fm 3-24, 29 may 2013, initial draft

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 1 29 May 2013 2

Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 3

DRAFT—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION 4

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. The material in this manual is under development. It is not approved doctrine and cannot 5 be used for reference or citation. Upon publication, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be 6 unlimited. 7

Headquarters, Department of the Army 8

*FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5

Distribution Restriction: The material in this manual is under development. It is not approved doctrine and cannot be used for reference or citation. Upon publication, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be unlimited.

*When published, this manual will supersede FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated 15 December 2006.

Marine Corps PCN: XXX XXXXXX XX

i

Field Manual No.3-24

Headquarters Department of the Army

Washington, DC Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5

Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Department of the Navy Headquarters

United States Marine Corps Washington, DC

29 May 2013

Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies DRAFT—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Contents Page

PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iv INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... vi

PART ONE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT............................................ 1-1 United States’ Strategy and Policy to Counter an Insurgency ........................... 1-4 Indirect Approach in a Counterinsurgency ......................................................... 1-5 Direct Approach in a Counterinsurgency ............................................................ 1-6 Land Forces and the Range of Military Operations ............................................ 1-7 U.S. Involvement in Counterinsurgency ............................................................. 1-7 Understanding Unified Action ............................................................................. 1-9

Chapter 2 UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 2-1 Demographic and Urbanization Trends .............................................................. 2-1 The Operational Variables .................................................................................. 2-2 The Mission Variables and Civil Considerations .............................................. 2-10

Chapter 3 UNDERSTANDING CULTURE .......................................................................... 3-1 Characteristics of Culture ................................................................................... 3-1 Methods for Understanding Culture ................................................................... 3-6

Contents

ii FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013

PART TWO INSURGENCIES

Chapter 4 INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES AND FUNDAMENTALS .............................. 4-1 Insurgency Prerequisites .................................................................................... 4-1 Insurgency Fundamentals ................................................................................... 4-5

Chapter 5 INSURGENCY THREAT CHARACTERISTICS ................................................. 5-1 Threat Characteristics ......................................................................................... 5-1 Associated Threats ............................................................................................. 5-6

PART THREE COUNTERINSURGENCIES

Chapter 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL AND MISSION COMMAND ................................ 6-1 Command in Counterinsurgency ........................................................................ 6-1 Headquarters Use In Counterinsurgency ........................................................... 6-4

Chapter 7 PLANNING FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ........................................... 7-1 Conceptual Planning ........................................................................................... 7-1 Detailed Planning ................................................................................................ 7-8 Counterinsurgency Paradoxes ............................................................................ 7-9

Chapter 8 INDIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES.......................... 8-1 Generational Engagement .................................................................................. 8-1 Negotiation and Diplomacy ................................................................................. 8-2 Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate ....................................... 8-3 Security Cooperation........................................................................................... 8-4 Other Indirect Enablers ..................................................................................... 8-19

Chapter 9 DIRECT METHODS FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCIES ............................. 9-1 Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition ..................................................................... 9-1 Attack the Network .............................................................................................. 9-4 Targeted Threat Infrastructure ............................................................................ 9-5 Strike ................................................................................................................... 9-6 Other Direct Enablers.......................................................................................... 9-7

Chapter 10 INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS .......................... 10-1 Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 10-2 Inform and Influence Activities .......................................................................... 10-5 Operational Considerations .............................................................................. 10-9

Chapter 11 ASSESSMENTS ............................................................................................... 11-1 Assessment Frameworks .................................................................................. 11-1 Assessment Methods ........................................................................................ 11-2 Assessment Considerations ............................................................................. 11-2 Developing Measurement Criteria .................................................................... 11-3

Chapter 12 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 12-1 Authority to Assist a Foreign Government ........................................................ 12-1 Rules of Engagement........................................................................................ 12-2 Law of War ........................................................................................................ 12-2 Non-International Armed Conflict ...................................................................... 12-7 Detention and Interrogation .............................................................................. 12-9 Enforcing Discipline of U.S. Forces ................................................................ 12-11 Training and Equipping Foreign Forces .......................................................... 12-12

Contents

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) iii

Claims and Solatia .......................................................................................... 12-14 Establishing the Rule of Law .......................................................................... 12-14

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

Figures Figure 1-2. Construct for counterinsurgency .......................................................................... 1-7 Figure 1-3. The primary objectives of an insurgency ............................................................. 1-9 Figure 1-4. Country team command relationships ............................................................... 1-14 Figure 4-1. Conflict model .................................................................................................... 4-11 Figure 4-2. Insurgency in different phases ........................................................................... 4-12 Figure 4-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency ......................................................... 4-13 Figure 4-4. Urban (terrorist) strategy .................................................................................... 4-17 Figure 4-5. Foco strategy ..................................................................................................... 4-18 Figure 4-6. Protracted strategy ............................................................................................. 4-19 Figure 4-7. Subversive strategy, part I ................................................................................. 4-21 Figure 4-8. Subversive strategy, part II ................................................................................ 4-22 Figure 7-1. Army design methodology ................................................................................... 7-2 Figure 7-2. Lines of effort ....................................................................................................... 7-6 Figure 8-1. Building host-nation capacity ............................................................................... 8-9 Figure 8-2. Counterinsurgency relationships ........................................................................ 8-11 Figure 8-3. Country planning ................................................................................................ 8-14 Figure 8-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force ................................................. 8-16 Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict ........................................ 9-4 Figure 12-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties ..................................................... 12-8 Figure 12-2. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 .............................................. 12-10

Tables Table 1-1. Influence of ends, ways, means, and risk in determining military

involvement ......................................................................................................... 1-5 Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment ....................................... 2-8 Table 3-1. Cultural influences ................................................................................................. 3-4 Table 8-1. Developing the host-nation security force ............................................................. 8-4 Table 8-2. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and

facilities framework. ............................................................................................ 8-6 Table 8-3. Host-nation contributions .................................................................................... 8-19

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) iv

Preface 1

Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 provides doctrine for Army 2 and Marine units that are countering an insurgency. It provides a doctrinal foundation for counterinsurgency. 3 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is a guide for units fighting or training for counterinsurgency operations. 4

The principal audience for FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is for battalion, brigade, and regimental commanders and 5 their staffs. 6

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., 7 international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their 8 Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) 9

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 implements standardization agreement (STANAG) 2611. 10

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint, Army, and Marine Corps terms and 11 definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For terms and their definitions shown in the text, the term is 12 italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. 13

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, Army National 14 Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. 15

The proponent of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing 16 agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send 17 comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank 18 Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D 19 (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to 20 [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. 21

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mailto:[email protected]

Preface

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) v

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29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) vi

Introduction 24

The introduction will be completed after comment adjudication. 25

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29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 1-1

PART ONE 27

Strategic and Operational Context 28

Every time the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency 29 operations, it does so in a unique strategic and operational environment. Part 1 30 provides an overview for commanders and staff to understand the environment and 31 context of an insurgency and the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 32 provides the strategic context of a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes 33 involved in a counterinsurgency, policy and strategic decisions affect operations. 34 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the operational environment and operational 35 variables. In a counterinsurgency, there are unique considerations that operators and 36 planners should take into account. Of particular importance in a counterinsurgency is 37 culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of culture and its relationship with 38 counterinsurgency. 39

Chapter 1 40

Understanding the Strategic Context 41

1-1. Any decision by the President to commit U.S. forces in a counterinsurgency must be understood 42 within the larger sphere of U.S. policy. Soldiers and Marines must first understand the strategic context that 43 the U.S. is acting in to best plan, prepare, execute, and assess a counterinsurgency operation to achieve 44 national objectives. Countering an insurgency should incorporate previous or continuing security 45 cooperation efforts and other activities, U.S. and host-nation objectives, and whole-of-government efforts 46 to address root causes of the conflict. Despite its irregular nature and generally less intense combat level, 47 counterinsurgency may be just as critical to U.S. vital interests as conventional warfare. Strategic planning 48 guidance reflects this importance. 49

1-2. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence 50 over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches and asymmetric capabilities, 51 though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s 52 power, influence, and will (JP 1). Because of its irregular nature, U.S.’ involvement in a counterinsurgency 53 demands a whole-of-government approach. Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and 54 military efforts that address both assisting the host-nation government to defeat the insurgents on the 55 battlefield and to enable the host nation to address the root causes of the insurgency. Nevertheless, U.S. 56 civilian and military participants in counterinsurgency can never fully compensate for lack of will, lack of 57 capacity, acceptance of corruption, or counter-productive behavior on the part of the supported 58 government. 59

1-3. Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for legitimacy and influence, generally from a 60 position of relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, 61 during, or after a conventional conflict. Throughout history, elements of a population have grown 62 dissatisfied with the status quo. When they are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using 63 both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they have often initiated 64 an insurgency. An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 65 political control of a region (JP 3-24). Counterinsurgency is comprehensive civilian and military efforts 66

Chapter 1

1-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013

taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 3-24). Warfare 67 remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. 68 Traditionally, in conventional warfare, there are clear determinants of victory. Achieving victory for the 69 insurgent may depend less on defeating an armed opponent and more on a group’s ability to garner support 70 for its political interests (often ideologically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political 71 consequences. 72

1-4. Ideally, the host nation is the primary actor in defeating an insurgency. Even, in an insurgency that 73 occurs in a country with a nonfunctioning central government or after a major conflict, the host nation must 74 eventually provide a solution that is culturally acceptable to a society. The conclusion of any 75 counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people that reside in that 76 country. Ultimately, every society has to provide relevant solutions its own problems. As such, one of the 77 Army and Marine Corps’ roles (perhaps their primary role) is to enable the host nation. 78

1-5. Counterinsurgency can occur as part of large-scale combat, but it often occurs absent a major 79 conflict. For example, an external threat may sponsor an insurgency and this could be part of an effort to 80 attain other strategic objectives. As such, the objectives of a counterinsurgency must be contextual to that 81 insurgency. Creating objectives that are relevant to a particular insurgency is essential to defeating that 82 insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency requires clearly defined and obtainable objectives that result in an 83 end state acceptable to the host-nation government and the governments providing forces. 84

1-6. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society (see chapter 2), is the central issue in 85 insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), 86 informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal or 87 ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow or undermine the existing authority. This 88 authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be an existing generally 89 accepted social order. Political power in itself, however, may not be the end state desired by the insurgent. 90 A criminal enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its 91 criminal activities; or, there could be a desire to seize political power in order to impose an ideological 92 (including religious) system on an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, the affected government 93 should use all instruments of its national power to defeat the insurgency and reduce the likelihood of 94 another crisis emerging. 95

1-7. The military role should be coordinated with all instruments of national power—diplomatic, 96 informational, military, and economic. The Army and Marine Corps are only part of the elements of 97 national power that the U.S. can use to counter an insurgency. At times, they may be a supporting role. For 98 example, Soldiers and Marines may be withdrawn from the counterinsurgency effort altogether while the 99 U.S. uses other elements of national power as the primary enablers of a host nation. In such cases, the 100 Army and Marine Corps may play a supporting role performing security cooperation tasks. 101

1-8. Counterinsurgency is neither a concept nor a strategy. It is simply a descriptor of a range of diverse 102 activities intended to counter an insurgency. The U.S. can use a range of activities to aid a host nation in 103 defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these activities with different levels of resourcing 104 provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an 105 insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, 106 and the resources or means it uses the enable those ways. 107

1-9. The Laos insurgency highlights the unique nature of an insurgency. This insurgency took place in the 108 context of Vietnam. Here, internal groups with various interests and outside interests from North Vietnam 109 and the U.S. created a unique context for the Laos insurgency. Moreover, the corrupt and ineffective host 110 government was not able to wage its own counterinsurgency campaign effectively. To effectively counter 111 the insurgency in Laos, the U.S. needed an operational approach that would work in that environment, if a 112 successful operational approach were possible. Unfortunately, U.S. forces failed to create an effective 113 strategy to counter the insurgency in Laos. Thus, the U.S. government failed to find the needed ways and 114 means to meet the policy goal. 115

Understanding the Strategic Context


The Laos Insurgency 116 Lamented as “the forgotten war,” the insurgency in Laos was heavily influenced (and 117 often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam. A victim of geography, 118 half-hearted fighting between the different factions in Laos may well have worked 119 itself out in a lasting compromise if not for pressure from North Vietnamese 120 communists to control areas of Laos for the infiltration of men and materiel into South 121 Vietnam (the Ho Chi Min trail) and U.S. efforts to oppose communist presence and 122 influence. 123 Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao forces 124 supported by Hmong guerillas against the leftist Pathet Lao (indigenous communists) 125 and their North Vietnamese supporters. These participants were at times joined by 126 other players, including U.S. advisors, Filipino troops, U.S. air power, Thai 127 commandos and artillery formations, as well as “neutralist” Lao forces. During the 128 period of conflict, Laos was underdeveloped in every way: the government, the 129 economy, and the military. The government was corrupt and ineffective, the economy 130 was wholly dependent on outside support, and the military was corrupt and 131 ineffective. 132 As the United States became more invested in Vietnam, it also increased support to 133 Laos; by the end of 1955, the U.S. provided 100% of the Lao military budget. North 134 Vietnamese backers of the Pathet Lao sought to grow that force, supporting a 135 significant recruiting campaign and sending many of the recruits to North Vietnam for 136 schooling and training. This led to greater investment by the U.S. in materiel and 137 training for government forces, and included, beginning in 1957, efforts to arm 138 Hmong guerillas, who would play an important role later in the conflict. 139 Vietnamese interest in Laos was primarily in securing the so called “panhandle” 140 region, through which the Ho Chi Min trail allowed the North Vietnamese to infiltrate 141 men and materiel into South Vietnam. A secondary consideration was the support of 142 a fellow communist movement (the Pathet Lao). Once fighting began in earnest in 143 1959, the Vietnamese used government chaos to their benefit, increasing attacks on 144 government forces and expanding the territory under their influence or control. 145 During this period, many attacks took the form of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 146 regulars attacking and overwhelming a position, and then letting their Pathet Lao 147 allies occupy the area and claim the victory, thus at least paying lip service to 148 maintaining the neutralization of Laos. 149 These NVA-led attacks and several attempted counterattacks by Royal Laotian 150 Forces against Pathet Lao positions revealed the gross incompetence of the 151 government’s regular forces. This lack of capability stemmed from several sources, 152 including a half-hearted martial tradition in general, a preoccupation with profiteering 153 and political games by the senior leadership, lack of earnest efforts by the French 154 responsible for their training until late 1958, and a fundamental lack of motivation. 155 Despite the vigorous efforts of U.S. trainers and millions of dollars in materiel 156 throughout the course of the conflict, Royal Lao Forces would never become a 157 consequential fighting force. In this phase, the only effective forces on the 158 government side were the Hmong tribesmen, trained and provisioned by the CIA, and 159 fighting as guerillas. 160 International pressure (from the United States as well as from China and Russia 161 preferring to avoid unnecessarily provoking the United States) and support (from the 162 United States and other allies) prevented the complete collapse of the government of 163 Laos in 1962 and pushed for neutralization through coalition government. The North 164 Vietnamese were content to allow negotiations to take place, as they had succeeded 165 in securing what they needed: the Ho Chi Min trail. After months of wrangling, 1962 166 finally saw another Geneva agreement, this time for a neutralized Laos with a 167 coalition government representing the three major factions: the rightists, the leftists, 168 and the neutralists. Part of the neutralization agreement included the removal of 169 foreign forces from Laos. While U.S. and allied personnel who had been fighting on 170

Chapter 1


the side of the Royal Lao Government were withdrawn from the country, very few of 171 the substantial number of NVA forces withdrew. Nor, of course, did the CIA cease its 172 work with the Hmong. 173 The new coalition government proved shaky. Turmoil again rocked the Lao 174 government with continued political maneuvering by greedy generals and a string of 175 coups. Military Region commanders ran their zones like private fiefdoms, rarely 176 dispatching their troops outside the Mekong River valley. A series of spectacular 177 failures by the Royal Lao forces all but ensured those forces would never seek to 178 take the initiative and act in other than a strictly defensive capacity again. Between 179 1964 and 1968, the conflict was primarily between the U.S.-supported paramilitaries 180 (backed by U.S. airpower), and the Pathet Lao. The cycle of dry season and wet 181 season, each favoring one side or the other, saw very modest back and forth 182 movement between the two primarily irregular forces, with little change from year to 183 year. That all changed in 1969. The communist dry season offensive of 1968 did not 184 end with the onset of the rainy season, and gains were substantial. In early 1970, the 185 communists seized a provincial capital for the first time, and later that year they 186 seized another. 187 In the now traditional way, Hmong guerillas counterattacked. However, after nearly a 188 decade of war, the CIA’s secret army was nearly fought out. Fighting against superior 189 numbers of regular troops, the Hmong became more and more reliant on U.S. 190 airpower and on support from Thai artillery. Bombing in southern Laos expanded 191 such that by 1971, it was more extensive than bombing in South Vietnam and 192 Cambodia combined. 193 The communist dry season offensive that started in December of 1971 brought 194 extraordinary pressure on the government. For the first time, NVA forces used 195 significant armor, as well as large tube artillery. The Hmong were battered and 196 quickly thrown back. After another year of significant communist gains, the Lao 197 government and its international supporters once again sought a ceasefire. 198 By the time of the 1973 ceasefire and neutralization, the government of Laos 199 controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong river valley, and that only by 200 virtue of the Hmong and U.S. airpower. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both 201 airpower and funding) in 1973, the Hmong were demobilized and the Lao 202 government was left to its fate, which was to fall relatively quickly to the communists. 203

UNITED STATES’ STRATEGY AND POLICY TO COUNTER AN 204 INSURGENCY 205

1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to fight an insurgency is a 206 question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a 207 range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces performing an active role in the 208 counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information on how the counterinsurgent may 209 organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and should not be the only 210 reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for anyone who wishes to fully understand the policy 211 tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See JP 3-24, NATO 212 Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more information on 213 counterinsurgency policy tools.) 214

1-11. Counterinsurgency operations involve other military actions addressed in other manuals. One 215 example is a unit supporting security cooperation activities linked to a nation combating insurgents. (See 216 FM 3-22.) Advisors and trainers need to understand their own doctrine on how brigades and battalions fight 217 a counterinsurgency before they can train or advise host-nation security forces to counter an insurgency. If 218 trainers have no frame of reference for what a host nation is doing in a counterinsurgency, their 219 effectiveness at training is questionable. Whether a unit is directly performing the tasks to defeat an 220 insurgency or indirectly supporting a host nation, this manual provides foundational doctrine for how land 221 forces perform counterinsurgency. 222



1-12. Political leaders and commanders must have a dialogue to decide the optimal strategy to meet the 223 security needs of the U.S. The different operations and activities provide different choices that offer 224 different cost and risk. Commanders inform political leaders about the different cost and risk of various 225 options, and political leaders weigh these costs and risks with the importance to U.S. national interests. 226 Once U.S. policymakers have determined the goals (the ends) of the U.S., the military evaluates operational 227 approaches to conduct counterinsurgency efforts depending on the ends, ways, means, and acceptable risk. 228 The joint force provides a range of capabilities that integrate into the overall strategy. For example, in a 229 functioning state that is facing an insurgency, the joint force may employ a range of security cooperation 230 tools. Moreover, there are tools that fall outside of security cooperation, such as direct action and counter 231 threat financing, that the U.S. can integrated into the mixture of ways that it will use to defeat or contain an 232 insurgency. (See JP 3-22, JP 3-24, JP 3-05, Commanders Handbook on Counter Threat Finance, and 233 Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook for more information on integrated 234 counterinsurgency tools.) The U.S. government integrates the various elements of national power to create 235 a range of strategic options, of which military involvement is only one part. (See table 1-1, and see chapter 236 8 for more information on indirect approaches and chapter 9 for more information on direct approaches.) 237

Table 1-1. Influence of ends, ways, means, and risk in determining military involvement 238

Strategy and Military Operations Ends Ways Means Risk

Defeat or contain an insurgency.

Support strategic goals and end state defined by policy makers.

Indirect approach Nation assistance. Security cooperation. Generational

Engagement Negotiation

Diplomacy Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and reintegrate counter threat finance

Other indirect enablers

Direct approach Shape, clear, hold,

build, transition. Attack the Network Targeted Threat

Infrastructure Other Direct Enablers

Unified Action Military Force

Determined by a mismatch in the ends, ways, and means.

INDIRECT APPROACH IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY 239

1-13. An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments and security forces through the building 240 of capabilities to counter an insurgency and enabling existing capabilities. This approach indirectly 241 counters an insurgency by working through the host-nation institutions. The U.S. can use nation assistance 242 and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its institutions and capabilities. Moreover, the U.S. 243 has other capabilities, such as counter threat finance, that can enable a host nation’s counterinsurgency 244 force. The list of capabilities in this manual is not an exclusive list of capabilities that the U.S. uses to 245 indirectly aid a host nation in defeating an insurgency. 246

NATION ASSISTANCE 247

1-14. Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory 248 based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This civil or military assistance (other 249 than foreign humanitarian assistance) is rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory 250

Chapter 1


during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. 251 and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by promoting sustainable development 252 and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. 253

1-15. Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in building civil 254 institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to 255 build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host 256 nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using the whole-of-government approach is 257 essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from arising. 258

SECURITY COOPERATION 259

1-16. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to 260 build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and 261 friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces 262 with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). These activities help the U.S. and host 263 nation gain credibility and help the host nation build legitimacy. These efforts can help prevent 264 insurgencies or shape the host nation’s ability to defeat or contain insurgencies. 265

1-17. As directed, the Army and Marine Corps provides forces to support security cooperation missions. 266 This requirement can include assistance in training, equipping, and advising the military forces of foreign 267 nations. Security cooperation includes security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force 268 assistance (See FM 3-22 and chapter 8 for more information on security cooperation activities) 269

COUNTER THREAT FINANCE 270

1-18. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the transitional 271 financing of state and non-state enemies threatening U.S. national security. Counter threat finance can deny 272 the insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In 273 counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and 274 black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more 275 information, see the Joint Staff’s Commander’s Guide to Counter Threat Finance and DODD 5205.14.) 276

OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS 277

1-19. The U.S. can also integrate a number of other enablers into a counterinsurgency effort. Some 278 examples include signal intelligence assets, geospatial intelligence assets, airlift capabilities or a number of 279 other capabilities the U.S. possesses that it can use to enable a host nation’s ongoing counterinsurgency 280 efforts. These assets can enhance an ongoing effort to combat an insurgency and allow a host nation to 281 defeat an insurgency. Effective integration of other enablers requires an understanding of the problem and 282 an understanding of the gaps in host-nation capabilities. 283

DIRECT APPROACH IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY 284

1-20. The direct approach of using land forces in a decisive action role is resource-intensive when done on 285 a large scale, but it is often necessary to fully support a counterinsurgency effort. One example of a 286 possible direct approach is when the success of a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts are critical to U.S. 287 interests. The U.S. can use a direct approach after or during a major conflict or when U.S. interests 288 necessitate stability in a failed or failing state. Land forces can also integrate into a host-nation’s ongoing 289 effort. There are often unintended consequences to a direct approach, and leaders must carefully plan and 290 execute a direct approach to avoid negative consequences. However, this remains a valid option and an 291 important capability that the Army and Marine Corps provide the joint force. 292

1-21. There is a spectrum of direct approach capabilities. For example, a host nation may be capable of 293 providing civil control and security. The U.S. commander can integrate a conventional force into the host 294 nation’s efforts that provide a force to perform direct action or fires provided by airpower or field artillery. 295 There is a spectrum of a modest and supporting ground force commitment doing a range of offensive, 296 defensive, and stability tasks, to a major ground force commitment that may, for a time, take the role of 297



primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves. 298 These efforts, when combined with various indirect capabilities, are integrated to create an overall 299 operational approach. 300

LAND FORCES AND THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 301

1-22. Across the range of military operations, U.S. land forces take actions and set priorities to shape the 302 environment to reduce the possibility of insurgencies. For example, during conventional warfare, land 303 forces must take actions to prevent insurgencies from occurring once the opposing conventional force is 304 defeated. These actions could include a range of stability tasks. (See ADRP 3-07) 305

1-23. Security cooperation can prevent an insurgency from occurring. First, it increases credibility of the 306 capacity, readiness, and capability of the host nation. Second, it increases the capacity of the host-nation’s 307 security forces. Third, it changes the factors that allow an insurgency to begin. (See FM 3-22.) Figure 1-2 308 depicts the prevent-shape-win construct specific to counterinsurgency. 309

Figure 1-2. Construct for counterinsurgency 310

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 311

1-24. The circumstances of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency are important to understanding the 312 context of an insurgency. U.S. forces participate at the direction of the President based on challenges to 313 national security or national security interests. One example is the collapse of a fragile state in a 314 geographically strategic area. Even if U.S. land forces are not in place when the government collapses, the 315 President may deploy land forces to counter an insurgency and restore stability. The use of an indirect 316 approach in a failed state is complex because the commander often has to work with groups outside of the 317 legitimately constituted government. However, large scale direct involvement is often resource intensive, 318 because the state has collapsed. The commander can use a smaller direct approach to support groups 319 outside the legitimately constituted government, but this also adds to the uncertainty and strategic risk. 320

1-25. U.S. forces can participate at the request of a sovereign government that seeks to counter an 321 insurgency in its country with assistance from the U.S. In cases where there is a capable government, the 322 U.S. can offer a wide range of capabilities, including the use of land forces to intervene directly to help a 323 host nation counter an insurgency. 324

1-26. U.S. involvement can also occur in a country where there are ongoing security cooperation 325 operations. If the U.S. is performing security cooperation activities in a country and an insurgency 326 develops, continued security cooperation efforts could result in U.S. involvement in an insurgency. If land 327 forces are preventing an insurgency from occurring, and an insurgency begins, U.S. forces could also 328 transition to direct involvement in an insurgency. This can be a range of direct involvement activities, from 329

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enabling the host nation with fires to providing units to secure directly an area of operation. In either case, a 330 clear policy decision should be made to include the development of a national strategy. 331

1-27. Insurgencies could also be part of large scale combat or fueled by a regional or global adversary. In a 332 protracted large scale operation, an insurgency often develops in controlled areas with populations 333 sympathetic to the enemy. As such, planning for prevention of an insurgency and integrating stability tasks 334 into a prolonged operation is essential. If an insurgency develops, it will require resources to defeat the 335 enemy. In addition, an adversary can fuel an insurgency in a partner nation to undermine U.S. interests. In 336 this case, the insurgency is part of an overall strategy and policy of an adversary. 337

1-28. An insurgency can also occur at the conclusion of a large scale combat operation when an organized 338 movement seeks to challenge the authority of the U.S. and its partners. The organized movement may be 339 remnants of the defeated force or an opportunistic movement that seeks to obtain power using a 340 political-military challenge to the existing authority. In either case, U.S. land forces, along with other 341 unified action partners, must be prepared at all stages of conventional warfare to assess the capability of an 342 insurgency occurring either during the conflict or after hostilities cease. Soldiers and Marines must also 343 recognize that the very presence of U.S. forces in the region can lead to the conditions for an insurgency. 344 U.S. land forces can do much to prevent the insurgency from occurring in the manner in which it conducts 345 the conventional warfare and in the conduct of post conflict operations. Should prevention fail, U.S. forces 346 will be exponentially more successful in countering the insurgency if it shapes the environment during and 347 immediately following conventional warfare for an effective transition to counterinsurgency. 348

1-29. From the U.S. land forces’ perspective, insurgencies range along a spectrum depending on the scale 349 of effort and resources the Army and Marine Corps must take to counter them. The discussion in 350 paragraphs 1-30 through 1-34 is not absolute, but it allows for a discussion on the range of insurgencies that 351 U.S. land forces may encounter. 352

1-30. In a worst-case scenario, an extremely capable insurgency that has a significant impact on the 353 population exists in a failed state region in which there is little or no host-nation government capability. 354 The U.S. may have to commit significant combat power to offset the momentum of the insurgency. While 355 the U.S. can avoid using land forces in direct combat, often the use of other capabilities will support groups 356 that are not the recognized government. In such cases, the U.S. would be enabling one group to gain control 357 over the state. While the cost may be lower, it is fraught with possible unintended consequences. On the 358 other hand, direct involvement could be extremely costly and provoke a wider conflict. If the U.S. operates 359 in a failed state to defeat an insurgency, it must create a policy and strategy that matches its goals and the 360 resources that it is willing to spend. Moreover, it must be willing to accept a large degree of uncertainty and 361 strategic risk. 362

1-31. The best-case scenario is when the host nation has the capability to defeat an insurgency and the U.S. 363 plays only a role in enabling the insurgencies’ defeat with weapons, training, or intelligence. A middle case 364 occurs when a functional state has an insurgency in a remote area in which the host-nation government 365 cannot exert complete control. The existing insurgency is not a challenge to the continued authority of the 366 host-nation government, but it may seek to gain control of a specific region or area. This type of scenario 367 can require much fewer resources for U.S. land forces to counter the insurgency than the worst-case 368 scenario. Since the capacity of the host-nation security forces exists to contain the insurgency to a specific 369 region or area, the U.S. can integrate a number of capabilities into the host government’s efforts to increase 370 the effectiveness and capabilities of the host nation. While every insurgency is unique, this basic 371 framework offers the U.S. the opportunity to achieve policy goals while spending fewer resources and 372 offering less uncertainty and risk. However, as with any conflict, unintended consequences can change the 373 insurgency and increase the cost and uncertainty of U.S. involvement. 374

1-32. In all cases, specific national policies govern U.S. land forces’ actions to counter an insurgency. 375 Figure 1-3 on page 1-9 depicts the four primary objectives of insurgencies. These insurgencies are not 376 exclusive and can occur anywhere along the range. 377



Figure 1-3. The primary objectives of an insurgency 378

1-33. Victory will not be as clear as winning in conventional conflicts. U.S. national ends determine 379 winning, regardless of how the U.S. land force deployed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. As it 380 applies to U.S. national objectives, winning in an insurgency often depends on developing host-nation 381 capacity to contain, reduce, and defeat the insurgency without the requirement for U.S. involvement. In a 382 counterinsurgency, the host nation often determines the criteria. Counterinsurgents avoid judging 383 host-nation criteria based on their own cultural and national expectations. Achieving victory may depend 384 less on defeating the armed element of the insurgency and more on the ability to legitimize host-nation 385 institutions to the populace. Short- and mid-term success in counterinsurgency can be developing a 386 host-nation government that has sufficient capability to secure itself and address an insurgency on its own. 387 This success allows the U.S. to continue to support it through a long-term relationship that addresses that 388 nation’s legitimacy in the long term. Winning includes the concept of developing resiliency systems within 389 the host-nation population and host-nation institutions to sustain the ability to counter the insurgency in the 390 future and prevent the conditions in the area from allowing an insurgency to gain strength. Achieving the 391 conditions for winning will require a mix of application of force, influence operations, cultural awareness, 392 information collection, and building capacity within host-nation institutions either to persuade the people to 393 support the government or dissuade them from supporting the insurgents. 394

1-34. U.S. forces should expect that the host-nation government will have its own interests that may not 395 coincide with U.S. national interests. It may not be willing to undertake the political changes necessary to 396 address the root causes of the insurgency. How U.S. forces deploy may depend upon the degree to which 397 U.S. policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice, and reform. 398 How Soldiers and Marines deploy will also require a clear determination by national decision makers as to 399 what post-conflict commitments by military and civilian organizations will be required. Outside 400 counterinsurgents, however, can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity, or counter-productive 401 behavior on the part of the supported government. No government that is not unambiguously committed to 402 the defeat of an insurgency is likely to do so, regardless of the actions of (or commitment level of) an 403 outside supporter. 404

UNDERSTANDING UNIFIED ACTION 405

1-35. Once the U.S. decides to become involved in a counterinsurgency, all instruments of national power 406 provide the U.S. important capabilities to defeat an insurgency. Unified action is essential for all types of 407 involvement in any counterinsurgency. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or 408 integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to 409 achieve unity of effort (JP 1). This section provides commanders and staffs with an understanding of how 410 civilian agencies and military departments and forces synchronize and integrate their operations to achieve 411

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unity of effort. This section explains both a whole-of-government and a comprehensive approach to defeat 412 insurgencies and achieve U.S. and host-nation objectives. It also explains the roles of intergovernmental, 413 nongovernmental, multinational forces, private sector organizations in counterinsurgency, and host-nation 414 government and host-nation forces. 415

A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT EFFORT 416

1-36. Accomplishing U.S. policy objectives in any conflict requires government expertise and resources 417 outside of the DOD. Policy objectives, especially during a conflict, require a whole-of-government effort. 418 A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the 419 U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A whole-of-government effort is vital to 420 achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the 421 instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. It relies on coordination among the 422 agencies of the U.S. government, including DOD, to ensure that the full range of available capabilities are 423 leveraged, synchronized, and applied to a given policy objective. Government agencies usually agree upon 424 relationships and authorities in a memorandum of agreement or understanding. Military commanders 425 exercise only the authority outlined in the agreements and are often directed by another agency. The terms 426 in those documents may form the basis for establishing some form of relationship between commanders 427 and agency chiefs. When unity of command is not possible, commanders should strive to achieve unity of 428 effort. Often, the interpersonal relationship that commanders establish with their interagency partners 429 proves essential. 430

1-37. A whole-of-government effort incorporates all of the capabilities of the U.S. government to achieve 431 U.S. national objectives. In many counterinsurgencies, for example, political objectives will include 432 assisting the host nation with managing the nonmilitary aspects of the insurgency. Therefore, these political 433 objectives should include eliminating the root causes of the insurgency. However, counterinsurgency 434 commanders and planners must understand that, in the end, societies must address their own root causes of 435 insurgency. Imposing major reforms may result in unintended consequences. Enabling a host nation to 436 address its root causes is more likely to succeed. In dealing with the sorts of complex socio-cultural 437 problems that counterinsurgents frequently face, host-nation good enough is normally better than what the 438 U.S. would consider perfect. 439

1-38. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole-of-government effort is 440 the differing capacities and cultures in civilian agencies compared to those of military forces. A successful 441 whole-of-government effort requires that all actors— 442

Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process. 443 Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved. 444 Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal. 445 Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities. 446 Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal. 447

1-39. The importance of the commander’s personal involvement in building inter-organizational trust, 448 understanding, mutual respect, and friendships cannot be overstated. If the commander does not set the 449 appropriate tone and establish the necessary climate, the best whole-of-government plan will fail. 450

1-40. A clear understanding of the desired end state and national objectives should infuse all efforts, 451 regardless of the agencies or individuals charged with their execution. Given the primacy of political 452 considerations, military forces often support civilian efforts. However, the nature of counterinsurgency 453 operations means that lead responsibility shifts among military, civilian, and host-nation authorities. In 454 other words, as the U.S. shifts its policy and strategy, different agencies take on different roles during the 455 operation. Different or changing relationships with the host nation may also drive shifts in lead 456 responsibility between different authorities. Regardless, military leaders should prepare to assume local 457 leadership for counterinsurgency efforts if civilian leadership is unavailable or cannot access the area. 458

1-41. U.S. land forces conducting counterinsurgency operations must recognize the legal authority of the 459 country team and the chief of mission. Commanders must ensure that they gain an understanding of the 460 purposes, goals, and restrictions under which their interagency partners are operating. Absent such an 461 understanding, the military and nonmilitary efforts may frustrate and interfere with one another because the 462



military and civilian organizations are functioning under separate statutory obligations that lead to 463 conflicting guidance and direction. 464

COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT 465

1-42. In addition to the whole-of-government effort, counterinsurgent forces may also use a comprehensive 466 effort to plan and execute operations when intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, 467 multinational partners, and private sector entities are involved to achieve unity of effort toward a shared 468 goal. This effort incorporates all capabilities of U.S and host-nation governments, intergovernmental and 469 regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to address the root causes of the 470 insurgency, in conjunction with military operations aimed at the insurgents themselves. This is difficult 471 because many organizations will be operating in the same area, some conducting combat operations, while 472 others use non-lethal methods such as education programs and humanitarian assistance. Each organization 473 will have different perspective or interests. In addition to the host-nation government and U.S. military 474 forces, likely participants in counterinsurgency operations include— 475

A country team. 476 Other governments’ agencies. 477 Multinational forces. 478 Multinational corporations and contractors. 479 Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN). 480 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 481

and Medecins Sans Frontieres. 482 Private sector corporations. 483 Other organizations that wield diplomatic, informational, and economic power. 484

1-43. These various organizations may work with, in parallel to, separately from, or counter to U.S. 485 government and civilian agencies supporting counterinsurgency efforts. Those organizations, whose goals 486 align at least partially with U.S. government goals, frequently have capabilities that, if properly 487 synchronized and coordinated, can be critical to achieving success in counterinsurgency operations. 488 Aligning U.S. military, NGO, and intergovernmental organization capabilities requires collaboration and 489 cooperation focused toward a common goal. This can be more difficult than working with other U.S. 490 government agencies. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for 491 military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in a 492 counterinsurgency. Often, the legal, cultural, and operational requirements will prevent direct collaboration 493 between U.S. land forces and non-U.S. civilian organizations. U.S. forces will encounter NGOs not aligned 494 with any insurgent faction and providing humanitarian assistance. These organizations can be neutral or 495 hostile to U.S. policy goals. Commanders should handle such groups carefully and professionally. 496 Commanders must work to understand the objectives and priorities of each organization. Unity of effort 497 between U.S. forces and host-nation forces is particularly critical. Understanding these organizations is 498 essential to understanding the operational environment and shaping the effect of even organizations that are 499 hostile or neutral to U.S. policy goals. (See JP 3-08 for more information on NGOs.) 500

UNITY OF COMMAND 501

1-44. Unity of command is the operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the 502 requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose (JP 3-0). Where 503 possible, counterinsurgency leaders achieve unity of command by establishing and maintaining the formal 504 command or support relationships. While designated officers will exercise unity of command of military 505 forces, such relationships will not usually include nonmilitary U.S. government organizations engaged in a 506 counterinsurgency mission. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on unity of command.) 507

1-45. Unity of command of military forces is operationally desirable and important for the military to 508 establish. However, unity of command is almost impossible to achieve among all of the various actors in a 509 counterinsurgency. Differing political objectives, national caveats, the legal limitations on the use of force, 510 and sensitivities about subordinating national forces to those of other states or intergovernmental 511 organizations often preclude strong command relationships. While agreements that establish a 512

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multinational force provide a legal foundation for determining the scope and limitations on authorities, 513 responsibilities, command, support, or other relationships, the reality might be less clear. Unity of 514 command is one of the most sensitive and difficult-to-resolve issues in a counterinsurgency. 515

UNITY OF EFFORT 516

1-46. When unity of command with part or all of the force, including nonmilitary elements, is not possible, 517 commanders work to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward 518 common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or 519 organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). In a counterinsurgency campaign, an 520 example of unity of effort could be a military commander and a civilian leader ensuring that governance 521 and economic lines of effort are fully coordinated with military operations. Unity of effort among 522 nationally, culturally, and organizationally distinct partners is difficult to maintain given different mission 523 focus and layers of command. To achieve unity of effort will require participants to overcome cultural 524 barriers and set aside parochial agendas. It also will require that each organization understand the 525 capabilities and limitations of the others. 526

1-47. Commanders achieve unity of effort through the following activities: 527 Coordination. 528 Liaison. 529 Division of labor. 530

Coordination 531

1-48. The complex diplomatic, informational, military, and economic context of insurgency and 532 counterinsurgency precludes military leaders from exercising unity of command—and they should not try 533 to do so. Interagency partners, NGOs, and private organizations have many interests and agendas that 534 military forces cannot control. In addition, the degree of independence of local institutions affects their 535 legitimacy to the population. However, military leaders should make every effort to ensure that 536 counterinsurgency actions are as well integrated as possible, taking into consideration the distinct mission, 537 need for independence, and security requirements of other organizations. Coordination between the various 538 actors in a counterinsurgency is essential. 539

1-49. U.S. government agencies should participate in coordination meetings to ensure integration with 540 military and host-nation plans. At the joint headquarters level, the commander establishes joint interagency 541 coordination groups. A joint interagency coordination group provides timely, usable information and 542 advice from an interagency perspective to the commander. Joint interagency coordination groups share and 543 integrate information and assist with synchronization, training, and exercises. Joint interagency 544 coordination groups may include representatives from other federal departments and agencies, state and 545 local authorities, and liaison officers from other commands and DOD components. The interagency 546 representatives and liaison officers are the subject matter experts for their respective agencies and 547 commands. They provide the critical bridge between the commander and interagency organizations. (See 548 JP 3-08 for more information on joint and interagency coordination.) 549

1-50. Coordination between NGOs may be difficult or impossible. Direct interaction among various 550 organizations may be impractical or undesirable. The differing goals and fundamental independence of 551 NGOs and local organizations usually prevent formal relationships governed by command authority. In the 552 absence of such relationships, military leaders seek to persuade and influence other participants to 553 contribute to achieving counterinsurgency objectives. Informal or less authoritative relationships include 554 coordination and liaison. Basic awareness and general information sharing may be all that is possible. 555 Nevertheless, NGOs and other organizations may resist or refuse cooperation because of the appearance of 556 cooperating with military forces. 557

1-51. Commanders are responsible for coordinating the activities of military forces and nonmilitary 558 organizations in their areas of operations. To carry out this responsibility, military and civilian leaders 559 establish a coordinating structure, such as an area coordination center (see JP 3-22) or civil-military 560 operations center at each subordinate political level of the host-nation government. Area coordination 561 centers and civil-military operations centers provide a forum for sharing information, conducting 562



coordination and liaison, and ensuring an effective and efficient division of labor. Active commander 563 involvement is imperative to affect coordination, establish liaison (formal and informal), and share 564 information. Influencing and persuading groups outside a commander’s authority requires skill and 565 subtlety. In some cases, informal meetings with a civilian group at a civil-military operations center will 566 grow to an informal liaison that eventually leads to close cooperation. 567

1-52. Leaders must ensure the various organizations supporting counterinsurgency operations in each area 568 know which commander is responsible for the respective areas of operation. Multiple organizations 569 operating within a land force commander’s area of operations—such as U.S. government, coalition, 570 host-nation, interagency organizations, and special operations forces—increase the risk of fratricide, insider 571 threats, and civilian casualties and create tactical and operational seams that insurgents can exploit. 572

1-53. Entities best qualified to accomplish nonmilitary tasks may not always be available. In such cases, 573 military forces perform those tasks until civilian-led capabilities become available. Sometimes forces have 574 the skills required; other times they learn them during execution. By default, U.S. and multinational 575 military forces often possess the only readily available capability to meet many of the local populace’s 576 fundamental needs. As such, it is important for commanders to assess the capabilities of their forces and 577 other organizations on the battlefield. 578

UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS 579

1-54. In counterinsurgency operations, unified action partners work together. These partners consist of 580 personnel from U.S. government organizations, special operations forces, NGOs, and other organizations. 581

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 582

1-55. The U.S. Department of State is responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy 583 efforts and plays a key role in integrating the capabilities of the U.S. The Department of State leads and 584 oversees U.S. government support to counterinsurgency efforts. Several functional bureaus and offices 585 have substantive roles in the development and execution of counterinsurgency strategy. These offices 586 include the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the 587 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 588 Labor; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and 589 the Legal Advisor’s Office. The Department of State is responsible for diplomatic programs to assist the 590 host nation with countering the insurgency. In many of U.S. military operations—such as detention 591 operations; demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration; and governance capacity building—the 592 Department of State is the U.S. supported element and the military is the supporting element. 593

1-56. One important capability that the State Department maintains is the civilian response corps. The 594 civilian response corps maintain active members who are full time responders whose specific job is to train 595 for, prepare, and staff overseas conflict prevention and stabilization operations. Active members of the 596 civilian response corps can deploy with a 48-hour notice. The civilian response corps also maintains 597 standby members. They are current full-time employees the U.S. government or retirees of the U.S. Foreign 598 Service. Members in the standby component must be available to deploy within 30 days, for up to 90 days 599 with the possibility to extend. The civilian response corps’ work focuses on six skill groups. They are 600 planning, operations, and management, security and rule of law, diplomacy and governance, essential 601 services, and force protection. 602

COUNTRY TEAM 603

1-57. The country team is the senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the 604 chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented 605 United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission 606 (JP 3-07.4). In a foreign country, the chief of mission is the highest U.S. civil authority. The chief of 607 mission leads the country team and is responsible for integrating U.S. efforts in support of the host nation. 608 See figure 1-4 for an illustration of country team command relationships. As permanently established 609 interagency organizations, country teams represent a priceless counterinsurgency resource. They often 610 provide deep reservoirs of local knowledge and interaction with the host-nation government and 611

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population. (See JP 3-07.4 for more information on the country team.) Some of the government agencies 612 normally represented on a country team include: 613

The United States Agency for International Development. 614 The Department of Justice. 615 The Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 616 The Department of Homeland Security. 617 The Department of Agriculture. 618

Figure 1-4. Country team command relationships 619

MULTINATIONAL FORCES 620

1-58. Soldiers and Marines normally function as part of a multinational force, for example supporting the 621 UN or as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each multinational participant provides 622 capabilities and strengths that U.S forces may not have. Many other countries’ military forces bring cultural 623 backgrounds, historical experiences, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable to 624 counterinsurgency efforts. 625

1-59. However, nations join coalitions for various reasons. Although the missions of multinational partners 626 may appear similar to those of the U.S., rules of engagement, host-nation policies, and sensitivities may 627 differ among partners. U.S. military leaders require a strong cultural and political awareness of other 628



multinational military partners. (See JP 3-16 and the ABCA Coalitions Operations Handbook for more 629 information on multinational partners.) 630

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 631

1-60. A nongovernmental organization is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to 632 alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, 633 environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of 634 democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). There are several thousand NGOs of many different 635 types. Organizational charters and their members’ motivations govern their actions. Some NGOs receive at 636 least part of their funding from national governments or intergovernmental organizations. Some may 637 become implementing partners according to grants or contracts. For example, the United States Agency for 638 Internal Development contracts some NGOs to perform certain functions. In these cases, the funding 639 organization often gains oversight and authority over how to use the funds. 640

1-61. To ensure their own security and gain access to vulnerable populations in theaters of conflict, most 641 NGOs currently maintain neutrality, impartiality, and independence from all sides in a counterinsurgency. 642 These positions provide protection against claims of favoritism by the parties to armed conflict and enhance 643 the credibility and security of these organizations. 644

1-62. Depending on the degree to which NGOs follow these principles, NGOs may carry out their work 645 with a very different frame of reference from that of the government. Rather than perceiving their 646 organization as supporting the overall U.S. or coalition stabilization effort, they may view the situation 647 from the perspective of the victims of conflict, regardless of their affiliation with belligerent parties. They 648 will give preference to individuals and communities based on humanitarian need, rather than meeting 649 operational objectives. 650

1-63. While NGOs sometimes choose to coordinate their activities with the U.S. government for security, 651 policy, or funding, often they are reluctant for fear of being associated with the government’s political 652 goals in conflict. This creates a natural but often unavoidable tension in the relationship. Commander’s ease 653 this through a mutual understanding of respective mandates and a clear delineation of tasks. For example, 654 some organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, refuse to take armed escorts in 655 conflict zones, relying instead on their wide recognition as neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian 656 actors. 657

1-64. Many NGOs are already operating in conflict areas long before external military forces arrive. These 658 NGOs may remain after forces depart. Depending on their mandate, they can support critical host-nation 659 government functions, or can contribute to the stabilization effort. To the greatest extent possible, 660 commanders should attempt to complement rather than override their capabilities. It is vitally important to 661 build a complementary, trust-based relationship based on mutual understanding, and a clear delineation of 662 objectives and tasks. 663

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 664

1-65. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or 665 more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared 666 by member states (JP 3-08). Regional organizations like the Organization of American States and European 667 Union or global organizations such as the UN may be involved in some counterinsurgency operations. The 668 UN in particular has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active worldwide. 669

1-66. In the private sector, multinational corporations and other businesses often operate in a conflict 670 environment. At a minimum, commanders should know which companies are present in their area of 671 operations and where those companies are conducting business. Understanding the overall profit motivation 672 of these business will help commanders understand their actions in the operating environment 673

1-67. When the U.S. government pays contractors, the principle of unity of command should apply. 674 Commanders should influence contractors’ performance through U.S. government contract supervisors. 675 Commanders should identify contractors operating in their area of operations and determine the nature of 676

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their contract, accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships. (See FM 4-92 for 677 more information on contractors.) 678

HOST-NATION GOVERNMENT AND FORCES 679

1-68. The essential unified action partner is the host nation and its own forces. The purpose of 680 counterinsurgency operations, from the viewpoint of the U.S., is to support or enable the host nation to 681 defeat an insurgency. In the worst case situation, this may require the U.S. becoming the primary 682 counterinsurgent or working with groups inside a state to build a legitimate government. However, even in 683 the worse case, the goal is still for the host nation and its forces to defeat an insurgency. 684

PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 685

1-69. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgent takes, several 686 counterinsurgency principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain 687 capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-70 through 1-93 are 688 normally relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, the principles are not meant to be 689 exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provide for the practitioner and planner a firm foundation for 690 how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency. 691

LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE 692

1-70. The primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation is properly to foster development of 693 effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security and acts in the best interests of 694 the people. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government by the population (see 695 chapter 2). Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced application of both 696 military and nonmilitary means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. 697 Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the consent of the governed;; those described as 698 “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for 699 fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. This 700 requires the use of resources, such as internal intelligence. A government that derives its powers from the 701 governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion—for example, against 702 criminals—but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance. Legitimacy is a perceived condition 703 by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of 704 its primacy by the people. 705

UNITY OF EFFORT IS ESSENTIAL 706

1-71. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a counterinsurgency operation. Otherwise, 707 well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to 708 exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgency leader has authority over all agencies involved in 709 counterinsurgency operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort 710 through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of nonmilitary agencies. Both military and nonmilitary 711 leaders must be key players in higher level planning. Unity of effort is a requirement between all 712 participants in a counterinsurgency, especially in relationships in which unity of command is impossible. 713 Counterinsurgents must achieve unity of effort between host-nation government entities, host-nation 714 security forces, foreign diplomatic entities, foreign security forces, development agencies, and 715 non-governmental organizations. 716

Political Factors Are Primary 717

1-72. The political and military aspects of insurgencies are inseparable. Military actions executed without 718 properly assessing their political effects at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are 719 counterproductive. Any military action should support a political end state, otherwise it lacks any rational 720 purpose. Resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that 721 counterinsurgency actions do not hinder achieving that political solution. (See chapter 2 for more 722 information on political factors.) 723



1-73. At the beginning of a counterinsurgency operation, military actions may appear dominant as security 724 forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; however, political 725 objectives must guide the military’s approach. This means that political and diplomatic leaders must 726 actively participate throughout the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 727

Secure the Population 728

1-74. The cornerstone of many counterinsurgent efforts is establishing security for the civilian populace. 729 Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. 730 Counterinsurgents, in coordination with the host-nation security forces, must determine how best to provide 731 that security. Security includes separating the insurgents from their cause and support and protecting the 732 people from insurgent intimidation and violence. Although killing and capturing insurgents will be 733 necessary, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to kill them all, especially if their cause is based 734 on commitment to an ideology or religion. Killing insurgents can also be counterproductive, in that it risks 735 generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of 736 revenge. Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. 737

1-75. Some sources of support can be reduced by addressing the core grievances that fuel the insurgency 738 and combating the insurgency’s narrative. If the host nation can mitigate the core grievances of the 739 insurgency, the insurgent will no longer be seen as the solution to the underlying problems. Physical 740 support can be cut off by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be 741 required to limit financial support. 742

1-76. Where possible, a permanent presence of security forces, whether military or paramilitary, should be 743 established at the lowest possible level within an area of operations. The violence level must be reduced 744 enough for counterinsurgents to maintain order prior to any transition to full host-nation responsibility; 745 otherwise, host-nation forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the legitimacy gained by 746 the transition. Counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and police are viewed by the 747 populace and not assume they are always seen as protectors. The goal of change to any host-nation security 748 forces is an accountable, self sustaining, capable and credible force able to meet the security challenges 749 faced by the host nation and looked upon as legitimate by the population. 750

Counterinsurgent Forces Must Understand the Environment 751

1-77. Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the 752 society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsurgency operations in which 753 foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak 754 the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests. 755 Thus, for foreign forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on 756 certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding, than they do for conventional operations. 757 Understanding the operational environment allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which 758 impact the pre-requisites for the insurgency and the root cause that is driving the population to accept the 759 insurgency. Only through understanding the operational environment can the counterinsurgent plan and 760 execute successful operations to counter the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the first place. 761 Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume they will be welcomed by the local people. They may even be 762 viewed as occupiers. (See chapter 2 for a discussion on developing an understanding of the operational 763 environment.) 764

Intelligence Drives Operations 765

1-78. Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, 766 gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Without good 767 intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. Gaining situational understanding before action is 768 often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission objectives. In environments where commanders do 769 not have situational understanding, the first action they is to use forces to gain that understanding while not 770 creating unintended and lasting harm to the mission. (See chapter 10 for more information on intelligence.) 771

Chapter 1


1-79. Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of counterinsurgency 772 forces is a key generator of intelligence. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives 773 subsequent operations. Reporting by tactical units and civilian agencies is often of greater importance than 774 reporting by specialized intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable 775 tempo (rate of military operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the 776 lowest practical level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process. 777

1-80. Intelligence does not pertain only to insurgent combatants and insurgent leaders. To truly counter an 778 insurgency, intelligence includes gathering, analyzing and disseminating relevant information pertaining to 779 the population. If legitimacy is the primary principle of counterinsurgency operations, then identifying what 780 is preventing legitimacy is as important, if not more so, than intelligence pertaining to enemy actions. 781

Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support 782

1-81. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. 783 Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially if the insurgency is based upon violent 784 extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be 785 counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new 786 recruits, and producing cycles of revenge. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. 787 Counterinsurgency forces must cut off the sources of that recuperative power. 788

1-82. Some sources of support can be reduced by addressing the root causes that fuel the insurgency and 789 combating the insurgency’s narrative. If the host nation can mitigate the root causes of the insurgency, the 790 insurgent will no longer be seen as the solution to the underlying problems. Physical support can be cut off 791 by population control or border security. International or local legal action might be required to limit 792 financial support. Counterinsurgent efforts are more successful when insurgents can be isolated from 793 outside support. (See chapter 7 for developing lines of effort to isolate the insurgents and address root 794 causes.) 795

Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential 796

1-83. The cornerstone of most counterinsurgency effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. 797 Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. 798 Counterinsurgents, in coordination with the host-nation security forces, must determine how best to provide 799 that security. Security includes shielding, separating, and protecting the people from insurgent intimidation 800 and violence. Where possible, a permanent presence of security forces, either military or paramilitary, 801 should be established at the lowest possible level within an area of operations. 802

1-84. To establish legitimacy, the affected government must strive to transition security activities from 803 military authorities to host-nation law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are 804 seen as criminals, they lose public support. 805

1-85. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with insurgents and 806 criminals enhances the affected government’s legitimacy. To succeed in countering an insurgency, the 807 host-nation government must develop its legal and conflict resolution systems, including police forces, 808 judicial systems, and penal facilities. It is important to remember that the violence level must be reduced 809 enough for counterinsurgency forces to maintain order prior to any transition to full host-nation 810 responsibility; otherwise, counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the populace and may lose the 811 legitimacy gained by the transition. Counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and 812 police are viewed by the populace and not assume they are always seen as protectors. 813

Counterinsurgent Forces Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment 814

1-86. Insurgencies can be protracted by nature. Though most insurgencies are quickly defeated by 815 government forces (see chapter 4), U.S. involvement normally comes in insurgencies that are not quickly 816 defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to identify, track, and interdict once their manpower 817 and activity drop below a critical mass. Insurgencies may persist for many years after the main threat has 818 been broken. Thus, counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and 819 resources. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and 820



any counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The populace may prefer the affected government to the 821 insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the 822 government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Stabilizing the security situation and 823 transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual government is an extremely difficult task that may take an 824 extended period to complete. 825

Manage Information and Expectations 826

1-87. Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage both. To limit 827 discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces assisting it create 828 and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the 829 international community. Inform and influence activities (including military information support operations 830 and the related activities of public affairs and civil-military operations) are key tools to accomplish this. 831 Commanders always tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they never promise more than can be 832 provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the populace’s 833 tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences entailed by ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a 834 large foreign force is present to help establish a regime, such progress can extend the period before foreign 835 forces are perceived by the population as an army of occupation. 836

1-88. Counterinsurgency forces ensure that their deeds match their words and both are consistent with the 837 broader narrative. They also understand that any action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgency 838 forces carefully consider that impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. 839 They work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences 840 must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the area of operations can access the 841 internet and satellite television to determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the 842 international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines 843 counterinsurgency efforts. 844

Use the Appropriate Level of Force 845

1-89. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There will be times when an overwhelming effort is 846 necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. However, counterinsurgency 847 forces should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any 848 operation. Normally, counterinsurgency forces can use escalation of force procedures to minimize 849 unnecessary loss of life or suffering. These procedures are especially appropriate during any operation in 850 which the counterinsurgent security force interacts with the local populace. All interactions between 851 security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy, and if the counterinsurgent security forces 852 show restraint in the eyes of the population, the entire counterinsurgency effort is further legitimized. The 853 general rule for the use of force for the counterinsurgents is “do not create more enemies than you eliminate 854 with your action.” Escalation of force does not limit the right of self-defense, including the use of deadly 855 force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. However, 856 counterinsurgency forces must be properly trained in such procedures and, more importantly, in methods of 857 shaping situations so that tactical leaders have to make fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions. 858

1-90. Who wields force is also important. If the police have a reasonable reputation for competence and 859 impartiality, it is better for them to execute urban raids than military forces because the populace is more 860 likely to view that application of force as legitimate. This is true even if the police are not as well armed or 861 as capable as military forces. Local circumstances, however, affect this decision. For example, if the police 862 are seen as part of an ethnic or sectarian group oppressing the general population, their use may be 863 counterproductive. (See chapter 8 regarding the development of host-nation security forces and chapter 11 864 regarding assessing counterinsurgency operations for further discussions on use of force.) 865

Learn and Adapt 866

1-91. An effective counterinsurgency force is a learning organization. Insurgents connected with other 867 organizations constantly exchange information about their enemy’s vulnerabilities—even with insurgents 868 in distant theaters. However, skillful counterinsurgency forces can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Every 869 unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Commanders must 870

Chapter 1


develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. Commanders might also 871 need to seek new laws or policies that authorize or resource necessary changes. Insurgents shift their 872 locations looking for weak links, so widespread competence is required throughout the counterinsurgency 873 force. 874

Empower the Lowest Levels 875

1-92. Local commanders have the best grasp of their situations, but they require access to or control of the 876 resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage 877 intelligence operations and civil-military operations. Leaders encourage the initiative of subordinates and 878 facilitate the learning that must occur at every level. Effective counterinsurgency operations are 879 decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible 880 down to their level. However, this must be balanced with ensuring that tactical leaders have the situational 881 understanding of the wider operational and strategic consequences of their actions. While tactical missions 882 are essential, it is the responsibility of commanders to ensure that tactical missions support the overall 883 objectives to defeat the insurgency. 884

Support the Host Nation 885

1-93. In the situation of U.S. and multinational forces committed to assisting a host-nation government 886 with its counterinsurgency strategy, the long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In 887 the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders 888 and institutions. External assistance can help, but host-nation authorities must accept responsibilities to 889 achieve real victory. Depending upon the condition of the host-nation government (failed, failing, or 890 viable), a robust whole-of-government approach may be critical to enabling that government to accept 891 those responsibilities. In a failed or failing state, there may be no functioning government or national 892 economy. The counterinsurgent, therefore, will be forced to create institutions necessary to provide 893 governance and support economic development. While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct 894 operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. 895 Host-nation governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign 896 armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers. The sooner the main effort can transition to host-nation 897 institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better. 898

899


Chapter 2 900

Understanding an Operational Environment 901

2-1. Regional and strategic conditions affect U.S. involvement in opposing an insurgency. How and why 902 the U.S. becomes involved in an insurgency is important. However, some important strategic trends can 903 also affect the context of an insurgency. The global trends of demographic changes, globalization, the 904 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism, and failed states are leading to an era of 905 persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted conflict among state, non-state, and individual actors 906 who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. These trends not 907 only affect the likelihood of conflict, they also affect the capabilities and action of friendly, threat, neutral, 908 and nonaligned actors. 909

2-2. Understanding the conditions that may affect the stability of a nation or region assists commanders as 910 they focus on a specific operational environment to determine the root causes that led to an insurgency. 911 Whether operating at the operational or tactical level, commanders must understand and anticipate the 912 effects of their operations and how they fit into the broader mission. The U.S. may enter situations with 913 long-standing conflicts and established ways of life that have implications beyond the boundaries of a 914 specific area of operations. They must identify individuals within that area that may exert external 915 influence on other governments that have their own agendas in the region. Commanders also must 916 recognize that in the modern interconnected world, actions at any level may have far broader impact than 917 intended. This, coupled with certain global trends, may provoke more insurgencies in the future. 918

DEMOGRAPHIC AND URBANIZATION TRENDS 919

2-3. The world will become more populated and urbanized. Global population will increase by 920 approximately 1.2 billion people by 2025 with more than a billion new urban dwellers in that time. Most 921 population growth will occur in the developing world. Population growth, urbanization, and competition 922 for limited resources in the Middle East, Africa, and South Central Asia will contribute to increased 923 resource scarcity and may present governance challenges. The uncertain impact of climate change 924 combined with increased population centers in or near coastal environments may challenge the ability of 925 failing and fragile states to respond to natural disasters. These conditions enhance the possibility of 926 insurgencies in highly populated developing countries whose governments lack the capacity to provide 927 effective governance, to include providing security and the rule of law. These trends could lead to failed 928 states and problems that will affect regional and global security because of globalization. 929

2-4. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to both a population surge and migration. In 1950, 930 29 percent of the world’s population lived in urban areas;; by 2050, it is estimated that 60 percent of the 931 world’s population will live in urban areas. This rapid growth of urban areas, and accompanying crowded 932 conditions with the potential for high unemployment, creates a greater potential that future insurgencies 933 may arise in urban areas. 934

GLOBALIZATION 935

2-5. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces 936 that are bringing nation-states and the people of the world closer together. Globalization affects an 937 insurgency by providing a freer flow of arms, information, and money to an insurgency and allows an 938 insurgency to have a wider strategic effect than in the past. It is easy for ethnic groups or ideological groups 939 to link together internationally because of globalization. That provides a greater likelihood that insurgents 940 will have access to outside resources, or that they will try to affect objectives outside of their local area. 941 Through technology, globalization also allows an insurgent to gain access to cyber tools that could be used 942 to attack any country. 943

Chapter 2


PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 944

2-6. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and precision and technologically advanced 945 weapons will increase the potential for catastrophic attacks. The threat of the use of weapons of mass 946 destruction by terrorist organizations actively seeking them is as real as it is deadly. However, weapons of 947 mass destruction present significant possibilities beyond terrorist actors. If the insurgent group acquires 948 them, they can allow the insurgent group to pressure the host nation, attack a target that would have 949 countrywide affects, or to attack a target that could have regional or global strategic affects. These weapons 950 can provide an insurgent group with capabilities unmatched in the history of irregular warfare. The 951 likelihood of an insurgent group obtaining these weapons has never been higher because of both 952 globalization and failed states. As ethnic and ideological groups enhance bonds that go beyond state 953 boundaries, and insurgent groups create vast safe haven areas within failed states, the proliferation of 954 weapons of mass destruction creates new possibilities for any insurgency. Not only will insurgents strive to 955 obtain weapons of mass destruction, but the continued availability of more precise, cheaper, and more 956 lethal conventional weapons will make insurgent actions more deadly. 957

FAILING OR FAILED STATES 958

2-7. Governments of nation-states face increasingly greater challenges in providing effective support to 959 their growing populations. The problems of both demographic changes and the pressures of globalization, 960 corruption, lack of government services, and decaying infrastructure can lead to a failed state. A failed state 961 can provide insurgent groups safe havens to build their organizations, but may also hinder their ability to 962 promulgate their message and actions due to lack of infrastructure. (See FM 3-07 for a detailed discussion 963 on a failed state framework.) 964

THE OPERATIONAL VARIABLES 965

2-8. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 966 affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders 967 and staff analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational 968 variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time 969 (PMESII-PT). The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of 970 an operational environment. 971

2-9. In the Iraq's Anbar Province, the eight interrelated operational variables created a unique operational 972 environment. The Al Qaim tribes had different interests, both political and economic, than both the 973 Americans and Al Qaeda. Religion, economic interests, culture, and other variables helped to shape the 974 actions of everyone in the operational environment. The Marine Corps had to act in this environment and 975 attempt to shape it. This was a process that required situational understanding and an appreciation for the 976 uniqueness of the environment. 977

The Anbar Province Operational Environment 978 The Anbar Province’s Al Qaim district became increasingly important to Abu Musab 979 al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after November 2004 when it lost its sanctuary to 980 the American forces’ offensive in the second battle of Fallujah. The Al Qaim district is 981 located on Iraqi’s border with Syria. Although the district represents only 10% of the 982 Anbar population, the area holds strategic importance due to its location along the 983 Iraqi/Syrian border as well as the Euphrates River. Al Qaim is and always has been 984 a lucrative smuggling route for black market goods and served as AQI’s lifeline to 985 infiltrate Baghdad with foreign fighters, money, and other resources that fueled the 986 insurgency. With the loss of Fallujah, Al Qaim became AQI’s newfound sanctuary. 987 AQI arrived with offers of partnering with Al Qaim’s tribes to defeat and 988 expel the Americans. They promised the indigenous population money and other 989 resources for their support. As Muslims and Arabs, AQI members exhorted it was 990 their obligation, their Jihad, to fight the crusaders. After all, the Americans, ignorant of 991 tribal customs, religion, and traditions had disrespected and dishonored the people of 992

Understanding an Operational Environment


Al Qaim and a patriotic resistance had already formed in the district. The tribes of Al 993 Qaim saw the Al Qaeda movement as the answer to their problem with the 994 Americans. The tribes, together with AQI, felt that the time was ripe to rid the area of 995 the infidel occupiers. 996 Al Qaim tribes varied in available resources and were incapable of defeating the 997 American occupiers on their own. For example, the Albu-Mahal tribe, the strongest 998 tribe in the area, organized and resourced the Hamza Battalion specifically to fight 999 the Americans. However, it, along with the other tribal militias, lacked the weaponry, 1000 ammunition, and other equipment to win such a fight on their own. AQI’s offer was 1001 tempting and most of the tribes accepted. 1002 As time went on it became apparent that AQI’s offer was deceptive;; this partnership 1003 was not what it seemed. AQI provided weaponry and funding, but in return they 1004 demanded to lead the Jihad with the intent of first destroying and then transforming 1005 the social fabric of the tribes and Al Qaim. AQI started by taking over the smuggling 1006 routes, skimming large profits and killing those that resisted. They then imposed a 1007 radical form of Sharia on the community with fanatical punishments for transgressors. 1008 Religion was used to justify AQI’s actions, which included marriages to the local 1009 women, not allowing cigarettes, the ban of music and films and the common 1010 intimidation tactic of beheading those that resisted. 1011 3rd Battalion 6th Marines (3/6) executed Operation IRON FIST the first week of 1012 October, attacking from east to west through the town of Sadah and eastern Karabila, 1013 ultimately stopping at the Emerald Wadi in the center of the Al Qaim region. They 1014 built four Combat Out Post (COP) : Chosin, Iwo Jima, Belleau Wood, and Khe Sahn 1015 and left Marines and Iraqis in place providing combined, permanent, persistent, 1016 presence. 1017 The next clearing operation was conducted the first week in November by 3/6 and 2/1 1018 commanded by Regimental Combat Team 2. This operation cleared the Husaybah, 1019 Karabilah, Sadah and Ubaydi areas of all insurgents. Immediately upon clearing the 1020 areas, 3/6 began constructing COPs in all of the cities. 1021 By late November 3/6 had constructed 14 COPs in the areas from Husaybah to 1022 Ubaydi. Each COP consisted of a U. S. Marine platoon and an Iraqi Army platoon or 1023 company. Those positions completed and reflected combined, permanent, persistent 1024 presence, where the Marines and Iraqi Army lived together and amongst the people. 1025 The next step was to engage the people. Mission analysis led to assigning company 1026 areas based on the tribal distribution. The ideal was to link a company with a tribe. 1027 This was not an exact science because the tribes were intermingled, but they did 1028 locate companies to areas where a majority of tribe resided. The next step was a 1029 concerted drive to recruit tribesmen into the police force. The Marines solicited help 1030 from the Sheikhs to nominate men from their tribes, and started developing police 1031 stations near the COP’s. This would allow the Marines and Iraq Army forces to 1032 partner with the local police forces in those areas and further engender trust and 1033 confidence from the local people. 1034 In January 2006 General Casey, the commander of all forces in Iraq, visited the Al 1035 Qaim area and was toughly pleased with the general progress in the region, but he 1036 was very concerned with the smuggling of foreign fighters, money and weapons 1037 coming across the Syrian border. His orders were to confiscate everything being 1038 brought across the border in order to stop the flow of illegal goods. During some 1039 discussion it was explained to the General that this “smuggling industry” was the life 1040 line of this region and always had been. These people had been “good honest 1041 smugglers” for millennia and we should not intervene and disrupt the tribe’s 1042 livelihood. This ordered disruption of cross border trading would jeopardize our fragile 1043 relationship that we worked so hard to develop over the past months. In fact, we had 1044 learned from the Sheikhs that this disruption of trade was one of the major mistakes 1045 and grievances the locals had against AQI. It was also explained to the General that 1046 we had worked a deal with the local tribes that we would stop and inspect all vehicles 1047

Chapter 2


coming into the country to ensure no foreign fighters, money or weapons were being 1048 smuggled. The tribes readily agreed and said they would help with the inspection. 1049 These inspections were largely conducted by the new local police and the Iraqi Army 1050 with Marines in over-watch. The tribes had picked our side in the struggle against 1051 AQI and wanted to stop foreign fighters, money and weapons from entering Iraq as 1052 much as we did. The scenario described above was the beginning of what is known 1053 today as “The Awakening”. 1054

2-10. It is important to have an understanding of the operational environment before beginning a 1055 counterinsurgency operation. This understanding is necessary to begin planning the initial development of 1056 measures of effectiveness and performance. The commander must understand what happened in the 1057 operational environment and determine the nature, scope, and severity of its problems. The situation is 1058 usually more complicated than it seems when the military force first becomes involved. Understanding the 1059 operational environment is a collaborative effort of the unified action partners—U.S. government military 1060 and civilian, international civilian and military, as well as host-nation civilian and military. To the 1061 maximum extent possible, the military force and unified action partners strive to have a common situational 1062 understanding from the beginning. If the partnering agencies do not have the same picture, they can quickly 1063 find themselves working at odds with each other. Rarely will there be enough time to fully understand the 1064 operational environment. Understanding the operational environment is a continued and iterative process 1065 that will continue throughout the operation. 1066

2-11. An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 1067 maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). 1068 For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations as well. A commander’s 1069 area of operation may be relatively static, but people and information continuously flow through the area of 1070 operations. An area of operations can cross physical structures, such as roads and rivers, and span diverse 1071 population groups. Fabricated borders that divide natural groupings can create problems in understanding 1072 an area of operations. For example, cross-border ties allow insurgents safe haven outside of a tactical unit’s 1073 area of operations. Moreover, international boundaries often divide population groups. The span of the 1074 insurgency may be far larger than the defined area of operations and areas outside the area of operations 1075 may be relevant to a commander. For example, areas outside a commander’s area of operations may 1076 provide a safe haven for an insurgency or an adjacent state may support an insurgency. In an insurgency, an 1077 area of interest may be large. 1078

2-12. The area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas 1079 adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy 1080 forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). It is the area in which events 1081 could have significant impact on areas of operations. The area of interest can be large relative to the area of 1082 operations. When defining an area of interest, commanders should consider the operational variables. 1083

2-13. Commanders analyze operational variables to understand the operational environment in which they 1084 are conducting operations. An operational environment is not static; it continues to evolve. Introducing 1085 units into the environment causes shifts and changes. As a result, commanders, their respective staffs, and 1086 all Soldiers and Marines must continuously reassess the operational environment for changing conditions. 1087 Moreover, in addition to understanding U.S. interests and desired end states in an environment, a 1088 commander must understand the environment from three additional perspectives; those of the host nation, 1089 the enemy, and the population. 1090

POLITICAL 1091

2-14. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of 1092 governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. (See 1093 ADRP 5-0 for more information on the political variable.) Legitimacy is essential to understanding the 1094 political variable in an insurgency. Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of authority. Legitimacy can 1095 change as the society involves and groups or individuals change their conceptualization of who they are 1096 and what authority they accept. Sometimes, large changes, such as the American War of Independence or 1097 the creation of the German state, create a change in group identity and accepted authority. Sometimes 1098



group identity changes by slow evolution, such as the case with the European Union. However, at the core, 1099 whom a group accepts as providing legitimate authority to govern their actions is that group’s legitimate 1100 authority. Legitimacy provides willing acceptance of authority and thus does not require resources to 1101 enforce an authority. Whom the population sees as a legitimate authority is at the core of a 1102 counterinsurgency. 1103

2-15. The counterinsurgent seeks to understand not just the formal political system, such as political parties 1104 and elected officials, but also the informal systems of political influence, such as ethnic groups and other 1105 centers of power. There is a connection between the political variable and the social variable. A tribal 1106 grouping or a Hindu caste may directly affect whom that group sees as a legitimate authority in an area. 1107 Moreover, these social groupings can affect the formal power structure. For example, in an electoral 1108 system, groups will often vote in unison, giving them added political power in the formal system. 1109

2-16. Often, informal groups such as tribes or local councils are the essential actors in the distribution of 1110 political power, especially at the local level. Political power is the ability to influence behavior. The biggest 1111 influence of behavior is often local groupings that can create a norming effect on a population. Most groups 1112 hold power only because the population accepts that power distribution. Political power is the by-product 1113 of a society that has developed by countless human choices over time, rather than an objective and 1114 non-changing set of rules. 1115

2-17. However, the opposite can also be true and the formal political system can change group identity and 1116 influence the actions of any social group. States can create identity in a population though education and 1117 information. For example, an education program that instills nationalist views on an individual from an 1118 early age can be a powerful tool in shaping a person’s identity and in turn whom that person sees as a 1119 legitimate authority. Group and individual identity is not static nor is whom the population views as 1120 legitimate static. While groups have internal means to view identity, variables outside the group, including 1121 the host nation, also affect them. 1122

2-18. The commitment and motivation of the host nation to defeat the insurgency is an important 1123 motivation. Governments with more than one of the following traits have tended to lose historically, even 1124 when supported by competent and committed external forces: 1125

Government sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or 1126 cultural institutions. 1127

Government involved corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule. 1128 Government operates as a kleptocracy. 1129 Government elites had perverse incentives to continue conflict. 1130 Government economically dependent on external actor. 1131

MILITARY 1132

2-19. The military variable explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, 1133 friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment (see ADRP 5-0). For many countries, an army is 1134 the military force primarily responsible for maintaining external security. However, this is not a universal 1135 rule, and many militaries become involved in internal security and even governance. In some cases, there is 1136 a degree of military control over the government, which then blends the political and military variables. 1137 This can range from a military dictatorship to a praetorian guard type military that intervenes in the 1138 governance of society periodically. Even in cases where a host nation appears to have complete objective 1139 control over the military, the military can be an important bureaucratic and political actor. The interaction 1140 between the military and the political structure is important to understanding this variable’s relationship 1141 with the political distribution of power in a society. 1142

2-20. A host of institutions including police, paramilitary, intelligence, and other organizations can 1143 maintain internal security and thus need to be considered within the military variable. In many autocratic 1144 societies, intelligence agencies provide an essential means of control over a society. Many societies 1145 maintain civil control and civil security by an accepted rule of law and a police force that enforces the rule 1146 of law. In a counterinsurgency, the host nation may use the military or a paramilitary to defeat an 1147 insurgency. 1148

Chapter 2


2-21. The military variable includes all forces involved in both internal and external security. 1149 Counterinsurgents must fully understand how the host nation maintains internal and external security. 1150 Moreover, they must understand both neutral and enemy military forces. Neutral military forces are 1151 commonplace in a counterinsurgency, as some states or multinational corporations will employ or contract 1152 for limited forces to protect personnel, resources, or infrastructure for their own interests. Moreover, the 1153 there can be a peacekeeping force that is maintaining a position of neutrality in the conflict. Also, there can 1154 be informal groupings of military power. For example, local gangs, armed militias, and private security can 1155 be a factor in local areas. 1156

2-22. Commanders and staffs should analyze friendly, neutral, and enemy forces with both qualitative and 1157 quantitative data. Some aspects to consider include— 1158

Position of forces in national and local government structure. 1159 General organization, training, and doctrine. 1160 Economic basis (to include appropriations system). 1161 Conscription or recruitment systems. 1162 Police role in the nation’s internal security. 1163 Rapport with population. 1164 The impact of other international forces already there or there in the recent past. 1165

These considerations are particularly important with regard to the insurgents. Knowing from what groups 1166 and sources, both within the country of conflict and outside of it, are providing what kinds of support (for 1167 example, financial, personnel, materiel, and provisions) and by what processes or routes is critical. 1168 Insurgencies that continue to meet their tangible support needs are difficult to defeat. 1169

2-23. There is variance in an enemy force in a counterinsurgency. Some could be based on cellular 1170 organizations while others could be more hierarchical. Moreover, there will be a wide variance in enemy 1171 capabilities. Some insurgencies have capabilities to conduct large scale and well coordinated attacks that 1172 may rival the capability of the host nation military. Others have less capability and may rely on small unit 1173 tactics. (See chapter 5 for a further discussion on enemy military forces.) 1174

ECONOMIC 1175

2-24. The economic variable encompasses individual and group behaviors related to gaining access to, 1176 producing, distributing, and consuming resources. These behaviors determine incentives and disincentives 1177 that encourage or discourage economic behaviors. The sum of these individual and group decisions may 1178 determine the production, distribution, and consumption of economic resources. Typically, an economy is 1179 conceptualized as currency, stocks, major commodities, banking, and trade controlled and monitored by the 1180 government. However, informal economies, trade, or economic exchange outside state controlled or 1181 money-based transactions may be of equal or greater importance in understanding an operational 1182 environment. While the world economy continues to grow more interdependent, local economies remain 1183 relatively distinct. These differences significantly influence political choices, including individuals’ 1184 decisions to support or subvert the existing order. When commanders and staffs analyze a local economy, 1185 they should look at both governmental policies and the type of local economy. 1186

2-25. Types of economies vary widely. When looking at economic activities, it is important to understand 1187 the relative importance of the various sectors of an economy. Looking at the percentage of the economy in 1188 the public sector versus the private sector provides some understanding of the structure of the economy. 1189 Moreover, the private and public sector can potentially be divided into different sectors based on type of 1190 activities. Agriculture, raw materials, services, and other types of production play an important role in 1191 defining the economy of a local area. It is important to analyze governmental policies. Corruption, the rule 1192 of law, and macroeconomic policy play a role in the structure of a local economy. 1193

2-26. Another important factor in analyzing economic activity is the informal economy. In weak states, 1194 understanding the informal economy is key to providing a full understanding of an operational 1195 environment. The informal economy is those economic interactions and exchanges that are not recognized, 1196 regulated, controlled, or taxed by a state government. In this case, informal does not always equal 1197 illegitimate. For example, a black market is a form of informal economy based on criminal activities such 1198



as racketeering, money laundering, prostitution, drug trafficking, and smuggling. In every country, there is 1199 a balance between formal and informal economies. In successful states, the informal economy may be 1200 relatively small. However, in failing states the informal economy may form the majority of all economic 1201 activities. The local population may depend on informal markets for their most basic needs. It is difficult 1202 but important to develop an understanding of these informal economies (both legitimate and illegitimate.) 1203 Because they are outside host-nation government oversight, insurgents can exploit even legitimate formal 1204 economies as a source of funding. The black market, on the other hand, will most likely be a direct enabler 1205 of an insurgency in terms of both funding and logistics. 1206

2-27. The counterinsurgent must give attention to other informal economies. Most people work, buy, and 1207 sell in this economy—operating outside legal frameworks but not engaging in illicit or criminal activity 1208 (except for taxation issues). Sensitivity to the rules of an informal economy is one piece of cultural 1209 sensitivity to the population and the host nation in general. Examples of the rules of an informal economy 1210 include the following: 1211

People earn income in kind rather than in cash. 1212 People often use land for decades (or more) through traditional usage rights granted by village 1213

heads and chiefs with no legal title. 1214 People may work without pay (in arrangements ranging from slavery to traditional divisions of 1215

household and farm labor). 1216

2-28. Economic variables also tie into other elements of a society. For example, ownership or control of 1217 land and debt indicate something about the power structure within a society. Many developing societies 1218 have highly concentrated ownership of land, which can serve as a driver for social conflict and discontent. 1219 Whoever owns land or controls the land has the power to use it for economic profit. Maintaining this 1220 ownership or control during an insurgency indicates a degree of power in a society. The same is true of 1221 debt. The ability to collect a debt owed indicates a degree of power in a society. Land and debt are 1222 examples of how economic factors link into other social factors. 1223

2-29. A lack of economic opportunity can be the reason an insurgency continues to exist. As part of 1224 developing an understanding of an operational environment, counterinsurgents assess the current economic 1225 variables described in paragraphs 2-24 through 2-28, the economic opportunities available to different 1226 segments of the population, and the effect insurgent and counterinsurgent operations are having on the 1227 population’s ability to meet their most basic economic needs. Economic survival, especially in an area 1228 where an insurgency is occurring, is almost as important and as immediate a challenge for households as 1229 physical security. For this reason, leaders at all levels of the counterinsurgency operation (including 1230 platoons and companies) need to assess the impacts of military operations on the following simple elements 1231 of the economic welfare of households and communities: 1232

Income (including the capacity to earn streams of income in future). 1233 Assets and property (used to earn income). 1234 Work (including traditional patterns of unpaid work). 1235

2-30. Commanders strive to understand the economic impact of the unit’s presence in the area. For better 1236 or worse, the presence of an Army or Marine Corps unit affects normal economic incentives and 1237 disincentives for individual behavior. Introducing foreign wealth can have unintended negative 1238 consequences. For this reason, careful thought and planning is needed for a project intended to have local 1239 economic impact. Commanders anticipate the economic impact of their arrival and their continued presence 1240 in the area of operations. Additionally, commanders and staffs carefully weigh the costs and benefits 1241 associated with all economic activity. Some factors to consider are: 1242

Prospects of long-term sustainability. 1243 Possibility of local price inflation. 1244 Disrupting natural incentives (such as farmers leaving fields to work on trash pickup projects). 1245

SOCIAL 1246

2-31. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational 1247 environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society. Understanding the society is 1248

Chapter 2


foundational to understanding the social variable. A society is defined as a population whose members are 1249 subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a 1250 sense of identity. However, no society is completely homogeneous. A society usually has a dominant 1251 culture, but it can have a vast number of secondary cultures. Different societies may share similar cultures, 1252 such as Canada and the U.S. do. Societies are not static, but change over time. (For more information on 1253 this variable, see chapter 3 of this publication and ADRP 5-0.) 1254

INFORMATION 1255

2-32. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, 1256 organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information 1257 environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, 1258 or act on information (JP 3-13). Understanding the communications system is important because it 1259 influences international, national, regional, and local audiences. Insurgents often use information to gain 1260 credibility and legitimacy with the population, while simultaneously undermining their opponents. 1261 Understanding how people communicate and who influences them on a daily basis is essential. This is 1262 important at all levels. For example, identifying local gathering places is important for spreading 1263 information, rumors, and gossip. 1264

2-33. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: cognitive, informational, 1265 and physical (see table 2-1). The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker or 1266 specific audience and is the dimension where people think, perceive, visualize, and decide. The 1267 informational dimension is the place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, 1268 displayed, and protected with key components of the content and flow of information. The physical 1269 dimension is composed of systems, human beings (including decision makers, leaders, and military forces), 1270 and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across air, 1271 land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. 1272

Table 2-1. Interrelated dimensions of the information environment 1273

Dimension Description Cognitive Dimension

Exists in the minds of human beings. Consists of individual and collective consciousness. Where information is used to develop perceptions and make decisions. Significant characteristics include values, beliefs, perceptions, awareness,

and decision making.

Informational Dimension

Created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive dimensions. Where information is collected, processed, and disseminated. Significant characteristics are information content and flow.

Physical Dimension

The tangible, real world. Where the information environment overlaps with the physical world. Consists of targetable individuals, organizations, information systems, and

the physical networks that connect them. Significant characteristics include terrain, weather, civilian information

infrastructure, media, populace, and third party organizations.

2-34. The technological advances in communications offer some unique considerations for insurgencies. 1274 For one, international communication is easier than it used to be. This allows insurgencies to communicate 1275 with organizations outside of their physical control. Connecting to diasporas or sympathetic groups could 1276 be vital to an insurgency. With the ability to communicate comes the ability to move resources and funding. 1277 Moreover, communications can be vital in importing weapons or other supplies to an insurgency. Global 1278 communications can be essential in increasing the military capabilities of an insurgency. 1279

2-35. At the operational and tactical level, communications allow for effective coordination of attacks. 1280 Organizations can communicate by cell phones, by the internet, or a number of other instant and quick 1281 means. This allows for coordinated large-scale attacks even by dispersed organizations. 1282



INFRASTRUCTURE 1283

2-36. The infrastructure variable is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for 1284 the functioning of a community or society. Societies have different infrastructure needs. For example, the 1285 expectation for hours of available electricity vary widely. Counterinsurgents should try to access 1286 infrastructure needs to meet the expectation of the user not their own expectations. 1287

2-37. Infrastructure is also interrelated with other variables. For example, the development of a highway 1288 system will affect the ability of people to move and interact with others. Creating a society in which 1289 humans can easily move based on economic needs or simple desire greatly increases the variety of groups a 1290 person will meet. These interactions and new relationships can change how the person views the world and 1291 the person’s values. A communication system, such as a cellular network, can have the same effect. These 1292 systems allow for communication outside of one’s areas and allow the transmission of new ideas and 1293 concepts. 1294

2-38. Another important interaction to consider is the relationship with infrastructure and the economic 1295 variable. An effective infrastructure can allow for the easy movement of people, goods, and ideas. 1296 Moreover, many businesses require infrastructure. While it is true that a local population may not expect 24 1297 hours of electricity a day, a manufacturing plant may require it. Moreover, infrastructure such as schools 1298 can increase the human capital in an area and drive economic growth. 1299

2-39. Infrastructure also has an effect on the military variable. Host nation forces can use a good 1300 transportation system, but so can an insurgency. A road system provides a means of transportation for 1301 everyone, not simply the population and government. Moreover, infrastructure may be important for the 1302 population and the government’s role in maintaining civil control and security. An attack on the 1303 infrastructure may undermine the government’s legitimacy in an area. However, the opposite is also true. 1304 An attack on infrastructure may also undermine the insurgency, if the population places blame on the 1305 insurgency and turns towards to government. 1306

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 1307

2-40. The physical environment includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate 1308 and weather in the area of operation. The physical environment can affect the tactics and operations of an 1309 insurgency. Extreme conditions, such as in nations in higher elevations, can make insurgent movements 1310 difficult in the winter. The movement and the tactics of any military force will be affected by the physical 1311 environment of the area of operations. The physical environment will influence insurgency sanctuaries, the 1312 ability of an insurgency to hide resources, and the ability of an insurgency to mass forces. Understanding 1313 the physical environment is essential to understanding an insurgency. (See chapter 4 for further discussion 1314 on how the physical environment relates to an insurgency.) 1315

2-41. The physical environment also relates to the other variables. A country with a high attitude and that 1316 is landlocked will have a difficult time building the infrastructure needed for large-scale international trade. 1317 Moreover, if the physical environment precludes the ability produce with ease an excess of food, it is 1318 difficult to divert much labor to other enterprises. This can hamper the development of a highly specialized 1319 economy. A green revolution will often predate a major increase in industrial production. 1320

TIME 1321

2-42. Time describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational 1322 environment, as well as how various actors in the operational environment perceive the timing and 1323 duration. Time also has an interrelated relationship with other variables. For example, a multinational 1324 coalition may see their efforts in an insurgency as limited by national objectives or by the public pressure. 1325 In other words, other parties can always leave an insurgency. On the other hand, for the host nation, the 1326 insurgent, and the population in the struggle are less constrained by time. An insurgency may use the time 1327 variable to its advantage, while the time variable usually works against an external counterinsurgent. 1328

2-43. Time can also play a role in the social variable. Ongoing conflicts tax societies. Populations can 1329 become less interested in the nuisance of a conflict and more interested in simple peace. As time passes, a 1330

Chapter 2


population may be more interested in who is likely to win an insurgency, than the motivation of either side 1331 of the conflict. 1332

THE MISSION VARIABLES AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS 1333

2-44. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables 1334 into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with 1335 the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct 1336 operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, 1337 time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) (see ADRP 5-0.) Within the mission variables, civil 1338 considerations are of unique importance for counterinsurgency. Civil considerations are the influence of 1339 manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and 1340 organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations 1341 comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, 1342 organizations, people, and events. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for information on the use of ASCOPE.) 1343

2-45. The commanders’ refinement of information for their mission and their particular area of operation is 1344 essential. ASCOPE can play an important role in the identification of structures or events, for example, that 1345 will have an effect in a unit’s area of operations. As such, ASCOPE is an important tool for the unit in 1346 determining important civil considerations in an insurgency. Units within an insurgency should use 1347 ASCOPE to identify and continually refine their understanding of the area of operations over time. 1348

2-46. It is essential to perform ASCOPE in the perspective of the population, the insurgent, and the 1349 counterinsurgent. This is of unique importance for counterinsurgency. A detailed explanation of a 1350 technique to perform ASCOPE in can be found in ATP 3-24.1. 1351

1352


Chapter 3 1353

Understanding Culture 1354

3-1. Each society is composed of both a social structure and culture. A social structure refers to the 1355 relations among groups of persons within a system of groups. Social structure is persistent over time. It is 1356 regular and continuous despite disturbances. While social structure does change, it changes over a long 1357 period and its change is characterized by evolution, not dramatic change. In a military organization, for 1358 example, the structure comprises the arrangement into groups like brigades, regiments, and battalions. In a 1359 society, the social structure includes groups, institutions, organizations, and networks. Social structure 1360 involves the following: 1361

Arrangement of the parts that constitute society. 1362 Organization of social positions. 1363 Distribution of people within those positions. 1364

3-2. Staffs should identify and analyze the culture of the society as a whole and of each major group 1365 within the society. Social structure comprises the relationships among groups, institutions, and individuals 1366 within a society. In contrast, culture—ideas, norms, rituals, codes of behavior—provides meaning to 1367 individuals within the society. For example, families are a core institutional building block of social 1368 structure everywhere. However, marital monogamy, expectations of a certain number of children, and 1369 willingness to live with in-laws are highly variable in different societies. They are matters of culture. 1370 Social structure resembles a skeleton with culture being the muscle on the bones. The two are mutually 1371 dependent and reinforcing. A change in one results in a change in the other. 1372

CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURE 1373

3-3. Culture is web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society. (See 1374 FM 3-05.301/MCRP 3-40.6A for more information.) Culture is— 1375

A system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society 1376 use to cope with their world and with one another. 1377

Learned through a process called enculturation. 1378 Shared by members of a society; there is no culture of one. 1379 Patterned, meaning that people in a society live and think in ways forming definite, repeating 1380

patterns. 1381 Changeable, through social interactions between people and groups. 1382 Variable, meaning that Soldiers and Marines should make no assumptions regarding what a 1383

society considers right and wrong or good and bad. 1384 Internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as natural by people 1385

within the society. 1386

3-4. Culture can be described as an operational code that is valid for an entire group of people. Culture 1387 conditions the individual’s range of action and ideas, to include what to do and not do, how to do or not do 1388 it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture includes under what circumstances the rules shift and 1389 change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is 1390 important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into categories. Cultural 1391 rules are flexible in practice. For example, the kinship system of a certain Amazonian Indian tribe requires 1392 that individuals marry a cousin. However, the definition of cousin is often changed to make people eligible 1393 for marriage. 1394

3-5. Each individual belongs to multiple groups, through birth, assimilation, or achievement. Each group 1395 to which individuals belong influences their beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions. Individuals 1396

Chapter 3


consciously or unconsciously rank their identities into primary and secondary identities. Primary identities 1397 are frequently national, racial, and religious. In contrast, secondary identities may include such things as 1398 hunter, blogger, or coffee drinker. Frequently, individuals’ identities are in conflict;; counterinsurgents can 1399 use these conflicts to influence key leaders’ decisions. 1400

3-6. Structure and culture relies on relationships to create a group norming affect on an individual, called 1401 enculturation. Relationships, whether based on a number of groups based on family, economic (such as 1402 class), tribal, ethnic, racial, religious, or other ties, affect how an individual views the world. Both social 1403 structure and culture help shape identity each person’s identity and in turn helps shape legitimacy. 1404

3-7. The norming effect of groups also provides social norms for individuals. The standard of conduct for 1405 social roles is known as a social norm. A social norm is what people are expected to do or should do, rather 1406 than what people actually do. Norms may be either moral (theft, homicide prohibitions) or customary 1407 (prayer before a meal, removing shoes before entering a house). Violation of a role prescribed by a given 1408 status, such as failing to feed one’s children, results in social disapproval. When a person’s behavior does 1409 not conform to social norms, the society may sanction a person. Understanding the roles, statuses, and 1410 social norms of groups within an area of operations can clarify expected behavior and provide guidelines 1411 on how to act. Some norms that may impact military operations include the following: 1412

The requirement for revenge if honor is lost. 1413 Appropriate treatment of women and children. 1414 Common courtesies, such as gift giving. 1415 Local business practices, such as bribes and haggling. 1416

3-8. An individual can be a member of more than one group, and groups within an area, even groups with 1417 some of the same members, can be in conflict. Friction points between different groups, based on religious, 1418 racial, gender, or some other form of cultural identity, in a society are important to understand. 1419 Commanders and staffs can understand conflict and cultural change by understanding internal friction 1420 points within a society. Different values are often friction points. 1421

3-9. The size of a nation, its diverse sub-cultures, different educational levels, and geographic 1422 backgrounds contribute to a great range of cultural variances among individuals and groups. Members of 1423 the population view cultural influences differently depending on their geographic location or identifying 1424 group. Analyzed and understood together, cultural influence provide a snapshot of a culture. Developing 1425 relevant questions about cultural influences enables commanders and staffs to achieve greater situational 1426 awareness and understanding. 1427

3-10. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to 1428 an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence. Values include beliefs concerning such 1429 topics as toleration, stability, prosperity, social change, and self-determination. Each group to which a 1430 person belongs inculcates that person with its values and their ranking of importance. Individuals do not 1431 absorb all the values of the groups to which they belong. They accept some and reject others. Most 1432 individuals belong to more than one social group. The values of each group are often in conflict: religious 1433 values may conflict with generational values or gender values with organizational practices. 1434

3-11. Religion can play a role in changing the value of a culture, and it can create friction points within a 1435 culture. When groups are under stress, a message of change based on a new understanding of the world can 1436 change a culture as the concepts gain cultural acceptance. These new concepts often create friction with 1437 groups in a society that resists the change. This can lead to conflict, uncertainty, and complexity in the 1438 operational environment. When societies encounter new ideas, religions being one of them, the end state of 1439 that interaction is often unpredictable. For example, Hong Xiuquan led the Taiping rebellion in China. He 1440 had contact with an American Southern Baptist missionary and then had visions in which he was the 1441 younger brother of Jesus Christ and sent to reform China from Confucianism. In 1850, he started a revolt 1442 that lead to the death of over 20 million Chinese in one of the deadliest conflicts in history. 1443

3-12. Cultural forms are the concrete expression of the belief systems shared by members of a particular 1444 culture. Cultural forms include rituals, symbols, ceremonies, myths, and narratives. Cultural forms are the 1445 medium for communicating ideologies, values, and norms that influence thought and behavior. Each 1446 culture constructs or invents its own cultural forms through which cultural meanings are transmitted and 1447

Understanding Culture


reproduced. One can decode a culture’s belief systems by observing and analyzing its cultural forms. 1448 Insurgent groups frequently use local cultural forms to mobilize the population. 1449

3-13. One of the most important cultural forms to understand is the narrative. A cultural narrative is a story 1450 recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that explains an event in a group’s history and 1451 expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group. People express and absorb ideologies though 1452 narratives. For example, at the Boston Tea Party in 1773, Samuel Adams and the Sons of Liberty dumped 1453 five tons of tea into the Boston Harbor to protest what they considered unfair British taxation. This 1454 narrative explains in part why the Revolutionary War began. However, it tells Americans something about 1455 themselves each time they hear the story that fairness, independence, and justice are worth fighting for. As 1456 this example indicates, narratives may not conform to historical facts or they may drastically simplify facts 1457 to express clearly basic cultural values. For example, the British taxed Americans in 1773 less than their 1458 British counterparts and most British attempts to raise revenues from the colonies were designed to help 1459 reduce the crushing national debt incurred in their defense. By listening to narratives, one can identify a 1460 society’s core values. Commanders should pay particular attention to cultural narratives of the host-nation 1461 population pertaining to outlaws, revolutionary heroes, and historical resistance figures. Insurgents may use 1462 these narratives to mobilize the population. 1463

3-14. Other cultural forms include ritual and symbols. Rituals can be either sacred or secular. Vast amounts 1464 of information are found in symbols, and a knowledgeable observer can decode the information. Symbols 1465 can be objects, activities, words, relationships, events, or gestures. Institutions and organizations often use 1466 cultural symbols to amass political power or generate resistance against external groups. Commanders 1467 should pay careful attention to the meaning of common symbols and how various groups use them. 1468

INTERESTS VERSUS BELIEFS 1469

3-15. Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted and perceived as true. Beliefs can be core, intermediate, or 1470 peripheral. Core beliefs are those views that are part of a person’s deep identity. They are not easily 1471 changed. Examples include belief in the existence of God, the value of democratic government, the 1472 importance of individual and collective honor, and the role of the family. Core beliefs are unstated, taken 1473 for granted, resistant to change, and not consciously considered. Attempts to change the core beliefs of a 1474 culture may result in significant unintended second- and third- order consequences. 1475

3-16. Intermediate beliefs are predicated are assumptions and expectations about the world and a person’s 1476 identity. They have a direct relationship with one’s core beliefs. These perform a set of rules that a person 1477 follows. Intermediate beliefs can change overtime and that change is sometimes influenced by leadership 1478 within a society or group. 1479

3-17. From intermediate beliefs flow peripheral beliefs. These beliefs are open to debate, consciously 1480 considered, and easiest to change. Peripheral beliefs within a society that are often debated. However, the 1481 intermediate beliefs or core beliefs are rarely challenged in that debate. For example, a society may debate 1482 the punishment for a murder and that debate can range from the death penalty to prison time with the hope 1483 of rehabilitation and return to society. However, the core belief, that society has an obligation to seek 1484 justice and protect its members from murders, is not often challenged in that debate. 1485

3-18. The totality of the identities, beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions that an individual holds—and 1486 the ranking of their importance—is that person’s belief system. Religions, ideologies, and all types of 1487 “isms” fall into this category. As a belief system, a religion may include such things as a concept of God, a 1488 view of the afterlife, ideas about the sacred and the profane, funeral practices, rules of conduct, and modes 1489 of worship. 1490

3-19. A belief system acts as a filter for new information. It is the lens through which people perceive the 1491 world. What members of a particular group believe to be rational, normal, or true may appear to outsiders 1492 to be strange, irrational, or illogical. Understanding the belief systems of various groups in an area of 1493 operations allows counterinsurgents to more effectively influence the population. 1494

3-20. Commanders analyze the belief systems of the population, insurgents, and other groups in the area of 1495 operations carefully. A society’s belief system is fundamental to how an insurgency uses a core grievance 1496 to mobilize a population. Moreover, an insurgent group’s belief system influences their actions and their 1497

Chapter 3


relationship with society. Differences between the insurgents’ and population’s belief systems provide 1498 opportunities for counterinsurgents to separate the insurgents from the population. 1499

3-21. The interests of a group flow from their belief system. Interests refer to what a group or society 1500 wishes to attain or protect. The perception of these interests changes with time and events. For example, 1501 after the September 11th attacks, the U.S. wished to attain a greater degree of security and saw terrorist 1502 groups as greater threats. This event changed how the U.S. saw its interest in security. 1503

3-22. Interests can include physical security, basic necessities, economic well-being, political participation, 1504 and social identity. During times of instability, when the government cannot function, the groups and 1505 organizations that people belong to meet some or all of their interests. Understanding a group’s interests 1506 allows commanders to identify opportunities to meet or frustrate those interests. A group’s interests may be 1507 used as a core grievance by an insurgent, if that group thinks that the insurgent group is more likely to meet 1508 their grievance versus the host government. 1509

3-23. Beliefs and interests affect attitudes which are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and 1510 objects. Attitudes affect perception, which is the process by which an individual selects, evaluates, and 1511 organizes information from the external environment. Commanders should consider groups’ attitudes 1512 regarding the following: 1513

Other groups. 1514 Outsiders. 1515 Host-nation government. 1516 The U.S. 1517 The U.S. military. 1518 Globalization. 1519

CULTURAL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING 1520

3-24. To understand culture, a basic understanding of various cultural influences is often important. 1521 Cultural influences are categories of information used study culture. Cultural influences include, but are not 1522 limited to, those items listed in table 3-1. 1523

Table 3-1. Cultural influences 1524

Cultural influences History Philosophy Science and technology Political science Literature Geography Sociology Psychology Law, crime, and punishment Cultural anthropology Education Art, music, and entertainment Language Religion Military arts and science Economics Communication Food and drink

3-25. History is the study of the past. Understanding what occurred in the past and what the population 1525 views as significant, controversial, inspirational, and regretful provides insight on the population’s culture. 1526 What actually occurred in an event or a period is less important than how those events are perceived by the 1527 population. When a historian or a individual studies history, that individual studies the remaining evidence 1528 of past events. It is up to an individual to make sense of that evidence. The evidence of any historical event 1529 is filtered through the historian’s own set of bias and that influences how that person perceives an historical 1530 event. 1531

3-26. Political science is primarily concerned with interaction between different international states and the 1532 politics of a certain state or type of state. Political science uses the scientific method to provide insights into 1533 these different relationships. It is based on the development of a theory, creating a hypothesis based on that 1534 theory, and then testing that hypothesis using either quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both 1535 methods. 1536



3-27. Sociology is the scientific study of human society. It uses many of the same methods as political 1537 science. The primary difference between political science and sociology is that sociology is not as tied to 1538 political structure. Sociology studies the effect of various systems, such as the family, community, and 1539 laws, on an individual or group. 1540

3-28. Cultural anthropology studies cultural variation among humans. The methods of anthropology 1541 include participant observations, interviews, and surveys. The adaptation of culture to a particular 1542 environment and the evolution of that culture is essential in the study of cultural anthropology. 1543

3-29. Language is verbal communication. Language proficiency is essential in a counterinsurgency. This 1544 can range from simply learning and using some common phrases of greeting to a full understanding of a 1545 language. In many cultures, the use of language helps to demonstrate respect and commitment to work with 1546 members of the host nation. The use of basic greetings, in the local language, can be the fastest and 1547 effective ways of gaining rapport and setting a good impression. 1548

3-30. Economics studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. An 1549 awareness of the how the local economy works can help U.S. forces support local merchants, laborers, and 1550 managers within their own system. It also provides an understanding of the connection between the local 1551 economy and the national economy. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of economics and chapter 10 for a 1552 discussion of integrated monetary shaping operations.) 1553

3-31. Philosophy uses reason and logic to study fundamental problems. Many cultures have a wide range 1554 of philosophies. Many cultures believe in fatalism and have different criteria to describe a code of honor 1555 that can all provide insights to their value and interests. Other cultures may have more of an individualist 1556 philosophy. 1557

3-32. Literature consists of written works. In many cultures, there are important pieces of literature that are 1558 known and read widely. Literature helps to shape a culture. Authors often try to capture part or all of a 1559 culture in a written work or use allegories to describe part or the whole of a nation’s identity. 1560

3-33. Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior. An individual’s mental state is effected by that 1561 individual’s environment. Using psychology can help Soldiers and Marines understand the state of mind of 1562 the local populace. 1563

3-34. Education is the transfer of knowledge to a person. Understanding the education levels and literacy 1564 rates of the host nation can assist in all aspects of working with host-nation forces, provide an appropriate 1565 medium for delivering information operations products to the population, and determine who the people 1566 consider responsible for providing curriculum and education services. 1567

3-35. Religion is the belief and worship of a supernatural power. Understanding what the religions are of 1568 an area and understanding their basic structure is fundamental to understanding a culture. This will help 1569 staffs and commanders understand the operational environment, including the roles of religious leaders, 1570 significant religious structures, and religious sites. Understanding a culture’s religion can provide insights 1571 on local family functions, local taboos, and the local moral code. 1572

3-36. Communications is the transmission of information from person to person. Commanders and staffs 1573 determine the best way for the locals to pass and receive information. This can help counterinsurgents 1574 understand how the enemy may conduct their propaganda and the best means for counterinsurgency 1575 elements to conduct information operations. 1576

3-37. Science and technology refers to the level of technological sophistication. Understanding the 1577 compatibility of the local community with the nation’s infrastructure and U.S. capabilities (for example, 1578 cell phones and the internet) is important to determine what projects and initiatives are sustainable. 1579

3-38. Geography is the study of the terrain, including the human terrain, of the earth. Geography provides 1580 knowledge of the terrain and its surrounding in the area of operations. This could include knowing where 1581 one community begins and another ends, where different migrants or displaced personnel congregate, and 1582 the natural and manmade landmarks that are significant to the population. 1583

3-39. The legal structure of a society deals with laws, crimes, and punishments. A basic understanding of 1584 local and accepted rules, laws, and justice within the communities and society is important. The legal 1585

Chapter 3


structure determines who in and outside the government plays roles in maintaining order. The legal 1586 structure governs the significant rules within a community, including etiquette, driving, and dispute 1587 resolution. 1588

3-40. Art, music, and entertainment are important elements of culture. Understanding the significance of 1589 host-nation crafts, music, dance, clothing, and symbols provides an awareness of key events and their 1590 significance. Commanders and staffs determine what holidays are important. They then determine events 1591 that can adversely affect operations or the timing of operations that can adversely affect the populace. 1592

3-41. Military arts and science deals with the use of military force and its relationship with a society. 1593 Understanding how the military is viewed by the host nation’s population is critical to assessing the 1594 military’s effectiveness and credibility. For example, commanders and staffs need to determine if 1595 host-nation military forces believe in their cause, or if they are in the military primarily for employment. 1596 Another example is determining where the loyalty of the military is. Determining whether the military’s 1597 loyalty is to a certain section of society, to the elected government, or to themselves is essential to 1598 determining the military’s relationship to society. 1599

3-42. Food and drink are often important to a culture. What and how a person eats is essential to the 1600 day-to-day life of the average individual. Determining what traditional meals and beverages are or 1601 determining the importance of sharing a meal is important for the counterinsurgency. Culture in religion, 1602 holidays, celebrations, and daily life are commonly tied to food and drink. 1603

METHODS FOR UNDERSTANDING CULTURE 1604

3-43. There are two important methods for trying to understand the cultural element of a 1605 counterinsurgency. One involves the organization of a staff in order to concentrate on cultural 1606 understanding. The other provides an outside capability to allow commander’s and staff to understand the 1607 culture. These outside capabilities are — 1608

Cultural analysis cell and cultural advisor. 1609 Human terrain teams. 1610

CULTURAL ANALYSIS CELL AND CULTURAL ADVISOR 1611

3-44. There are cultural implications for planning. Planning teams must develop an understanding of 1612 civilian aspects of the area of operations and the will of the population. There are many techniques to 1613 achieve this capability and each unit may approach this differently based on resources and available 1614 qualified personnel. Two techniques of note are the cultural analysis cell and cultural advisor. 1615

3-45. A cultural analysis cell is an ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of 1616 education and experience capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the 1617 host-nation government and other stakeholders within an operational environment (MCWP 5-1). Ideally, a 1618 cultural analysis cell is composed of individuals with cultural expertise across all warfighting functions. If a 1619 whole-of-government approach is used, experts from other government agencies such as the Department of 1620 State should be included in the cell. The cultural analysis cell cooperates closely with the other members of 1621 the planning staff, so that cultural factors are considered throughout the range of military operations. The 1622 cultural analysis cell is also expected to interface and coordinate with joint and interagency groups, 1623 drawing upon the Department of State, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign resources, such as 1624 provincial reconstruction teams. 1625

3-46. The commander forms the cultural analysis cell during receipt of mission and problem framing 1626 planning steps to add to the commander’s and the operational planning team’s cultural understanding of an 1627 operational environment. In order to support the operational planning team, the cultural analysis cell 1628 understands the operational planning team’s mission and tasks and is able to translate cultural information 1629 in a manner that is relevant to the mission. 1630

3-47. The cultural advisor is a concept developed and employed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 1631 Afghanistan. Cultural advisors are the principal subject matter experts on culture and planning related to 1632 their designated geographical region of expertise, serving as the culture and language advisor to the 1633



commander. The cultural advisor is a special staff officer for the commander and a member of the planning 1634 staff. This person not only serves on the planning staff, but also deploys and serves as an ongoing advisor 1635 to senior leaders while in they are in theater, if needed. The advantage of having a cultural advisor on staff 1636 is that this advisor can often help explain to the commander what the advisor sees on the ground in the area 1637 of operations. As a result, the commander can adjust operations in response to a rapidly changing 1638 environment. 1639

3-48. Overall, there are many options to task-organize staffs to incorporate culture into planning. While a 1640 cultural analysis cell creates expertise in one part of the staff, those concerns are also important for other 1641 staff sections. It is important for commanders to create staffs that are well integrated across the warfighting 1642 functions. One danger of creating a cultural cell within the staff is that it will relegate cultural concerns to 1643 one staff element and inhibit cultural concerns being integrated into the planning process. It is a 1644 commander’s responsibility to ensure that the staff integrates all operational and planning concerns, 1645 including cultural concerns. 1646

3-49. Regardless of the particular planning configuration, commanders and planners seek out and use 1647 whatever cultural resources are available to the unit. Incorporating culture into planning occurs during the 1648 beginning of mission planning in order for commanders and staffs to understand an area of operations prior 1649 to developing any course of action. Success is recognized not by stand-alone briefs that describe the culture 1650 of an operational environment, but when all of the operational planning teams’ planning products reflect 1651 and have been informed by the cultural analysis that has been performed by these subject matter experts. 1652

HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM 1653

3-50. Human terrain teams provide tactical-level support to brigade and regimental commanders. They 1654 conduct field research of the local population to determine the “human terrain” in order to help the 1655 commander assess how actions will be perceived by the local populace. The human terrain team typically 1656 consists of a team leader, one or two social scientists, and one research manager. When manning demands 1657 permit, human terrain teams are deployed with at least one woman each to facilitate access to females 1658 within the local population. 1659

3-51. Human terrain teams represent a capability that traditionally falls outside of military expertise. 1660 These teams are an additional tool for the commander to gain situational understanding and are an 1661 important tool in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. (See FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A for 1662 more information on human terrain teams.) 1663

1664


PART TWO 1665

Insurgencies 1666

Part two provides doctrine to help understand an insurgency. Chapter 4 provides the 1667 prerequisites of a successful insurgency and an insurgencies fundamentals. Chapter 1668 5 then provides a description of an insurgency’s threat characteristics. While part one 1669 provides the context of an insurgency, part two provides a discussion of an 1670 insurgency within that context. 1671

Chapter 4 1672

Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals 1673

4-1. The three prerequisites of an insurgency, opportunity, motive, and means provide a framework for 1674 both planners and executers to plan for and prevent an insurgency. Planners and executers should use the 1675 prerequisites for planning and execution of operations in environments where insurgencies are likely, such 1676 as a post conflict environment. (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion of insurgency prerequisites.) 1677

4-2. The vast majority of insurgencies are not successful. Generally they start and then they are quickly 1678 defeated by government forces. However, several factors separate an insurgency that has the possibility of 1679 being successful from insurgencies that are quickly defeated. An developing adaptive and capable 1680 insurgency is a significant risk to any counterinsurgency operation. 1681

INSURGENCY PREREQUISITES 1682

4-3. In previous doctrine, the prerequisites of a insurgency were represented as a vulnerable population, 1683 leadership for direction, and lack of government control. The concept was that a population is vulnerable if 1684 the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. Moreover, there must be an 1685 insurgent leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a vulnerable population. The insurgency 1686 must act on real or perceived lack of governmental control, which can allow insurgents to operate with little 1687 or no interference from security forces or other agencies. This means that the government is not providing 1688 for the people. This may refer inadequate services or an overly harsh and repressive government. When all 1689 three exist in an area, an insurgency can operate with increased freedom of movement, gain the support of 1690 the people, and become entrenched over time. 1691

4-4. Insurgencies are also be viewed in the context of intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflict directly relates 1692 to insurgencies. With the exception of a coup d’état, which may or may not be an insurgency, other types of 1693 interstate conflicts are insurgencies that differ only in the amount of popular support or the amount of 1694 governmental capacity. The types of intrastate conflicts include rebellions (also referred to as 1695 insurrections), revolutions, civil wars, and coup d’états. This section gives the counterinsurgent a 1696 foundation for understanding an insurgency in its different forms. 1697

4-5. A rebellion (also known as an insurrection) may be fomented by a group that challenges state 1698 control, is usually manifested by acts of violence, and the state is unable or unwilling to address the group’s 1699 concerns. Another insurgency may use a rebellion if it can gain enough popular support to engage in large 1700 scale unrest or open conflict with the governing authority. Rebellions are forms of insurgency in which an 1701 organized group is leading the population, the causes of instability exist, and the movement enjoys some 1702

Chapter 4


passive support among the population. Under most bodies of international laws it is a crime to incite, assist, 1703 or engage in violent actions against a constituted government. The Geneva Convention states that “Every 1704 government had a right to put down rebellion within its borders and to punish the insurgents in accordance 1705 with its penal laws.” (See the final record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. II section 1706 B, page 121 for more information on insurrections.) 1707

4-6. A revolution is a popular insurgency with designs at overthrowing a government and totally 1708 replacing its form from one type to another. Revolutions generally evolve from a rebellion but differ in the 1709 fact that popular support comes in the form of a mobilized population, which differs from simply passive or 1710 active support. A mobilized population are a part of a revolution and are generally looking for fundamental 1711 lasting change in a society’s political, economic, or social order. Significant in this distinction is a 1712 requirement of the host-nation military, government, and civil authorities to prepare, plan, and conduct 1713 counterrevolution, and not simply counterinsurgency. The main difference is the need to reintegrate the 1714 mobilized population and not only reintegrate members of the insurgency. Although coup d’états can 1715 resemble a revolution in the fact that they can overthrow a government, this is generally done rapidly and 1716 secretly versus a protracted struggle of the masses during a revolution. 1717

4-7. Civil wars are condition-based conflicts beginning with an insurgency. Once the insurgency achieves 1718 certain characteristics of organization and resembles an alternate government, the conflict reaches the state 1719 of civil war. If the insurgency loses the ability to meet these criteria, the status or state of civil war is no 1720 longer present. The insurgent movement may attempt to gain outside recognition by calling the conflict a 1721 civil war as it tends to afford international recognition as a competing group and not an illegal movement. 1722 According to the Geneva Convention the criteria of a civil war is “that the insurgents must have an 1723 organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State; that the insurgent civil authority must exercise 1724 de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; that the armed forces must act under the 1725 direction of the organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; that the 1726 insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.” (See the final record 1727 of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. II section B, page 121 for more information on civil 1728 wars.) 1729

4-8. Recognized anti-government elements in a civil war may be classified as belligerents and not 1730 insurgencies. A belligerent, though generally a sovereign state, can be a non-sovereign state if it is 1731 recognized by the international community (of two or more states or organizations like the United Nations), 1732 organized, and providing services to the population within their controlled areas. In the case where 1733 anti-government forces meet the criteria of a state during a civil war, they achieve sufficient international 1734 recognition they may achieve belligerent status rather than that of an insurgency. Although status may 1735 change, counterinsurgency operations, by government forces, generally remain the same at the theater 1736 through lower tactical levels. The difference between a group being classified as an insurgency or a 1737 belligerent can affect the overall status of U.S. involvement as a belligerent has international recognition. 1738

4-9. A coup d’état seeks to overthrow the governing authority by a quick decisive action. A coup d’état 1739 may or may not be an insurgency. If the conditions of instability are present and the movement has popular 1740 support, then a coup may be the action of an insurgency. Without the conditions of instability sufficient to 1741 cause a popular resistance movement, a small group or single person can kill or remove a leader and 1742 assume control without an insurgent movement. Many coups are called revolutions due to the change in 1743 government. The main point is a coup, if successful, may be unknown as a revolution, but is still not 1744 protracted or organized like other insurgencies that use mass popular support in its strategy. 1745

4-10. An intrastate conflict is as war or conflict between a constituted government and its people or 1746 representative factions from the people. It is a war within a state versus a war between two or more nation 1747 states. Intrastate conflicts present different challenges than interstate wars, since they involve the 1748 population and, therefore, human rights violations and sectarian violence are more likely. Secondly, 1749 intrastate conflicts can spread to adjacent countries that have governments or aspects of the population that 1750 share beliefs or goals with one side or the other. When looking at global conflicts since the post soviet era, 1751 the overwhelming preponderance of conflicts have been intrastate conflicts. 1752

4-11. The nature of an intrastate conflict is a grievance between segments of a state’s population with its 1753 constituted government. There can be a single root cause or a variety of causes perceived as so severe that 1754 they impact the population’s social contract with its government. There are many likely contributors to 1755

Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals


intrastate conflicts, including perceived weak, illegitimate, corrupt, or overly oppressive governments, 1756 ethnic or racial tensions, religions conflicts, economic stresses, or a need for land reform. Often an 1757 intrastate conflict causes the formation and growth of insurgencies and other intrastate conflicts. 1758 Understanding the nature of intrastate conflicts is important because they are often poorly defined. A 1759 misdiagnosis, by a commander, of an intrastate conflict can be disastrous in properly identifying and 1760 addressing the root cause of instability and nature of the threat. 1761

4-12. Also, commanders and staffs should not see an insurgency as simply an intrastate conflict. Insurgent 1762 movements may operate in multiple countries, as their desired end state may be regional, transnational, or 1763 global. As such, understanding an insurgency in the context of an intrastate conflict is important. 1764

OPPORTUNITY 1765

4-13. Opportunity refers to the emergence of significant gaps in the ability of the state or its local allies to 1766 control its territory and population. States must have the capacity to detect the early stages of insurgent 1767 organization and mobilization – a challenge that typically requires the cooperation of a significant portion 1768 of the population or the establishment of an extensive program of domestic surveillance and intelligence 1769 activities. The state must also be capable of suppressing the insurgency in a way that deters other potential 1770 rebels while avoiding feeding the insurgent narrative and provoking wider resistance. 1771

4-14. For a land force, opportunity provides a means to evaluate the likelihood of an insurgency. For 1772 example, after victory during a major combat operation, if the former government prevented insurgencies 1773 by a domestic surveillance and intelligence program, the commander and staff need to consider how likely 1774 and for how long can an occupying force prevent an insurgency without gaining the active support of the 1775 population or re-establishing domestic surveillance programs. Moreover, the commander and staff need to 1776 consider that if the enemy has the active support of the population, will population groups within areas that 1777 you control start insurgencies. Understanding the opportunity of an insurgency in an area is essential for 1778 land forces. 1779

4-15. At the tactical and operational level, this provides a means for commanders and staffs to analyze the 1780 local conditions and the likelihood of a successful insurgency developing. Commanders and staffs should 1781 actively make assessments on both the support of the population or the domestic surveillance and 1782 intelligence ability of a local area. If the population is not supportive of the host nation and the host nation 1783 has no means to prevent an insurgency in a hostile population, there is an opportunity for an insurgency in 1784 that area. (For a further discussion on why a gap in state control might happen, see JP 3-24.) 1785

4-16. A population that has grievances does not necessarily cause an insurgency. Grievances are a 1786 necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for an insurgency. Poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, 1787 inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are commonplace. These conditions 1788 exist in many places where an insurgency does not. It takes established or emerging leaders to build a 1789 compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support a 1790 violent social movement. The narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grievance will 1791 be addressed under an insurgent’s rule, and how the population and insurgency should work together to 1792 accomplish the goal. Ideology often provides a coherent set of ideas that provide a compelling framework 1793 for a narrative. Where opportunity and motive (grievances) intersect, individuals emerge to attempt to 1794 mobilize the population. When grievances mobilize a population, they are a root cause of an insurgency. 1795 (See JP 3-24 for a further discussion on motive.) 1796

ROOT CAUSES OF AN INSURGENCY 1797

4-17. The root causes of an insurgency are real or perceived grievances that insurgents use to mobilize a 1798 population in support of an insurgency. Insurgents use these grievances to fuel an insurgency. Root causes 1799 are not static and can change over the course of an insurgency. As conditions change, insurgent leaders will 1800 create different narratives to mobilize a population. The root causes that led to the insurgency in the first 1801 place may not be the same ones that are sustaining an ongoing insurgency. Commanders and staffs perform 1802 continued assessments and reassessments to determine what an insurgency is using as a root cause. 1803

4-18. Identity, based on cultural, religious, or other cultural grouping, can create a strong root cause. In 1804 cases were groups are persecuted and underrepresented, the insurgents can use a narrative that uses this 1805

Chapter 4


underrepresentation or persecution as root causes against the government. In some cases, groups are 1806 concentrated in certain regions where the government exercises biased controls over those groups. This 1807 might be an effective root cause to use for an insurgency based on a nullification of government control. 1808

4-19. Religion can also be an effective root cause. Religious-based movements create a perception that a 1809 certain type of religion should drive politics and groups should convert to that religion. Insurgents can use 1810 religion as part of an identity based root cause if the government persecutes a certain religious group. 1811 However, insurgents can also use religion to create an ideology that everyone should be a part of, and 1812 governed by, a certain religion. In this case, a religious-based root cause group could seek to overthrow its 1813 government and replace it with a religious based government. 1814

4-20. Insurgents can use a foreign military forces’ presence in another state as a root cause. The presence 1815 can come after a major combat operation that replaces a government. As such, any major combat operation 1816 includes planning for stability tasks to prevent an insurgency. However, this could also be a root cause if 1817 there are Soldiers or Marines stationed in a host nation. Insurgents can use the perception that outsiders 1818 exploit the host nation or that the host-nation government excessively caters to foreigners as a root cause. 1819

4-21. Pervasive and desperate poverty can often be a root cause of an insurgency. Starving young people 1820 without jobs or hope are ripe for insurgent recruitment. Where there is little expectation of better future, 1821 populations may align with any movement that provides them hope. Poor economic policies can hurt a 1822 population, thus adding more strength to the insurgency. In these conditions, an effective root cause of 1823 insurgencies is often a narrative that uses wealth inequality and connects that wealth inequality to 1824 government policies. 1825

4-22. A related root cause is land disputes concerning ownership, usage, and rights, especially to agrarian, 1826 mining, or other land based livelihoods or identities. Land disputes often manifest themselves as an issue of 1827 income inequality. For example, landowners may have tenant farmers that pay the landowner rent. 1828 Insurgent groups can often use a narrative that promises redistribution of land and land reform to the tenant 1829 farmers as an effective root cause. 1830

4-23. Corruption of the host-nation government can be a root cause. If institutional corruption is systemic, 1831 ongoing, and considered unfair, insurgents can use that as an effective narrative. For example, corruption in 1832 government development programs can cause resentment by the aggrieved group. Corruption can lead to 1833 loss of host-nation legitimacy and can undermine government control of an area. 1834

4-24. Insurgents can use a gap between a population’s expectations and the government’s capability to 1835 meet those expectations as a root cause. The larger the gap, the greater the population’s perceived or real 1836 sense of deprivation. This allows for the development of a narrative in which the insurgents promise to 1837 close the gap. 1838

MEANS 1839

4-25. It takes considerable resources to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent political authorities and 1840 the ways an insurgency goes about securing those means determines a great deal about its behavior. The 1841 leaders of a potential insurgency must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of 1842 secure communications and logistics. The other prerequisites relate to the means. For example, recruitment 1843 can leverage strong pre-existing social networks, which insurgents could use based on the development of a 1844 root cause. (See JP 3-24 for a detailed discussion on means.) 1845

4-26. Commanders and staffs consider the possible resources of an insurgency or possible insurgency. An 1846 insurgency will often depend on a local population for resourcing and recruitment. In these cases, 1847 insurgents base an insurgency on social networks, defined by villages, clans, tribes, ethnicities, or other 1848 groups. In these cases, the insurgency may have legitimacy. However, the use of these means also restricts 1849 an insurgency. It is constrained by the social norms of the society. Moreover, there is a certain amount of 1850 difficulty expanding the insurgency beyond its core group. 1851

4-27. A local area with an ethic population could connect, through communications, with its diaspora and 1852 attain resources from around the world. In such cases, commanders and staffs need to determine possible 1853 means to undermine this support. For example, the use of counter threat finance may prevent this funding. 1854 On the other hand, resourcing can be local. Insurgencies can have access to black markets or other 1855



resources that they can use to buy weapons. In these cases, stopping these transactions may be an effective 1856 means of blocking insurgent resources. 1857

4-28. If an insurgency has state sponsorship, the insurgency has important advantages and disadvantages. 1858 State sponsorship could offer resources, sanctuary, and training. These are important advantages for any 1859 insurgency because they offer an insurgent group the ability to organize and become tactically and 1860 operationally more effective. On the other hand, state sponsorship can undermine the support of the local 1861 population. An insurgency that depends on outside state support can be perceived as artificial and may not 1862 have deep support from the local population. While recruits may join an insurgency because of increased 1863 resources, recruits that are attracted because of the possibility of wealth may be less effective. However, if 1864 an insurgency uses outside support to build a political base before starting military operations, insurgents 1865 mitigate these risks. For the counterinsurgent, understanding the nature of state support allows the 1866 commander and staff to undermine that support before an insurgency begins. 1867

4-29. A group that already has resourcing could potentially become an insurgency. Groups tied to black 1868 markets, such as those selling drugs, may seek to resist or nullify the government’s ability to stop their 1869 activities. While they may exploit the population and create a root cause, the protection of their resources is 1870 the essential reason for the development of their insurgency. The means for an insurgency can play an 1871 interrelated role with the motive and opportunity. 1872

INSURGENCY FUNDAMENTALS 1873

4-30. Few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification. However, insurgencies do have common 1874 characteristics that can provide a basis for building a more accurate picture of an insurgency and allow 1875 commanders to achieve an understanding of the situation. The fundamentals of insurgencies help 1876 commanders and staffs to analyze insurgent strategies, objectives, and tactics. Each fundamental is 1877 important independently, but analyzing the interactions and relationships between the fundamentals as a 1878 whole is the key to understanding an insurgency. Two major areas used to examine an insurgency are— 1879

Dynamics of insurgency. 1880 Insurgent strategies. 1881

DYNAMICS OF INSURGENCY 1882

4-31. In an operational environment, there may be multiple insurgent groups. These groups can be 1883 pursuing a wide variety of goals and interests. As such, these groups can be collaborating, fighting each 1884 other, or acting neutral towards each other. When commanders and staffs analyze an insurgency, they 1885 consider each group and provide a different analysis for each group based on the eight dynamics of 1886 insurgency. 1887

4-32. Eight dynamics or some combinations of these dynamics are common to most successful 1888 insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for planners to analyze insurgencies. Each of these 1889 dynamics can contribute to the strength of an insurgency, but each can also be a source of weakness or 1890 vulnerability for the insurgents. The eight dynamics are— 1891

Leadership. 1892 Ideology. 1893 Objectives. 1894 Environment and geography. 1895 External support. 1896 Internal support. 1897 Phasing and timing. 1898 Organizational and operational patterns. 1899

First Dynamic—Leadership 1900

4-33. A group committing random violence is not an insurgency. There is a political rational behind the 1901 violence in an insurgency. An insurgency requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, 1902

Chapter 4


coordination, and organizational coherence. Leadership is required to mobilize the population by using a 1903 root cause (see chapter 4). The key tasks of an insurgency’s leaders are to undermine the legitimacy of the 1904 host nation and to establish the legitimacy for their movement. Their ability to organize and their 1905 willingness to distribute power across the organization is vital to the long-term success of the movement. 1906 Organizations dependent upon key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation for the 1907 movement are vulnerable to disruptions if those leaders or co-opted or killed. 1908

4-34. Poor leadership can undermine an insurgency. Insurgent leaders that undermine their own legitimacy 1909 with the population, for example, will significantly hamper the success of their insurgency. An analysis of 1910 insurgent leadership provides information on how effective its leaders are in mobilizing the population and 1911 effectively using resources to undermine the host nation. 1912

Second Dynamic—Ideology 1913

4-35. The insurgents must have a problem that justifies their actions in relation to the population’s 1914 grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. Insurgents use a narrative to connect population 1915 grievances with what its actions and demands. This is the root cause of an insurgency. An essential part of 1916 the ability of an insurgency to mobilize a population is an insurgency’s ideology. An ideology is the 1917 integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program. Not all insurgencies are 1918 ideological, but an ideology provides an insurgency with a message of change that is normally coherent and 1919 logical, based upon the insurgency’s underlying assumptions. 1920

4-36. Ideology is an important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among the 1921 insurgency members and the general population. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and 1922 norms, ideology is used to influence the behavior of individuals within the group. It is an explanation of 1923 how the world works. Ideology can serve as the rallying call for all members of the population to join the 1924 struggle. There are several question to answer when analyzing insurgent ideology: 1925

What is the problem the insurgency will fix, and how will they fix it? 1926 Are there any ideological divisions within the insurgency or the population? 1927 Is the ideology supported by outside groups? 1928 What propaganda are the insurgents using to propagate their ideology? 1929

Third Dynamic—Objectives 1930

4-37. Insurgencies can have strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Tactical objectives most directly 1931 translate to actions. For example, a tactical goal of destroying a logistics convoy directly translates into an 1932 attack against a logistics convoy. However, these actions are normally done to achieve an operational 1933 objective. In the example of the attack on the convoy, the operational objective might be to prevent 1934 logistical support of host nation forces. When insurgents achieve various operational goals, they will 1935 achieve the strategic end state of their insurgency. 1936

4-38. A strategic objective is the movement’s overall political goal or desired end state. An insurgency will 1937 seek to— 1938

Force significant political, economic, or religious change. 1939 Overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power. 1940 Generate resistance to outside occupiers or change within a society. 1941 Nullify government control in an area. 1942 Secede a region from government control. 1943 Subvert the population away from the government. 1944

4-39. An insurgency’s strategic objectives will influence the type of insurgency that develops and its 1945 ideology will influence an insurgency’s end state. For example, an insurgency focused on resistance against 1946 outside occupiers or change in a society may unify many different groups based on that shared end state. 1947 The strategic end state of the insurgency may be as simple as resistance to occupation or a conservative 1948 insurgency that is resisting change in a society. Groups that seek to nullify government control may have an 1949 objective to protect criminal activities and black markets. These groups may be non-ideological, but they 1950 will still need to mobilize the population to nullify governmental control. On the other hand, groups that 1951



wish to force significant change in a society or overthrow an existing social order are likely to be 1952 ideologically driven. There is a connection between an insurgency’s strategic goal and an insurgency’s 1953 ideology. 1954

Fourth Dynamic—Environment and Geography 1955

4-40. The environment and geography affect insurgent actions. Insurgencies may form their base in urban 1956 environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. Insurgents located in rural areas can enjoy the 1957 relative safety of remote terrain or safe heavens, such as jungles or mountains. These geographical 1958 conditions make it possible for them to form larger units and conduct larger-scale operations. However, 1959 there are some disadvantages to a rural based insurgency. Communications and supply lines are longer and 1960 slower. Insurgents can be isolated from the population, and an insurgency can be destroyed with a decisive 1961 military operation. 1962

4-41. Urban insurgencies tend to operate within ethnic ghettos or enclaves of sympathetic supporters. 1963 However, operating in urban settings requires a high degree of compartmentalization, which makes it 1964 difficult for groups to train and organize for larger-scale operations. Urban insurgencies are often cellular. 1965 However, an urban setting does allow an insurgency to work within large population groups. The 1966 opportunity for mobilization of the population is therefore higher than in a rural insurgency. 1967

4-42. Other factors of the area of operations may affect an insurgency. Tribal, religious, and others factors 1968 have an interrelated relationship with insurgencies. Moreover, the physical environment also effects 1969 insurgent movement and planning. 1970

Fifth Dynamic—External Support 1971

4-43. Historically, insurgencies are less likely to succeed without some form of external support. The 1972 support can be in the form of— 1973

Moral support. 1974 Political support. 1975 Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, training, and foreign fighters. 1976 Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from 1977

extradition. 1978

4-44. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally share beneficial interests or a common 1979 ideology with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant 1980 support, even if a country’s government is not actively supporting an insurgency. For example, a global 1981 diaspora could provide significant resources for an insurgency, even if no government is providing active 1982 support. 1983

4-45. However, with external support comes a degree of dependency on that support. The support is a 1984 possible means to influence or change the actions of the insurgency. External support provides one means 1985 to affect an insurgency indirectly. 1986

4-46. External support can help to shape an insurgency and the outcome of an insurgency. In the case of 1987 the insurgency in Sri Lanka, external support was essential to the success of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 1988 Eelam. A large diaspora provided the Liberation Tigers of Tamil sanctuary and resources. This allowed 1989 them to gain dominance over other insurgent groups and to wage a long and bloody insurgency against the 1990 government of Sri Lanka. 1991

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External Support for the Tamil Tigers 1992 Even Years of discrimination by the Sinhala majority against the Tamil minority 1993 reached a breaking point in Sri Lanka during the Black July riots of 1983. Soon after, 1994 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the most capable Tamil 1995 insurgent group, prepared to wage a campaign of violence and terror against the Sri 1996 Lankan state and non-Tamil civilians. The operational environment was complex, 1997 with insurgents fighting insurgents while also fighting the government, as occurred 1998 with Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq. At various stages of the conflict, the LTTE fought 1999 against the Sri Lankan state but also against other anti-government insurgent groups. 2000 The most prominent of these groups was the Janatha Vimukthi Permuna, (JVP), a 2001 Marxist-Leninist group that blended violence and right-wing politics before laying 2002 down its arms in the mid to late 1990s. 2003 This case illustrates the importance of non-state actors in an operational 2004 environment. While the LTTE was indeed a non-state actor in its own right, the group 2005 relied on its global diaspora for a range of support activities. Following the ethnic 2006 riots of 1983, thousands of Tamil refugees fled overseas to India, Australia, Canada, 2007 and the United Kingdom. This sowed the seeds for the Tamil diaspora and the 2008 transnational nature of the LTTE’s insurgency. The global diaspora was a major part 2009 of the organization’s fundraising and propaganda network. Furthermore, the 2010 transnational diaspora network provided funding and weaponry to sustain the Tigers 2011 for most of the group’s existence. 2012 In addition to enjoying the largesse of a well-organized and entrepreneurial diaspora, 2013 the insurgents relied on co-ethnics in India for sanctuary, which was essential in the 2014 group’s early years. Since the Tamils effectively controlled the Jaffna peninsula in 2015 the northeast of the country, the LTTE had a home base from which it could train, 2016 plan, and execute attacks against the military. Furthermore, across the Palk Straits 2017 in Tamil Nadu, India, the LTTE was able to rely on the support—both active and 2018 passive—of thousands of ethnic Tamils who sympathized with the group. 2019 The LTTE took advantage of the benefits of globalization, developing a truly global 2020 network of contacts abroad, and soon engaged in weapons procurement activities 2021 throughout East and Southeast Asia, in AFPAK, Ukraine, the Balkans, Lebanon, and 2022 other well-known arms markets. At various points throughout the insurgency, the 2023 Tigers collaborated with other terrorists groups as diverse as the Revolutionary 2024 Armed Forces Colombia (FARC), the African National Congress (ANC) in South 2025 Africa, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in 2026 Afghanistan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), and the Popular Front for the Liberation 2027 of Palestine (PFLP). In 1996, the insurgents acquired U.S. Stinger-class missiles 2028 from the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and used these weapons two years later to 2029 shoot down a Sri Lankan civilian Lionair jet. 2030 Over time, the LTTE distinguished itself as perhaps the most lethal insurgent force in 2031 modern history. By the mid-late 1990s, the group boasted a navy, an air force, and 2032 an elite suicide commando unit used to assassinate several heads of state and 2033 numerous COIN force commanders. As a pioneer of suicide techniques, the Tamil 2034 Tigers devoted significant resources to two operational wings that functioned as 2035 suicide strike teams, the Black Tigers and the Sea Tigers. A “no-holds barred” 2036 approach to the conflict led the COIN force and the insurgents to routinely and 2037 systematically slaughter each other, while also destroying Sri Lanka’s infrastructure 2038 and displacing much of its civilian population. 2039

Sixth Dynamic—Internal Support 2040

4-47. Internal support is any support provided from within the borders of the state in which the insurgency 2041 is active. Any sort of insurgency must have some sort of internal support, even if limited. The level and 2042 type of support varies by insurgency and area. It is important to understand the specific nature of the 2043



support to address and counter the relationship between the population and insurgents. Support may be 2044 either willing or based on coercion. 2045

4-48. A larger populated area or region where insurgents can operate represents many different 2046 communities that provide varying levels of support for different reasons. There are two basic types of 2047 internal support: active and passive. Passive support is critical for successful insurgent operations. It 2048 provides freedom of movement for members of the insurgency to conduct operations, reside, train, plan, 2049 and operate in an area without resistance from the local community. As Mao Tse-tung states, “The guerrilla 2050 must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Passive supporters do not report insurgents to 2051 local counterinsurgent forces out of sympathy for the cause, antigovernment sentiment, or reluctance to get 2052 involved due to peer pressure, threats of violence, or the benefits that the insurgency provides. 2053

4-49. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in insurgent operations, and 2054 find new recruits. Active supporters are usually central to the insurgency’s propaganda efforts. They may 2055 provide material, intelligence, or assistance as requested or demanded by insurgents. Active support, like 2056 passive support, may be volunteered or coerced. 2057

4-50. When trying to determine the type and amount of support the following factors may be important for 2058 analysis: 2059

Increased communications between the insurgents and an outside state. 2060 Reduction in local medical supplies or personnel absent from clinics and hospitals. 2061 Increased black market activities and extortion for resources. 2062 Increased theft or purchase of food and gas. 2063 New presence of bodyguards. 2064 New areas in which the local police are growing reluctant to patrol or conduct operations. 2065 New or increased interaction with local civilian leaders by insurgents 2066 Rumors confirming the presence of insurgents in areas where people gather and communicate. 2067 Increased assassinations of those opposing insurgents or for symbolic value to frighten locals. 2068 A drop in the number of walk-ins and tips due to fear of retribution. 2069 A rise in the reluctance of locals civilians to be seen talking with counterinsurgent forces. 2070 An increase in the absence of local reconstruction crews, police, and military or a decrease in 2071

their willingness to be associated with counterinsurgent forces or to leave their families. 2072 Suspension of local government or community meeting and events. 2073

4-51. There is a relationship between internal and external support. Insurgents must have significant 2074 strength in at least one of these dynamics (internal or external support) or they will not be able to meet their 2075 tangible support needs, making them much less viable. Both of these dynamics must be controlled and 2076 reduced in order for the counterinsurgent to prevail; just eliminating internal support is not enough to defeat 2077 an insurgency with robust external support (and vice versa). 2078

Seventh Dynamic—Phasing and Timing 2079

4-52. Successful insurgencies often progress through three phases in their efforts. Not all insurgencies 2080 progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three phases is not a requirement for 2081 success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. In addition, insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase 2082 and resume development when favorable conditions return. 2083

4-53. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities of 2084 earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves from 2085 one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of the 2086 country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize; they are dynamic and 2087 adaptive. 2088

4-54. The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of 2089 insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and 2090 political actions, such as organizing protests. An eventual insurgent group may be simply a legitimate 2091

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political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups 2092 into insurgencies. 2093

4-55. The second phase is guerrilla warfare. In this phase, successful insurgents could use small unit tactics 2094 to attack security forces while continuing ongoing political efforts. The goal is to undermine the 2095 government’s legitimacy and replace the government’s legitimacy with the population seeing them as 2096 legitimate. In this stage, insurgencies may begin performing limited governmental functions for the 2097 population in areas they control. 2098

4-56. The third phase is war of movement. During this phase, an insurgency can be trying to overthrow a 2099 government or trying to force the withdrawal of an occupying power. For success, an insurgency does not 2100 necessarily need to transform into a conventional military, but it must position itself to defeat the 2101 government or occupying power. Moreover, this phase may not needed. In some cases, all an insurgency 2102 must do is create a continual problem that cannot be solved and thus wear down the patience of the 2103 counterinsurgents. This is especially true when the counterinsurgents are an outside power. However, this 2104 phase is characterized by increased military capability, popular support, logistics capacity, and territorial 2105 control. 2106

4-57. Many successful insurgencies go through a process similar to the three phases. This is not a uniform 2107 rule. Some insurgencies, for example, form rapidly and displace a government quickly. Figure 4-1 on page 2108 4-11 provides a model for understanding the possible evolution of insurgencies. A model provides a 2109 simplification of reality in order to understand something. A model of conflict simplifies that type of 2110 conflict so that one can take actions. A model is not a uniform rule. A phase-like evolution of an insurgency 2111 tends to create a strong political and military organization with deep roots in a society. Such organizations 2112 are difficult to undermine. However, historically the most likely outcome of an insurgency is its rapid 2113 defeat. These insurgencies demonstrate little phasing beyond the beginning of violence followed by the 2114 quick defeat of the insurgency. 2115

2116

2117



Figure 4-1. Conflict model 2118

4-58. Figure 4-2 is an attempt to show how an insurgency adapts and changes in response to actions by 2119 host-nation security forces. It depicts an insurgency in different phases in different areas and possible 2120 reactions to counterinsurgency actions. In figure 4-1, insurgents openly control the city marked in area 1, an 2121 indication that that portion of the insurgency is in Phase III (a war of movement). Counterinsurgency forces 2122 started actions in the market to remove the insurgency. During clearing operations, many insurgents were 2123 defeated or left while others, especially auxiliary and underground elements, remained. This occurred 2124 because of the counterinsurgency clearing operations. 2125

4-59. Insurgents in area 1 then reverted to Phase I. The underground elements were specifically tasked, 2126 trained, and equipped to operate within government-occupied areas; this is especially prevalent if the 2127 insurgents are using an advanced strategy. Auxiliary elements, which can operate among the population, 2128 may be present. In the clear-hold-build operational approach, clearing operations are designed to eliminate 2129 the guerrilla elements, not the entire insurgency. Hold and build phases, following the clear phase, are used 2130 to destroy the remaining insurgent infrastructure. (See chapter 9 for more information on the shape-clear-2131 hold-build-transition.) 2132

4-60. Insurgents in areas 2 and 5 could increase activity to draw friendly resources to those areas. 2133

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4-61. Areas 3, 4, and 7 show reduced activity. Although this may appear to be good news for 2134 counterinsurgents, it may actually indicate the arrival of insurgents, their leaders, foreign advisors, sensitive 2135 information, and equipment. They may move without weapons and use fleeing civilians to mask 2136 movements. The drop in attacks can indicate that insurgents are conducting consolidations and 2137 reorganization, movement, tending to their wounded, occupying safe houses, preparing for a counterattack, 2138 or performing logistic, administrative, and intelligence operations. Counterinsurgents must consider all 2139 three phases of an insurgency to evaluate if insurgents have migrated to new areas, even if there is not an 2140 increase in violence. 2141

Figure 4-2. Insurgency in different phases 2142

4-62. Commanders and staffs use this data and the broader view to observe, collect, analyze, and 2143 disseminate intelligence to units across the region to identify potential insurgent routes, and proactively 2144 address media in anticipation of negative insurgent propaganda. At the same time, commanders and staffs 2145 must promote counterinsurgent actions that provide safety and care to civilians who have left the area. 2146

4-63. An ability to react to the actions of a counterinsurgency is an indication of that insurgency’s 2147 capability and the degree of control the leaders has over the organization. Insurgents can migrate to a 2148 variety of locations to consolidate and reorganize. A lack of guerrilla activity does not mean there are no 2149 insurgents. Rather, insurgent leaders and other elements may be temporarily underground, intending to 2150 reappear when conditions are more favorable. 2151

Eighth Dynamic—Organizational and Operational Patterns 2152

4-64. Each insurgency’s organization is unique. The specific type and level of organization, however, is an 2153 indicator of the insurgents’ strategy and capabilities. Understanding an insurgency’s organizational and 2154



operational patterns helps counterinsurgents predict the enemy’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, 2155 understand their capabilities, and forecast their potential targets. 2156

4-65. Insurgents can be organized into networks and require certain elements, characteristics, bonds, and 2157 conditions to survive and operate. A network is a series of direct and indirect ties from one entity to a 2158 collection of others. There may be a central point of communication or influence (critical node) that 2159 provides a critical vulnerability for targeting against the network. Insurgent networking extends the range 2160 and variety of both insurgent military and political actions. Networks of communications, people, and 2161 activities exist in all populations and have a measureable impact on the organized governance of a 2162 population and, consequently, military operations. Many insurgent networks are actually complex adaptive 2163 systems, making them difficult to destroy. They tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. They may be a 2164 combination of insurgent, criminal, regular, or irregular forces, and foreign government sanctioned forces. 2165 These networks live within the population that enhances their capabilities to sow disorder, survive, and 2166 protract the struggle, presenting particularly difficult problems for counterinsurgency forces. 2167

Organizational Elements 2168

4-66. The basic organizational elements of an insurgency are the movement’s leadership, guerrillas, 2169 auxiliary forces, and underground. Each element has its specific leadership, proportion of personnel, and 2170 effectiveness. While there are almost certainly members of the insurgency that perform multiple functions, 2171 grouping an insurgency into these groups provides a model of understanding. However, commanders and 2172 staffs must avoid the trap of mirror imaging an insurgency against U.S. organizational structure. Many 2173 insurgencies have these four basic elements. Each element is broken down into smaller cells, included as a 2174 part of larger wings, and so forth. (See figure 4-3.) 2175

Figure 4-3. Organizational elements of an insurgency 2176

Leadership 2177

4-67. Insurgencies have a political rational or reason for their existence. As such, every insurgency has 2178 some type of political leadership. That leadership can be the same as military leadership. However, 2179 sometimes this is not the case and there is well-defined political leadership. When an insurgency has 2180 well-defined political leadership, that leadership is called the political cadre. The political cadre can 2181 participate in the political system or could be clandestine and illegal. In either case, it is useful to define the 2182 political cadre of an insurgency when there are insurgent leaders who are mainly involved in the political 2183 struggle and not the armed struggle. 2184

4-68. The political cadre are the force behind the ideology of the insurgency. They are actively engaged in 2185 the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. They may also work within a political party to work within the 2186 political system and provide some legitimacy for the insurgency to the population. The cadre is active in 2187

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spreading the ideology of the insurgency, if the insurgency has an ideology. Modern noncommunist 2188 insurgencies rarely, if ever, use the term cadre; however, these movements usually include a group that 2189 performs similar functions. Additionally, in a movement based on religious extremism, religious leaders 2190 can play a role similar to cadre. 2191

4-69. The leadership of an insurgency is composed of leaders from the political cadre, guerrillas, and 2192 auxiliaries. They may work closely together or operate in a more decentralized manner, depending on their 2193 need for security or other operational concerns. Insurgent leaders usually exercise leadership through force 2194 of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may 2195 hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority. These leaders may include supporting 2196 members, much like command and staff in a regular military. These supporting members may include 2197 advisors, logistics and administration personnel, spokespersons, and those leading operations. Insurgent 2198 leaders can attain positions within the government and work to undermine the government. 2199

Guerilla Units 2200

4-70. The origin of the word guerrilla comes from the Peninsula War of Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and 2201 Portugal in the early 1800s. Spanish partisans formed small rebel groups to conduct small wars. The 2202 Spanish word for war is guerra, adding –illa to the end of guerra means small war and thus guerrilla. These 2203 are the guerrillas, analogous to combat arms in a regular military. Each cell, for example, may consist of 10 2204 to 15 members, divided into two or three smaller sub cells of five to seven individuals, depending on the 2205 insurgents’ mission variables and strategy. Guerrillas are used for a wide range military purposes, but the 2206 underlying purpose is to achieve a political end. For example, attacks on host-nation forces may undermine 2207 host-nation legitimacy among the population and create safe heavens. 2208

4-71. Guerrilla cells can conduct small-unit tactics and can mass for larger initiatives. Bomb and 2209 demolition squads designed to build and plant explosives or conduct ambushes against convoys are 2210 examples of small unit tactics meant to engage the enemy but to not themselves become decidedly engaged. 2211 However, as an insurgency gains military power, guerilla units increase their ability to conduct large scale 2212 attacks. During the final insurgency stage, war of movement, guerilla movements can perform actions 2213 meant to destroy the host-nation military force. This can be a decisive action for an insurgency. If 2214 successful, a war of movement can overthrow the government or allow the insurgency to reach other 2215 political goals. However, if the insurgency begins a war of movement too soon, the insurgency can deplete 2216 its military power and undermine its political power. 2217

Auxiliary Forces 2218

4-72. Auxiliary forces are the support elements. Logistic functions can be performed by anyone involved 2219 in an insurgency, and there are probably members of the insurgency involved in both logistics and combat. 2220 However, creating this division allows the grouping of an essential function for a counterinsurgency. 2221

4-73. The auxiliary includes cells and external elements. Cells include logistics, intelligence, 2222 counterintelligence, propaganda, population control, and recruiting. These are elements that perform tasks 2223 directly connected to an insurgency. External elements are elements that provide support for an insurgency 2224 but are not directly part of the insurgency. External elements may include drug smugglers or external 2225 support from another state, for example. Examples of the support provided by cells and external elements 2226 include— 2227

Logistics. 2228 Training. 2229 Populace and resource control. 2230 Intelligence and counterintelligence. 2231 Recruitment and screening. 2232 Deception operations. 2233 Propaganda. 2234 Transportation. 2235 Medical support. 2236



Promotion or facilitation of security forces’ desertion. 2237 Inner and outer security zones and early warning. 2238 Manufacture and maintenance of equipment and weapons (for example, improvised explosive 2239

devices). 2240 Money laundering and financing. 2241

4-74. Auxiliary forces also include economic support systems to fund the insurgency’s military and 2242 political operations. Economic support systems include— 2243

Fund raising and terrorist finance networks. 2244 Pillaging, looting, extorting, and enslaving the population. 2245 Business operations that include both direct control, joint ventures and taxation of enterprises in 2246

these industries: 2247 Illicit trade in commodities and natural resources (such as oil, timber, and diamonds). 2248 Criminal trafficking in narcotics, humans, and arms. 2249 Sanctions busting. 2250 Legal business enterprises (such as oil, shipping, motor transport, and hotels). 2251 Banking and finance operations. 2252

Underground 2253

4-75. Underground cells conduct clandestine combatant and logics operations in areas controlled by 2254 government forces. Combat operations can include sabotage, assassinations, and small arms attacks. 2255 Logistical operations can include maintaining safe houses, controlling hostages, moving weapons, and 2256 providing communications. Underground cells include intelligence cells, logistic cells, and combatant cells. 2257

4-76. The underground includes those elements of the insurgency that conduct covert or clandestine 2258 activities, especially in counterinsurgent occupied areas. Movement leaders may also often exist within the 2259 underground if they are attempting to keep their affiliation or identity a secret. Insurgencies with effective 2260 undergrounds tend to be more compartmentalized, secretive, vetted, trained, and indoctrinated than 2261 insurgencies without them. The underground, for example, can carry out terrorist acts, if desired, with 2262 plausible deniability for the insurgency. The underground may remain in an area after counterinsurgency 2263 clearing operations to gather information, intimidate civilians, attack members of the security forces or 2264 government, emplace improvised explosive devices, or perform sniper operations. The underground can be 2265 a major part of an insurgency. Its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) provides counterinsurgent analysts with 2266 indicators of the skill, advancement, and strategy of the insurgency. An advanced insurgency with an 2267 effective underground is capable of operations and tactics that differ from those of a basic insurgency, with 2268 a less capable underground. The underground tends to be the most difficult element to recruit and train; 2269 therefore, its size tends to fluctuate with time and capability. 2270

4-77. Underground cells seek to be self-contained; they often have their own leadership, combatants, and 2271 auxiliary forces. The underground, however, can also utilize members of the auxiliary to provide materials, 2272 intelligence, counterintelligence, and early warning as well as to pass messages, propaganda, and 2273 disinformation. This use allows the underground to conduct operations in areas where the regular auxiliary 2274 is present, but the underground does not have a widespread presence. 2275

4-78. Some activities of the underground include— 2276 Conducting psychological warfare. 2277 Conducting sabotage, assassination, and subversion. 2278 Conducting intelligence and counterintelligence. 2279 Maintaining safe houses. 2280 Protecting shadow or alternate insurgent political wings. 2281 Eliminating rivals. 2282 Destroying practical or symbolic political, cultural, social, or economic structures and ensuring 2283

the blame is on another group or on the government. 2284 Controlling the population and resources. 2285

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Demoralizing locals and counterinsurgent forces. 2286 Counterfeiting documents, including identification and currency. 2287 Conducting extortion. 2288 Conducting coercion. 2289 Conducting intimidation. 2290

INSURGENT STRATEGIES 2291

4-79. Counterinsurgents have to determine not only their opponents’ motivation but also the strategy being 2292 used to advance the insurgency. Insurgencies can use more than one strategy, depending on the level or 2293 echelon of the insurgency. Aspects of these strategies and their recognizable characteristics are important. 2294 This information is essential for developing effective programs that attack the root causes of an insurgency. 2295 The dynamics of insurgency are used as a methodology to assess an insurgent strategy. Commanders and 2296 staffs combine their understanding of the insurgent’s plan to accomplish goals with the insurgent’s 2297 capabilities to provide the counterinsurgent with the insurgent’s most probable and dangerous course of 2298 action. 2299

4-80. Understanding the insurgent strategy is vital to understanding the insurgent’s decisionmaking 2300 process, capabilities, future actions, current tactics, method of command and control, recruiting, 2301 propaganda, and use of the local population. The term strategy refers the insurgents’ devising or employing 2302 a plan or method to dictate actions toward a specific goal. Counterinsurgents assess the insurgent strategy 2303 and capabilities to develop assumptions about insurgents’ operational goals. Examining these goals and the 2304 insurgents’ attempts to achieve them through combat actions, propaganda, and subversion enable 2305 counterinsurgents to get in front of the enemy’s decisionmaking process. The insurgents’ strategic goals 2306 may be overt and publicly championed or covert. Insurgent operations may have immediate consequences 2307 or delayed effects aligned with long-term objectives. For example, car bombings among a local population 2308 may seem counterproductive because they incite immediate anger against the bombings and their 2309 perpetrators. However, a sustained campaign of massive violence can have two long-term results, it can— 2310

Weaken popular support for the government, who has failed to protect the people. 2311 Make the population susceptible to insurgent intimidation. 2312

Whatever the insurgent’s intent, approaching the problem from the perspectives of the population and the 2313 insurgents’ campaign plan can provide counterinsurgents the means to interdict the threat on a number of 2314 levels. 2315

4-81. Four insurgent strategies are the most common strategies that counterinsurgents are likely to face. 2316 Two of these strategies are considered basic and the other two are considered advanced. Basic strategies 2317 refer to the insurgents’ capabilities as a whole to achieve long-term political objectives in their current state 2318 or area. It may refer to the entire movement or just the movement in a given area. Basic strategies do not 2319 mean insurgents are not efficient in tactics or other skills, but overall they are not capable of longer-term 2320 political goals. In contrast, advanced strategies do have political wings that govern the militant side of the 2321 movement and are focused on longer-term political goals. This distinction is only important in the analysis 2322 of the dynamics to determine the strategy. 2323

4-82. There are variations to every strategy. Insurgents do not necessarily use a single doctrinal model or 2324 theory for their strategy. The eight dynamics of an insurgency aid in identifying an insurgents’ strategies. 2325 This allows counterinsurgents to identify the insurgents’ operational objectives in relation to their overall 2326 campaign plan by region, area of operations, or area of interest. The eight dynamics enable 2327 counterinsurgents to combat all of the insurgent elements, not just the combat forces. This is necessary in 2328 order to conduct counterinsurgency operations designed to physically and psychologically separate the 2329 insurgents from the population and deny them the active or passive support of the people. 2330

4-83. Insurgent strategies include, but are not limited to, the following: 2331 Urban (terrorist) strategy. 2332 Military-focused or Foco strategy. 2333 Protracted strategy. 2334 Subversive strategy. 2335



URBAN (TERRORIST) STRATEGY 2336

4-84. The urban (terrorist) strategy is a basic strategy. In this strategy, insurgents attack government targets 2337 to cause government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government’s 2338 repressive measures to enrage the people so that they rise up and overthrow the government. Although this 2339 type of strategy may develop popular support against a government that is particularly brutal or corrupt, it 2340 may only develop limited committed support. (See figure 4-4.) The urban (terrorist) strategy has these 2341 distinguishing characteristics: 2342

Insurgent actions calculated to provoke harsh government or counterinsurgent response. 2343 Propaganda that focuses on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh government 2344

actions (massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances, brutal response to peaceful 2345 demonstrations, and so forth). 2346

Political organization or sustained effort to indoctrinate a political cadre or the masses. 2347 Little effort to subvert the government from within. 2348 Use of tactics to sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the government, intimidate the 2349

population, kill government and opposition leaders, fix and intimidate police and military forces, 2350 and attempt to create government repression. 2351

Popular sympathy if the government is particularly brutal or corrupt, but limited committed 2352 support. 2353

Figure 4-4. Urban (terrorist) strategy 2354

4-85. The actions of an urban (terrorist) strategy are sometimes predictable because they cause 2355 counterinsurgents to respond harshly. In some cases, this allows the insurgency to gain popular support as 2356 the population blames the government for these harsh tactics. In other cases, the population is willing to 2357 accept a harsh government response because of their dislike of insurgent actions. 2358

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FOCO STRATEGY 2359

4-86. The Foco strategy is another basic strategy. (See figure 4-5.) It is military-focused and named for its 2360 origins from Latin American insurgencies (Spanish enfocar—to focus). Insurgents’ efforts focus on causing 2361 the government to lose legitimacy and inspiring a vulnerable population to join the insurgents against the 2362 government. The most important idea behind a Foco strategy is that it does not require building political 2363 support among the population. Instead, military success and action will gain the support of a population 2364 with core grievances. Foco strategy has these distinguishing characteristics: 2365

Attacks on soft government and civilian targets and on poorly equipped and trained security 2366 forces, demonstrating their inability to protect themselves or the population. 2367

Propaganda focused on showing the government’s weakness and illegitimacy. 2368 Little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base. 2369 Few efforts along a wider spectrum of objectives (for example, political wing, infiltrating 2370

legitimate organizations, and so forth) as seen in more advanced strategies. 2371

Figure 4-5. Foco strategy 2372

4-87. The foco strategy is vulnerable to effective counterguerrilla operations due its dependence on 2373 successful military action and developing a popular uprising. As a basic strategy, counterinsurgents can 2374 sometimes predict foco actions through detailed analysis. 2375

PROTRACTED WAR STRATEGY 2376

4-88. A protracted war strategy is an advanced strategy based on Mao Tse-Tung’s theory of protracted 2377 popular war. (See figure 4-6 on page 4-19.) It postulates that insurgents should lengthen the conflict as 2378 much as necessary to assemble the resources and forces necessary for success and to wear down the 2379 counterinsurgent forces and their political leadership. Although most insurgent strategies use some or all of 2380 the phases as discussed in the sixth dynamic (phasing and timing), the protracted war strategy is based upon 2381 three distinct phases: latent and incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. Each phase builds upon 2382 the previous phase and continues activities from all or some of the previous phases. The protracted strategy 2383



requires both a political wing and a military wing. In all the variations of this strategy, certain 2384 characteristics stand out, including— 2385

Continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government 2386 organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization. 2387

Highly-indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and combatant fighters. 2388 Extensive, well-organized auxiliary and underground elements. 2389 Leadership able to exert control over the insurgency. 2390 Ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership to include return to previous phases, if 2391

necessary. 2392 Campaign of attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government (and 2393

other counterinsurgents). 2394 Continuous operations along multiple lines of effort (although some are emphasized more than 2395

others are in different phases). 2396 Advanced insurgencies (like those in the protracted strategy) are more likely to form 2397

collaborative efforts with other insurgencies including rival movements due to a common enemy 2398 or goals. This may simply be coordinating simultaneous attacks to maximize psychological 2399 effects. 2400

Figure 4-6. Protracted strategy 2401

4-89. The protracted strategy is characterized by a high level of organization, indoctrination, a requirement 2402 to balance multiple objectives, and the need for leaders who can adjust and direct efforts according to 2403 circumstances. 2404

SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY 2405

4-90. The subversive strategy is another advanced strategy. (See figure 4-7 on page 4-21.) A subversive 2406 strategy attempts to subvert the government from within by using its political arm to become a legitimate 2407 political party and enter the government. Subversive activities may occur as part of other strategies, 2408

Chapter 4


particularly the protracted war strategy. (See figure 4-8 on page 4-22.) Certain characteristics and actions 2409 stand out: 2410

Insurgents seeking meetings with government or coalition forces to discuss ceasefires, although 2411 local insurgent movements are in a position of strength. The goal of these meetings is often not 2412 to discuss the details of a ceasefire, but rather to bolster their bid for legitimacy within the 2413 nation, with sympathetic external states, and the international audience. 2414

Prolonged campaign of attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down and reduce the 2415 credibility of the government. 2416

Public statements by the insurgency’s political wing denouncing violence and distancing itself 2417 from the insurgency (while still operating under insurgent leadership). 2418

An apparent breach between the insurgency’s military and political wings. 2419

Note: A breach between the insurgency’s military and political wings could be an indicator of a 2420 subversive strategy, but the counterinsurgent must be aware that there may actually be a real 2421 split between the two wings that counterinsurgent forces can exploit. The key is that 2422 counterinsurgent forces should never assume the one or the other without confirmation. 2423 Commanders and staffs continue to look at all of the dynamics of an insurgency to identify other 2424 indicators of the subversive strategy. 2425

Formation of new alliances, sometimes with rival groups that seem to have little in common, 2426 except to defeat counterinsurgents. 2427

An end or reduction in combatant activity and an increase in political activity, riots, 2428 demonstrations, and propaganda. 2429

Sophisticated propaganda aimed at specific target audiences with appropriate messages. 2430 Emergence of an insurgent political wing (not a legitimate political party) that seeks recognition 2431

and entry into national politics or election to national, regional, department, district, or local 2432 offices. 2433



Figure 4-7. Subversive strategy, part I 2434

Chapter 4


Figure 4-8. Subversive strategy, part II 2435

4-91. Commanders and staff must understand the nature of an insurgency when conducting a 2436 counterinsurgency. This requires understanding both the dynamics of an insurgency and the insurgent 2437 strategies. Understanding the nature of an insurgency will help the commander in analyzing an insurgency 2438 and understanding that insurgency in the context it is occurring in. 2439

MODELS OF INSTABILITY 2440

4-92. The district stability framework assists planners in identifying and mitigating sources of instability. 2441 Because of the uniqueness of the stability environment, the interagency district stability framework was 2442 designed to identify and mitigate sources of instability. This framework works as a planning assessment 2443 tool and nests into the military decisionmaking process. There are three steps to the district stability 2444 framework: analysis, design, and monitoring and assessment. (ADRP 3-07 contains more details on the 2445 district stability framework.) 2446

4-93. The interagency conflict assessment framework is another framework used to understand conflict. 2447 The purpose of the interagency conflict assessment framework is to develop a commonly held 2448 understanding, across relevant U.S. government departments and agencies, of the dynamics driving and 2449 mitigating violent conflict within a country, that informs U.S. policy and planning decisions. It may also 2450 include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which U.S. government engagement can be evaluated. 2451 It is a process and a tool available for use by any U.S. government agency to supplement interagency 2452 planning. (For more information on interagency conflict assessment framework, see the interagency 2453 conflict assessment framework at ) 2454

2455 2456


Chapter 5 2457

Insurgency Threat Characteristics 2458

THREAT CHARACTERISTICS 2459

5-1. Threat characteristics involve the composition, disposition, activities, and tactics of an insurgency. 2460 The composition of an insurgency is covered under the eighth dynamic—organizational and operational 2461 patterns. Tactics for an insurgency include both political activities and military tactics. It is also important 2462 to consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and weaknesses for an insurgency. 2463

DISPOSITION 2464

5-2. The disposition is the geographic location of insurgent elements and the way they are deployed, 2465 employed, or located. Additionally, disposition includes the recent, current, and projected movements or 2466 locations of these elements: 2467

Training camps. 2468 Base camps. 2469 Logistic camps. 2470 Headquarters. 2471 Safe houses. 2472 Front organizations or businesses to include farms, factories, universities, markets, and trading 2473

posts. 2474 Cultural sites insurgents use as protection from counterinsurgent forces and for the psychological 2475

impact of counterinsurgents entering or firing on such a site (shrines, religious structures, 2476 cemeteries, ruins, schools, and other protected sites). 2477

5-3. The dispositions of an insurgency are partially determined by the operational environment and 2478 variables. For example, if an insurgency has connections to a black market, some of its dispositions will 2479 normally be to protect that market. Terrain will also affect the dispositions of the enemy. Commanders and 2480 staffs must understand the operational environment to understand the enemy’s dispositions. 2481

INSURGENT ACTIVITIES AND TACTICS 2482

5-4. Insurgents that rely solely on violence to achieve their political goals are probably ineffective. 2483 Instead, effective insurgents conduct a wide range of activities to achieve their goals. Many of these 2484 activities are not enemy or terrain oriented. Many insurgent actions are political. Moreover, many insurgent 2485 military actions are terrorism. Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear 2486 and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other 2487 ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political (JP 3-07.2). In addition 2488 to terrorism, insurgents use a wide range of means to achieve their end state. There is also a range of 2489 activities supporting both military and political actions. 2490

Political Activities 2491

5-5. Insurgents may use political activities to achieve their goals and enhance their cause’s legitimacy. 2492 An insurgency’s actions can come from inside the government’s political system or actions to communicate 2493 a message to the population. Political actions that happen within the government normally happen in a 2494 democracy or a semi-democracy. In these systems, an insurgency and related political parties can have 2495 some political power through elections. This gives groups the ability to launch official investigations and a 2496 platform to question government actions. This was a technique used by the Irish Republican Army and Sinn 2497 Fein. 2498

Chapter 5


5-6. Insurgent political actions within the government are limited to a democracy, unless those actions are 2499 secretive. An authoritarian regime can have members that are either sympathetic to or actual members of an 2500 insurgency. However, those individuals must remain clandestine, if they are to remain inside the 2501 government. In these cases, insurgencies can use these individuals for intelligence and to influence some 2502 governmental decisions. 2503

5-7. The use of political activities to influence a society is much more common. Demonstrations, 2504 propaganda, strikes, and civil disobedience can be effective means to undermine the legitimacy of the 2505 government and to disrupt the host nation. These actions show the level of support for the insurgency and 2506 transmit the insurgents message to the rest of society. 2507

5-8. In areas of the country where the insurgency is in control, the insurgency can perform governmental 2508 functions. These functions replace the functions of the host-nation government. When an insurgency 2509 provides effective governance of a region or community, it builds its legitimacy in that area. 2510

5-9. Moreover, at the national level an insurgency can promote a shadow government. A shadow 2511 government offers a known alternative that is tangible to the population. This can be effective as a 2512 propaganda technique, and a shadow government can be useful in creating a successful transition for an 2513 insurgency. As propaganda, a shadow government allows an insurgency to identify and inform a population 2514 of a known alternative to the current government. In practice, it allows a governmental structure to form in 2515 insurgent controlled areas quickly. If an insurgency is successful, this allows for a transition to a coherent 2516 national government. 2517

5-10. Propaganda is one of the most important political tools an insurgency has. Propaganda provides the 2518 means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the population. It allows the 2519 insurgency to create a narrative of why the government’s actions are not legitimate, and how the 2520 insurgency can eliminate the root causes of the conflict. Common insurgent propaganda efforts include the 2521 following: 2522

Encouraging the host-nation populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting host-nation 2523 or other friendly governments’ forces. 2524

Increasing insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions. 2525 Inciting riots or organizing rallies, which may include honoring martyred insurgents. 2526 Causing or exacerbating a dislocated civilian crisis. 2527 Creating or fostering public distrust of the host-nation security forces. 2528 Undermining the support of specific host-nation local leaders or businessmen. 2529 Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest or friction. 2530 Supporting or revitalizing dissident or opposition organizations. 2531 Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring countries or regions. 2532 Discrediting or ridiculing specific host-nation or counterinsurgent officials. 2533 Characterizing government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign counterinsurgency forces. 2534 Spreading hostile coverage of counterinsurgency personnel, especially counterinsurgent 2535

mistakes. 2536 Justify insurgent violence 2537 Generate sympathy from the local to the international. 2538

Military Tactics 2539

5-11. Insurgents use violence to achieve a wide range of effects. For example, in the early phases of an 2540 insurgency, insurgents plan attacks to achieve the greatest political and informational impact while not 2541 becoming decisively engaged. During the war of movement phase of an insurgency, insurgents may try to 2542 destroy a host-nation’s security forces. Commanders need to understand the wide variety of insurgent 2543 tactics. Insurgents make use of terrorist acts and conventional military tactics. 2544

Insurgency Threat Characteristics


Terrorist Acts 2545

5-12. Terrorist acts are meant to undermine the legitimacy of the government by demonstrating both the 2546 inability of the government to protect the population and the strength of the insurgency. Insurgents 2547 generally select targets based on their strategic importance and propaganda value. A terrorist attack will 2548 generally have some amount of deception and use techniques outside of the accepted norms. 2549

5-13. The possibility of an insurgent group gaining access to weapons of mass destruction changes the 2550 strategic effect of terrorist actions. If an insurgency gained nuclear capability, which is an increased 2551 possibility in an interconnected world, the threat of using a nuclear weapon would provide leverage for any 2552 type of political negotiations. The actual use of a nuclear weapon would have regional and global effects. 2553 Biological and chemical weapons also have a strategic effect, but to a lesser degree. The insurgent’s use of 2554 weapons of mass destruction as a terrorist weapon would transform the nature of the conflict. 2555

5-14. There are several types of terrorist attacks that may be effective and that insurgents have used. A 2556 faked terrorist attack can also undermine a host nation. All of these attacks serve to undermine the 2557 government’s legitimacy by undermining the security of the population. Vehicle borne improvised 2558 explosive devices can be effective in terrorist attacks. Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices can be 2559 used against markets, checkpoints, voting stations, cultural sites, ports and ships, combat outposts, traffic 2560 control points, or other targets. Assassinations can also be an effective tactic. An assassination can be 2561 directed towards killing a government or community leader. Intimidation and blackmail can both raise 2562 revenue and create fear. 2563

5-15. Insurgents may perform terrorist attacks on key infrastructure and government or public facilities to 2564 disable systems, deny their use by the government, demonstrate government inability to secure critical 2565 sites, kill or capture personnel, or acquire resources (such as robbing a bank or stealing a fuel truck). 2566 Examples of key infrastructure are power plants and substations, dams and bridges, petroleum refineries, 2567 public health facilities, reconstruction projects, telecommunications and mass media facilities. Insurgents, 2568 especially those who use more advanced strategies, may patiently infiltrate personnel who work at these 2569 facilities in order to gather information about these systems and conduct precision sabotage as dictated by 2570 the insurgents’ objectives. 2571

5-16. Pseudo operations are operations normally carried out to blame someone else for the unit’s deeds. In 2572 pseudo operations, the element assumes the guise of another group. They can mask themselves as 2573 government elements, security forces, or any group outside of their own. This involves developing or 2574 obtaining false identifications, uniforms, official vehicles, and credentials to complete the deception. The 2575 goal is to conduct operations in someone else’s name to cause blame to that group. 2576

5-17. Insurgents can also use cyber attacks. Cyber capabilities can give an insurgency the ability to affect 2577 systems within the host nation and outside of the host nation. For example, a cyber attack could undermine 2578 the financial system within a state. This may be an effective way to undermine the legitimacy of a host 2579 nation. However, a cyber attack could also affect any state or region. Cyber capabilities provide an 2580 insurgent the ability to attack a country that supports the host nation, for example. If an insurgency attains 2581 cyber capabilities, the nature of the conflict changes. 2582

Conventional Tactics 2583

5-18. Insurgents use a wide range of tactics to engage the counterinsurgent. During a war of movement, 2584 insurgents may try to destroy host-nation government forces. However, this may expose the insurgent if an 2585 attempt to destroy a host nation’s security force is taken too early. Often insurgents will use small unit 2586 tactics. 2587

5-19. The counterinsurgent’s knowledge of the insurgent’s conventional capabilities is used to evaluate 2588 insurgent courses of action. Commanders use this knowledge to determine appropriate protection measures 2589 and tactics to counter insurgent actions. A knowledge of how insurgents conduct attacks helps to determine 2590 the effectiveness of efforts to counter enemy military capabilities. Commanders and staffs evaluate the 2591 following to determine insurgent capabilities for violent action: 2592

Forms of violent actions used. 2593 Available weapons and their capabilities. 2594

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Training. 2595 Known methods of operating. 2596 Frequency of attacks. 2597 Timing of attacks. 2598 Targets of attacks. 2599 Tactics and techniques. 2600 Known linkages between violent, political, and information actions. 2601 Uses of violence to increase popular support and undermine counterinsurgents. 2602 Means of command during attacks (to include methods of communication). 2603

5-20. Insurgents use a wide range of conventional tactics. Insurgents often employ ambushes for 2604 harassment and disruption. Sniper operations may also be effective. Insurgents may use indirect fire, such 2605 as mortar and rocket attacks, to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces that can then be 2606 attacked by other means. Weapons and munitions are frequently modified to best suit insurgent needs for a 2607 specific target or mission. Examples include using direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to 2608 avoid detection. 2609

5-21. Improvised explosive devices are effective tools that can be integrated into many different types of 2610 attacks. Improvised explosive devices can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation 2611 techniques available, may avoid risks to the perpetrator. Also, suicide bombing cannot be overlooked as an 2612 employment method, and it can be very effective. Other advantages of improvised explosive devices 2613 include their ability to gain publicity and their ability to control casualties through timed detonation and 2614 careful placement of the device. It is also easily for insurgents to deny responsibility, should the action 2615 produce undesirable results. Improvised explosive devices that can be command detonated or tripped by a 2616 device like a pressure plate are also used as ambush weapons to disrupt and destroy vehicles and convoys. 2617 In addition to improvised explosive devices, insurgents often use mines and booby-traps against vehicles, 2618 helicopters, dismounted troops on patrol, in homes, while searching enemy equipment and personnel, and 2619 first responders. 2620

Support Activities 2621

5-22. Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent 2622 support activates include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain 2623 insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgency’s ability 2624 to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low. 2625 These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. 2626

5-23. The effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics. The support cells and active 2627 supporters within the population accumulate, move, store, and disseminate supplies for the other cells. 2628 Specialty underground cells tend to have their own covert logistics elements to ensure secrecy and security. 2629 Insurgents obtain logistics from active supporters, smugglers, black markets, extortion, theft, and external 2630 actors. Insurgents can purchase items such as food, water, medicine, bomb making materials, propaganda 2631 products, transportation, and places to store supplies. Sometimes an insurgent’s location and disposition is 2632 dictated by existing logistics or supplies. Commanders and staffs can find insurgents through analysis of 2633 their logistics and supply lines. Insurgent logistics activities can include outposts and bases near rivers, 2634 farms, smuggling routes, markets, hospitals, drug fields and labs, and borders. 2635

5-24. In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is 2636 widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially large surpluses in the most violent 2637 regions of the world. Explosive hazards, such as mines and improvised explosive devices, are likely to be 2638 common weapons in insurgencies. Insurgents can obtain weapons through legal or illegal purchases or from 2639 foreign sources. A common tactic is to capture them from government forces. Counterinsurgency forces 2640 should seek to cut off the flow of arms into the area of operations and eliminate their sources. 2641

5-25. Income is essential not only for insurgents to purchase weapons but to pay recruits and bribe 2642 officials. Money and supplies can be obtained through many sources. Foreign support is one possible 2643 source of income. Local supporters or international front organizations may provide financial support. 2644



Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents, 2645 confiscation or taxation may be utilized. Another common source of funding is criminal activity. 2646

5-26. Funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. The insurgents’ approach 2647 determines the movement’s requirements. Protracted popular war strategies that emphasize mobilization of 2648 the masses require considerable resources to build and maintain a counter-state. In comparison, the 2649 military-focused approach—which emphasizes armed action—needs only the resources to sustain a 2650 military campaign. Counter threat finance is an important means to interdict an insurgency’s funding. (See 2651 the Commander’s Handbook for Counter Threat Finance for more information.) 2652

Training and Indoctrination 2653

5-27. The quality and quantity of training depends on how advanced the insurgency is and what its specific 2654 strategy is. Indoctrination is a part of training which is critical to maintain allegiance and to focus cells to 2655 conduct continuous operations without frequent communications and direction from insurgent leadership. 2656 The level of indoctrination can help analysts identify the strategy and sophistication of the insurgency and 2657 includes more than just the overall objective of the insurgency. Subordinate leaders within an insurgency 2658 are indoctrinated because they must execute the senior leadership’s intent and vision as well as guide 2659 operations until redirected. The better the indoctrination of the intent and vision, the more decentralized, 2660 self-sufficient, and focused the insurgent cells are. 2661

5-28. Higher education also plays a role in insurgent training. Many insurgent leaders are well educated 2662 and understand how to use things such as the Internet and mass media to communicate their messages. 2663 Guerillas, however, might not be as well educated. 2664

5-29. Training also includes individual and collective training depending on the role of the insurgent and 2665 the specific skills of the insurgent (such as sniper, information operations, human intelligence, raid or 2666 ambush, communications, logistics and caches, or bomb maker). More advanced training may include how 2667 insurgents conduct themselves if captured, including resistance to interrogation and operations within 2668 detention facilities (recruiting, clandestine communications, and maintaining control of other insurgents). 2669

5-30. Other states may play an essential role in training an insurgency. Training can occur at sites in the 2670 supporting country or covertly within the host nation. Many states maintain the ability to conduct 2671 unconventional warfare. (See FM 3-05 for more information on unconventional warfare.) 2672

Communications 2673

5-31. Communications in an insurgency cannot depend on open and traditional means. Ensuring an 2674 effective network of communications is an essential support activity of an insurgency. Insurgents can 2675 compensate for the lack of regular and reliable communications in numerous ways, including masking their 2676 communications in radio, television, or Internet messages. They may also pass information in cameras, 2677 high frequency, short-wave, and amateur (ham radio) sets, cellular phones, the mail, computers, or memory 2678 storage devices transported by couriers. They may also avoid detection by use of couriers and face-to-face 2679 meetings. 2680

INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 2681

5-32. Insurgents usually have several strengths. Insurgents usually have a significant knowledge of an area 2682 of operations. Usually insurgents are operating in their own country and own ethnic group, making it 2683 extremely difficult for friendly forces to identify insurgents in the community or to identify people 2684 connected with the insurgency. Insurgents have intimate knowledge of the area of operations including 2685 things like the characteristics of the local people and their culture, daily schedules, accents, and local slangs 2686 that enable them to blend in with the local population, enhancing their ability to operate with secrecy. 2687 Insurgents will probably wear similar clothing, have like postures, mannerisms and hand gestures, body 2688 movements, walking speed, greetings, body motions, and maintain eye contact (or lack of) as the 2689 population of the area of operations. They will also probably observe local social norms of food, drink, and 2690 sleeping schedules. 2691

Chapter 5


5-33. The insurgent is not usually responsible for maintaining normal governmental obligations to the local 2692 population. While an insurgent may conduct some governmental functions and set up a shadow 2693 government, an insurgency does not normally have the same expectations from the population to provide 2694 governmental services. This normally means that insurgencies spend few resources on governmental 2695 functions, which frees more resources to conduct the insurgency. 2696

5-34. Most insurgencies have limited personnel and resources. Long periods without resupply and loss of 2697 key personnel can affect the insurgency’s ability to sustain the conflict. Counterinsurgents can apply 2698 pressure on the insurgency by conducting raids on cell members; recovering enemy caches; interdicting 2699 supply routes; searching or seizing resources from cars, homes, and personnel entering the area of 2700 operations; isolating the insurgents from access to markets, smugglers, and black-market goods; and by 2701 conducting offensive operations that diminish guerrilla numbers. Insurgencies usually fail when their 2702 ability to replenish, either through counterinsurgent action, mismanagement on their own part, or 2703 withdrawal of the support of an external actor, is undermined. 2704

5-35. Insurgent movements are vulnerable to friendly force information operations that shows their danger, 2705 futility, privation, and numerical inferiority compared to government forces. In some cases, the fear of 2706 being treated as a criminal if captured, and the fear of violence to the insurgent and the insurgent’s family, 2707 can cause desertions and defections. In some societies, good treatment, pardons, protection, food, shelter, 2708 and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to 2709 induce desertions. Other insurgent stress factors include sustained combat and a hostile environment that 2710 weakens insurgent resolve. 2711

5-36. The decentralized nature of the insurgent cells that provide operations security can also be a 2712 weakness as it is resource intensive, slows responsiveness, and causes information to move slowly. The 2713 difficulty of the insurgent to receive encouragement from superiors and members of the political wing, a 2714 lack of direction in the face of counterinsurgent pressures, and an inability to openly call for reinforcements 2715 and logistics due to their operations security plan can make insurgents feel isolated, alone, confused, and 2716 unsupported. Analysts need to identify these points and recommend operations to demoralize and promote 2717 defections among insurgents. 2718

ASSOCIATED THREATS 2719

5-37. Other threats can play an interconnected role in an insurgency. Two groups are particularly 2720 important, criminal organizations and nongovernmental militias. These groups can be supportive, neutral, 2721 or opposed to an insurgency. 2722

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 2723

5-38. Insurgents commonly use criminal organizations to accomplish objectives. Common activities 2724 designed to gain revenue or materials include theft, drug or human trafficking, smuggling of illicit 2725 materials, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail, counterfeiting, taxing of civilians, bank robbery, 2726 and bribery. Criminal organizations appear as street gangs, mafias, cartels, or other structured groups. 2727 Criminal organizations can also assist insurgent groups in achieving objectives other than financial or 2728 accumulating resources. Other objectives may include intimidating government employees or candidates, 2729 conducting assassinations, kidnapping key personnel, initiating sectarian violence, strikes, demonstrations, 2730 riots, and smuggling high-value leaders, advisors, or weapons. Criminal organizations can also conduct 2731 operations deemed unpopular with the civilian population at a distance from the insurgent movement to 2732 create deniability. 2733

5-39. Many insurgencies degenerate into criminality. This occurs as the primary movements disintegrate 2734 and the remaining elements become isolated. Insurgent disintegration is desirable; it replaces a dangerous, 2735 ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less dangerous but more diverse body, 2736 normally of uneven character. The first is a security threat; the second is a law-and-order concern. This 2737 should not be interpreted as denigrating the armed capacity of a law-and-order threat. Successful 2738 counterinsurgents are prepared to address this disintegration. They recognize that the ideal approach 2739 eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats the insurgency’s elimination produces. 2740



5-40. However, criminal groups can develop into insurgencies. In the case of localities that depend on 2741 black markets for their general welfare, the local population may depend on criminal activities. This creates 2742 an closely interlocked relationship between the criminal element (running the black market) and the 2743 insurgents (linked to the black market). In some cases, this relationship feeds into the causes of an 2744 insurgency, namely the local population supports the insurgents because they want to stop interference with 2745 their economic livelihood. An insurgency based on a black market generally has ties to other black markets 2746 and resources through globalization. At its core, a black market requires trade and contact with others. This 2747 can create a well-funded, trained, and equipped commercial insurgency. 2748

5-41. An insurgency can begin with a political aim and then develop into a commercial insurgency because 2749 of connections to that market. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia started as a communist 2750 insurgent group in 1964. However, through its involvement in the drug trade, it has become the richest 2751 self-sustaining insurgent group in history. In the parts of Columbia that it controls, it is closely linked to the 2752 population because the population depends on the drug trade for its economic well-being. 2753

NONGOVERNMENT MILITIAS 2754

5-42. As the host-nation government weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect 2755 themselves. If the government cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed militias to 2756 protect themselves. Moreover, some societal structures, such as tribes, may have a militia structure. 2757 Examples of militias include the following: 2758

Loyalist militias formed in Northern Ireland. 2759 Right-wing paramilitary organizations formed in Colombia to counter the Revolutionary Armed 2760

Forces of Colombia. 2761 Militias of various ethnic and political groups formed in Iraq during Operation IRAQI 2762

FREEDOM. 2763

5-43. If militias are outside the host-nation government’s control, they can often be obstacles to ending an 2764 insurgency. Militias may become more powerful than the host-nation government, particularly at the local 2765 level. They may also fuel the insurgency and a precipitate a downward spiral into a full-scale civil war. 2766 However, they can also play a constructive role and provide local security. While this can undermine the 2767 host-nation’s government, it can also be a building block to help build legitimacy at the local level. 2768

OPPORTUNISTS 2769

5-44. An opportunist is one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often with no 2770 regard for principles or consequences. In the context of irregular warfare, opportunists often take advantage 2771 of the conditions of instability in the pursuit of their own goals, such as smuggling contraband, while 2772 security forces are distracted from protecting the border due to combating an insurgency. Commanders and 2773 staffs identify opportunists, assess their impact on the mission and force protection, consider them in 2774 planning, and mitigate their impact as needed. This section will review the types of opportunists and their 2775 activities, and it will discuss planning considerations to address the impact of opportunists. 2776

5-45. There are several types of opportunists who, by nature, impede the regular and effective functions of 2777 government and may act contrary to the wellbeing of the people. Opportunists may be existing local people 2778 or external actors, including civilians, members of the government, or security forces. Opportunists can be 2779 in direct support of the insurgency or outside actors. They can be state sponsored, sponsored by a non-state 2780 actor, or unsponsored, all while taking advantage of unstable conditions. Opportunists understand and 2781 exploit the conditions of instability inherent in irregular war where lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency 2782 are the norm. The extreme conditions of an insurgency may allow activities that are normally countered 2783 with effective law enforcement and governance to proceed with impunity. These conditions allow 2784 opportunists to pursue their political and economic interests. 2785

5-46. Opportunists may tend to exploit vulnerable populations by conducting kidnapping for ransom, 2786 revenge killings, murder for hire, hijacking, extortion, black marketing, smuggling, and trafficking of 2787 drugs, humans, and weapons. Opportunists use the conditions of instability to perform activities that are 2788 often illegal to further their interests. They can also work within the political system to further their 2789

Chapter 5


interests. Insurgencies often occur in a chaotic political environment. As such, opportunists can take 2790 advantage of the chaos to gain political power 2791

5-47. Foreign opportunists, such as mercenaries, international criminal groups, and terrorists, may be 2792 sponsored by an external state or non-state actor or act independently. These groups may also work in the 2793 environment of an insurgency. They can act in a similar manner as internal opportunists, but they pursue 2794 the interests of an external actor. 2795

5-48. Opportunists can work for an insurgency, against an insurgency, or both. How they work and who 2796 they work for is determined by an opportunist’s own interests. Opportunists can work both sides to 2797 maximize influence and profits while avoiding retribution. An opportunist can provide safe passage for 2798 insurgents, while also providing intelligence to counterinsurgents. An opportunist is not bound by the 2799 objectives of either the counterinsurgent or insurgent. 2800

5-49. Reintegration initiatives, although favorable to resolve many insurgencies, can be exploited by 2801 opportunists due to the inclusive and reconciliatory nature of these programs. Opportunists can infiltrate 2802 local civilian security forces to avoid retribution, influence less secure communities, and provide 2803 opportunities for vigilantism. Reintegration can also offer incentives for opportunists looking for 2804 employment, benefits, or even amnesty from a seditious criminal, social activist, or political past. 2805

5-50. Opportunists can be malign by design or by circumstance. Malign by design refers to the opportunists 2806 whose purpose is criminal and counterproductive to effective government and a populace’s wellbeing by 2807 charter. By circumstance refers to opportunists whose purpose is not criminal by design but shifts to wholly 2808 or partial illicit activities to further their interests based on obstacles to their original path. Groups like 2809 corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or security contractors may be advocates for a functioning 2810 government, but due to conditions which present opportunities for them, these groups or individuals may 2811 act counterproductively to counterinsurgent efforts. These are very difficult to identify due to their 2812 favorable position and the potentially clandestine activities employed to sustain their position. 2813

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPPORTUNISTS 2814

5-51. In the planning process, it is important to analyze the activities of opportunists, even though their 2815 presence may not be apparent. The same conditions that may allow an insurgency to form and enjoy 2816 freedom of movement also allow opportunists to act. Opportunists will probably take advantage of the 2817 vulnerability of the population and exploit the lack of governmental control in pursuit of their goals 2818

5-52. The presence, actions, and impact of opportunists can affect the success of the mission to defeat the 2819 insurgency and address the root causes of the conflict. This is especially true as the opportunists may rely 2820 on the presence of the insurgency and unstable conditions to achieve their ends. Opportunists and their 2821 activities need to be included in understanding the area of operations and addressed during mission 2822 planning and in attack the network operations. In the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace 2823 process, opportunists may be addressed within civil considerations, or within the threat, where appropriate. 2824 The mission analysis must address identifying opportunists, understanding their impacts, and addressing or 2825 mitigating their impacts. 2826

5-53. The commander’s intent may need to include dealing with opportunists depending on the level of 2827 interference or political nature of opportunists. Opportunists can impact the mission or force protection. 2828 This is especially true if the opportunists are from a state sponsor or a border region where an internal 2829 conflict can spread to another country. Overall, it is important to understand how opportunists can aid an 2830 insurgency, either directly or indirectly, and how they can undermine the efforts of a host-nation 2831 government or a coalition effort, to address the causes of instability. 2832


PART THREE 2833

Counterinsurgencies 2834

Part three provides doctrine for how to counter an insurgency. How one counters an 2835 insurgency is dependent on the strategic and operational context (Part I) and the 2836 insurgency (Part II). Chapter 6 discusses command and control and mission 2837 command. Chapter 7 discusses planning. This includes conceptual and detailed 2838 planning. Chapter 8 discusses indirect methods and chapter 9 discusses direct 2839 methods for countering an insurgency. Chapter 10 discusses intelligence and 2840 operational considerations. These include inform and influence activities and 2841 integrated monetary shaping operations. Chapter 11 discusses assessments, which 2842 provides information on effectively using measures of performance and measures of 2843 effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Finally, part three discusses legal considerations 2844 in chapter 12. 2845

Chapter 6 2846

Command and Control and Mission Command 2847

6-1. The operations process is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and 2848 the command and control or mission command process sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. 2849 Sometimes this recognition takes the form of a conscious command decision—as in deciding on a concept 2850 of operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a preconditioned reaction—as in immediate-action drills, 2851 practiced in advance so that units can execute them reflexively in a moment of crisis. Sometimes it takes 2852 the form of a rules-based procedure—as in the guiding of an aircraft on final approach. Some types of 2853 command and control or mission command must occur so quickly and precisely that they can be 2854 accomplished only by computers— such as the command and control of a guided missile in flight. Other 2855 forms may require such a degree of judgment and intuition that they can be performed only by skilled, 2856 experienced people-as in devising tactics, operations, and strategies.(See MCDP 6 and Marine Corps 2857 Operating Concepts – Third Edition for more information.) 2858

COMMAND IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 2859

6-2. Command in counterinsurgency often involves a large geographic area and control over multiple 2860 units performing different types of operations. In Western Iraq, Brigadier General W. Blake Crowe 2861 commanded a large area that began along the Syrian border and extended to the Jordanian border. He 2862 executed command over multiple units, performing multiple tasks in different areas. The following vignette 2863 provides a his insights into command during the Iraqi War in 2006. 2864

Chapter 6


Command in Counterinsurgency 2865 Our area of operations began along the Syrian border and extended down to the 2866 Jordanian border. We were also responsible for the Marine Expeditionary Force 2867 (MEF) security area, which extended to Saudi Arabia. This was a large area, and it 2868 was not possible to be everywhere. This situation forced us to work with the locals 2869 and to work and play well with other units operating in the region, such as the Special 2870 Operations Forces (SOF). But there in 2006,we were the surrogate government. We 2871 did not have mayors at the time. The provincial governor was in Ramadi, and he 2872 stayed there. Twice we were able to get him out to western al-Anbar in the year I was 2873 there, and it took a regimental size operation to get him out to cities such as 2874 Baghdadi, Haditha, and al-Qa’im. We spent nearly thirty days’ worth of planning to 2875 get him out there because for us he was more important than the president of the 2876 United States. I think Marines here would understand that. 2877 Our first mayor came in six months into my deployment in al-Qa’im. Lieutenant 2878 Colonel Dale Alford, commander of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was involved in 2879 setting the conditions for that success. We didn’t have a mayor in Haditha because 2880 we had to arrest him. He was an insurgent. We didn’t have a mayor in Hit because 2881 the previous ones had been killed. So until December 2006, we were the surrogate 2882 local government. We learned very quickly that if we allowed the Iraqis to fail to build 2883 and provision their security forces, then we would have failed as well. So, we had to 2884 step in and fill that surrogate role. 2885 There is a debate concerning these operations and whether or not they are 2886 counterinsurgencies, hybrid operations, or distributed operations. We did them all. In 2887 al-Qa’im, we conducted what I would call a pure counterinsurgency (COIN) operation 2888 because the conditions had been set by the previous regiment. We were still having 2889 major manned gun, tank rounds, and combined arms in downtown Hit with more than 2890 one hundred surging on twelve- to fifteen-man positions. Phasing, synchronizing, 2891 supporting, and enabling formed what I thought was my primary role there. 2892 Every battalion commander wants to be the main effort. Every regimental or brigade 2893 commander wants to be the main effort. We weren’t the main effort in Iraq. And every 2894 battalion could not be the main effort, and that’s the hard thing for people to 2895 reconcile. How come I’m not getting all these assets? 2896 When I was in Afghanistan, I received everything. We were one Marine battalion 2897 attached to the Army and we were given everything. In Iraq, I had five battalions in 2898 my command and one reduced Force Reconnaissance company commanded by six 2899 lieutenant colonels. At least one unit is not going to get what they want in a timely 2900 fashion. The battalions, companies, and platoons had autonomy, but autonomy 2901 doesn’t mean that they operated independently. That’s where synchronizing comes 2902 in. It means going out and working very close to the battalions and blurring the 2903 borders between zones of responsibility and forcing commanders to get together and 2904 have a cup of coffee. Just as we needed to have tea with the local nationals, we also 2905 needed to do that among ourselves. We did that very well with the SOF. I put liaisons 2906 with the national-level SOF. I put liaisons with the white SOF. We established an ad-2907 hoc tactical fusion center at the regimental level. 2908 [W]e raised close to 4,000 police officers. I waited a year and was told the police 2909 stations are coming. They never did. So we created expeditionary forward operating 2910 bases, because that way I could use Marine Corps money. I could put police in them, 2911 although they could not be designated official Iraqi Police stations. If it was 2912 designated as such, you would get reported because it would not be official. So, 2913 there are things that you have to do. It’s not selective disobedience of orders, but 2914 rather a creative way of getting the mission accomplished. 2915 We had two force protection measures: the American standard and what was 2916 acceptable to the Iraqis. Casualties were unacceptable to me as a commander. The 2917 first time you go to a scene where you’ve lost a soldier, it does not matter what 2918

Command and Control and Mission Command


uniform he’s wearing. He is one of ours. He was bought in to serve with us, and I 2919 don’t care what nationality he is. We needed to build it to one standard: checkpoints, 2920 force protection, food, weapons, ammunition, all the way down. They fight with us 2921 and we’re going to treat them to our standard. That’s just nonnegotiable. 2922 Excerpt from Chapter 5, Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency, 2923 Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, p. 51-54. Marine 2924 Corps University Press, Quantico, Virginia. 2925

Note: For Army users, JP 1 defines command as the authority that a commander in the armed 2926 forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes 2927 the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the 2928 employment of, organizing directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the 2929 accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, 2930 and discipline of assigned personnel. ADP 6-0 defines control as the regulation of forces and 2931 warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. 2932

6-3. Sometimes mission command occurs concurrently with the action being undertaken—in the form of 2933 real-time guidance or direction in response to a changing situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and 2934 even after. Planning, whether rapidly time-sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and objectives, 2935 develops concepts of operations, allocates resources, and provides for necessary coordination, is an 2936 important element of mission command. Furthermore, planning increases knowledge and elevates 2937 situational awareness. Effective training and education, which make it more likely that subordinates will 2938 take the proper actions in combat, establish mission command before the operation. The immediate-action 2939 drill, practiced beforehand, provides mission command. A commander's intent, expressed clearly before the 2940 operation begins, is an essential part of mission command. Likewise, analysis after the operation, which 2941 ascertains the results and lessons of the action and so informs future actions, contributes to mission 2942 command. 2943

Note: For Marine Corps users, mission command is a type of command and control that 2944 promotes innovation and enables the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding 2945 necessary for decentralized decision making required to seize the initiative, degrade enemy 2946 cohesion, and strengthen friendly cohesive relationships that are critical elements to any 2947 counterinsurgency. Based on leader character, mission command offers no checklist for success, 2948 but instead challenges the services to cultivate a bias for taking appropriate action and accentuate 2949 the senior leadership virtues of trust, moral courage, and restraint. The mission command 2950 philosophy asserts that people are the basis of all military organizations, and military operations 2951 occur as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to exploit 2952 and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command though the 2953 leadership providing direction and guidance as part of command and understanding that his 2954 subordinates contribute to control. For the Army, the philosophy of mission command is the 2955 exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined 2956 initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of 2957 unified land operations (ADP 6-0). 2958

6-4. Mission command is the preferred method for counterinsurgency operations because Marines and 2959 Soldiers interact with a society at the lowest levels. Because interactions with a society occur at the 2960 individual level, freedom of action within the commander’s intent is the most effective means to support a 2961 host nation in building legitimacy. Effective counterinsurgency operations require tactical leaders to have 2962 freedom of action but to stay within the commander’s intent. Tactical leaders can have strategic effects in a 2963 counterinsurgency. As such, tactical leaders must act with a conceptual understanding of operational 2964 environment and how their action’s fit into that operational environment. 2965

6-5. A counterinsurgency involves simultaneous activities at every echelon. For example, platoons within 2966 a company could be doing a different tasks, and companies within a battalion could be doing different 2967 tasks, all in support of a battalion’s method of counterinsurgency. Every task involves potential decisions 2968

Chapter 6


that can have an immediate impact on success or failure. Moreover, these tasks are interrelated. This 2969 means that junior leaders will make decisions at the point of effort, relying on mission type orders. This 2970 applies to any operational approach taken to defeat an insurgency. For example, if the commander 2971 integrates a direct action force into a host nation’s counterinsurgency effort, that force will have to 2972 understand the operational environment and the commander’s intent. Any mission can have unintended 2973 consequences, and this includes missions with clear objectives. For example, a direct action mission taken 2974 with faulty intelligence could result in the deaths of civilians. All commanders have to be empowered to 2975 make decisions that positively impact mission accomplishment. Whatever operational approach the 2976 commander takes and however the host nation is supported, mission command is essential. 2977

6-6. When squads, platoons and companies are distributed over wide areas, they must frequently make 2978 decisions and their understanding of the environment is generally better than that of their higher 2979 headquarters. In an effective counterinsurgency, there is a need for decentralization that puts a premium on 2980 the higher headquarters establishing a clear commander's intent and providing subordinates with vision and 2981 guidance particular to the insurgency and host nation. In a counterinsurgency, commanders must effectively 2982 execute the art of command, which is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely 2983 decision-making and leadership. These decisions often have to be made in a time constrained environment. 2984 As such, decentralized decision making is essential, and it provides control over the operations and 2985 activities inherent in a counterinsurgency. 2986

HEADQUARTERS USE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 2987

6-7. While mission command allows for multiple actions to simultaneously occur at every echelon, every 2988 echelon has an important role in ensuring that the various actions meet the desired end state. Control, which 2989 is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the 2990 commander’s intent (ADP 6-0), requires a shared understanding of the operational environment and 2991 operational approach in a counterinsurgency. A lack of effective control over these activities can create 2992 gaps that insurgents can exploit. For example, if brigades or different divisions set different prices for 2993 weapons buyback programs or have different policies on wages, this sometimes creates situations that 2994 hamper the overall policy. A lack of understanding of the economic variables within a country can produce 2995 policies that undermine a weapons buyback program or distort the labor market. On the other hand, there 2996 might be cases in which one wants to allow a local commander more flexibility in setting such policies. The 2997 balance between local control and coordination of overall policy is one of the primary challenges facing the 2998 commanders and staffs of brigades, battalions, and regiments. 2999

6-8. The commander bases the level of flexibility and coordination of activities and policies on the 3000 operational environment and the commander’s intent. Conditions vary within a country or region and the 3001 cities and towns within it. For example, while different policies on wages could produce a disjointed 3002 overall policy, it is also possible that different wages are justified by the economic environment in different 3003 areas in the country. One city could have low unemployment, while another city could have high 3004 unemployment. The different conditions in the labor market is something commanders should take into 3005 account when designing a policy on economic development and hiring local workers. 3006

6-9. The various activities that different units perform must also work within the operational approach of 3007 the joint commander. The joint commander is responsible for designing the overall operational approach of 3008 the counterinsurgency campaign. The joint commander has to ensure that that various activities being 3009 performed will meet the stated policy goal of the U.S. Subordinate commanders must ensure that their 3010 operational approaches and activities fit within the overall operational approach. Tactical actions must 3011 produce a strategic result, and every echelon of command shares a responsibility for ensuring that this 3012 occurs. Commanders understand the end state and the ramifications of their actions in meeting that end 3013 state. In a counterinsurgency, operations are interrelated, and they must support the overall commander’s 3014 intent. 3015

6-10. Moreover, understanding the problem and having key leaders engage the population may be more 3016 important than having a large number of troops. Understanding and analysis drive planning. Understanding 3017 what one should do is more important than doing tasks that may be counterproductive. Also, constant 3018 engagement of key leaders with the population is essential to enhancing understanding of the population 3019

Command and Control and Mission Command


and understanding of the counterinsurgency. Having a robust headquarters or multiple headquarters may be 3020 more important than having a large number of Soldiers or Marines. 3021

6-11. A larger number of headquarters may also provide a further ability to work with the interagency and 3022 host-nation organizations. The interagency organizations can integrate their capabilities more effectively if 3023 there is a robust headquarters element to work with. The analysis and intelligence capabilities of a division 3024 or corps headquarters may be essential in integrating interagency organizations’ capabilities. These division 3025 and corps capabilities provide brigades the needed span of control to operate and integrate interagency 3026 organizations capabilities. Using multiple headquarters provides a robust capability for working with the 3027 host-nation organization, both military and civilian. Many programs meant to build capacity within the host 3028 nation are national level programs. A robust headquarters element will help to ensure that these programs 3029 are integrated and resourced to maximize the benefit to the counterinsurgency effort. This is needed to 3030 ensure that these programs are effective at the local level. 3031

6-12. A headquarters can also serve as a coordination center. A coordination center can provide a means to 3032 unify multiple governmental, military, police, and civilian partners to share information, provide support to 3033 priority projects, gather information, conduct meetings with local leaders, promote a whole of government 3034 and unified effort approach, and lend added credibility to the government. Coordination centers provide 3035 needed flexibility to control and coordinate host nation and coalition actions. Coordination centers can also 3036 act as joint tactical operations centers and integrate various joint capabilities, such as air support. 3037

6-13. Finally, every echelon has to ensure that adjacent units or units working in another unit’s area of 3038 operations have relationships that allow for the overall completion of the end state. The operational 3039 environment does not normally dramatically change at a unit boundary. It is essential in a 3040 counterinsurgency to understand the actual economic, political, and social boundaries of an operating 3041 environment and not base policies on unit boundaries. Moreover, the relationships between units that are 3042 adjacent is essential. While the conditions in their operational environment may be different, commanders 3043 should understand their adjacent unit’s problem frame and operational approach. Moreover, they should 3044 understand how their actions may affect the operational environment of other units. It is essential for 3045 commanders at every echelon to ensure adjacent units have relationships that allow for the completion of 3046 the overall mission. 3047

6-14. The same is true of forces operating in another unit’s area of operations, such as special operating 3048 forces. While missions to capture an insurgent leader are may be essential to the overall mission, 3049 commanders must also work with other units to mitigate any negative consequences of those actions. It is 3050 the responsibility of commanders and staffs at all levels to ensure that the units under their command have 3051 productive relationships with other units. Establishing command and support relationships helps create 3052 channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the 3053 right people. The three common channels for information dissemination are known as command, staff, and 3054 technical channels. (See ADRP 6-0.) 3055

6-15. The effective link between planning and assessing the effects of operations is in a counterinsurgency 3056 is the foundation for establishing effective mission command. (See chapter 11 for more information on 3057 assessments.) Success in a counterinsurgency is largely dependent on making lasting changes to the 3058 operating environment. This requires that commanders and staff continue to evolve in their situational 3059 understanding. Linking planning and assessing one’s actions is essential. 3060

3061


Chapter 7 3062

Planning for Countering Insurgencies 3063

7-1. The planning process provides a means to understand the operational environment and understand 3064 the commander’s intent within that operational environment. (See ADRP 5-0). The activities of the 3065 operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) in a counterinsurgency are usually performed 3066 simultaneously. Multiple units perform multiple tasks at the same time within an ever changing operating 3067 environment. Developing situational understanding is a continuous process and counterinsurgencies 3068 involve evolving commander’s visualizations. As such, the continued conceptualization of the operational 3069 environment and problem is essential for effective mission command in a counterinsurgency. Effective 3070 mission command in a counterinsurgency requires conceptual planning that is continually refined and 3071 questioned through assessments. 3072

CONCEPTUAL PLANNING 3073

7-2. The complexity of insurgencies presents problems that have incomplete, contradictory, and changing 3074 requirements. The solutions to these challenging problems are often difficult to recognize because of 3075 interdependencies of the relationships of the operational environment. While attempting to solve these 3076 problems, the solution to one of its aspects may reveal or create another, even more complex, problem. 3077 Operational design employs various elements to develop and refine the commander’s operational approach 3078 (JP 5-0). Operational design involves conceptual planning. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to 3079 the art of operations and is the focus of the commander with staff support. The commander’s activities of 3080 understanding and visualization are key aspects of conceptual planning (ADRP 5-0). 3081

7-3. Design provides a method to perform conceptual planning. (Refer to JP 5-0 for more information.) 3082 The purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding, a proposed solution based on that 3083 understanding, and a means to learn and adapt. For the Army, the Army design methodology is a method 3084 for performing design. Army design methodology is an approach for applying critical and creative thinking 3085 to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for 3086 more information on the Army design methodology.) The Army design methodology is one way to develop 3087 an operational approach. First, design helps to frame the understanding of the operational environment by 3088 understanding what the current environment is and what the environment should look like. Understanding 3089 the operational environment is an essential foundation of counterinsurgency. (See chapter 2.) Commanders 3090 use the Army design methodology to create a shared understanding of the operational environment among 3091 commanders, staffs, and partners through a collaborative process. Commanders then use Army design 3092 methodology to create an understanding of what the environment should look like through the same 3093 collaborative process, which is known as the environmental frame. From there, commanders can actually 3094 begin to frame the problem and determine how to move the environment from the current state to the 3095 desired end state. This allows for the conceptualization of an operational approach, which is the general 3096 actions commanders can use to solve the problem. From an operational approach, the commander develops 3097 detailed planning. (See figure 7-1.) 3098

Chapter 7


Figure 7-1. Army design methodology 3099

7-4. The Army design methodology must be iterative and reframing is essential. Reframing involves 3100 revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. 3101 Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new plan. 3102 (See ADRP 5-0). By their nature, counterinsurgency efforts require repeated assessments from different 3103 perspectives to see the various factors and relationships required for adequate understanding. Assessment 3104 and learning enable incremental improvements to the operational approach. The aim is to rationalize the 3105 problem—to construct a logical explanation of observed events and subsequently construct the guiding 3106 logic that unravels the problem. The essence of this is the mechanism necessary to achieve success. This 3107 mechanism may not be a military activity—or it may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary 3108 activities. Once commanders understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they 3109 identify the means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. 3110 This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent reframing. 3111

7-5. In an ideal world, a commander engaged in counterinsurgency operations would enjoy clear and 3112 well-defined goals for the campaign from the beginning. However, the reality is that many goals emerge 3113 only as the mission develops. For this reason, counterinsurgents usually have a combination of defined and 3114 emerging goals to achieve. Likewise, the complex problems encountered during counterinsurgency 3115 operations can be so difficult to understand that a clear operational approach cannot initially be developed. 3116 Often, the best choice is to create iterative solutions to better understand the problem. Using Army design 3117 methodology allows the initiation of learning from intelligent interaction with the environment. 3118

7-6. Initially, situational understanding might be relatively low and the environmental and operational 3119 frame requires, by necessity, a number of assumptions, especially with respect to the populace and the 3120 force’s ability to positively influence their perception of events. Before deployment, improved situational 3121 understanding is aided by cultural and historical knowledge. The problem frame can be viewed as an 3122 experiment that tests the operational logic, with the expectation of a less-than-perfect solution. As the 3123 experiment unfolds, interaction with the populace and insurgents reveals the validity of various 3124 assumptions, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the design. Other key considerations include the 3125 following: 3126

Planning for Countering Insurgencies


Systems thinking. 3127 Continuous assessment. 3128 Structured learning. 3129

7-7. System thinking involves developing an understanding of the relationships within the insurgency and 3130 the environment. It concerns the relationships of actions within the various lines of effort. This element is 3131 based on the perspective of the systems sciences that seeks to understand the interconnectedness, 3132 complexity, and wholeness of the elements of systems in relation to one another. 3133

7-8. Continuous assessment is essential as an operation unfolds because of the inherent complexity of 3134 counterinsurgency operations. No design or model completely matches reality. The object of continuous 3135 assessment is to identify where and how the design is working or failing and to consider adjustments to the 3136 design and operation. (See chapter 11 for more information on assessments.) 3137

7-9. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and then learn, adapt, 3138 and iteratively and continuously improve the initial plan as more about the dynamics of the 3139 counterinsurgency problem become evident. The problem and environmental frame can be thought of as a 3140 model. In counterinsurgency, this model must always be tested to determine how well it matches reality. 3141 Ensuring that one understands the problem is core to ensuring that tactical actions have an effect on the 3142 environment. 3143

Center of Gravity 3144

7-10. An important element of conceptual planning is center of gravity analysis. The center of gravity is 3145 important in understanding both the environment and the enemy. A center of gravity is a source of power 3146 that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The center of gravity 3147 construct is useful as an analytical tool to help counterinsurgency forces analyze the insurgency’s sources 3148 of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Centers of gravity may change over time, they may 3149 be different at the operational and strategic level, and they could be different from location to location. (See 3150 JP 2-01.3) 3151

7-11. In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for the enemy. A center of 3152 gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, 3153 or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions. Any center of gravity analysis in a 3154 counterinsurgency must begin with understanding that any counterinsurgency is unique, and a center of 3155 gravity analysis must not begin with a preconceived center of gravity. 3156

7-12. Moreover, it is important to understand one’s own and the host nation’s center of gravity. In many 3157 cases, political support is the strategic center of gravity for the U.S. Tactical actions, such as war crimes, 3158 can undermine political support for the counterinsurgency. Host nations may also have a wide range of 3159 centers of gravity. Operational and tactical leaders must plan and execute operations that do not undermine 3160 the host nation’s center of gravity. 3161

Lines of Effort 3162

7-13. One important planning tool to move conceptual planning to detailed planning are lines of effort. 3163 Understanding drives the commander’s visualization of an end state in the context of the objectives set by 3164 the commander. An end state are those conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. (ADP 5-0) 3165 Generating understanding of operational environments and understanding the comprehensive threat allows 3166 the commander to determine the set of conditions his force must create to counter the insurgency. The 3167 complex nature of counterinsurgency requires tactical commanders at every echelon to visualize end state 3168 conditions. In a counterinsurgency, the most desirable end state is the conceptualization that the host nation 3169 is legitimate by the population. Different strategic contexts may dictate different end states. For this reason, 3170 establishing lines of effort is an effective way to structure counterinsurgency plans and operations. 3171

7-14. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical 3172 reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). A line of 3173 effort is a tool for long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary are not the 3174

Chapter 7


determining factor in friendly action. Because counterinsurgency operations involve many nonmilitary 3175 factors, lines of effort may form a way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of 3176 effort help commanders visualize how to integrate military capabilities into the efforts of the rest of the 3177 unified action community. 3178

7-15. Lines of effort are an important tool to link conceptual planning to detailed planning. Lines of effort 3179 are an essential means that commanders can use to arrange tactical events in time and space. Benefits of 3180 using the line of effort framework include— 3181

Aiding the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing operations toward a definitive 3182 end state. 3183

Unifying the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, host-nation government, and host-nation 3184 security forces toward a common purpose. 3185

Allowing commanders and staffs to synchronize activities along all lines of effort to gain unity 3186 of effort. 3187

Ensuring all efforts converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state. 3188 Combining the effects of long-term operations with short-, mid-, and long-term goals. 3189 Helping commanders identify missions, assign tasks, allocate resources, and assess operations. 3190 Enhancing mutual support between echelons and adjacent organizations. 3191

7-16. Lines of effort are different then lines of operation. A line of operation is a line that defines the 3192 interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or 3193 decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s) (JP 5-0). Because counterinsurgencies are 3194 oriented towards an intended outcome or purpose more so than an enemy force, counterinsurgency 3195 operations generally use lines of effort. However, this does not mean that lines of operation are not useful 3196 as a planning tool in a counterinsurgency. For example, if the counterinsurgency is conducting an attack 3197 into an insurgency safe heaven, lines of operation are useful. 3198

7-17. Lines of effort depict how the actions of a counterinsurgent, over time, achieve the end state 3199 visualized by the commander. In a counterinsurgency, lines of effort must be nested to the actions and 3200 activities of the host nation as well. From the tactical level to the strategic level, the goal of the 3201 counterinsurgent may be to support the host nation, depending on the operational design of the 3202 counterinsurgency. While that may require some tactical actions that do not involve host-nation forces, the 3203 overall effort must be to support the host nation’s efforts at all levels. The counterinsurgent forces support 3204 and nest their efforts within the efforts of the host nation’s strategic and operational approaches. 3205

7-18. Each line of effort must be consistently questioned and evaluated. Lines of effort are important 3206 because they help in the conceptualization and visualization of various tasks. However, if the tasks are 3207 linked together and the end state is not important to the mission or the tasks will not attain the end state, 3208 lines of effort can trap the commander into a preconceived notion that accomplishment of various tasks will 3209 result in a successful completion. Lines of effort are a useful means to help plan activities, not a measure of 3210 mission success. All leaders must guard against the assumption that their actions are relevant because they 3211 support a line of effort. The underlying assumptions of any line of effort must be constantly questioned and 3212 evaluated. 3213

7-19. The effects of actions in one line of effort are not contained to only that line of effort. For example, 3214 the commander could have a line of effort to support the rule of law and a line of effort to support 3215 economic development. However, a working legal system has a direct effect on the economic system. A 3216 system, in which contract law is enforced, for example, will have a much wider range of economic activity. 3217 Lines of effort are used for planning and conceptualization. Both commanders and staffs must guard 3218 against their own planning tools creating preconceived notions about the operational environment. 3219

7-20. Below is one example of lines of effort in a counterinsurgency. However, while this is an example 3220 that may apply well to a counterinsurgency after a large-scale combat operations, it may not apply well to 3221 other counterinsurgency operations. For example, the U.S. could be providing only enablers for a 3222 counterinsurgency effort. In other words, U.S. forces might be combining capabilities such as 3223 counter-threat finance, signal intelligence, and a direct action force to enable the host nation by stopping 3224 the insurgency from attaining the means to fight, providing intelligence on an insurgency’s 3225



communications, and providing a means to capture or kill insurgent leadership. The host nation may have 3226 the capability to handle basic functions such as governance. When designing lines of effort for a 3227 counterinsurgency, the context one is operating in does matter. If one reduces lines of effort to a standard 3228 solution, the tool becomes supreme, instead of the function the tool performs. In a counterinsurgency, 3229 tactical actions must be connected to operational and strategic purpose. Lines of effort are a means to help 3230 the commander perform operational art. Use of the tool of lines of effort without performing the function 3231 will produce tactical actions not connected to a strategic purpose. Tactical actions not connected to an 3232 operational and strategic end state are ineffective and may not lead to the desired end state. 3233

Chapter 7


Figure 7-2. Lines of effort 3234



Transitions 3235

7-21. Transitions are fundamental to the planning and execution of any line of effort. Transitions are an 3236 internal part of any operation and their integration into each line of effort is essential. There are three types 3237 of transitions in counterinsurgency operations: 3238

Transitions between phases. 3239 Transitions between units in an area of operations. 3240 Transitions of responsibilities to host nation or other agencies. 3241

7-22. A transition between units or phases or a transition to another agency or the host nation represents an 3242 important milestone. A counterinsurgency seeks to change certain variables in the operational environment 3243 to influence the population’s perception of legitimacy and to defeat the insurgency. As such, transitions are 3244 different from conventional warfare, in which transitions are likely to be based upon a unit’s movements 3245 and enemy actions or conditions. 3246

7-23. Because transitions are based on the conditions of the operational environment, they must be a part 3247 of both the planning process and based on assessments of the operational environment. Transitions in 3248 counterinsurgency are essential because they show progress towards the desired end state. However, the 3249 commander must link transitions to an assessment process that allows the commander to attain situational 3250 understanding. A transition to another phase or a transition to the host nation delinked from the assessment 3251 process can undermine the achievement of the end state. For example, a transition to a host-nation agency 3252 before that host-nation agency is ready to assume responsibility will ultimately have the effect of 3253 undermining the legitimacy of the host nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic expectations of the 3254 population. 3255

7-24. Transitions and assessments are planned and executed from the beginning of any counterinsurgency. 3256 Commanders build legitimacy by ensuring that the host nation takes responsibility for basic functions when 3257 it can. Therefore, building towards and executing that transition to the host nation is fundamental to the 3258 commander’s planning and operations. Transitions to other units or other agencies maintain a coherent and 3259 logical progression towards an ultimate transition to the host nation. The commander avoids allowing any 3260 U.S. element to transition to another U.S. or coalition element in a way that sets back the mission. This is 3261 also true for transitions between phases. A transition to another phase before the operational environment 3262 allows that transition can have disastrous consequences. 3263

7-25. Effective counterinsurgency is about effectively linking offense, defense, and stability tasks to a 3264 purpose and achieving that purpose. This is what makes lines of effort an effective planning tool for a 3265 counterinsurgency. However, linking both assessments and transitions into each line of effort is just as 3266 essential. The end state of every line of effort will be the host nation taking over primary reasonability for 3267 that effort. Transitioning to that point requires a well planned effort that evaluates progress and executes all 3268 transitions in a way that does not undermine the objective of the line of effort. (See chapter 11 for a further 3269 discussion on assessments.) 3270

Transition Considerations 3271

7-26. A transition is a sequence of actions required to shift responsibility from one organization to another, 3272 not a specific point in time. Transitions require adequate time to allow for all transitional tasks to be 3273 completed. Thinking of a transition as a general series of actions rather than a point in time more accurately 3274 reflects what must occur. 3275

7-27. Whether the transition is between military units or from a military unit to a civilian agency, all 3276 involved organizations must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being transferred and the time 3277 expected for completion. Commanders and staffs enable coordination between units, agencies, and 3278 organizations to reduce the friction normally associated with a transition. Commanders identify a 3279 collaborative transition planning team early in the process. 3280

7-28. Commanders and staffs identify the criteria and conditions that must be met with regard to lines of 3281 effort prior to executing a transition. For example, transitioning a strongpoint to host-nation control may 3282 require the host nation to allocate specialized personnel to replace the specialized personnel previously 3283 provided by other forces. Additionally, host-nation manning may need to be increased to offset the 3284

Chapter 7


departure of transitioning forces. Commanders identify criteria for all parties involved or gaps will develop 3285 in execution. One criteria is the minimum sustainable effort of the host nation prior to transition. Getting 3286 the balance for host-nation sustained effectiveness and long-term maintenance right may reflect a less than 3287 optimal solution from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, but any additional effort may actually 3288 jeopardize the legitimacy of the host nation in the long term. 3289

7-29. The counterinsurgency force understands that transitions occur at varying times and locations based 3290 on the situation in a given area. A transition may be linear at the local level, but transitions may occur at 3291 multiple levels in the aggregate. For example, one battalion or brigade may have three village clusters in a 3292 build phase, one that has transitioned, and two that are in a clear phase without any geographical context. 3293 One host-nation security unit may be more advanced in training and equipping than another. As a result, 3294 counterinsurgent forces may have to tailor their approach on a daily basis depending on the area, village, or 3295 unit where they are operating. Success in counterinsurgency operations requires small-unit leaders agile 3296 enough to transition among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. 3297

7-30. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between 3298 organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions. 3299 A poorly executed transition affects the success of the mission and places the new unit at risk. Ego and 3300 unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition, increasing 3301 unnecessary risks to Soldiers, Marines, and the mission. Commanders must set the tone for their forces to 3302 accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions. 3303

7-31. A successful transition is achieved when it is executed properly and in synchronization with all the 3304 relevant organizations, entities, and agencies. Planning for transitions is more than the identification of the 3305 events that govern phases and branches for planning. It requires a holistic framing to develop the full 3306 appreciation of the tasks, time, and resources required to execute effectively and efficiently in a 3307 counterinsurgency environment. Well-planned transitions require proactive analysis and continuous 3308 assessment during execution. Assessment of qualitative and quantitative criteria, supported by expert 3309 opinion, should inform the decision to transition. 3310

DETAILED PLANNING 3311

7-32. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation 3312 and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). Commanders 3313 use the military decisionmaking process to conduct the detailed planning that is required in an insurgency. 3314 Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Conceptual 3315 planning provides the basis for all detailed planning, but conceptual planning must respond to detailed 3316 constraints (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the military decisionmaking process). 3317

7-33. The conceptual planning efforts in an insurgency are often not under a real time constraint, in that 3318 they are a continued and ongoing process. However, often in detailed planning there are time constraints. 3319 Counterinsurgents often receive time sensitive intelligence or mission requirements that require 3320 commanders and staffs to consider time as a key planning factor. In such cases, commanders allocate 3321 subordinate commands adequate time to conduct planning before an operation. Both parallel planning and 3322 the one-third, two-third rule are essential in detailed planning. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on 3323 planning.) 3324

7-34. Mission command requires disciplined action that is informed by the commander’s intent. In a 3325 counterinsurgency environment, small unit leaders must also understand the overall design of the operation 3326 and the operational environment. It is essential to understand the commander’s intent, but it is also essential 3327 to have a shared understanding of the operational environment and the overall design of the operation. 3328 Subordinate commanders tailor and prioritize their actions within the lines of effort based on the distinct 3329 and evolving circumstances within their respective areas of operation. Small unit leaders work on obscure 3330 problems with host-nation, international, and unified action partners. In such an environment, the 3331 commander’s overarching design and a shared understanding of the operational environment inform 3332 detailed planning. Subordinate leaders must understand the overall operational design and environment to 3333 make their actions relevant to the end state. 3334



COUNTERINSURGENCY PARADOXES 3335

7-35. A commander planning a counterinsurgency requires a specific mindset before that commander can 3336 plan or execute operations, and that mindset is the foundation for understanding how to counter an 3337 insurgency. Throughout conceptual and detailed planning, the counterinsurgency paradoxes described in 3338 paragraphs 6-51 through 6-58 provide a set of contradictions that aid the commander and staff in 3339 developing a counterinsurgency mindset. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. 3340 The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in 3341 particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the statement that “sometimes, the more force used, the 3342 less effective it is”, does not apply when the enemy is coming over the barricades;; however, that thought is 3343 applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced 3344 to a checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought. 3345

SOMETIMES, THE MORE YOU PROTECT YOUR FORCE, THE LESS SECURE YOU MAY BE 3346

7-36. Ultimate success in counterinsurgency operations is gained by protecting the populace, not the 3347 counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, 3348 appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. To be successful, commanders 3349 employ aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations, and they share risks and 3350 maintain contact with the populace. Commanders weigh the effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and 3351 operational support bases against the security of using larger unit bases. Establishing patrol bases ensures 3352 access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Sharing risks with the populace reinforces the 3353 connections with them that help establish real legitimacy. 3354

SOMETIMES, THE MORE FORCE IS USED, THE LESS EFFECTIVE IT IS 3355

7-37. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force the 3356 commander applies, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also 3357 increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, 3358 using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. The key to 3359 successful counterinsurgency operations is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be 3360 counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of 3361 timing regarding insurgents’ actions. 3362

THE MORE SUCCESSFUL THE COUNTERINSURGENCY IS, THE LESS FORCE CAN BE USED 3363 AND THE MORE RISK MUST BE ACCEPTED 3364

7-38. This paradox is really a corollary to the paradox described in paragraph 6-52. As the level of 3365 insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to 3366 a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of 3367 engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines 3368 may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people. 3369

SOMETIMES DOING NOTHING IS THE BEST REACTION 3370

7-39. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing 3371 counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for example, 3372 opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it removes from 3373 the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive 3374 effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting. 3375

SOME OF THE BEST WEAPONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS DO NOT SHOOT 3376

7-40. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and 3377 legitimacy for the host-nation government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (although 3378 killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds;; hence 3379

Chapter 7


synchronizing influence operations with lines of efforts along the other lines of effort is critical. Every 3380 action, including uses of force, must be supported by adequate information. While security is essential to 3381 setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, 3382 and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more 3383 important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when money is ammunition. Depending on the 3384 state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to accomplish many nonmilitary 3385 missions to support counterinsurgency efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department 3386 of State and civil affairs personnel. 3387

THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US 3388 DOING IT WELL 3389

7-41. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where 3390 the U.S. is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable host-nation leaders and 3391 institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. 3392 public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces 3393 and government. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, recognized this fact 3394 when he said, “There’s very clear evidence,…in some things, that we helped too much. And we retarded 3395 the Vietnamese by doing it.…We can’t run this thing.…They’ve got to run it. The nearer we get to that the 3396 better off they are and the better off we are.” T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the 3397 Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better 3398 the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it 3399 for them.” However, a key word in Lawrence’s advice is tolerably. If the host nation cannot perform 3400 tolerably, the counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the area of 3401 operation, and cultural sensitivity are essential in deciding when such action is necessary. 3402

IF A TACTIC WORKS THIS WEEK, IT MIGHT NOT WORK NEXT WEEK; IF IT WORKS IN 3403 THIS PROVINCE, IT MIGHT NOT WORK IN THE NEXT 3404

7-42. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates 3405 constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices and rapidly 3406 disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a counterinsurgency tactic 3407 is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective 3408 leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no single 3409 prescribed set of counterinsurgency procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential. 3410

MANY IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE NOT MADE BY GENERALS 3411

7-43. Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines 3412 at all levels. Indeed, young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic 3413 consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear 3414 guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders 3415 requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their 3416 local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and 3417 sound judgment in accordance with their senior commander’s intent. 3418

3419


Chapter 8 3420

Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies 3421

8-1. The U.S. possesses many different indirect methods to counter an insurgency. Some of these 3422 capabilities may also contain elements that directly involve U.S. forces. For example, security cooperation 3423 also may include combat operations in support of foreign internal defense. (See JP 3-22 for more 3424 information on foreign internal defense.) If U.S. forces become directly involved in offensive operations, 3425 the overall operational approach has a direct element to it. The overall operational approach may involve 3426 the integration of both indirect and direct capabilities. This chapter discusses methods and capabilities that 3427 have a greater indirect element than direct element. 3428

8-2. Generational engagement is an indirect method that seeks to persuade the population to take part in 3429 the legal methods of political discourse and dissent. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve an 3430 insurgency by negotiating the root causes of the insurgency and the issues and challenges with the 3431 government and people. Security cooperation is a capability that can be used to build a host nation’s armed 3432 forces or other security forces. The U.S. also has other enablers, such as counter threat finance, that can be 3433 used to enable a host nation’s security force. These various indirect approaches and capabilities can be used 3434 in conjunction with one another and integrated into an overall approach. 3435

GENERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 3436

8-3. Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches 3437 that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of 3438 political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where the 3439 insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method 3440 as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement is a population centric approach 3441 to combating insurgency. Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation 3442 population to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of 3443 the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation. 3444

8-4. Generational engagement works with factions from the relevant population to get them to see the 3445 benefit of participating in peaceful means to address their core grievances. Getting youths to understand the 3446 legal means they have to address root causes of conflict is a critical tool for reducing violence. If 3447 commanders and staffs believe that insurgencies may occur over extended periods, then some efforts must 3448 be made to engage this next generation of leaders who can establish a lasting peace. Engagement also has 3449 to be made with the intellectual elites of the country. They may still be residing in the country of conflict or 3450 in another country that has significant influence over the insurgent cause. An example of getting youths 3451 involved can be seen in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 3452

8-5. In 2008 in Afghanistan, the U.S. government and U.S. forces influenced the government of 3453 Afghanistan to support the creation of the Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization. This is a nonprofit 3454 social and cultural organization dedicated to helping young Afghans understand and advance real 3455 democracy. The Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization has a grassroots network in all 34 provinces of 3456 Afghanistan. Its members consist of young men and women who are interested in rebuilding the 3457 democratic, economic, and social fabric of their country. 3458

8-6. The members of the Afghanistan Youth and Social Organization have been able to unite 30,000 3459 independent youths throughout the country to have a unified voice and establish an active grassroots 3460 network of young activists. They conducted voter outreach to 50,000 individuals in the 2009 presidential 3461 and provincial council elections and assisted 17 of its members getting successfully elected as provincial 3462 counselors. They were effectively represented in youth affairs throughout the country, especially in the 3463 traditionally volatile areas of the South and East of Afghanistan where Afghanistan Youth and Social 3464 Organization members head the department of youth affairs in a number of provinces. They successfully 3465

Chapter 8


implemented projects funded by international donors on anticorruption, education for vulnerable 3466 populations, voter education, and field assessments. The Marine Commander of the 7th Marine Regiment, 3467 after returning from Afghanistan in 2011, indicated in his after action report, that U.S. forces need to work 3468 extremely hard to empower the elders of the society but work harder to win the information operations with 3469 the younger males and get them involved in the political process. 3470

8-7. Another example of youth engagement can be found in the insurgency in Vietnam. In Vietnam, the 3471 U.S. military and Department of State, along with the government of South Vietnam, established several 3472 youth groups that were very successful. For example, the 4-T Youth Club was modeled after the American 3473 4-H organization. In the end, over 2000 4-T clubs have served as a model of success for organizing youths 3474 at the grassroots level. The Republican Youth Movement, National Revolutionary Movements, and 3475 personnel labor revolutionary parties were all models of successful youth engagement strategies, taking 3476 away prospective fighters for the Vietcong. Youth programs were seen as generators of self-esteem for the 3477 participants and tended to work out pent-up student energy by deploying them to the provinces. In this 3478 connection, youth programs proved beneficial. The conclusive report on youth programs in Vietnam was 3479 declassified in 1988. It concluded with this statement: Youth groups rank second only to the in-country 3480 intellectuals as potential transmitters for the stimulus required for social change. 3481

NEGOTIATION AND DIPLOMACY 3482

8-8. Negotiation and diplomacy are ways to resolve or defeat an insurgency. The counterinsurgent must 3483 influence the host-nation government and its subordinate elements (for example, the office of land reform) 3484 to remove the root causes that have led to acts of subversion and violence in order to seize, nullify, or 3485 challenge political control of a region. 3486

8-9. The goal of negotiation and diplomacy is to address the insurgent root cause and therefore reduce the 3487 causes for armed conflict. If a host nation can be influenced by U.S. government or military personnel to 3488 peacefully address root causes then the expected outcome is a reduction in violence and bringing the 3489 insurgents into the political process to have their issues resolved peacefully. If the host-nation government 3490 can do this successfully the insurgency may not totally go away, but it may only use force of arms in a 3491 limited context that would manifest as limited insurrections compared to a full blown armed insurgency. 3492

8-10. An example of how third party intervention with negotiation and diplomacy can have an effect on an 3493 insurgency is shown by the intrastate conflict in the Chiapas region of Mexico, between the Zapatista 3494 Liberation Army Mestizo land owners and the government of Mexico. The Zapatista Liberation Army has 3495 three root causes for its insurgent movement. The first is over indigenous control of land taken away by 3496 article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. The second is the application of social justice by legal recognition 3497 of indigenous rights. The third is the lack of social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and paved 3498 roads in the Chiapas region. 3499

8-11. The Mexican government has made efforts to address the root causes for insurgency. In reaction to 3500 U.S. demands, the government released several people from prison who has been characterized by human 3501 rights groups as political prisoners. The Mexican government also designated a special prosecutor to 3502 investigate and prosecute abuses reported back as far as 1970 by the National Human Rights Commission. 3503 This shows that a third party such as the U.S. can influence a nation to address the root causes of its 3504 insurgency through negotiation and diplomacy. 3505

8-12. Another example of how a third party can influence a country to address insurgents’ grievances is 3506 found in a 1997 document from the committee on the elimination of racial discrimination. The committee 3507 on the elimination of racial discrimination lauded the Mexican government for its efforts in creating and 3508 implementing sustainable welfare programs within the state of Chiapas, with spending surpassing 12 3509 million pesos, which was at that time the largest beneficiary of the federal budget. The Mexican 3510 government addressed the core grievance of the absence of social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, 3511 and paved roads in the Chiapas region by ensuring that a preponderance of the funds targeted for Chiapas 3512 went to the creation of a regional center for social action, building medical centers, investing in educational 3513 and material supplies for the care and feeding of 48% of the school population, and reconstructing roads 3514 and public works. While the Zapatista Liberation Army still exists today, it rarely resorts to violence in the 3515 path of seeking resolution of its issues. 3516

Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies


8-13. In a peacetime environment where U.S. forces are not committed to help a host nation combat its 3517 insurgency, U.S. military personnel can help influence a nation faced with an insurgency in the conduct of 3518 security cooperation activities and bi-lateral military exercises. If one of the insurgents’ root causes is 3519 against the host-nation military for human rights abuses or using heavy handed tactics with the local 3520 population, U.S. military personnel can work with the military wing of the government to find alternative 3521 ways of dealing with the population. 3522

8-14. In an armed conflict environment where U.S. forces have been sent in to assist a host nation to fight 3523 its insurgency, U.S. military personnel can not only work the host-nation armed forces to reduce causes for 3524 conflict, but also interact with U.S. and host-nation government personnel to take steps to peacefully 3525 address core grievances and root causes of conflict. 3526

IDENTIFY, SEPARATE, ISOLATE, INFLUENCE, AND 3527 REINTEGRATE 3528

8-15. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a method that combines several activities that 3529 affect relevant population groups. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where the 3530 insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. 3531

8-16. Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a proactive method of addressing root causes 3532 before a full blown armed insurgency can develop. Its purpose is to identify and separate the insurgents 3533 from the population. This is a primary requirement for forces conducting counterinsurgency. By identifying 3534 who is an insurgent and who is not, and then applying resources to separate insurgents from the population, 3535 commanders and planners can more effectively focus their efforts on making the insurgency feel isolated. 3536 Insurgents may then believe that their causes for conflict are not supported by the population. Once the 3537 insurgent leaders and members feel isolated from the population, peaceful efforts can be made to influence 3538 insurgents to surrender, return, and be reintegrated into peaceful members of society. 3539

8-17. The importance of influencing members of an insurgency to surrender cannot be overstated. And the 3540 importance of how that former insurgent is reintegrated into a peaceful society is also critical because the 3541 way a war is won will decide how long the peace will last. The Malayan insurgency is a good case study to 3542 illustrate how to influence and reintegrate former insurgents. 3543

8-18. The Malayan insurgency was a contest between the Malayan government’s armed forces and the 3544 Malayan National Liberation Army that lasted from 1948 to 1960. The Malayan Emergency was the 3545 colonial government's term for the conflict. The Malayan National Liberation Army called it the 3546 Anti-British National Liberation War, although Australian and British armed forces had fully withdrawn 3547 from Malaysia years earlier. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the 3548 term "emergency" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyds’ of London insurers if it had 3549 been termed a "war”. Despite the communist’s defeat in 1960, communist leader Chin Peng renewed the 3550 insurgency in 1967. The insurgency lasted until 1989, and it became known as the Communist Insurgency 3551 War. 3552

8-19. One of the root causes of this insurgency was the restoration of civil government following the end 3553 of World War II. During WW II, many of the Malayan tin mines and plantations had been destroyed to 3554 prevent the Japanese using them, so the Malayan economy was slow to recover after the war. The Japanese 3555 occupation had also sown the seeds of future unrest. The Japanese had pursued a policy of divide and 3556 conquer by favoring the Malays while persecuting the Chinese who were already anti-Japanese due to the 3557 Japanese actions in China. This resulted in some violence in the period between the Japanese leaving and 3558 the British returning. Another cause for unrest was the British plan for a new constitution for Malaya, 3559 known as the Malayan Union. This new constitution was written with little regard and no consultation with 3560 the local population. This new constitution would remove the power of the Sultans and effectively change 3561 Malaya from a being a British protectorate to a British colony. This raised concerns among the Malay 3562 population that they would be swamped by the millions of ethnic Chinese and Indians living in Malaya. 3563

8-20. The Malayan government’s civil police were heavily involved in creating safe conditions for 3564 insurgents to surrender on their own accord. The government established the surrendered enemy personnel 3565 program. The government offered generous surrender terms and also increased the rewards for helping kill 3566

Chapter 8


or capture other insurgents. This created a moral dilemma in the mind of the insurgent. Insurgents had to 3567 decide whether to keep fighting, knowing their increased chances of death, or to surrender and live as 3568 peaceful members of society. Insurgents were well aware that those who surrendered on their own terms 3569 were not prosecuted after their surrender. The Malayan government also distributed leaflets and taped radio 3570 broadcasts telling insurgents they would be well treated if they surrendered, and that the life out of the 3571 jungle where the insurgency was being fought was a good one. 3572

8-21. It is a vital lesson. Counterinsurgents should offer a surrendered insurgent generous terms, and 3573 counterinsurgents should follow those terms. These terms helped the Malayan government defeat its 3574 insurgency. 3575

8-22. U.S. military commanders and planners should consider this case study. By separating the insurgent 3576 from the population, commanders and staffs make the insurgent feel vulnerable and also take from the 3577 insurgency the means for recruitment and logistical support. Planners and commanders should work toward 3578 creating liberal and generous surrender terms. It is also vital to protect the surrendered insurgent from 3579 reprisals from his former insurgent colleagues. 3580

SECURITY COOPERATION 3581

8-23. The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including building a host 3582 nation’s forces, may be essential. In the eyes of the people, the credibility of the host-nation government is 3583 key in counterinsurgency efforts to address the threat and conditions of instability. Because the host 3584 nation’s military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible element of the host-nation 3585 government’s power and authority, building the capacity of counterinsurgents includes the 3586 professionalization and development of the host-nation security force’s competence, capability, 3587 commitment, and confidence (see table 8-1). 3588

Table 8-1. Developing the host-nation security force 3589

Developmental area

Developmental indicators

Competence The host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate individual and collective skills in their respective warfighting or law enforcement tasks. They must also support institutional functions.

Capability Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately sized to accomplish their respective missions. The host-nation security force must be adequately manned and equipped at a level that is sustainable, given the host nation’s own resources. The host-nation security forces’ supporting institutions, such as their national level force generation and logistic agencies, must be organized and directed in a manner that adds value to the lower-level, host-nation security forces’ mission requirements.

Commitment The host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful transition of political power. It must also be committed to the security and survival of the state, the rule of law, the preservation of human rights, civil liberties for the population, and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active insurgency.

Confidence The host-nation population must believe that the host-nation security forces’ actions are always in the best interests of the people. The host-nation government must believe that the host-nation security force supports the government’s legal authority. Also, the international community must see the host nation’s security force as a force for good that respects human rights and the international law of war.

8-24. To enable a host-nation security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or coalition 3590 forces conduct various security cooperation capabilities. Commanders often view host-nation security force 3591 development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in the host 3592 nation’s ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because host-nation troops will 3593



normally prove more effective in conducting operations among the local population. Transitioning 3594 responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or 3595 coalition troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government. 3596

8-25. Security cooperation can be an effective means to shape and aid a host nation’s counterinsurgency 3597 efforts. In the case of El Salvador, the U.S. had limits on its level of direct involvement. The U.S. mainly 3598 aided the El Salvador government with security assistance. By following an effective strategy that linked 3599 this aid to governmental and military reform, the U.S. was able to shape the ongoing counterinsurgency and 3600 aid the government of El Salvador in defeating the insurgency. 3601

Security Cooperation in El Salvador 3602 In 1979, a group of disparate insurgent groups formed a coalition (the FMLN) that 3603 would become a significant threat to the Salvadoran government. They were 3604 opposed by the Salvadoran armed forces, at that time a barracks-bound, defensively 3605 minded organization with severe deficiencies in command and control, tactical 3606 intelligence, tactical mobility, and logistics. The Salvadoran army did poorly in 3607 combat, and its only significant successes early in the conflict were in intimidating 3608 and massacring the civilian population. 3609 The mid-1980s saw a massive U.S. aid effort, and considerable civilian and military 3610 reform. During the decade, the U.S. government spent more than $200,000 in aid 3611 per guerrilla. Congressionally constrained to a limit of no more than 55 military 3612 advisers and no combat troops, U.S. aid consisted of arms, military trainers, and 3613 reform and civic action programs. Several of these programs made slow progress 3614 because many in the Salvadoran military resented their imposition by an outside 3615 power. Though resentful of the imposition, many in the Salvadoran military 3616 recognized the incentive structure, where much U.S. aid was contingent on improving 3617 El Salvador’s human rights record. Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova 3618 said, “We know that improving our image is worth millions of dollars of aid for the 3619 country.” Even if many Salvadoran counterinsurgents were principally motivated by 3620 the flow of foreign aid, they did learn, they did increase in competence, and they did 3621 improve their human rights behavior. The idea of focusing on all aspects of the 3622 struggle, political, social, economic, as well as military, had taken root and continued 3623 to the end of the war. 3624

8-26. One issue with developing security forces in counterinsurgency is the issue of the quality versus the 3625 quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more 3626 important than quantity. While it is true that “quantity has a quality all its own”, to the extent that too small 3627 a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, and quantity and quality must be balanced to some 3628 degree, quantity is not a substitute for quality. 3629

8-27. U.S. or coalition efforts to develop the capability and capacity of the host-nation security force must 3630 focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan to 3631 develop the host nation’s capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, 3632 comprehensive assessment of the host-nation security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or coalition 3633 forces selects to assess the host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of security force 3634 being assessed. For example, assessment of the host-nation army may require a completely different set of 3635 criteria from those used to assess the host-nation police. Likewise, the host-nation border or customs police, 3636 local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must all be assessed according to their 3637 specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration the federal or local laws, political 3638 considerations, or tribal affiliations. 3639

HOST-NATION FORCE ASSESSMENT 3640

8-28. Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or coalition 3641 forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine assess another Army or 3642 Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct, fire department, 3643

Chapter 8


or sanitation department. One framework most U.S. land component personnel are familiar with is the 3644 doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities framework. When assessing a 3645 unit using this framework, commanders and staffs ask the questions listed in table 8-2. 3646

Table 8-2. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3647 framework. 3648

Assessment Areas Assessment Questions Doctrine Does the army have set doctrine that provides a foundation for training

and education? If it does, how is that doctrine developed and changed? What are the intellectual roots of the doctrine? Doctrine can play a foundational role in how an organization fights because it can create the foundation for what is trained and how the force is educated.

Organization How is your counterpart’s units organized? Do they have an institutional organization? Is the current organization meant to defeat a counterinsurgency, or is it organized to defeat another army?

Training What is your counterparts’ level of training in individual and collective tasks? Do they have an mission-essential task list? Does the host-nation staff your unit with personnel who have been through some kind of entry-level training, or are personnel inducted directly into the operating forces, where they receive on-the-job training? Does the host-nation security force employ any kind of training and readiness cycle, or is everyone on, all of the time?

Material Does the unit have a specific table of equipment established by higher headquarters? Of the major end-items on the table of equipment, how many do they have on-hand, and what percent are fully mission capable; what percent are operable, but degraded? Other than major end items, how is the unit stocked in the other classes of supply? What are their major deficiencies, and how does this affect readiness?

Leadership How well qualified are the unit’s leaders (mentally, physically, and morally)? Are they loyal to the host-nation government, do they uphold the rule of law, and can they be trusted to conduct partnered operations with U.S. or coalition forces? How willing are they to take advice from U.S. or coalition personnel? Are they vulnerable to influence by the insurgency? Does the host-nation security force have a quality noncommissioned officer corps?

Personnel Based upon the unit’s table of organization, how close is the unit to its formal staffing goals? What is the army’s ability to recruit members of society and replace members of the unit? How many personnel are actually present for duty on a given day? What are the top ten personnel issues, such as pay, discipline, drug abuse, infiltration by insurgents, and so on? Does an insider threat exist within the ranks of the host-nation security force? If so, is this the product of ineffective vetting of host-nation security force personnel and infiltration by insurgents, or are there cultural issues that could drive host-nation security force personnel to act out violently against their U.S. or coalition counterparts due to real or perceived injustices?

Facilities Does the host-nation security force organization have adequate facilities, such as barracks, office spaces, supply warehouses, armories, and maintenance facilities? Are adequate physical security and force protection measures in place? Does the host-nation security force have access to training areas and ranges? Are the ranges certified for specific weapons systems based upon range safety considerations such as surface danger zones?



8-29. When using the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3649 framework, commanders and staffs should consider policy as well. Are there weak or strong linkages 3650 between national-level goals and objectives, and the host-nation security force units? How are 3651 national-level policies promulgated, and are these policies adhered to, or scorned? 3652

8-30. Although the assessment metrics for host-nation police or other paramilitary forces may be different, 3653 the process and framework should be similar. Although not prescriptive, metrics for assessment of 3654 host-nation police forces might include issues such as investigations, case review, patrolling, logistics, 3655 administration, detention operations, training, evidence handling, biometrics, and community relations. In 3656 addition to assessing specific tasks, metrics should include military or police specific core competencies. 3657

8-31. One process for establishing an assessment framework for host-nation police, constabulary, 3658 maritime, or aviation organizations begins with the creation of working group staffed by security 3659 cooperation, law enforcement, or other subject matter experts. A working group brainstorms and then 3660 refines a list of lines of efforts and operational tasks for the host-nation security force, if such a list does not 3661 already exist. It is critically important to bear in mind all of the supporting functions that enable or facilitate 3662 the host-nation security force’s execution of its operational tasks. The working group then develops a 3663 framework similar to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 3664 framework, but tailored to the specific requirements and circumstances for the police, constabulary, or 3665 other type security force, and selects observable, measurable, and relevant metrics by which the host-nation 3666 security force organization will be assessed. 3667

8-32. U.S. or coalition forces working to develop the capability and capacity of host-nation security forces 3668 during the course of counterinsurgency operations must understand the difference between the assessment 3669 of host-nation security forces, and the fulfillment of higher headquarters’ reporting requirements. 3670 Assessment requires a steady, persistent cycle of observation across a broad framework, and then using 3671 those observations to inform plans for subsequent security cooperation activities, to include the preparation 3672 of official reports to higher headquarters. Historical examples of these kinds of reports include the 3673 operational readiness assessment submitted by advisor teams during operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the 3674 commander’s unit assessment tool prepared by advisors or partner units during operation ENDURING 3675 FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Reports like the operational readiness assessment and the commander’s unit 3676 assessment tool were designed primarily to inform key decisionmakers of the achievement or 3677 nonachievement of milestones necessary for the transition of responsibility for security to the host-nation 3678 security force, and do not necessarily constitute a valid or complete assessment framework by themselves. 3679 Preparation of required reports to higher headquarters rarely constitutes a complete assessment of the 3680 host-nation security force. 3681

8-33. A relationship with host-nation forces can provide important training for U.S. forces. Learning from 3682 how the host nation fights could benefit U.S. and coalition efforts in countering an insurgency. Upon a 3683 decision to become involved in an insurgency, U.S. forces learn how the host nation fights. If possible, the 3684 U.S. send officers and noncommissioned officers to professional military schools of the host nation. If the 3685 host nation does not have a developed institutional military, the U.S. finds means to teach leaders how the 3686 host nation operates. To the extent possible, host-nation forces are be built following host-nation doctrine 3687 or otherwise following the host nation’s traditional organization and approach. 3688

8-34. Security cooperation is a multi-echelon endeavor that builds the capability and capacity of the 3689 host-nation security force at the executive direction, generating force, and operating force levels. During 3690 counterinsurgency operations, U.S. or coalition forces may take a bottom-up approach to building the host 3691 nation’s capacity to defeat the insurgency and defend its sovereignty by first developing host-nation 3692 security forces at the small-unit level. This approach buys time and space for the host nation to develop 3693 capacity at higher echelons. In time, the host-nation security force establishes the capacity to generate its 3694 own forces through recruiting, vetting, and induction of enlistees as well as officer candidates; initial entry 3695 training for all personnel, to include basic warrior or police skills and advanced technical, tactical, and 3696 leadership training; and processes for promotion, noncommissioned officer training, and senior leader 3697 training. The host-nation security force must also develop processes for acquisition and life-cycle 3698 management of major end items, as well as processes for procurement of all classes of supply, and 3699 contracting of other services or capabilities. Further, at the executive direction levels, the host-nation 3700 security force must establish policies and a system of orders and directives that supports the host nation’s 3701

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statutory framework, and drives standardization of policies and procedures through a top-down flow of 3702 information and a robust command inspection program. In sum, U.S. or coalition personnel charged with 3703 conducting security cooperation activities in a counterinsurgency environment must look beyond the 3704 immediate tactical conditions on the ground and collaborate with multiple agencies to develop the 3705 supporting infrastructure required for the host-nation security force to sustain and re-generate itself over the 3706 long term. 3707

8-35. Counterinsurgency usually requires an adaptable campaign plan that includes specific objectives for 3708 all lines of effort, to include host-nation security force development. Comprehensive assessments of 3709 host-nation security force units conducted at regular intervals (possibly aligned with reporting 3710 requirements) provide critical information that can shape and inform U.S. or coalition units’ goals and 3711 objectives for host-nation security force development. One proven technique is to prepare a draft long 3712 range plan prior to deployment, and complete the plan once the initial assessment is complete. Following 3713 every subsequent assessment, the U.S. or coalition leadership develops new goals and objectives based 3714 upon the developmental needs of the host-nation security force, and then issues a fragmentary order with 3715 specific tasks for the advisor teams or partner units that support the new goals. 3716

8-36. Development of a host-nation security force cannot be detached from other operations. Development 3717 of host-nation security forces includes many subtasks that require synchronization across all warfighting 3718 functions and other lines of effort. Protecting the population requires that counterinsurgents also be aware 3719 of other enemies within the operational environment, to include foreign fighters, narco-traffickers, and 3720 common criminals. Host-nation security force developmental goals must include harmonized coordination 3721 among the various branches of the host-nation security force, particularly between the land forces and the 3722 police. All components of the host-nation security force must understand their own constitutional mandates 3723 and limitations. For example, the host-nation army must know if or when it has the authority to detain 3724 individuals suspected of a crime. Host-nation police forces must understand and support the rule of law, 3725 and ensure that their actions harmonize with the nation’s criminal courts, as well as with the prison system. 3726 Finally, when U.S. and coalition forces advise host-nation security force personnel, they must conduct the 3727 proper troop-to-task analysis to ensure that land forces orient their operations according to host-nation army 3728 doctrine, while police forces should be employed in a way that meets the expectations of the host-nation 3729 government and the people they protect. 3730

8-37. When working with host-nation security forces, U.S. and coalition forces have three primary 3731 functions: advise, assess, and assist. It is important to note that monitoring of host-nation security forces 3732 serves multiple functions, to include intelligence and operational security. U.S. or coalition forces must 3733 always be aware of the host-nation security forces leadership’s loyalty to the host nation and be sensitive to 3734 any perceived intentions on the part of the host-nation security force that may run counter to legitimization 3735 of the host-nation government. 3736

8-38. Unified action partners advise the host-nation security forces to affect changes in the way they 3737 operate. If the host-nation security forces are a model of military efficiency across all functions, no 3738 advising would be necessary. However, the only way the host-nation security force will undergo enduring 3739 growth and improvement is if it comes from within. Therefore, advisors must shape host-nation security 3740 force actions so that they make their own processes and systems work as intended. Prior to and during 3741 deployment, advisors must apply a motivated approach to learning and understanding the host-nation 3742 security force’s organizational design. To build effective working relationships, advisors need to possess a 3743 keen understanding of the host nation’s culture, social mores, and taboos. Language capability—focused on 3744 rapport-building words and phrases as opposed to just operational jargon—further enhances the advisor’s 3745 credibility and status. The ability to negotiate and communicate diplomatically is essential to effective 3746 advising. If possible, commanders and staffs send representatives to attend institutional schools of the host 3747 nation. 3748

8-39. Once the U.S. or coalition forces gain an understanding of their counterparts’ culture and 3749 organizational design and have completed an initial assessment of the host-nation security force unit’s 3750 capabilities and capacity, advising activities can commence. (See figure 8-1.) Advisors consider culture and 3751 the baseline assessment when choosing an approach to advising the host-nation security force. There are 3752 three approaches to developing a host-nation security force: teach, coach, or advise. 3753



Teaching involves a number of activities designed to impart knowledge or skills to host-nation 3754 security force counterparts, but the advisor or partner unit drives the process. 3755

Coaching also involves the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities, but the host-nation 3756 security force unit or individual assumes responsibility for applying what they have learned 3757 when executing counterinsurgency tasks. 3758

Advising simply involves providing advice to commanders and staffs on their actions. There is 3759 no longer a need to actively transfer knowledge. Advising is passive and allows the host nation 3760 to be the primary actor. 3761

Figure 8-1. Building host-nation capacity 3762

8-40. Regardless of the approach taken to developing the capabilities of the host-nation security force, a 3763 key corollary of security cooperation in counterinsurgency is to legitimize the host-nation security force in 3764 the eyes of the population. This is best accomplished by setting the conditions for the host-nation security 3765 force to conduct security and law enforcement operations independently and professionally. 3766

8-41. Assisting the host-nation security force in counterinsurgency means to provide or augment the 3767 host-nation security forces with U.S. or coalition capabilities or resources that they cannot generate on their 3768 own. Forms of assistance may include enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets 3769 and capabilities in support of the host-nation security force’s intelligence collection efforts. U.S. or 3770 coalition forces may provide assistance in the form of certain battlefield effects such as close air support, 3771 electronic warfare, secure long-range communications, or inform and influence activities. Assistance to the 3772 host-nation security forces often complements their nascent logistics capabilities, such as transportation or 3773 mobility, medical capabilities, or corrective maintenance support. Assistance may also come in the form of 3774 materiel support across one or more classes of supply. For example, the U.S. may provide host-nation 3775 security forces major end items such as vehicles or weapons systems through foreign military sales or 3776 excess defense articles programs, medical supplies through humanitarian assistance programs, or 3777 construction materials through authorities such as the commanders’ emergency response program. 3778 Historically, host-nation security force personnel have shown few reservations about asking U.S. forces for 3779 materiel or other forms of assistance. When pressed for assistance of any kind, U.S. or coalition personnel 3780 should ask themselves three basic questions: 3781

Do my counterparts really need this materiel or capability to accomplish their mission? 3782 Is there any way the host-nation security force could procure or acquire this resource or 3783

capability using their own systems, processes, or methods? 3784 Can the host-nation security force sustain this system or capability over the long term? 3785

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8-42. Commanders and staffs should consider the following example. Suppose that host-nation security 3786 force counterparts suspect that insurgent forces have established camps on the far side of a ridgeline where 3787 they assemble and conduct final preparations prior to conducting attacks into major towns in the area. 3788 These counterparts ask if the U.S. commander can arrange for coalition unmanned aircraft systems to 3789 maintain persistent surveillance over these suspected campsites to provide early warning of pending 3790 attacks. By posing the three fundamental questions in paragraph 8-41, it may be possible to determine other 3791 courses of action whereby the host-nation security force can produce and sustain the same effects. For 3792 example, the commander might offer the host-nation security force instruction how to build an intelligence 3793 collection plan and techniques for determining named areas of interest. Next, the advisors could coach their 3794 counterparts on determining what capabilities they have at hand to observe those named areas of interest. 3795 Can they establish permanent outposts or temporary observation posts that overlook these named areas of 3796 interest? Can they establish or improve relations with local police forces or tribal networks to establish 3797 hotlines linking the local population and the host-nation security force? The point is that although 3798 host-nation security force personnel often imagine U.S. or coalition technological or logistic capabilities as 3799 more powerful than they truly are, they also fail to consider or neglect their own capabilities that can 3800 ultimately achieve the same effect. 3801

8-43. It is also important to remember that decisions made at the strategic level may make little tactical or 3802 operational sense to local commanders and staffs. The is especially true with foreign military sales. For 3803 example, the U.S. may sell a major weapon system to a host nation that has inadequate means to maintain 3804 and support that weapon system. However, the sale may accomplish an essential political goal in the 3805 relationship between the host nation and the U.S. Moreover, it may ensure a continued relationship between 3806 the host nation and the U.S. If a host nation is dependent on the U.S. for maintaining a major weapon 3807 system, this gives the U.S. influence over a host nation’s decisionmaking process. 3808

RELATIONSHIPS 3809

8-44. Counterinsurgency operations require well-defined and understood relationships between U.S. and 3810 coalition forces and the host-nation security force. Insurgent forces will quickly identify and exploit gaps in 3811 the counterinsurgents’ leadership and cohesion. Clearly defined relationships that evolve as the host-nation 3812 security force’s operational capabilities grow are essential for effective mission command and facilitate a 3813 smooth transition to a host-nation security force lead for security. Broadly stated, there are five possible 3814 relationships worth considering for each specific counterinsurgency operation. These relationships are 3815 parallel commands, lead nation, partnered, integrated, and advisors. (See figure 8-2 on page 8-11). Each of 3816 these relationships requires U.S. or coalition forces to modify or adapt their organizations for combat to 3817 complement combined U.S. or coalition and host-nation security force counterinsurgency goals. 3818



Figure 8-2. Counterinsurgency relationships 3819

Parallel Commands 3820

8-45. A parallel command is when U.S. or coalition forces maintain their own command structure with no 3821 integration or partnership with a host nation. Under a parallel command structure, no single force 3822 commander is designated. This arrangement is suitable when the host-nation security force has well 3823 established, mature operational and institutional capabilities, and U.S. or coalition forces deploy to provide 3824 additional capabilities. The relationship may be based on U.S. forces being given a specific task. For 3825 example, U.S. forces may only conduct raids or only gather intelligence for the national command 3826 authority. It can also be based on the U.S. forces being given their own area of operations within a host 3827 nation. This can be done for various reasons, including that the area is sensitive to host nation forces and an 3828 external counterinsurgent may provide a temporary stabilization of the area. This arrangement supports unit 3829 cohesion. 3830

Lead Nation 3831

8-46. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one 3832 nation. This relationship works with one nation’s forces in the lead, and the supporting nation provides a 3833 unit or units that are attached, under operational control, or tactical control of the lead nation. This 3834 arrangement provides flexibility in that the U.S. or coalition force may initially serve as the lead nation, and 3835 as the operational capacity of the host-nation security force grows, the host nation can eventually assume 3836 the role of lead nation. In also provides a possible means for the U.S. to aid a host nation in an ongoing 3837 insurgency. For example, the U.S. could provide a brigade to a host nation in an ongoing insurgency. Like 3838 parallel command, this arrangement supports unit cohesion. 3839

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Partnered 3840

8-47. This arrangement differs from parallel command in that U.S. or coalition forces and the host-nation 3841 security forces are paired down to the small-unit level. Issues commanders and staffs consider include how 3842 to manage unity of command, logistics challenges, and language and cultural barriers. Partnering has the 3843 advantage of maintaining a degree of unit cohesion (individual units are still homogenous), and the specific 3844 capabilities of each nation’s force can be leveraged down to the small-unit levels. 3845

Integrated 3846

8-48. Integrate means to assemble forces from both the U.S. or coalition and the host-nation security force, 3847 and meld them into a single, inseparable unit. Integration, also referred to as augmenting, poses many 3848 challenges, but it has been used successfully in the past. For example, the Korean augmentation to the U.S. 3849 Army was a very successful program that integrated individual South Korean soldiers into Army units. This 3850 yielded units with enhanced manpower, as well as cultural and linguistic fluency down to the squad level. 3851 The drawback is that integration requires significant time to institutionalize and does little to enable the 3852 host-nation security force as a whole to assume lead responsibility for operations. Integration requires a 3853 single shared language for all personnel, so either the U.S. or coalition forces will have to learn the host 3854 nation’s language or host-nation security force personnel will have to learn English. Furthermore, 3855 integration of U.S. and host-nation security forces into a single coherent force requires significant 3856 combined training in individual and collective tasks, which will result in a period at the beginning of the 3857 deployment when the integrated force is not fully combat capable. This could result in extended 3858 deployment periods to compensate for this operational integration and training period. Finally, integration 3859 does little to build the capability and capacity of the host nation’s ministerial-level leadership or the 3860 security forces’ supporting institutions. 3861

Advisors 3862

8-49. When host-nation security force units achieve a certain degree of organizational maturity at a specific 3863 echelon, the U.S. or coalition forces may assign individuals or teams of advisors to perform any number of 3864 advisory tasks. One advantage of this approach is that is imposes the smallest possible U.S. or coalition 3865 force requirement. It also puts the host-nation security force in the most visible role of providing security in 3866 the eyes of the local population. Finally, since the basing and force requirements are relatively small for the 3867 U.S. or coalition forces, it is the most flexible and adaptable. Advisor teams can be quickly re-assigned to 3868 different host-nation security force units based upon capability gaps across the host-nation security force. 3869 (See FM 3-22 for more information on advisors.) 3870

SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING 3871

8-50. Security cooperation activities occur across the range of military operations. Two important activities 3872 relevant to counterinsurgency are foreign internal defense and security force assistance. Security force 3873 assistance consists of the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. 3874 Government to support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their 3875 supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies 3876 of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 3877 organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other 3878 threats to its security (JP 3-22). Moreover, security assistance, which are activities in which the U.S. 3879 provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan or credit, could 3880 be important in equipping and resourcing a counterinsurgency force. (For a further discussion on foreign 3881 internal defense, security force assistance, and security assistance, see FM 3-22). Both foreign internal 3882 defense and security force assistance represent important defense activities to build the capacity of a host 3883 nation to defeat an insurgency. 3884

8-51. Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan to 3885 develop and deploy a host nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a country 3886 that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an effective 3887 military. If there is a lack of an effective military, aid in the development of a host nation military could 3888 follow five phases: planning and resourcing, generation of host-nation security force, employment of 3889



host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security to host-nation security force, and 3890 sustainment of host-nation security force. U.S. or coalition forces conduct parallel planning with their 3891 host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in support of 3892 the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that lead to a 3893 successful transition from U.S. or coalition lead to host-nation security force lead for security. 3894

8-52. Security cooperation activities are part of both strategy and policy. In planning security cooperation 3895 activities, DOD starts with the National Security Strategy issued by the White House and expanded upon in 3896 overarching DOD guidance documents. The National Defense Strategy influences the Guidance for 3897 Employment of the Force, which provides the parameters for combatant commands to develop their theater 3898 and functional campaign plans, which include direction for the development of country plans. DOD plans 3899 take place in the context of the actions of other partner nations and with other nations. These activities take 3900 place throughout all phases of a joint operation. Figure 8-3 provides a graphic representation of this 3901 relationship. (See FM 3-22 for a detailed explanation on security cooperation activities and planning.) 3902

8-53. The focus on U.S. security cooperation efforts is to support the host nation’s internal defense and 3903 development. Internal defense and development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote 3904 its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its 3905 security (JP 3-22). Internal defense and development focuses on building viable institutions that respond to 3906 the needs of society. Security cooperation must work with and support a nation’s own internal defense and 3907 development programs. Within the context of counterinsurgency, it is essential that commanders and staffs 3908 understand and support a host nation’s internal defense and development strategy. In the long run, the host 3909 nation, and not the U.S., will either defeat of be defeated by the insurgency. Supporting a host nation’s 3910 internal defense and development plan is how the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. (See 3911 JP 3-22 for more information on internal defense and development.) 3912

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Figure 8-3. Country planning 3913

8-54. The joint phasing model provides a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations, but it 3914 does not provide a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations. The operation plan 3915 consists of six phases: 3916

Phase 0, shape. 3917 Phase I, deter. 3918 Phase II, seize the initiative. 3919 Phase III, dominate. 3920 Phase IV, stabilize. 3921 Phase V, enable civil authority. 3922

8-55. Shape, or phase 0 operations, are joint and multinational operations inclusive of normal and routine 3923 military activities. During phase 0, both the Army and Marine Corps perform security cooperation activities 3924 to indirectly support a host nation in countering an insurgency. However, security cooperation operations 3925 can continue through all phases of the operation. Many of these activities, such as foreign internal defense 3926 direct support and foreign internal defense combat operations directly use U.S. forces to counter an 3927 insurgency and are important in phase II and III, for example. Foreign internal defense, security force 3928 assistance, and other security cooperation activities are essential throughout the phases of any operation. 3929 (See JP 5-0 for more information on the joint phasing model.) 3930

8-56. If the U.S. commits forces to a counterinsurgency conflict, it will normally deploy a joint task force 3931 or coalition joint task force headquarters to provide planning and command and control. The coalition joint 3932 task force’s desired end state is to terminate the operation plan at the conclusion of Phase V, stand-down or 3933



redeploy the coalition joint task force headquarters, and revert to Phase 0 operations. The geographic 3934 combatant command and respective Service component commands, in coordination with the country team, 3935 resume security cooperation activities per the country plan. Counterinsurgency operations typically extend 3936 across all phases (0 through V). Therefore, U.S. or coalition security force assistance and foreign internal 3937 defense activities in support of the host-nation security force’s counterinsurgency conflict may occur under 3938 the auspices of the American ambassador to the host nation and the geographic combatant commander, or 3939 under the authority of the coalition joint task force commander. 3940

8-57. Typically, the first phase of building a host nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to the 3941 responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team. 3942 Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense 3943 activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of 3944 different sections of the United States Code (USC). For example, DOD-funded security force assistance 3945 activities fall under Title 10, USC, whereas DOD-funded security force assistance activities (implemented 3946 by the DOD) fall under Title 22. Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as foreign military 3947 sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense operations. 3948

8-58. Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host nation security force. 3949 If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which regiments or 3950 brigade combat teams will actually have an active role (see figure 8-4). These forces can partner with 3951 host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 3952 For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, 3953 host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed 3954 operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or 3955 ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 3956 the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level 3957 executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these, 3958 U.S. and coalition forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units, while assisting in 3959 the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip security force 3960 assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or coalition regiment- or brigade-sized units while they are 3961 simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to establish the 3962 host-nation security force’s own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or coalition 3963 personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult predicament 3964 in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from the 3965 immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the host-nation 3966 security force’s organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of the best 3967 host-nation security force leaders to operating force units, while neglecting to invest in their own force 3968 generation capacity. 3969

Chapter 8


Figure 8-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force 3970

8-59. The third phase of building a host nation security force is the employment of the host-nation security 3971 force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from 3972 organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding the host-nation security forces to employing the host-nation 3973 security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security 3974 force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process. 3975 Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the 3976 lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate 3977 host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small 3978 station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically 3979 have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their 3980 effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the 3981 trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders. 3982

8-60. The fourth phase of building a host nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of 3983 responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or coalition forces to the host-nation security force. In 3984 some instances, such as Colombia or the Philippines, the host-nation security force may already be mature 3985 and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, maritime). Security force assistance 3986 activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may only refer to a specific 3987 functions such as intelligence, or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks such as employment of remote 3988 sensors that supports the host-nation’s counterinsurgency strategic or operational goals. In these instances, 3989 the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting security force 3990 assistance in the form of equipment or training to close the capabilities gap. Once the gap is filled, the 3991 host-nation security force assumes responsibility for that function, and the U.S. forces redeploy, with the 3992 country team providing the host-nation access to long-term security assistance programs as appropriate. In 3993 other cases such as Iraq, U.S. or coalition forces may initially have to assume responsibility for all security 3994 tasks in all operational realms, and across all security force functions (land forces, police, border security, 3995 and so on). In the latter case, transition is a lengthy process with no clearly defined beginning or end date. 3996

8-61. Transition will likely be conducted in steps or subphases, and the steps or subphases may be either 3997 geographic, functional, or a combination of both. For example, the transition to host-nation security force 3998 lead for land force security operations may transpire one province at a time until the entire country has 3999 transitioned. A second example might be for transition to occur for land forces across the entire country by 4000 January 20XX, all police forces by June 20XX, and air and maritime forces by December 20XX, and so 4001 forth. A transition to a host-nation security force lead should be conditions or assessments-based, although 4002 the U.S. or coalition may elect to use a set transition date as a forcing function to compel the host-nation 4003 security forces to assume greater responsibility for securing their own country and their own people. 4004



Transitions will rarely be simple. In cases where U.S. or coalition general-purpose brigade combat teams 4005 deploy for extended tours such as 12-month rotations, units may find that they are supporting the 4006 host-nation security force transition to lead for security when they arrive in-country and still supporting the 4007 same transition when they re-deploy one year later. 4008

8-62. The fifth phase of building a host nation security force in counterinsurgency is sustainment. In this 4009 context, the term sustainment does not refer exclusively to logistic sustainment or combat service-support 4010 functions. Rather, sustainment is an ongoing set of security assistance activities (Title 22) and security 4011 cooperation activities (Title 10) designed to enhance the capabilities and capacity of the host nation to 4012 provide for its own security and to participate in regional or global multinational operations. These 4013 programs also seek to develop enduring relationships with key leaders within the host-nation security force 4014 and to facilitate peacetime or contingency access to host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, and 4015 training venues. As the transition to the host-nation security force lead for security draws to a close, there 4016 may be a number of security force assistance tasks that require an extended period to be completed 4017 properly. Examples include geographic combatant command-level security assistance programs such as 4018 foreign military sales of new equipment such as tanks, artillery, helicopters, or watercraft and subsequent 4019 deployment of mobile training teams to train the host-nation security force on the employment of these new 4020 weapons systems. Enduring geographic combatant command-level security cooperation activities such as 4021 international military education and training or rotational deployment of U.S. forces to conduct combined 4022 exercises with the host-nation security force serve to sustain and extend the development of the capability 4023 and capacity of the host-nation security force to deal with residual insurgent threats and potential future 4024 external threats to the host nation’s sovereignty. 4025

8-63. In a counterinsurgency, the host-nation security force’s executive and ministerial leadership, its force 4026 generation capacity, and its operating forces’ capabilities must develop and mature quickly, while U.S. or 4027 coalition forces initially provide time in the form of security to allow this process to succeed. U.S. or 4028 coalition forces must gradually reduce and eventually relinquish control of the counterinsurgency to the 4029 host-nation security force. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force provides the blueprint for 4030 what must occur from the U.S. or coalition side and the host-nation security force side of the operation. 4031 Both entities plan for transition to host-nation security force lead, but they approach the transition from a 4032 different perspective. Initially, teaching, coaching, and advising the host-nation security forces in their 4033 planning efforts is part of the overall process, but it ultimately will result in the host-nation security force 4034 having the capability and capacity to defeat the insurgency on its own. 4035

PARALLEL PLANNING 4036

8-64. When enabling a host nation to develop a security force, parallel planning is essential. Parallel 4037 planning is a time-saving technique that enables leaders at all levels from fire team to division to initiate the 4038 operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) prior to the receipt of a complete operation order. 4039 Parallel planning allows units to generate tempo by conducting a multi-tiered planning process. This 4040 reduces haste and provides all echelons more available time to prepare for future actions. Likewise, parallel 4041 planning with host-nation security forces enables greater efficiency and the ability to conduct simultaneous 4042 actions. It also serves as an essential step in the host-nation security force transition to the lead for security 4043 in a counterinsurgency. 4044

8-65. Parallel planning with the host-nation security force assumes adequate planning capabilities on the 4045 part of at least some of the host-nation security force commanders and staffs. When making this 4046 assumption, U.S. or coalition forces assume operational risks relating to the ability of the host-nation 4047 security force staffs to deliver on their planning requirements. Considerations when conducting parallel 4048 planning with the host-nation security force commanders and staffs may include, but are not limited to 4049 varying or competing agendas, lower literacy rates, access to computer technology, and use of graphics or 4050 visuals. U.S. commanders and staffs conducting parallel planning consider these points: 4051

U.S. or coalition forces have their own national security objectives, while host-nation 4052 counterparts may have conflicting objectives from the national to the local level. 4053

Literacy rates in many of the countries that the U.S. or coalition forces may partner with often 4054 fall far below that of the U.S. or other western countries. Lack of formal education, however, 4055

Chapter 8


does not preclude the host nation from being capable of understanding the western style of 4056 military planning. 4057

Access to computer technology in various host nations often does not match that of the U.S. or 4058 western countries. Manual methods of data collection, storage and dissemination may have to be 4059 used. 4060

Programs, whether computer based, or done on a terrain model, are based on western preference 4061 for the presentation of information through visual modalities. Successful counterinsurgency 4062 operations require U.S. or coalition advisors imbue their host-nation security force counterparts 4063 with the capability to process raw data into information that provides knowledge and leads to an 4064 understanding of an operational environment. 4065

8-66. Regardless of the difficulties of parallel planning, U.S. and coalition forces should make every effort 4066 to understand host-nation planning capabilities prior to conducting operations. Despite the many challenges 4067 presented by conducting parallel planning with host-nation security forces, U.S. and coalition forces should 4068 be completely integrated into the planning process as early as possible because they potentially bring to the 4069 counterinsurgency the specific and essential abilities shown in table 8-3 on page 8-19. 4070



Table 8-3. Host-nation contributions 4071

Task Reason for contribution Understand an operational environment

The area of operations is the host-nation’s home and their culture; they know the language, the different groups, the political situation, educational levels, economic considerations, historical bad actors, and unofficial community leaders.

Provide human intelligence The host-nation security force is better able to gather information that leads to human intelligence for a host of reasons, to include speaking the same language, understanding the important players in the area, and so on.

Put the pieces together The host-nation can often better integrate the different fragments of intelligence into the context of an operational environment.

Determine credibility of intelligence assets (sources, walk-ins, call-ins)

The host-nation possesses a vastly superior sense of cultural and situational awareness vital to managing and assigning credibility to sources.

Validate and check interpreters

The host-nation can confirm not only the interpreters' ability, but also the interpreters' loyalty.

Identify and root out infiltrators

The host-nation can pick out minute differences between normal and abnormal behavior.

Gain information superiority The host-nation can write messages that resonate with the local populace.

8-67. Tactical-level planners in the U.S. military employ either the military decisionmaking process or the 4072 Marine Corps planning process to gain an understanding of an operational environment, identify the tactical 4073 problem, develop possible courses of action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to most 4074 effectively address the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem. When 4075 given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiating directive, certain 4076 intelligence products, and an initial commander’s visualization, the commander and staff complete the steps 4077 to work toward a specified output, such as a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation security 4078 force leaders have been directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who survive 4079 often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation security force leaders 4080 apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of making decisions. They can immediately size 4081 up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously recognize dangers and opportunities, and decide upon a 4082 course of action. While this capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to others, and it is 4083 of no use in situations unrelated to the leader’s own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S. or coalition 4084 advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force counterparts for them to develop a 4085 planning and decision support process as opposed to allowing them to rely solely on the intuitive approach. 4086

8-68. U.S. and coalition planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analysis prior to parallel 4087 planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop and assess assumptions, identify 4088 implied and specified tasks, determine what assets and capabilities are available, and formulate a tentative 4089 timeline to coordinate advisory efforts throughout the planning process. 4090

OTHER INDIRECT ENABLERS 4091

8-69. The U.S. can integrate enablers into a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. These enablers can 4092 provide intelligence or prevent the flow of resources to a counterinsurgency. Various intelligence 4093 capabilities, such as signal intelligence and geospatial intelligence, may be essential to a host-nation’s 4094 counterinsurgency. Also, other enablers, such as airlift capabilities, might be important for 4095 counterinsurgency. Another capability that can be integrated into a counterinsurgency effort is counter 4096 threat finance. Counter threat finance works to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the 4097

Chapter 8


transitional financing of state and non-state enemies threatening the U.S. Counter threat finance can deny 4098 an insurgent access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding. In 4099 counterinsurgency, this can play an important role because of the connection between insurgencies and 4100 black markets. It provides one means to prevent an insurgency from obtaining resources. (For more 4101 information on counter threat finance, see the Joint Staff’s Commander’s Guide to Counter Threat Finance 4102 and DODD 5205.14.) 4103

4104


Chapter 9 4105

Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies 4106

9-1. The U.S. has a wide range of direct capabilities that it can integrate to create many different 4107 operational approaches to counter an insurgency. This chapter provides a list of methods and capabilities 4108 that are employed by land forces to directly intervene in an insurgency. These methods and capabilities 4109 provide a framework for a land commander to organize tactical tasks in time, space, and purpose to achieve 4110 a desired end state. Developing an operational approach is the essential product of the Army design 4111 methodology. These operational approaches are also integrated with other capabilities, including indirect 4112 capabilities, from the U.S., and this creates an overall operational approach for the U.S. The U.S. must 4113 develop an operational approach that addresses the challenges of a particular insurgency and meets the 4114 ends the U.S. wishes to achieve. 4115

9-2. Commanders and staffs may use the following methods in combination or independently to support a 4116 direct approach to countering insurgencies. In these operational approaches, U.S. forces act independently, 4117 partnered with a host nation, or as part of a coalition operation to actively address root causes of the 4118 insurgency and engage in activities to reduce the insurgent threat. Moreover, the Army and Marine Corps 4119 can also integrate enablers, such as indirect fires, into a host nation’s counterinsurgency efforts. The 4120 following is a list of direct methods to counter an insurgency: 4121

Shape, clear, hold, build, and transition. 4122 Attack the network. 4123 Targeting threat infrastructure. 4124 Strike operations. 4125

SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION 4126

9-3. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition is an operational approach commanders may select for 4127 counterinsurgency operations. This operational approach is based largely on an understanding of an 4128 operational environment and the problems facing the commander. Once the commander approves the 4129 approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. 4130

9-4. Commanders and staffs need to understand this method if they are training, advising, or integrating 4131 capabilities into a host nation effort. If a host nation is performing operations, whatever the U.S. role in the 4132 counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have some framework for understanding a host nation’s 4133 actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train another force unless they have a base of 4134 knowledge on the subject. In many counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by 4135 performing a general operational approach that is similar to shape-clear-hold-build-transition. 4136 Understanding shape-clear-hold-build-transition is a fundamental framework for understanding what units 4137 are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all units involved in the 4138 counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing actions, a member of a 4139 Special Forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command integrating and 4140 evaluating various security cooperation and other capabilities. 4141

9-5. Whether U.S. forces are executing shape-clear-hold-build-transition or another state is executing it, 4142 it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the government was 4143 successful in performing shape-clear-hold-build-transition, even if it was not called shape-clear-hold-build-4144 transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Understanding shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be 4145 essential in understanding what a host nation is trying to achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. 4146

Chapter 9


A Direct Approach: The Huks 4147 The Hukbalahap, or “Huks,” was one of several guerilla organizations that appeared 4148 in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. By the time of the 4149 country’s liberation from the Japanese occupation, the Huks were well-armed with 4150 weapons taken from the Japanese or shipped to them from the United States. 4151 The Philippines gained independence from the United States on July 4, 1946, and 4152 held its first national election in November 1946. The Huks participated in the 4153 elections, and the head of the wartime Huk movement, Luis Taruc, won a seat in the 4154 Philippine Congress. However, the newly elected president, Manuel Roxas, refused 4155 to seat Mr. Taruc or his allies in Congress, leading many Filipino peasants to join the 4156 Huk movement. 4157 By late 1946, there was open fighting between the Huks and the forces of the newly 4158 independent Republic of the Philippines. The insurgency was motivated by vast 4159 economic inequality during the country’s transition to an export-led capitalist 4160 economy, with abject poverty affecting 90 percent of the population. 4161 The Huks’ primary tactics in the beginning of the conflict included bank, payroll office, 4162 and train robberies, as well as small hit-and-run raids and ambushes that allowed 4163 them to avoid contact with large government formations. During these first few years, 4164 the Huks numbered 5,000 active insurgents, 10,000 lightly armed reserves, and 4165 35,000 other supporters. The Huks also enjoyed incredible levels of internal support, 4166 with an estimated 250,000 peasants actively supporting them during the early years 4167 of the insurgency. 4168 The COIN force was unable to control the insurgency in the early years. Shortly after 4169 the country was granted independence, the Philippine Army had been reduced from 4170 132,000 to 37,000 men. Approximately 24,000 of these forces were in the Military 4171 Police Command, which was tasked with combating the insurgency. However, the 4172 Military Police Command was poorly led and poorly equipped, and pursued tactics 4173 that accomplished little beyond alienating the population between 1946 and 1948. In 4174 1948, President Roxas reorganized the Military Police Command into the Philippine 4175 Constabulary, which remained neither well-trained nor well-equipped. It mainly 4176 practiced encirclement and sweeps, both of which were easily evaded by the Huks, 4177 and systematically committed abuses against civilians – raiding villages, stealing 4178 possessions, and treating the populace worse than did the Huks. 4179 The Huks then began making strategic and operational errors, failing to reach out to 4180 other disaffected groups to form a broad front and employing many common 4181 criminals in their ranks, causing peasants to fear the group. Probably most 4182 catastrophic to the group’s public image was the assassination of Mrs. Aurora 4183 Quezon, the well-liked and popular wife of the late former President, Manuel Quezon. 4184 As a result of Mrs. Quezon’s murder, President Quirino appointed then-Congressman 4185 Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950. 4186 After this, the Huk Rebellion became a good example of successful shape-clear-hold 4187 operations, with Magsaysay immediately instituting a shape-clear-hold approach. 4188 Shaping operations focused on efforts to win popular support for the COIN effort in 4189 preparation for future operations to clear insurgent areas. These operations therefore 4190 included putting a stop to the abuses of civilians by the Constabulary and Army, firing 4191 many high-level military officers, placing the Constabulary under Magsaysay’s 4192 personal control, suppressing troop brutality towards the population, and increasing 4193 pay for enlisted troops to remove their incentives for looting. They also involved the 4194 establishment of a Civil Affairs Office through which troops became involved in civic 4195 action projects (including digging wells and building bridges) and the Army’s provision 4196 of medical assistance to villagers. Additionally, Magsaysay pursued a population 4197 engagement strategy, even going so far as to set up a telegraph system that 4198 provided a direct line to the Defense Ministry for any villager on Luzon to use. 4199

Direct Methods for Countering Insurgencies


9-6. The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other 4200 enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of host nation institutions, the 4201 capacity of the host nation security forces, and the capacity of the host nation’s population. The capacity 4202 requirement (such as, commitment) for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the 4203 capacity differential between the insurgents and the host nation systems. As the framework is predicated by 4204 the conditions on the ground, shape-clear-hold-build-transition is based on understanding areas of operation 4205 and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the build, the 4206 unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are achieving the 4207 commander’s end state. This ties the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to assessments. 4208

9-7. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be used as a method for constructing specific tactical 4209 operations, planning short-range operations for a specific area, or developing a mid- to long-range 4210 operational framework for a unit’s plan for countering an insurgency. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition can 4211 be used as a campaign framework, guiding planning from the introduction of foreign forces to conflict 4212 resolution. It can be used as to campaign design to be executed by multiple units on a rotational basis. The 4213 imperatives, structure, considerations, and conditions listed herein apply no matter how the shape-clear-4214 hold-build-transition method is applied. 4215

9-8. The counterinsurgent cannot get trapped into thinking that the shape-clear-hold-build-transition 4216 approach is a stage by stage process. The phase that a unit performs is determined by the area of operations, 4217 not planning constructs. While shape-clear-hold-build-transition can be a phased operation in each area, the 4218 environment must dictate the progression of a shape-clear-hold-build-transition. The counterinsurgent uses 4219 the framework as the way to synchronize subordinate unit actions, prioritize efforts, allocate resources, and 4220 direct specific effects to achieve end state criteria in an ever-changing environment. The overall objective 4221 of using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition construct is to transition responsibility of countering the 4222 insurgency to host nation institutions. The commander must understand that conditions associated with the 4223 clear, the hold, and the build phases may be present at any time. U.S. ground forces can expect to carry out 4224 offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously throughout the entirety of shape-clear-hold-4225 build-transition construct. 4226

9-9. There are some imperatives for the shape-clear-hold-build-transition method. These imperatives help 4227 counterinsurgents turn the method from theory into practical application. The imperatives are— 4228

The conditions are assessed across several variables and cannot be taken in isolation. 4229 The phase that the environment is in dictates the decisive operation, priorities, and resourcing. 4230 In each phase, the clear, hold, and build, counterinsurgents must simultaneously conduct 4231

offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 4232 Each area requires its own assessment and assessments change over time. 4233 The shape-clear-hold-build-transition process is not always linear, but the methodology is meant 4234

to be progressive. Improving conditions in the environment allows for progression from one 4235 phase to the next. In essence, the operational framework is cyclic, as changes in the capacity of 4236 any element in the environment can change the conditions on the ground and therefore change 4237 the priorities and actions of the counterinsurgent, including the host nation. 4238

The shape-clear-hold-build-transition process is only reactive if the unit on the ground responds 4239 to conditions. The process can be proactive if the counterinsurgents dictate the conditions they 4240 want to establish and provide the resources and emphasis necessary to achieve them. 4241

Although an area is in a certain stage, this does not preclude operations. For example, although 4242 a unit is in the build phase, that does not preclude the unit from performing offensive operations 4243 against underground cells. 4244

9-10. Executing operations in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition construct requires the counterinsurgent 4245 to continually address the root causes of the insurgency. Actions taken in the clear, hold, and build phases 4246 are not executed in isolation. Instead, elements of each phase must be conducted simultaneously. The 4247 shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework does not specify phasing or stages, but it may be appropriate 4248 for the counterinsurgent to create phases or stages of operations to synchronize actions and priorities 4249 effectively. 4250

Chapter 9


9-11. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is driven by the conditions in an area of operations. 4251 To facilitate discussion of these conditions, figure 9-1 graphically depicts the generic spectrum of 4252 counterinsurgency conflict. The graph portrays the relationship of capacity between the insurgent, the host 4253 nation government, the host nation security forces, the host nation population, and the external 4254 counterinsurgent. Capacity represents the ability to change the conditions in the environment towards the 4255 insurgent or the counterinsurgent. This graph depicts the conditions leading to the insurgency—a 4256 vulnerable population, a lack of government control, and effective insurgent leadership. As the 4257 counterinsurgent is able to impact these conditions, the capability spectrum changes. The left hand side of 4258 the graph depicts the worst-case scenario in which the insurgent possesses increased capacity comparative 4259 to the host nation. The right hand side of the graph depicts the best-case scenario in which the host nation 4260 capacity is sufficient to counter the insurgent capability without assistance from the external 4261 counterinsurgent. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes the process the 4262 counterinsurgent takes to progress from the left of the graph to the right. 4263

Figure 9-1. The capability spectrum of counterinsurgency conflict 4264

9-12. As part of developing understanding, the counterinsurgent must identify the conditions that exist in 4265 particular regions that lead to instability or allow the insurgency to impact the environment. Commanders 4266 must decide where to focus actions and priorities to impact the conditions in a designated area for tactical 4267 or operational reasons. In many instances, commanders specify a preparation phase or shape phase of the 4268 shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework which clarifies the period of time, series of tasks, and effects 4269 to be achieved before the counterinsurgent begins taking deliberate action against the insurgents. Whether 4270 phasing is used or not, preparation of the environment is an absolute requirement to achieve conditions to 4271 progress along the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. 4272

ATTACK THE NETWORK 4273

9-13. Attack the network operations are defined as lethal and nonlethal actions or operations focusing on 4274 friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels. While 4275 two thirds of attack the network operations deal with the neutral and friendly population, there is a direct 4276 component to attack the network operations. Attack the network operations include activities against enemy 4277 networks. Attack the network operations are tactical, operational, and strategic operations that capitalize on 4278 or create key vulnerabilities to neutralize the threat network’s ability to function and enable success of the 4279 operation. Network engagement is constructed around six fundamentals which are— 4280

Understand the mission. 4281 Understand the operational environment. 4282



Understand the networks. 4283 Organize for the fight. 4284 Engage the network. 4285 Assess. 4286

While listed sequentially, these actions occur continuously and simultaneously and are designed as an 4287 enhancement to planning processes rather than a linear operational procedure. 4288

9-14. Network engagement provides a construct to identify, define, and engage any network, regardless of 4289 its design. The framework for network engagement can be applied against any type or combination of 4290 adaptive networks. It allows leaders to effectively engage neutral and threat networks with the appropriate 4291 lethal or nonlethal targeting, once a network has been defined through information collection and analysis. 4292 It also provides a means to protect friendly networks. 4293

9-15. Adaptive networked threats present an enduring challenge to all military operations. Neutralizing 4294 them may require an attack the network approach which includes the following activities: 4295

Supporting friendly networks to increase their capability to neutralize any residual networked 4296 threats independently. 4297

Influencing neutral networks and the general population to gain popular support. 4298 Neutralizing the threat network’s capabilities to operate within an operational environment. 4299 Employing force protection. 4300 Performing inform and influence activities. 4301

9-16. These activities or actions are mutually supportive and work concurrently, as focusing on any one 4302 activity may not produce the desired outcome. 4303

9-17. Network engagement requires commanders to understand and integrate specific staffing 4304 requirements. Integrating organic capabilities with enablers including, but not limited to, other government 4305 agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and law enforcement 4306 professional, and theater-specific joint task force explosive ordnance disposal elements is crucial to 4307 conducting network engagement operations. 4308

TARGETED THREAT INFRASTRUCTURE 4309

9-18. The targeted threat infrastructure method is a subset of the attack the network method. Targeted 4310 threat infrastructure is a method that seeks to destroy the insurgencies’ forces physical infrastructure. This 4311 method seeks to destroy the necessary requirements of an insurgency to conduct combat operations. 4312 Targeted threat infrastructure proactively targets the physical and societal mechanisms that support and fuel 4313 the insurgency. It involves an aggressive spirit of the offense. When using this method, commanders and 4314 staffs consider the legal concept of proportionality. The inconvenience caused to civilians or civilian 4315 property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 4316 anticipated by an attack on a military objective. Commanders and staffs using targeted threat infrastructure 4317 must also ensure it is not contributing to the recruitment of insurgent fighters by using too heavy a hand 4318 against elements of society that are not fully or willingly supporting the intrastate conflict. 4319

9-19. For this method to be effective, commanders and staffs must understand where an insurgency is 4320 attaining its strength and attack those areas and facilities. These efforts must further the desired overall end 4321 state and not undermine a host nation government’s legitimacy. Commanders and staffs plan for and limit 4322 second and third order effects of attacks. Moreover, attacks are only targeted against the infrastructure the 4323 insurgency relies on. For example, crop eradication aimed at reducing cash flow is unlikely to effect an 4324 insurgency with a large amount of financial resources. It may, however, hurt the legitimacy of the host 4325 nation. 4326

9-20. Illicit crops such as marijuana, coca, or poppy used to fuel and fund the insurgency can be the targets 4327 threatened under the targeted threat infrastructure method. The cash from these crops may help arm, train, 4328 and pay insurgent fighters or pay condolence payments to the families of terrorists who kill themselves in 4329 suicide acts. Attacking such crops may hurt the individual farmer. In some cases, farmers may be coerced 4330 and have no real choice. In others, farmers may support the insurgency. However, the illicit nature of these 4331

Chapter 9


crops make them valid targets. To avoid creating a new insurgent by crop destruction, counterinsurgents 4332 can work with interagency partners and the United States Agency for International Development to 4333 establish crop substitution programs that can help ease hardships farmers may experience. 4334

9-21. Another key target for the targeted threat infrastructure method is any material or physical item used 4335 to fuel the insurgency. For example, a road network that is the primary means of movement for insurgents 4336 needs to be interdicted by checkpoints or destroyed. This may inconvenience the local population, but 4337 under the legal precept of proportionality this can be a valid course of action. Power systems and water 4338 systems deep in insurgent controlled areas are prime targets for targeted threat infrastructure. As the 4339 building blocks of society, power and water are staples that the insurgents needs to survive in their own 4340 region. By impairing these resources, in concert with effective inform and influence operations, the people 4341 can be made to see that their support of the insurgency has brought them difficulties. Aggressive strikes and 4342 raids are central to the targeted threat infrastructure method, to destroy the physical infrastructure that 4343 supports an insurgency. This tactic is not a slash-and-burn technique, but consists of well-planned, 4344 pinpointed attacks on those critical enablers the enemy needs to operate. 4345

9-22. Another key target is the illicit funds used to fuel the insurgency. By establishing counter threat 4346 finance fusion centers, commanders and staffs can work with the power of interagency law enforcement 4347 and international legal partners to find, interdict, and seize huge sums of money that the illicit regime must 4348 launder before it can be used again for legal currency. By using unit counter threat finance specialists in 4349 targeted threat infrastructure operations, funds determined to have been gained through illicit means can be 4350 targeted for seizure at the local level. For example, if a man is a small farm owner and lives in a palatial 4351 home with three cars, he must be investigated, and his funds can be targeted if it is determined that his 4352 wealth is from illicit means and those means are being used to fuel the insurgency. 4353

STRIKE 4354

9-23. A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (See JP 3-0). A strike may be 4355 useful to disrupt an insurgency, especially in insurgent controlled areas. Strikes can be made on guerrilla 4356 bases, large enclosed or isolated compounds, and training camps. Normally these operations are meant to 4357 disrupt an insurgency and allow for the success of other operations. Strike operations can be integrated into 4358 a host nation’s operations to secure a population. The U.S. can contribute a force to perform strikes. 4359

9-24. The purpose of a strike is to destroy insurgent forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from 4360 their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes and lines of communications. Strikes are primarily 4361 offensive operations. They are characterized by reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and careful 4362 planning, followed by vigorously executed, coordinated attacks or raids by small, highly mobile combat 4363 forces operating in dispersed formations to locate and fix an insurgent force. Upon locating the insurgent 4364 force, strike force commanders attack, pursue, and destroy the insurgent force. If contact is lost, the strike 4365 forces resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy the insurgent force before it can rest, 4366 reorganize, and resume combat operations. 4367

9-25. Strikes can be conducted in support of shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations after guerrilla 4368 forces are initially driven out of an area during the clear phase. Strikes are often employed to assault 4369 outside cleared areas to fix and destroy guerilla forces and prevent counterattacks against governmental and 4370 reconstruction personnel. Counterinsurgents conduct assaults in areas where guerrillas attempt to 4371 consolidate during the hold and build phases. Precision airpower weapons can be used to support other 4372 units conducting strike operations or to conduct strike operations on their own. 4373

9-26. Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional 4374 intelligence can be followed immediately by a hasty attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize 4375 thorough reconnoitering of an area and is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small-unit operations. 4376 Since strike campaigns are conducted in insecure areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal after 4377 mission accomplishment. 4378

9-27. Strike forces are generally task forces composed of military units and may contain intelligence, 4379 police, and paramilitary elements. Civilian elements may be represented. Forces designated to conduct 4380 strikes should be relieved of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of an operation. Strike 4381



forces can be controlled at the national, regional, or local levels. Strike forces are organized as 4382 self-sufficient task forces capable of operating for extended periods in areas remote from home bases. 4383

9-28. Once insurgent bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. The insurgent’s 4384 ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require a 4385 thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly to 4386 avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance 4387 locate relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained and reaction forces 4388 quickly deployed to destroy them. In areas suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, 4389 reconnaissance and surveillance should be conducted and followed with an immediate raid by reaction 4390 forces when sufficient information has been developed on a target. Good communications and mobility are 4391 essential for success in these combat operations. 4392

9-29. Speed and surprise are important in strikes. The sudden and unexpected delivery of combat forces 4393 into an insurgent held or contested area provides significant advantages to the forces conducting strike 4394 operations. If caught by surprise, guerrillas may be unable to react effectively. Speed and surprise can be 4395 achieved by using air assault tactics to insert the first forces into the area of operations. Subsequent forces 4396 can be delivered on later airlifts or by other modes of transportation. Fires can be used to block escape 4397 routes or areas that are not secured by land forces. 4398

9-30. However, strikes do not address the root causes for beginning or sustaining an insurgency, nor do 4399 they necessarily increase the legitimacy of the host nation government. Strikes will, most likely, need to be 4400 integrated with other approaches to counterinsurgency as part of the overall operational design. In some 4401 cases, the U.S. can integrate this ability into an ongoing host nation effort. 4402

OTHER DIRECT ENABLERS 4403

9-31. The Army and Marines can also integrate other direct enablers into a counterinsurgency operation. 4404 For example, indirect fires can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. Moreover, special 4405 forces have the capability to perform direct actions, which are short-duration strikes and other small-scale 4406 offensive actions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 4407 and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 4408 designated targets. As with indirect enablers, the Army and Marine Corps have a wide range of direct 4409 capabilities that can be integrated into an ongoing counterinsurgency effort. 4410

4411


Chapter 10 4412

Intelligence and Operational Considerations 4413

10-1. This chapter covers several types of considerations for a counterinsurgency. First it covers 4414 intelligence considerations. This includes considerations for intelligence and for intelligence related 4415 capabilities. Next, the chapter provides some operational considerations. This includes inform and 4416 influence operations, which includes integrated monetary shaping operations. Finally, this chapter covers 4417 considerations for remote area operations, border operations, and basing. 4418

10-2. The insurgency in Peru demonstrates the importance that intelligence capabilities, inform and 4419 influence operations, and integrated monetary shaping operations can have on a counterinsurgency 4420 operation. The Peruvian government was eventually successfully in using economic development and an 4421 information campaign to weaken the Shining Path insurgency. With the gradual development of an 4422 effective military, Peru was able to defeat the Shining Path. 4423

Intelligence and the Shining Path 4424 Peru suffered an unprecedented economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s. The 4425 Peruvian government, though democratic, was characteristically ineffective and 4426 unable to stem the worsening crisis. This opened the door for an insurgent 4427 organization, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and its establishment of alternative 4428 governance structures in the economically devastated Peruvian highlands. Sendero 4429 would purge local officials and establish its own authority in the villages, beating back 4430 any contestation of control brought by the Peruvian police. 4431 In the first few years of the insurgency, the government did not take the threat 4432 seriously. Opposition to the insurgents (such as it was) was organized by local 4433 police, and the government made no effort to improve the desperate socioeconomic 4434 conditions in the highlands or to define a clear mission for regional security forces. 4435 With its superior organization and a lack of effective response by the government, 4436 Sendero made significant progress. Its operations and propaganda were coordinated 4437 to create the perception that the group was a “winner” and met its Maoist strategic 4438 goals, in sharp contrast to the largely ineffective government. 4439 Still plagued by a lack of internal unity both in the government and in the military, the 4440 state moved forward with two competing COIN strategies: one focused on 4441 development and the other focused on ideology and military force. First proposed in 4442 1984, the developmentalist approach finally got its turn (sort of) in 1985. The state 4443 recognized that the highlands were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis and 4444 the heartland of the insurgency, so its goal was to increase development and job 4445 opportunities in these regions. Public investment in Ayacucho (a region in the 4446 southern highlands) quadrupled between 1985 and 1986. Unfortunately, the 4447 insurgents actively resisted this development, or co-opted it, forcing government 4448 teachers to include Sendero materials in their curricula. The government did not 4449 provide the security necessary for development to have any effect. Subsequent to 4450 1986, development funding fell off, and embezzlement became common. So, while 4451 there was an initial push of development and investment, it fell far short of meeting 4452 the needs of the economically disadvantaged population in the highlands. 4453 The election of Alberto Fujimori in June 1990 raised new hopes of resolving the 4454 conflicts within the government and making greater headway against the insurgents. 4455 Fujimori promised a better human rights record and a new commitment to 4456 developmentalism. In addition to renewed government legitimacy, the Fujimori 4457 administration also brought two significant improvements to Peru’s approach to 4458

Chapter 10


COIN: first, the use of the police and the national intelligence service to track the 4459 movements of Sendero sympathizers and attempt to infiltrate the group and, second, 4460 the arming of rondas, peasant civil-defense militias. These rondas were possible 4461 only because the insurgents’ treatment of villagers in its areas of operation had 4462 become so harsh that the locals were finally pushed to stand up for themselves. 4463 Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the military allowed 4464 effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support to 4465 threatened rondas. For the first time in the conflict, the government, police, and 4466 military made effective use of what would now be called strategic communication, 4467 with a greater emphasis on government credibility, consistency between actions and 4468 messages, and significant efforts to woo the population in the highlands away from 4469 the insurgents (of which the rondas were an integral part). 4470 The final blow came in 1992 when good intelligence led to Abimael Guzmán 4471 (Sendro’s leader)’s capture. At the time of capture, the police seized Guzmán's 4472 computer, in which they found a very detailed roster of his armed forces and the 4473 weapons each formation had in each region of the country. His authoritarian 4474 management of Sendero had proven very effective when he was at large, but when 4475 he was captured, not so much. 4476

INTELLIGENCE 4477

10-3. Intelligence can be broken down into seven disciplines, and it is an enabler of any counterinsurgency 4478 effort. Each discipline provides a means for the counterinsurgent to gain a higher level of situational 4479 understanding. These disciplines include counterintelligence, human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, 4480 measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, signals intelligence, and technical 4481 intelligence. The intelligence disciplines are integrated to ensure a multi-discipline approach to intelligence 4482 analysis, and ultimately all-source intelligence facilitates situational understanding and supports decision 4483 making. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence.) 4484

10-4. An essential part of understanding the operational environment is the process of intelligence 4485 preparation of the battlefield/battlespace. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace is a 4486 systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat/adversary, 4487 terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By 4488 applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain the information necessary 4489 to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. (See FM 4490 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A.) In a counterinsurgency environment, intelligence preparation of the 4491 battlefield/battlespace must take into account operational environment considerations. 4492

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 4493

10-5. All-source intelligence are intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate 4494 all sources of information, most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, 4495 measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of 4496 finished intelligence (JP 2-0). Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source 4497 intelligence products to support counterinsurgency operations. Analysis for counterinsurgency operations is 4498 challenging, due in part to the— 4499

Need to understand perceptions and culture. 4500 Need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities. 4501 Local nature of insurgencies. 4502 Tendency of insurgencies to change over time. 4503

10-6. Databases are important for analyzing and synthesizing insurgent activities and personalities. At a 4504 minimum, there should be common searchable combatant command databases of insurgent actions and 4505 personnel, as well as another database of all intelligence reporting. These should be accessible by analysts 4506 both in and out of the theater. 4507

Intelligence and Operational Considerations


10-7. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in analysis. Units are 4508 simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence capabilities are normally greater at 4509 higher echelons of command. Battalion staffs have fewer personnel to collect patrol debriefs, analyze 4510 incoming information from multiple sources, produce finished intelligence products, and disseminate 4511 products to appropriate consumers than brigade staffs, for example. In many cases, brigade intelligence 4512 sections may be inadequate for a counterinsurgency environment. 4513

10-8. Counterinsurgency requirements may require pushing analysts to battalion and brigade staffs to give 4514 those echelons the required analytical support. There are instances when analysts can be beneficial at the 4515 company level. This is the case when a maneuver company must collect large amounts of information on 4516 the local populace and insurgents. An analyst can help collect and process this information and develop a 4517 common operational picture of the area of operations. Pushing analysts to brigade level and below places 4518 analysts closer to collectors, improves the common operational picture, and helps higher echelon staffs 4519 receive answers to their priority intelligence requirements. Commanders may need to be creative in 4520 developing analytical capabilities within their units. Though it is not ideal, commanders can have assigned 4521 non-intelligence personnel to work in the intelligence section. 4522

10-9. A bottom-up flow of intelligence in counterinsurgency is important. Battalions and brigades develop 4523 intelligence for their area of operations. Higher echelons fuse it into intelligence of the insurgency 4524 throughout the combatant command. Higher echelons can also integrate the human intelligence that 4525 battalions and brigades receive with the other intelligence disciplines. Comprehensive insurgency analysis 4526 focuses on the people in the area of operations. It develops information about relationships among them and 4527 the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. Comprehensive insurgency analysis brings together all other 4528 forms of analysis. 4529

Fusion Centers 4530

10-10. Fusion centers are a means to provide effective all-source intelligence. A fusion center is an ad hoc 4531 collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or agencies that provide resources, expertise, 4532 information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of supporting the rapid execution of operations by 4533 contributing members. Fusion centers are primarily designed to focus collection and promote information 4534 sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission type. These centers are not 4535 operations centers. Commanders at various echelons create fusion centers to manage the flow of 4536 information and intelligence, focus information collection to satisfy information requirements, and to 4537 process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. The intelligence portion of a fusion 4538 center typically comprises intelligence representatives from different tactical echelons, interagency 4539 partners, multinational organizations, host-nation organizations, and nongovernmental organizations 4540 operating in the area of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on fusion centers.) 4541

10-11. In a counterinsurgency, creating shared situational understanding is essential. Fusion cells are 4542 important in creating this understanding. The mixture of personnel and expertise allows for the integration 4543 of information and analysis. This is an effective means of understanding the operational environment from 4544 multiple different perspectives. Fusion cells can help in understanding intelligence and informing 4545 operations to avoid unintended consequences. 4546

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 4547

10-12. Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided 4548 by human sources (JP 2-0). Because insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles for legitimacy, human 4549 intelligence plays a vital role in counterinsurgency. Human intelligence uses human sources as tools, and 4550 human intelligence uses a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to 4551 meet intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. Interrogation is just one of the 4552 human intelligence tasks. (See FM 2-22.3 for more information on human intelligence.) During 4553 counterinsurgency operations, a great deal of intelligence is based on information gathered from people. 4554

10-13. Operational reporting may have information of intelligence value that originates from the local 4555 populace. People may approach Soldiers and Marines during the course of their day-to-day operations and 4556 offer information. Soldiers and Marines record information and report it to the intelligence section. Doing 4557

Chapter 10


so allows for verification of the information and establishes a means for human intelligence collectors to 4558 contact individuals offering information of value. 4559

10-14. People offering information on insurgents are often in danger. Insurgents continuously try to defeat 4560 collection operations. Commanders ensure that the appropriate personnel are trained in handling human 4561 sources in accordance with Army, Marine Corps, and DOD standards and policies. Human intelligence 4562 collectors are trained in procedures that limit risks to sources and handlers. Counterinsurgents should not 4563 expect people to willingly provide information if insurgents have the ability to violently intimidate sources. 4564 Human intelligence reporting increases if counterinsurgents protect the populace from insurgents and 4565 people begin to believe the insurgency is defeated. 4566

10-15. People often provide inaccurate and conflicting information to counterinsurgents. They may spread 4567 rumors or provide inaccurate information purposefully for their own reasons. For example, people may 4568 give inaccurate information to settle tribal, ethnic, or business disputes. The accuracy of information 4569 obtained by Soldiers and Marines is verified before using it to support operations. This means that 4570 information reported to patrols should be verified with all-source intelligence. Improved accuracy will 4571 come from collecting intelligence from the whole population. Information must be seen as part of a whole 4572 picture and part or segments of information cannot override the whole picture. An important part of gaining 4573 access from the whole population is gaining access to restricted populations. These populations often 4574 include women, but they can include any element which the counterinsurgent cannot access because of 4575 cultural considerations. Restricted access teams may be helpful in ensuring that information is attained 4576 from the whole population, including women. 4577

INFORMATION COLLECTION 4578

10-16. There are several important enabling capabilities affecting intelligence support (See ATTP 2-91.6 4579 for a further discussion.) These capabilities are for information collection in a counterinsurgency 4580 environment. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and 4581 employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in 4582 direct support of current and future operations. (See FM 3-55 for more information on information 4583 collection.) Several capabilities have important considerations for information collection in a 4584 counterinsurgency. They are— 4585

Biometrics. 4586 Law Enforcement. 4587 Forensics. 4588

Biometrics 4589

10-17. Understanding biometrics-enabled intelligence requires knowledge of biometrics and its 4590 contribution to Army and Marine Corps missions. The term biometric describes both a characteristic 4591 (biometric) and a process (biometrics): 4592

Biometric is a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize the 4593 identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual (JP 2-0). 4594

Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, 4595 physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). 4596

10-18. The Army and Marine Corps employ automated biometric systems to deny threat forces any 4597 freedom of movement within the populace and to positively identify known threats (threat forces, friendly 4598 populace, local nationals, and third-country nationals) throughout their areas of operation to separate 4599 insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population. Biometric systems collect biometric data, such 4600 as iris images, fingerprints, and facial images, and combine them with contextual data to produce an 4601 electronic dossier on an individual. Automated biometric systems support the following tasks: 4602

Positively identity high-value targets. 4603 Screen and badge personnel. 4604 Manage the populace. 4605



Perform force protection (local access). 4606 Conduct detention operations. 4607

10-19. Biometrics are important assets in any counterinsurgency operation. These tools allow the 4608 counterinsurgent to gain both civil security and control. Moreover, biometrics allow the counterinsurgent 4609 to conduct operations and avoid detaining civilians. If used correctly, biometrics allows the 4610 counterinsurgent to effectively execute offensive operations against the insurgency and protect the 4611 population. Moreover, the host nation can be enabled with these capabilities. Biometric abilities can be 4612 essential in building legitimacy among the population. (For more information on biometrics, see 4613 FM 2-22.3, ATTP 2-91.6, and TC 2-33.4.) 4614

Law Enforcement 4615

10-20. Although not an intelligence discipline, police intelligence operations can support the overall 4616 intelligence effort through the analysis, production, and dissemination of information collected from police 4617 activities. Information gathered from military police operations may contribute to a commander’s critical 4618 information requirement in addition to focusing policing to maintain order. Criminal acts such as robberies, 4619 kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion may be linked to insurgent psychological or money- gathering 4620 activities. Police information, police intelligence, and criminal intelligence are subtasks of police 4621 intelligence operations. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on law enforcement.) 4622

Forensics 4623

10-21. Forensics involves methodically gathering and analyzing evidence to establish facts that can be 4624 presented in a legal proceeding. It applies multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts.(See 4625 ATTP 2-91.6). Forensics is essential in site exploitation. Site exploitation is a series of activities to 4626 recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the 4627 conduct of operations (JP 3-31). In an insurgency, understanding the operational environment often 4628 depends on understanding activities which civilians or insurgents want to remain secret. The scientific tools 4629 offered by forensics are essential to this understanding. 4630

10-22. For example, documents and pocket litter, as well as information found in computers and cell 4631 phones, can provide critical information that analysts need to evaluate insurgent organizations, capabilities, 4632 and intentions. Forensics that includes site exploitation and forensic documents is of great benefit to 4633 substantiating information if detainees are insurgents. The methods of forensics allow the counterinsurgent 4634 work towards situational understanding. 4635

INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 4636

10-23. Inform and influence activities are the integration of designated information-related capabilities to 4637 synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence 4638 foreign audiences, and affect threat decisionmaking. All assets and capabilities at a commander’s disposal 4639 have the potential to be used to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. 4640 Information-related capabilities are tools and techniques utilizing dimensions within the information 4641 environment that can be used to achieve a commander’s end state. Designated information-related 4642 capabilities that support inform and influence activities and its lines of efforts typically include, but are not 4643 limited to, public affairs operations, military information support operations, combat camera operations, 4644 Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs activities, and the human terrain system. Other capabilities the 4645 commander may allocate—such as components of cyber electromagnetic activities; special technical 4646 operations; presence, posture and profile; physical attack; and physical security—are capabilities not solely 4647 designed to inform or influence, and they may assist in achieving effects and mission objectives. One of the 4648 most essential inform and influence operations is integrated monetary shaping operations. Success depends 4649 on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the 4650 information environment. (See FM 3-13 for more information on inform and influence activities.) 4651

10-24. In a counterinsurgency, the insurgent often targets the American population with themes and 4652 messages concerning the insurgency. There are legal and professional reasons why the armed forces cannot 4653

Chapter 10


attempt to influence American public opinion. To do so would undermine civil control over the military. 4654 However, the military has a responsibly to inform the American public. Transparency and truthful 4655 information allows policy decisions to be debated in among decisionmakers and the public. Providing that 4656 information in an insurgency is a responsibility of the military, trying to influence the actual debate is 4657 unethical and damages the military’s relationship with the society. On the other hand, the insurgent tries to 4658 influence the host-nation population. Inform operations are essential in trying to counter this effort. 4659

10-25. When integrating inform and influence operations into a counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgents 4660 must understand the cultural environment. The process of integration of influence operations is detailed in 4661 FM 3-13, but that process must be informed by cultural understanding and knowledge. Inform and 4662 influence operations must be integrated into all operations. 4663

10-26. There are several different considerations for influencing a population while an insurgency is 4664 ongoing. The first is the tension between broadcasting a message and engaging the population to achieve a 4665 two way understanding. Normally, the U.S. is involved in a counterinsurgency to aid a host nation. As 4666 such, broadcasting a message that is integrated with the host nation’s message to tell the population the 4667 reason for involvement may be important. However, there is also a need for engagement of the population 4668 in a counterinsurgency. Commanders and staffs have to establish relationships, seek two-way 4669 understanding, and listen to what others think. Effective counterinsurgency normally requires an effective 4670 broadcast message and engaging the population in a dialogue. Commanders and staffs must find the right 4671 balance between the two approaches. 4672

10-27. Commanders an staffs balance between controlling the message and allowing for complete 4673 freedom of messaging. Having a perfectly controlled message does not allow for real communication with 4674 the population. Leaders must have some ability to actual engage the population and create a shared 4675 understanding. However, if representatives of a command say whatever they feel like saying, the 4676 population is bombarded with contradictions and inconsistencies. Commanders and staffs must find the 4677 right balance to allow real communication, but to also ensure that the command has a coherent message. 4678

10-28. The most important aspect of inform and influence operations is honesty. In the contemporary 4679 information environment, propaganda and deception are unsustainable. Moreover, all information provided 4680 to the population is given to influence the population. There is no such thing as value free information. 4681 This being the case, commanders should be honest about their purpose. They should have a commitment to 4682 the truth, a commitment to credibility, and should seek to virtuously persuade the population. 4683

10-29. The truism that actions speak louder than words is of particular importance in counterinsurgency. 4684 Any inform and influence strategy that includes only traditional communications is likely to fail. To be 4685 successful, inform and influence activities must include a broad set of behaviors, deeds, and undertakings 4686 by members of the command. What units do, will often matter more than what they say. 4687

INTEGRATED MONETARY SHAPING OPERATIONS 4688

10-30. Integrated monetary shaping operations are the use of monetary resources, provided with various 4689 types of aid (for example, economic, financial, humanitarian, or developmental), involving the voluntary 4690 transfer of resources (for example, money, equipment, knowledge, or training other than military) from 4691 U.S. or unified action partners to a host nation, directly or indirectly, for mutual benefit. Simply stated, 4692 integrated monetary shaping operations are the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support the 4693 commander’s objectives. They are a means to an end. Integrated monetary shaping operations are used to 4694 attack sources of instability, build partnerships, and provide for economic stabilization and security. The 4695 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force categorize integrated monetary shaping operations-type activities as 4696 part of information operations executed through civil military operations. The Army and Marine Corps 4697 categorize integrated monetary shaping operations as inform and influence activities. Integrated monetary 4698 shaping operations have two major components: 4699

Supporting operations by funding developmental assistance, infrastructure, and governance 4700 support projects to win the support of an indigenous populace and erode support for the 4701 adversary. 4702

Denying adversaries sanctuary and operational flexibility by hindering their ability to reliably 4703 fund operations. 4704



10-31. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be an effective tool to stabilize the security 4705 environment. However, it can also undermine both the local and national economies. One essential 4706 consideration of counterinsurgencies is to understand that long-term counterinsurgency efforts have an 4707 economic impact on the host nation. Additionally, the implementation of funding and projects can have 4708 negative secondary and tertiary effects. Commanders should recognize decisions over which contractors, 4709 communities, and individuals are chosen to receive funding could create winners and losers in their area. 4710 This effect can exacerbate tensions in the area. Finally, a counterinsurgency can last many years, and this 4711 effort can distort the pricing of goods and services existing within the local and national economy. 4712 Counterinsurgents must understand that they can undermine their own efforts by demanding goods in such 4713 quantities that they fundamentally alters market forces, which results in economic dependence on the 4714 counterinsurgency. This can result in economic problems that can undermine the host nation’s stability 4715 when the external counterinsurgent departs. 4716

10-32. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be effective, but they should be linked into an overall 4717 development plan. Without that link, the haphazard use of money can be highly destructive to an economy 4718 because it creates an unsustainable economy once the counterinsurgent leaves. The basic point of integrated 4719 monetary shaping operations is primarily to be a catalyst for long-term and natural development and only 4720 secondarily to meet short-term needs or security concerns. The counterinsurgent must understand that 4721 interactions with the local culture do have far-reaching effects. Economic effect is one area where the 4722 counterinsurgent can have both positive and negative effects. 4723

10-33. Integrated monetary shaping operations can also inform a commander’s situational understanding. 4724 Property ownership records include census records, deeds, and other means of determining ownership of 4725 land and buildings. They help counterinsurgents to determine who should or should not be living in a 4726 specific area and help them secure the populace. In some cases, it may be necessary for Soldiers and 4727 Marines to go door to door and collect census data themselves. 4728

10-34. Financial records can provide information gathered on sources of insurgent funding. Collection of 4729 financial records often requires help from agencies like the Department of the Treasury and financial 4730 institutions. It may require analyzing criminal activities or traditional means of currency transfer. 4731

10-35. Property ownership and financial records can reveal information about the structure of the society. 4732 Who owns and controls land and who controls debt provide some information on who may be a power 4733 broker in a particular society. Finding these individuals or institutions provides greater situational 4734 understanding for the counterinsurgent. 4735

10-36. Integrated monetary shaping operations can be used to aid stability efforts. Some possible uses of 4736 money include— 4737

Repairing damage resulting from coalition operations. 4738 Providing condolence payments to civilians for death or injury resulting from coalition 4739

operations. This type of payment must be in accordance with prevailing standards for payments 4740 of solatia, a victim’s bereavement fund, or compensatory statutes provided by donor agencies as 4741 well as the United Nations. (The counterinsurgent must be aware of the going rates and, as far as 4742 possible, ensure that the right messaging is provided to the village or other district leadership 4743 where death or injury has occurred resulting from coalition operations.) Further, the 4744 counterinsurgent must guard against payment for injury or accident becoming a means of 4745 extortion or harassment. 4746

Funding civic clean-up projects and other sanitation projects and equipment to provide those 4747 services. 4748

Funding small-scale infrastructure improvements to improve the quality of life of citizens. 4749 Funding agricultural projects to improve farming practices, improve livestock health, or 4750

implement cooperative farming programs. This type of activity should be conducted in 4751 consultation with donor agricultural agencies or the host-nation departments of agriculture to 4752 ensure that land rights and water rights of communities are not infringed and crop management 4753 is according to agriculturally sustainable principles. 4754

Repairing civic and cultural sites and facilities. Preservation of cultural heritage is a sensitive 4755 issue and due respect to the site or culture and its practices must be adhered to. It might even be 4756

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preferable that the counterinsurgent maintain a low profile and let the cultural leaders take a 4757 leading role in this initiative. 4758

Repairing institutions and infrastructure critical to governance and rule of law (such as prisons, 4759 courthouses, and police stations). 4760

Purchasing education supplies or repairing infrastructure critical to providing education to the 4761 local populace. 4762

Paying rewards to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and locations. 4763 Supporting the creation, training, and operation of host-nation security forces. 4764 Funding events and activities designed to build relationships with host-nation officials and 4765

citizens. 4766

Money Usage Principles in Counterinsurgency 4767

10-37. There are seven principles that can help guide the commander and staff in integrated monetary 4768 shaping operations in a counter insurgency. They are— 4769

Host-Nation ownership. 4770 Capacity building. 4771 Sustainability. 4772 Selectivity. 4773 Partnership. 4774 Flexibility. 4775 Accountability. 4776

Host-Nation Ownership 4777

10-38. Units must ensure that there is counterinsurgent and host-nation ownership of any project. The 4778 local population and the government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has 4779 been imposed on them by outside agencies. A project that has been conceptualized, funded, and constructed 4780 at the local level legitimizes the local government in the eyes of the populace and further contributes to 4781 stability. However, host-nation officials might lack the capacity to implement and manage the project. 4782 Often it is important to consult development agencies to promote adequate ownership and accountability 4783 for projects. 4784

Capacity Building 4785

10-39. Capacity building involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to the local people, 4786 institutions, and government. This transfer enables those people to develop the requisite capabilities to 4787 deliver essential services to the population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions that gain capacity 4788 are better prepared to lead their regions through political, economic, and security-related issues. 4789

Sustainability 4790

10-40. The principle of sustainability states that commanders should design and select projects and 4791 services that have a lasting effect on the local population. In other words, the impact of the projects under 4792 consideration must endure after forces hand over the facility or service to local authorities and the unit (or 4793 contractors) departure from the site. Sustainability implies that the local government has the necessary 4794 resources to staff and maintain the project. There are examples where commanders have failed to conduct 4795 adequate analysis and built new schools or medical clinics only to discover that too few teachers or doctors 4796 were available to staff these facilities. Similarly, some commanders have purchased large generator systems 4797 to address electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods within their areas of operation. However, without 4798 addressing the fuel, maintenance, and service requirements of these systems, the machines eventually failed 4799 and were unable to serve as a sustainable solution for the local electrical deficit. 4800



Selectivity 4801

10-41. The development community defines the principle of selectivity as the allocation of resources 4802 based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These characteristics, while strategic in 4803 nature, are equally important at the tactical level. Commanders seldom receive all of the financial resources 4804 they would like to have when implementing their essential service, economic, and governance lines of 4805 effort. Therefore, it is critical to allocate the available resources into select areas where there is a strong 4806 local commitment to the reconstruction program, where the project can positively impact the most people, 4807 and where the project under consideration can simultaneously best achieve the commander’s intent. 4808

10-42. Commanders and staffs carefully research nominations, adopt best practices, and design for local 4809 conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders assess local conditions before investing financial 4810 resources into any potential relief or reconstruction program. Money is not invested in an intelligence 4811 vacuum—all available information about local conditions is considered (such as the population’s 4812 requirements, animosities, traditions, capabilities, and economics). A detailed assessment of local 4813 conditions will best inform the commander on the project’s potential to deliver its desired effects. Each 4814 project should be a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. It is equally critical that the 4815 commander and staff assess potential unintended results from their integrated monetary shaping operations. 4816 Many second- or third-order effects from a project may potentially outweigh the benefits from the original 4817 commander’s intent. 4818

Partnership 4819

10-43. The principle of partnership is close collaboration with local governments, communities, donors, 4820 nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership plays a 4821 central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program, as it supports each of the other principles 4822 of reconstruction and development. In the context of money in integrated monetary shaping operations, 4823 effective partnership ensures the unit’s financial resources are well invested and synchronized with other 4824 programs from outside agencies. 4825

Flexibility 4826

10-44. The principle of flexibility mandates that units adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of 4827 opportunities, and maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development program. Just as 4828 the conditions for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief and 4829 reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions often require commanders to 4830 change tactics to achieve desired objectives. 4831

Accountability 4832

10-45. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and 4833 balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or 4834 development program. Accountability in all actions, to include the unit’s integrated monetary shaping 4835 operations, reinforces the legitimacy of the commander and operations, as well as the legitimacy of the 4836 local government, in the eyes of the population. (See ATP 3-07.20/MCRP3-33.1G for more information on 4837 integrated monetary shaping operations.) 4838

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 4839

10-46. There are three types of operations that have important considerations for counterinsurgency. 4840 They are: 4841

Remote area operations. 4842 Border operations. 4843 Basing. 4844

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REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS 4845

10-47. Remote area operations are conducted in rural areas where a decentralized array of forces can be 4846 most effective. Remote area operations are generally conducted in insurgent-controlled or contested areas 4847 to establish pockets of popular support for the host-nation government and deny support to the insurgents. 4848 Remote area operations may be conducted to establish bases in unpopulated areas where insurgent forces 4849 have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistic facilities, or command posts. Units support 4850 remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas, and demonstrate that the 4851 host-nation government has not ceded control to the insurgents. They collect and report information on 4852 insurgent intentions in more populated areas. This method is an enemy-centric approach to combating an 4853 insurgency. 4854

10-48. Remote area operations are usually conducted in areas that are either under insurgent control or are 4855 contested. In these areas, ground or water modes of entry are often used, but air assault or parachute 4856 operations can be employed. These operations use offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, 4857 cordon and searches, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit (or combinations of these tactics). Their 4858 purpose is to— 4859

Harass the insurgent to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistic resources. 4860 Destroy the insurgent force and its base complexes. 4861 Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area. 4862 Expand controlled areas. 4863 Isolate insurgents from their support. 4864

10-49. To the extent possible, the task force should include personnel indigenous to the operational area. 4865 The type of task force employed, along with its host-nation counterpart (regular forces or paramilitary) 4866 depends on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political 4867 considerations, and the equipment and logistic support available. The size and composition of the 4868 host-nation unit is, in part, determined by the insurgent’s influence over the population and the 4869 government’s ability to recruit and develop an adequate local force. When the unit is recruited from local 4870 inhabitants, local leaders should be used even though their military ability may be limited. By using local 4871 leaders, assisted by advisors, better control and motivation are possible. Training, indoctrinating, and 4872 incorporating the local force into the governmental structure is facilitated by using local leaders. 4873

10-50. Understanding the population’s issues from their perspective enables counterinsurgents to address 4874 the prerequisites of the insurgency and obtain local support for remote area operations. Success is more 4875 likely if— 4876

A significant segment of the local population supports the program. 4877 The host nation recruits local personnel for its remote area paramilitary or irregular force. 4878 Host-nation forces conduct remote area operations to interdict infiltration routes in areas nearly 4879

devoid of people. In this case, elements and host-nation forces operate in a manner similar to that 4880 of the insurgents, but with access to superior sustainment resources. 4881

10-51. In a rural environment, insurgents rely on friendly elements within the population to provide 4882 supplies and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and 4883 concealment, such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder the counterinsurgency force in 4884 gaining access to them. Often operating from their own home or village, rural insurgents often move to 4885 camps if security does not permit them to remain at home. Insurgent camps are chosen with a view toward 4886 easy access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared escape routes, and good 4887 observation of counterinsurgency force approach routes. When counterinsurgency operations force the 4888 insurgents from preferred base camps, insurgents tend to establish camps in rugged inhospitable areas not 4889 easily penetrated. Like counterinsurgency in urban areas, remote counterinsurgency operations must focus 4890 on both locating and eliminating insurgents and on severing the supportive element of the population from 4891 providing supplies and intelligence to them. 4892

10-52. Remote operations typically call for use of combat outposts that are linked to the local population. 4893 It is important to consider all three perspectives (the population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents) when 4894



choosing site locations. Establishing a proximity to the local population does not serve to advance the 4895 counterinsurgency’s goals without certain factors. These include— 4896

Gaining acceptance of the local civilian leadership. 4897 Maintaining a constant presence in the community. 4898 Maintaining constant communications with the local community to provide immediate 4899

emergency assistance. 4900 Maintaining situational awareness and an awareness of any changes in the population’s patterns 4901

of life. This includes movement of outsiders (such as visitors, merchants, nomads, or seasonal 4902 labor). 4903

10-53. Remote area operations may include civil affairs, military information support operations, 4904 intelligence, populace and resources control, and advisory assistance operations. Most remote operations 4905 are long term and continuous. They are initially directed at disrupting the insurgent’s operations and then 4906 destroying the insurgent armed forces. The insurgent infrastructure is destroyed as early as possible. 4907

10-54. Remote area operations generally start with delineating the area of operations, collecting and 4908 assessing data and information pertaining to the area of operations, estimating resource requirements, 4909 training personnel, and preparing operation plans. Following the assessment, counterinsurgents move the 4910 force into the operational area, establish a secure operational base, destroy insurgent tactical forces from the 4911 area, neutralize the insurgent base area, neutralize the insurgent political infrastructure, and establish 4912 government control. Following a primarily offensive posture, counterinsurgents conduct aggressive 4913 defensive operations, primarily by extensive patrolling; introducing and conducting short-term military 4914 civic action programs that may develop into long-term development programs; and training paramilitary 4915 self-defense forces to include tactical operations, populace and resources control, intelligence, civil affairs, 4916 and military information support operations. Development activities initially may include such areas as 4917 health, education, and agriculture. Finally, counterinsurgents continue development activities, transfer 4918 control to appropriate civil agencies, and expand operations to adjacent areas. 4919

10-55. Initially, strong combat and sustainment forces establish secure operational bases. A remote area 4920 operation may be conducted in areas with little or no population to interdict infiltration routes. Maximum 4921 use is made of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes. Firepower 4922 and combat forces, with air assault capability, should be prepared to quickly attack identified targets. 4923 Because remote area operations can stress the capability of land forces to make a rapid response, 4924 commanders can mitigate risk by coordinating with joint enablers for close air support, tactical airdrops, 4925 information collection, communications relays, and personnel recovery forces. 4926

BORDER OPERATIONS 4927

10-56. In a counterinsurgency environment, armed forces may be responsible for border security, and they 4928 may have to help other security forces with immigration, customs, and internal security operations. The 4929 specific threat level, however, may require combat-type border operations, particularly in remote areas. The 4930 threat level may require units or advisor teams to advise and assist host-nation forces assigned to prevent or 4931 interdict the infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. This method is 4932 a terrain-centric approach to combating an insurgency. The commander’s intent is to isolate insurgent 4933 forces from their external support and sanctuaries. Secondary purposes are to locate and interdict insurgent 4934 land infiltration routes, destroy insurgent forces and bases in areas adjacent to the border, and collect and 4935 report information on insurgent capabilities and intentions. Border operations normally require restrictive 4936 populace and resources control measures that are particularly annoying to tribal and ethnic border groups 4937 who do not recognize the international boundary. The host-nation government must make a continuing 4938 effort to physically and psychologically gain and maintain the loyalty of the affected populace. 4939

10-57. Designated border forces may be composed of border police and guards and may include 4940 paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the 4941 national border or key internal routes to access other regions. Border operations are planned, conducted, 4942 and supervised from the national level, to the regional level, and finally through commanders at the local 4943 level. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in their assigned areas. They 4944

Chapter 10


should contain sufficient sustainment warfighting function and sustainment elements to support civil 4945 authorities operations for extended periods. 4946

10-58. Tasks that may be performed in controlling the border include the following: 4947 Security of populated areas. 4948 Intelligence and counterintelligence operations. 4949 Operation of authorized points of entry. 4950 Refugee and internally displaced person control. 4951 Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions. 4952 Military information support operations. 4953 Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. 4954 Attacks against insurgent forces. 4955 Destruction of insurgent base areas. 4956 Barrier and denial operations. 4957

10-59. In a phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and 4958 other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly 4959 in remote areas. In phases II and III, denial of external support for the insurgency may require combat 4960 operations in border areas. These operations require close coordination and cooperation between the armed 4961 forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved. 4962

10-60. Physically sealing the border may not be possible, since it could require the commitment of more 4963 government forces and materiel than overall resources permit. Intelligence must be gathered by all means 4964 available to determine the locations and extent of insurgent activities in border areas. 4965

10-61. Commanders should determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and 4966 volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, 4967 terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Continuous and 4968 detailed surveillance is required. Since placing forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites 4969 may be impossible, priorities should be established. Natural barriers must be used wherever possible. Using 4970 patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increase the effectiveness of natural barriers. Herbicides, if 4971 approved for the area of operations, may be used to enhance visibility in vegetated areas. 4972

10-62. A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Public 4973 notice is given that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone are dealt with 4974 as infiltrators or insurgents. A friendly population buffer zone is an area in which civilians living within the 4975 area of operations are limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. Persons whose loyalty cannot 4976 be established are monitored. This concept offers a good potential for establishing information nets and 4977 using loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base 4978 areas for border-crossing activities. A continuing military information support operation effort should be 4979 directed toward maintaining the morale and loyalty of the population. 4980

10-63. Aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground reconnaissance patrols may be 4981 employed to ensure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance and control of 4982 extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated 4983 offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategically located observation posts, and an effective system of 4984 licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft. 4985

10-64. In addition to the three perspectives normally considered in counterinsurgency, border operations 4986 introduce a fourth perspective, the population of the host-nation neighbor country. Counterinsurgent actions 4987 will be viewed and interpreted by local populations in the neighboring country. Counterinsurgents must 4988 consider the impact their actions have on this population. If the neighboring local population sympathizes 4989 with host-nation insurgents or believes that counterinsurgent programs are counterproductive to their 4990 individual goals, then negative perceptions can lead to increased foreign fighter, weapons, and resource 4991 trafficking to support an insurgency. The counterinsurgent lacks the physical means to influence this 4992 population, but the counterinsurgent can mitigate risk by performing effective information operations that 4993 explain counterinsurgent programs and their benefits. 4994



BASING 4995

10-65. Counterinsurgency forces operate within a host country and must therefore have a base from which 4996 to operate. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). All bases must be 4997 securable and defendable. Bases vary according to the size of the unit occupying the base and the mission 4998 of the units utilizing the base. All types of bases require clear command relationships. In counterinsurgency 4999 operations, forward operating bases, combat outposts, and patrol bases are three types of bases. 5000

10-66. Normally, at least one forward operating base exists in an area of operations. The size of the area, 5001 its physical characteristics, and the number and size of the units operating within the area often require 5002 additional operating bases. The forward operating bases established by a brigade or battalion are often 5003 semi-permanent and provide deployed units with command, control, and communications facilities; 5004 sustainment; personnel systems support; staging areas; and intelligence activities. They provide units with 5005 relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare for operations. During counterinsurgency 5006 operations, they aid in limiting insurgent mobility nearby and in providing some security to the local 5007 population. 5008

10-67. There are a few differences between brigade and battalion forward operating bases. Brigade 5009 forward operating bases are larger than battalion forward operating bases and provide a rear location for 5010 nondeployed elements of the deployed battalions such as battalion forward support companies. A battalion 5011 forward operating base is normally staffed with the minimum personnel needed to operate and provide 5012 security. All nonessential personnel, those not crucial to the tactical mission, are positioned in the brigade 5013 operational base. A battalion forward operating base should maintain two methods for sustainment: by road 5014 and either air or water. 5015

10-68. A combat outpost is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations 5016 (FM 3-90-2). In counterinsurgency operations, combat outposts are often company and platoon sized bases 5017 inside of insurgent influenced territory. They represent the cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. 5018 Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct 5019 contact with the local populace not possible from remote bases. Although this strategy carries with it 5020 potential downsides in terms of increased force protection and limiting flexibility, combat outposts provide 5021 a huge increase in overall security in an area. 5022

5023


Chapter 11 5024

Assessments 5025

11-1. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force 5026 capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0). (See ADRP 5-0 and ADRP 6-0 for doctrine on 5027 assessments.) The assessment process monitors the effects of actions on mission accomplishment. 5028 Operational assessments have three enduring purposes. First, they monitor the nature, scope, and severity 5029 of the situation. Second, they track the military force’s implementation of the plan in combination with 5030 collaborating agencies. And finally, operational assessments evaluate progress towards achieving goals or 5031 objectives. Assessments must be integrated into the Army design methodology and conceptual planning. 5032 Assessments are crucial for successful adaptation and innovation by commanders within their respective 5033 areas of operation. Assessments are also essential in any type of transition. They are a key ingredient in 5034 adapting and learning. Assessments must be part of initial design. Commanders and staffs must 5035 conceptualize what is actually important and determine how to question those assumptions from the 5036 beginning of understanding a problem. Assessment precedes and is integrated into every operations activity 5037 and entails two broad, enduring tasks: 5038

Continuously monitoring the current situation (including the environment) and the progress of 5039 the operation. 5040

Evaluating the operation against established criteria, expected outcomes, and the desired end 5041 state. 5042

11-2. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, continuously evaluate an operation’s progress against the 5043 established commander’s intent, mission, and concept of the operation. Based on their assessments, 5044 commanders may adjust the operation and associated activities to better achieve the end state and adjust 5045 assessment criteria to address the most credible and relevant activities. 5046

11-3. The critical role of assessment necessitates establishing measures of effectiveness and performance 5047 during planning. Commanders choose these measures carefully so that they align with the campaign design 5048 and the commander’s intent and reflect the emphasis on and interrelationship among the lines of effort. 5049 Commanders and staffs revise their assessment and measures of effectiveness and performance as the 5050 operation progresses to most effectively focus limited collection and analytical resources. 5051

11-4. Sound assessment blends qualitative and quantitative analysis with the judgment and intuition of all 5052 leaders. Great care must be applied here, as counterinsurgency operations most often involve complex 5053 societal issues that may not lend themselves to quantifiable measures of effectiveness. Moreover, bad 5054 assumptions and false data can undermine the validity of both assessments and conclusions drawn from 5055 them. Data and metrics can inform a commander’s assessment. However, they must not be allowed to 5056 dominate it in uncertain situations. Subjective and intuitive assessment must not be replaced by an 5057 exclusive focus on data or metrics. Commanders must exercise their professional judgment in determining 5058 the proper balance. 5059

ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS 5060

11-5. Several assessment frameworks have been developed over the past decade to assist in the 5061 development of the initial assessment. Depending on their specific purpose, they can be used as tools to 5062 develop an interagency initial assessment, assess conflicts, or measure progress. For example, the 5063 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework is a recognized and very useful initial assessment framework 5064 (See U.S. Government publication Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework). Alternatively, units may 5065 use some form of systems analysis based on the operational variables. 5066

Chapter 11


ASSESSMENT METHODS 5067

11-6. Selecting the appropriate approach to assessment is the most important assessment decision of the 5068 commander. Assessment methodologies may be centralized, decentralized, or both. A centralized 5069 methodology requires units to collect and report information requirements to their higher headquarters for 5070 analysis and situational understanding. This is a common methodology and is often described as pattern 5071 and trend analysis. Pattern and trend analysis uses centralized quantitative analysis to produce a snapshot of 5072 the operation’s momentum over time. Pattern and trend analysts tend to accept that counterinsurgency data 5073 will be inaccurate and incomplete, but when viewed in aggregate this data will be sufficient to produce 5074 relevant, centralized, and quantifiable analysis. Pattern and trend analysis measures progress, but it is not 5075 truly an assessment. The problem with the centralized approach to assessment is that the decentralized 5076 nature of counterinsurgency prevents the development of any centralized model to understand the important 5077 nuances of local context. Decentralized assessments enable subordinate units to develop and measure 5078 progress locally. The interaction between levels of command is critical to informing the higher commander. 5079 Although preferred by the lower tactical levels, actual measurement of progress is limited by the lack of a 5080 common starting point. This often gives the best picture of the local situation, but it lacks the context of 5081 how it compares to other locales. Senior commanders must weigh the results by comparing apples to 5082 oranges. This makes the development of an aggregate analysis very difficult. 5083

11-7. Military forces in counterinsurgency usually use a combination of these two assessment methods, 5084 choosing common reporting requirements for all subordinates but also requiring a subjective analysis from 5085 each of the subordinate commanders to aid in informing the senior commanders’ situational understanding. 5086 Units report qualitative statistics to enable pattern analysis, commanders provide quantitative analysis to 5087 fully depict what the statistics mean at the local level. The combined assessment involves a top down 5088 planning, bottom-up refinement approach in which analysis is conducted at the level the data is collected 5089 and reports to higher headquarters include narratives from local commanders. This type of assessment 5090 eschews the establishment of core level metrics at the highest levels and allows commanders to establish 5091 additional metrics in accordance with their situation and their resources. Combined assessment generally 5092 results in more accurate reporting and efficient use of collection and analysis resources. 5093

11-8. In geographically distributed, decentralized counterinsurgency campaigns, only a few activities 5094 produce similar outcomes or are consistently implemented across the theater of operations. What is 5095 important in one area may not be important in another. Similarly, what works in one area may not work in 5096 another area. 5097

ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS 5098

11-9. Assessment begins as soon as the military force receives an alert or warning and does not end until 5099 after the force has ceased operations and left the area. Assessment begins with an initial assessment that 5100 serves as the basis for planning. Planning develops this into an operational assessment that evaluates plan 5101 effectiveness and focus. The assessment is continually reassessed. Often plans are updated because of the 5102 reassessment process. 5103

11-10. The assessment should reflect the achievements of collaborating partners. Military forces cannot 5104 defeat an insurgency alone. It is important that assessors realize that information about the underlying root 5105 causes for social, cultural, political, and economic turbulence will probably be incomplete. Obtaining 5106 reliable information can be costly and time-consuming. Assessors should be extremely wary of methods 5107 that claim to provide this information quickly. An assessment based on faulty information can result in 5108 military force actions that are counterproductive. It is better for assessors to monitor the situation, track 5109 what every organization is doing, and be clear about what they do not know. The next step is to postulate, 5110 hypothesize, and clearly state what assumptions the evaluation process is making. Assessors seek 5111 information to test assumptions and revise estimates as operations continue. 5112

11-11. At its core, a counterinsurgency environment is a political problem. Understanding and solving the 5113 political problem is the essence of counterinsurgency operations. A counterinsurgency environment is 5114 complex, with many lines of effort covering a variety of political, military, economic, social, 5115 infrastructural, and informational activities. As such, developing a comprehensive assessment is a 5116 time-consuming process that is difficult to perform properly and effectively. Counterinsurgents must assess 5117

Assessments


not only their own actions or inactions, but also those of the insurgent and the population. These 5118 assessments must include, among many other factors, the context for any given situation, the perceptions of 5119 those involved, and the possible outcomes of actions or inactions. 5120

11-12. Assessments are the responsibility of the commander. The commander’s direct and personal 5121 involvement in the assessment process is critical. Moreover, assessments must contain both subjective and 5122 objective elements. Assessments combine elements of science and art. They are not simply a collection of 5123 numbers or indicators. They must be understood in the context of the overall campaign, not just from a 5124 military perspective. 5125

11-13. Countering an insurgency most often involves an extended campaign. A counterinsurgent must 5126 assess his actions or inactions broadly, to include how they are viewed locally, within the coalition (if one 5127 exists), host nation, and the region. The counterinsurgent also assesses actions against host-nation strategic 5128 goals. Without the backing of each of these levels, the counterinsurgent risks loss of legitimacy and 5129 potential failure. 5130

11-14. Eliminating the root causes of the insurgency is the goal of a counterinsurgency. Assessment must 5131 focus on those activities and actions that are most important in addressing these root causes. The key point 5132 is that the assessment must be focused on gathering the right information needed to understand what to do. 5133 The commander must determine if counterinsurgents are doing things right, if counterinsurgents are doing 5134 the right things, and if change is necessary. 5135

11-15. Balanced assessments include information from all relevant and objective sources, including both 5136 quantitative and qualitative data. This data includes the proper combination of centralized and decentralized 5137 reporting. A balanced assessment includes countering opinions and data that contradict overall findings. A 5138 combination of quantitative and qualitative types of indicators reduces the chance of misconstruing trends. 5139

11-16. No assessment will ever show all the salient aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign. Efforts to 5140 do so waste resources and places unrealistic demands on subordinate units that often result in falsified 5141 reporting. Assessment should rely principally on information gathered through ongoing intelligence and 5142 operational reporting. Demands for additional reporting should be minimized. 5143

11-17. There is no substitute for seeing the battlefield as a means for understanding the situation. 5144 Battlefield circulation is critical to establishing relationships between commanders at all levels. The view of 5145 the commander who walks and lives on a particular piece of ground daily provides a level of insight that no 5146 statistic or report can replace. These first-hand encounters provide commanders a lens with which to review 5147 and compare centralized reports and trend analysis with the intuition and local understanding of 5148 subordinate commands. 5149

11-18. Collecting, assembling, and analyzing information is a time and labor-intensive process. 5150 Commanders balance time and resources for assessment just as they do across the planning, decision, and 5151 execution continuum. To help achieve this balance, commanders and staffs ask the following questions: 5152

What must be understood to begin planning? 5153 What will be assessed and to what detail? 5154 How will a particular task, objective, end state condition, or assumption be assessed? 5155 What measures of effectiveness and measures of performance will be used? 5156 What information requirements (indicators) are needed to support a particular assessment? 5157 Who on the staff has primary responsibility for assessing a particular area? 5158 What is the collection plan? 5159 How can the host nation help? 5160 How can the other agencies of the U.S. government assist? 5161

DEVELOPING MEASUREMENT CRITERIA 5162

11-19. Assessment requires determining why and when progress is being achieved along each line of 5163 effort. Traditionally, commanders use discrete quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate 5164 progress. However, the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations makes progress difficult to 5165 measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and complex nature of 5166

Chapter 11


counterinsurgency problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure against the overall 5167 operation’s end state. Additionally, commanders need to know how actions along different lines of effort 5168 complement each other; therefore, planners evaluate not only progress along each line of effort but also 5169 interactions among lines of efforts. 5170

11-20. The most common types of assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and 5171 measures of performance (MOPs). A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in 5172 system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end 5173 state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or 5174 consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, “Are we achieving results that move 5175 counterinsurgents towards the desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required?” A 5176 measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task 5177 accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answers the question, “Was the task or action performed as the 5178 commander intended?” 5179

11-21. MOEs and MOPs for assessing counterinsurgency operations are designed with the same 5180 characteristics. MOEs and MOPs are measurable, discrete, relevant, and responsive: 5181

MOEs and MOPs have quantitative or qualitative standards against which they can be measured. 5182 The most effective measurement is a combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to 5183 guard against an inaccurate view of results. 5184

Each MOE and MOP measures a separate, distinct aspect of the task, purpose, or condition. 5185 MOEs and MOPs are relevant to the measured task, outcome, and condition. Host-nation local, 5186

regional, and national leaders, and nongovernmental organization personnel, may provide 5187 practical ideas, professional ideas, and feedback to craft relevant MOPs and MOEs. 5188

Assessment tools detect environmental and situational changes. 5189

DESIGNING EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 5190

11-22. An MOE provides some information about how the operational environment is changing. An 5191 MOE of a number of attacks on the counterinsurgent can indicate a successful counterinsurgency, or it can 5192 indicate insurgent control of an area and an unwillingness of the counterinsurgent to contest that control. In 5193 this example, commanders and staffs need to understand why the attacks are down. What is essential to 5194 any MOE is the development of an effective measure that tells the commander critical information about 5195 how the operational environment is changing. 5196

11-23. Moreover, in developing MOPs, commanders and staffs measure a units performance based on the 5197 conditions of the area of operations. In other words, MOPs should be developed as a means to measure if a 5198 unit is effectively doing the things that the commander and staff view as essential to defeating an 5199 insurgency. MOPs are developed based on the counterinsurgency mission and the area of operations. 5200

11-24. When designing MOEs and MOPs, commanders and staffs consider several points: 5201 Knowledge of how many of anything is usually not as important as how many out of a total and 5202

how important is each. 5203 Knowledge of the state of insurgent training may provide information about the overall 5204

capability of the insurgency. If an insurgency can produce trained units, it may have a higher 5205 military and sustainment capacity. 5206

Training in other states could indicate support from another state. 5207 A high number of un-coerced informant reports could be an important indicator of a breakdown 5208

in insurgent security. 5209 The number of insurgent attacks is not always as important as the scale of an insurgent attack. 5210

Large-scale attacks require a level of operational sophistication that may imply an increased 5211 insurgent capability. 5212

How many insurgents are caught and jailed may be an important MOE. However, the number 5213 convicted and sentenced by government judicial authorities and remaining in jail over time is 5214 also an important MOE for governmental capability and corruption. 5215

Assessments


The number of recruits available for an insurgency can be an important indicator of the 5216 government’s and the insurgency’s legitimacy. 5217

An MOP based on the number of patrols in a given area over a period may not be as effective as 5218 the persistence of patrols in a given area over the same period of time. 5219

An MOE based on the amount of money seized may not be as important as an MOE based on 5220 denying funding sources. 5221

11-25. When developing MOPs and MOEs, commanders and staffs avoid developing MOPs or MOEs 5222 that highlight what a commander and staff are actively doing to defeat an insurgency. For example, 5223 building a number of schools can be used as an MOP, and the number of students in the school can be used 5224 as an MOE. However, these activities may have no effect on the insurgency at all. Commanders and staffs 5225 connect MOEs and MOPs to the operational environment and insurgency. Accepting the assumption that 5226 what one is doing is actually relevant to defeating an insurgency is an easy means to undermine the 5227 effectiveness of an MOPs and MOEs. Commanders and staffs avoid the trap of thinking that because they 5228 do something and measure it, it is important. 5229

11-26. Commanders and staffs generally avoid measures without any context. For example, the number 5230 of enemy killed, without any context, is normally a dangerous MOP. The number of enemy killed can 5231 indicate that the insurgency is increasing its recruitment and capabilities, thus more insurgents are being 5232 killed in more attacks. Commanders and staffs establish some context in any measure that they use. 5233

11-27. Vietnam highlights the importance of creating an assessment framework that is contextual to the 5234 insurgency and is relevant to actually measuring success. In Vietnam, the U.S. leadership made 5235 assumptions about what were important measures of success without connecting those measurements to 5236 situational understanding. Moreover, U.S. leaders did not actively question their assumptions. Even worse, 5237 their ineffective assessment framework had an influence on operations. 5238

Measuring Effectiveness and Performance in Vietnam 5239 Historical accounts of the conflict in Vietnam vary widely in the points emphasized 5240 and the explanations offered. Disputes are facilitated by the different personal 5241 experiences of many different direct observers who saw or participated in sometimes 5242 very different slices of the conflict at different times, at different operational levels, 5243 and in different parts of the country. What, if anything, could have been done to 5244 change the outcome of the war and who to blame for that outcome remains fairly 5245 hotly contested. What the outcome was, however, is not contested: U.S. forces 5246 withdrew in 1973, and the Saigon government fell to the combined pressure of the 5247 insurgency and North Vietnamese regular forces in April of 1975, unequivocally a 5248 counterinsurgent loss. 5249 The literature on the U.S. military’s Vietnam-era assessment process is highly 5250 negative; even the most strident defenders of the assessment reports produced 5251 during that period expressed some dissatisfaction with the process. Assessments of 5252 the Vietnam War varied in type, purpose, and intended consumer. The entire process 5253 changed and grew between the early 1960s and the early 1970s; there was no single 5254 “Vietnam War assessment.” There were many assessment processes, and many 5255 were burdened with murky objectives, measures that were poorly connected to those 5256 objectives, and poor data collection. Quantitative data of questionable veracity were 5257 used to make optimistic prognostications, such as the illusion of a trend toward “a 5258 light at the end of the tunnel.” Distrust of Vietnam-era military briefings became so 5259 endemic that members of the press corps referred to the daily military press briefings 5260 as the “five o’clock follies.” 5261 The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, was the theater-level military 5262 command in Saigon, South Vietnam. MACV was the neck of the funnel for nearly all 5263 field reports on operations, intelligence, pacification, and other data categories. 5264 Some of the MACV reports and nearly all of the OSD reports relied heavily on 5265 aggregated quantitative data and pattern and trend analysis. In some cases, data 5266 collection requirements were developed to meet perceived operational or strategic 5267

Chapter 11


needs; in other cases, they were specifically designed to provide data that would 5268 show some kind of progress without context. For example, in 1968, MACV reported 5269 the number of cakes of soap it had issued to Vietnamese villagers in 1967 (572,121), 5270 an irrelevant input metric. More famous (or infamous) is the use of “body counts” as 5271 a primary progress metric. Not only were body counts a poor proxy for progress 5272 driven by an untenable assumption about adversary attrition, but data collected were 5273 wildly inaccurate because of the adversary emphasis on reclaiming bodies, difficult 5274 terrain, duplicate reporting, and the temptation to exaggerate, among other reasons. 5275 Assessment of the Vietnam War was haphazard before MACV became a theater 5276 combat command in the early 1960s. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, 5277 MACV and OSD (with CIA assistance) created the single largest and most 5278 comprehensive military COIN assessment apparatus in the history of warfare. It 5279 involved the efforts of hundreds of thousands of military personnel, civilians, 5280 Vietnamese nationals, intelligence experts, and analysts over the course of several 5281 years. These contributors produced hundreds of millions of data items (in DoD 5282 parlance), tens of thousands of tactical and operational analytic reports, and 5283 hundreds of comprehensive assessments that addressed nearly every aspect of the 5284 war. Data flowed up from the hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground, 5285 province advisors, military advisors to Republic of Vietnam units, U.S. civilian 5286 officials, and U.S. intelligence officers, as well as Republic of Vietnam military units, 5287 government agencies, and civilian development teams. These data were then fed 5288 into catalogs and computer databases, including the Hamlet Evaluation System 5289 (HES), the Terrorist Incident Reporting System, the Territorial Forces Effectiveness 5290 System, the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS), the Situation Reports 5291 Army File, and many others. “Data” could mean anything from a simple number (e.g., 5292 rounds fired in a single artillery attack) to a more complex set of ostensibly correlated 5293 survey data (e.g., hamlet evaluation data). 5294 Assessment in Vietnam was non-trivial: A July 26, 1970, U.S. military intelligence 5295 briefing listed 44 provinces, 257 districts, 2,464 villages, 11,729 hamlets, and 1,500 5296 miles of coastline from the demilitarized zone with North Vietnam to the border with 5297 Cambodia in the Gulf of Siam. The challenges of assessment in Vietnam are the 5298 same challenges faced in any counterinsurgency: How should policymakers 5299 determine progress and decide strategy if all they have to choose from is inaccurate, 5300 decontextualized, and aggregated numbers or thousands of pages of lengthy 5301 narrative? 5302 While it is not possible to state that poor assessment led to the loss of the Vietnam 5303 War, the war was distinguished by internal confusion, poor decisionmaking, and, 5304 ultimately, strategic defeat. It is apparent from analyzing the way in which 5305 assessments were presented and used that they contributed to many of the poor 5306 decisions that led to this defeat. 5307

BROAD INDICATORS OF PROGRESS 5308

11-28. Numerical and statistical indicators have limits when measuring social environments. For example, 5309 in South Vietnam U.S. forces used the body count to evaluate success or failure of combat operations. Yet, 5310 the body count only communicated a small part of the information commanders needed to assess their 5311 operations. It was therefore misleading. Body count can be a partial, effective indicator only when 5312 adversaries and their identities can be verified. (Normally, this identification is determined through a 5313 uniform or possession of an insurgent identification card.) Additionally, an accurate appreciation of what 5314 insurgent casualty numbers might indicate regarding enemy strength or capability requires knowing the 5315 exact number of insurgent armed fighters initially present. In addition, this indicator does not measure 5316 several important factors. For example, it does not measure which side the local populace blames for 5317 collateral damage, whether this fighting and resultant casualties damaged the insurgent infrastructure and 5318 affected the insurgency strategy in that area, and where families of dead insurgents reside and how they 5319 might react. Within the essential services lines of effort, the number of schools built or renovated does not 5320

Assessments


equate to the effective operation of an educational system, nor is it as important as the number of children 5321 in school. 5322

11-29. Planners start with broad measures of social and economic health or weakness when assessing 5323 environmental conditions. Illustrative examples of possible counterinsurgency indicators include: 5324

Acts of violence (numbers of attacks and friendly or host-nation casualties). 5325 Dislocated civilians. The number, population, and demographics of dislocated camps or the lack 5326

thereof are a resultant indicator of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people 5327 in the camps often indicates a return to normalcy. People and families exiled from or fleeing 5328 their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and revealing. 5329

Human movement and religious attendance. In societies were the culture is dominated by 5330 religion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the ease of movement and 5331 confidence in security, people’s use of free will and volition, and the presence of freedom of 5332 religion. Possible indicators include the following: 5333 Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof. 5334 Development and active use of places of worship. 5335 Number of temples and churches closed by a government. 5336

Presence and activity of small- and medium-sized businesses. When danger or insecure 5337 conditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are 5338 open and how many customers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of 5339 sales activity. 5340

Level of agricultural activity: 5341 Is a province, region, or nation self-sustaining, or must life-support type foodstuffs be 5342 imported? 5343 How many acres are in cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered? 5344 Are agricultural goods getting to market? Has the annual need increased or decreased? 5345

Presence or absence of associations. The formation and presence of multiple political parties 5346 indicates more involvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent professional 5347 associations demonstrate the viability of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity 5348 indicates worker involvement in the economy and politics. 5349

Government services available. Examples include: 5350 Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area. 5351 Clinics and hospitals in full operation, and whether new facilities sponsored by the private 5352 sector are open and operational. 5353 Schools and universities open, functioning, with increasing attendance over time. 5354

Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications. This is a classic measure to 5355 determine if an insurgency has denied areas in the physical, electronic, or print domains. 5356

Tax revenue. If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of host-nation government 5357 influence and subsequent civil stability. 5358

Industry exports. 5359 Employment or unemployment rate over time. An increasing employment rate over time is 5360

generally a sign of stability. 5361 Amount of electricity produced. Increasing production of electricity is associated with provision 5362

of essential services. However, increased stability often results in greater demand so care must 5363 be taken in the use of this indicator. 5364

Specific attacks on infrastructure. 5365

ASSESSMENT CELL 5366

11-30. An assessment cell normally shadows the planning effort, looking for areas of the plan that may 5367 require assistance in measuring progress toward planned goals and the purpose of the operation. Assessing 5368 progress is the responsibility of all staff sections and not the sole purview of any one staff section or 5369 command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its specific area of expertise. However, 5370

Chapter 11


these staff sections must coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated 5371 recommendations across the warfighting functions to produce comprehensive assessments for the 5372 commander, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. 5373

11-31. The function and purpose of an assessment cell or working group must include not only the 5374 assessment of the plan and progress of operations, but also the effects of those operations on operational 5375 environments. To understand the effect, it is important to assess not only what happened or how, but why a 5376 particular result was achieved. This level of understanding aids in informing future decisions and plans. 5377

11-32. In counterinsurgency operations, especially in widely decentralized operations, assessment cells 5378 with analysts are organized down to and including the battalion level. This capability greatly assists in the 5379 development of bottom-up assessment metrics that provide context and balance for other types of 5380 assessment. 5381

DIRECTED TELESCOPE TECHNIQUE 5382

11-33. The directed telescope technique aids commanders with assessments by providing eyes on the 5383 ground. Military commanders often find value in a separate and objective source of information regarding 5384 actions and events “on the ground.” Commanders who have favored the directed telescope technique 5385 include Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, King Edward III, Napoleon Bonaparte, the Duke of Wellington, 5386 Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, General George C. Marshall, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, 5387 General George S. Patton, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, General Stanley McChrystal, and General 5388 Davis Petraeus. 5389

11-34. When using the directed telescope technique, commanders send trusted subordinates and teams to 5390 the battlefield to swiftly assess and report. This helps the commander get a sense for what is transpiring in 5391 the field. This technique does not take the place of regular after action reviews or reporting, but instead it 5392 helps the commander confirm or deny the visual image he has of how operations are going and the impact 5393 his troops efforts’ are having. 5394

11-35. The duties of a team assigned to a directed telescope mission, as stated in the 1937 edition of the 5395 United States Army Command and General Staff School’s Command and Staff Principles (Tentative), 5396 include a variety of skills and qualities to be successful. They include— 5397

Good judgment. 5398 Unfailing tact. 5399 Initiative. 5400 Sympathy, which implies a desire to help rather than to criticize. 5401 Acute perception, coupled with exactness and accuracy in determining facts. 5402 Ability to express themselves and deliver impartial reports in the clearest and most concise 5403

terms. 5404 Good tactical knowledge. 5405

11-36. Instead of spying or informing the commander on personnel or single events, the focus is to 5406 provide advice to units based on their findings, report trends to the commander, and most importantly 5407 provide recommendations that are feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Sample questions, as detailed in a 5408 1992 directed telescope study by the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Combat Studies Institute, 5409 included— 5410

What functions did such personnel perform during combat? 5411 In what ways did such personnel enhance the command and control of units, generate initiative, 5412

create agility and depth, and contribute toward the synchronization of combat power? 5413 What special preparation and training did these personnel receive? 5414 What qualities, attributes, competencies, and capabilities did these personnel possess? 5415 For whom did these personnel work? 5416 How did these personnel go about performing their duties? 5417 How were these personnel selected? 5418

Assessments


Who used these personnel? What are the similarities and differences between the battlefield 5419 effectiveness of units that used such personnel versus units that did not? 5420

What authority did these personnel possess? 5421

11-37. Although the generals mentioned in paragraph 11-33 commanded large forces, the directed 5422 telescope technique can work at various echelons and can be included when battalion and brigade staff and 5423 personnel are supporting subordinate units in information analysis, operations, planning, and training. 5424

5425


Chapter 12 5426

Legal Considerations 5427

AUTHORITY TO ASSIST A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 5428

12-1. All U.S. military operations, including counterinsurgency operations, are governed by U.S. domestic 5429 law, the international law binding on the U.S., to include the law of war, and U.S. policy and regulations. 5430 Counterinsurgency operations are complex and raise challenging legal issues for Soldiers, Marines, and 5431 their commanders. A number of areas of the law are critical for counterinsurgency operations, from the 5432 authority to deploy forces and conduct counterinsurgency operations in the first instance, to the laws 5433 governing the conduct of operations, to the laws that fund counterinsurgency operations. The law of war, to 5434 include the treatment of civilians and detainees, and the application of rules of engagement, in particular, 5435 are critical issues that have a significant impact on the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 5436

12-2. In addition to the authorities to use military force, through a variety of statutes contained in Title 10, 5437 United States Code (USC) and Title 22, USC, Congress has authorized and directed the Department of 5438 Defense (DOD) and Department of State, respectively, to provide assistance to foreign governments 5439 relevant to counterinsurgency. For instance, U.S. forces may be called upon to provide foreign internal 5440 defense or training to foreign security forces (such as military forces and police). 5441

AUTHORITY FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 5442

12-3. The President or Secretary of Defense may issue a deployment or execution order, which may 5443 authorize U.S. forces to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal 5444 defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can 5445 participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval may go through the standing statutory 5446 authorities in Title 22, USC. Among other programs, Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act and the 5447 Arms Export Control Act. Programs under Title 22 authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, 5448 and other forms of aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions of Title 10, as 5449 well. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited 5450 forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the American ambassador for the host 5451 nation. In such situations, U.S. military personnel work as administrative and technical personnel. They are 5452 part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, pursuant to a status of forces agreement, or pursuant to an exchange of 5453 notes. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing 5454 defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. 5455

GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE 5456

12-4. With certain exceptions, such as those noted above, DOD is usually not the lead governmental 5457 department for assisting foreign governments, even for the provision of security assistance. The U.S. 5458 military typically has no authorized role with regard to the provision of training a foreign government’s 5459 police or other civil interior forces. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign 5460 police forces except within carefully circumscribed exceptions, and under a Presidential directive, and the 5461 lead role in providing police assistance within those exceptions has been normally delegated to the 5462 Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In addition, Public 5463 Law 101-510, div. A, title X, Sec. 1004, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 STAT. 1629, as amended gives U.S. forces 5464 authority to train foreign law enforcement in counternarcotics, and counternarco terrorism. Limited 5465 exceptions have been granted. For instance, National Security Presidential Directive 36, of 11 May 2004, 5466 gave the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the responsibility for U.S. efforts with respect to security 5467 and military operations in Iraq, including the authority to train and equip Iraqi police. U.S. commanders are 5468 not able to train foreign law enforcement unless given specific legal exception. 5469

Chapter 12


RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5470

12-5. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 5471 circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat 5472 engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If 5473 there are no operation-specific rules of engagement, U.S. forces apply the standing rules of engagement. 5474 When working with a multinational force, commanders must thoroughly coordinate the rules of 5475 engagement. 5476

MISSION-SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5477

12-6. The standing rules of engagement provide a mechanism for combatant commanders to develop 5478 mission-specific rules of engagement by implementing supplemental measures within their discretion, or by 5479 submitting a request for supplemental measures to the Secretary of Defense for approval. These 5480 mission-specific rules of engagement are then passed down the chain of command in the form of an execute 5481 order, fragmentary order, or other formal operational tasking. The combatant commander and subordinate 5482 commanders must follow these mission-specific rules of engagement. Combatant commanders may 5483 augment the rules of engagement as necessary by implementing supplemental measures within their 5484 authority to approve. Both combatant commanders and subordinate commanders are required to notify the 5485 Secretary of Defense of any restrictions placed on the Secretary of Defense-approved mission-specific rules 5486 of engagement. Commanders at all levels are required to evaluate the rules of engagement and request 5487 changes if they determine the rules of engagement are inadequate for the mission. 5488

12-7. Taken as a whole, the rules of engagement regulate the conduct of U.S. forces for the application of 5489 force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense. For instance, for mission 5490 accomplishment, U.S. forces may be authorized to engage enemy forces declared hostile anywhere and 5491 anytime without the need to observe a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. With respect to 5492 self-defense, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense 5493 in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. U.S. forces may exercise individual self-defense 5494 in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent; however, unit commanders may limit individual 5495 self-defense by members of their unit. The rules of engagement in counterinsurgency operations are 5496 dynamic. Commanders must regularly review the rules of engagement for their effectiveness in the 5497 complex counterinsurgency environment. Training counterinsurgents in the rules of engagement is 5498 regularly reinforced. 5499

MULTINATIONAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 5500

12-8. U.S. forces assigned to the operational or tactical control of a multinational force will follow the 5501 rules of engagement of the multinational force for mission accomplishment, if authorized by the Secretary 5502 of Defense. U.S. forces retain the right of self-defense. Apparent inconsistencies between the right of 5503 self-defense contained in U.S. rules of engagement and the rules of engagement of the multinational force 5504 will be submitted through the U.S. chain of command for resolution. While final resolution is pending, U.S. 5505 forces will continue to operate under the U.S. rules of engagement. When U.S. forces, under U.S. 5506 operational or tactical control, operate with a multinational force, reasonable efforts are made to develop 5507 common rules of engagement. If common rules of engagement cannot be developed, U.S. forces operate 5508 under U.S. rules of engagement. The multinational forces will be informed prior to U.S. participation in the 5509 operation that U.S. forces intend to operate under U.S. rules of engagement. U.S. forces remain bound by 5510 international agreements to which the U.S. is a party even though other coalition members may not be 5511 bound by them. International agreements, such as status-of-forces agreements, are never interpreted to limit 5512 U.S. forces’ right of self-defense. 5513

LAW OF WAR 5514

12-9. Counterinsurgency operations may occur in both an international armed conflict (state versus state) 5515 and a non-international armed conflict (state versus armed nonstate actor). Situations can occur, such as 5516 during occupation, where armed forces are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or other persons 5517 who are not part of a state’s armed force. Any hostilities between state and non-state actors are by 5518

Legal Considerations


definition a non-international armed conflict. There might be a simultaneous international armed conflict 5519 occurring, but this does not affect the state vs. non-state conflict's qualification as non-international armed 5520 conflict. Regardless of the context, U.S. forces obey the law of war. The law of war is that part of 5521 international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict 5522 or international humanitarian law. An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 5523 between states (in an international armed conflict) or protracted armed violence between governmental 5524 authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state (in a non-international armed 5525 conflict). The U.S. is bound by the law of war treaties to which it is a party, as well as binding norms of 5526 customary international law. 5527

12-10. The law of war (or law of armed conflict) is the branch of international law limiting the use of 5528 violence in armed conflicts. It spares those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities. It also 5529 limits the violence to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict. The purposes of the law of 5530 war include: 5531

Ensuring good order and discipline. 5532 Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with U.S. national values. 5533 Maintaining domestic, international, and local support. 5534 Protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering. 5535 Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of an enemy. 5536 Facilitating the restoration of peace. 5537

12-11. The primary sources of the law of war can be found in The Hague Convention of 1907, and its 5538 Annexed Regulations; the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; and their two additional Protocols of 1977. 5539 The law of war is based upon the following fundamental principles: 5540

First, military necessity, that is, that a belligerent is justified in applying those measures not 5541 forbidden by international law, which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of 5542 the enemy as soon as possible. 5543

Second, humanity, according to which requires military forces to avoid inflicting gratuitous 5544 violence on the enemy. 5545

Third, honor, which demands a certain mutual respect between the opposing forces within an 5546 armed conflict, and in their conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations. 5547

MILITARY NECESSITY 5548

12-12. The principle of military necessity is explicitly codified in Article 23, of Hague IV Reg., which 5549 forbids a belligerent to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be 5550 imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. While no law of war treaty defines military necessity, it 5551 has been recognized through its codification into treaties to which the U.S. is a state party. Moreover, the 5552 U.S. has defined military necessity in its law of war manuals. For instance, FM 27-10 defines military 5553 necessity as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 5554 indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. 5555

12-13. Military necessity does not authorize all military action and destruction. Under no circumstances 5556 may military necessity authorize actions specifically prohibited by the law of war, such as the murder of 5557 prisoners of war, ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees, the taking of hostages, or the execution of a 5558 reprisal against a person or object specifically protected from reprisal. Civilian objects are generally 5559 protected from intentional attack or destruction. However, civilian objects may lose their protections if they 5560 are being used for military purposes or if there is a military necessity for their destruction or seizure. 5561 Civilian objects may, in such circumstances, become military objectives, and if so, the law of war permits 5562 their destruction. In treaties such as Hague IV Reg. and the Geneva Conventions, where an express 5563 prohibition has been stated, neither military necessity nor any other rationale of necessity may override that 5564 prohibition. In short, the principle of military necessity authorizes that use of force that is required to 5565 accomplish the mission. Military necessity, however, does not authorize acts otherwise prohibited by the 5566 law of war. This principle must be applied in conjunction with other law of war principles as well as other, 5567 more specific legal constraints set forth in law of war treaties to which the U.S. is a party. 5568

Chapter 12


HUMANITY 5569

12-14. Humanity addresses those acts governments have determined are neither consistent with the 5570 objectives of the law of war nor necessary for the achievement of the complete or partial submission of the 5571 enemy. As such, the principle of humanity includes, inter alia, the following humanitarian considerations: 5572

Individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, the civilian population, and civilian 5573 objects are granted immunity from direct attack by military forces. 5574

The provision of certain fundamental safeguards for persons who fall into the hands of the 5575 enemy, particularly prisoners of war, military wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians. 5576

Protections for military medical personnel, units, and transport. 5577 The prohibition of weapons and munitions that may cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 5578

injury to combatants or that may be so indiscriminate as to pose a risk to civilians in their normal 5579 use. 5580

The principle has been developed further through rules regulating lawful weapon employment to reduce 5581 risk to individual civilians, the civilian population, and civilian objects. The principle of humanity is 5582 sub-divided into discrimination, proportionality, and the prohibition of weapons or munitions calculated to 5583 cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to combatants. 5584

UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR SUPERFLUOUS INJURY 5585

12-15. Relevant treaty law is contained in Hague IV Reg. Article 22, which states, the right of belligerents 5586 to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. Article 23(e) then prohibits the employment of arms, 5587 projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. The terms unnecessary suffering and 5588 superfluous injury are regarded as synonymous. Although neither of the terms is defined, they are 5589 understood to refer to injury to persons, rather than damage to objects. The prohibition of unnecessary 5590 suffering constitutes acknowledgement that suffering to combatants is lawful and expected, and may 5591 include severe injury or loss of life. As a general proposition, the suffering inflicted by weapons or 5592 munitions would be deemed unnecessary only if: 5593

Its use was calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 5594 The inevitable result of the normal use causes an injury the nature of which is considered by 5595

governments as manifestly disproportionate in relation to the military advantage anticipated 5596 from employment of the weapons or munitions. 5597

12-16. Weapon’s or munitions’ effects must be weighed in light of comparable lawful weapons and 5598 munitions in use on the modern battlefield. A weapon cannot be declared unlawful merely because it may 5599 cause severe suffering or injury. The appropriate determination is whether a weapons’ or munitions’ 5600 employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. The 5601 correct criterion is whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably would 5602 cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. A state is not required to 5603 foresee or anticipate all possible uses or misuses of a weapon or munitions, since almost any weapon or 5604 monition can be misused in ways that might be prohibited. 5605

12-17. Under the law of war, combatants may kill or wound enemy combatants and civilians taking a 5606 direct part in hostilities; such acts are legitimate if accomplished with lawful means and methods. For 5607 example, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering does not limit the bringing of overwhelming firepower 5608 on an opposing military force in order to subdue or destroy it. What the law of war does prohibit is the 5609 design, modification, or employment of a weapon or munitions for the purpose of increasing or causing 5610 suffering beyond that required by military necessity. 5611

DISCRIMINATION 5612

12-18. The principle of discrimination, sometimes referred to as the principle of distinction, is the 5613 international law obligation of parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population (or 5614 individual civilians not taking a direct part in the hostilities) and combatant forces when engaged in 5615 military operations, directing the application of force solely against personnel belonging to the latter. 5616 Similarly, military force may be directed only against military objects or objectives, and not against civilian 5617



objects. A military objective is not limited to military bases, forces, or equipment, but includes other 5618 objects that contribute to an opposing state’s ability to wage war. Additionally, a civilian object is immune 5619 from intentional attack unless and until it loses its protected status through enemy abuse of that status. The 5620 principle of discrimination also provides civilians immunity from direct attack for so long as they take no 5621 part in hostile acts against enemy military forces. 5622

12-19. The principle of discrimination applies to military forces engaged in offensive or defensive 5623 operations, and to governments in providing protection for their civilian population and civilian objects. 5624 Each government and its military forces, as well as armed nonstate parties to a conflict, are obligated to 5625 separate their military or other fighting forces and military objects from the civilian population and civilian 5626 objects, to take steps to protect the civilian population (or civilians within its control) through affirmative 5627 steps such as evacuation from the vicinity of military operations or air raid precautions, and to minimize or 5628 avoid actions that might otherwise place the civilian population at risk from lawful military operations by 5629 the opposing force. The employment of voluntary or involuntary human shields to protect military 5630 objectives, individual military units, or military personnel is a violation of the law of war principle of 5631 discrimination. 5632

12-20. Physical damage or destruction of property is an inevitable and lawful aspect of combat. Military 5633 equipment (other than military medical equipment and transportation) is subject to lawful attack and 5634 destruction at all times. Civilian objects, including cultural property, are protected from seizure or 5635 intentional attack unless there is military necessity for their seizure or destruction, that is, they become 5636 military objectives. Destruction of civilian objects that is expressly prohibited, or that is not justified by 5637 military necessity, or that is wanton or excessive, is unnecessary destruction for which a commander may 5638 be culpable. 5639

12-21. The civilian population and individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities are protected 5640 from intentional attack. Where civilians are present on the battlefield or in proximity to legitimate military 5641 objectives, or are being used to shield legitimate targets from an attack that otherwise would be lawful, they 5642 are at risk of injury incidental to the lawful conduct of military operations. A law of war violation occurs 5643 when— 5644

The civilian population is attacked intentionally. 5645 Civilian casualties incidental to an otherwise lawful attack become excessive in relation to the 5646

concrete and direct military advantage to be gained and are attributed to the wanton conduct of 5647 an attacking force, for which the defending force or individual civilians or groups of civilians 5648 (such as voluntary human shields) bear no responsibility. 5649

A defender or attacker employs civilians as voluntary or involuntary human shields. Each of 5650 these acts constitutes a violation of the principle of discrimination. 5651

12-22. The law of war does not expressly prohibit civilians from taking a direct part in hostilities. If they 5652 do, however, they may be targeted for so long as they take a direct part. Civilians do not enjoy the 5653 combatant’s privilege—that is, they do not have combatant immunity, and if captured, they may be 5654 prosecuted for their belligerent acts under the domestic law of the captor. Civilians engaging in belligerent 5655 acts not only forfeit their immunity from direct attack; they also make it more difficult for military 5656 personnel to apply the principle of discrimination and, thereby, put all civilians at risk. There is no 5657 definition of direct part in hostilities in treaty law or customary international law. At a minimum, it 5658 encompasses actions that are belligerent per se, that is, by their very nature and purpose can be expected to 5659 cause actual harm to the enemy. In general, the qualification of an act as direct participation in hostilities is 5660 a fact-dependent analysis that must be made after analyzing all relevant available facts, in the 5661 circumstances prevailing at the time. 5662

12-23. Three categories of civilians can be targeted: civilians who are directly participating in hostilities, 5663 while they are directly participating in hostilities; civilians who are continuously participating in hostilities, 5664 and are therefore targetable at all times (as if they were in the third category); and members of organized 5665 armed groups or armed nonstate actors who are parties to the conflict. Generally, a civilian who takes a 5666 direct part in hostilities may be targeted, but only while engaged in such activities, which include deploying 5667 or moving to a position of attack and exfiltrating from an attack to the point from which their movement to 5668 the attack originated. When a civilian commits an isolated belligerent act, the duration of his or her direct 5669 participation in hostilities, and hence the period during which he or she is subject to attack, may be difficult 5670

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to define. When, however, a civilian repeatedly engages in belligerent acts over an extended period, it may 5671 be difficult to determine when or whether his or her direct participation in hostilities has ended. In those 5672 cases, a civilian engaged in a continuous pattern of belligerent acts may be treated as taking a direct part in 5673 hostilities on an ongoing basis, thereby subjecting him or her to attack at any time. The assessment of 5674 whether a person is entitled to protection against direct attack should be based on a reasonable assessment 5675 of the facts available at the time. 5676

12-24. Within an international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict, the armed forces of a 5677 state may engage in hostilities with armed nonstate actors. This is the classic counterinsurgency 5678 environment. While most international armed conflict involves warfare between the armed forces of two or 5679 more states, situations can occur, such as during occupation, where such armed forces and other armed 5680 security forces of the state (including police forces) are engaged in combat with armed nonstate actors, or 5681 other persons who are not part of a state armed force. Such a group can take a variety of forms, including 5682 an organized resistance movement that belongs to a state party but fails to meet the requirements for 5683 prisoner of war status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article 5684 4A (2), or a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda that, without regard to compliance with any of the other 5685 requirements of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 4A(2) (such as 5686 under responsible command, wears fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carries arms openly, 5687 and conducts operations in compliance with the law of war), operates without any authorization or 5688 affiliation with a state and thereby falls outside of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 5689 Prisoners of War. An individual who is formally or functionally part of an organized armed group that is 5690 engaged in hostilities may be targeted at any time. In essence, membership in armed forces or armed groups 5691 (such as the status of belonging to such a group) and direct participation in hostilities (such as a conduct-5692 based standard) are separate bases for targeting under the law of war. 5693

12-25. U.S. practice is that the designation of an armed nonstate actor as hostile (such as targetable at all 5694 times) and its members as direct participants in hostilities, should only be made by an official authorized to 5695 do so. Absent such a designation, the determination of whether a civilian may be targeted depends on 5696 whether that civilian is committing specific acts that amount to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile 5697 intent, in accordance with the standing rules of engagement. In addition, individual conflicts may involve 5698 specific rules of engagement that incorporate direct participation in hostilities analysis. 5699

PROPORTIONALITY 5700

12-26. Proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to 5701 attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 5702 gained. Proportionality is process-oriented rather than result-oriented. Decisionmakers are expected to take 5703 all feasible precautions in planning military operations, but they remain dependent on the (often imperfect 5704 and incomplete) information available at the time to weigh the risk these operations may pose to the 5705 civilian population. In this context, proportionality may be viewed as a fulcrum upon which military forces 5706 and commanders must weigh the legitimate destructive effect of an attack (the law of war principle of 5707 military necessity) against the undesirable incidental effects of an attack (such as the risk of death or injury 5708 to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities). Proportionality may be applied by decisionmakers at the 5709 national, strategic, operational, or tactical level. 5710

12-27. Proportionality does not prohibit destruction for which there is military necessity, or limit the 5711 degree of engagement of enemy military forces in the absence of civilians or civilian objects. In particular, 5712 it does not prohibit bringing overwhelming firepower to bear on an opposing military force to subdue or 5713 destroy it. Nor does it prohibit injury to civilians that is incidental to lawful military operations. As used in 5714 this context, proportionality constitutes an acknowledgment of the unfortunate inevitability—but 5715 lawfulness—of incidental injury to civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, or of the incidental 5716 damage or destruction of civilian objects, despite precautions, in the execution of legitimate military 5717 operations, particularly when these persons or objects have been inter-mingled with military forces or 5718 objectives. 5719

12-28. Proportionality is weighed by a commander in determining whether, in engaging in offensive or 5720 defensive operations, his or her actions may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 5721 civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 5722



concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by those actions. The military advantage anticipated is 5723 intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from those actions considered as a whole, and not only from 5724 isolated or particular parts thereof. Generally, military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, but is 5725 linked to the full context of a war strategy. 5726

HONOR 5727

12-29. Honor has long been a basis of a warrior’s ethos and of the law of war. Honor demands a certain 5728 mutual respect and trust between opposing forces. It denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means, 5729 expedients, or conduct that would constitute a breach of trust. An example of this form of honor is the use 5730 of a white flag, which in land warfare represents a flag of truce. Its display is predicated upon good faith. 5731 Its misuse is prohibited and constitutes a war crime. Another example of how honor applies comes from 5732 law of war requirements regarding the treatment of persons hors de combat—that is, military personnel 5733 who are no longer able to fight due to sickness, injury, or wounds, or because they are shipwrecked. The 5734 principle of honor (and other humanitarian considerations) requires that an individual who is hors de 5735 combat be treated and protected in the same manner as one would wish to be treated and protected by the 5736 enemy if the roles were reversed. However, it is not dependent upon reciprocity. 5737

THE SOLDIER’S AND MARINE’S BASIC RULES 5738

12-30. It is DOD policy that members of DOD components comply with the law of war during all armed 5739 conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized (such as international armed conflict or 5740 non-international armed conflict), and in all other military operations. The law of war principles discussed 5741 above can be safely applied by Soldiers and Marines by adherence to the following ten basic rules: 5742

Soldiers and Marines fight only enemy combatants. 5743 Soldiers and Marines do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over 5744

to their superiors. 5745 Soldiers and Marines do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war or detainees. 5746 Soldiers and Marines collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 5747 Soldiers and Marines do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment. 5748 Soldiers and Marines destroy no more than the mission requires. 5749 Soldiers and Marines treat all civilians humanely. 5750 Soldiers and Marines do not steal. They respect private property and possessions. 5751 Soldiers and Marines do their best to prevent violations of the law of war. 5752 Soldiers and Marines report all violations of the law of war to their superior. 5753

12-31. When working with host-nation or local friendly forces in a counterinsurgency, it is critical to both 5754 teach and enforce these rules among allies and friendly forces. Following the law of war is a critical 5755 component of counterinsurgency operations that directly supports the accomplishment of the strategic 5756 mission to defeat the insurgency and establish local rule by gaining the trust of the local civilian population, 5757 or at a minimum, enabling the local population to cease active support of the insurgency. Violations of the 5758 law of war have a direct and significant negative impact on the ability to conduct successful 5759 counterinsurgency operations. 5760

12-32. The law of war includes rules governing situations in which the military forces of one state occupy 5761 the territory of another. Occupation is not a transfer of sovereignty. It does, however, grant the occupying 5762 power the authority and responsibility to restore and maintain public order and safety. The occupying 5763 power must respect, as much as possible, the laws in force in the host nation. One of the four Geneva 5764 Conventions of 1949—the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 5765 War—becomes a prominent source of law during occupation, as well as the Hague Convention IV 5766 Regulations of 1907 5767

NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5768

12-33. The full body of the law of war only applies during international armed conflict, as a matter of law. 5769 It does not apply during a non-international armed conflict. This does not mean no rules apply during a 5770

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non-international armed conflict. For instance, the law of war principle of distinction still applies requiring 5771 force to be directed at combatants and not innocent civilians, and a proportionality analysis is required 5772 when targeting combatants and military objectives if civilians or civilian objects will be impacted. 5773 Counterinsurgency operations are almost certain to be a feature of non-international armed conflict, the 5774 most common form of armed conflict today. During counterinsurgency operations, Common Article 3 of 5775 the Geneva Conventions applies. Commanders must be aware of Common Article 3, and the basic 5776 protections that must be afforded to insurgents or others captured by U.S. forces, as well as the status of 5777 insurgents under the laws of the host nation. 5778

GENEVA CONVENTION, COMMON ARTICLE 3 5779

12-34. Although insurgencies can occur within the context of an international armed conflict, they are 5780 classically conflicts between states and non-state actors, and therefore legally qualified as non-international 5781 armed conflicts. 5782

12-35. It bears emphasis, however, that one article contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions—5783 Common Article 3—is specifically intended to apply to non-international armed conflicts. Common Article 5784 3 affords significantly fewer protections to combatants fighting in a non-international armed conflict than 5785 does the full body of the law of war in an applicable international armed conflict. However, it does set a 5786 simple baseline of humane protection, along with fundamental rules that reflect the principles captured in 5787 the broader law of war. 5788

12-36. Common Article 3 requires that in the case of armed conflict not of an international character (a 5789 non-international armed conflict) occurring in the territory of one of the high contracting parties to the 5790 Geneva Conventions, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions 5791 identified in figure 12-1. 5792

5793 (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, to include members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. (2) To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (3) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. (4) An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. (5) The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. (6) The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Figure 12-1. Provisions binding high contracting parties 5794

APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE HOST NATION 5795

12-37. There is no concept of prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed conflict, as reflected in 5796 Common Article 3. Insurgents may be prosecuted by the host nation as criminals for offenses related to 5797 participation in hostilities, such as bearing arms against government forces. Similarly, U.S. forces captured 5798 by insurgents are not prisoners of war, but U.S. forces must be held in accordance with Common Article 3, 5799



which remains binding on non-state armed groups. U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations 5800 should remember that the insurgents are, as a legal matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of the 5801 host nation. To support criminal prosecution of insurgents, counterinsurgents must develop and implement 5802 procedures to carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at 5803 the scene. This evidence is used to process the insurgents into the host-nation legal system and thus hold 5804 them accountable for their crimes while still promoting the rule of law. 5805

12-38. It also is important to note that U.S. personnel may be subject to host-nation law as well, 5806 depending on the terms of any existing status of forces agreement between the host nation and the U.S. 5807 Status-of-forces agreements establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries and 5808 generally provide the U.S. military some level of protection from host-nation criminal jurisdiction. In the 5809 absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host nation, DOD personnel in foreign 5810 countries may be subject to the criminal law of that host nation. 5811

DETENTION AND INTERROGATION 5812

12-39. Chapters 3, 5, and 8 of this publication indicate the need for human intelligence in 5813 counterinsurgency operations. This need can create great pressure to obtain time-sensitive information from 5814 detained individuals. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, FM 2-22.3, and other specific standards guide 5815 U.S. forces working with detainees. 5816

DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 5817

12-40. U.S. law clearly prohibits U.S. forces, to include officials from other government agencies, from 5818 using certain methods to obtain information. Instances of detainee abuse, to include maltreatment involving 5819 interrogation, were documented. In response, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the 5820 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. (See figure 12-2.) 5821

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Figure 12-2. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 5822

INTERROGATION FIELD MANUAL 5823

12-41. The Detainee Treatment Act established FM 2-22.3 as the legal standard for interrogations. No 5824 interrogation technique other than those prescribed by FM 2-22.3 is authorized for use by U.S. forces. 5825 Commanders ensure that interrogators receive proper training and supervision. Executive Order 13491 5826 extended this requirement to all U.S. government agencies. 5827

STANDARDS FOR DETENTION AND INTERNMENT 5828

12-42. Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in 5829 custody by U.S. forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released to host-nation 5830 authorities, who then assume legal responsibility. They must be provided the minimum protections of 5831 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police 5832 units in adequately designed and resourced facilities should accomplish prolonged detention. Such 5833 detention must follow the detailed standards contained in AR 190-8/MCO 3461.1. Military police operating 5834 such facilities shall not be used to assist in or set the conditions for interrogation. 5835

TRANSFER OF DETAINEES TO THE HOST NATION 5836

12-43. There are certain conditions under which U.S. forces may not transfer the custody of detainees to 5837 the host nation or any other foreign government. U.S. forces retain custody if they have substantial grounds 5838 to believe that the detainees would be in danger in the custody of others. Such danger could include being 5839



subjected to torture or inhumane treatment. (See DODD 2310.01E for more information on transferring 5840 detainees and consult the legal advisor or staff judge advocate.) 5841

ENFORCING DISCIPLINE OF U.S. FORCES 5842

12-44. Despite rigorous selection and training, some personnel will commit infractions requiring 5843 discipline. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the criminal code of military justice applicable to all 5844 military members and, in time of declared war or contingency operations, other persons serving with or 5845 accompanying an armed force in the field. Commanders and general officers are responsible for their 5846 subordinates and their behavior. Commanders must give clear guidance and ensure compliance. All 5847 civilians, including contractors, working in support of operations of the U.S. forces overseas must comply 5848 with the law of war. 5849

UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 5850

12-45. Although most well-led and well-trained U.S. military perform their duties honorably and lawfully, 5851 there are some who will commit various crimes, including violations of the law of war. U.S. military 5852 personnel remain subject at all times to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Suspected criminal behavior 5853 must be investigated and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. This includes violations of 5854 orders, maltreatment of detainees, assaults, thefts, sexual offenses, destruction of property, and other 5855 crimes, to include homicides, which may be committed during a counterinsurgency. All reportable 5856 incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual must be reported 5857 promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action. A reportable 5858 incident is a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible 5859 information or conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute a violation of the 5860 law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict. 5861

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 5862

12-46. In some cases, military commanders may be deemed responsible for crimes committed by 5863 subordinates or others subject to their control. This situation arises when the criminal acts are committed 5864 pursuant to the commander’s order. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, commanders are 5865 responsible if they have actual knowledge through reports received or through other means, that troops or 5866 other persons subject to their control are about to commit or have committed a crime, and they fail to take 5867 the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the law or to punish violators. Commanders 5868 must know that under international law, commanders are responsible if they know, or should have known, 5869 their subordinates are about to commit or have committed a violation of the law of war. In a 5870 counterinsurgency environment, where compliance with the law of war is critical to the success of the 5871 mission, commanders may also be held accountable for failing to report and investigate reportable 5872 incidents. Commanders may not ignore credible information that indicates U.S. forces may have 5873 committed, intend to commit, or are in the process of committing violations of the law of war. In addition, 5874 commanders must pay close attention to the command climate within their units. Commanders must foster 5875 a climate through leadership and training that helps Soldiers and Marines understand the critical need to 5876 abide by the law of war, in particular, to distinguish between civilians and insurgents, to refrain from 5877 unnecessarily harming civilians, and to treat detainees in accordance with all applicable laws, policies, and 5878 regulations. 5879

GENERAL ORDERS 5880

12-47. Orders issued by general officers in command during counterinsurgency likely include provisions, 5881 such as a prohibition against drinking alcohol or against entering places of religious worship, important to 5882 maintaining discipline of the force. These types of orders safeguard the image of U.S. forces and promote 5883 the legitimacy of the host-nation government. These types of orders are readily enforceable under the 5884 Uniform Code of Military Justice. 5885

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CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS 5886

12-48. Modern counterinsurgency operations involve many DOD civilians as well as civilian personnel 5887 employed by government contractors. These civilians may be made subject to general orders. They are 5888 subject to U.S. laws and to the laws of the host nation. These civilians may be prosecuted or receive 5889 adverse administrative action by the U.S. or contract employers. Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code of 5890 Military Justice provides court-martial jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed 5891 force in the field during a time of declared war or a contingency operation. Under this authority, 5892 commanders have Uniform Code of Military Justice authority to disarm, apprehend, and detain DOD 5893 civilians and contractors suspected of having committed a felony offense in violation of the rules for the 5894 use of force, or outside the scope of their authorized mission, and to conduct the basic Uniform Code of 5895 Military Justice pretrial process and trial procedures currently applicable to courts-martial of military 5896 service members. (See Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 25 September 2007 for more 5897 information.) Before bringing a DOD civilian or contractor to a court-martial, however, the Department of 5898 Justice must have the opportunity to review and determine whether it will pursue the matter pursuant to the 5899 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. This act extends federal criminal jurisdiction over felony offenses 5900 committed by DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and others while employed by or accompany the armed 5901 forces overseas. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is implemented within the DOD by DODI 5902 5525.11. Third country nationals employed by U.S. forces are covered under Military Extraterritorial 5903 Jurisdiction Act, but host-nation personnel are not. 5904

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN FORCES 5905

12-49. Foreign forces need training and equipment to be effective. U.S. laws require Congress to 5906 authorize such expenditures. U.S. laws require the Department of State to verify that the host nation 5907 receiving the assistance has not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 5908 recognized human rights. All training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically 5909 authorized. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested 5910 from the Department of State under the Foreign Assistance Act or Arms Export Control Act. The President 5911 may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the operational 5912 mission. In this case, DOD personnel and operation and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental 5913 benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and 5914 services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. 5915 Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund of fiscal year 2005. 5916 Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in such training and equipping 5917 efforts. 5918

12-50. In counterinsurgency, like all operations, commands require specific authority to expend funds. 5919 That authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act, specifically, operation and maintenance 5920 funds. In recent counterinsurgency operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for 5921 the specific purpose of dealing with counterinsurgency. Recent examples include the Commanders’ 5922 Emergency Response Program, Global Train and Equip Program, and the Global Security Contingency 5923 Fund. 5924

DOD FUNDS GENERALLY NOT EXPENDABLE BY COMMANDERS FOR THIS PURPOSE 5925

12-51. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. The United States Agency for 5926 International Development expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 22 5927 authorize small amounts of money. These funds are appropriated annually for commanders to provide 5928 humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with military operations. These 5929 standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally require significant advance coordination within the 5930 DOD and the Department of State. As such, they are of limited value to ongoing counterinsurgency 5931 operations. 5932



COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM 5933

12-52. The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program is a statutory authorization to obligate funds 5934 from the DOD operation and maintenance appropriation for the primary purpose of authorizing U.S. 5935 military commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief 5936 requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility that provide an 5937 immediate and direct benefit to the people of Afghanistan. The Commanders’ Emergency Response 5938 Program authority is found at § 1201 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 STAT. 1619, Dec. 31, 5939 2011). Notably, the authority to use Commanders’ Emergency Response Program in Iraq was specifically 5940 repealed, eliminating the use of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program in Iraq. The Commanders’ 5941 Emergency Response Program is one of the most important authorities commanders have in Afghanistan. 5942

12-53. Section 1201 of NDAA FY12 includes waiver authority. Section 1201, states that, “[f]or purposes 5943 of the exercise of the authority provided by this section or any other provision of law making funding 5944 available for the [Commanders’ Emergency Response Program] ... the Secretary may waive any provision 5945 of law not contained in this section that would (but for the waiver) prohibit, restrict, limit, or otherwise 5946 constrain the exercise of that authority.” As a result, the Secretary of Defense has periodically waived the 5947 Competition in Contracting Act requirements for Commanders’ Emergency Response Program-funded 5948 projects. Therefore, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program-funded projects did not need to follow 5949 the competition requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 5950

12-54. Commanders’ Emergency Response Program appropriated funds may be used to repair property 5951 damage that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations that are not otherwise 5952 compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. These funds can also be used for condolence payments to 5953 individual civilians for the death or physical injury resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military 5954 operations that are not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act. Such payments include payments to 5955 surviving spouse or kin of defense or police personnel killed because of U.S., coalition, or supporting 5956 military operations. Commanders’ Emergency Response Program appropriated funds may not be used to 5957 pay rewards or fund any type of weapon buy-back program. Title 10, U.S.C. § 127b, provides the authority 5958 for the Rewards Program. 5959

GLOBAL TRAIN AND EQUIP OR BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 5960

12-55. Section 1206 of NDAA FY06 (Public Law 109-163, 119 STAT. 3456, Jan. 6, 2006)—as amended 5961 most recently by section 1204 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 STAT. 1621, Dec. 31, 2011)—5962 provides DOD with the authority to build the capacity of foreign military forces in support of overseas 5963 contingency operations. Section 1206 Train and Equip authority allows DOD to build the capacity of a 5964 foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to— 5965

Conduct counterterrorist operations. 5966 Participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S forces are a 5967

participant. 5968

The NDAA FY09 expanded this authority to include building the capacity of maritime security forces 5969 conducting counterinsurgency operations. 5970

GLOBAL SECURITY CONTINGENCY FUND 5971

12-56. Section 1207 of NDAA FY12 (Public Law 112-81, 125 stat. 1625, DEC. 31, 2011) established the 5972 global security contingency fund, which provides funds to the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense to 5973 provide assistance to designated countries for the purposes of enhancing the country’s national military 5974 forces, and other national security forces that conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and 5975 counterterrorism operations. Funds provided also may be used for the justice sector, including law 5976 enforcement and prisons, rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country in those cases in which 5977 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that the conflict or 5978 instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such 5979 assistance. Funds come from both DOD operation and maintenance appropriations and state funds. DOD 5980 may transfer up to $200,000,000 of operation and maintenance to the fund. On any given project, the state 5981 must contribute no less than 20% of the total and DOD no more than 80%. 5982

Chapter 12


HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 5983

12-57. Congress typically limits when it funds training or equipment for foreign security forces. If the 5984 Department of State has credible information that the foreign security force unit identified to receive the 5985 training or equipment has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 5986 human rights, Congress prohibits funding. Such prohibitions impose a requirement upon Department of 5987 State and DOD. These departments must vet the proposed recipient units against a database of credible 5988 reports of human rights violations. 5989

CLAIMS AND SOLATIA 5990

12-58. Under certain conditions, the U.S. government makes payments to host-nation civilians. The 5991 Foreign Claims Act permits certain claims to be filed against the U.S. government. In some countries, 5992 solatia payments are made. 5993

FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT 5994

12-59. Under the Foreign Claims Act, claims by host-nation civilians for property losses, injury, or death 5995 caused by service members or the civilian component of the U.S. forces may be paid to promote and 5996 maintain friendly relations with the host nation. Claims that result from noncombat activities or negligent 5997 or wrongful acts or omissions are payable. Claims that are not payable under the Foreign Claims Act 5998 include losses from combat, contractual matters, domestic obligations, and claims which are either not in 5999 the best interest of the U.S. to pay, or which are contrary to public policy. Because payment of claims is 6000 specifically governed by law and because many claims prove, upon investigation, to be not payable, U.S. 6001 forces must be careful not to raise expectations by promising payment. 6002

SOLATIA 6003

12-60. If U.S. forces are conducting counterinsurgency in a country where payments in sympathy or 6004 recognition of loss are common, solatia payments to accident victims may be legally payable. Solatia 6005 payments are not claims payments. They are payments in money or in kind to a victim or to a victim’s 6006 family as an expression of sympathy or condolence. The payments are customarily made immediately and 6007 generally are nominal. The individual or unit involved in the damage has no legal obligation to pay; 6008 compensation is simply offered as an expression of remorse according to local custom. Solatia payments 6009 should not be made without prior coordination with the combatant command. 6010

ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW 6011

12-61. Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency. Defining that end 6012 state requires extensive coordination between the instruments of U.S. power, the host nation, and 6013 multinational partners. Attaining that end state is usually the province of host-nation authorities, 6014 international and intergovernmental organizations, the Department of State, and other U.S. government 6015 agencies, with support from U.S. forces in some cases. Some key aspects of the rule of law include— 6016

A government that derives its powers from the governed and competently manages, coordinates, 6017 and sustains collective security, as well as political, social, and economic development. This 6018 includes national, regional, and local government. 6019

Sustainable security institutions. These include a civilian-controlled military as well as police, 6020 court, and penal institutions, all of which should be perceived by the local populace as fair, just, 6021 and transparent. 6022

Fundamental human rights. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the 6023 International Convention for Civil and Political Rights provide a guide for applicable human 6024 rights. The latter provides for derogation from certain rights, however, during an officially 6025 proclaimed state of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Respect for the full 6026 panoply of human rights should be the goal of the host nation; derogation and violation of these 6027 rights by host-nation security forces, in particular, often provides an excuse for insurgent 6028 activities. 6029



12-62. In times of extreme unrest and insurgency, host-nation legal structures—courts, prosecutors, 6030 defense assistance, and prisons—may cease to exist or function. Under these conditions, counterinsurgents 6031 may need to undertake a significant role in the reconstruction of the host-nation judicial system to establish 6032 legal procedures and systems to deal with captured insurgents and common criminals. During judicial 6033 reconstruction, counterinsurgents can expect to be involved in providing sustainment and security support. 6034 They can expect to provide legal support and advice to the host-nation judicial entities. Even when judicial 6035 functions are restored, counterinsurgents may still have to provide logistic and security support to judicial 6036 activities for a prolonged period. This support continues as long as insurgents continue to disrupt activities 6037 that support the legitimate rule of law. 6038

12-63. The rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 6039 and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 6040 enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms 6041 and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 6042 equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 6043 powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and 6044 legal transparency.” Justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of 6045 rights and the prevention of punishment of wrongs. Its administration involves both formal judicial and 6046 informal, customary, or traditional mechanisms. Within this paradigm, a range of terms are used to describe 6047 various approaches and activities that strengthen the rule of law such as security sector reform, 6048 administration of justice, protection, and combating impunity. 6049

12-64. Guiding principles for rule of law include— 6050 Base assistance on international norms and standards. 6051 Take account of the political context. 6052 Base assistance on the specific country context. 6053 Advance human rights and gender justice. 6054 Ensure national ownership. 6055 Support national reform constituencies. 6056 Ensure a coherent and comprehensive strategic approach. 6057

12-65. In addition, the framework for strengthening the rule of law includes— 6058 A constitution or equivalent. 6059 A legal framework and the implementation thereof. 6060 An electoral system. 6061 Institutions of justice, governance, security, and human rights. 6062 Transitional justice processes and mechanisms. 6063 A public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and hold public 6064

officials and institutions accountable. 6065

12-66. In counterinsurgency environments, it is likely that justice mechanisms will have either collapsed 6066 or be in serious need of rebuilding. Given the time and resources required to establish a fully functional 6067 judicial system, counterinsurgents may need to support transitional justice mechanisms—mechanisms to 6068 provide temporary justice in communities. Such mechanisms may be baseline formal mechanisms or they 6069 may rely on communities and so-called transitional justice mechanisms. It is important that the 6070 counterinsurgent keep in mind that transitional justice and institutional capacity building should be 6071 mutually reinforcing. Overall, the rule of law requires simultaneous capacity building of police, 6072 prosecutors, judiciary, and corrections. 6073

12-67. Tools counterinsurgents can use in the immediate term include the following: 6074 Employ mobile courts, legal defense, and case tracking systems to reduce case processing delays 6075

that lead to prison overcrowding. Mobile courts help address problems of access to justice for 6076 women, minority, and marginalized groups. 6077

When access to courts is obstructed by prohibitive costs, corruption, and socio-cultural biases, 6078 support legal aid, public defenders, and paralegals. 6079

Chapter 12


Investigate whether causes of case delays (lack of court administration systems, training, or 6080 capacity of judges, and training or capacity of prosecutors). 6081

Support prosecution cells with the host-nation armed forces. 6082 6083

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) Glossary-1

Glossary 6084

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, 6085 and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) 6086 precedes the definition. The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses 6087 after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a 6088 common definition are followed by (Army-Marine Corps). 6089

SECTION I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 6090

ADP Army doctrine publication ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

AJP allied joint publication AR Army regulation

ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures COIN counterinsurgency

DA Department of the Army DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive DODI Department of Defense instruction

DOS Department of State FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FM field manual JP joint publication

MCO Marine Corps order MCRP Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time available, civil considerations

MOE measure of effectiveness MOP measure of performance

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO nongovernmental organization

PMESII political, military, economy, social, informaion, infrastructure SOF special operations forces

STANAG standardization agreement U.S. United States UN United Nations

USAID United States Agency for International Development USC United States Code

Glossary

Glossary-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013

SECTION II—TERMS 6091

all-source intelligence 6092 Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, 6093 most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature 6094 intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 6095 (JP 2-0) 6096

area of interest 6097 That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and 6098 extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could 6099 jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0) 6100

assessment 6101 A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities 6102 during military operations. (JP 3-0) 6103

base 6104 A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (JP 4-0) 6105

counterinsurgency 6106 Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core 6107 grievances. (JP 3-24) 6108

country team 6109 The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the 6110 United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United 6111 States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. 6112 (JP 3-07.4) 6113

end state 6114 Those conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. 6115

foreign internal defense 6116 Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 6117 another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, 6118 lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) 6119

cultural analysis cell 6120 An ad hoc working group consisting of individuals with a diversity of education and experience 6121 capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, the host-nation government 6122 and other stakeholders within an operational environment. (MCWP 5-1) 6123

human intelligence 6124 A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0) 6125

information environment 6126 The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 6127 information. (JP 3-13) 6128

insurgency 6129 The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force 6130 change of a governing authority. (JP 3-24) 6131

intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace 6132 A systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of 6133 threat/adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a 6134 specific mission. By applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace, commanders gain 6135

Glossary

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) Glossary-3

the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points 6136 in time and space. (FM 2-01.3/ MCRP 2-3A) 6137

intergovernmental organization 6138 An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, 6139 regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. 6140 (JP 3-08) 6141

internal defense and development 6142 The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from 6143 subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22) 6144

irregular warfare 6145 A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 6146 population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the 6147 full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. 6148 (JP 1) 6149

line of effort 6150 A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus 6151 efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0) 6152

measure of effectiveness 6153 A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is 6154 tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. 6155 (JP 3-0) 6156

measure of performance 6157 A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0) 6158

military decisionmaking process 6159 An iterative planning methodology used to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of 6160 action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0) 6161

military necessity 6162 That principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 6163 indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. (FM 27-10) 6164

nation assistance 6165 Assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements 6166 mutually concluded between nations. (JP 3-0) 6167

nongovernmental organization 6168 A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or 6169 promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and 6170 conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. 6171 (JP 3-08) 6172

operational environment 6173 A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 6174 capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0) 6175

rules of engagement 6176 Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations 6177 under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 6178 encountered. (JP 1-04) 6179

security cooperation 6180 All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense 6181 relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military 6182

Glossary

Glossary-4 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013

capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with 6183 peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22) 6184

security force assistance 6185 The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to 6186 support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting 6187 institutions. (JP 3-22) 6188

terrorism 6189 The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. 6190 Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the 6191 pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2) 6192

unified action 6193 The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and 6194 nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1) 6195

unity of command 6196 The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to 6197 direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose. (JP 3-0) 6198

unity of effort 6199 Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily 6200 part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1) 6201

6202

References 6203

Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by 6204 old number. 6205

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS 6206 These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. 6207 ADRP 1-02. Operational Terms and Military Symbols. 31 August 2012. 6208 JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010. 6209

RELATED PUBLICATIONS 6210 These documents contain relevant supplemental information. 6211

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS 6212 Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.> 6213 DODD 2310.01E. The Department of Defense Detainee Program. 5 September 2006. 6214 DODD 5205.14. DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy. 19 August 2010. 6215 DODI 5525.11. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed 6216

Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members. 6217 3 March 2005. 6218

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013. 6219 JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011. 6220 JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 June 2007. 6221 JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 16 June 2009. 6222 JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011. 6223 JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011. 6224 JP 3-07. Stability Operations. 29 December 2011. 6225 JP 3-07.2 Antiterrorism. 4 November 2010. 6226 JP 3-07.3. Peace Operations. 1 August 2012. 6227 JP 3-07.4. Joint Counterdrug Operations. 13 June 2007. 6228 JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011. 6229 JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012. 6230 JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 7 March 2007. 6231 JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 12 July 2010. 6232 JP 3-24. Counterinsurgency Operations. 5 October 2009. 6233 JP 3-26. Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009. 6234 JP 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 29 June 2010. 6235 JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 18 July 2008. 6236 JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011. 6237

ARMY PUBLICATIONS 6238 Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.apd.army.mil/>. 6239 ADP 5-0 (FM 5-0). The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. 6240

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm

http://www.apd.army.mil/

References

References-2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) 29 May 2013

ADP 6-0 (FM 6-0). Mission Command. 17 May 2012. 6241 ADRP 2-0 (FM 2-0). Intelligence. 31 August 2012. 6242 ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012. 6243 ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012. 6244 ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012. 6245 ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. 6246 ATP 3-07.20/MCRP 3-33.1G. IMSO Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated 6247

Monetary Shaping Operations. 26 April 2013. 6248 ATP 3-24.1. Operational Environment and Causes of Instability. Not yet published. 6249 ATTP 2-91.6. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Site Exploitation. 27 6250

December 2010. 6251 ATTP 3-39.20 (FM 3-19.50). Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010. 6252 FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009. 6253 FM 2-22.3(FM 34-52). Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006. 6254 FM 3-07. Stability Operations. 6 October 2008. 6255 FM 3-05. Army Special Operations Forces. 1 December 2010. 6256 FM 3-05.301. Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 30 August 6257

2007. 6258 FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013. 6259 FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013. 6260 FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013. 6261 FM 3-90-2. Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2. 22 March 2013. 6262 FM 4-92. Contracting Support Brigade. 12 February 2012. 6263 FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956. 6264

MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS 6265 Most Marine Corps publications are available online: 6266 <http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil>. 6267 Marine Corps Operating Concepts – Third Edition. June 2010. 6268 MCDP 6. Command and Control. 4 October 1996. 6269 MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010. 6270

OTHER GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 6271 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 6272

Stabilization, United States Department of State. July 2008. <http://www.crs.state.gov/>. 6273 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Department of State. 6274

13 January 2009. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>. 6275

UNITED STATES CODE 6276 Find the United States Code (USC) at http://uscode.house.gov/lawrevisioncounsel.shtml. 6277

Title 10, Armed Forces. 6278 Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse. 6279

http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/

http://www.crs.state.gov/

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf

http://uscode.house.gov/lawrevisioncounsel.shtml

References

29 May 2013 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (DRAFT-NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) References-3

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PUBLICATION 6280 AJP 3.4.4. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN). 6281

REFERENCED FORMS 6282 DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 6283

fm 3-24, 29 may 2013, initial draft

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