als

in

these regards become codified

as a

subset

of the

descriptive predicates

of the

natura l language

in

the course of its development

(p . 574).

Norm an's discussion

of the issues involved is sober and sophisticated: It is explicitly

not assumed that complete theories

of

personality will simply

emerge automatically from such taxonomic efforts.. . . There

is a good deal more to theory construction . . . than the

development

of an

observation language—even

a

good one

(p.

574).

However,

his

empirical

offering

consisted only

of a

replication

of

the study of Tupes and Christal. On the basis of the factors

identified

by Tupes and Christal, Norman selected 20 of their

Cattellian variables

(the four

variab les best represen ting each of

the five factor s). B y his variable selection procedure, he limited

himself to the variables most likely to demonstrate simple struc-

ture. He then had several groups of undergraduates offer peer

ratings using this

restricted set of

variables.

By

this narrowed

selection

from

among wha t has already been suggested m ay be a

prestructured set of variables, it

follows

that the factor structure

subsequently observed may have been a foregone conclusion.

Norman's findings, however, were subsequently viewed as fur-

ther empirical support for the existence, primacy, and perhaps

sufficiency of the five

orthogonal personality factors reported

by

Tupes and Christal (No rma n renamed the Dependability

factor as Conscientiousness, a replacement label that subse-

quently

achieved p reference).

It

should be noted that in collecting peer ratings by laypersons

on a

restricted

set of 20 variables and in emphasizing the

basic

importance of the five personality factors subsequently ex-

tracted

from

this kind

of

data, Norman would seem

to

have

shifted from

h is

announced focus

on the development of a

sci-

entifically

oriented language for the description of personalities

to a study of the way laypersons use a constrained language to

characterize other laypeople. There

are connections—impor-

tant,

useful, even crucial

connections—between

these two em-

phases,

but

they

are not the

same. Psychologists certainly

can

learn a great deal for their science by studying the nature of lay

observations. But it does not

follow that

lay usages should be


9/29

A CONTRARIAN VIEW OF THE FIVE-FACTOR APPROACH

195

taken over to provide the basic concepts of the field of personal-

ity psychology.

In contemplating

his

1963 study,

and

prompted

by the

sug-

gestion of Tupes and Christal that the C attellian variables might

have

omitted some

of the

personality concepts residing

in the

Allport-Odbert adjectives, Norman decided that

it was

time

to

return

to the

total

pool

of

trait names

in the

natural language—

there to search for additional personality indicators not easily

subsumed under one or another of these five recurrent factors

(1963, p. 582).

To locate personality terms

that

were new o r previously omit-

ted, Norman (1967) searched a later unabridged edition of

Webster and found 175

single-word

descriptors to add to the list

compiled by Allport an d Odbert. Then, applying his own set

of decision rules for sorting through this descriptor lexicon, he

excluded

terms judged

to be

purely evaluative

and

mere quan-

tifiers, ambiguous, vague, and . . . metaphorical, very

difficult, obscure,

and

little-known,

and

anatomical, physical

and grooming characteristics.

The

remaining terms

he

further

sorted into

the

categories

of stable

traits, temporary

states,

and social roles.

Excluding

the latter two categories as inap-

propriate for the purpose of personality description, Norman

was

left with 2,800 single-word descriptors deemed to represent

stable traits. These remain ing terms were then administered

to undergrad uates to empirically assess their understandability

by laypersons, thei r social desirability, and the degree to which

undergraduates believed these terms were descriptive

of

them-

selves

an d

their peers. After Norm an removed terms

he

judged

to be ambiguous or

unfamiliar

to the typical college student or

redundant, 1,431 terms remained. With this last culling, Nor-

man had a pool of descriptors he believed approached suitabil-

ity fo r

the development

of a

structured taxonomy.

Norman then proceeded

to a

further, semantic sorting

of his

stable trait terms that, although never formally reported an d

published by him (but

described

by Briggs, 1992; Goldberg,

1981, 1990; John et al., 1988; John, 1990), may have

influ-

enced later research findings. Impressed by the factor structure

that

he,

Tupes,

and

Christal

had

identified earlier,

and

using

his

understanding of the psychological m eaning of the factors, Nor-

man personally sorted h is 1,431 term s according to their judged

fit into his five dimensions an d assigned the terms to the positive

or

negative pole

of

each dimension.

As a final

step,

he

examined

the

terms

at

each pole

a nd

further formulated what

he

judged

to be

semantic clusters within each pole.

In

all,

he

sorted

his

1,431 terms into 75 sem antic clusters specifying one or the other

end of the five-factor dimensions he viewed as paramount.

Fewer

than 25 terms were

left

unclassified by Norman. The

John, Angleitner, and

Ostendorf

(1988)

historical review

may

be

consulted

for

closer information regarding this Norman

effort.

Although Norman did not proceed

further

with his terms

and trait clusters, his delineation and structuring of the trait

lexicon

provided

an

important starting point

for

subsequent

efforts

to

advance

a

lexically based tra it taxonomy.

By the mid-1960s, the initial phase of the FFA may be said

to have ended. A lthough a number of

subsequent

articles (e.g.,

Borgatta, 1964; Digman

& Takemoto-Chock,

1981; Smith,

1967) also reported sim ilar five-factor solutions of rating data,

these studies all were based on v arious versions of the Cattellian

or Norman variable

sets

and so these later studies can be classi-

fied as

further

manifestations of this early stage of the FFA.

Given that prestructured sets of variables may have been used,

it follows that

the fiveness of the

factors emerging

in

these

later studies and their appreciable

(but

no t

full)

similarity of

factor interpretation need not be viewed as persuasive.

The curren t FFA frequently memorializes and cites as foun-

dational the empiricism of

this

first

phase

of the

FFA.

There-

fore, to the extent the concerns expressed previously regarding

this

first

phase

are

cogent,

a

muting

of

these observances

may

be in order. However, it is on the basis of contemporary accom-

plishments rather than its early history that the FFA must

achieve its claimed deservedness. And so, the later work that

has

zoomed the FFA into its present prominence must be

considered.

The second, and

current,

phase of the FFA began with the

work

of

Goldberg (e.g., 1977, 1981, 1982, 1990, 1992),

who

sought to go beyond the constraints set by

Cattell's

choice of

variables. Working

with

larger numbers of adjectival

descrip-

tors, he has

presented

a refinding and refining of the five factors

reported by earlier investigators. The consequent claims for this

lexical approach merit alternative analysis. Further, the team of

Costa

and McCrae

(e.g., 1985,

1992c;

McCrae

&

Costa, 1985,

1987) has

brought

the

FFA, which

had

been focused exclusively

on adjective-based ratings of self or others, into the question-

naire

realm. Th eir adopting

and

adapting

of the Big

Five frame-

work also warran ts close scrutiny.

Five-Factor Lexical Approach

Goldberg (1971) had long been concerned w ith the question,

Why measure

th t

trait? With close knowledge of Norman's

(1963)

work

on an adequate taxonomy o f personality attri-

butes (p. 57 4) and heuristically using the lexical hypothesis,

during

the

1970s Goldberg began

and has

sustained

a

meticu-

lous lexical and taxonomic

effort.

Among his many

studies,

he

evaluated the role of the evaluation component in adjective us-

age

(Peabody

&

Goldberg, 198 9), their

frequency in

various

categories (Ha mps on, Joh n, & Goldberg, 1986), the consis-

tency w ith w hich adjectives

a re

used

by

laypersons (Goldberg

&

Kilkowski,

1985), the

level

of

abstractness

of

adjectives (J ohn ,

Hampson,

&

Goldberg,

1991), the

influence

of

unipolar

and

bipolar contexts for the way adjectives are employed (Goldberg,

1992),

and—not

least—the factor structure underlying lay us-

age

of

adjective-descriptors.

For

ma ny years, Goldberg's taxon omic work

was

communi-

cated only

informally

to members of an invis ible college of

assessment psychologists

at

conferences

or via

technical reports

(e.g., Goldberg,

1977,1980, 1983).

Increasingly,

over

the years,

his

views

an d arguments became persuasive. Two pub lications

summarizing his lexical work appeared relatively early and

proved especially

influential

(Goldberg, 1981, wherein

he

coined the phrase the Big-Five ; 1982). More recently, he has

presented a major, integrat ive report intended to alleviate any

qualms about the generality of the Big-Five structure of per-

sonality descriptors (Goldberg, 1990, p. 1223). Along the way,

he has

offered

a variety of sets of adjectives as marker vari-

ables so that indiv iduals can be assessed in terms of the lexical

Big Five factors (Goldberg, 1980, 1983, 1992).

Goldberg's program of thinking and research has been pred-


10/29

196

JACK BLOCK

icated on the assum ption, questioned earlier, that the method of

factor analysis is suitable an d

sufficient

for achieving a scien-

tifically

c ompelling personality taxonomy. In addition, the lexi-

cal approach involves premises, procedures, and findings that

often

adm it alte

five-factor personality description

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