. . .Marine Division

U.S. Marine Corps

FMFM 6-1

PCN 139 000426 00

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Record of Changes

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Marine Division

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1. Mission and Organization

Mission of the Marine Division 1-1Organization of the Marine Division 1-1

Headquarters Battalion, Marine Division 1-1Infantry Regiment, Marine Division 1-3Artillery Regiment, Marine Division 1-4Tank Battalion, Marine Division 1-5Assault Amphibian Battalion, Marine Division 1-6Combat Engineer Battalion, Marine Division 1-7Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 1-8

Chapter 2. Command and Control

Command and Control Organization 2-1Division Command 2-1

Division Commander 2-1Assistant Division Commander 2-2

Division Control 2-2Division Staff 2-2Liaison 2-4Liaison Duties and Responsibilities 2-5Headquarters Echelon 2-6Headquarters Operations 2-7Headquarters Echelon Displacement 2-9Headquarters Echelon Security 2-9

Information Management 2-9Information Quality 2-10Information Flow 2-11Information Exchange 2-11Commander's Critical Information Requirements 2-11Information Display 2-11

VII

FMFM 6-1

Delivery of Fires 8-15

Deliver Function 8-16Counterfire 8-16

Assessment 8-19

Assess Function 8-19Battle Damage Assessment Subcomponents 8-20

Chapter 9. Operations Other Than War

Overview 9-IPrinciples 91

Objective 9-1

Unity of Effort 9-1

Security 9-2Restraint 9-2

Legitimacy 9-2Agencies Routinely Involved in OOTW 9-2

Department of State 9-3

Types of Operations Other Than War 9-4Operations to Deter War and Resolve Conflict 9-4

Peace Operations 9-7

Operations to Promote Peace 9-8

Planning 9-9Mission Analysis 9-9

Task Organization 9-10

Logistic Support 9-10Command and Control and Communications 9-11

Negotiation and Mediation 9-11

Public Affairs and the Media 9-12Postconflict Operations 9-13

Chapter 10. Combat Service Support

Overview 10-1

Principles of Combat Service Support 10-1

Functional Areas of Combat Service Support 10-1

Supply 10-1

Maintenance 10-5

Transportation 10-6General Engineering 10-6Health Service 10-6Services 10-7

Planning 10-7

Supporting the Offense

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FMFM 6-1

Supporting the Defense 10-9Support for the Retrograde Operations 10-9

Appendix A. Notional Headquarters Echelon Organization A-iAppendix B. Tactical Decisionmaking B-i

Glossary Glossary-i

References Reference-i

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Chapter 1

Mission and Organization

Mission of the Marine DivisionThe Marine division is a multirole, expeditionaryground combat force. The division is employed asthe ground combat element (GCE) of the Marine Ex-peditionary Force (MEF) or may provide task-organized forces for smaller Marine Air-GroundTask Forces (MAGTFs). The MAGTF is a balancedcombined arms team capable of a wide range of op-erations throughout the spectrum of war. The opera-tions of the GCE are coordinated with those of theaviation combat element (ACE) and the combat serv-ice support element (CSSE) by the command element(CE) of the MAGTF.

The mission of the Marine division is to execute am-phibious assault operations and such operations asmay be directed. The Marine division must be ableto provide the ground amphibious forcible entry ca-pability to the naval expeditionary force (NEF) andconducting subsequent land operations in any opera-tional environment. The division commander fightsusing combined arms tactics and tailors the force tothe demands of each mission.

Organization of the MarineDivisionThe Marine division consists of organizations de-signed to provide command and control, maneuver,fire support, and logistic capabilities. The subordi-nate organizations of the division are identified infigure 1-1.

Headquarters Battalion, Marine DivisionThe primary mission of the headquarters battalion isto exercise command, control, and administration ofthe division. It contains a headquarters and servicecompany; a division headquarters with a headquar-ters and service company; a reconnaissance com-pany; a special security communications team; acommunications company; a military police com-pany; the division band; and a truck company. Seefigure 1-2.

Command and Control

The headquarters battalion contributes to the com-mand and control (C2) of the division by providing

Figure 1-1. Organization of the Marine Division.

1-2

Figure 1-2. Headquarters Battalion.

FMFM 6-1

the preponderance of C2 support assets, organic in-telligence support, and facilities for the divisionheadquarters. The principal providers of this sup-port located in the headquarters battalion include thedivision headquarters, the headquarters and servicecompany, the communications company, the specialsecurity communications team, and the recomiais-sance company.

ManeuverThe headquarters battalion contributes to the maneu-ver of the division by providing assets that facilitatemobility, traffic control in the rear area, commandand control, and security. The principal providers ofthis support located in the headquarters battalion arethe headquarters and service company, military po-lice company, truck company, and the division band.

IntelligenceIntelligence support to the division from the head-quarters battalion includes that resulting from di-rected reconnaissance of the reconnaissance com-pany; military police actions in the rear area to

include route reconnaissance, handling of enemyprisoners of war, refugees, and other civilians; andthe intelligence personnel assigned to the divisionheadquarters. The special security communicationsteam provides special intelligence communicationssupport to the division commander and staff.

Fire Support

The headquarters battalion contributes to the deliveryand coordination of fire support within the divisionby providing command and control, target acquisi-tion capability, and rear area forces to the divisionheadquarters. The reconnaissance company, mili-tary police company, and communications companyare the principal providers of this support from theheadquarters battalion.

Mobility/CountermobilitylSurvivability

The headquarters battalion is limited to providingmanpower when necessary to these tasks. The mili-tary police company provides a measure of mobilityassistance through the maintenance of area securityand crowd control. The C2 capability provided to

HEADQUARTERSBATTALION

HEADQUARTERSAND

SERVICECOMPANY

DIVISIONHQ

TRUCK

COMPANY

MILITARYPOLICE

COMPANY

SPECIAL SECURITYCOMMUNICATIONS

TEAM

MARINE CORPS

BAND

COMMUNICATIONSCOMPANY

RECONNAISSANCECOMPANY

Marine Division 1-3

the division by the battalion contributes to the abilityof other dedicated units to conduct mobility, coun-termobility, and survivability tasks.

Combat Service Support

The headquarters battalion provides the preponder-ance of organic combat service support (CSS) capa-bility to the Marine division. The headquarters andservice company, military police company, and truckcompany are the principal providers of combat serv-ice support to the division.

Infantry Regiment, Marine DivisionThe primary mission of the infantry regiment is tolocate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire andmaneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and closecombat. The regiment is capable of limited inde-pendent operations when appropriate units are at-tached. The regiment contains a headquarterscompany and two or more infantry battalions (nor-mally three infantry battalions) that provide the basictactical units with which the regiment accomplishesits mission. The headquarters company of the infan-try regiment contains a regimental headquarters, acommunications platoon, and a reconnaissance pla-toon. When combined with other combat supportand CSS units, the infantry regiment may form aregimental landing team. The basic means of groundmobility of the regiment is by foot, supplemented bylight-weight vehicles for the transportation of elec-tronics equipment, weapons, and limited amounts ofammunition and supplies. See figure 1-3.

Command and Control

The C2 capability of the infantry regiment is de-signed to support the regiment and its subordinateunits. However, the reconnaissance platoon can bedirected to conduct operations in support of the divi-Sian commander's information requirements. Anydivision requirements placed on the regiment for C2support degrades the regiment's ability to exerciseit's own command and control.

Maneuver

The infantry regiment is the principal maneuver unitof the Marine division. It receives direction fromthe division commander and conducts maneuver inaccordance with the division commander's intent.

Intelligence

The infantry regiment provides intelligence to the di-vision through the directed reconnaissance of the re-connaissance platoon and standard reporting fromthe regiments subordinate units.

Fire Support

The infantry regiment's contribution to the divisionis limited to short-range indirect fire support frominfantry mortars and direct fires of subordinate units.Fires from organic weapons of the regiment arerarely sufficient to support any organization otherthan the infantry regiment.

Figure 1-3. Infantry Regiment.

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Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The infantry regiment is limited to providing man-power to support the mobility, countermobility, andsurvivability of the division. Subordinate units ofthe regiment construct reinforcing obstacles, protec-tive positions, and conduct security operations thatenhance the overall mobility, countermobility, andsurvivability of the regiment and the division as awhole.

Combat Service Support

The infantry regiment is a CSS consumer. Organictransportation is limited and normally insufficient foranything other than subordinate unit combat trains.

Artillery Regiment. Marine DivisionThe mission of artillery in the Marine division is tofurnish close and continuous fire support by neutral-izing, destroying, or suppressing targets whichthreaten the success of the supported unit. Notion-ally, an artillery regiment requires five artillery bat-talions to provide adequate fire support for all themaneuver forces of a fully-committed Marine divi-sion. See figure 1-4. An artillery regiment is organ-ized with a headquarters battery and four artillerybattalions but may be augmented by an additionalbattalion from another (active or Selected MarineCorps Reserve) artillery regiment to meet th spe-cific support requirements of a particular situation.Additionally, the artillery regiment may be aug-mented with a U.S. Army multiple-launch rocketsystem (MLRS) battaliOn or battery to provide long-range, high-volume, rapid-fire general support and

counterfire capabilities. The artillery regimentheadquarters battery includes a counterbatteiy radarplatoon equipped with weapons-locating radars todetect and locate enemy indirect fire weapons, sur-vey and meteorological sections to assist in the accu-rate delivery of artillery fire, and an engineerequipment platoon to perform limited general engi-neering tasks in support of the regiment's mobilityand survivability. The regiment's operations and ac-tions are closely integrated with those of the maneu-ver forces to be responsive to rapidly changingtactical situations. To facilitate this close integra-tion, the artillery regiment provides a fire supportcoordination section to assist in establishing and op-erating the division's fire support coordination cen-ter, and each artillery battalion and firing batteryprovides liaison personnel to its supported unit.

Command and Control

The artillery regiment provides C2 connectivitythroughout the division through a variety of radioand artillery fire support nets. When the divisionheadquarters is destroyed or otherwise rendered in-operable, artillery regiment command and controlmay be required to communicate intent by the divi-sion commander. However, the use of artillery firesupport nets for other than their intended purposecan delay the coordination and application of respon-sive artillery support.

ManeuverThe artillery regiment is the principal provider of thefires component of maneuver in the Marine division.

Figure 1-4. Artillery Regiment.

MIRS BATTERYIBATTAUON

Marine Division 1-5

Intelligence

Counterbattery radars in the headquarters batteryprovide real-time target acquisition to the division.Forward observers located in the infantry regimentsalso provide significant intelligence to the division inthe form of calls for fire and standard reportingthrough the fire support system.

Fire Support

The artillery regiment provides the preponderance offire support to the division by: providing timely,close, accurate, and continuous fire support; provid-ing depth to combat by attacking hostile reserves, re-connaissance forces, and disrupting enemy C2 sys-tems and logistic installations; and delivering coun-terfire within the range of the weapon system to en-sure freedom of action of division maneuver units.Furthermore, the artillery regimental commanderalso serves as the fire support coordinator for thedivision.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The headquarters battery of the artillery regimentcontains an engineer equipment platoon that per-forms limited general engineering support to the ar-tillery regiment. When dictated by METT-T, theseassets may perform tasks in support of the divisionas a whole.

Combat Service Support

The artillery regiment is a CSS consumer. Organicassets are seldom adequate to support the CSS re-quirements of other division organizations.

Tank Battalion, Marine DivisionThe mission of the tank battalion is to close with anddestroy the enemy utilizing armor-protected fire-power, shock effect, and maneuver, and to provideantiinechanized fire in support of the division. Atank battalion consists of headquarters and servicecompany that contains the battalion headquarters, or-ganic combat service support, and an antitank pla-toon and four tank companies. The tank battalion isbest employed as a maneuver force without detach-ment of units. However, the division commandermay task-organize forces of tanks, mechanizedinfantry, and other division resources based onMETT-T that require the cross-attachment of tankbattalion and infantry regiment assets. Employmentof the tank battalion must take advantage of thespeed, mobility, and firepower of the organization.See figure 1-5.

Command and Control

The tank battalion is limited in capability to that re-quired to exercise command and control of its subor-dinate units.

ManeuverThe tank battalion provides the division the prepon-derance of armored-protected firepower and mobil-ity. In the defense, it can be employed in thesecurity area, the main battle area, or rear area as areserve. In the offense, it can be employed as thelead maneuver unit or main effort in the assault, asthe reserve to exploit success of other division ma-neuver units, or as a supporting effort to deceive theenemy or support the main effort by fire.

Figure 1-5. Tank Battalion.

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Intelligence

The tank battalion may provide subordinate units tosupport light armored reconnaissance (LAR) unitsconducting reconnaissance and surveillance. Thetank battalion commander is also the duty expert inthe division on the employment of armor and assiststhe G-2 and division commander as required duringintelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).

Fire Support

The tank battalion may provide direct and indirectfires in support of other division units. The antitankplatoon may provide overwatch antiarmor fires insupport of the tank battalion or other division unitsas required by METT-T.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability

The tank battalion contains tanks equipped withmineplows that can support the overall mobility andsurvivability of the division. The battalion also con-tains armored-vehicle-launched bridges that providethe division with a limited gap crossing capability.

Combat Service SupportThe tank battalion is a high-volume, CSS consumer.Organic combat service support is sufficient to meetroutine needs of the battalion.

Assault Amphibian Battalion, MarineDivisionThe mission of the assault amphibian battalion is totransport the surface assault elements of the landingforce from amphibious shipping to inland objectivesin a single lift during the amphibious assault, to pro-vide support to mechanized operations ashore, and to

provide combat support for other operational re-quirements. The battalion is organized with a head-quarters and service company and four assaultamphibian companies. The organization of the as-sault amphibian company permits independent de-ployment for limited operations. Assault amphibiousvehicles (AAVs) are primarily employed to transportpersonnel in tactical operations. See figure 1-6.

Command and Control

The assault amphibian battalion provides C2 variantsof the AAV to facilitate command and control of thedivision and its subordinate units during highly mo-bile ground and amphibious operations.

Maneuver

The assault amphibian battalion's primary missionincludes transporting assault elements of the divisionduring ship-to-objective maneuver. It provides thepreponderance of tracked mobility for infantry unitsduring amphibious and subsequent operationsashore.

Intelligence

The assault amphibian battalion commander providesintelligence support to the G-2 as a mechanized op-erations subject matter expert. He assists during IPBby evaluating terrain and other environmental condi-tions that can impact on the employment of friendlyor enemy fighting vehicles.

Fire Support

The assault amphibian battalion provides direct andindirect fire support within the capability of organicweapons during amphibious operations and subse-quent operations ashore.

Figure 1-6. Assault Amphibian Battalion.

Marine Division 1-7

Mobility/Countermobility/SurvivabilityThe assault amphibian battalion provides minefieldbreaching assistance to subordinate division unitsemploying AAVs.

Combat Service Support

The assault amphibian battalion transports selectedequipment and supplies of the landing force duringship-to-objective maneuver and provides mobility forCSS units during subsequent operations ashore.

Combat Engineer Battalion, MarineDivisionThe mission of the combat engineer battalion is toenhance the mobility, countermobility, and surviv-ability of the Marine division through close combatengineer support and provide limited general supportrequired for the functioning of the Marine division.The combat engineer battalion consists of a head-quarters and service company, engineer supportcompany, and four combat engineer companies. op-erations of task-organized combat engineer elementssupporting forward units will generally be decentral-ized. See figure 1-7.

Command and Control

The combat engineer battalion provides utility sup-port to include mobile electric power equipment tothe division headquarters and other division units.

ManeuverThe combat engineer battalion provides maneuversupport to the division through its principal functionsof mobility, countermobility, and survivability.Tasked-organized engineer units may be formed toconduct specific maneuver tasks and controlled by

the combat engineer battalion commander based onMETT-T. The battalion also constructs and im-proves expedient vertical takeoff and landing sites.

Intelligence

The combat engineer battalion conducts engineer re-connaissance and intelligence collection within thedivision zone or sector.

Fire Support

The combat engineer battalion assists in the planningand conduct of fire support by planning reinforcingobstacles and barriers in support of the division andother subordinate units. These obstacles and barriersare integrated into the fire support plan to ensuremaximum disruption of the enemy at the obstacleand the effectiveness of fires.

Mobility/Countermobility/SurvivabilityThe combat engineer battalion participates in theplanning and coordination of obstacle breachingfrom the high-water mark inland. It employs avail-able assault bridging systems exclusive of the ar-mored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB). Thebattalion provides expedient repair and reinforce-ment of existing bridges and constructs expedient,short-span nonstandard bridges from local materials.The combat engineer battalion also provides tempo-rary repair of existing roads and limited new con-struction of combat roads and trails; plans andconstructs obstacles requiring special engineer equip-ment or technical skills; performs specialized demo-lition missions beyond the capability of otherdivision units; and provides technical assistance andnecessary equipment for the development of tempo-rary protective positions for personnel and equip-

Figure 1-7. Combat Engineer Battalion.

ment.

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Combat Service Support

The assault amphibian battalion provides potable wa-ter for consumption and maintenance requirements.

Light Armored ReconnaissanceBattalionThe mission of the light armored reconnaissance(LAR) battalion is to conduct reconnaissance, secu-rity, economy of force operations and, within capa-bilities, conduct limited offensive or delayingoperations that exploit the unit's mobility and fire-power. The LAR battalion is capable of being em-ployed as a separate maneuver force. The LARbattalion consists of a headquarters and service com-pany and four light armored reconnaissance compa-nies. See figure 1-8.

Command and Control

The LAR battalion contains C2 variants of the light-annored vehicle that can be tailored for use with thetactical echelon of the division.

ManeuverThe LAR battalion provides the division a force ca-pable of limited offensive and defensive operations.It can be employed in any area of the battlefield andwhen properly task-organized, it provides the divi-sion a highly mobile maneuver unit.

Intelligence

The LAR battalion is the principal provider ofextended-range ground reconnaissance and surveil-lance in the division.

Fire Support

The LAR battalion is capable of providing limiteddirect and indirect fire support to other divisionunits; however, this support is limited as the battal-ion's fire support capabilities are designed to supportsubordinate units of the battalion. The LAR battal-ion can position terminal controllers in depth to as-sist in the control of artillery, naval gunfire, andaviation in support of the division.

Mobility/Countermobility/SurvivabilityThe LAR battalion provides support to mobility andcountermobility actions of the division by locatingand reporting on the nature of enemy obstacles, lo-cating bypasses or lanes in enemy obstacles, and rec-ommending locations for friendly reinforcing obsta-cles to the division engineer and G-3.

Combat Service Support

The LAR battalion is a CSS consumer. Combatservice support of the LAR battalion requires de-tailed planning and support external to the battalionwhen operating at extended ranges. CSS assetswithin the LAR battalion are limited to those neces-sary to support the battalion during routine opera-tions.

Figure 1-8. Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.

Chapter 2

Command and Control

Command and Control OrganizationThe division commander must exercise commandand control over a large and complex organization.His C2 assets must be used to maximum advantageand organized to support his information require-ments in a rapidly changing, high-tempo environ-ment. Command and control for the Marine divisionmust be organized to allow the commander to —

• Rapidly orient to the battle.• Evaluate the situation.• Estimate and anticipate the course of events.• Determine whatis critical.• Measure risk.• Take decisive action.• Plan future operations.

Efficient operations of the division headquartersechelons can be attained by careful consideration ofseveral time-tested precepts:

• A headquarters must be small to be efficient.• Only one headquarters can be exercising con-

trol at any one time.• The commander must limit the amount of infor-

mation he receives.• The commander conducts and receives brief-

ings that are short, concise, and on time. Or-ganization of orders and information briefs isdependent upon the type of operation and timeavailable.

• Whenever possible, the commander will deliverorders in person to subordinate commanders.

• The headquarters echelons are organized to ac-quire and disseminate information in a priori-tized fashion.

• The commander does not confine himself to aheadquarters echelon. He observes the battlefirsthand at the critical point.

Division CommandCommand and staff relationships are establishedwithin the division's organizational structure. Thisstructure includes the commander, an assistant com-mander, subordinate unit commanders, and the gen-eral and special staffs.

Division CommanderThe commander is responsible for the accomplish-ment of assigned tasks and missions. With this re-sponsibility goes the authority to direct forces andtake actions that ensure success. Command author-ity is the basis through which control is extended.Decisive application of combat power hinges on thecommander's ability to continually visualize the ob-jective, conceptualize the battlespace, and makerapid decisions that shape the battle.

The division commander must be able to convey tosubordinates a clear, concise statement that definessuccess for the division by establishing, in advanceof events, the battle or campaign's end state. He is-sues his intent and ensures it is disseminatedthroughout the division to unify the division toward acommon objective. Commander's intent providessubordinate commanders a way of gauging freedomof action. Commander's intent contains —

• The purpose of the operation.• The critical vulnerabilities and center of gravity

for both enemy and friendly forces.• A vision of how the operation will be con-

ducted in a broad scope.• A description of the end state with respect to

the relationship of the division, the enemy, andthe terrain.

• A description of how the end state will facilitatefuture operations.

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not specifically assigned to another general staff sec-tion. The ACtS, 0-1 has staff responsibility for per-sonnel strength, replacements, discipline, prisonersof war, graves registration, morale and personnelservices, and organization of the internal arrange-ment of the main echelon.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The ACtS, 0-2 is theprincipal staff assistant in matters pertaining to theaccomplishment of command intelligence functions.He directs the command's intelligence and counterin-telligence efforts and is responsible for the collec-tion, production, and dissemination of intelligencethroughout the command. He is also responsible forthe supervision of the command's intelligence train-ing program.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. The ACtS, 0-3 is theprincipal staff assistant in matters pertaining to or-ganization, training, and tactical operations. He isresponsible for planning, coordinating, and supervis-ing the tactical employment of units, integrating fireand maneuver, coordinating breaching and barrierplans, planning and supervising civil affairs activities(when a G-5 section is not established), and deter-mining priorities for allocation of personnel, weap-ons, equipment, and ammunition.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The ACtS, G-4 is theprincipal staff assistant in logistic matters and theCSS functions of supply, maintenance, transporta-tion, medical/dental, passenger and freight transpor-tation, engineer support, landing support, materialhandling, and food services.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. The ACtS, 0-5 is theprincipal staff assistant in matters pertaining to civilaffairs. He is responsible for supervising the collec-tion, care, and disposition of refugees and displacedpersons. He provides assistance to the G-2 in col-lecting intelligence from civilian sources; plans theevacuation and hospitalization of sick, wounded, andinjured civilians; controlling civilians to avoid inter-ference with the military operations; and supervisesthe control of civilian activities to include publichealth, safety, property control, public works, utili-ties, and claims.

Assistant Chief of Staff. G-6. The AdS, 0-6 is theprincipal staff assistant in matters pertaining to auto-mated information and communications systems sup-port. He is responsible for plans and supervising theinstallation, operations, and maintenance of commu-nications system; disseminating communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI); and themanagement of cryptographic material systems. Hecoordinates with the 0-3 to ensure communicationsplanning and training are compatible with the overallplan. The G-6 recommends, in coordination withthe G-3 and headquarters battalion commander, thelocation of key installations within the headquartersechelons. To improve communications, he coordi-nates with G-6s of higher, reinforcing, adjacent, andsupporting/supported units.

Special Staff

The special staff consists of staff officers whose ac-tivities pertain to particular military specialties. Thedivision commander may meet unusual conditions byomitting sections not required, combining or adjust-ing responsibilities, and by creating additional sec-tions. Special staff officers may be temporarilyassigned from the MEF or Marine Corps Base basedon the mission of the division and may include butare not limited to —

• Adjutant.• Career planning officer.• Chaplain.• Disbursing officer.• Embarkation officer.• Engineer.• Headquarters commandant.• Staff judge advocate.

LiaisonThe division establishes liaison to aid in coordinationand parallel planning. Liaison teams must have theirown transportation and communications links to theirheadquarters. Reciprocal liaison involves exchangeof liaison teams. It is required when a formation isplaced directly under the command of a headquartersof a different Service or nationality or when units of

Marine Division 2-5

different nations are adjacent. The liaison officer(LNO) represents the commander at the headquartersof another unit for effecting coordination and pro-moting cooperation between the units. He should beof appropriate rank and experience to ensure credi-bility of the liaison team and knowledge of the divi-sion organization and operation. When liaison is notreciprocal, responsibility for establishing liaison isnormally that of the higher commander.

From Rear to Frontline Units of the Division

The LNO. to the forward unit examines and reportson the forward unit's concept and intent and pro-vides combat information and intelligence to his unit.The LNO's role is to provide information which al-lows his unit to parallel plan in real time. He mayrecommend positions for his unit to occupy as it

moves forward. He may coordinate terrainmanagement.

From Higher to Lower Echelon Unit

This liaison is normally established between the divi-sion and organizations attached or under operationalcontrol of the division. The division may also ex-change liaison teams with the MEF CE. The pri-mary role of these LNOs is to maintain continuity ofinformation and operations.

From Supporting to Supported Unit

This liaison is similar to that from rear to frontlineunits and normally occurs when the division is givena follow-and-support mission.

From Moving Unit to Stationary UnitThis liaison is normally effected by collocation oftactical echelons to enhance the primary and specialstaff officer coordination.

Liaison Duties and ResponsibilitiesThe liaison team's parent unit headquarters shouldprovide the following:

• Transportation compatible with the mobility ofthe supported unit.

• Communications equipment with appropriatecryptographic and operating instructions.

• Maps and operations overlays covering theappropriate sectors and routes.

• Overlay material.• The current operations orders for the parent

and supported units and the most recent situa-tion reports.

• Current information concerning the parent unit.At a minimum, it should include —

Mission.Future operations.Task organization.

• Boundaries with changes and time effective.• Fire support and obstacle overlays and plans.• Current logistics situation.

Personnel situation and critical MOSshortages.An intelligence situation update.

The receiving unit should ensure the liaison officerhas access to all staff sections within the appropriateheadquarters echelon. On arrival at the host unit,the LNO —

• Establishes communications with his unit andreceives any information updates.

• Reports to the commander of the host unit andis prepared to brief his unit's situation.

• Visits each staff section, provides informationas required, and obtains information he musttransmit to his parent unit.

• Ensures his location at the host headquarters isknown at all times.

• Acquires as much information as possible aboutthe host unit mission, unit locations, future op-erations, and commander's intent.

On returning to his parent headquarters, the LNOwill —

• Brief the commander concerning the mission ofthe visited headquarters, unit locations, futureoperations, and the commander's intent.

• Transmit mission requirements and requests forinformation from the visited headquarters.

• Brief representatives from all staff sections oninformation received during the liaison visit.

• Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared toperform the next liaison mission.

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Headquarters EchelonNormally, the division maintains three headquartersechelons — the tactical echelon, the main echelon,and the rear echelon. The division's headquartersechelons exist to support the commander whereverhe may be on the battlefield. These echelons consistof personnel and facilities used by the division com-mander and staff to plan, direct, control, and coordi-nate operations of the division. The tactical echelonand rear echelon are extensions of the main echelon.See figure 2-2.

Tactical Echelon

The primary purpose of the tactical echelon is tosupport immediate tactical requirements of close op-erations and provide the commander with freedom ofmovement and information critical to his situationalawareness. It should be minimally structured andmanned to support maneuver, intelligence, and firesupport. To provide the commander with the tacticalsupport he requires, the tactical echelon is designedand manned to be small, highly mobile, and surviv-able. Its survivability is directly related to its smallsize and capability to rapidly displace. It containsonly essential personnel and equipment. The tacticalechelon is deployed forward near the lead regimentsor even farther forward when the situation dictates.

Its main focus is the control of close operations; itshould not be distracted from this purpose. The tac-tical echelon normally controls only those forcescommitted to or engaged in close combat. The tacti-cal echelon is commonly referred to as the commandgroup and typically consists of the commander, the0-2, the 0-3, the fire support coordinator (FSC),and communications personnel. See appendix A. It

must have the mobility and C2 support commensuratewith its purpose.

During an operation, the division tactical echelon —

• Continuously supports the close operation bycoordinating .and integrating the immediate tac-tical requirements of elements committed to it.

• Receives, posts, analyzes, and distributes com-bat information and tactical intelligence fromhigher, lower, and adjacent units to support theclose operations.

• Integrates and expedites fires of all fire supportassets supporting close operations.

• Coordinates and integrates mobility and surviv-ability operations in support of the closeoperation.

Main Echelon

The division main echelon supports the direction ofcurrent operations and the planning of future opera-tions. Immediate tactical decisions are rarely madeat the main echelon. However, the main echelonwill make decisions based on requests from the tacti-cal and rear echelons that support immediate closeand rear operations. It maintains the ability to seethe battlefield and makes plans and decisions thatwill affect committed forces several hours out. It isspecifically designed, manned, and equipped to di-rect all organic and supporting elements of the divi-sion. Threat acquisition and targeting capabilities,technology, and training will determine the disper-sion of the main echelon necessary to survive. Tofunction in the dispersed mode, the main echelonmust have the requisite computer and communica-tions assets that will allow it to electronically collo-cate. The main echelon contains both current andfuture operations staffs, the chief of staff, the 0-1,G-2A, G-3A, 0-4, 0-5, 0-6, and assistant FSC.See appendix A.

The current operations staff of the division —

• Supervises mission execution.• Coordinates combat operations.• Coordinates required combat support/service

support.• Conducts close and deep operations.

The future operations staff —

• Plans future close and deep operations.• Monitors continuity of division operations.• Determines possible courses of friendly/enemy

action/reactions.• Develops branches and sequels.

Rear Echelon

The rear echelon's primary mission is to supportcombat operations and is an extension of the mainechelon. It should be located where it can fulfill its

Marine Division 2-7

I'

MAINECHELON

iaH\_MEF MAINECHELON

REARECHELON

$

primary mission and not engage in close combat. Itsmost critical role is to coordinate and integrate rearoperations with close and deep operations. The divi-sion rear echelon performs the functions of sustain-ment, terrain management, movement control,security, and fire support.

Key division personnel normally located in the rearechelon include the 0-lA and G-4A. Normally, therear echelon is collocated with or sited near theCSSE's combat service support operations center(CSSOC). The rear echelon controls all elementsfunctioning or transiting through the division's reararea. The rear echelon and the CSSOC jointly ana-lyze future division plans for their impact on currentand future rear operations to ensure logistic and per-sonnel support is available. The division rear eche-ion monitors activity in the regimental and adjacentunit rear areas to prevent potential conflicts with thedivision rear operation. When properly augmented,the rear echelon may assume control of the fight ifthe main and tactical echelons can no longerfunction.

Personnel

The quality of personnel is a constant factor that de-fines effective headquarters operations. The divisionheadquarters echelons must be staffed with the requi-site skills and MOSs to perform the functions of thesection to which assigned. Each individual must becapable of performing his own job and understand-ing the relationship of his job to that performed byother staff personnel.

Division officers must be capable of assessing thetactical situation, anticipating the enemy's intent, anddetermining the long- and short-term impact offriendly actions. Officers issue instructions in accor-dance with the commander's guidance and intent.Primary staff officers must maintain a complete pic-ture of the division operation and not be consumedby rudimentary activities that should be left for staffassistants.

I

TACECHELON

I''

IIII.'III

TACTICAL ECHELON. Controls all units committed tocombat in the close operation or moving to fight in theclose operation.

MAIN ECHELON. Allocates, coordinates, and integratesavailable assets to support current and future operationsand plans future operations.

REAR ECHELON. Controls all units supporting rearoperations or moving through the division reaT area.

Headquarters Echelonment.

Headquarters Operations

Figure 2-2.

2-8 FMFM 6-1

Normally, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs)and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) focus on spe-cific aspects of their duties or work area. Some spe-cific responsibilities of SNCOs and NCOs include —

• Collecting, processing, and disseminating infor-mation within his section, throughout the eche-lon, and external to the headquarters echelon.

• Preparing and updating staff estimates and pre-paring and reviewing orders and plans.

• Coordinating and integrating internal and sepa-rate section activities, such as maintenance ofmap boards, status charts, shift changeoverprocedures, and health and welfare of Marines.

• Participating in site selection, reconnaissance,and movement.

Planning

The division conducts planning in two types of envi-ronments — when it has a mission but is not commit-ted to tactical operations against an enemy force andwhen it is currently committed. However, once thedivision is committed to a tactical operation, plan-ning time is greatly reduced and becomes a preciouscommodity. The commander's involvement is criti-cal to the planning process and the ability of the divi-sion to dictate the tempo of operations.

Tempo. The speed of operations has quickened be-cause of advances in the rate of intelligence and in-formation flow. The ability to gather, manage,process and circulate information, in near real-time,among sensors, decisionmakers, weapons, andhighly mobile forces give operational and tacticalcommanders the means to set battle tempo. Tempois a function of speed of operations within time toaccomplish the mission based on the commander'splan and available resources. Tempo is dictated byseveral elements:

• Sufficiency and reliability of information.• Timely communications and intelligence.• Ability and time to understand effects of

actions.• Mobility.• Coordination and integration of combat power.• Availability of logistic support.

Tempo requires both mental and physical agility byleaders and organizations. Commanders must

understand these relationships and manage them ef-fectively. Commanders must possess the mentalagility and discipline to make timely decisions tomodify the tempo to their advantage, to deny the en-emy the initiative, and to decisively defeat him at theselected time and place. Advantages in range,speed, accuracy, kill potential, and sensor capabili-ties allow commanders to choose and vary the time,place, and form of attack. The staff provides deci-sion support to the commander by thorough analysisof the situation that permits the commander to in-crease tempo, decrease the enemy's tempo, and gen-erate uncertainty for the opponent.

Plans Section. The plans section is located in themain echelon and works for the 0-3. The plans sec-tion allows the commander to maintain his ability tocontinually look towards the future and effectivelytransition from current to future operations. Theplans section helps the division transition from oneoperation to another, the objective being to prevent aloss of tactical integrity and momentum. The fol-lowing key factors are involved in the successfultransition from one operation to another.

• Early anticipation by the commander and theassignment of one clearly articulated future op-erations mission.

• Rapid planning and development of a conceptof operation that minimizes operational or tacti-cal pauses.

• Continuous planning, coordination, and inte-gration of future operations requirements withthose of current operations.

Main Echelon. The main echelon, less the plans sec-tion, control the current operation. They allocate re-sources and establish priorities in the support of thecurrent deep, close, and rear operations and monitorexecution of the current plan. Staff sections workwith the plans section to coordinate requirements forfuture operations. These staff sections are the pri-mary conduit for transmitting and coordinating infor-mation for both current and future operations tosubordinate organizations they control or advise.

Parallel Planning

Parallel planning is effective when dealing with re-duced planning time and transitioning from one op-eration to another. Parallel planning is the act of

Marine Division 2-9

conceptualizing, developing, and coordinating a fu-ture operations plan with a current operation and itscontinually changing situations. It emphasizes con-tinuous information sharing through verbal and writ-ten means to quickly distribute intelligence, planningguidance, and coordination instructions to subordi-nate, adjacent, and higher staff sections. Units neednot wait for a detailed analysis or a published orderto begin their own parallel planning. Continuous in-formation sharing allows all units to receive informa-tion on the future mission early in the planningprocess.

Combat Operations

Combat operations are fast-paced, around-the-clock,and intense. Continuous operations are a combatmultiplier when effective performance is sustained.Command and control of continuous combat opera-tions requires the headquarters echelons to operateeffectively over long periods of time until the divi-sion has accomplished its mission. Headquarterspersonnel will not function efficiently under thestress of combat without established work cycles thatallow rest periods. To accomplish this, designatedwork shifts are established.

Staggering the Shift Change

Scheduling en mass shift changeover of the entireechelon is not effective. It degrades efficiency of theoperations centers and staff functions. It allows amass departure of the last shift and a complete lossof the collective knowledge of the period of timepassed during that shift to include planning and coor-dination. Regardless of the thoroughness of the shiftbriefing, supporting decisions and rationale can beforgotten or deemed unimportant and not briefed.This places the oncoming shift at an information dis-advantage, losing effectiveness in controlling thecurrent operation and planning the future operation.A proven method of scheduling shifts and maintain-ing continuity of information is to stagger the shiftchange. See figure 2-3. It involves scheduling offi-cers, SNCOs, and NCOs on overlapping shifts sothat the new shift element has access to a body ofknowledge four to six hours old.

Headquarters Echelon DisplacementNormally, an echelon does not shut down and trans-fer operations to another echelon while it displaces.

Each headquarters echelon in the division must beable to displace during the operation and simultane-ously conduct command and control. A preferredmethod of displacement is by organizing the echeloninto two displacement increments. When one incre-ment moves, it monitors the stationary incrementwhich maintains functional operations. Once themoving increment establishes itself in the new loca-tion, an exchange of only that critical information re-ceived during the move is passed. Once this incre-ment receives and understands the information, it ac-cepts control and the stationary increment thenmoves to the new location or another location aheadof the first increment. During displacement opera-tions, an echelon should only perform those func-tions absolutely critical to support the battle oroperation. SOPs should determine the exact person-nel breakout for displacement increments. Duringhigh-tempo operations, any or all headquarters eche-lons may have to operate continuously in a displace-ment mode to maintain contact with maneuverforces.

Headquarters Echelon SecuritySecurity of the echelon takes many forms. Theechelon employs electronic security and physical se-curity measures. Mobile subscriber equipment andother wire conununications enhance electronic secu-rity. Physical security is enhanced by the use ofcamouflage nets, mobility, patrols, checkpoints,sentinel/listening posts, and observation posts (OPs).A designated security force may be organized frommilitary police, the division band, or any other ele-ment capable of performing the security mission.When the threat is significant, reinforced rifle pla-toons may be part of the security force. All effortsto disguise the headquarters are used to prevent en-emy discovery of a high value target (HVT).

Information ManagementCritical to effective control in the division's C2 sys-tem is information management. Information mustsupport its intended user, and its quality and flow de-termine C2 effectiveness. Information managementhas one overriding purpose — to enable the com-mander to make timely decisions during the turmoiland confusion of battle. As the division com-mander's information manager, the chief of staff Out-lines and monitors the performance and

2-12 FMFM 6-1

commander to see the battlefield without unnecessaryclutter. Staff section maps normally contain moredata to enable analysis prior to presentation of infor-mation to the commander.

Maneuver Information

All information relating to the maneuver of forces orthe coordination and integration of maneuver unitswith combat support and combat service support ispassed through the G-3 section. Maneuver informa-tion must be distributed between the G-3 representa-•tives of each headquarters echelon. The need fortimely maneuver decisions and the commander'sability to see the close operation require expeditedtransfer of information to the division tactical eche-ion by all committed units. The tactical echelon col-lates, posts, and analyzes maneuver information,turning it into current or updated close operations in-formation which it then sends to both the divisionmain echelon and the MEF tactical echelon. Maneu-ver infonnation maintained at the tactical and mainechelons of the division is identical in focus. Thetactical echelon focuses on current information re-garding the capabilities of units two levels down tomake decisions on close operations. The main eche-lon uses information to make decisions affecting thedivision's current deep operations and futureoperations.

Intelligence Information

The 0-2 section at the main echelon collates all in-formation relating to intelligence functions. To beeffective, the intelligence flow must allow for the ac-cess of information at any level of command withinthe division. All information received from subordi-nate and adjacent units must be analyzed to convertit from raw data into intelligence appropriate for theechelon of command for which it is intended. Un-less specifically requested, raw intelligence datashould not be routinely passed to a higher headquar-ters. Raw data increases the bulk of information,hampering staffs in effectively seeing the enemy andin anticipating actions in a timely way.

Battlespace Organization and ControlBattlespace organization is the way the divisioncommander visualizes how he is going to fight theenemy and stwcture his command and control. Seefigure 2-4. Battlespace is an area of operations

viewed in four dimensions — air/space, surface,subsurface, and time. The division commander re-lates his forces to each other in terms of commandand control, maneuver, fires, and combat servicesupport to the enemy in terms of time. He mustknow the location of the enemy, how fast the divi-sion can react to enemy initiatives, and how fast theenemy can react to actions of the division. The divi-sion commander's understanding of time and spacerelationships and systems capabilities determines hisreaction time and ability to maintain operationalmomentum.

The division commander organizes the battlespaceby assigning areas of responsibility to subordinatecommanders. Key to this assignment is appreciationof the subordinate organization's capabilities, ter-rain, weather, and the enemy threat. The divisioncommander also organizes his command, control,and intelligence (C21) support forces to ensure conti-nuity of operations and disruption of the enemy's C2effort.

Friendly ForcesFriendly forces are assessed by the commander interms of training, personnel strength, equipmentreadiness, and leadership. Subordinate organizationsthat are well led, are at full strength, and have highequipment and weapon system readiness, are notnecessarily assigned the largest area of responsibility(AOR). Instead, it is advantageous to the division toreduce its AOR to focus this organization against acritical objective. Less capable organizations maybe better employed in secondary areas or in econ-omy of force operations over more extensive areas.

Terrain and WeatherTerrain and weather have a critical impact on thebattle. The division commander considers theweather and both macro and micro terrain when as-signing subordinates portions of the battlespace.

Terrain

Proper evaluation and utilization of the terrain miti-gates incomplete information of the enemy. Terrainprovides opportunities and imposes limitations.Analysis will include the unit's assigned AOR andthe surrounding area which may affect the operation.The commander must recognize the battlefield's

Manna Division 2-13

Figure 2-4. Battlespace Organization.

natural structure and the means and techniques to ex-ploit,• improve, or overcome it to accomplish themission. Terrain must also be viewed from the pointof view of the enemy. The commander must see thebattlefield as his enemy sees it to anticipate the influ-ence of the terrain on the enemy's plan.

WeatherWeather affects observation, trafficabiity, control,performance of personnel, functioning of equipment,and the range and effect of weapons. The com-mander anticipates changes in the weather, capitaliz-ing on them when possible. Inclement weather isexploited. Inclement weather and poor visibilityhelp conceal movement and degrade the alertness ofthe enemy.

Enemy Threat

Enemy capabilities, limitations, and possible coursesof action are evaluated. The division commander al-locates battlespace based, in part, on the most likelyand most dangerous courses of action the enemymight adopt and positions or avenues the enemy mayselect to support them.

Command and Control SupportSystem

AfloatThe division utilizes four principal C2 facilitiesafloat — the landing force operations center (LFOC),the tactical-logistical group (TACLOG), the support-ing arms coordination center (SACC), and theintelligence center.

2-14 FMFM 6-1

LFOC

The LFOC is used by the highest landing force com-mand level afloat. The LFOC is normally organizedto support the MEF CE. Ordinarily, the divisionwill have representatives posted in the LFOC to as-sist and monitor operations.

TACLOG

The TACLOG contains detachments that representsthe landing force (MEF), the division, and the divi-sion's regimental landing teams. The CSSE com-mander is responsible for forming and directing thelanding force (LF) detachment. The division com-mander forms the GCE TACLOG detachment. Keypersonnel are provided from the G-3 and G-4 staffsections. It is collocated with the Navy control or-ganization responsible for planning and conductingthe waterborne and helicopterborne ship-to-objectivemaneuver. The commander, amphibious task force,(CATF) will designate either the central control of-ficer or tactical air officer as the single point of con-tact for the GCE commander to resolve issues andmake decisions affecting ship-to-objective maneuver.

SACC

Upon the initiation of planning, the CATF estab-lishes a SACC. The SACC is under the supervisionof the supporting arms coordinator (SAC), who isthe direct representative of the naval commandercharged with supporting arms coordination. The LFforce fires coordinator may serve as the SAC. TheLF force fires coordination center (FFCC) providesrepresentatives to work in the SACC. The divisionprovides fire support representatives which may in-clude the AO, the naval gunfire officer (NGFO), andthe target information officer. Requests for support-ing arms from division units are coordinated by LFrepresentatives with the SAC to ensure continuity ofsupport.

Intelligence Center

The intelligence center aboard the ATF flagship isused by the highest landing force command afloat.It is nonnally organized to support the MEF CE.Additionally, a subordinate intelligence center willbe established aboard the amphibious ship which thedivision headquarters is embarked. The mission ofthe intelligence center is to direct the intelligence

effort during amphibious operations and to collect,process and disseminate intelligence to embarkedand subordinate commanders.

AshoreThe division establishes each headquarters echelonashore. Each echelon contains a combat operationscenter (COC) which contains the communicationsand personnel required to control the operations ofthe division. The primary purpose of the COC is tosupervise the execution of the division commander'stactical decisions. It is staffed by representatives ofthe intelligence and operations sections with desig-nated communication personnel. Normal COC func-tions include —

• Receiving and recording reports from subordi-nate organizations and transmitting reports toadjacent and higher headquarters.

• Maintaining situational awareness of currentoperations of subordinate organizations.

• Transmitting orders and tactical decisions of thecommander to subordinate organizations.

• Advising the FSCC and other staff sections onevents or information of immediate concern.

• Serving as the primary point of contact for liai-son personnel from subordinate, supporting, oradjacent units.

Fire Support Coordination Center

The fire support coordination center (FSCC) is thedivision facility that centralizes the necessary com-munications and supporting arms personnel to planand coordinate offensive air support, naval surfacefire support, and artillery support and to execute theconunander's plan. It maintains connectivity withthe MEF FFCC if established, the SAC if theMAGTF FFCC is not established, and with subordi-nate FSCCs. The FSCC contains the designatedFSC, supporting arms and aviation representatives,target information personnel, and the communica-tors. Coordination with the division engineer andcombat engineer battalion commander is necessary toensure obstacles are covered by fire and to plan theuse of FASCAM.

Direct Air Support Center

The direct air support center (DASC) is the principalair control agency responsible for the direction of air

Marine Division 2-15

operations directly supporting ground forces. Itfunctions in a decentralized mode of operation, but isdirectly supervised by the tactical air conunand cen-ter (Marine TACC). It is normally the first majorair control agency ashore, and it lands in the samecategory as the division FSCC. It processes and co-ordinates requests for immediate air support andcontrols aircraft transiting its AOR. It coordinatesair missions requiring integration with groundforces, including close air support, assault support,and designated air reconnaissance missions. Directair support for the division commander's close op-eration is controlled and directed by the DASC.

The DASC collocates with the division FSCC.Ordinarily, this collocation will be by physical prox-imity. However, an electronic link may be an ac-ceptable alternative. DASC siting requirements maydiffer from those of the division FSCC because ofthe necessity for line-of-sight communications. A di-rect air support center (airborne) (DASC(A)), con-sisting of an AN/UYQ-3A within a speciallymodified KC-130 aircraft, can also support divisionoperations when the situation dictates. It is ex-tremely flexible and adaptable to a variety of envi-ronments. Situations in which a DASC(A) can beemployed include —

• Extended overland displacement.• Supplementing the coverage of the primary

DASC while it displaces or becomes degraded.

• Operations in geographic areas in which terraincharacteristics adversely affect DASC commu-nications.

• Amphibious operations to aid in control ashorefrom the Navy TACC to the DASC.

• Split sector operations while control is afloat orashore.

The link between the DASC and the division FSCCis vital for coordination and integration of offensiveair support missions with the employment of othersupporting arms and the expeditious processing ofimmediate air requests. The fire support coordinatorwithin the FSCC is the final arbitrator of all support-ing arms integration conflicting requests for fire sup-port assets. The FSCC provides the DASC withupdates to unit boundaries and fire support coordina-tion measures, positions, and other pertinent data.The DASC is responsible to the FSCC to providetimely information on —

• Predicted flight paths for aircraft under theDASC's control.

• Bomb damage assessment.• Status of outstanding requests.• Intelligence.• Delays or cancellations to the air tasking order.

Also see FMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Mis-sues

(reverse blank)

Chapter 3

Amphibious Operations

The Division in AmphibiousOperationsThe Marine divisions operational depth, speed, andflexibility is increased by integrating the capabilitiesof the division with that of the MEF and the NEF inthe conduct of amphibious operations. Amphibiousoperations are part of operational maneuver from thesea (OMFTS) and integral to naval power projection.An amphibious operation integrates virtually alltypes of sea, air, and land forces in a concerted mili-tary effort. It is conducted in the face of certainnatural forces not normally encountered in land war-fare. These forces include seas, surf, and features ofhydrography. However, the advent of high mobilitysystems, long-range weapons, and modern surveil-lance systems offset many of these limitations andthe capabilities of the enemy.

Types of Amphibious Operations

Amphibious AssaultAn amphibious assault is the principal type of am-phibious operation which establishes a force on ahostile shore. Amphibious assaults are essential tothe landward dominance of battlespace. The divisionis organized and equipped to conduct an amphibiousassault. It may be the entire ground element of thelanding force or part of the assault element of alarger landing force. Maneuver of the divisionashore is a logical extension of the maneuver of theATF. When necessary, an amphibious assaultagainst an integrated defense will require the NEF tofocus overwhelming combat power to create a gap.The division must then exploit this window of oppor-tunity created by the NEF.

Amphibious RaidsAn amphibious raid is an attack from the sea involv-ing swift incursion into hostile territory for a speci-fied purpose, followed by a planned withdrawal.Raid forces may consist of aviation, infantry, engi-neers, artillery, or any other element with skills andequipment particularly needed for the mission. Am-phibious raids are conducted in support of other op-erations or as independent operations directedagainst objectives requiring specific effects not possi-ble with other power projection means. Generally,amphibious raids are conducted to —

• Destroy specific facilities, personnel, and/orequipment. Harass the enemy by attacks onisolated posts and headquarters and to captureor kill key personnel.

• Attack the enemy rear or flank coastal positionsin support of other landing forces.

• Obtain information on hydrography, terrain,enemy dispositions, morale, strength, move-ments, and weapons.

• Create a diversion in connection with strategicor tactical deception operations.

• Evacuate individuals and equipment.• Establish, support, or coordinate unconven-

tional warfare activities.

Thorough, integrated rehearsals are essential toachieve precision and speed in executing a raid. Allparticipating forces must be drilled in every detail ofdebarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore,withdrawal, and reembarkation. Timing, criticallyimportant in all raids, cannot be accurately estimatedor adhered to without adequate rehearsals.

3-2 FMFM 6-1

Amphibious DemonstrationsAmphibious demonstrations enhance deception andsurprise. A demonstration is conducted to deceivethe enemy by a show of force to induce him to adoptan unfavorable course of action. The value of thedemonstration must be measured against its merit asa supporting effort and its impact on the main effort.The division may provide forces to make the demon-stration more plausible. When an amphibious dem-onstration is applied within the framework ofOMFTS, forces and assets providing an amphibiousdemonstration can be rapidly redirected to supportoperations elsewhere.

Effectiveness of a demonstration increases in directproportion to the degree of realism involved in itsexecution. It should neither be underplayed notoverplayed. It is crucial that the enemy receive aconvincing impression of preparations for a landing.All visible, audible, and electronic aspects of thedemonstration must appear to be authentic. A dem-onstration normally includes the approach of demon-stration forces to the demonstration area, the launchof landing forces toward the coast, and fires. Seefigure 3-1.

Amphibious WithdrawalsAn amphibious withdrawal is an operation involvingthe evacuation of land forces by sea in naval ships orcraft from a hostile shore. Amphibious withdrawals

may be conducted to extract a force under pressure,to assist in the repositioning of forces elsewhere inthe theater, to reconstitute forces afloat, or to estab-lish an operational reserve after introduction ofheavy follow-on forces.

CharacteristicsThe amphibious withdrawal embraces the followingdistinguishing characteristics:

• Time available for planning and execution isnormally limited.

• Facilities for embarkation and loading may berestricted, compounding Iogistic/CSS prob-lems.

• All requisite fire support means may not beavailable.

• Means for controlling the withdrawal may belimited.

• The operation may be conducted under condi-tions of adverse weather, terrain, andhydrography.

• Circumstances may render it advisable to con-duct the operation under limited visibility.

• The force to be withdrawn could be land forcesnot orginally inserted by amphibious opera-tions. Therefore, forces to be withdrawn maybe unfamiliar with amphibious procedures,complicating the operation.

Figure 3-1. Timing Considerations for Amphibious Demonstrations.

The timing of a demonstration conducted in support of another operation must be coordinatedto achieve the maximum desired level of reaction from the enemy force.

Prior to the main operation, a demonstration isconducted to —

Simultaneous with the main operation, a demon-stration may commence at the same time as themain operation if it is desired to —

Draw enemy forces to the threatenedarea and away from the area of themain operation.Cause the enemy to disclose itspositions.Provide protracted and systematicharassment.Divert the attention of the enemy fromthe main effort.Cause premature commitment ofenemy forces.

Prevent redeployment of enemy forces.Deceive the enemy as to the location ofthe main effort.

Subsequent to the main operation, a demonstra-tion may be conducted if the desired effect is todivert enemy forces or fire from the main effort.Successive demonstrations may be executed at anumber of points after the main operation

commences.

Marine Division 3-3

Embarkation Area

The CATF in consultation with the commander,landing force (CLF) selects the embarkation area andbeaches. Multiple embarkation beaches in the em-barkation area are desirable to achieve maximumspeed in embarkation and to provide passive protec-tion against mass destruction weapons. Other factorsto be considered when selecting the location andnumber of embarkation beaches include hydrogra-phy, distance from the transport area, availability ofsuitable assembly areas, proximity to the landingforce as a whole, the covering force in particular,and protection from enemy observation and fires.Initial size of the embarkation area depends on sev-eral factors, such as —

• Terrain essential for defense in the event theembarkation is conducted under enemypressure.

• Number of personnel and amount of equipmentand supplies to be embarked.

• Artillery, naval surface fire support (NSFS),and air support available for defense, ifrequired.

• Nature and extent of usable beaches.• Time available for embarkation.

Additional Planning Considerations for theAmphibious Withdrawal

Good observation and fields of fire are necessary sothat the enemy can be engaged at long ranges. Natu-ral and manmade obstacles, including barrier sys-tems, minefields, and deniolitions, are used incombination with the terrain to minimize enemy in-terference with the withdrawal. Cover and conceal-ment are sought for assembly areas and movementroutes to embarkation beaches.

A covering force may be assigned the mission ofpreventing enemy interference with the withdrawalof the main body; its size should be the minimumconsistent with providing adequate protection. Thestrength and composition of the covering force mayvary in different portions of the embarkation area.A unit occupying a sector protected by a formidableobstacle may leave only minimum security posts,while units under attack may be required to remainat full strength.

Supporting forces are attached to the covering forceconsistent with requirements. Support requirementsmay conflict with the requirement for the early em-barkation of heavy support equipment. Reconnais-sance units, engineers, and medical personnel maybe included as part of the covering force ifnecessary.

The requirement for supporting fires increases as theforce withdraws and its capability to repel the enemydiminishes. Emphasis is placed on maximum use ofexternal fire support agencies, including air supportand NSFS.

Aviatioii requirements may include the use of trans-port helicopters to accomplish part of the with-drawal, naval gunfire spotting, close air support(CAS), antiair, reconnaissance, and interdiction.

The effect of the withdrawal on logistic support mustbe anticipated to ensure adequate support for the op-eration, to prevent the unnecessary destruction orloss of supplies, to provide for the destruction ofsupplies and equipment not evacuated, and to pro-vide prompt evacuation of casualties.

Movement to embarkation beaches is controlledthrough the use of assembly areas, routes of with-drawal, initial points, and checkpoints. The plan forembarkation must emphasize speed and provide formaximum coordination between the arrival of unitsat embarkation beaches and the arrival, loading, anddeparture of landing craft. The amount of detail in-cluded in the plan is determined by the size of theoperation, experience of personnel, and time avail-able. The following may be included:

• Designation of embarkation beaches.• Reactivation of the shore party as an embarka-

tion combat agency and the assignment of pre-cise responsibilities, including an officer incharge of embarkation.

• Detailed instructions concerning embarka-tion.

• Schedule and priorities for embarkation.• Schedule for movement of units to embarkation

beaches.

34 FMFM 6-1

Embarkation is performed by the shore party, in-cluding ship's platoons and embarkation personnel.Control agencies, provided for each embarkationbeach, summon and guide units from the assemblyareas to the embarkation beaches and expediteloading

General Sequence

The amphibious withdrawal is normally executed inthe following sequence.

• Establish defense of the embarkation area byair, naval, and ground covering forces whileorganizing and embarking landing force (LF)personnel, supplies, and equipment not re-quired for support of operations ashore.

• Progressively reduce troop and materielstrength ashore under protection of air, naval,and ground covering forces. Depending onlimitations in afloat cargo capacity and/or load-ing time, all usable military materiel is eitherevacuated or destroyed. During this phase,specific provisions are made for the evacuationof casualties.

• Withdraw the ground covering force, with pri-ority to heavy elements such as artillery andtanks, usually under cover of darkness and sup-ported, as necessary, by air and NSFS.

Phases of Amphibious OperationsAmphibious operations are conducted withinOMFTS to enable the introduction of larger forces,to support a main effort elsewhere, or to introduceforces designated the main effort in a campaign.

The threat of amphibious operations may serve as adeterrent to hostile action; to shield intent and ob-jectives; and to disperse and fix in place enemyforces over an extended area. The phases of an am-phibious operation are a sequence of events or activi-ties. Certain phases may be conducted concur-rently. The five phases of an amphibious operationare planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement,and assault. However, forward-deployed amphibi-ous forces may execute these phases in the followingsequence: embarkation, movement, planning, re-hearsal, and assault.

Planning PhaseThe planning phase is the period extending from theissuance of the initiating directive (mission) to forcesembarking in assigned shipping (embarkation). Dur-ingthis phase, the necessary preparatory measuresare effected including coordinated planning. Eventhough planning is a continuous process, it is usefulto distinguish between the planning phase and thesubsequent operational phases, since a markedchange occurs in the relationship between the com-manders of the various forces. During the planningphase, the CATF coordinates planning. Any differ-ences which the CATF and CLF cannot resolve arereferred to the NEF commander (the common supe-rior) at this time. At the commencement of the op-erational phases, the CATF assumes full re-sponsibility for the entire force and the operation.The division commander may be designated the CLFor serve as a subordinate commander to the CLF(normally the MEF commander). Regardless, heprovides recommendations for all basic decisions andmust understand the general requirements of both theATF and the LF commanders in the development ofplans and orders.

Types of Planning

Amphibious planning procedures are characterizedby detailed concurrent and parallel planning amongall forces involved in an amphibious operation.Concurrent and parallel planning favor the assemblyof commanders and staffs of corresponding echelonsin the same locality. When such an arrangement isnot practical, qualified liaison officers are exchangedto perform essential planning.

Basic Planning Considerations

All commanders are involved in amphibious plan-ning. Though the CATF and CLF have overall re-sponsibility for amphibious planning, the divisioncommander and his subordinate commanders coordi-nate their planning with higher, adjacent, supporting,and supported forces. A specific amphibious opera-tion may be related to other ongoing or future opera-tions. Thus, the planning for an amphibious opera-tion must ensure that the operation does not hinderor disrupt other actions. This is particularly critical

Marine Division 3-5

when the amphibious operation is a supporting ef-fort. The division commander must also ensure thatplanning throughout the division is integrated to de-velop a coherent plan.

The CATF must determine the criticality of surprise,the need for a preparatory phase of deception opera-tions to divert enemy forces from the amphibious ob-jective area (AOA), and the need for protection offorces in transit. Commander's critical informationrequirements (CCIRs) and operations security (OP-SEC) planning guidance must be issued at the earli-est possible time.

Accurate and adequate intelligence is a prerequisitefor sound amphibious planning. Intelligence collec-tion efforts directed toward satisfying the priority in-telligence requirements (PIRs) must begin as soon aspractical. National, theater, joint and advanceforces, space, and other theater assets may be em-ployed to collect information for the CAlF and theCLF.

Development of the division's concept of operationsashore must precede detailed planning for surfaceand air operations in support of the amphibious op-eration. The division concept must be examined byall commanders concerned to determine its support-ability, and it must be concurred with by the CATF,through the CLF, before detailed planning begins.All commanders who provide support for the assaultmust be prepared to alter and accommodate theirsupporting plans to reflect the changing requirementsof the landing force as dictated by changes in the en-emy situation.

Planning Documents

The CATF and subordinate commanders use the fol-lowing documents to coordinate the planning effortat all levels of the amphibious task force.

Planning Directive. The CATF issues his planningdirective to ensure interdependent plans are coordi-nated, planning is completed in the time allowed,and important aspects are not overlooked. The plan-ning directive specifies the principal plans to be pre-pared and sets a deadline for completion of eachmajor step in the planning process for the ATF com-mand element and major forces assigned. The plan-ning directive includes a mission statement,

commander's analysis, assumptions, forces appor-tioned, proposed courses of action, OPSEC guid-ance, task assignments, administrative schedules,and coordinating instructions.

Planning Program. Using the ATF planning direc-tive as a guide, each commander prepares a planningprogram that contains the schedule of planningevents for his force The division commander'splanning program includes concept development,mission analysis, planning guidance, staff estimates,the commander's estimate, and the concept ofoperations.

Planning Memorandums. Planning memorandumsare issued as additional information as intelligence isdeveloped or received. These memorandums are is-sued to all commanders to ensure planning is basedon the most accurate and current informationavailable.

Preliminary Planning

Upon receipt of the warning order or other directiverequiring the planning for an amphibious operation,the CAlF conducts a thorough review of the missionand other information provided. As necessary, stud-ies and initial estimates are prepared at both thelanding force and ATF levels. These estimates pro-vide information required to support the basic deci-sionmaking process and for the detailed planning thatfollows. See figure 3-2 for a description of basicdecisions.

Detailed Planning

Once the CAlF determines that the ATF can be sup-ported, detailed planning begins. During detailedplanning, the concept of operations and the adequacyof forces available is constantly evaluated.

Intelligence. During the planning phase, all subordi-nate commanders of the ATF have unique intelli-gence requirements. When the division is locatedoutside the theater of war, it is particularly depend-ent on higher commands for meeting its intelligencerequirements. However, the division may be taskedto conduct certain intelligence support functions andtasks for other forces. Regardless, the division com-mander coordinates with the CLF to ensure his re-quirements are met. The CLF has a number of

3-6 FMFM 6-1

Basic decisions are those decisions that must be made before detailed planning for an amphibious operation can proceed.

Some of these decisions may be provided in the initiating directive. Although discussed in the general sequence in which they

are made, certain decisions may be made concurrently and others held pending further information.

Selection of the ATE Course of Action

CAlF and the CLF jointly select a general course of action forthe ATF that will accomplish the mission assigned. It is basedon the NEF commander's intent and the guidance of tasks heassigns the ATF.

Selection of ATF Objectives

The CAlF and CLF jointly select ATF objectives essential tothe operation. The objective(s) are enemy critical vulnerabilities

that, when neutralized, lead to mission accomplishment.When the purpose of the operation is to enable introduction ofheavier follow-on land forces, the ATF objectives may take theform of terrain objectives (ports and airfields) or destruction ofspecific enemy capabilities (aviation, long-range weapons, and

C2).

Determination of the LF Mission

Based on the ATF mission, general course of action, and ATEobjectives, the CLF develops a mission statement for the LFand submits it to the CAlF for concurrence.

Designation of Landing Sites

A landing site is a continuous segment of coastline over whichtroops, equipment, and supplies can be landed by surfacemeans. Landing sites must be of sufficient length to contain atleast one penetration point. CATF designates the potentiallanding sites within the AOA and fumishes the CLF with perti-nent information concerning them.

Designation of IF Objectives

The CLF determines LF objectives, attainment of which arenecessary to accomplish the ATF mission.

Selection of the Landing Area

The landing area is that part of the objective area within whichthe landing operations of an amphibious force are conducted.It includes the penetration points, approaches, transport ma-neuver area, fire support areas, airspace, and landward exten-sion of the battlespace to landing force objectives.

Formulation of the ATE Concept of Operations

The ATF concept of operations is usually a written and graphicrepresentation of the CAlF's intent about the operation. It

gives an overall picture of the operation, including maneuver ofthe AIF to and within the AOA, and form of maneuver forship-to-objective maneuver of the LF, AlP, and LF objectives,linkup plans, subsidiary landings, and the end state to beachieved by the ATF.

Selection of Penetration Points

A penetration point is a point through or over which thelanding force pierces the coastline en route to inland ob-jectives. Evaluation of potential penetration points in-cludes consideration of beaches and helicopter landingzones (HLZs).

Beaches. A landing beach is that portion of a shorelinerequired to support a surface penetration of the highwater mark. The CLF selects specific beaches. Princi-

pal factors in selection of landing beaches are —

- ATE concept of operations.• Suitability for beaching landing craft and assault

amphibious vehicles.• Trafficability.

Location, type, and density of obstacles, includingunderwater obstacles.

• Nature of the terrain immediately inland from thebeach.

• Expected weather and tidal conditions.• Known enemy coastal defense and force

dispositions.

HLZs. An HLZ is a specified area for landing assaulthelicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo.A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites.The CLE selects HLZs and advises the CATF. Principalfactors in the selection of HLZ5 are —

ATF concept of operations.• Enemy capabilities and dispositions, in particular

air defense capabilities.- Nature of the terrain where the force must operate

after landing.- Combat service support.

Fire support considerations.Capabilities of the assault support aircraft to movepersonnel, equipment, and supplies ashore insupport of the operation.

Selection of Fixed-wing Aircraft LZs and DZs forAir-transported and Airborne Operations

When airborne or air-transported forces are employed,the CLF selects the landing zones (Us) and drop zones(DZs) after consulting with the CAlF.

Selection of the Tentative Date and Hour ofLanding

If not specified, the CAlF selects the tentative date andhour of landing. Principal factors in the selection forlanding are shown in figure 3-3.

Figure 3-2. Basic Decisions for Amphibious Operations.

Marine Division 3-7

1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Figure 3-3. Factors for Selecting the Tentative Date and Hour of Landing.

intelligence responsibilities during thephase. These responsibilities include —

planning

• Identifring and forwarding LF intelligence re-quirements to CATF and/or the appropriate in-telligence support agency.

• Procuring and distributing basic intelligencematerials (maps, charts, imagery) to LF units.

• Collecting, producing, and disseminating intel-ligence in support of mission planning andexecution.

• Assisting in the preparation and distribution ofthe Intelligence Annex to the ATF OperationPlan.

• Establishing liaison with ATF, joint task force(JTF), and theater intelligence organizations, asappropriate.

Command and Control. Maintaining seamless com-mand and control in an amphibious operation re-quires significant planning and redundancy in assets.

The division commander must evaluate his owncommunications capabilities, his C2 requirements,and how the situation affects his ability to maintainconnectivity to his subordinate units, higher com-manders, adjacent commanders, and any other forcesthat support the operation. The division commanderuses his estimate of the situation to recommend C2organization and support requirements to the CLF.The CLF is responsible for —

• Establishing adequate LF communications dur-ing the planning phase.

• Developing and promulgating a plan that inte-grates air operations ashore with air supportfrom air elements outside the AOA.

• Determining requirements for communicationfacilities controlled by higher headquarters andsubmitting these requirements to the CATF.

• Determining requirements for shipboard com-munication facilities and services while em-barked.

DATE FOR LANDING HOUR FOR LANDING

Availability of forces

• Readiness of forces

Present and projected enemy Situation

Known enemy routine

Seasonal conditions in the area underconsideration

Duration of daylight

Need for tactical surprise

Local conditions of weather, tide,current, phase of moon (durationof darkness and daylight)

• Concept of operations ashore of thelanding force

Designation of limiting dates by a higherauthority

Favorable conditions of wind, tide,and phase of moon

Coordination with preliminary operations

Requirements for conducting certainoperations during hours of darkness

Most effective employment ofsupporting arms

• Maintaining liaison with CATF and subordinateLF units in all C2 planning matters.

• Developing and promulgating a coordinatedplan for the LF and submitting this plan toCATF for review, coordination, approval, andinclusion in the ATF plan, as appropriate.

• Developing and promulgating a plan for link-up• operations with other ground forces ashore.

Fire Support. The nature of amphibious operationsplaces a premium on sound fire support planning andexecution. The division commander must rely pri-marily on assets from supporting forces during theinitial stages of the operation. Based on METT'-T,the division commander identifies his fire support re-quirements and coordinates the use of NEF, ATF,and landing force assets to meet these requirementswith the CLF. The CLF is responsible to the CATFfor the following fire support planning requirements:

• Establishing fire support agencies at each ap-propriate level of the LF agency to dischargeand implement LF fire support coordination re-sponsibilities throughout the planning and exe-cution of the operation.

• Determining the supporting arms requirementsof the LF and ensuring that requirements areintegrated with the planned scheme of maneu-ver of the ATF.

• Coordinating requests for supporting arms forthe LF.

• Providing coordinated requests for naval sur-face fires and offensive air support to theCATF

• Preparing the artillery fire plan.

Combat Service Support. An amphibious operationrequires detailed sustainment planning. With the ex-ception of amphibious raids of short duration, allamphibious operations rely on the ability of the ATFto provide sustainment to all subordinate forces.The division's concept of operations is legitimizedby the sustainment capabilities available. The divi-sion commander coordinates his sustainment require-ments with the CSSE commander, the ACEcommander, and the ATF, through the CLF. TheCLF is responsible to the CATF for determining theoverall logistic and CSS requirements of the landingforce, to include special equipment and shipping. Inaddition, the CLF is responsible for —

FMFM 6-1

• Determining logistic and/or CSS requirementsthat cannot be met by the LF and submission ofthese requirements to CAlF.

• Determining and allocating the means to meetlogistic and/or CSS requirements of the LF.

• Developing plans for the assembly of suppliesand equipment to be embarked, to include thesupplies and equipment of other forces that theLF is responsible for embarking.

• Preparing the LF embarkation and ship loadingplans and orders in coordination with theCAlF.

• Planning for the coordination of logistics andcombat service support required by all elementsof the LF.

• Preparing the logistic and CSS annex to the LFoperation plan.

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver. The division must beorganized to permit the seamless and continuous ap-plication of combat power to distant inland objec-tives. The following guidelines apply to organi-zation for ship-to-objective maneuver:

• Provide for the concentration of combat powerat the critical time from dispersed locations.

• Provide maximum shock effect at the penetra-tion points to overcome enemy resistance at thebeach.

• Provide for the timely employment of combat,combat support, and combat service supportelements required to support the commander'sconcept.

• Provide depth to the assault to ensure exploita-tion of gaps created or located by the NEF.

• Provide sufficient flexibility to exploit opportu-nities discovered during execution of the op-eration.

The requirements of ship-to-objective maneuvermust be determined by the CLF. The division com-mander's concept of operations, the CSSE com-mander's concept of support, and the ACEcommander's concept of operations all require thor-ough integration and detailed planning. Based onthese subordinate concepts of operation and theCLF's and CATF's intent, landing means are dedi-cated to place the appropriate forces and support atthe most decisive location. The division commandermust consider the mobility requirements of his C2

Marine Division 39

assets, each maneuver unit, fire support units, andhis reserve and how to best arrange their maneuverin time and space to achieve his end state. These re-quirements are submitted to the CLF for approvaland reflected in the landing force's landing plan.When he has received the requirements of his subor-dinate units, the CLF is responsible to the CATFfor —

• Determining ship-to-objective maneuver re-quirements and presenting them to CATF.

• Advising the CATF of the availability of LF as-sault support aircraft, rubber and rigid-hulledboats, obstacle breaching equipment, and am-phibious vehicles.

• Preparing landing plans.

NBC Defense. The CLF is responsible for determin-ing and prescribing the active and passive NBC de-fense measures required for the landing force. TheCLF then presents to CATF the NBC defense meas-ures that should be provided by other forces. NBCactive defense measures are employment of fires toeliminate enemy NBC capabilities, increased air de-fense measures, increased air reconnaissance, andincreased communications security (COMSEC)measures, including the use of appropriate counter-measures. NBC passive defense measures are dis-persion of units, protective clothing and equipment,distribution of trained NBC defense personnel, es-tablishment of a monitoring system, creation of NBCsalvage units, and development of plans for masscasualty handling.

Embarkation PhaseThe embarkation phase is the period during whichforces, with their equipment and supplies, embark inassigned shipping. This phase commences the op-erational phases of the amphibious operation. Theprimary goal of this phase is the orderly assembly ofpersonnel and material and their embarkation in as-signed shipping in a sequence designed to meet therequirements of the ATF concept of operationsashore. Force protection measures are crucial to en-sure the secure embarkation of the force and pre-clude compromise of the impending operation.

The CATF and the CLF respectively prepare theplans for assembly of assault shipping and for move-ment of the division to embarkation points. Theseplans must be coordinated and distributed as soon aspossible to permit initiation of preliminary move-ments and preparations. The CLF is responsiblefor —

• Determining LF requirements for assault ship-ping associated with the assault echelon and as-sault follow-on echelon.

• Developing the LF organization for embar-kation.

• Determining the means required from forcesafloat and external agencies at the embarkationpoints during loading.

• Designating shipping in which Marine unitswill be embarked and preparing detailed em-barkation and loading plans for the CATF's ap-proval.

Rehearsal PhaseThe rehearsal phase is the period during which theprospective operation is rehearsed for testing theadequacy of plans; the timing of detailed operations;ensuring combat readiness of participating forces;ensuring all are familiar with plans; and testing com-munications. The rehearsal phase may be conductedconcurrently with other initial phases of the amphibi-ous operation but it is most often associated with themovement to the objective phase. It is during thisperiod that one or more rehearsal exercises are con-ducted by the ATF, ideally under conditions ap-proximating those to be encountered in the objectivearea. Although OPSEC may be the major limitingfactor during this phase, the CATF's objectiveshould be to exercise as much of the force and theoperational plan as the situation permits.

Rehearsal Plans

Rehearsal plans should be issued separately from ac-tual plans and they should require execution of thevarious tasks and functions paralleling those requiredduring the actual operation. See figure 3-4 for plan-ning considerations.

3-10 FMFM 6-1

Figure 3-4. Planning Considerations for Rehearsal Plans.

Rehearsal Security

Strict security must be enforced during rehearsalsbecause of similarity with the actual operation. Re-connaissance, selection of, and arrangements for theuse of rehearsal areas are to be accomplished care-fully. Deception measures should be planned to en-sure the security of the rehearsal. Restrictingmovement of ships and personnel and establishingpatrols around the rehearsal area, at sea and ashore,are primary means of establishing security. Re-hearsals may have to be timed to coincide with thosetime periods when satellites cannot observe the re-hearsal area. Particular attention must be given tosignal security.

Movement PhaseThe movement phase is the period during which thecomponents of the ATF move from the points of em-barkation to the objective area. This move may bevia rehearsal, staging, and/or rendezvous areas. Themovement phase is completed when the componentsof the ATF arrive in their assigned positions in theobjective area. Movement of the ATF to the AOAincludes departure of ships from loading points in anembarkation area; passage at sea; and approach to,and arrival in, assigned positions in the AOA.

ations:

The number, nature, and scope of rehearsalswill be influenced by the following consider-

AIFComplexity of the tasks assigned to the

Critiques at all levels of command forevaluation and correction of mistakes.Time to revise plans in those areas that therehearsal has disclosed to be necessary.

Selection of the rehearsal area is influenced bythe following:Time available for rehearsals.

State of training of the forces.Suitability of available rehearsal areas.

• Special or unusual problems to be faced inthe actual operation, the solution to whichmust be given special attention inrehearsals.

• Intelligence and counterintelligenceconsiderations.

• Adequacy of the communication plan.CSS availability to replenish, replace, orrepair assets used during rehearsals.Degree of OPSEC required to preventdisclosure of the intent, the timing of, or thelocation of the amphibious operation.

Similarity of rehearsal area to actual landingarea.Feasibility of employing live fire.OPSEC.Susceptibility to enemy interference.Location of the rehearsal area in relation tothe AOA and to points ol embarkation.Health conditions at the rehearsal area.Activity of civilians, vehicles, shipping, andsmall craft that may interfere with therehearsal.

for —

The dates on which rehearsals are conductedand the time allocated for them must provide

Testing the adequacy of the communication planwiH be influenced by the following:

Complete and careful execution of the entirerehearsal.Reembarkation of all troops, equipment, andsupplies.Replenishment, repair, or replacement ofequipment and supplies used duringrehearsals, including landing craft, ships, oraircraft.

State of training of assignedcommunications personnel.Material status of communicationequipment.OPSEC and COMSEC restrictions.Advanced training time available before therehearsal phase.

Marine Division 3-11

Organization for Movement

Based on the landing plan, the ATF organizes itsships, self-deploying aircraft, and airlift for embar-kation and deployment. This organization is basedon the time-phased force requirements of the ATF,the NEF, and other Service units in the objectivearea.

Transport Groups

Transport groups are those elements that deploy andsupport the landing and are functionally designatedas transport groups in the ATF task organization.Transport groups provide for the embarkation, ma-neuver within the AOA, landing, and sustainment ofthe LF. Navy landing craft and cargo off-loadingand discharge systems to be employed during ship-to-objective maneuver are organic or attached to thetransport groups. Multiple transport groups areformed when required to support multiple penetra-tion points. Each is combat loaded to support thelanding plan for the penetration point assigned.Each group is assigned assault shipping required bythe LF in its assigned area.

Movement Planning

The CATF is responsible for preparing a movementplan during the planning phase. In operations inwhich several attack groups are involved, the CATFusually prepares a general movement plan in whichcoordinating measures are included as necessary.Subordinate force and group commanders preparetheir own detailed movement plans.

Sea Routes to the AOA. Sea routes and routepoints from ports of departure to the AOA are deter-mined by the CATF, subject to approval by the NEFcommander. Alternate routes are also planned toavoid interference between forces and to permit di-version should the enemy threaten or the weatherprevent use of the primary routes. The CATF deter-mines sea routes in the AOA that support the maneu-ver of the ATF. Sea routes must take intoconsideration the missions of various task forces,groups, units, and subordinate elements of the ATF.The CLF should be familiar with sea routes withinthe -AOA so his landward maneuver capitalizes onthe effects of maneuver at sea.

Approach to the AOA. Approach to the AOAincludes arrival of various movement groups in thevicinity of the AOA and deployment of movementgroups from cruising formations, reforming as nec-essary according to assigned tasks and proceeding todesignated positions in the AOA. During this criti-cal period, additional protective measures are takenbeyond those provided during passage.

Preassault Operations. A preassault operation is anoperation conducted in the AOA before the assaultphase begins. It may include reconnaissance,minesweeping, fires, underwater demolition, and de-struction of beach obstacles. Preassault operationsare conducted by subordinate elements of the ATFthat are normally organized as an advance force.These operations may be conducted to —

• Isolate the penetration points.• Gain information about the enemy.• Prepare the penetration point(s) for the assault.

Supporting Operations Before Arrival of the Ad-vance Force. The joint force commander (JFC) mayprovide forces to support the ATF before the arrivalof an advance force in the AOA. Any or all of thefollowing tasks may be accomplished before the arri-val of the advance force.

• Deception.• Isolation of the penetration points and attain-

ment of air, surface, and subsurface supe-riority.

• Destruction of specific targets.• Harassment.• Psychological operations.• Intelligence collection.• Destruction or neutralization of distant forces

and installations.• Special operations.• Mine countermeasures.

Advance Force Operations. An advance force is atemporary organization within the ATF. The deci-sion to employ an advance force is made early in theplanning phase by CATF. after consultation with theCLF. The decision to employ an advance force mustbe weighed against the relative advantages of sur-prise and requirements for preparation of penetrationpoints. The advance force commander is responsible

3-12 FMFM6-1

for detailed planning for advance force operationsand ensuring plans fulfill overall requirements of theATF. The advance force commander preparesNSFS, air operations, penetration point reconnais-sance, underwater demolition, mine countermeasures(MCM), and pre-D-day landing plans. Landings ordemonstrations to be conducted are planned in con-sultation with the landing group commander of theadvance force. The advance force may conduct anyor all of the following tasks:

• Destruction of defenses ashore.• Preparation of seaward maneuver space.• Preparation of landing sites and approaches.• Conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance.• Isolation of the penetration points and mainte-

nance of local air superiority.• Conduct of demonstrations and other deception

operations.• Collection of meteorological and oceanographic

information.

Assault PhaseThe assault phase is the period between the arrival ofthe assault forces of the ATF in the AOA and theaccomplishment of the mission. Development of thearea for its ultimate use may be initiated during thisperiod. The assault phase encompasses —

• Fires to disrupt enemy defenses and supportamphibious breaching.

• Amphibious breaching when required.• Ship-to-objective maneuver.• Link-up operations between surface and air-

landed assault forces.• Fires in support of maneuver inland.• Provisions for continuous combat service sup-

port throughout the phase.

Organization for the AssaultThe ATF and LF are organized to retain the tacticalintegrity of assault elements during the ship-to-objective maneuver. The division organizes the in-fantry regiments into assault elements, normally re-taining one or more regimental-sized elements as the

reserve. The reserve provides the division com-mander the means to influence the course of the ac-tion ashore. The ability to commit the reservequickly is dictated by availability of landing craft,AAVs, and assault support aircraft; command andcontrol, and rapid planning.

Fire Support Coordination

The division FSCC is charged with the accomplish-ment of coordinated planning of supporting arms.The division exercises responsibilities for fire sup-port coordination through the division FSCC. TheFSCC is comprised of the designated FSC, support-ing arms representatives, a target information offi-cer, and the required operations, intelligence, andcommunication personnel. The coordination of sup-porting fires is under the supervision of the opera-tions officer. The FSCC is an advisory, planning,and coordinating agency that does not possess eithercommand or control of supporting arms means. Theartillery, naval gunfire, and air officers have specialstaff functions that provide them access to the com-mander and his staff in the routine performance ofduty.

The commander of the artillery regiment is desig-nated as the division FSC. He exercises suchauthority as is delegated to him to accomplish thetasks of planning and coordinating fire support. TheFSC supervises overall fire support planning andcoordination. The individual fire plans (artillery, na-val gunfire, air) are prepared by supported arms rep-resentatives and/or their control agencies. Also seeFMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for FireSupport Coordination.

Termination of the AmphibiousOperationThe termination of the amphibious operation is

predicated on the accomplishment of the mission ofthe ATF in accordance with the specific conditionscontained in the initiating directive.

Chapter 4

Offensive Operations

Characteristics of OffensiveOperationsThe division conducts offensive operations in supportof the MEF operation. The offensive is the divisioncommander's primary means of gaining the initia-tive, forcing the enemy to conform to his intent, andretaining freedom of action. When the opportunityfor decisive action presents itself, the division com-mander commits all necessary resources. Failure totake advantage of all opportunities may result inslow, inconclusive attacks and heavy losses.

Combat power in the offense is maximized by organ-izing responsive combined arms forces that canmove rapidly, deliver accurate fire, and maintaincontinuous situational awareness. Offensive plansmust provide flexibility to use any favorable advan-tage that develops during the attack.

Surprise is always sought when operating in the of-fense. It can be gained by deceiving the enemy's de-fense and by choosing an unexpected time for, placeof, direction of, and form of maneuver. Cover andsecurity aid in achieving surprise. Night andlimited-visibility attacks with smoke also increase theprobability of achieving surprise. Applying pressureday and night can deny a weakening enemy relieffrom battle, recoup of losses, or the opportunity togain the initiative.

The division commander task-organizes subordinateorganizations based on METT-T. The success of theattack depends on the proper application of the prin-ciples of war (see FMFM 6) and the five characteris-tics of the offense — concentration, audacity, speed,flexibility, and surprise.

ConcentrationConcentration may be achieved by narrowing thezone of action of the division's main effort, thereby

achieving an advantage of combat power at the pointof attack. It may also be achieved by allocating andshifting priorities of fire support. This will requirean economy of force from elsewhere in the divisionarea, using supporting efforts to fix and deceive theenemy. Concentration of division forces must beconducted from dispersed locations as rapidly as pos-sible to minimize vulnerability and rapidly redis-persed once the end state has been achieved.Concentration includes the massing of combat sup-port and CSS resources as well as maneuver forces.

AudacityThe division and subordinate commanders must beaudacious and capable of taking advantage of win-dows of opportunity. As battles and engagementsprogress, the enemy will make tactical errors or vul-nerabilities will be created by our own actions.These windows of opportunity will, usually be ofshort duration, forcing the division commander tomake bold decisions that have significant impact oncurrent and future operations. Even though the divi-sion commander may not have all the intelligence orcombat information he would desire, he cannot allowhimself to wait for the complete tactical situation tobe developed. The commander that cannot or willnot take risks will eventually be overcome by enemyactions.

Speed and FlexibilitySpeed and the flexibility to rapidly shift the main ef-fort to take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities andweaknesses contribute to the success of the division'sattack. Speed allows division forces to maneuverquickly, to disrupt enemy decisionmaking, and torapidly mass at the decisive location. Speed pro-vides an inherent amount of security as the enemytarget acquisition efforts are hampered. Flexibility,built into plans by constantly developing branches tocurrent operations, and planning future operations,

4-2 FMFM 6-1

allows the division commander to maintain the initia-tive and continue operations without unintended op-erational pauses.

SurpriseSurprise is achieved by attacking at unexpected loca-tions and times. Surprise permits a smaller force tooverwhelm a larger, more powerful force. An en-emy taken by surprise often reacts without coordina-tion, mutual support, or knowledge of the attackersstrength. Plans of attack are developed that promotesurprise through the use of limited visibility, opera-tions security, attacks from unexpected directionsand with unexpected techniques or methods.

Forms of ManeuverThe division commander, selects the most decisiveform of maneuver to achieve his purpose. His deci-sion is influenced by the type of offensive operationhe is conducting (see Types of Offensive Operationson page 4-11); by rear operations and affects otavailable sustainment; and by the shaping of the battiespace through division and MEF deep operations.Though forms of maneuver are normally associatedwith close operations, they can also be conducted indeep (deep maneuver) and rear operations (securityoperations). Furthermore, the division commanderconsiders the effects of deep operations and the suc-cess or failure of deception which may permit him to

adopt an otherwise unfavorable form of maneuver.The forms of maneuver are frontal attack, flankingattack, envelopment, and the turning movement.

While frequently used in combination, each form ofmaneuver attacks the enemy in a different way andposes different opportunities and challenges to thedivision. The commander may orient his attack onthe front, flank, or rear of the enemy. Helicopter-borne operations that place forces on the enemy'sflanks or his rear can be used during all forms ofmaneuver. The distinction in the form of maneuveremployed exists primarily in the intent of the com-mander, since subordinate units may use other formsof maneuver. The mission of the division, charac-teristics of the area of operations, disposition of op-posing forces, and relative combat power of op-posing forces are analyzed to determine the bestform of maneuver.

Frontal AttackA frontal attack normally involves attacking the en-emy on a broad front by the most direct route. See

figure 4-1. Frontal attacks are used when the at-tacker possesses overwhelming combat power,against lightly held or disorganized forces, as rapidlyas possible to deny the enemy time to react, and tosustain the attacker's momentum. Subordinate unitsof the division conducting a frontal attack are not

Figure 4-1. Frontal Attack.

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I.J

xxll

[SIrI

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Marine Division 4-3

restricted to conducting frontal attacks themselves ormaintaining alignment with adjacent units.

The frontal attack is most often selected by com-manders tasked with conducting supporting attacks,during a pursuit, or for fixing an enemy in place.During a frontal attack, commanders seek to createor take advantage of conditions that will permit amore decisive penetration of the enemy positions.

The goal of a frontal attack is to achieve a penetra-tion. A penetration divides the enemy and allowshim to be defeated in detail. As forces attack fron-tally, successful units will rupture portions of the en-emy defense. The penetration usually progresses inthree stages: rupturing the forward enemy defensivepositions, widening the rupture to permit the em-ployment of follow-on forces, and overrunning orseizing deep objectives to destroy the continuity ofthe enemy defense. The division commander mayconduct feints or demonstrations in other areas toweaken the enemy effort at the breach by causinghim to shift reserves to the attacker's advantage.The main effort may be shifted and combat power isbrought to bear at the point of penetration to widenthe breach, defeat enemy counterattacks, and attackthe enemy in depth.

Follow-on forces may be used to widen the ruptureafter the leading force has ruptured the enemy posi-tion, or they may pass through the leading force andmaintain the momentum of the attack by overrunningor seizing assigned objectives in the enemy rear.Follow-on forces may also be employed to attack en-emy forces isolated or bypassed by leading forces.

Fire support contributes to the violence of the attackand reduces friendly casualties. Preparation firescover the movement of the main effort and then con-centrates to weaken the enemy at the point of therupture. Fires are also directed against targets tolimit enemy movement and neutralize his reserves.When the rupture is effected, fire support is shiftedto support attacks to widen the breach, on deep tar-gets to defeat counterattack forces, or on defensivepositions in depth to facilitate exploitation. Objec-tives are selected in the enemy rear to break up thecontinuity of his forces and to make his forward de-fensive positions untenable. Objectives are selected

at least to the depth of the enemy reserve and includehis fire support means, command and control instal-lations, and reserve. To facilitate the momentum ofthe main effort, lateral movement should not be un-duly restricted by boundaries or obstacles. Interme-diate objectives are assigned to the main effort onlyif they are essential to the accomplishment of themission. Liaison must be maintained with forces incontact to facilitate one force passing through an-other. Successful penetrations —

• Disrupt enemy command and control.• Force the enemy to expend resources against

supporting attacks.• Force the premature commitment of the enemy

reserve.• Create psychological paralysis in enemy

commanders

Flanking AttackA flanking attack is a form of maneuver where themain effort is directed at the flank of an enemy. Seefigure 4-2. A flank may be created by fires, terrain,and/or enemy dispositions. A flanking attack seeksto strike the enemy while avoiding the frontal orien-tation of his main weapon systems. A flanking at-tack is similar to an envelopment but is conducted ona shallower axis and is usually less decisive and lessrisky than a deeper attack. Ordinarily, flanking at-tacks are conducted by subordinate units of the divi-sion in support of the division's scheme ofmaneuver.

Supporting efforts strike along the enemy's front tofix the enemy. Units conducting supporting attacksmay attack by fire or by maneuver. Fires in sup-port of the flanking attack fix frontline enemy unitsand counterattack forces. Security forces are em-ployed in depth to prevent the attacking units frombeing flanked themselves. As the maneuver unitsmake contact with enemy units on the flank, fires areshifted along the enemy's front and intensifiedagainst reserves and counterattack forces. As theenemy's frontline defensive positions are over-whelmed, the flanking attack is exploited by continu-ing the attack into the depth the defensive system.Supporting efforts that achieve success may becomethe main effort to ensure maintenance of momentuminto the enemy rear.

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Figure 4-2. Flanking Attack.

EnvelopmentAn envelopment is an offensive maneuver in whichthe main effort passes around or over the enemy'sprincipal defensive positions to attack the objectivewhile avoiding the enemy's main combat power. Seefigure 4-3. By nature, it requires surprise, superiormobility (ground and/or air), and successful support-ing attacks. An envelopment generally —

• Strikes the enemy where he is weakest.• Severs enemy lines of communication.• Disrupts enemy command and control.• Interrupts enemy combat service support.• Forces the enemy to fight on a reverse front.• Minimizes the attacker's losses.• Compels the defender to fight on ground of the

attacker's choosing.

The enveloping force avoids the enemy's strength enroute to the objective. Superior mobility and sur-prise are key. An enveloping force should deploy indepth and secure its flanks to avoid being outflanked

in turn. Supporting attacks, which are designed tofix the enemy's attention to his front and which forcehim to fight in two or more directions simultane-ously, contribute to the main effort's ability to ma-neuver to the enemy's rear. A vigorous supportingattack holds the enemy in position and prevents himfrom maneuvering against the enveloping force. Insome situations, the supporting effort may deceivethe enemy as to the existence or location of the en-veloping attack. Supporting efforts must have suffi-cient combat power to seize limited objectives andkeep the enemy engaged.

Rapid movement is essential to prevent the enemyfrom redeploying his forces against the envelopingforce or occupying prepared supplementary posi-tions. If the enemy extends his front to cut off theenveloping force, the commander may decide topenetrate the enemy's extended front. The reservenormally follows the enveloping force but the com-mander is alert to exploit success of the envelopingor supporting attacks.

Figure 4-3.

Preparation fires may precede the enveloping attackand/or the supporting attack. When used to supportthe enveloping attack, preparation fires are short andintense. Fire support is used to help hold the enemyin place and prevent his maneuvering against the en-veloping attack. Fire support is also used to neutral-ize enemy forces bypassed by the enveloping attackand to disrupt the depth of the enemy defense.

Envelopment objectives include C installations, firesupport means, and routes of escape. The envelop-ing force and supporting efforts may be launched si-multaneously or they may be conducted at differenttimes to confuse the enemy. Minimum controlmeasures are assigned to the enveloping force.

A turning movement is a form of maneuver in whichthe main effort seizes objectives so deep as to forcethe enemy to abandon his position or divert majorforces to meet the threat. See figure 4-4. The intentof a turning movement is to force the enemy out ofhis position without assaulting him; the act of seizinga key objective to his rear makes his position Un-tenable.

Ertv&opment.

4-5

The main effort usually operates at such a distancefrom supporting efforts that its units are beyond mu-tual supporting distance. Therefore, the main effortmust be self-sufficient and reach the objective beforebecoming decisively engaged. Once a key objec-tive has been seized, the enemy is then destroyed ata time and place of the commander's choosing.Normally, the division is the smallest organizationcapable of conducting a successful turning move-ment.

Offersk HanningThe division commander plans his attack to ensurethe division avoids unintended pauses or loss of mo-mentum. His vision of how the overall operationwill unfold, to include making transitions from onetype of offensive operation to another or to the de-fense, is key to his planning. The division com-mander must develop a flexible plan that will allowhim to adjust to batdefield changes created byfriendly actions or enemy operations.

The division plan of attack must be consistent withthe MEF commander's intent and concept of opera-tions. The division commander must also rely on

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Figure 4-4. Turning Movement.

connectivity with the MEF and the ACE to ensure his plan is supportable and that it takes advantages of the strengths and minimizes the limitations of the other elements of the MEF. In particular, the MEF's deep and rear operations have significant im- pact on the number of viable options the division may adopt.

A division plan for offensive operations usually takes into account all four types of offensive operations. The plan may include plans for gaining contact through movement to contact; for attacking the en- emy in depth, using one of the forms of maneuver; for conducting an exploitation by designating tenta- tive exploitation forces; and for conducting the pur- suit of the enemy to fmish his destruction. Offensive planning is a continuous process. In the offense, the commander and staff plan branches and sequels to current operations and future operations. In the

defense, the commander and staff plan future offen- sive operations and offensive sequels to the current defensive battle.

Planning The Attack The planning sequence begins with the receipt of a mission. Based on information available to him from his staff and from higher, lower, and adjacent units, the commander initiates his estimate by ana- lyzing and restating the mission and issuing his plan- ning guidance. Based on this guidance, the staff prepares and presents estimates and recommenda- tions. The commander then completes his estimate by analyzing the opposing courses of action. He then compares the advantages and disadvantages of the various courses of action and makes his decision. He states his decision in terms of who, what, when, where, how, and why. During the process of analy- sis and comparison of courses of action, the

Marine Division 4-7

commander will develop his concept of operation which provides the staff with sufficient guidance to translate the decision into plans and orders.

Task Organization The division commander implements his decision by allocating combat power to support his plan of at- tack. In accomplishing this, he may form temporary task forces consisting of combat, combat support, and CSS units. The battalion is the basic maneuver organization of the division. The division's organi- zation lends itself to the formation of task forces based on the infantry battalion and regiment. The division reconnaissance company, artillery regiment, tank battalion, assault amphibian battalion, light ar- mored reconnaissance battalion, combat engineer battalion, and CSS units are designed to facilitate task-organizing around basic infantry formations.

Distribution of Forces Successful offensive action requires the concentra- tion of all assets. Available maneuver forces, artil- lery, engineers, air defense, aviation, and command and control warfare (C2W) must be integrated at the decisive point and time to ensure success. This re- quires the division commander and staff to analyze the division's mission and translate it into specific objectives that, if successfully achieved, facilitate the destruction of the enemy force. Designation of the main effort and assignment of supporting efforts con- tribute to the understanding of responsibilities of at- tacking organizations. The division commander will designate a main effort, supporting effort(s), and the reserve.

Main Effort

The division commander provides the bulk of his combat power to the main effort to maintain momen- tum and ensure accomplishment of the mission. The main effort is provided with the greatest mobility and the preponderance of combat support and combat service support. The division commander gives the main effort priority of fires. Reserves are echeloned in depth to support exploitation of the main effort's success. The commander can further concentrate the main effort by assigning it a narrower zone of action.

All other actions are designed to support the main effort. The commander disguises the' main effort un- til it is too late for the enemy to react to it in strength. He accomplishes this through the use of demonstrations or feints, security, cover and con- cealment, and by dispersing his forces until the last instant and achieving mass at the critical time and place. When the main effort fails to accomplish as- signed tasks, the commander's C2 system must facili- tate a rapid shift of the main effort.

Supporting Effort

A supporting effort in the offense is carried out in conjunction with the main effort to achieve one or more of the following:

Deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort. Destroy or fix enemy forces which could shift to oppose the main effort. Control terrain that if occupied by the enemy will hinder the main effort. Force the enemy to commit reserves pre- maturely.

There may be more than one supporting effort. A supporting effort may achieve unexpected success, in which case the division commander must be ready to quickly shift combat power and redesignate that force the main effort. The commander assigns the minimum combat power necessary to accompljsh the purpose of each supporting effort.

Reserve

The reserve is held under the control of the division commander as a maneuver force to decisively influ- ence the action. The primary purpose of the reserve is to attack at the critical time and piace to ensure the victory or exploit success. Its strength and location will vary with its contemplated mission, the form of maneuver, the terrain, the possible enemy reaction, and the clarity of the situation. When the situation is obscure, the reserve may consist initially of the bulk of the force, centrally located and prepared to be employed at any point. When the situation is clear and the enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a smaller portion of the force dis- posed to support the scheme of maneuver. How- ever, the reserve must always be sufficient to effectively exploit success.

4-8 LWI 6-i

The reserve provides the commander the flexibilityto react to unforeseen developments. When the re-serve is committed, the next higher commander isnotified. The reserve should be —

• Positioned to readily reinforce the main effort.• Employed to exploit success, not to reinforce

failure.• Committed as a maneuver force, not piecemeal.• Reconstituted immediately.

Scheme of ManeuverThe scheme of maneuver represents the integrationof the division's subordinate units activities in timeand space to achieve the commanders desired endstate. It is the basis for subordinate unit maneuver,fire support prioritization, intelligence collection ac-tivities, and CSS operations. Graphically portrayed,the scheme of maneuver normally contains —

• Time of attack.• Subordinate unit boundaries, axes of advance,

directions of attack, and tactical areas ofresponsibilities.

• Phase lines, checkpoints, coordination points,passage points, assembly areas, the line of de-parture, and other coordination measures.

• Fire support coordinating measures such as thecoordinated fire line (CFL), fire support coor-dination line (FSCL), and free fire areas(FFA), etc..

• Initial locations of headquarters echelons andkey C2 nodes.

Fire Support PlanThe fire support plan is the plan of supporting firesfor the scheme of maneuver. It is fully integratedand concurrently developed with the maneuver of di-vision units. Fire support planning involves not onlythe translation of the commander's concept into adefinitive plan which portrays the supported unit'srequirements, but also involves the detailed planningwhich must be accomplished to effect delivery of thesupporting fires.

Fire support is used to suppress, neutralize, fix, ordestroy pockets or resistance prior to direct fire en-gagement by maneuver units. The division FSCdevelops the fire support task organization and the

coordinating measures for the attack, exploitation,pursuit, and contingency plans. Fire support sys-tems are positioned to ensure continuous firesthroughout the operation. Mutual support of firesupport systems promotes responsive support andprovides the commanders of maneuver units freedomof action during each critical event of the engage-ment or battle. Direct support artillery moves withsupported units and aviation is used to destroy en-emy fire support means and key enemy units and fa-cilities. Counterbattery radars are positioned tomaintain radar coverage for forward maneuverforces. The artillery regiment manages radar cover-age to ensure continuous coverage during rapidmovement forward.

Deep OpertonsDeep operations are military actions conductedagainst enemy capabilities which pose a potentialthreat to friendly forces. These military actions aredesigned to isolate, shape, and dominate the bat-tiespace and influence future operations. Deep op-erations are conducted primarily through the eni-ployment of fires. They seek to open the window ofopportunity for decisive maneuver and are designedto restrict the enemy's freedom of action, disrupt thecoherence and tempo of his operations, nu1lii hisfirepower, disrupt his command and control, inter-dict his supplies, isolate or destroy his main forces,and break his morale.

The enemy is most easily defeated by fighting himclose and deep simultaneously. Well-orchestrateddeep operations, integrated with simultaneous closeoperations, may be executed with the goal of defeat-ing the enemy outright or the goal of setting the con-ditions for successful future close operations. Deepoperations enable friendly forces to choose the time,place, and method for close operations.

Deep operations in the MEF are primarily planned,coordinated, and executed by the MEF CE. Al-though deep operations are primarily the responsibil-ity of the MEF CE and may be conducted largelywith ACE resources, the division has a significantrole. The division contributes to the deep operationsof the MEF by recommending deep operations ob-jectives and targets that will help shape the future di-vision battlespace. The division must also be pre-pared to provide resources to execute deep

Marine Division 4-9

operations as directed by the MEF CE, and may infact be tasked to control certain deep operations mis-sions on behalf of the MEF. Additionally, the divi-sion may plan and execute deep operations within itsown area of operations to shape the division bat-tiespace. Deep operations conducted in support ofthe offense may include —

• Deception.• Deep interdiction through deep fires, deep ma-

neuver, and deep air support.• Deep reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition.• Command and control warfare.• Offensive antiair warfare.

Deception plays a major part in shaping the bat-tlespace, and the division plays a major role in theMEF's deception operations. Deceptive measuressuch as demonstrations or feints can disrupt enemyplans, divert enemy forces away from the actualpoint of battle, and delay enemy reactions therebyplacing the enemy at a disadvantage when forcescome in contact. Deception activities of the divisionmust be well coordinated with the MEF to ensure ef-forts are directed towards a conunon goal. Divisiondeep interdiction capabilities include the long-rangefires of its artillery and rockets and its high-speed,mobile maneuver forces. The division may contrib-ute to deep surveillance and target acquisition effortswith its organic reconnaissance forces and the coun-terbattery radar platoon of the artillery regiment.Command and control warfare and offensive antiairwarfare conducted in support of deep operations arenormally outside the capability of the division.

The coordination and integration of the MEF and di-vision deep operations help to ensure constant pres-sure on critical enemy capabilities throughout thebattle. Because of the scarcity of resources withwhich to conduct these activities, deep operationsmust be focused on those enemy capabilities whichmost directly threaten the success of the projectedfriendly operations.

Close OperationsClose operations are military actions conducted toproject power decisively against enemy forces whichpose an immediate or near term threat to the successof current battles and engagements. These military

actions are conducted by committed forces and theirreadily available tactical reserves, using maneuverand combined arms. These operations require speedand mobility to enable the rapid concentration ofoverwhelming combat power at the critical time, ap-plication of that combat power at the critical place,and the ruthless exploitation of success gained. Thedivision is the MEF commanders principal tool forthe conduct of close operations. The opportunity tomake a decision will be lost if the division com-mander fails to exploit success.

Command arid ControlThe command group (the tactical echelon), aug-mented by other special staff as desired by the divi-sion commander, is positioned well forward to seethe battle. The division commander can thus bettersense the tempo of the battle, personally observecritical events, improve communications, and influ-ence the main effort through his presence. The com-mand group routinely moves about the battlefieldand relies on the main echelon to maintain communi-cations with adjacent and higher headquarters.

The tactical and main echelons are required to movefrequently during offensive operations. The mainechelon will continue to perform its essential currentbattle coordination; however, the main will weightits effort toward future battle planning. The rearechelon is committed to coordinating and facilitatingthe pushing of combat service support forward tosustain the attack. The rear echelon is initially con-cerned with sustaining forward units, providing reararea security, clearing main supply routes, evacua-tion of casualties, equipment, and enemy prisonersof war, and preparing to reestablish CSS stockpilesforward.

ManeuverThe tactical advantage being sought through maneu-ver is the disposition of the division in such a man-ner as to facilitate the destruction of the enemy. Theability to maneuver is related to mobility, the abilityto place accurate fires on the enemy, the ability toprotect the division from enemy fires, and the initia-tive of subordinate commanders. The division com-mander determines the most decisive location on thebattlefield — where he can inflict the most seriousdamage on the enemy — and determines the form of

4-10 FMFM 6-1

maneuver that will place his main effort at thatlocation.

When the division commander is out of contact withthe enemy, he determines what type of contact he re-quires, if any, before striking an enemy critical vul-nerability with his main effort. This may require thedivision commander to conduct a movement to con-tact to more fully develop the situation before com-mitting the bulk of the division in the attack.

Though fires and supporting actions are critical tothe division's success, it is through maneuver of hissubordinate forces that the division commander canachieve a favorable decision. In any operation, theone constant requirement fOr success is the intelli-gent maneuver of division forces to gain positionaladvantage, followed by the ruthless exploitation ofthat advantage with fires and close combat.

IntelligenceIntelligence support in close operations focuses onmaintenance of an accurate picture of the battlespaceand rapid identification of critical enemy vulnerabili-ties which can be exploited during offensive oper-ations.

The results of the IPB process should define the pos-sibilities and limitations presented by the environ-ment and identify enemy strengths and weaknesses.This intelligence helps shape the concept of opera-tions. Information gaps that have the potential to ef-fect the success of the operation are designed as thecommander's PIRs. PIRs form the basis for the in-telligence collection plan and further IPB analysis.

The G-2 develops the collection plan, relying heavilyon the division's organic reconnaissance and surveil-lance assets. Coordinating with the G-3, FSC, LARbattalion and division reconnaissance company com-manders, and the regimental S-2s, he prepares a de-tailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan whichfocuses on the PIRs and is fully integrated with theconcept of operations. The G-2 also submits re-quests for intelligence support to the MEF to helpsatisfy those requirements which exceed the divi-sions organic capabilities.

During the operation, the G-2 rapidly processes in-coming information, producing and disseminating in-telligence to influence the decisionmaking process.He helps the division commander maintain situa-tional awareness, supports force protection and thetargeting effort, performs battle damage assessment,and continuously updates his IPB analysis. The re-suits of reconnaissance operations are used to "pull"the division to avoid enemy strengths and exploitcritical vulnerabilities. In this effort, the G-2 makesuse of intelligence from all available sources: theMEF, the ACE, CSSE, and other adjacent units.

Fire SupportFire support can deliver a variety of munitions tosupport close offensive operations. To effectivelyintegrate fire support, the division FSC must under-stand the mission, the division and the MEF com-mander's intents, and concept of operations. TheFSC develops fire support plans that focus on enemycapabilities and systems that must be neutralized.Specific considerations for the employment of firesupport in offensive operations include —

• Employing weapon and target acquisition sys-tems well forward to provide continuous in-depth support.

• Weighting the main effort and assigning priori-ties of fire support to lead elements.

• Isolating enemy forces at the point of attack.• Softening enemy defenses by delivering effec-

tive preparatory fires.• Suppressing enemy weapon systems to reduce

enemy stand-off capabilities.• Supporting screening forces adjacent to enemy

units.• Suppressing bypassed enemy elements to limit

their ability to disrupt friendly operations.• Interdicting enemy counterattack forces, isolat-

ing the defending force, and preventing itsreinforcement and resupply.

• Providing counterfire to reduce the enemy'sability to disrupt friendly operations and tolimit the enemy's ability to rapidly shift combatpower on the battlefield.

Mobility/Countermobility/SuirvivabilityThe combat engineer battalion commander and thedivision engineer help plan and coordinate mobility,

Marine Division 4-11

countermobiity, and survivability tasks with theG-2, G-3, G-4, and FSC to support the offensive op-eration. He coordinates these tasks with the G-3,FSC, G-2, and G-4. Priority during the offense isnormally to mobility. This requires task-organizingmaneuver and engineer assets to breach obstacles,maintain momentum, and ensure routes are open tofacilitate logistic support. Combat engineer compa-nies also support reconnaissance concerning bridgesand cross-country trafficability. Countermobility inthe offense includes the coordination of scatterablemines to protect flanks along avenues of approach,fix enemy counterattack forces, and close routes forengaged enemy units. Survivability in the offenseincludes support to guard forces on the flanks, pro-tection of prestaged sustainment, and the protectionof critical C2 nodes, such as observation posts andelectronic relay sites.. The combat engineer battalionconmiander must receive clear guidance and priori-ties for engineer effort. He is vital to developmentof the scheme of maneuver.

Combat Service SupportCSS operations in the offense are designed to main-tain the momentum of the attack. The G-4, in coor-dination with the force service support group (FSSG)G-3, prepares and executes a logistic plan developedto support the division's tactical plan. The specificlogistic needs of the division are identified and coor-dinated by the G-4 with subordinate unit S-4s. TheG-4 tailors mobile CSS packages to be pushed for-ward to support the regiments and separate battal-ions. Specific locations for ammunition transfer,maintenance collection, and main supply routes arecoordinated between the FSSG, the division, and thesubordinate units of the division. Priority resupplyclasses are displaced forward to support the momen-tum of the offense, without impeding maneuverunits, to ensure continuous support.

Air DefenseThe division commander relies on the MEF andwing for the vast majority of its air defense require-ments. The division may receive priority of lightantiaircraft missile assets for defense of critical divi-sion capabilities. The division also benefits fromthose medium air defense assets in general support ofthe MEF or in direct support of the aircraft wing.The G-3 must understand the commanders intent

and concept of operations for the offense to properlyplan specific air defense tasks. All division unitspractice air defense early warning and passive airdefense measures. Considerations for employmentof air defense in the offense include the following:

• Mix gun and missile systems (when possible).• Concentrate air defense to achieve massive

fires at decisive points.• Integrate air defense systems throughout the

division.• Weight the main effort with air defense

protection.• Identify potential choke points and plan their

protection.• Provide the supporting air defense units with

the same mobility as the protected force.

Types of Offensive OperationsThere are four general types of offensive operations— movement to contact, attack, exploitation, andpursuit. Though described in a logical or notionalsequence, these operations may occur in any orderor simultaneously throughout the battlefield. Amovement to contact may be so successful that it im-mediately leads to an exploitation, or an attack maylead directly to pursuit. Isolated or orchestrated bat-tles will become increasingly rare, as the divisionwill fight the enemy throughout the depth of thebattlefield.

Movement to ContactMovement to contact is an offensive operation con-ducted to develop the situation and to establish or re-gain contact with the enemy. A properly executedmovement to contact allows the division commanderto make initial contact with minimum forces and ex-pedites the employment and concentration of theforce. See figure 4-5. The commander must foreseehis actions upon contact. He organizes his force toprovide flexible and rapid exploitation of the contactgained. The division utilizes battle drills that focuson overcoming initial contact quickly. These proce-dures must be practiced and thoroughly rehearsed topermit the entire division to act without detailedguidance. Failure to prepare accordingly results indelay and confusion, granting the enemy time toseize the initiative and dictate the conditions underwhich the engagement is fought.

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Figure 4-5. Movement to Contact.

The division commander's intent will dictate the ex-tent his forces will be engaged. The desired contactmay be by observation, physical contact between se-curity forces, or physical contact with main forces.In each instance, the task organization, scheme ofmaneuver, and support required may differ signifi-cantly. In addition, the division commander mustconsider and arrange for additional support requiredfrom the MEF. Every reconnaissance and securitymeans is employed so that the main force will becommitted under the most favorable conditions.

To maintain his freedom of action once he makescontact, the commander deploys an advance guardcapable of locating and fixing the enemy. The sizeand composition of this force is METT-T dependent.For the division, a reinforced infantry regiment, sup-ported by the light armored reconnaissance battalion,normally provides forward security as the advanceguard. The advance guard conducts reconnaissance,develops the situation, destroys enemy reconnais-sance elements, secures key terrain, reports andbreaches obstacles, and prevents premature deploy-ment of the main body. The advance guard must en-sure the uninterrupted progress of the main body. It

must contain sufficient combat power to overcomesecurity and delaying forces, and provide time forthe commander to deploy the main body at the criti-cal location. This allows the commander to choosethe best possible time and location to exploit themeeting engagement, maintain pressure upon the en-emy, and transition to another type of offensiveoperation.

Long-range surveillance assets may locate the enemybefore physical contact is made. To counter the en-emy's surveillance capabilities, security for the mainbody must operate far enough from it to allow the di-vision commander adequate reaction time. Securityis enhanced by rapid movement, by continuousground and air surveillance of the division area ofoperations, and command and control warfare. Thedivision integrates fire support assets into the marchformations of the advance guard, the main body, andsecurity elements to the flanks and rear. Air defenseprotection is provided by all elements observing andproviding fires with all available weapons. Air de-fense assets are located on selected sites along theroutes of march and are displaced as necessary.

Marine Division 4-13

The main body is positioned so as to remain uncom-mitted, capable of maneuvering without effective en-emy interference, at the time of the commanderschoosing. Premature deployment of the main bodyis costly in terms of time, resources, and disclosureof the main effort. The decision to attack, bypass,or defend must be made rapidly at each echelon.This decision is governed by the understanding ofthe MEF and division commander's intent. Com-manders should not hesitate to take appropriate ac-tion in the absence of orders. While efforts to retainthe initiative remain decentralized, the decision tocommit the entire force or to halt the attack remainswith the division commander. A movement to con-tact ends when ground enemy resistance requires thedeployment of the main body.

AttackThe purpose of the attack is to defeat, destroy, orneutralize the enemy. Offensive action emphasizesmaximum application of combat• power, coupledwith bold maneuver, shock effect in the assault, andprompt exploitation of success. There are four prin-cipal tasks in an attack:

• Prevent effective enemy maneuver orcounteraction.

• Maneuver to gain an advantage.• Deliver an overwhelming assault to destroy

him.• Exploit advantages gained.

The division commander and his subordinate com-manders must expect to make adjustments during anattack. Skillful commanders provide for the meansand methods to work these adjustments rapidly in or-der to maintain the momentum of the attack. Flexi-bility in the scheme of maneuver, organization forcombat, and universal understanding of the com-mander's intent provide means to adapt to thesechanges on the battlefield.

The division commander presses the attack althoughhis troops may be exhausted and his supplies de-pleted against a weakened or shaken enemy. How-ever, the commander must strive to accomplish hisobjectives prior to the division reaching its culminat-ing point. If the division is incapable of accomplish-ing its mission before reaching its culminating point,the commander must plan to phase his operation

accordingly. The differences between the types ofattacks lie in the degrees of preparation, planning,coordination, and the effect desired on the enemy.

Hasty AttackA hasty attack is an attack in which preparation timeis traded for speed to exploit opportunity. To main-tain momentum or retain initiative, minimum time isdevoted to preparation. Those subordinate organiza-tions and units readily available are committed im-mediately to the attack. A hasty attack seeks to takeadvantage of the enemys lack of readiness and in-volves boldness, surprise, and speed in order toachieve success before the enemy has had time toimprove his defensive posture. By necessity, hastyattacks are simple and require a minimum of coordi-nation with higher and adjacent commanders. Hastyattacks are most likely the result of movements tocontact, meeting engagements, penetrations, or fleet-ing opportunities created by disorder, enemy mis-takes, or the result of our own actions.

To minimize the risks associated with the lack ofpreparation time, organizations should utilize stan-dard formations, proven standing operating proce-dures, and rehearsals. Major reorganization of thedivision should be avoided, and habitual relation-ships maximized when the division commander task-organizes the force.

There are three phases to a hasty attack: advance ofreconnaissance and security elements, deploymentand assault by security forces, and assault by majorsubordinate maneuver units. Attacking units maybypass obstacles and pockets of resistance that do notthreaten the overall success of the attack. The divi-sion needs to retain some ability to reinforce withfires and redirect maneuver with minimum commu-nications. The most effective way to accomplishthisis with an operation overlay that reflects the divisioncommander's intent and scheme of maneuver.

The most critical control measures are objectives,phase lines, checkpoints, axes of advance, and unitboundaries. On-order objectives are used to orientfollowing forces and reserves quickly and increasethe flexibility of tactical maneuver throughout the di-vision. Fire support planning for the hasty attack iscontinuous. The operation needs extremely respon-sive fire support to compensate for the lack of

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illI.'IRES

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ExploitationThe enemy may still be capable of fielding cohesiveunits after an attack. In the exploitation, the divisionextends the destruction of the defending force bymaintaining constant offensive pressure. The objec-tive of the exploitation is the disintegration of enemyforces to the point where he has no alternative butsurrender or flight. When an attack succeeds, theenemy may attempt to disengage, withdraw, and es-tablish or reconstitute an effective defense. Attacksthat result in annihilation of the defending force arerare,

The division commander must be prepared to exploitevery attack without delay. While exploitation fol-lowing an attack is fundamental, it is especially im-portant in a deliberate attack where the concentrationnecessary for success requires accepting risk else-where. Failure to exploit aggressively the success ofthe main effort may provide the enemy sufficienttime to detect and exploit those risks and thus regainboth the initiative and the advantage.

The division commander's principal tool for the con-duct of an exploitation is his reserve. However, hemay designate other exploiting forces through the is-suance of a fragmentary order. Commanders of ex-ploitation forces must be given as much freedom ofaction as possible and efforts must be characterizedby boldness, aggressiveness, and speed. However,the commander needs sufficient centralized controlto concentrate his forces and to prevent his unitsfrom becoming overextended.

Essential to the exploitation is the knowledge of theenemy's condition and identification of the criticalvulnerabilities. The division commander's knowl-edge of the situation must be so complete as to pre-vent premature commitment of the exploitation forceor loss of the opportunity by acting too late. Eventssuch as increased enemy prisoners of war (EPWs),lack of organized defense, loss of enemy unit cohe-sion upon contact, and capture of enemy leaders in-dicate an opportunity to transition to an exploitation.Once begun, an exploitation is executed relentlesslyto deny the enemy any respite from pressure.

Il lii

Ill

ri illL1

xxFigure 4-6. Reconnaissance in Force.

Marine Division 4-17

Enemy troops encountered are not engaged unlessthey are a threat to the division or cannot be by-passed. The decision to bypass or engage theseforces normally rests with division commander andmay be destroyed by division units in the main bodyor another supporting force. The lead maneuverunits of the division habitually attack from the marchcolumn to reduce roadblocks and pockets of resis-tance and perform reconnaissance necessary to de-velop the situation. Typical missions for theexploitation force include cutting lines of communi-cations, isolating and destroying enemy units, anddisrupting enemy command and control.

PursuitWhen it becomes clear that organized enemy resis-tance has completely broken down, the commandertransitiOns to the pursuit. The difference between anexploitation and a pursuit is the condition of the en-emy. The object of a pursuit is annihilation of theenemy force. Like exploitation, pursuit requiresbroad decentralized control and rapid movement.

The division commander must ensure that all assets,to include allocated MEF assets, are used to maxi-mum effectiveness during the pursuit. The divisioncommander task-organizes the division into a direct-pressure force and an encircling or envelopmentforce. The direct-pressure force must have sufficientcombat power to maintain pressure on the enemy.The encircling force must have significant firepowerand greater mobility than the enemy. The capabili-ties of the ACE make it particularly valuable as anencircling force by destroying and denying the en-emy routes of escape. To maintain tempo and pres-sure, the MEF commander may shift the main effortto the ACE during a pursuit. A pursuit is pushed tothe utmost limits of endurance of troops, equipment,and especially supplies. If the force must stop forrest, maintenance, or reorganization, the enemy maybe able to pull together scattered units, emplace ob-stacles, or break contact altogether.

Rear OperationsRear operations are those actions necessary to sus-tain the deep and close operations. Rear operationsensure the freedom of action of the division and the

ability to conduct continuous operations. Rearoperations include sustainment, terrain management,movement control, and security. As these activitiesare conducted throughout the division's zone of ac-tion in support of offensive operations, they are notconsidered "rear operations" solely by geographiclocation. The division commander will, in fact, con-duct rear operations throughout the division bat-tlespace to support the conduct of a single divisionbaffle.

The division's rear operations include all activitiesconducted to the rear of maneuver units in contact toensure freedom of maneuver and sustainment ofdeep, close, and rear operations. Most of the divi-sions CSS assets will be located in the division's reararea. This area may also contain host nation, MEF,and joint facilities such as airfields, forward logisticbases, and civilian population centers. The rearechelon is responsible for the control of rear opera-tions. During offensive operations, the rear eche-lon's ability to retain connectivity between thesubordinate maneuver units and the FSSG will becritical to continuous support over extendeddistances.

SustainmentThe basic mission of combat service support is tosustain the battle. Sustainment functions consist ofthose actions that move and maintain personnel andequipment. CSS planning must be fully integratedwith planning for terrain management, movementcontrol, and rear area security. Sustainment plan-ning is the responsibility of the division G-4. He co-ordinates these plans with the U-i, the civil affairsofficer, the division engineer, and the G-3 of the di-vision, and subordinate unit S-4s.

During offensive operations, sustainment is pushedforward to ensure support at critical times in the bat-tle. Mobile combat service support detachments(CSSDs) are configured with the sp�Jfic support an-ticipated to be required by the maneuver units.These CSSDs are initially controlled by the rearechelon of the division. At a time or event of thecommander's choosing, control is passed to the sup-ported maneuver unit to ensure continuity of support

4-18 FMFM 6-1

without overburdening the supported commander.When the offensive operation is of relatively shortduration or conducted over a limited distance, mo-bile CSSDs may remain under division control untilthe end state has been achieved and then rapidly dis-placed forward to rearm, refuel, and fix subordinateunits.

Movement ControlMovement includes planning, coordination, conduct,and integration of mode operations, terminal opera-tions, and movement control. Movement makes sus-tainment possible. Supplies and personnel replace-ments constantly move from the sustainment baseinto the division rear area and then forward to sup-port subordinate maneuver units.

The rear echelon controls movements in the reararea to include the employment of maneuver forcesresponding to enemy threats. The rear echelonmonitors and deconflicts movement of nondivisionforces through the rear area. It ensures routes arecleared and iniinediate CSS support is available asrequired. It coordinates engineer, NBC decontami-nation, and MP support.

The G-4 designates main supply routes (MSRs) afterconsultation with the G-3, division engineer, andG-2. He determines and disseminates MSR condi-tions based on information received from rear areaunits. He maintains the status and expected recoverytime of those routes in disrepair or otherwise untraf-ficable. The rear echelon establishes a process oftracking convoys and mobile CSSDs from the reararea to their destination and back. Further, it —

• Monitors lines of communications to determineproblems in movement flow.

• Develops alternatives to ensure movements re-main constant.

• Keeps transportation users informed of avail-able assets.

• Programs back-haul availability to Cut down ondelayed returns.

• Directs MSR maintenance and security.• Processes convoy clearance requests for units

requesting movement on division MSRs.

Terrain ManagementTerrain management demands highly centralizedplanning and control. The major problem in posi-tioning units within the rear area comes from thecompeting demands of mission and security. Posi-tioning of units in the rear area requires a fine bal-ance between the needs of units, the requirement tosupport the concept of operations, and the need toprovide security to units. Terrain managementshould facilitate current and future operations.Faulty terrain management can result in congestion,interruption of rear area traffic patterns, and degra-dation of support operations.

Terrain management requirements should be ana-lyzed using the factors of METT-T. A unit's mis-sion must be analyzed to determine specific terrainrequirements. Artillery units must be within rangeof intended targets; transportation units should benear road networks; supply units near lines of com-munications. Unit missions must also be evaluatedand prioritized to determine their importance to thedivision mission. Conflicts between unit require-ments can be resolved, and units positioned.

IPB of the rear area will provide much of the dataneeded to accurately assess terrain managementneeds. The rear echelon uses the intelligence esti-mate and other intelligence products from the mainechelon to analyze enemy capabilities and to deter-mine possible threats. Combat units such as the divi-sion reserve or a reaction force may be positionedclose to likely enemy landing zones and ground ave-nues of approach.

When possible, CSS units should be located near es-tablished air, road, rail, and water lines of communi-cations (LOC5). Positioning must simplify receipt ofsupplies and material from higher commands andease of movement forward to committed units. Therear echelon analyzes the terrain to determine traffi-cability, available facilities, and natural obstacleswhich can support security or hinder sustainment ormovement operations. Planners in the rear echelonmust know the division's task organization andwhich units are located in the rear area.

Marine Division 4-19

Security • Coordinate mutual support from other bases orunits.

The Threat

A thorough understanding of the threat to the reararea is needed to ensure proactive security opera-tions. IPB for the rear area identifies the effects ofterrain and weather, enemy capabilities, and poten-tial enemy courses of action in the rear area. Thefollowing enemy capabilities are examined in detailbecause of their potential impact on rear areaoperations:

• Long-range fires.• Airborne and air assault forces.• Unconventional warfare.• NBC.• Command and control warfare.

Levels of Response

Security operations in the rear area are based oneconomy of force measures and are designed to pro-vide a graduated response to threat activity. Thereare three levels of response:

• Level I. Response to threats which logisticbase defense forces can defeat.

• Level II. Response to threats which are beyondthe capabilities of base defense forces butwhich rear area reaction forces can defeat.

• Level Ill. Response to threats which necessi-tate a command decision to commit tacticalcombat forces.

CSS Security

Every CSS unit is responsible for its own security.It must be capable of detecting and defending againstenemy forces. Units should employ both active andpassive measures to avoid detection. If detected, itmust be able to defeat or withstand the enemy untilassistance arrives. Units operating in the rear areamust —

• Prepare a defensive plan.• Rehearse the plan.• Organize a reaction force.• Recommend movement or repositioning of the

unit to enhance security.

to improve

Response forces normally consist of military policeunits weighted by fire support units. Fire supportmay consist of artillery or aviation. When MP unitsare committed to other priority missions or be un-available for commitment in sufficient strength forresponse force operations, other forces may beformed for the mission. Engineer or logistic units,elements of the division reserve, or combat unitstransiting the rear area may be designated the re-sponse force.

Response forces are only effective if they can reactswiftly. They must be familiar with the locationsand dispositions of bases in the threatened area.When threats materialize, the rear echelon conductsan assessment and, if appropriate, commits addi-tional response force assets. If the threat exceeds thecapability of response forces, a tactical combat force(TCF) may be committed. The response force main-tains contact with the enemy and provides spot re-ports to the rear echelon and TCF commander untilthe TCF arrives to engage the threat.

Tactical Combat Force. The primary mission of theTCF is to defeat those enemy forces in the divisionrear area that exceed the capabilities of responseforces. A TCF must be flexible, capable of eitherday or night operations, and have a mobility advan-tage over the enemy. The TCF is normally a task-organized combined arms force comprising groundor air maneuver units, fire support assets, and aheadquarters capable of planning and coordinatingcombat operations. Under the division commander'sguidance, the G-3 designates or dedicates one ormore forces as TCFs. A TCF may be designatedwith an on-order mission or task-organized under therear echelon. It should be organized under the rearechelon when the commander determines the threatto his rear area is sufficient to justify the employ-ment of combat forces of battalion size or larger.

• Coordinate reaction force operations.• Adjust the defense as required.• Constantly improve positions

survivability.

Response Forces

4-20

A designated TCF is not committed to rear area se-curity operations. It is normally given a 'be pre-pared" mission to respond to threats. Oncecommitted to rear operations, a designated TCF isunder the operational control of the rear echelon un-til the enemy is defeated. It can then be released toparent unit control.

FMFM 6-1

MEF Assistance, When a threat in the rear area ex-ceeds the division's capability to defeat it, the divi-sion must request assistance from the MEF. TheMEF may then provide additional ground forces (ina multidivision MEF), aviation assets, or coordinateforces from adjacent organizations. Normally, liai-son established by the division with adjacentdivisions (Marine, U.S. Army, or multinational) willenhance the employment of reaction forces fromother units in the division rear area.

Chapter 5

Defensive Operations

Defensive FLrnmentaIsThe division will rarely achieve a decision throughdefensive operations. However, the division com-mander may decide to assume the defense or beforced into the defense by enemy actions. Regard-less, the division defense must be viewed as a tem-porary condition during which the commandermaintains an offensive mindset. The commanderconducts a maneuver-oriented defense, executing of-fensive actions such as spoiling and counterattacks,while always searching for the opportunity to makethe transition to offensive operations.

Though the offensive is preferred, the division com-mander may decide to conduct a defense when thesituation and terrain are so favorable that they pro-vide an advantage. When terrain permits the am-bush of the enemy and does not permit sufficientmaneuver space for enemy counteraction, the de-fense may be established to permit the destruction ofthe enemy force through fires and rapid maneuver.When the enemy has established operational patternsthat can be exploited or when the situation is well-known to the commander, the defense may providean opportunity to reduce enemy capabilities that areessential to his success. When the enemy hasreached his culminating point, he can then be at-tacked by the reserve and the counterattack exploitedby uncommitted forces of the division.

Offensive action is key to successful defense. A de-fense that relies on positional or defending units issubject to the enemy's will. The division com-mander plans and conducts spoiling attacks, counter-attacks, and attacks against enemy vulnerabilitieswhenever and wherever the opportunity presents it-self. Reconnaissance units are positioned in depth toensure enemy vulnerabilities are discovered and thedivision commander exploits these vulnerabilities byfires or by maneuver of subordinate units. Not only

does offensive action confuse the enemy commanderand reduce enemy combat power, it also maintainsthe initiative and morale of subordinates.

Terrain must be exploited to advantage. The divi-sion takes advantage of terrain that maximizes effec-tive direct fires; emplacement, movement of, andobservation for indirect fire assets; cover and con-cealment; surprise; and maneuver. Though the en-emy chooses the time and location for his attack, thedivision commander can direct the energy of the at-tack into locations that permit effective counterac-tion. Natural obstacles such as rivers, cliffs, andbogs are exploited and reinforced with mines, wire,trenches, and other reinforcing obstacles that canal-ize and slow the enemy. These obstacles are dis-guised and covered by fire to enhance surprise andto maximize the enemy's exposure to effective fireswhile negotiating the obstacle. Obstacles that are notintegrated with the scheme of maneuver and plan ofsupporting fires will not contribute to the defenseplan. Terrain should be sought that possesses gooddefensive qualities, provides depth to the defense,and contains sufficient maneuver space for makingthe transition to the offense from dispersed locationswithout delay.

Organization of the DefenseThe defense is organized in depth into three areas —the security area, main battle area, and rear area.See figure 5-1.

Security AreaThe division's security area is the area forward ofthe forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and as-signed to the security forces. It is here that securityforces execute assigned tasks. The commander addsdepth to the defense by extending the security areaas far forward as is tactically feasible, to inflict thegreatest possible damage and disruption to the enemy

5-2 FMFM 6-1

SECURITY AREA

MAIN BATTLE AREA

I

1 I l l REARARU , -1

XXX XXX

NOTIONAL ORGANIZATION

/ SECURITY AREA / I

XXX

J XXX

TERRAIN AND THREAT ADJUSTED ORGANIZATION

Figure 5-1. Organization of the Defense.

attack by the time it reaches the main battle area. Normally, the commander extends the lateral boundaries of subordinate units forward of the FEBA, giving those units responsibility for the secu- rity area within sector to the forward extension of their boundaries.

Main Battle Area The main battle area is the area extending from the FEBA to the rear boundaries of the forward subordi- nate units, normally the regimental rear boundaries. The commander positions forces throughout the main battle area to destroy or contain enemy assaults. Re- serves are employed in the main battle area to reduce penetrations, regain terrain, or destroy enemy forces. The greater the depth of the main battle area, the greater the maneuver space for fightingthe main defensive battle afforded subordinate com- manders. It is in the main battle area that the deci- sive defensive battle is usually fought.

Rear Area The rear area is the area extending forward from the division's rear boundary to the rear boundary of the main battle area. This area is provided primarily for the performance of CSS functions. Rear operations include those functions of security and sustainrnent required to maintain continuity of operations by the force as a whole.

Division Task Organization The division commander organizes his force as fol- lows: security forces, main battle forces, and reserves.

Security Forces Security forces are employed forward of the main battle area to delay, disrupt, and provide early warn- ing of the enemy's advance and to deceive hi as to the true location of the main battle area. These

Marine Division 5-3

forces are assigned cover, guard, or screen mis- sions. Operations of the security forces must be an integral part of the overall defensive plan. Every unit assigned responsibility for a portion of the secu- rity area establishes a security force, under a single commander, forward of the FEBA. The mission as- signed those forces is based on the situation. At each higher level, available resources allow the secu- rity force to operate at a greater distance forward of the main battle area.

The division commander may provide the bulk of the MEF's covering force, which operates apart from the main force for the purpose of engaging, delay- ing, disrupting, and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the main force. The covering force ac- complishes this by conducting offensive and/or de- fensive operations. Covering forces must have the tactical mobility and operational flexibility to accom- plish its mission over large expanses of terrain. It may operate at extended distances and should be self-sufficient, when possible. When operating for longer durations, provisions for reconstitution must be developed to ensure continuity of operations. Covering forces have a high degree of reliance on aviation support and may have aviation assets at- tached when dictated by METT-T. The size of the covering force is METT-T dependent and its ground combat assets may include tanks, light-armored vehi- cles, AAVs with embarked infantry, artillery, engi- neers, and CSS assets. The covering force may be controlled by the division or the MEF, depending upon the situation.

The division may designate a guard force for pro- tection from enemy ground observation, direct fire, and surprise attack for a given period of time. A guard force allows the commander to extend the de- fense in time and space to prevent interruption of the organization of the main battle area. An organiza- tion with a guard mission fights to accomplish these tasks. Observation of the enemy and reporting of in- formation by the guard force is an inherent task of the guard force, but secondary to its primary func- tion of protection. A guard force is organized based on METT-T. The division commander determines the orientation of the guard force and the duration the guard must be provided. Normally, guard forces are oriented to the flanks for the minimum amount of time necessary to develop an integrated defense.

When the division commander determines the re- quirement for a guard force has expired, the guard force may receive a cover or screen mission with the requisite loss or gain of resources.

The division may establish a screening force to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and observe, identify, and report information. In most situations, the minimum security force organized by the divi- sion is a screening force. Normally, the screen force only fights in self-defense, but may be tasked to -

Repel enemy reconnaissance units as part of the GCE's counter-reconnaissance effort. Prevent enemy artillery from acquiring terrain that enables frontline units to be engaged. Provide early warning. Attack the enemy with supporting arms.

Security forces at all levels warn of the enemy ap- proach and, within capabilities, strip away enemy re- connaissance and security elements, deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main battle area and principal defensive positions, and disrupt, delay, and damage him as much as possible without becom- ing decisively engaged. Security forces destroy as much of the enemy as possible, within capabilities, without losing the freedom to maneuver.

At a predetermined location, control of the battle is transferred to security elements established by the next subordinate command. This location is known as a handover line. A handover line is a control fea- ture, preferably following easily defined terrain fea- tures, at which responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from one force to an- other. This transfer of control must be carefully co- ordinated. The security forces conduct a rearward passage of lines at designated passage points, and the senior command's security force withdraws in prepa- ration for its subsequent mission. The subordinate unit's security force supports the disengagement of the division's security force.

Security forces in one part of the security area do not withdraw automatically because adjacent forces have been forced rearward. Adjusting to the enemy advance and securing its flanks to avoid being cut off, security forces should continue their mission

5-4 FMFM 6-1

when possible. Retaining forward positions in partof the sector provides surveillance and control ofsupporting arms into the enemy's depth, allows thecommander to concentrate temporarily on a nar-rower front in the main battle area, and provides ac-cess to the enemy's flank for a counterattack.

All units of the division provide local security. Thedepth of local security is dictated by terrain, commu-nications, target acquisition capabilities, and the en-emy threat. All units employ passive securitymeasures to reduce exposure to the enemy, to in-clude observation, electronic exposure, and fires.Communications procedures, camouflage, movementcontrol, and other individual continuing actions arestrictly enforced.

Active security measures are employed by the divi-sion and coordinated at all levels. Active securitymeasures include combat patrolling, use of sensorsand target acquisition radars, surveillance, and em-ployment of false visual and electronic signatures.In addition, skills of certain units within the divisionenhance the security posture of the organization.For example, engineers contribute to survivability,mobility, and countermobility, all of which contrib-ute to security.

Mair 3atte ForcMain battle forces engage the enemy in decisivecombat to slow, stop, canalize, disorganize, and de-feat his attack. Main battle forces occupy defensivepositions within the main battle area. Positions areoriented on the most likely and most dangerous ave-nues of approach into the sector. The most danger-ous approach is normally assigned the initial maineffort. The commander can strengthen his defense atthis point by narrowing the sector of, and providingthe priority of support to, the unit astride it.

ReservesThe reserve is a part of the force, held under controlof the commander as a maneuver force to influencethe action. Missions assigned to the reserve nor-mally consist of counterattack, reinforcement of themain effort, protection of flanks, and supportingcommitted units by fire. Movement of reserves mustbe planned carefully due to vulnerability to indirectfires and air attack while moving. Until employed,

reserves normally occupy covered assembly areas inthe rear area, protected from eneity fires. Selectedroutes should provide cover and concealment whilerear area security and counter-reconnaissance opera-tions decrease the probability of enemy stay-behindor special forces observing rererve locations. Effec-tive command and control warfare can degrade theenemy's ability to attack the reserve.

The weaker the defender and the less that is knownof the enemy or his intention, the more important isthe defender's reserve and the greater the proportionof combat power that must be held in reserve. Thedivision commander withholds his reserve for deci-sive action and refuses to dissipate it on local emer-gencies. Once a reserve has been committed, a newreserve must be created or obtained. The reserveprovides the defender flexibility and balance to strikequickly with concentrated combat power on groundof the defender's choosing.

The tactical mobility of mechanized and helicopter-borne forces make them well suited for use as the re-serve. As the reserve, mechanized forces are bestemployed offensively. In suitable terrain, a helicop-terborne reserve can react quickly to reinforce mainbattle area positions or block penetrations. How-ever, helicopterborne forces often lack the shock ef-fect desired for counterattacks.

Timing is critical to the employment of the reserve.As the area of probable employment of the reservebecomes apparent, the commander moves his reserveto have it more readily available for action. Thecommander's intent must clearly state the circum-stances calling for the commitment of the reserve.When he commits his reserve, the commander mustmake his decision promptly and with an accurate un-derstanding of movement and deployment times.Committed too soon or too late, the reserve may nothave a decisive effect.

To conserve forces, the division commander maychoose to use security forces as part or all of his re-serve after completion of their security mission.However, the commander must weigh the decision todo this against the possibility that the security forcemay suffer a loss of combat power that may reduceits capability to accomplish its subsequent mission asthe reserve.

Marine Division 5-5

Forms of ManeuverThere are two forms of defensive maneuver — de-

fend and retrograde. Most schemes of maneuver de-veloped by the division commander will incorporatea combination of these two forms. For example, thedivision commander may task a foot-mobile infantryregiment to defend in restrictive terrain and a mecha-nized infantry regiment to delay (a type of retrogradeoperation) to force the enemy into that terrain, estab-lishing conditions suitable for counterattack by thetank battalion and his remaining regiment. The for-m(s) of defensive maneuver adopted by the divisioncommander is based on the MEF commanders in-tent and METT-T.

The form of maneuver selected takes advantage ofenemy vulnerabilities and division strengths. Unitswithin the division are more suited than others forspecific defensive tasks. For example, the light ar-mored reconnaissance battalion is structured to pro-vide mobility over extended ranges and may be mostappropriately used in a reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, or security operation. The tank bat-talion's firepower and mobility is best employed of-fensively, as part of the reserve or counterattackforce. Mechanized infantry provides both the abilityto strike offensively or quickly establish positionaldefenses at critical points after discovery of the en-emy main effort. Foot-mobile infantry regimentsmay provide the positional component of the divisiondefense or, when combined with adequate assaultsupport, provide a portion of the reserve that can berapidly employed at a critical location on thebattlefield.

DefendWhen a unit defends, it does so around a series oftactical localities, the retention of which ensures theintegrity of the defense. Main battle forces occupydefensive positions where they can best defeat theenemy. Considerations include good observationand fields of fire, cover, concealment, and the op-portunity for surprise and deception. Whenever pos-sible, positions are located in depth and should bemutually supporting. Defending units utilize defen-sive sectors, battle positions, blocking positions, andstrongpoints.

Sector

The division commander may assign a defensive sec-tor to a subordinate unit that defends. Assignmentof a defensive sector provides the subordinate com-mander maximum latitude to accomplish defensivetasks. The subordinate commander may, in turn, as-sign his subordinate commanders sectors, battle posi-tions, or strongpoints from which to defend; orassign retrograde missions to subordinates within thesector. The subordinate commander's sector willnormally contain his security area, main battle area,and rear area; subordinate sectors or positions; firesupport units; and reconnaissance units. Sectorsshould be large enough for the subordinate com-mander to fight his own defensive battle, yet notlarger than he can influence. Assigning a subordi-nate too large a sector will create gaps that must becovered by other division assets or the assumption ofrisk in those areas. Likewise, the division com-mander should not assign a subordinate a sector thatcontains more likely enemy avenues of approachthan he has the capability to protect. When the divi-sion is operating in an area that presents the enemynumerous avenues of approach, the division com-mander should consider the use of a mobile-typedefense.

Battle Position

A battle position is a designated location from whicha subordinate unit will conduct its principal defensivebattle. The division commander may assign a subor-dinate a battle position when a specific area must beprotected or retained. Battle positions restrict subor-dinate commanders; however, it is usually desirableto task a subordinate to occupy, prepare, or recon-noiter one or more battle positions within an as-signed sector. A. subordinate unit tasked to occupy abattle position within an assigned sector is permittedadditional latitude, though not as much as when as-signed a sector without additional constraints. Battlepositions are continuously improved for all-arounddefense and may or may not be manned for extendedperiods of time. Battle positions provide an abilityto mass fires, maintain mutual support within the po-sition, and enhance making the transition to the of-fense by the concentration of subordinate units.

5-6 FMFM 6-1

The division commander assigns battle positionswhen a particular avenue of approach or key terrainwarrants the inherent restrictions of a battle position,e.g., reduced maneuver space, presentation of arelatively dense target to the enemy, a requirementfor detailed coordination of disengagement criteria,displacement, and with adjacent units.

Blocking Position

A blocking position is similar to a battle position anddesigned to deny the enemy access to a specific areaor along an avenue of approach. Blocking positionsare normally designed to impede the enemy once hehas entered an engagement area to permit his de-struction by fires; or to anchor the defense to permita maneuver component to strike the enemy on aflank or to the rear. Blocking positions are also usedduring retrogrades to slow the enemy or to deceivehim as to the location of main battle area forces ofthe division. Units assigned blocking positions arenormally supporting efforts that block ancillary en-emy forces from interfering with the division maineffort or counterattack forces during the main battlearea battle.

StrongpointA strongpoint is a strongly fortified defensive posi-tion designed to successfully defeat enemy armorand mechanized attacks. A strongpoint is located ona terrain feature that is critical to the overall defenseand is intended to be occupied for an extended pe-riod of time. A strongpoint normally is occupied bya company or larger organized for all-around de-fense. A unit or organization holding a strongpointmay be cut off and lose its freedom of maneuver,thus requiring its own combat service support. Astrongpoint is established only after the commanderdetermines that a position must be retained at allcosts.

RetrogradeA retrograde operation is a movement to the rear oraway from the enemy. A retrograde may be aplanned movement or one forced by enemy action.Retrogrades may be classified as delay, withdrawal,or retirement. The division or its subordinate unitsmay conduct retrograde operations to —

• Preserve combat power by gaining time.• Avoid combat under unfavorable conditions.• Reposition forces to eliminate exposed flanks or

shorten lines of communications.• Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.• Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and damage the

enemy.

Delay

A delay is an operation in which a force under pres-sure trades space for time by slowing down the en-emy's momentum and inflicting maximum damageon the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.The division commander must specify the amount oftime to be gained by the delaying force to success-fully accomplish the mission. Time may be ex-pressed in hours or in events to be accomplished bythe main battle area forces.

Delays may be used appropriately in the securityarea, main battle area, or rear area. The divisioncommander will task-organize delay forces to ensurethey have the requisite mobility and firepower to ac-complish the mission. The typical delay force willinclude mechanized or motorized infantry, LARunits, tanks, artillery, and engineers. The delayforce may also have the preponderance of assaultsupport and CAS during the delay to ensure that theydo not become decisively engaged. The divisioncommander must also preposition combat servicesupport and make provisions for mobile CSSDs tosupport the delay force. Sufficient depth of area isrequired for a delay. Delays are conducted —

• When the division's strength is insufficient todefend or attack.

• To reduce the enemy's offensive capability byinflicting casualties.

• To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.• To determine the strength and location of the

enemy's main effort.• When the enemy intent is not clear and the

commander desires intelligence.• To protect and provide early warning for the

main battle area forces.• To allow time to reestablish the defense.

Marine Division 5.7

Fundamentals of the Delay

A delay differs from the defense in that decisive en-gagement is to be avoided. Special consideration isgiven to the following fundamentals:

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution.A delaying action is normally characterized by op-erations on a wide front with the majority of delay-ing forces forward and minimum forces in reserve.This results in a series of independent actions acrossthe sector in which each commander must havedom of action while engaging the enemy.

Maximum Use of Terrain and Obstacles. Obstaclesare emplaced and natural obstacles are enhanced tocanalize and delay the enemy. Blocking positionsmay be located on terrain commanding avenues ofapproach that provide long-range fields of fire andfacilitate disengagement. Engineers within the delayforce provide mobility support, countermobility sup-port, and limited survivability support to the delayforce. In particular, the engineers within the delayforce may be required to supervise the breaching andclosing of minefields, the construction of obstacles tothe flanks, and demolition of key bridges or otherstructures critical to enemy maneuver. Desirablecharacteristics of delaying positions are —

• Natural obstacles on the front and flanks.• Long-range observation and fields of fire.• Cover and concealment for forces on the delay-

ing position.• Covered and concealed routes of withdrawal.• Sufficient distance between successive positions

to require the enemy to reorganize before at-tacking the next position.

Maximum Use of Fires. Long-range fires arebrought to bear against the enemy to destroy high-payoff targets and force the enemy to deploy. Thesefires must be thoroughly pknned and coordinated bythe division and the MEF to ensure unity of effortand proper utilization of all available Marine andjoint fire support means. Reconnaissance units ofthe division must be echeloned in depth to permit theaccurate application of fires to destroy high-payofftargets and facilitate disengagement of delay forces.

Force the Enemy to Deploy and Maneuver. Delayforces must be strong enough to force the enemy todeploy prematurely, thus slowing his advance.Strong delay forces can also disguise the location ofthe main battle area, disguise the division's main ef-fort, and help identify the enemy's main effort.

Maintain Contact. Maintaining contact with the en-emy prevents him from bypassing delaying forces;advancing unimpeded by forcing him to maintain hiscombat formations; slows his mobility by forcinghim off high speed avenues of approach; and pro-vides continuous information to the division com-mander.

Avoid Decisive Engagement. Units decisively en-gaged lose their freedom of maneuver and must fightthe engagement to a decision. Consequently, theylose the ability to continue to accomplish the as-signed delay mission.

Minimum Logistics. Logistic planning must providefor early movement to the rear of all logistics instal-lations and material not required to support the de-laying operation. Plans must be made for the de-struction of material which cannot be evacuated.Supplies required to support the delay are stockpiledat selected locations along planned routes.

Deceive the Enemy. Deception measures are em-ployed to deceive the enemy as to the strength anddisposition of forces remaining in contact, the timeof withdrawal, and the locations of new positions.Security is obtained through both active and passivesecurity measures to include —

• Employment of counter-reconnaissance forcesto deny the enemy knowledge of the scheme ofmaneuver as long as possible.

• Employment of helicopterborne forces to en-hance flank security and to patrol unoccupiedterrain between delaying forces.

• Conduct of attacks to facilitate disengagementand deceive the enemy as to friendly intentions.

• Movement during periods of reduced visibilityor under cover of smoke to deceive the enemyand reduce the effectiveness of enemy targetacquisition means.

Techniques for Delaying

Units conducting a delay can delay from successiveor alternate positions, or a combination of the two.The method adopted depends largely on the width ofthe assigned sector and the forces available.

Delay From Successive Positions. This is a tech-nique for delay in which all delaying units are posi-tioned forward in a single echelon. See figure 5-2.Units delay continuously on and between battle posi-tions throughout their sectors, fighting rearwardfrom one position to the next, holding each positionfor a specified period of time or as long as possible.When initial delay positions are occupied prior to theestablishment of contact with the advancing enemy, adivision covering •force or security elements fromcommitted units are sent forward to establish contactand to delay the enemy advance toward the initialposition.

Delay From Alternate Positions. This is a techniqueof delay in which a unit delays in sector with subor-dinate units deployed in depth. See figure 5-3. As

FMFM 6-1

the forward unit delays, another subordinate unitoccupies the next position in depth and prepares toassume the fight. The forward unit disengages andpasses through the next rearward position and pre-pares for subsequent delay at the third position indepth after handing over the battle to the secondunit. This technique may be used when the sector isnarrow enough to permit the deployment of the de-laying force in depth. Delay from alternate positionshas the advantage of providing more time for the im-provernent of delaying positions and the maintenanceof material. This technique has a disadvantage inthat it may create a lucrative target during frequentpassages of lines.

Withdrawal

A withdrawal is a planned operation in which a forcein contact disengages from an enemy force. The di-vision commander's intention in a withdrawal is toput distance between his force and the enemy asquickly as possible and unnoticed. A withdrawalmay be undertaken —

INITIALDELAY

POSITION

SECONDDELAY

POSITION

Units of the delayforce disengage andmove to organize thenext position.

Elements remainingfight to rear whilemaintaining contact.

Units rejoin parentunit at next delay.

Figure 5-2. Delay from Successive Positions.

5-8

Marine Division 5-9

INITIALDELAY

POSITION

SECONDDELAY

POSITION

THIRDDELAY

POSITION

Units organize initialand 2d delay positions.

Units from initialposition delay backto 3d delay position.

Units at 2d delayposition assumecontrol. 3d delayposition is occupied.

• If the objective of the operation cannot beachieved and the force is in danger of beingdestroyed.

a To avoid battle under unfavorable conditions.• To draw the enemy into an engagement area.• To allow for the use of the force or parts of it

elsewhere.

There are two types of withdrawal — a withdrawalunder pressure and a withdrawal not under pressure.Withdrawals not under pressure provide freedom ofaction since the division commander selects the timeof withdrawal. They facilitate deception and reducethe effectiveness of observed enemy fires since thecommander can take advantage of darkness or otherconditions of reduced visibility. A withdrawal underpressure envisions fighting to the rear. When sur-prise is lost, a withdrawal not under pressure is exe-cuted similar to a withdrawal under pressure. A

prudent commander always attempts to conduct awithdrawal not under pressure, but plans to executethe withdrawal under pressure.

Withdrawal Under Enemy Pressure. The successfulconduct of a withdrawal under enemy pressure de-pends on local air superiority, speed, decentralizedexecution, and effective employment of securityforces. Subordinate units use delaying tactics to fighttheir way to the rear.

The division normally employs a task-organized cov-ering force consisting of infantry, LAR, artillery,tank, engineers, and other combat support and com-bat service support units. The covering force ac-complishes its mission from prescribed areas forwardof the new security area. In addition to covering thewithdrawal of the main battle area forces, the cover-ing force assists the main battle area forces to breakcontact and to delay.

The least engaged units of the main battle area with-draw first. The more heavily engaged units with-draw under cover of the division covering force andthe massed fires of available fire support means.Smoke can be used to screen movement and to re-duce enemy observation and accuracy of enemy fire.

Figure 5-3. Delay From Alternate Positions.

5-10 FMFM 6-1

Movement is expedited. Normally, assembly areasare not used. The division's movement and opera-tions are similar to those of a delay on alternate posi-tions. The use of alternate covering positions by thecovering force and the disengaged main battle areaunits continues until the entire division breaks con-tact with the enemy or reaches the planned delayingpositions.

Withdrawal Not Under Enemy Pressure. The divi-sion normally specifies the time of withdrawal. Togain the utmost advantage from secrecy and decep-tion, the division commander takes maximum use ofconditions of limited visibility. The withdrawalshould commence as soon as enemy observation isreduced to the point where the enemy cannot effec-tively deliver observed fires.

The division commander controls the movement ofsubordinate units to successive delaying positions bydesignating times and specific routes of withdrawal,including alternate routes, designating priority ofmovement, and enforcing traffic control measures.Maneuver units in contact with the enemy designatedetachments left in contact to protect the initialmovement of the main body to the rear and to simu-late normal activity. These forces may be providedadditional transportation capabilities.

The withdrawing force moves to the rear in sequenceby dispatching units to reconnoiter and prepare thenext position, displacing CSS units followed by artil-lery not essential to the support of detachments leftin contact, and then by relocating the division cover-ing force. Once completed, the main body moves,and finally, the detachments left in contact and theirdirect support artillery are withdrawn.

Units in the main battle area execute the withdrawalon a broad front. Units move directly to the rearand proceed to designated locations. To further thereorganization and assembly of units, the division ormajor subordinate units may designate assembly ar-eas for subordinate units. Such areas are widely dis-persed and are occupied for minimum periods.When all elements of the division, except the detach-ments left in contact, have disengaged from theenemy and formed for movement, the withdrawal is

considered completed. Further movement to therear or away from the enemy is classified as aretirement.

The detachments left in contact have a limited capa-bility for resistance and must depend on deceptionand long-range fires to accomplish their mission.The division coordinates their employment; how-ever, infantry regiments specify their times of with-drawal in consonance with the actions of adjacentunits.

Retirement

A retirement is an operation in which a force out ofcontact moves away from the enemy. A retiring unitnormally is protected by another unit between it andthe enemy. However, the retiring unit must estab-lish security. Often a retirement immediately fol-lows a withdrawal. Depending on the number ofroutes available, the division may retire in one orseveral columns. Each column is organized with amain body, an advance guard, flank guards, and rearguard. The advance and flank guards should bemade sufficiently mobile to permit accomplishmentof their mission without delaying the main body.The rear guard conducts the delaying actions re-quired to prevent enemy interference with the mainbody.

Supplies and equipment are displaced prior to themovement of combat units. Necessary dumps ofsupplies are established along the retirement routes.CSS units may move prior to or with the main body.While not in contact with the enemy, deployed unitsassemble, march formations are organized, and rear-ward movement initiated. While in contact, unitsnot required to support the withdrawal from actionassemble, organize march formations, and com-mence the rearward movement.

Deep OperationsDeep operations are conducted in support of the de-fense to identify and attrit the enemy's main effort,degrade his attempts to mass his forces and concen-trate his effort, interrupt his momentum, disrupthis command and control, and neutralize his support-ing arms. Deep operations in the defense mayinclude —

Marine Division 5-11

• Deep reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition.

• Deep interdiction through deep fires, deep ma-neuver, and deep air support.

• Command and control warfare.• Offensive antiair warfare.

Although deep operations are primarily the responsi-bility of the MEF CE, the division plays a significantrole in recommending surveillance and targeting pri-orities. The division must also be prepared to pro-vide resources to execute deep operations and maybe tasked to control certain deep operations. The di-visions long-range fires, highly mobile maneuverforces, and reconnaissance assets are division re-sources that may be employed to extend the defensein time and space thus optimizing the employment ofMEF and division combat power in the main battlearea.

Close OperationsThe defense strives to achieve conditions to gain andmaintain the initiative for decisive action. The divi-sion commander accomplishes this through the as-signment of subordinate missions that provide thedivision protection and facilitate offensive actiononce the enemy has reached his culminating point, orhas exposed a critical vulnerability during the courseof the battle. The division defense contains Iwoprincipal components — positional, or static compo-nents, and mobile, or maneuver components. Thesepositional and maneuver forces execute an integratedscheme of maneuver and fire support plan. Thepositional elements provide stability and pivot pointsfrom which the mobile elements of the defense canstrike enemy vulnerabilities created by his attacksagainst or maneuver around the positional elements.Positional elements defend to accomplish assignedtasks from designated sectors, battle positions, andstrongpoints. Mobile elements conduct retrogradesor offensive operations against the enemy, such asdelays, counterattacks, or spoiling attacks, to ac-complish assigned tasks.

Similarly, there are two types of defenses — mobileand position. However, each type incorporates posi-tional elements and maneuver elements into theirschemes of maneuver. In this respect, neither ispurely mobile or static. However, they do conveythe division commander's visualization of the

defensive battle. At the division level, the mobiledefense is normally the preferred type of defense asit is more likely to create opportunities for decisivemaneuver or resumption of the offense. Position de-fenses are normally used when the division lacks therequisite mobility to strike offensively from dis-persed locations or key terrain retention is critical tothe overall operation, such as in the initial stages ofintroducing heavy follow-on forces into a lodgmentor undeveloped theater of war.

Mobile DefenseThe mobile defense orients on the destruction of theenemy through offensive action. See figure 5-4.The bulk of the force is held as a mobile counterat-tack force with strict economy applied to dedicatedpositional supporting efforts designed to canalize,delay, and disrupt the attack. The mobile defenserequires the capability to mass overwhelming firesand to provide adequate maneuver space in depth.This allows the commander to take advantage of vul-nerabilities created in the enemy's effort to defeat thepositional elements of the defense.

Command and control warfare and the division com-mander's interpretation of the enemy's operationalintent are used to focus him on a noncritical objec-tive and then counterattack him from an unexpecteddirection. It requires effective counter-reconnais-sance coupled with recognition of enemy C2 nodes,sustainment elements, and fire support units. Thecombination of assets and information allows the di-vision commander to blind the enemy, then strikethroughout the depth of the enemy force at the deci-sive moment.

To succeed, the mobile element of the defense musthave mobility greater than that of the enemy. Ter-rain is traded in order to extend the enemy and ex-pose his flanks and allow the defender to maximizethe benefit of the terrain for purposes of counterat-tack. In order to draw the enemy into an engage-ment area, a mobile defense requires depth.

Position DefenseThe position defense is conducted to deny the enemyaccess to critical terrain for a specified period oftime. See figure 5-5. The bulk of the defendingforce is deployed in a combination of static defense

5-12 FMFM6-1

Figure 5-4. Mobile Defense.

and small, mobile reserves. Mutual support and po-sitions in depth force the enemy to expose his forcein the attack of each position. Principal reliance isplaced on the ability of the forces to maintain theirpositions and to control unoccupied terrain by fire.The reserve is used to blunt and contain penetra-tions, to reinforce the main effort, and counterattackto destroy enemy forces.

The position defense is seldom capable of achievingthe outright destruction of the attacking force due toits limited mobility. The attacker may disengagewhen dealt a tactical set-back or take advantage ofother opportunities to maintain the initiative. Thus,the position defense relies on other simultaneous or

subsequent operations by adjacent or reinforcingforces to achieve decisive results. The following cir-cumstances may require or favor the conduct of aposition defense:

• Specific terrain is so militarily orcritical it must be defended.

• Defender possesses less mobilityenemy.

• Maneuver space is limited.• Terrain restricts the movement of the defender.• Terrain permits surprise fires to be massed on

the bulk of the enemy force.• Terrain does not permit the attacker mutual

support.

politically

than the

Marine Division 5-13

Commanders may conduct position and mobile de-lenses simultaneously to take advantage of thestrengths of subordinate organizations. Units withsignificant mobility may be designated part of the re-serve or tasked to conduct mobile-type defenses,given the situation and terrain within their assignedsector. Other units without a mobility advantageover the enemy force may be assigned a position de-fense mission. Irrespective of the type of defenseemployed, the defender must conduct a decisivecounterattack or resume the offensive once the en-emy is defeated or reaches his culminating point.Without a compelling reason to defend, the defenderattacks.

Rear OperationsAs in offensive operations, rear operations providesustainment to the deep and close operations. Rear

operations in the defense include sustainment, terrainmanagement, movement control, and security. Reararea forces conduct these functions during defenseoperations similar to that during offensive opera-tions. However, the characteristics of the defenserequire each function to be carefully assessed to en-sure continuity of support. For example, sustain-ment in the offense is normally characterized bypush-logistics provided by mobile CSSDs. In a mo-bile defense, sustainment may include a combinationof push-logistics, such as that required to support se-curity forces and counterattack forces, and stock-piled supplies to support delaying and defendingunits.

The success of the division defense may depend onits success in conducting rear operations. Enemyoperations in the division rear, ranging in size from

Figure 5-5. Position Defense.

xxx

5-14 FMFM 6-1

individual saboteurs and terrorists to enemy specialoperations, airborne, or infiltrated infantry units,will target key division units, facilities, and capabili-ties. Division defensive planning must address theearly detection and immediate destruction or contain-ment of enemy forces attempting to operate in the di-vision rear area. Additional emphasis on rearoperations may be required based on the type of de-fense and form of maneuver selected. The degree ofrisk accepted during a mobile defense includes an in-creased threat to supporting rear area forces as gapsnormally exist in division maneuver unit disposi-tions. Likewise, a defense that can be characterizedas positional in nature will normally provide an in-creased amount of security for rear area units duringinitial stages of the defensive battle. As the battleprogresses, rear area units must maintain situationalawareness as enemy forces that successfully pene-trate frontline units can be expected to seek CSSunits for destruction.

Defensive PreparationThe division comnander initiates defensive prepara-tions any time the division is not in the offense. Thisis usually concurrent with offensive planning for an-ticipated future operations. Preparations for the de-fense include reconnaissance and development ofassembly areas, tentative positions, and counterat-tack routes and objectives; establishment of securityand priorities of work; rehearsals; determination ofthe engineer effort and barrier planning; and devel-opment of fire plans. The division commander mustvisualize the defensive battle and how these activitiescontribute to the accomplishment of the mission.The extent of the division's defensive preparationsare based on the amount of time available. In thisrespect, a defense is considered either hasty or delib-erate. In either case, a defense is constantly evalu-ated and improved.

Deliberate DefenseA deliberate defense is a defense normally organizedwhen out of contact with the enemy or when contactwith the enemy is not imminent and time for organi-zation is available, A deliberate defense normallyincludes fortifications, strongpoints, extensive use of

obstacles, and fully integrated fires. The com-mander normally is free to make a detailed recon-naissance of his sector, select the terrain on which todefend, and decide the best tactical deployment offorces.

Hasty DefenseA hasty defense is a defense normally organizedwhile in contact with the enemy or when contact isimminent and time available for organization is lim-ited. Reconnaissance of the sector must be curtailedand the defense assumed directly from the currentpositions of units. Depending on the situation, itmay be necessary for a commander to initiate a hastyattack to seize terrain suitable to his defense. Or,the commander may employ a security force to delaythe enemy while deploying the bulk of his force tomore suitable defensive terrain. A hasty defense isimproved continuously as the situation permits andmay eventually become a deliberate defense.

Defensive PlanningPlanning for the defense begins when the divisioncommander receives a mission or warning order todefend or anticipates a need to do so. To facilitatepreparations, concurrent planning at all levels ofcommand is essential. The defensive plan should ac-centuate the natural strengths of the terrain and thatof the division.

The division commander develops a flexible defen-sive plan that can deal with a number of enemycourses of action. Branches are developed to takeadvantage of opportunities and offensive sequels areplanned for transition to the offense. In particular,counterattack plans must be well developed and re-hearsed to ensure counterattack forces are committedat the most decisive time and place; to ensure thecounterattack force's maneuver is unimpeded; and toensure as much support as possible is available fromdefending units to the counterattack force.

IntentThe division commander's intent will guide the sub-ordinate organizations' defensive effort. It reflectsthe MEF commander's intent and depicts the divi-sion's role in the MEF battle. At a minimum, thedivision commander must consider the —

Marine Division 5-15

• Enemy and environment as described by hisIPB.

• Combat power of each subordinate unit.• Impact of deep, close, and rear operations of

the MEF.• Use and availability of fires, obstacles, C2W as-

sets, and aviation.• Logistic supportability of each defensive course

of action.• Training, morale, and experience of subordi-

nates.

Command and ControlThe division commander, with key staff, normallyfights the defensive battle from the tactical echelon.It allows him to remain near the major actions orcritical events. The main echelon is located as farrearward as possible and still maintain contact withsubordinate units and the tactical echelon. It focuseson monitoring progress of the battle, forwarding in-formation and support requests, and coordinatingsupporting units. The rear echelon anticipates futuresupport requirements; it coordinates with the FSSGand mobile CSSD commanders to ensure continuouslogistic support to enable friendly units to regain theoffensive. It also focuses on continuity of supportfor current operations and control of mobile CSSDsmoving forward from the rear area. The rear eche-lon must monitor the battle and be prepared to im-mediately assume the role of the main echelon.

IntelligenceIn defensive operations, the focus of the intelligenceeffort is on identification of the enemy's probablecourses of action and the development of a collectionplan to detect the approach of enemy units as far for-ward of the defensive area as possible. The divisioncommander requires specific intelligence about —

• Avenues of approach and mobility corridorsinto the defensive area.

• Location of potential assembly areas and firingpositions for supporting arms.

• Size, composition, organization, rate of move-ment, and tactics of enemy first and secondechelon forces.

• Locations of enemy reserves, fire support, andCSS elements supporting the main effort.

• Enemy C2 systems.• Enemy intelligence capabilities, with emphasis

on his reconnaissance capabilities.

The G-2 develops a thorough intelligence collectionplan focused on providing early warning of themovement of enemy forces toward the division's de-fensive area. He uses the results of his IPB processto focus the collection effort on the most likely en-emy courses of action, but allocates some collectionresources against all possible enemy actions to guardagainst surprise and the enemy's use of deception.The collection plan is integrated with activities of thesecurity forces and the fire support plan in order toengage the enemy as far forward as possible. Whilethe division's organic reconnaissance assets willcarry Out most of the collection tasks, the G-2 coor-dinates his efforts with those of the MEF, drawingon force assets, in particular unmanned aerial vehicle(UAVs) and electronic warfare units, to provide cov-erage deep into the area of interest.

In a separate but related effort, the G-2 coordinateswith the G-3 to develop detailed force protectionmeasures with particular emphasis on the preparationof a counter-reconnaissance plan. The early detec-tion and identification of enemy reconnaissance ef-forts is critical to prevent the enemy from seeing andreporting the strength, composition, and location ofthe division's defensive positions.

ManeuverThe scheme of maneuver for the defense includes —

• Initial positions to be occupied, prepared, andreconnoitered, withdrawal routes, and passagepoints for the security force per METT-T.

• Primary, alternate, and supplementary positionsfor main battle area forces.

• Counterattack plans.• Contingency plans to block penetrations or re-

inforce threatened areas.• Dummy positions designed to deceive the

enemy.• Planned retrogrades to draw the enemy into en-

gagement areas.• Obstacles and barriers integrated with the

scheme of maneuver and fire support plan.• Counter-reconnaissance and other force protec-

tion measures.

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Fire SupportThe division commander weights the main effort byestablishing priorities of fires. Close fires, deepfires, and counterfires are coordinated with maneu-ver forces to disrupt and weaken the enemy's offen-sive action and to provide windows of opportunityfor friendly offensive action. The FSC uses the IPBprocess, full integration of intelligence gathering re-sources, and the target value analysis process to fo-cus fire support on the HPTs vital to the enemy'ssuccess.

The fire support plan must support the scheme ofmaneuver. It is normally designed to place the en-emy under increasing volumes of fire as he ap-proaches a defensive position. Long-range fires aredelivered by aircraft, artillery, and rockets. Firesare planned along expected enemy routes, in engage-ment areas, integrated with obstacles and barriers,and within the defensive positions. The degree ofcompleteness and centralization of defensive fireplanning depends on the time available to prepare forthe defense. Ordinarily, defensive fire support plansare based on terrain, friendly positions, and barriersrather than on known or suspected enemy disposi-tions. Indirect and aviation fires are closely inte-grated with infantry, tank, and antitank direct-fireweapons.

Control of fire support assets is centralized for de-fensive operations. Artillery and rnortar.s pre-position ammunition and survey firing positions inadvance. The FSC focuses his planning effort on thefollowing tasks:

• Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohe-sion of his attack and reduce his intelligencegathering capability. As the enemy enters thesecurity area and main battle area, fire supportcontinues to reduce the enemy's intelligencegathering effort and ability to mass combatpower.

• Supporting rear operations.• Providing deep fires to delay and disrupt

follow-on echelons.• Screening friendly movements.

• Providing counterfire to permit friendly maneu-ver and limit the enemy's ability to shift ormass his own fires.

• Integrating fires with the barrier plan and sub-ordinate unit's countermobility effort.

The defender engages the enemy with long-rangefires as early as possible unless fires are withheld toprevent the loss of surprise. Commanders makemaximum use of fire support to destroy and disruptenemy formations as they approach the main battlearea. As the enemy closes, he is subjected to anever-increasing volume of fires from the main battlearea forces and all supporting arms. Obstacles andbarriers are located to delay or canalize the enemyand are covered by fire to destroy him while he ishalted and concentrated on the process of breaching.Main battle forces maintain an offensive spiritthroughout the battle, executing local counterattacksby fire and maneuver whenever there is a probabilityof success.

Air DefenseAir defense priorities within the division will nor-mally shift successively from the division coveringforce or other forward security forces, to the divi-sion fire support elements, combat service support,and C2 facilities.

Mobility/Countermobility/SurvivabilityThe priority of engineer effort in the security area isnormally given to mobility of the passing units of thecovering force, then to countermobility to delay theadvance of the enemy. Priority for support in themain battle area is determined by the division com-mander based on METT-T. Countermobility andsurvivability requirements must be thoroughly exam-ined as they normally compete for the same limitedresources. Obstacles are emplaced in depth to sup-port the scheme of maneuver and are integrated intothe fire support plan to maximize the effects of fires.Counterattack plans may require a mobility effort toimprove routes and mobility corridors. Priority ofengineer support in the rear area is given to mobil-ity, then survivability for command and control, thereserve, and CSS assets.

Marine Division 5-17

Combat Service Support can be established and operations planned to ensure

Logistic support to the division must be coordinated, the supportability of the defense. CSS plans must be

The G-4 and FSSG commander must understand the flexible enough to support opportunities for maneu-

division commanders intent 50 that CSS priorities ver units to transition to the offense and other futureoperations.

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Chapter 6

Other Tactical Operations

OverviewThis chapter describes operations which are rou-tinely conducted by the division. These tactical op-erations are relief in place, passage of lines, linkupoperations, breakout from encirclement, infiltration,helicopterborne operations, river crossings, mecha-nized operations, and military operations on urban-ized terrain (MOUT). The division may conduct anyor all of these operations during the offense or thedefense to ensure mission accomplishment.

Relief in PlaceA relief in place is a combat operation in which oneunit replaces all or part of another unit in a combatarea. The relief in place is conducted when the out-going unit is on the defense. The incoming unit mayhave the mission of continuing the defense or prepar-ing for a subsequent attack. The division may be di-rected to conduct a relief in place during the courseof a joint, multinational, or MEF operation. Se-crecy and speed characterize this operation. Cen-tralized planning by the division staff anddecentralized execution by major subordinate com-mands are the key to its success. A relief in placemay be conducted to serve one or more of the fo]-lowing purposes:

• To relieve a depleted unit in contact.• To relieve units stressed by prolonged opera-

tions in adverse conditions.• To rest a unit after extended periods in a con-

taminated area.• To decontaminate a unit or avoid excess

radiation.

The higher headquarters directs when and where toconduct the relief and establishes appropriate controlmeasures. The order for the relief in place mustspecify, as a minimum, the time for commencingand completing the relief and the priorities using the

routes involved. The higher headquarters shouldnormally direct the relief to be carried out during re-duced visibility. The division may be required toconduct a relief in place under enemy pressure orwithout enemy pressure. A relief in place conductedwithout enemy pressure normally entails a one-for-one transfer of like units and equipment from occu-pied positions.

Relief in Place PlanningDuring a relief in place, the sequence of relief isexecuted by stages — rear to front or front to rear.See figure 6-1. This procedure establishes thestrongest defense. In determining the sequence ofrelief, both commanders should consider thefollowing:

• Subsequent mission of the division that is con-ducting the relief.

• Strength and combat efficiency of the unit pres-ently in the main battle area.

• Capability of the enemy to detect and reactagainst the relief.

• Characteristics of the area of operations.• Need to vary the pattern of relief.• Size and type of elements involved in the relief.• Requirement to retain surprise.

The incoming unit commanders and staffs must bebriefed and become thoroughly familiar with the ex-isting defensive plan to include fire plans, barrierplans, and counterattack plans. The outgoing unitleaves liaison personnel with the incoming unit.These liaison personnel usually remain until the in-coming units become familiar with the situation.

On receipt of the order, the division commander andstaff analyze the mission, issue internal warning or-ders, and establish liaison and communications withthe in-place division's main echelon. The relievingdivision's tactical echelon moves to collocate with

6-2

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xxx

the defending division's tactical echelon. The tacti-cal echelon monitors the current situation and coor-dinates withdrawal procedures. The LAR battalionmoves forward concurrently to reconnoiter routes toregimental assembly areas and proposed battle posi-tions. Reserves are relieved first, followed by reliefof forward elements. When minimum forces areemployed on the forward line of own troops(FLOT), the relief is conducted from rear to front.When maximum forces are on the FLOT, the reliefis conducted from front to rear. Once the relief inplace is begun, the division staffs are primarily con-cerned with —

• Supervising the timing and movement of subor-dinate units.

• Coordinating use of transportation between in-coming and outgoing units.

• Supervising the execution of traffic control.• Preparing for exchange of overall control after

transfer of command.• Continuously monitoring the situation so they

can react swiftly to any emergency or requiredchange in the plan for relief.

The time or circumstances under which the incomingcommander assumes responsibility for the area mustbe clearly established. During the relief, the outgo-ing commander retains responsibility for the areaand mission and exercises operational control overall subordinate elements of the incoming divisionthat have completed their portion of the relief. Re-sponsibility passes to the incoming commander whenall the subordinate units in the main battle area havebeen relieved and adequate communications havebeen established.

Arrangements must be made for a thorough recon-naissance by commanders and staffs of the incomingdivision. Reconnaissance should include an inspec-tion of terrain to the front, defensive installations,relief routes, assembly areas, weapon positions, andCSS installations.

All units must prevent the enemy from learning thata relief in place is taking place. In addition to con-ducting the relief during periods of reduced visibil-ity, the following security measures should be taken:

Figure 6-1. Relief in Place.

Marine Division 6-3

• Normal activities in the area of operations mustbe maintained during the relief.

• Restricting the size of advance parties and re-connaissance parties must be enforced. Infiltra-tion should be the movement technique used toposition these parties.

• Communications during the relief are con-ducted on the command frequency of the outgo-ing unit until the relief is completed.

• An integrated deception plan should be exe-cuted by both the incoming and outgoing units.

The outgoing unit transfers to the incoming unit allinformation and intelligence concerning the enemyand the area of operations, and detailed informationrelated to any emplaced sensor/surveillance systemswhich remain active.

The method of relieving fire support units must beclearly established. Normally, the artillery of theoutgoing unit will remain in position until the unitsin the main battle area have been relieved. Depend-ing on available firing positions, artillery units maytake over the outgoing artillery unit's position or se-lect new positions from which the same fire missionscan be accomplished. Until command passes, regis-tration and all other fires of the incoming artilleryunits are controlled by the commander of the outgo-ing artillery. The headquarters ordering the reliefmay direct that the artillery of the outgoing unit re-main in position to support subsequent operations ofthe incoming unit.

The time available for and other circumstances influ-encing the relief may require that certain weaponsand other equipment be exchanged between the in-coming and the outgoing units. Command authorityfor execution of demolition targets and demolitiontarget folders are exchanged between commanders.

Pertinent CSS matters such as the transfer of sup-plies, use of installations, transfer of enemy prisonerof war (EPWs), operation of civilian collectionpoints, displacement of CSS units, use of transporta-tion, and traffic control must be coordinated betweenthe incoming and outgoing units.

Arrangements between the incoming and outgoingunits must be made for the control of units moving

into and out of the area. Coordination for movementcontrol must include —

• Routes to be used and priorities for their use.• Responsibility for traffic control.• Location of assembly areas.• Provision of guides for incoming units.• Common use of transportation.

Passage of LinesA passage of lines is the coordinated movement ofone or more units through another unit. See figure6-2. The passage of lines is an operation designed tofacilitate another tactical operation. Elements of thepassed unit remain in position and support the attack-ing unit until their fires are masked, at which timethey may remain in position, be withdrawn, or becommitted to other action. Passages of lines are ei-ther forward or rearward. They are conducted to —

• Continue an attack or counterattack.• Envelop an enemy force.• Pursue a fleeing enemy.• Withdraw a security or main battle area force.

The division normally uses multiple passage lanesthrough a defending unit. This technique supportsdecentralized movement of units and the division'scapability to infiltrate and remain undetected. Thepassage of lines places both passing and in-place di-visions in danger while both occupy the same ter-rain. A passage of lines should be rapid to minimizethis vulnerability.

When possible, the areas selected for the actual pas-sage of lines should be the unoccupied areas betweenthe elements of the unit in position or on its flanks.This procedure reduces the vulnerability that resultswhen one unit passes directly through the occupiedpositions of another. Vulnerability also is reducedwhen the subordinate units of the division makingthe passage move directly to the areas of passage orinto the attack without delay. Division reconnais-sance units conduct initial reconnaissance to the rearof the stationary unit, and route reconnaissance fromthe division's assembly areas to passage lanes.The stationary unit conducts aggressive counter-reconnaissance operations to the front to deny enemyknowledge of the passage.

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0MAIN

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Figure 6-2. Passage of Lines.

The unit in contact provides all possible aid to theunit passing through. The stationary division engi-neer must pass all information concerning emplace-ment, turnover, execution, and breaching of allobstacles in sector. Additional engineer supportfrom the stationary unit may be required for creatingor opening gaps and providing guides to the attack-ing forces through obstacles along the FLOT. TheFSC of the passing unit coordinates the fires of theartillery of the stationary unit to support the passingunit after control has been transferred. The station-ary unit also provides other assistance to the passingunit to include —

• Evacuation of casualties and EPWs.• Control of civilians.• Use of areas and facilities, e.g., water points.• Route priority and traffic control.

Planning ConsiderationsThe higher headquarters is responsible for planningand coordinating the passage of lines. Certain basicconsiderations must be integrated into the planningprocess:

• Plans for the conduct of the passage must facili-tate transition to the subsequent missions ofboth the passing and stationary divisions.

• Responsibility for control of the zone or sectorpasses from one division to the other at a timeand place directed by the higher common supe-rior or mutually agreed upon by the stationaryand passing commanders.

• The passing division uses multiple routesthrough the stationary division and avoids theuse of assembly areas. It does not halt withinthe stationary division's forward positions.

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Marine Division 6-5

• Deception and smoke are planned at dummyand actual unit locations and passage points.

• Combat support and CSS assets of the station-ary division are integrated into the plan to sup-port the movement of the passing division.

Route PriorityThe unit passing through must have priority for useof routes to and within the area of the unit in con-tact. Route priority should be established by theheadquarters directing the passage of lines. Trafficcontrol in the area of the unit in contact is the re-sponsibility of that unit until the responsibility for thezone is transferred to the passing unit. When possi-ble, routes dedicated for the passing unit use shouldbe different from stationary unit supply routes toavoid congestion and confusion. These routes mustextend to the passing unit's final destination.

Receipt of Warning OrderUpon receipt of a warning order which directs anoperation requiring a passage of lines, the divisioncommander and his staff will make early, contactwith the unit in contact. Tactical echelons are collo-cated to facilitate a smooth passage and transfer ofresponsibility for the zone or sector. An order ofmovement setting priorities on which units move andwhen they move, precludes confusion and conges-tion. Divisions conducting the passage of lines coor-dinate and pass to subordinate commanders —

• Exchange of intelligence, tactical plans, andrecognition signals.

• Exchange of SOPs.• Arrangements of reconnaissance by elements of

the passing regiments.• Security measures during the passage.• Selection of passage areas and provisions for

guides.• Priorities for use of routes and facilities and

provisions for movement control. The passingunit must have priority.

• Time or circumstances when responsibility forthe control of the area of operations will betransferred.

• Fire support and other combat support to beprovided by the stationary unit.

• Combat service support to be provided by thestationary unit.

• Exchange of liaison personnel.• Collection and exchange of information on

friendly minefields and other obstacles.• Command and support relationship between in-

coming combat support and CSS units and fa-cilities and the stationary unit in whose areathey may plan to locate.

• Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemyNBC munitions.

• Tactical cover and deception plans to retain se-crecy and to aid in gaining surprise.

Linkup OperationsLinkup operations are conducted to join two friendlyforces. See figure 6-3. It may occur during an am-phibious operation where forces are landed by bothsurface and aviation means, during the relief of anisolated unit, or to join the division with other U.S.,allied, and/or indigenous forces. Forces may bemoving toward each other, or one may be stationary.A linkup may be part of an offensive or defensiveoperation. The division conducts linkup operationsto —

• Complete encirclement or envelopment of anenemy force.

• Assist in the breakout of an encircled friendlyforce.

• Join an attacking force with a force inserted inthe enemy rear.

PlanningPlanning for the linkup must be timely. Plans of theforces involved in the linkup are coordinated in ad-vance. Provisions are made for the prompt ex-change of information between the two forces. Thetwo organizations involved exchange as much infor-mation as possible prior to the operation. Divisionrepresentatives meet to coordinate the following:

• Command relationship and responsibilities.The headquarters directing the linkup must es-tablish the command relationships and responsi-bilities of the forces involved.

• Command and staff liaison. Liaison is estab-lished during planning and continues through-out the operation.

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FMFM 6-1

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• Communications. The communications planincludes the channels for radio communicationand recognition signals between the two forces.

• Coordination of schemes of maneuver and con-trol measures.

• The location and description of primary and al-ternate linkup points.

• Fire support coordinating measures.• Actions following linkup.

To support the linkup, the division G-2 employs re-connaissance and surveillance assets near linkuppoints to identify enemy movement toward the divi-sion's position. Fire support coordinating measurespermit both divisions to increase or decrease positivecontrol as required as the forces converge. Obstaclezones are planned on enemy avenues of approachinto the division sector based on METT-T. Theseobstacle zones include the full spectrum of obstaclesto include conventional and scatterable mine sys-tems. Logistic planning considerations include thedistance to the objective area, the amount of time theobjective area is to be held, planned operations ormovement out of the objective area, resupply of thestationary unit, and movement of support for heli-copterborne forces.

Linkup of a Moving Force with aStationary ForceIn an operation where one force is moving to link-upwith a stationary force, the following planning pro-cedures are necessary:

Coordination of Ground Linkup Points

Linkup points are coordinated at locations where theaxis of advance of the moving force intersect the se-curity elements of the stationary force. Alternatelinkup points are established. Enemy action mayforce linkup to occur at places other than thoseplanned. The number of linkup points establisheddepends on the capability of the stationary force, thenumber of routes being used by the linkup force, andthe nature of terrain and enemy threats to the opera-tion. Troops manning the points, as well as the unitscontacting them, must be familiar with, proceduresfor mutual identification and plans for the rapid pas-sages of the advancing units. Assistance by the sta-tionary force includes removing obstacles, providingguides, and reserving assembly areas for the reor-ganization of linkup forces.

PL CLOSE PL AWAY

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Figure 6-3. Linkup.

Marine Division 6-7

Fire Support Coordination

For linkup operations, a restrictive fire line (RFL)may be required to preclude fires from the converg-ing forces from affecting each other. As the linkupbecomes imminent, the RFL is moved as close to thestationary force as possible to allow maximum free-dom of action to the linkup force. A single FSCLshould encompass both forces; offensive air supportdelivered in the area between the two forces that isnot under control of a terminal controller must thenbe cleared by the FSCC of both the linkup force andthe stationary force. On linkup and when recom-mended by the responsible commander concernedfor fire support coordination for the force as a

whole, responsibility for fire support coordination istransferred to the designated commander. The forcehaving primary interest in the operation followinglinkup is normally given this responsibility.

Air Defense Considerations

The division must ensure timely dissemination of in-formation and coordination so that air defense unitsdo not engage friendly aircraft that may be support-ing the linkup units.

Actions Following Linkup

When the linkup is made, the linkup force may jointhe stationary force or may pass through or aroundand continue the attack. If the linkup force is to con-tinue operations with the stationary force, a singlecommander for the overall force is designated.

Linkup of Two Moving UnitsLinkup between two moving units is one of the mostdifficult operations and is normally conducted tocomplete the encirclement of an enemy force. Pri-mary and alternate linkup points for the movingforces are established on boundaries where the twoforces are expected to converge. As linkup unitsmove close to one another, fires must be coordinatedto ensure the enemy does not escape between the twoforces. Leading elements of each force shouldmonitor a common radio net. Considerations for firesupport coordination, air defense, and actions fol-lowing linkup are identical to those discussed abovefor stationary linkup.

Breakout From EncirclementA division is encircled when all ground routes ofevacuation and reinforcement have been cut by en-emy action. Due to the nonlinear nature of the mod-em battlefield, the division may have to fight whileencircled. See figure 6-4. The division may be en-circled by enemy design, when ordered to remain ina strong position on key terrain to deny the enemypassage through a vital choke point following an en-emy breakthrough, or when left to hold the shoulderof a penetration. When this occurs, it is vital thatthe encircled commander have a clear understandingof the higher commander's intent so the unit cancontinue to contribute to the mission.

The senior commander within the encirclement as-sumes control of all forces. He informs his superiorof the situation. Simultaneously, he begins to ac-complish the following tasks regardless of his subse-quent mission.

• Reestablish a chain of command. Frag-mented units are reorganized, and a clear chainof command is established. Personnel not es-sential to combat support and combat servicesupport are organized for combat operations orprovided to maneuver units as replacements.

• Establish a viable defense. The commandquickly established all-around defense; assignssectors, battle positions, or strongpoints; andinstitutes an aggressive patrolling plan.

• Establish a reserve. A reserve must be con-stituted and positioned to take advantage of in-terior lines.

• Organize fire support. Indirect fire assets arecentralized for breakout operations. Artilleryand mortars are positioned throughout thepocket to limit their vulnerability to counter-fire. The available fire support from outsidethe encirclement is coordinated by the FSC.

6-8 FMFM 6-1

Figure 6-4. Breakout From Encirclement.

• Reorganize logistics. An early assessment ismade of the logistics posture of the encircledcommand. Temporarily, all combat servicesupport comes under the centralized control ofthe senior logistician or designated individual.He rations key supplies, authorizes cannibaliza-tion, identifies equipment to be destroyed, anddevelops a casualty evacuation plan.

• Maintain morale. Commanders and leaders atall levels maintain the confidence of subordi-nates by resolute action and positive attitude.Subordinates are kept informed to suppressrumors.

While planning for the breakout, the division contin-ues to defend on the most defensible terrain, holdingthe entire perimeter. It may reduce the size of itsperimeter to maintain a strong defense; however, it

must maintain sufficient maneuver space. The divi-sion employs reconnaissance units to determine en-emy strengths and weaknesses near the plannedbreakout point. It conducts counter-reconnaissanceoperations to deny the enemy information onfriendly breakout plans.

The division selects the rupture location and routesof march that avoid enemy strengths, increasing thechance for surprise. The route selected may not bedirect; it may be over less favorable terrain. The di-vision avoids the most obvious route toward friendlylines unless there is no alternative. However, the di-vision may use the most obvious route for a diver-sionary attack.

The division may respond to encirclement in severalways. It can stay in position and defend. However,the effect on the enemy may be limited and the

Marine Division 6-9

division may lose combat effectiveness or be de-stroyed unless it successfully breaks out. The divi-sion can also attack to break Out of the encirclementand link up with friendly forces. Another way is toattack deeper toward enemy forces and facilities tointerfere with enemy command and control, to dis-rupt follow-on forces, and to destroy fire supportand CSS assets. Lastly, the division can infiltrate bysmall groups. Depending on the method selected,the commander uses the same planning considera-tions as are normally used in other defensive, offen-sive, and infiltration operations.

Defense While EncircledThe division can respond to an encirclement bymaintaining its position and defending in place. Thismay inflict damage on the enemy, divert an enemyattack, restrict enemy maneuver and logistic support,or acquire intelligence. Encircled forces also defendin-place if they are tying up sufficient enemy forcesto weaken the enemy's main effort. This decision isbased on METT-T and the higher coniniander'sintent.

Breakout Toward Friendly ForcesThe division can attack to break out of the encir-clement and link up with friendly forces when linkupis necessary and time is crucial. If a commanderuses a breakout attack toward friendly forces, it is

important that the breakout attack take place as soonas possible after the encirclement since the enemyforce may not realize that it has encircled a division.The longer the commander waits to conduct the at-tack, the more organized the enemy forces are likelyto be.

The attack to break out of an encirclement differsfrom other attacks in that a simultaneous defense inother areas of the perimeter is maintained. Toachieve a breakout, the commander should accom-plish the following tasks:

• Task-organize the force for the breakout.• Deceive the enemy as to time and place of the

attack.• Exploit vulnerabilities in the encircling force.

• Exploit darkness and limited visibility.• Concentrate combat power at the breakout

point.• Coordinate with supporting efforts.

When the division is involved in an attack to break-out, division forces can be task-organized into fivedistinct tactical groups — rupture force, reserveforce, main body, rear guard, and diversionaryforce.

Rupture Force

The rupture force attacks, creates a gap in the enemyforce, and holds the shoulders for the remainingforces to pass through.

Reserve Force

The reserve force follows the rupture attack to main-tain attack momentum and to secure objectives pastthe rupture. After the rupture force secures the gap,the reserve force normally becomes the division'slead element.

Main Body

The main body contains the headquarters elements,casualties, combat support, and combat service sup-port; it moves as a single group. it usually followsthe reserve through the gap created by the ruptureforce. One commander should be given commandof this element to ensure orderly movement.

Rear Guard

The rear guard consists of the personnel and equip-ment left on the perimeter to provide protection forthe rupture and diversionary attacks, if a diversion-ary attack force exists.

Diversionary Force

Attention must be diverted from the location of therupture by a show of force elsewhere. Mobileweapon systems and tanks are ideally suited for thediversionary force. The diversionary attack shouldbe directed at a point where the enemy might expecta breakout.

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Attack of Deeper Enemy Forcesand FacilitiesThe division can attack deeper toward enemy forcesand facilities to interfere with enemy command andcontrol, disrupt follow-on forces, and destroy firesupport and CSS assets (usually C2 facilities, logisticcenters, and other CSS assets). Units temporarilyencircled may continue attacks to their objective ifthe enemy force cannot contain the encircled forceand the encircled force can sustain the attack.

InfiltrationIf success of a breakout attack appears questionableand a relief operation is not possible, then the divi-sion can infiltrate by small groups. Infiltration maybe considered when the division needs to link-upwith another unit, but time is not a crucial considera-tion. An infiltration effort can distract the enemyfrom its overall operation and produce intelligencefor the higher headquarters. Infiltration is usually alast resort for an encircled force.

InfiltrationInfiltration is the movement through or into an areaor territory occupied by either friendly or enemytroops or organizations. The movement is made ei-ther by small groups or individuals at extended or ir-regular intervals. Infiltration can be used to supportdeception, reposition units in friendly or enemy ter-ritory, collect intelligence, or to move a unit to a po-sition of advantage for an attack. In an infiltration,infiltrating units seek to avoid enemy defenses andpass through gaps in the defense. Units are thenpostured to attack lines of communications, supportunits, installations, or other objectives in the rear ofthe forward defense areas, or are postured to seizekey terrain to facilitate other operations.

The division normally conducts infiltrations in threephases. The first phase is aggressive patrolling tofmd gaps in the enemy's forward defense. The sec-ond phase is the actual infiltration through the enemyforward defensive positions. The third phase is as-sembly in attack positions in the enemy's rear. Thecharacteristics of terrain and the nature of the con-flict influence the use of infiltration as a movementtechnique. Infiltration may be favored when —

• Enemy maneuver forces are dispersed.Dispersion allows passage of the infiltratingforce through the unoccupied areas of the en-emy dispositions.

• The enemy cannot easily mass against the infil-trating force without endangering his ownforce.

• Seizure or neutralization of objectives in theenemy's rear is critical.

• Terrain provides infiltrating forces relative pro-tection from detection and destruction.

Command and ControlCoordination and integration of all combat functionsare much the same as that for any other type of op-eration. Careful consideration must be given tomeasures to deconflict and control fire support andmovement through enemy counter-reconnaissanceforces. Command and control of infiltrating forcesrequires simplicity. The tactical echelon is bestsuited to monitor and control infiltrating units. Itwill normally locate well forward to monitor andsupport tactical requirements of infiltrating forces.The regiments executing the infiltration, or control-ling subordinate infiltrating units, report to the divi-sion tactical echelon.

The primary means of controlling an infiltration aretactical control measures and SOPs. Control meas-ures for an infiltration must be simple. See figure6-5. Due to inherent dispersion of forces during aninfiltration, command and control is a difficult un-dertaking. In addition to phase lines, boundary ar-eas, and fire support coordinating measures used inany other operation, infiltrating forces normally usethese additional control measures:

• The rear assembly area is located in a hiddenor concealed position to the rear of the FEBA.It must be close to the lanes to be used for theforward passage of lines through friendlyforces.

• Forward passage lanes must be close to the rearassembly areas as the tactical situation permits.The distance between the assembly areas andpassage lane will impact on the available timethe infiltrating unit has to coordinate with thestationary unit and to conduct reconnaissance ofthe passage and infiltration lanes.

Manne Division 6-11

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• Attack position(s) should be as close as possibleto the objective without compromising security.An attack position must be large enough for theforce to deploy and to provide a covered andconcealed position for infiltrating units to con-verge. It should be reconnoitered and securedbefore occupation. The position also can beused to make final adjustments prior to the at-tack. Linkup points are designated short of theattack position to facilitate security and move-ment of elements from the infiltration lanes.

• Hide positions are designated along the infiltra-tion lanes for operations longer than one day.Infiltrating forces use these hide positions dur-ing the daylight hours to remain hidden fromthe enemy. Hide positions must provide cov-ered and concealed locations which hide anddisperse the force until movement resumes.

• Infiltration lanes must be reconnoitered prior tomovement by infiltrating, forces. They containa start point, release point, target referencepoints, hide areas, and checkpoints. They areselected to avoid predicable routes which lendthemselves to enemy ambush. The number of

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Figure 6-5. Infiltration Control Measures.

6-12 FMFM6-1

lanes required depends on the size of the infil-trating force, time constraints, the availabilityof covered and concealed routes, and the natureof terrain.Rally points are designated along each infiltra-tion route by the infiltrating unit. They allowthe dispersed infiltrating forces to rapidly re-group in response to unforeseen enemy contactand continue movement to the attack position.They should be easily identifiable and providecover and concealment.

IntelligenceIntelligence operations to support an infiltration re-quires early efforts to locate and assess enemy capa-bilities along infiltration lanes, objectives, andpotential reactions once infiltration terminates andthe attack begins. Information from intelligence re-ports, reconnaissance and patrol reports, weatherand light data, and aerial photographs is used to de-termine infiltration lanes, locations of rally and con-tact points, enemy security elements, gaps in theenemy defense, and strength of enemy defenses onthe objective.

During the infiltration, division intelligence person-nel develop and maintain as accurate a picture aspossible of the enemy and his activities. Theyshould concentrate on enemy C2 systems to deter-mine if the enemy has discovered the infiltration op-eration and what his reaction will be.

Fire SupportFire support must be available to infiltrating forcesthroughout the operation. Regimental-sized infiltra-tions will normally have an artillery battalion in di-rect support (DS). DS artillery must be well forwardto support both the infiltration and attack on the ob-jective. Additional artillery units should be placed ina reinforcing role to the DS battalions during the in-filtration. Artillery can support deception efforts byfiring false preparations and programs into other ar-eas. CAS is planned for use during infiltration andattack of the objective once the infiltration is com-pleted. Counterbattery radars are positioned to sup-port the infiltrating force.

Mobility and SurvivabilityInfiltrating forces will have limited mobility, coun-termobility, and survivability assets. These are nor-mally limited to combat engineers task-organizedinto infiltrating groups. They can conduct limitedbreaching of enemy obstacles during the attack onthe objective. Bangalore torpedo sections, limiteddemolitions, pioneer tools, and a limited number ofmines are all they can realistically be expected tocarry on a foot mobile infiltration. The primaryconcern when task-organizing maneuver elementswith engineers is the mobility and survivability re-quirements during the attack on the enemy position.Considerations will normally focus on assaultbreaching and then on any hasty defensive prepara-tions required once the objective is secured.

Combat Service SupportCSS assets normally do not accompany infiltratingunits. However, CSS assets must be prepared to fol-low attacking forces which link up with the infiltrat-ing force to support resupply and medicalevacuation. Infiltrating forces carry the minimumessential equipment and supplies during the move-ment. Depending on the situation, limited aerial re-supply and medical evacuation may be provided tothe force during the infiltration. However, sincemedical evacuation will be difficult and could com-promise the infiltration, corpsmen and battalion-levelmedical support are critical.

Tactical ConsiderationsSuccessful infiltrations are characterized by boldnessand initiative. Individual and small-unit resourceful-ness and ingenuity are required to prevent enemy de-tection. Proficiency in tactical movement is arequirement for infiltration. It provides the ability tofind routes which permit the force to bypass enemypositions, locate gaps, and avoid enemy surveillancecapabilities.

Infiltrations should take advantage of periods andconditions of reduced visibility. If the enemy haselectronic detection devices, countermeasures mustbe incorporated into the plan to neutralize them. Pa-trols can provide security during the infiltration and

Marine Division 6-13

may prevent enemy reconnaissance from determin-ing the size of the infiltration and its objectives.Supporting artillery fires can be used to targetknown enemy locations and to mask the movementof infiltrating forces.

PlanningInfiltration requires a detailed plan based on missionanalysis and estimates of the situation. Infiltrationhas the best chance for success when the enemy de-fense is overextended. The commander and staff se-lect objectives and routes based on terrain analysis,enemy dispositions, and need to avoid contact beforereaching attack positions. Best results may beachieved when infiltrating forces attack simultane-ously with or soon after other attacking forces.

The size of the infiltrating force is METT-T depend-ent. Initial infiltration groups are normally of pla-toon or company size. Once gaps are located andpinpointed, larger infiltration groups may be passedthrough them. In some instances the infiltrationforce may include light vehicles and some armoredvehicles. When possible, the inclusion of transporta-tion can enhance combat power by providing addi-tional direct fires, long-range communications, andincreased ammunition support.

Helicopterborne OperationsA helicopterborne operation is a tactical operationnormally in support of the ground tactical planwhereby helicopters are employed to move troops,supplies, and/or equipment. Helicopterborne opera-tions allow the commander to maneuver rapidly toachieve tactical surprise and to mass his forces, re-gardless of terrain obstacles and without dependingon ground lines of communication. The unique ver-satility and strength of the helicopter — speed, agil-ity, and firepower — provides the division an abilityto rapidly maneuver against the enemy.

A helicopterborne force provides commanders withtruly unique capabilities. Helicopters help extendthe battlefield, move forces, and rapidly concentratecombat power. Helicopterborne operations are de-liberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executedcombat operations designed to allow friendly forcesto strike over extended distances and terrain barriers

to attack the enemy when and where he is mostvulnerable. These same attributes allow the forma-tion of helicopterborne task forces containing avia-tion units task-organized with division units to createcombined arms teams.

CapabilitiesGround and helicopter units can be fully integratedwith other members of the combined arms team toform flexible helicopterborne forces. Specifically,helicopterborne task forces can —

• Attack enemy positions from any direction.• Overfly or bypass barriers and obstacles and

strike objectives in otherwise inaccessibleareas.

• Conduct operations beyond the FLOT or pointof contact, using helicopters to insert and ex-tract forces.

• Rapidly concentrate, disperse, or redeploy toextend the area of influence.

• Provide a responsive reserve allowing the com-mander to commit a larger portion of the forceto action.

• Rapidly place forces at tactically decisive pointsin the objective area.

• Provide surveillance or security over a widearea.

• Rapidly secure and defend key terrain such ascrossing sites, road junctions, or bridges.

• Bypass enemy positions; achieve surprise.

Limitations and VulnerabilitiesA helicopterborne force will be relatively light andmobile but reliant on helicopter support throughoutthe operation. In addition, they may be limitedby —

• Severe weather, extreme heat and cold, andother environmental conditions such as blowingsnow and sand that limit flight operations orhelicopter lifting capability.

• Dependence on air lines of communication.• Enemy aircraft, air defense, and electronic

warfare action.• Reduced ground mobility and vehicle-mounted

antitank systems once inserted.• Availability of suitable HLZs.

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• Battlefield obscuration that limits helicopterflight.

• High fuel and ammunition consumption rates.

Initial elements are often separated from weapon sys-tems, equipment, and materiel that provide protec-tion and survivability on the battlefield. Thus, ahelicopterborne task force is particularly vulnerableto —

• Attack by enemy air defense weapon systemsduring the movement phase.

• Attack by NBC systems, because of limitedNBC protection and decontamination assets.

• Ground attacks by infantry, artillery, and ar-mor. Helicopterborne forces are particularlyvulnerable during embarkation and debarkationphases.

• Electronic warfare (jarmning).

PlanningSuccessful helicopterborne operations require a care-ful analysis of METT-T and detailed reverse plan-ning. Five separate but integrated plans are requiredto conduct a helicopterborne operation. See figure6-6. They are the ground tactical plan, landing plan,air movement plan, loading plan, and the stagingplan. The ground tactical plan is developed first anddictates the content of all others. These plans aredeveloped in reverse order. Sample formats for eachplan are provided in Appendix J, FMFM 6-21, Tac-tical Fundamentals of Helicopterborne Operations.

Ground Tactical Plan

The foundation for a successful helicopterborne op-eration is the commander's ground tactical plan. Allplanning evolves around this plan. The ground tacti-cal plan specifies actions in the objective area whichultimately accomplish the mission. The plan mayalso include subsequent operations. Tue ground tac-tical plan for the helicopterborne operation containsessentially the same elements as any other operationbut differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speedand mobility in order to achieve surprise. Infantryunits are placed on or near the objective and orga-nized to enable immediate attack. In some situations,the helicopterborne force must land away from theobjective and conduct a foot and/or vehicle move-ment to the objective. The scheme of maneuver may

assume a variety of possibilities depending on thecommander's evaluation of METT-T. Of particularimportance is the availability of HLZs in the area.

Mission. The most obvious portion of the helicop-terborne mission is the requirement to conduct ahelicopter movement. The following concernsshould be examined:

• Missions of all units and methods for em-ployment.•

• Special tasks required to accomplish the mis-sion.

• Means to accomplish the mission, e.g., organicpersonnel, aviation, communications, andmedical.

• Number of personnel to be lifted.• Total weight to be lifted.• Internal and external lift requirements.• Distance of the ah movement.

Concept of Operations. The ground concept is for-mulated in five parts:

• Ground movement to the pick-up zone.• Securing and organizing the pick-up zone.• Actions at the HLZ.• Ground movement from the HLZ to the objec-

tive or actions on the objective.• Operations subsequent to securing the ob-

jective.

Task Organization. Ground combat, ground combatsupport, and helicopter/aviation units are task-organized for a specific mission. Multiple objectivesand landings require detailed, flexible plans. Theground commander must have the opportunity to ad-just his organization and conduct briefs prior to be-ing landed in subsequent zones.

Other Ground Tactical Plan Considerations. Theseconsiderations include the following:

• Determine forecasted weather.a Determine available LZs.• Establish H-hour.• Determine fire support considerations such as

CAS, artillery, NSFS, SEAD, and coordinatingmeasures.

Manna Division 6-15

Figure 6-6. Planning Diagram.

6-16 FMFM 6-1

• Determine enemy situation, in particular air de-fense capabilities and reaction forces locatednear the objective or HLZ(s).

• Determine intelligence support available.

Landing Plan

The landing plan must support the ground tacticalplan. The plan sequences units into the area of op-erations so that they arrive at locations and timesprepared to execute the ground tactical plan. Con-siderations in developing the landing plan include —

• The availability, location, size, and enemyproximity to potential HLZs.

• The vulnerability of the helicopterborne forceduring landing.

• The tactical integrity of units when landing.• The disorientation of Marines if the briefed

landing direction changes and they are not keptinformed.

• The combat readiness of the helicopterborneforces to fight in any direction when it lands.

• Supporting fires.• The provisions for emergency extract, resup-

ply, and medical evacuation by air.

Selection of LZs. The ground tactical commandermakes the selection of LZs based on the recommen-dation of the air mission commander. LZs are se-lected using the following criteria:

• The ground force commander's concept ofoperations.

• LZs can be located on, near, or away from theobjective, depending of the factors of METT-T.

• The size of the LZ will determine the sequencefor landing. It is desirable to land the entireforce simultaneously to minimize exposure tothe threat. The size of available zones mayalso require the use of more than one zone,more than one wave, or increased separationbetween waves.

• An alternate LZ should be planned for each pri-mary LZ selected to ensure flexibility.

• Enemy troop concentrations, air defenses, andthe enemy's capability to react to a helicopter-borne landing are considered when selectingLZs.

a LZs are selected which deny enemyobservation and acquisition of friendly groundand aviation elements while they are in routeto/from and in the LZ.

• LZs should be readily identifiable from the air.• Requirements for logistic support.• Requirements for fire support.• Routes to and from LZs.• Weather, reduced visibility, or strong winds

may preclude or limit the use of marginal LZs.

LZ Characteristics. In addition to deciding where toland in relation to the objective, a decision is madeon whether to use single or multiple LZs.

Advantages of single LZ:

• Allows concentration of combat power in onelocation.

• Facilitates control and orientation.• Facilitates supporting arms coordination.• Enhances security for subsequent lifts.• Reduces the route planning requirements.• Centralizes required resupply operations.• Requires less planning and rehearsal time.

Advantages of multiple HLZs:

• Creates force dispersion to avoid creating a lu-crative target for enemy mortars, artillery, andCAS.

• Allows rapid employment of elements requiredto accomplish tasks in geographically separatedareas.

• Reduces enemy ability to determine main effortand react to the initial lift if the force is

detected.• Eliminates aircraft congestion.• Makes it difficult for the enemy to determine

the size of the helicopterborne force and the ex-act location of supporting weapons.

Fires to Support the Landing. It is desirable to landwithout preparatory fires to achieve tactical surprise.However, fires are planned to support a landing ineach LZ in the event they are needed. When devel-oping fire support plans, the commander gives con-sideration to —

Marine Division 6-17

• Deception. False preparations are fired into ar-eas other than the objective or LZ.

• Loss of surprise.• Availability and type of fire support.• Significant targets. A known or suspected en-

emy force regardless of size, warrantstargeting.

• Obstacles to landing and maneuver. Some ord-nance used in preparation (artillery, bombs, na-palm) can cause craters, tree blowdown, fires,and LZ obscuration and therefore may not bedesirable.

• Scheduled fires.• Positive control measures. Control measures

must be established for lifting or shifting fires.Airspace coordination areas (ACA) may benecessary to protect approach and retirementlanes.

Air Movement PlanThe air movement plan is based on the ground tacti-cal and landing plans. The plan provides the airmovement schedule and instructions for the airmovement of troops, equipment, and supplies. Italso provides coordinating instructions pertaining toapproach and retirement routes, air control points,aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations. The useof attack helicopters should be included in this plan.

Examination of METT-T, with strong emphasis onthreat analysis, determines approach and retirementroute selection. Route and altitude are interdepend-ent in the selection and shall be considered concur-rently to determine the optimum movement.Avoidance of enemy detection and fires is the pri-mary consideration. In addition to METT-T factors,the commander considers the following general prin-ciples when route selection planning.

• Terrain is used to the best tactical advantage.• Primary and alternate approach and retirement

routes are identified.• Routes should be easily identified and

navigated.• Communications will not be easily impaired.• Routes can be flown under adverse weather

conditions.

• Unique or complicated support requirementsare minimized.

• Supporting arms capabilities are maximized andlimitations are minimized.

It is important for ground commanders to know thedimensions of approach and retirement routes forfire support planning. Leaders must maintain situa-tional awareness to include navigation during flightas helicopters may be forced to land unexpectedly.

Planned fires in support of the operation may be exe-cuted during flight. These fires are planned as theywould be to support any helicopterborne operation.The commander's fire support planning incorporatesthe following considerations:

• Fires along the flight route are planned to sup-press known or suspected enemy positions.These fires should be of short duration. Multi-ple target engagement techniques should beutilized.

• Fire plans must be complete and flexible. Firesupport plans include suppression of enemy airdefense (SEAD) systems and smoke to protectformations from enemy detection from pick-upzones (PZs), along approach and retirementlanes, and the LZ.

• On-call fires are planned along the flight routeto ensure rapid adjustment of targets of op-portunity.

• The use of illumination requires detailed plan-ning.

Loading Plan

Correct helicopter loading is essential in maintainingproper employment and orientation upon debarka-tion. In turn, proper debarkation enhances mobilityand reduces the time required to organize for move-ment from the LZ to the objective. The key is toload and land helicopters in the manner and se-quence which allows immediate assumption of themission upon landing.

The loading plan is based on the air movement plan.It identifies the personnel, equipment, and suppliesto be loaded on each aircraft. A bump sequence is

6-18 FMFM 6-1

designated to ensure essential personnel and equip-ment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case ofaircraft breakdown or other problems. Each heli-copter load is prioritized to establish the force bumpplan. Likewise, each individual heliteam establishesan internal prioritization should conditions precludethe loading of the entire team. Planning must coverthe organization and operation of the pick-up zoneincluding load positions, day and night markings,and communications. The loading plan becomesmore complicated when mixing internal and externalloads and/or when mixing helicopter types. Externalloads and helicopter support teams (HSTs) should beplanned and coordinated to facilitate the rapid han-dling of cargo.

Written Plans. The requirement for detailed, writtenplans can be reduced by having adequate unit SOPscovering pick-up zone tasks and loading plans.

Load Planning. During preparation of the loadingtables, unit leaders at all levels attempt to maintainor ensure the following:

• Tactical integrity of units. When planningloads for helicopterborne operations, units areloaded intact on the same aircraft and in thesame wave. The goal is to load to ensure unitintegrity is maintained at every level.

• Every towed item is accompanied by its primemover.

• Crews are loaded with their vehicle or weapon.• Each weapon is accompanied by the appropri-

ate ammunition.• Sufficient personnel are on board to unload

cargo.• Communication between flights is maintained.• Tactical spread. Loads should be planned so

that leaders, special equipment, crew-servedweapons, or a capability are not lost with theloss or destruction of one aircraft.

Staging Plan

The staging plan is based on the loading plan andprescribes the arrival time of ground units (troops,equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the proper or-der for movement. Loads must be ready before air-craft arrive. The staging plan also provides for the

organization of the zone, defines flight routes to thezone, and provides instructions for linkup of all avia-tion elements. Air-to-air linkup of aviation unitsshould be avoided, especially at night when night vi-sion goggles are being used.

Mission Brief. The responsibility for operationalbriefmgs is a function of command and rests with thecommander tasked with executing the helicopter-borne operation. The mission brief is the final phaseof the planning effort and should include all key per-sonnel. This brief will set forth the concept of op-erations, scheme of maneuver, and specific detailsconcerning mission coordination and execution. In-fonnation shall be provided which enables each par-ticipant to understand the overall operation and hisspecific role and responsibilities regarding missionexecution. Joint briefings with representatives fromeach participating unit should be conducted.

River CrossingsThe division may be required to conduct river cross-ing operations during both offensive and defensiveoperations. River crossing operations facilitate mov-ing division units across the water obstacle so thatthere is minimum impact on the division's ability tomaneuver. Wide, unfordable rivers impose restric-tions on maneuver as they are obstacles to attack andthey form natural lines of resistance for the defense.However, a division in the defense also must con-tend with these obstacles for defensive maneuver andcounterattacks. River crossings may be consideredeither hasty or deliberate. See FMFM 7-26, RiverCrossing Operations for further information.

Hasty CrossingA hasty crossing is a crossing of a river or streamusing crossing means on hand or readily availablewithout pausing to make elaborate preparations.Preferably, a hasty crossing is conducted by seizingcrossing sites intact.

Deliberate CrossingA deliberate crossing is a crossing of a river that re-quires extensive planning and detailed preparations.Normally, deliberate crossings are conducted againstrivers incorporated into an integrated defense orwhen the river is particularly wide or hazardous. A

Marine Division 6-19

deliberate river crossing has four phases — Phase I.

Advance to the river; Phase II: Assault across theriver; Phase JH. Advance from the far bank; andPhase fV. Secure the bridgehead line. They aredistinct in planning, but there is no pause betweenthem in execution.

Crossing ConsiderationsThe focus of offensive river crossing operations maybe to destroy the enemy's defense in-depth alongwith securing a bridgehead. When bridgeheads areestablished, they must be large enough to accommo-date the force and to facilitate continuation of the op-eration. Projecting combat power across the river iscritical. Crossings should be conducted on as wide afront as possible, using as many crossing sites aspossible. Crossing at night, during reduced visibil-ity, using obscurants, and developing a deceptionplan are all means to reduce the vulnerabilities inher-ent in river crossing operations.

Throughout a river crossing operation, the crossingforce must be capable of defeating or blocking an-ticipating enemy reaction, including counterattacks,on the far bank. Plans must provide for a rate ofcrossing and buildup of combat power on the farbank that exceeds the rate at which the enemy canconcentrate against the force. The crossing force se-cures sufficient space on the far bank to provide ade-quate maneuver room and a depth sufficient tosuccessfully conclude the river crossing operation.

The MEF should be thoroughly familiar with the di-vision's river crossing operation as the MEF pro-vides some of the assets to carry out the operation.Although the actual operation is conducted primarilyby the division, all bridging assets are provided bythe CSSE. The ACE also provides necessary meansto carry out the crossing.

Provision should be made for flank security of thebridgehead by tying the bridgehead line into theriver itself. Flanks should include good defensibleterrain. METT-T will determine the task organiza-tion for the crossing. Under extremely favorablecircumstances, it may be possible to cross a riverand to secure the entire objective area in a singlesustained attack. This type of crossing and securing

of the area in one phase may be feasible when theenemy is incapable of significantly delaying the ad-vance of forces making the initial assault crossingsor disrupting subsequent operations.

Fire support available to river crossing operationsmay include artillery, CAS, and NSFS. Fire supportis assigned missions that —

• Neutralize enemy direct and indirect fire.a Isolate the crossing sites and objectives com-

prising the bridgehead.• Provide interdiction fires, particularly against

enemy reserves.• Provide smoke.• Suppress and destroy air defense and C2

facilities.• Deliver scatterable mines to protect the flanks,

support the defense of the bridgehead, and re-strict enemy activity in the vicinity of theobstacle.

A movement control plan is developed that speedsmovement across the river and maintains momentumof the attack. To accomplish this, maintenance andrefueling sites should be established on the friendlyside of the river. The plan requires detailed coordi-nation between movement control agencies and ma-neuver forces, to include in-place forces and theMEF when applicable.

Crossing sites are normally selected by the regimen-tal commander. The division may specify crossingsites when a certain location is critical to the com-mander's concept. METT-T determines the numberof crossing sites. Depending on available resources,it is desirable that each battalion making the initialcrossings should have at least one good assault cross-ing site in its zone. Control of the crossing sitesgenerally reverts to the CSSE when the division's es-sential combat support and CSS assets have crossedthe obstacle.

Deception operations include feints, demonstrations,ruses, and displays. The objectives of the divisiondeception effort are normally part of a MEF decep-tion plan. Deception measures must be plausible tothe enemy. A feasible course of action discarded inthe planning may provide a good basis for a decep-tion plan. Deception considerations include —

6-20 FMFM 6-1

• Concealing the location and strength of forcebuildup.

• Concealing the location of the proposed cross-ings and the main effort.

• Causing the enemy to reveal his defensive fires.• Causing the enemy the shift his fires from the

main effort.• Causing the enemy to commit reserves improp-

erly against the bridgehead or to delay commit-ment of reserves.

Retrograde River CrossingsA retrograde river crossing is usually conductedwhen enemy advances threaten to overwhelm the di-vision. The commander responds to the situation bydirecting the execution of some form of retrogradeoperation. While executing a retrograde operation,the division may be subjected to possible enemypursuit. In such a situation, the retrograde rivercrossing may be conducted to accomplish one of twoobjectives:

• To establish a new defense on the exit bank ofthe river.

• To continue the retrograde to new defensivepositions designated beyond the obstacle.

Retrograde river crossings are not merely offensiveriver crossings conducted in reverse. Retrograderiver crossings are characterized by the following:

• Detailed planning and centralized control.• Enemy control of maneuver initiative.• Use of delaying forces to impede the enemy's

advance and to trade space for time at thecrossing sites.

• Forces on the exit bank providing defensiveand overwatching fires.

PlanningThe retrograde river crossing should be conductedwith the same amount of detailed planning that is as-sociated with a deliberate offensive crossing. Sincethe enemy has the maneuver initiative, it is essentialto employ deception operations as an integral part ofthe plan. Deception should be planned and executedto deceive the enemy regarding the retrograde. Thedeception story should seek to conceal the locationand extent of crossing operations. For planning

purposes, the crossing operation is divided into threedistinct actions — delay, defense, and crossing.They normally take place concurrently on thebattlefield.

Delay

The delay trades space for time. The time gained al-lows the main body of the division to cross the river.MEF and division units not engaged in the delayexecute a planned retirement or withdrawal andcross the river as quickly as possible. These unitsare assigned appropriate missions within the crossingarea or in the defense which is established on theexit bank. The commander will direct delay opera-tions to continue until delay forces reach the battlehandover line. At this time, the units occupying as-signed defensive positions on the exit bank assumeresponsibility for the battle. The delay force thendisengages and begins its rearward crossing.

Defense and Crossing

The establishment of a strong exit bank defense ineach division sector is undertaken concurrently withthe execution of delay operations. The defense ofthe exit bank must be strong as possible with theavailable troops. The primary mission of the de-fense is to overwatch the crossing of the forces re-maining on the far side of the river. Once defenseforces are directed by the commander to assume re-sponsibility for the battle, they are expected to de-feat, or at least contain, the enemy in a specifiedarea. This is essential for the successful completionof the crossing. As units engaged in delay opera-tions negotiate the crossing, they are incorporatedinto the defense or are directed to prepare to assumethe delay mission if further retrograde operations arewarranted.

Because friendly forces control both banks of theriver for some period of time prior to the operation,existing bridges and crossing sites should be continu-ally improved and repaired. All available bridgingand rafting within the MEF should be installed orprepositioned to the rear to supplement existingcrossing means. The activity begins with the actualcrossings of CSS units. These units evacuate allnonessential supplies and engage in prestocking thedelay and defense forces. The crossing sites withinthe rear area should be fully operational early in the

Marine Division 6-21

retrograde to allow elements not involved in the de-lay to cross the river at the earliest possible timeconsistent with the tactical situation. Operationswithin the retrograde crossing area are characterizedby —

• Rapid and controlled flow of traffic across theriver.

• Maximum use of concealment and dispersal.• Coordinated crossing of equipment and

supplies.• Coordination between the defense and delay

forces for use of crossing sites by the latter.• Preparation of existing bridges with demolitions

for destruction while both banks are controlled.Specific criteria should be issued by the divi-sion commander concerning actual bridgedestruction.

Mechanized OperationsA mechanized operation is a tactical operation de-signed to maximize the ground mobility, protection,shock action and firepower of the division throughthe use of armor-protected vehicles to concentratecombat power against the enemy. Combat power isgenerated by the massed employment of tanks andby enhancing the mobility of other forces throughthe use of assault amphibians and light-armoredvehicles.

CapabilitiesThe task organization and employment of mecha-nized forces are based on METI'-T. Mechanizedforces may be organized to provide the divisioncommander a mobile striking or counterattack force.They can also be used as security forces over ex-tended distances or designated the division main ef-fort during exploitations and pursuits. In addition,they are capable in varying degrees of —

• Seizing terrain and penetrating or envelopingenemy defenses or strongpoints.

• Conducting defensive operations by dispersingover great distances and by concentratingrapidly.

• Rapidly exploiting success in the offense ordefense.

LimitationsUse of mechanized forces may also be limited.Limitations include —

• Mechanized forces rely on radio conimunica-tions. This makes them vulnerable to enemycounter C2 efforts and reconnaissance. Under-standing of commander's intent, doctrine, battledrills, and control measures helps the mecha-nized force overcome jamming and inoperablesystems.

• Mechanized forces are vulnerable to antiarmorweapons and mines. Proper integration of dis-mounted infantry and use of artillery, terraindriving, and extensive reconnaissance to locateand target enemy antiarmor positions, mine-fields and other obstacles, reduce thisvulnerability.

• Mechanized forces have a high consumptionrate of supply items, especially classes III, V,and IX. Anticipation of these supply needs,push-logistics at optimum times, and use of mo-bile CSSDs can reduce this vulnerability.

Planning ConsiderationsThe effective employment of the division with foot,motorized, or helicopterborne infantry and a mecha-nized force requires detailed planning. Coordinatedplanning, development of orders, rehearsals, and co-ordination between the respective commanders andstaffs must take place. Critical areas in the planningprocess include lateral communications and coordi-nation, combat support and CSS, and use of terrain.

Intelligence

Intelligence requirements for each type unit must beunderstood and integrated into the IPB. Mechanizedforces orient on unit concentrations, tank and antiar-mor locations, counterattack routes, armor obstacles,and engagement areas. Both infantry and mecha-nized infantry priority information requirementsmust be combined. The reconnaissance and surveil-lance plans of both type forces should be developedconcurrently and thoroughly coordinated.

6-22 FMFM 6-1

Maneuver

The commander develops his scheme of maneuver tomaximize the capabilities of his task-organized sub-ordinate units.

Both mechanized and nonmechanized forces can fixthe enemy while the other force attacks. In eithercase, the mechanized force requires adequate terrainto maneuver. Mechanized forces are best suited toopen and mixed terrain. Mobility and organic fire-power make it easier for mechanized forces to dis-perse and rapidly concentrate at the decisive point onthe battlefield. The direct fires of infantry andmechanized forces should be mutually supporting.The mechanized unit can use its long-range directfires to provide suppression and overwatch fires forthe infantry unit.

To ensure actions of the mechanized force and infan-try force are fully coordinated, the commander mustcoordinate movement of the mechanized force withthe other maneuver units of the division. He mustprovide sufficient maneuver space for the mecha-nized force. If the mechanized force is to be com-mitted subsequent to. infantry attacks, the divisioncommander must decide —

• The amount of separation to accept prior to thecommitment of the mechanized force.

• The amount of mechanized assets (if any) tosupport the infantry attack.

• What obstacles or fortifications along themechanized force's route are required to becleared by infantry to expedite movement.

Fire Support

Planners must integrate available fire support foreach force into the fire plan. Planners must be fa-miliar with the organization, capabilities, and limita-tions of all forces involved. During planning andpreparation phases, liaison teams should be ex-changed to facilitate the integration and coordinationof fire support.

Mobility

The division G-3, FSC, division engineer, and thecommanders of the tank battalion, assault amphibian

battalion, and combat engineer battalion mustdevelop an integrated breaching plan to overcomeobstacles. Breaching assets mounted on tanks andAAVs must be considered as well as assets organicto the combat engineer battalion. When foot mobileunits are required to clear choke points and obstaclesfor a mechanized force, breaches must be largeenough to accommodate the largest vehicles of theforce. Planners must also consider weapon dispari-ties in range, their impact on preparing obstacles,and the use of terrain during battle handover to themechanized force.

Combat Service Support

Combat service support requires an understanding ofthe current, ongoing, and forecasted needs of bothmechanized and nonmechanized forces. Command-ers must be able to distribute combat service supportto support overall support requirements and be pre-pared to receive CSS augmentation from the FSSG.Infantry unit commanders must understand themechanized unit's maintenance requirements andplan operations accordingly.

EmploymentMechanized forces can be employed as the maineffort in any operation to include movement tocontacts, attacks, and raids. They can also be com-mitted to support these operations by conductingtasks such as the reserve, overwatch, counterattacks,attacks by fire, covering force operations, and de-ception operations. Mechanized force tasks in thedefense include conducting counterattack, reserve,covering or other security force missions; providingoverwatch and reinforcement, or providing the de-tachment left in contact during retrogrades.

Mechanized forces are often employed in combina-tion with helicopterborne forces, with the helicopter-borne force seizing and holding key locations untilthe arrival of the mechanized force. In a linkup witha helicopterborne force, the mechanized force is nor-mally the moving force and the helicopterborneforce is the stationary force. As the helicopterborneforce lacks mobility, firepower, and sustainabilityonce on the ground, the mechanized force should beorganized with additional elements to provide sup-port as needed.

Marine Division 6-23

Military Operations in UrbanTerrainThe division commander and staff must understandthe problems and complexities of MOUT. Doctrineapplicable to the open battlefield is equally applica-ble to the urban battlefield. The decisioninakingmethodology used to develop courses of action re-mains the same. Only the factors of METT-Tchange. Commanders and staffs must know and un-derstand the unique challenges of the urban battle-field. The urban battlefield is characterized byisolation. Because of this isolation, the urban battlerequires psychologically strong leaders. However,the MOUT battle is the type of fighting at whichproperly trained and supported infantry units excel.The division can expect to conduct both offensiveand defensive operations in urban areas.

OffenseThe division may conduct offensive operations in ur-ban terrain to —

• Seize a tactical advantage. Cities control keyroutes of commerce and provide a tactical ad-vantage to the commander who controls them.Control of features such as bridges, railways,and road networks can have a significant out-come on future operations.

• Seize a political advantage. The political im-• portance of a built-up area may justify the useof time and resources to liberate them. Captur-ing the city could destroy the seat of govern-ment, local or national. If not, it could deal theenemy a decisive psychological blow and/or liftthe morale of the people within the city.

• Seize an economical advantage. The destruc-tion or capture of key industrial and commer-cial cities with the resulting denial ofproduction and distribution of equipment andsupplies strikes at the enemy's future ability towage war. Capture of such cities may proveextremely beneficial to the attackers who can,in turn, use these resources to their advantage.The requirement for a logistic base, especiallya port or airfield, may play a pivotal role dur-ing an operation.

Offensive PlanningA detailed study of an urban area and enemy disposi-tions in and around it forms the basis for planningthe attack. Normally, the division commander or-ganizes the force into an assault force and an envel-oping force.

The enveloping force —

• Prevents enemy escape.• Prevents reinforcements from entering the city.• Provides direct fires for the assault force.• Protects the assault force from counterattack.

The assault force clears the city of enemy resistanceand links up with the enveloping force. The attackerhas the advantage of maneuver to isolate an urbanarea. Then, he can either press the attack or containthe defender and perhaps force him to capitulatewithout a direct attack. The attacker selects his bestpoint of entry and can attack from any direction. Hecan choose to bypass strongly defended buildingsand contain or isolate the defenders. The followingare proven techniques and guidelines for conductingoffensive MOUT operations:

• Attack a built-up area only as the last resort andonly when a major advantage accrues throughits seizure or control.

• Know the characteristics of urbanized terrainand advantages and disadvantages it offers toeither attacker or defender.

• Attack where the enemy is weak and hit hisflanks and rear simultaneously.

• Require detailed planning by subordinate com-manders to enhance decentralized executionand minimize C2 problems during an attack.

• Employ combined arms to maximize capabili-ties and minimize vulnerabilities.

• Dissipate an enemy's strength by causing himto react to demonstrations, feints, or ruses.

• Maneuver over approaches to a built-up areawith smoke protection and overwatching fires.

• Reduce strongpoints with fires where possible,then keep moving, and secure them withfollow-on forces.

6-24 FMFM 6-1

• Cut lines of communications and defeat the en-emy through isolation.

• Attack at night to gain surprise and maximizeour night technology advantage.

• Attack continuously to maintain momentum.

Offensive Phases

Attacks in MOUT normally have three phases —Phase I. Isolation of the Built-up Area; Phase II.Advance and Gain a Foothold; and Phase Ill. Clearthe Built-up Area.

Phase I. The division isolates the built-up area andseizes terrain features that dominate approaches.The division secures positions outside the built-uparea from which to support entrance into the city it-self. The tactics and techniques for this phase of the

FR

operation are similar to those of attacks against otherwell-organized enemy positions. See figure 6-7.

Phase II. The division advances to the edge of thebuilt-up area and gains a foothold, while eliminatingthe defender's observation and direct fires on ap-proaches into the area. From the foothold area, theattacking unit penetrates on a narrow front withtanks and infantry leading where possible. Support-ing fires on the entry point focus on this frontage andon preventing attacks on the flanks. Assaulting unitscan expect to encounter barricades, antitank obsta-cles, mines, boobytraps, and antiarmor fires. Theprobability of success increases if the assault is

launched from an unexpected direction during peri-ods of limited visibility or under cover of smoke.See figure 6-8.

Figure 6-7. MOUT Phase I.

Marine Division 6-25

Phase III. Phase III begins without pause after com-pletion of Phase II. The division clears or seizes ur-ban terrain based on METT-T. It varies from asystematic, block-by-block, house-to-house reductionof the built-up area to a rapid advance with clearanceof only critical areas and buildings. When the built-up area is large and heavily fortified and the missionrequires a methodical house-to-house clearanceoperation, the division should divide the area intoregimental zones of action. Each regiment must thenclear its zone completely. See figure 6-9.

DefenseThe division may conduct a defense in urban terrainto —

Deny important strategic/political objectives.Capitals and cultural centers can be defendedfor strictly psychological or national moralepurposes even if they do not offer a tactical

advantage to the defender. Because of thesprawl of such areas, significant combat poweris required for their defense.Retain key economic, industrial, or transporta-tion centers. In many countries, the entire eco-nomic strength of the nation may be tied to oneor possibly two urban areas. A decrease in thecountry's primary industrial or transportationbase could result in the overthrow of the cur-rent government or deny that government theability to adequately support combat operationsagainst enemy regular or insurgent forces.

• Control avenues of approach. Urban sprawlhas made it impossible for forces to avoid citiesand towns. Most avenues of advance are strad-dled by small towns every few kilometers andmust be controlled by defending forces. If anattacker attempts to bypass a built-up area, hemay encounter an array of tank-killing weap-ons. To clear such an area, the attacker mustsacrifice speed and expend resources. In this

Figure 6-8. MOUT Phase II.

6-26 FMFM 6-1

FR

way, defense of a city or town can easily be-come a major obstacle to the enemy and an in-tegral part of our own defensive plan.

• Use economy of force. Due to the tactical ad-vantages to the defender, a well-trained forcedefending a built-up area can inflict majorlosses on a numerically superior attacker. Thedefender can anchor his defense in urban ter-rain and conserve the bulk of his combat powerso that it is available for use in open terrain.The defenders remaining in built-up areas per-form an economy of force role.

• Conceal forces. Forces can be well-concealedin built-up areas. It is difficult to detect forcesdeployed in cities despite aerial photographyand imagery and sensory devices. Headquar-ters echelons, reserves, CSS complexes, andcombat forces well emplaced in built-up areasare hard to detect and therefore hard to targetor attack.

The division commander may decide not to defendan urban area for the following reasons:

• The built-up area is unnecessary to the defen-sive plan.

• Nearby terrain allows the enemy to bypass theurban area on covered or concealed routes.

• Light construction or flammable structures of-fer little protection to the defender.

• The urban area is dominated by adjacentterrain.

• Available fields of fire are inadequate.• The urban area has been declared an open city.

Built-up areas present obstacles to an attacking forcewhile providing the defender an advantage and someprotection. A small, well-prepared force in an urbandefense can defeat or hold off a much larger attack-ing force. Strongly constructed cities give the de-fender a decided advantage. Each building or group

Figure 6-9. MOUT Phase III.

Marine Division 6-27

of buildings is a potential strongpoint. With addi-tional construction and the use of barricades, mines,and boobytraps, an urban area can become a verita-ble fortress. Under some conditions, elements of thedivision may hold built-up areas while the remainderof the division defends from adjacent restrictive ter-rain. The following are techniques and guidelinesfor defensive MOUT operations:

• Establish defenses in-depth in built-up areas.The defense must start far forward and includeapproaches to the urban area.

• Integrate adjacent terrain into the defense.• Use security forces in depth to counter enemy

ground reconnaissance and infiltration.• Use restrictive missions and detailed control

measures to facilitate decentralized execution.• Employ combined arms teams to maximize in-

dividual unit capabilities.• Maintain a strong, mobile reserve to counterat-

tack and block penetrations.

(reverse blank)

Chapter 7

Battlefield Tasks

OverviewBattlefield tasks are conducted continuously duringall division operations. The division conducts thesetasks to enhance overall operations and contribute tocombat effectiveness. These tasks enhance the divi-sion commander's decisionmaking capabilities, pro-mote security of the force, and permit the effectiveuse of maneuver and fires by subordinate units. Allof these tasks are integrated into the commandersconcept of operations and are reflected in his guid-ance and orders to subordinate commanders. Battle-field tasks are required to generate combat power atthe decisive time and place.

Reconnaissance OperationsReconnaissance is an essential and continuous opera-tion that the division conducts to collect informationand to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.Reconnaissance of some type should always precedea commitment of forces. Failure to conduct a thor-ough reconnaissance may cause the loss of initiativeor failure to exploit fleeting opportunities. Lack ofreconnaissance can result in the enemy's achievingsurprise, inflicting unacceptable losses on friendlyforces, and causing the failure of the mission.

ObjectiveThe objective of reconnaissance operations is to sat-isfy the commander's PIRs concerning the enemyand the battlespace. The reconnaissance effort is in-tegrated with the concept of operations and is fo-cused on obtaining critical information required toenable rapid decisionmaking in the execution ofcombat operations. Key reconnaissance tasks in-clude —

• Obtaining location and description of enemyforces.

• Identifying enemy strengths.• Discovering gaps in enemy dispositions.

• Confirming trafficability and other terraincharacteristics.

• Detecting high value targets such as commandposts, communications centers, logistic facili-ties, troop concentrations, firing positions fornuclear-capable systems and other supportingarms.

• Confirming or denying the adoption of a par-ticular course of action by the enemy.

• Confirming and expanding information col-lected by other sources.

Types of ReconnaissanceThere are four types of reconnaissance — route,area, zone, and force-oriented. Route reconnais-sance provides detailed information about a specificroute and the surrounding terrain which could beused to influence movement along that route. Areareconnaissance provides information about a specificpoint target and its immediate surrounding area suchas a town, assembly area, or key facility. Zone re-connaissance is employed to provide a detailed, thor-ough reconnaissance of all important terrain featureswithin specified boundaries. Force-oriented pro-vides information on the location, disposition, andactivities of a specific enemy force.

Reconnaissance MethodsThere are a variety of methods which can be em-ployed to conduct reconnaissance. Reconnaissancemay be aerial, ground-based, or a combination ofboth.

PatrolsIn ground reconnaissance operations, a patrol is theprincipal reconnaissance method employed. A re-connaissance patrol usually gains information aboutthe enemy without his knowledge, employing stealthto avoid detection by the enemy's counter-reconnaissance and security elements.

7-2 FMFM 6-1

Armed Reconnaissance

In certain circumstances, a patrol may conduct anarmed reconnaissance mission, in which it is author-ized to attack targets of opportunity in its prescribedpatrol area.

Reconnaissance by Fire

Fire support or maneuver units may conduct recon-naissance by fire. Known or suspected enemy posi-tions are fired upon in an effort to force the enemyto disclose his position by movement or return fire.

Fundamentals of ReconnaissanceReconnaissance operations are conducted accordingto the following fundamentals.

Orient on the Enemy

The reconnoitering unit must orient itself on the en-emy to be reconnoitered. The reconnoitering unitmust seek the best location or locations from whichit can obtain the information it seeks, without refer-ence to the location of friendly forces. As long asthe unit mission is purely reconnaissance, the unitshould not make any special effort to maintain itselfbetween its parent unit and the enemy. Measuresmust be taken to ensure the freedom of action of re-connaissance units in spite of boundaries or othercontrol measures that might otherwise restrict theiroperations.

Gain and Maintain Contact

Because reconnaissance is a time-consuming opera-tion and the commander requires information asearly as possible to help formulate his plan, observa-tion of the enemy must be gained as soon as possi-ble. Without being detected, reconnaissance ele-ments actively seek contact with the enemy. Be-cause accurate knowledge of the enemy's location,disposition, and movement is a potentially decisiveadvantage, contact is not broken off without permis-sion. Contact may be maintained by ground or airobservation.

Confirm Information Quickly

When contact is made or when a key object is en-countered, the enemy's strength, composition, anddisposition, or the nature of the object must be

detennined quickly. Special efforts will be made todetermine the flanks, gaps, unit boundaries, head-quarters, and supporting arms units. If authorized,fires may be directed into known, suspected, andlikely positions to induce the enemy to reveal its dis-position and strength.

Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately

Unless reconnaissance information reaches the com-mander in time to aid in his decisions, the informa-tion is useless. Inaccurate information may often bemore damaging than no information at all. By itsnature, the chain of command imposes friction onthe rapid reporting of information. Therefore, thecommander must establish special measures to en-sure that vital information is transmitted immediatelyto the echelon most affected by or in need of the in-formation. Essential information must be sent by themost rapid means available to all interested parties,without regard for usual military channels. Informa-tion that appears unimportant taken alone should bereported, as it may be of vital significance to thehigher commander when considered with other avail-able information.

Use Stealth

A reconnaissance mission should not be jeopardizedby engagements with the enemy if the informationcan be obtained without fighting. A reconnaissanceunit should obtain its information by the employmentof stealth wherever possible. It should engage incombat only to prevent the destruction of the unit orto force the enemy to disclose his positions by firewhen this information cannot be obtained by stealth.Information gained by stealth tends to be much morevaluable than the same information obtained with theenemy's knowledge. There will be times, however,in which reconnoitering units will have to fight togain information. Even in these cases, reconnoiter-ing units must not become decisively engaged asthey must retain their freedom to maneuver.

ResponsibilityThe G-2 has staff responsibility for reconnaissance.In conjunction with the G-3, he develops the recon-naissance and surveillance (R&S) plan, which allo-cates resources and assigns specific reconnaissancemissions to subordinate elements.

Marine Division 7-3

The LAR battalion and division reconnaissance com-pany have the primary responsibility for conduct ofR&S missions in support of the division. Regimentsand other subordinate units of the division may betasked to conduct specific reconnaissance missions insupport of the overall division operation.

All subordinate units conduct reconnaissance in sup-port of their own intelligence efforts through the useof reconnaissance and combat patrols. All Marineshave an inherent responsibility to report informationon the enemy and the environment up and down thechain of command and to adjacent units.

PlanningThe objective of the R&S plan is to integrate the re-connaissance effort with the concept of operations.This integration develops the intelligence required toenable rapid decisionmaking during the execution ofthe operation. The G-2 develops the R&S plan aspart of his overall collection plan. He uses the com-mander's intent and PIRs to prioritize the reconnais-sance effort. The G-2 uses the results of the LPBprocess and the concept of operations to focus theR&S plan.

In developing the R&S plan, the G-2 must considerwhen the information is required and when assetsmust be in position to collect and report that infor-mation. He must allow sufficient time for missionplanning, insertion, and movement to the objectivearea. The G-2 must also ensure that available recon-naissance units are not overcommitted and must at-tempt to retain a reserve capability to respond tounforeseen requirements. Factors which influencethe development of the R&S plan include —

• Time available.• Reconnaissance assets available.• Knowledge of the enemy situation.• Available information from other sources.• Enemy counter-reconnaissance capabilities.

Based on the PIR, anticipated enemy activity, overallcollection plan, and the concept of operations, theG-2 develops specific reconnaissance tasks. Eachtask includes a listing of where to look, what to lookfor, what information should be reported, and whattime the information is required. The G-2, in coor-

dination with the G-3, then resources thereconnaissance effort.

Deep reconnaissance operations will normally beconducted by the LAR battalion or the division re-connaissance company. Reconnaissance tasks insupport of the close battle will normally be con-ducted by security forces and committed forces inthe main battle area. Such missions are usually doneas collateral tasks concurrently with their primarymission, although the G-3 may assign a primary mis-sion of reconnaissance in force, reconnaissance byfire, or armed reconnaissance to any of these units.In the reserve or rear areas, reserve units, MPs, en-gineers or other combat support and CSS units maybe assigned reconnaissance tasks. Such tasks mightinclude route reconnaissance of counterattack routesor MSRs, LZ reconnaissance, or identification of re-constitution sites.

The R&S plan should incorporate the specializedreconnaissance and surveillance capabilities such.as engineer reconnaissance, NBC reconnaissance,counterbattery radars, as well as any attached or di-rect support R&S assets provided by the MEF.

ExecutionIndividual units carry out assigned reconnaissancetasks in accordance with the approved R&S plan.The G-2 establishes a surveillance and reconnais-sance center (SARC) to supervise the execution ofthe R&S plan and to coordinate the division's recon-naissance effort. Detailed information on the SARCis contained in FMFM 3-21, MAGTF IntelligenceOperations.

Rapid processing and utilization of reconnaissanceinformation is critical to the success of division op-erations. The G-2 works with the reconnaissanceunit commanders to establish reporting thresholdsand a rapid, flexible, and responsive reporting sys-tem. The G-2 develops procedures within his intelli-gence section to ensure reconnaissance reports areprocessed, analyzed, and integrated into mission spe-cific intelligence products. The perishable nature ofmost reconnaissance information demands that theintelligence section maintain situational awarenessand rapidly disseminate time-sensitive reports to theappropriate operational agency.

7-4 FMFM 6-1

The results of reconnaissance operations should beutilized to shape the battlespace. In offensive opera-tions, the commander should base his plan for ma-neuver on the concept of reconnaissance-pull.Reconnaissance determines which routes are suitablefor maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak,and where gaps exist. Thus, reconnaissance shouldpull the main force towards and along the path ofleast resistance. This facilitates the division's initia-tive and agility. Reconnaissance-pull is also valid indefensive operations.

Security OperationsThe division conducts security operations to providemaneuver space and reaction time, and to protect themain body. It incorporates security in the planningof all offensive or defensive operations. The 0-3 de-velops and recommends the concept of operations.This includes assigning security responsibilities andmissions to subordinate commanders, who train thenplan, prepare, and execute security operations.Every unit has a continuous security role.

Security operations include cover, guard, screen,and counter-reconnaissance operations. Cover in-cludes the functions of screen and guard operationsbut also develops the situation. Cover deceives, dis-organizes, and destroys enemy forces. Guard mis-sions include the functions of screen and protect themain body from ground observation and direct fire.Screens maintain surveillance, conduct counter-reconnaissance, provide early warning to the mainbody, and harass and impede the enemy through in-direct fires. Counter-reconnaissance is inherent inall combat operations. It prevents the enemy fromobtaining information about the division through vis-ual observation or other detection means.

Cover OperationsCovering missions differ depending on the type ofoperation the division is conducting. In the offense,a covering force is normally expected to penetratethe enemy's security forces and main defensive posi-tions sufficiently to facilitate division main bodyunits attacking the enemy's main defenses in depth;to identify the location and deployment of enemyforces in the main defensive positions; and to limit

the ability of the enemy security forces to collectintelligence and disrupt the deployment and commit-ment of forces from the main body. In the defense,a covering force conducts operations to either defendagainst or delay an attacking enemy force. A defen-sive covering force may be tasked to force the en-emy to prematurely deploy and commence hisattack; to identify the enemy effort; and to reducethe enemy's strength by destroying specific maneu-ver units and stripping away essential assets such asartillery. A division covering force may be organ-ized around a tactically self-contained, regimental-sized task force, but any covering force employedmust have mobility equal to or greater than that ofthe enemy.

The covering force orients on objectives establishedby the 0-3 and division commander. These objec-tives may be in the enemy's security zone with acounter-reconnaissance orientation to strip the en-emy's ability to determine in what force and wherethe division is attacking. This action requires thecovering force to use a two-team method — oneteam locates the enemy reconnaissance in the secu-rity zone and another team destroys it.

Locating enemy reconnaissance normally requires amix of ground, air, and electronic reconnaissance.Ground forces may include LAR, regimental recon-naissance, and battalion scout-sniper platoons. Themission of these units is to locate enemy forces sothat other maneuver and fire support assets may at-tack them. Another objective of a covering forcemay be to determine routes through enemy defensivebelts. The covering force uncovers enemy strengths,weaknesses, gaps, locations, and dispositions andserves as a reconnaissance-pull for the main body. Itmay conduct limited objective attacks or probesacross a wide front.

If the covering force conducts a movement to contactagainst a moving enemy, it may operate as a recon-naissance in force. As a reconnaissance in force, itconducts a series of limited objective attacks, and ituses objectives to orient its movement. The battal-ions of the covering force seize each objectiveand continue until contact is established. Reconnais-sance and counter-reconnaissance continue to be

Marine Division 7-5

paramount. Once it establishes contact, the coveringforce conducts a hasty attack or hasty defense tomaintain contact and/or establish conditions that willpermit the uninterrupted passage of the main bodyagainst the enemy force.

The G-2 must consider intelligence support for theoffensive covering force. He must provide a fullcomplement of intelligence resources to the coveringforce, normally be task-organized into an intelli-gence team. Ground-based systems must be able torapidly displace and should operate to allow continu-ous coverage. The G-2 coordinates the employmentof MEF and ACE intelligence resources that providelong-range coverage over wide areas forward and tothe flanks of the covering force. The CE and ACEmay also cue other joint assets to confirm or deny in-formation provided by other agencies and to providecoverage when division assets displace.

Fire support planning must include both supportingand deceptive fires. If sufficient artillery is avail-able, each battalion in the covering force shouldhave artillery in direct support. Counterbattery ra-dars should be part of the covering force's artillerytask organization. The covering force should estab-lish critical friendly radar zones around the main ef-fort to expedite reactive counterfire.

Fire support coordinating measures should be per-missive and on order. These measures should beused in conjunction with phase lines and well aheadof the covering force. Fire plans should be simple,but as detailed as possible. The FSC should plangroups and series of targets to support rapid-movingmaneuver forces and plan FASCAM on flank ave-nues of approach.

The FSC should consider the use of electronic war-fare, especially against the enemy's reconnaissanceand fire support nets in the fire support plan. CASshould be integrated into the fire support plan and,when possible, preplanned against the enemy. Evenwhen the enemy is moving, the G-2, G-3, and FSCcan project when they expect to make contact withthe enemy. Wargaming this event may provide anapproximate location and time for preplanning CAS.

The G-3 task-organizes air defense assets, based onrecommendations from the ACE commander, to thecovering force. Shoulder-launched systems are posi-tioned on dominant terrain and along likely air ave-nues. Because of their short range and need tomatch the momentum of the covering force, air de-fense assets should be part of the subordinate units ofthe covering force. The air defense unit commandermust have the capability to monitor the MEF earlywarning net.

Engineers with the covering force identify routes forforward movement and lateral routes to provide thecommander flexibility as he develops the situation.In coordination with the FSC, the engineer plansFASCAM on avenues of approach into the flanks ofthe covering force. The engineers should be pre-pared for earth moving, rapid obstacle breaching,and assault bridging.

In the defense, the covering force may be controlledby the MEF, ACE, or the division. When the cover-ing force is employed in a multidivision MEF orjoint operation, MEF control of the covering forcebattle permits the MEF to shape the battle, allowsthe division to concentrate on the decisive close ormain battle area battle, and eliminates the need foreach division to fight independent covering forcebattles.

The division's covering force operates well forwardof the main body to develop the situation and to de-ceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces. Thedefensive covering force mission may be to delayforward of a given phase line, time, or event. Thedivision must plan for the rearward passage of thecovering force by establishing passage points withthe main battle area regiments and the battle hando-ver line. A phase line depicts the area the coveringforce is to delay in front. It should be forward of thebattle handover line. Being forward of the battlehandover line gives the covering force commanderthe depth to complete the delay and yet retainenough maneuver space to conduct an orderly pas-sage. This also aids in the covering force's stag-gered withdrawal. Maneuver forces in the coveringforce should execute detailed counter-reconnaissanceplans.

7-6 FMFM 6-1

Intelligence assets supporting the defensive coveringforce are much the same as in the offensive coveringforce. In the defense, intelligence assets are movedin echelon to the rear, withdrawing in a way that fa-cilitates their use in the main battle area. Fire sup-port assets are organized and function in much thesame maimer. Fire plans are more detailed and anintegral part of the scheme of maneuver, Artilleryand other fire support assets are planned to mass atcritical times and places. Observers watch obstaclesand plan fires to cover them. Fire support coordi-nating measures are permissive and employed closeenough to the covering force to facilitate engagingthe enemy.

CAS is planned for engagement areas. Surveillanceis conducted by reconnaissance teams to observe andmonitor decision points for initiation of these attacks.Engineers with the covering force conduct counter-mobility and survivability tasks as their first priority.Air defense assets provide coverage on likely airavenues of approach. This is critical as the coveringforce tends to mass during the withdrawal. Cover-age of passage points and lanes into the main battlearea must be coordinated with air defense unitswithin the main battle area.

Guard Operations

Guard Forces

Guard forces and the offensive covering force differin their orientation during movement and in theirzone of action. The covering force focuses on theenemy, maneuvers toward him, and covers the entiredivision zone. Guard forces orient on the movementof the main body. They provide security along spe-cific routes of movement of the main body.

Advance Guard. The advance guard operates withinsupporting range of the main body and protects itfrom ground observation and direct fire. The divi-sion may provide and control the advance guard orassign a maneuver unit this responsibility. The G-3in the tactical echelon monitors the advanceguard's operations if it is controlled by the divi-sion. The G-3 monitors its advance and operationsas with any other committed force. He integrates theactions of the advance guard with those of the cover-ing force and the main body.

The advance guard conducts route reconnaissance infront of the main body. The tactical echelon coordi-nates its movement with the main body to ensure thatit remains within supporting range. Generally, re-connaissance elements of the advance guard shouldremain within range of supporting artillery. Artil-lery moves to provide support to the advance, flank,and rear guards and to rapidly occupy positionswhen the main body must deploy. Priority of fires isnorthally given to the advance guard during move-ment. This facilitates conduct of a hasty attack orhasty defense. The FSC at the tactical echelon coor-dinates this for the advance guard FSC when the ad-vance guard is under division control.

The advance guard FSC plans fire support much likethe covering force's, emphasizing simple fire planswith as much detail as possible. Groups, series, andsmoke missions are planned to support the maneuvercommander's scheme of maneuver. The FSC coor-dinates these through the tactical echelon FSC. Thetactical echelon coordinates C2W support for the ad-vance guard. The G-2 at the tactical echelon dis-seminates combat information and intelligence fromthe covering force and main echelon to the advanceguard.

The G-3 at the tactical echelon coordinates engineerand air defense support for the advance guard. Hecoordinates with the MEF, ACE, and CSSE to pro-vide required support. Engineer elements in themain body respond to the advance guard require-ments. Because of their short range, shoulder-launched air defense assets move with the advanceguard. When the lead regiment provides the ad-vance guard, the regiment coordinates, integrates,and supports the advance guard.

Flank Guard. The maneuver units of the main bodynormally provide and control flank guards. Thismission entails the conduct of defensive operations tothe flanks to prevent ground observation and directfire against the main body.

The flank guard establishes defensive positions to theflanks for stationary or moving forces. To securethe moving force, the flank guard leapfrogs forces tosuccessive positions along the flank of the mainbody. LAR or regimental units may conduct screens

Marine Division 7-7

to flanks which require close integration with flankguard units.

The regimental S-2 closely coordinates intelligencesupport for the flank guard. The flank guard mustplan reconnaissance and surveillance in detail to in-clude provisions for early warning, monitoring thethreat, and economy of force. Counter-reconnaissance actions assist in providing security tothe flank guard and ultimately the main body. Theymay also provide the first indication a threat is de-veloping to the flank.

The maneuver unit controlling the flank guardshould plan for its reinforcement or withdrawal. Toreinforce the flank guard, the flank guard becomesthe fixing force while other maneuver units engagethe enemy with fire and maneuver. To withdraw theguard, the main body maneuver unit establishes ahasty defense and passage points for the flank guardto move into the main body positions.

Rear Guard. The rear guard protects the main bodyfrom the rear during retrograde operations or frombypassed units during exploitation and pursuit. Therear guard must orient on the movement of the mainbody to prevent gaps from developing and being cutoff. Main body forces must position supporting ele-ments toward the rear of the main body to supportthe rear guard. This is particularly true of artillery.During retrograde operations, the first priority ofCAS should be to the rear guard.

The rear guard commander prepares to conduct a se-ries of delays from subsequent battle positions. Hemust not decisively engage the enemy unless thecontrolling commander approves. The main bodymay not be in a position to reinforce the rear guard.During offensive or retrograde operations, the rearguard occupies battle positions. It moves to new po-sitions by echelon toward the main body. The rearguard elements closest to the enemy should not beoutside supporting range of the main body. This re-quires close coordination between the rear guard andits controlling headquarters. The rear guard com-mander must closely monitor his subordinate units toallow displacing forces to occupy new positions be-fore in-place units vacate theirs.

During the exploitation and pursuit, the rearmaneuver unit controls the rear guard. During ret-rograde operations, the tactical echelon controls therear guard. Main body forces should identify andassist in preparing battle positions for the rear guardforce. Engineers should prepare survivability posi-tions. They also conduct countermobility operationsto delay, disorganize, and limit the enemy force. Inretrograde operations, they coordinate obstacle freezones and lanes through obstacle belts with the rearguard. Artillery and air delivered mines can rapidlyclose these lanes and reinforce breached obstacles.In exploitation and pursuit, FASCAM should assistthe rear guard to delay the enemy and to block ap-proaches from the rear. Fires should be planned toassist the rear guard to disengage and move to subse-quent positions.

Screen Operations

Screen Forces

Screens provide early warning and harass and im-pede the enemy with indirect fires. The divisionmay use screens as an economy of force securitymission. When sufficient maneuver space exists, thedivision should position the screen far enough awayfrom the main body to allow sufficient time to iden-tify and counter the threat. This distance will proba-bly be outside the range of supporting artillery,placing increased emphasis on the availability ofCAS to support the screen.

The screen commander combines reconnaissance,surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance techniquesto identify threats to the main body. He uses the IPBto identify enemy avenues of approach and to estab-lish named areas of interest (NAIs) for his forces toobserve. As he identifies a threat, the screen com-mander reports to the tactical echelon and attemptsto impede the enemy within his capability. Concur-rently, he uses fire support assets against the threat.This may require the screen to leave stay-behindforces to direct the attack. Reconnaissance unitsmay also support directing the attack. As the screenwithdraws into range, it employs main bodyartillery.

7-8 FMFM 6-1

Screening a Stationary Force. A security elementscreens a stationary force by establishing a series ofobservation posts along a designated screen line.The observation posts are located to provide overlap-ping observation. Areas that cannot be observedfrom observation posts are patrolled. Observationposts immediately report any sightings of. enemy ac-tivity and engage enemy forces with indirect fires atmaximum range. Maintaining contact, the screenfalls back along previously reconnoitered routes tosubsequent observation posts.

Screening a Moving Force. Advance or rearscreens must screen the entire width of the mainbody' s frontage; flank screens must screen the entiredepth of the main body's flank. Screening elementsmove on an axis generally parallel to the movementof the main body. Upon making contact with the en-emy, screening elements engage at maximum rangewith indirect fires, or direct fire if necessary, and re-port the contact. The screening force has several op-tions, based on the situation:

• Continue to advance if resistance is minimal orthe enemy tries to withdraw.

• Report the enemy location and bypass if the po-sition is not a threat.

• While avoiding decisive engagement and withincapabilities, develop the situation until rein-forcements from the main body arrive.

• Maintaining contact, fall back and hand the bat-• tie over to elements of the main body.

Counter-reconnaissance OperationsCounter-reconnaissance is the sum of action taken bythe division to counter enemy reconnaissance effortsthroughout the divisions area of operation. A de-tailed analysis of the enemy's reconnaissance capa-bilities during the IPB is crucial to understanding thenature, composition, and timing of the enemy's re-connaissance elements. This analysis, combinedwith the division commanders concept and estimate,will provide indications of enemy reconnaissance ob-jectives. Typical enemy reconnaissance objectivesare to —

• Identi1' possible sites for communicationsinstallations.

• Identify, locate, and report on friendly head-quarters, troop locations, communications cen-ters, and unit movement.

• Determine the disposition of friendly defenses,locate friendly boundaries and artillery posi-tions, provide terrain information on the ap-proaches to friendly defensive positions, andreport friendly emplacement of demolitions,minefields, and other obstacles.

• Determine obstacle crossing sites and providehydrographic information on water obstacles.

• Monitor areas of suspected NBC contami-nation.

• Identify routes for advance, withdrawal, andlateral communications.

The G-2 develops likely courses of action for enemyreconnaissance and main body elements during theIPB process. He identifies likely avenues of ap-proach and develops NAIs to focus the collectionand monitoring assets of the division. The G-3 usesthis information to determine required counter-reconnaissance actions and to task units to executethem. The G-3 fixes responsibilities and providesresources to units to locate, fix, and destroy enemyreconnaissance forces. Counter-reconnaissance re-quires a two-team approach — one to donduct sur-veillance and acquire enemy reconnaissanceelements and the other to close with and destroythem.

Counter-reconnaissance consists of active, and pas-sive measures. Active measures detect, fix, and de-stroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Passivemeasures conceal friendly units and capabilities anddeceive and confuse the enemy. The G-3 integratesboth types into the division's counter-reconnaissanceplan.

All subordinate units develop and coordinate theircounter-reconnaissance action. They fix responsibil-ity for patrols, ambush requirements, specific obser-vation post (OP) locations, and observation of NAIs.The G-3 reviews subordinate unit counter-recon-naissance actions and issues additional taskings to fillany gaps.

Countering the enemy's reconnaissance effort pre-sents a two-part problem. First is how to acquire thereconnaissance elements. Second is how to counter

Marine Division 7-9

them, once acquired. In most cases, destruction ofenemy reconnaissance units is the logical course ofaction. However, there may be significant disadvan-tages to attacking the lead elements of an enemy ad-vance such as revealing the location and dispositionsof your defenses or compromising your own intelli-gence effort. In certain circumstances, a more pru-dent course might be to maintain the enemyreconnaissance units under surveillance or subjectthem to deception operations. As part of thecounter-reconnaissance planning effort, the G-2,G-3, and FSC consider potential reactions to the de-tection of enemy reconnaissance forces. The com-mander and staff should —

• Develop NAIs and assign responsibilities forobservation.

• Provide for continuous surveillance (overcom-mitment of the counter-reconnaissance forceweakens security).

• Use aviation assets to detect infiltration.• Assign specific responsibilities for obstacle

security.• Plan to recover forward security elements.

Planning ConsiderationsAs the G-3 and other staff incorporate security re-quirements into the planning of division operations,they should consider the following;

Adequate Support to Security Forces

The covering force, especially in offensive opera-tions, operates well forward of the division mainbody. The G-3 allocates resources to the coveringforce so that it functions as a tactically self-sufficientforce. Guard forces operate within supporting rangeof the main body. However, the G-3 and other staffelements must consider relationships between themain body and the guard force.

Ranges and Capabilities of C2W Assets, FireSupport, and Communications Systems

The staff must consider the range and capabilities ofcombat and combat support weapons and systems asit assigns security responsibilities and missions tosubordinate conunanders. Terrain, weather, and en-emy electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)actions may significantly impact on effective rangesfor weapons and C2W systems.

Time-Distance Relationships

The staff considers time-distance relationships whenusing screens or guards. Screens provide earlywarning to the main body. During the planningprocess, the planner must consider the time requiredfor the main body to counter a threat and to computethe distance the enemy could move during that time.This aids in detennining location of the screen. Ifsufficient maneuver space is not available to accom-modate this time-distance relationship, then the staffshould consider employing a guard rather than ascreen.

Economy of Force Factors

Planners should consider economy of force in as-signing security responsibilities and missions. Fewerforces are required to screen a force than to guard it.Where possible, the plans element should consideremploying screens as opposed to guards. The con-siderations of adequate support, time-distance, andthe threat will affect this decision.

Passage of Lines

Planners should consider the requirements for pas-sage of lines by security forces. An offensive cover-ing force may be required to conduct a forwardpassage of lines as it begins a movement to contactor leads the division in an exploitation or pursuit.Similarly, a defensive covering force may execute arearward passage into the main battle area. Screensor guards may conduct a passage with main bodyforces. This consideration may assist the G-3 in de-termining which headquarters provides and controlsthe security force.

Formation of the Main BodyThe staff must also consider the division formation.Each formation has its own strengths, weaknesses,and planning considerations for security.

DeceptionDeception is an important combat multiplier. It en-hances the conditions which allow the commander toeffectively mass forces at the decisive time andplace. It is considered for every division operation.The ultimate goal of division-level deception opera-tions is to manipulate enemy behavior and to createopportunities for exploitation. Battlefield deception

7-10 FMFM 6-1

enables the commander to conduct economy of forceoperations, to mass at a decisive point, and to con-serve and protect the force. Well-planned and exe-cuted deceptions achieve surprise.

PlanningDeception operations cannot be planned independentof tactical operations. The primary consideration inany deception is the MEF mission and deceptionplan. Deception operations, whenever possible, arecentralized with the highest commander of the area.Failure to present an integrated deception operationwastes resources and may cause portions of the planto contradict each other. The MEF and adjacentheadquarters should be aware of division deceptionoperations. Failure to coordinate can damage otherunit's operations or deceptions.

A deception must be plausible. The enemy must be-lieve that the division's actions are in accordancewith its doctrine and that the division can do whatthe deception indicates. Enemy intelligence collec-tion channels must be fed information in a coordi-nated, redundant effort. The division may have topass the same information repeatedly through multi-ple channels to ensure the enemy collects the decep-tion. The enemy must see a picture consistent withour capabilities and his beliefs.

Deceptions should be adaptable and flexible. As theplan changes, the deception may also be forced tochange. The division must portray the deception foras long as it is feasible and beneficial. For this tohappen, the overall plan, including the deception,must have built-in flexibility.

Integration is vital to successful deceptions. A de-ception must not only be part of the overall plan, itmust extend into every facet of the plan; that is,aside from being part of maneuver, it must be part ofthe logistics, fire support, air defense, command andcontrol, and engineer effort as well.

The division can expect the enemy to know itsnorms, The enemy will seek to find where the divi-sion places it supplies. He will look for medical fa-cilities and fire support units. These signaturesprovide him a basis for true intent. Without full in-tegration into all plans, the deception will quicklylose credibility.

The target of any deception is the enemy decision-maker. He has the authority to react to the decep-tion. An elaborate deception should not be designedif the enemy is incapable of either collecting, analyz-ing, or reacting to the information or if the deceptionis contrary to normal operating procedures.

Feedback is important in any deception as the meansto verify the deception must be established. The di-vision's normal intelligence infrastructure of spe-cially established means can normally accomplishthis. It may not always be possible to verify the de-ception, and for this reason all plans must be flexi-ble, including deception plans.

Finally, the division must consider cost of a decep-tion in terms of resource expenditure. For a decep-tion to appear real, the division must dedicateadequate resources. The cost depends on the type ofdeception (demonstration, display, feint, or ruse) andits objective. The division must also measure costsin risk and flexibility. For example, it may be veryrisky for the success of the division's main effort torely solely on the success of a planned demonstra-tion. Should the demonstration not produce the ex-pected enemy reaction, it could cause the main effortto fail. Flexibility is built into the plan by usingbranches, sequels, or executable deceptions.

ObjectiveThe objective of any deception is to cause the enemyto act contrary to his interests and beneficial to thedivision's. The division's goals are to —

• Condition the target's beliefs.• Influence the target's action by misleading him

and persuading him to adopt a specific courseof action.

• Benefit from his actions through surprise, supe-rior combat power, and improved survivability.

The five components of battlefield deception are theobjective, target, story, plan, and event The objec-tive is what the division wants the enemy to do. Thetarget is the enemy decisiomnaker. The story iswhat the division portrays to the enemy. The plan isthe concept of how the story is portrayed. Eventsare specific actions performed as part of the plan.Since deception is inherent in planning and

Marine Division 7-11

concurrent with current operations, the division G-3has overall responsibility for deception.

If the intent is to induce the enemy to do somethingthe division can exploit, the commander and staffmust address deception early in the planning process.Deception designed after the division has developed,wargamed, and decided on a course of action iswasted, It becomes an afterthought, ill planned be-cause of lack of time, and ill resourced because alldivision assets have been allocated in the wargame ofthe chosen course of action. In providing his decep-tion guidance, the division commander should con-sider —

• What he wants the enemy to do..• How the division can best make the enemy do

it.

• What forces and material will be dedicated tothe effort.

• What enemy behavior is expected.• How the division can benefit from that be-

havior.

The staff uses this guidance to develop a deceptionplan or course of action in the same manner as it de-velops and analyzes other courses of action. TheG-2 provides input, identifring enemy weakness andvulnerabilitjes, and enemy collection assets that candetect the deception. Done properly, a deceptionshould be part of a course of action. Like anycourse of action, deception development must in-volve the entire staff with operations security meas-ures developed and implemented.

One method of planning and preparing deceptionplans concurrently with the commander's operationsplan is to prepare two or more related courses of ac-tion rather than optimizing one. This builds flexibil-ity into the plan. The division selects one course ofaction for execution and another related course ofaction for portrayal to the enemy. Both courses (onehidden and one displayed) seek to obtain a specificreaction. Thus, if the enemy reacts to the visiblecourse of action, the concealed course of action willbe able to exploit him. Conversely, if the enemy re-jects the visible course of action, reacting instead tothe concealed course or yet another, the divisionmay still be able to exploit him by executing the dis-played course of action. The key to this type of

deception is that no matter what the enemy does, thecommander still has an executable course of action.

The deception process relies greatly on signaturemanagement. Signature management is the use of —

• Deception assets to augment or mask signa-tures.

• OPSEC assets and techniques to diminishsignatures.

• Real assets and techniques to augment or di-mimsh course of action signatures.

The division uses signature management to reducethe visibility of key activities associated with thecourse of action it intends to execute. It does thisthrough the judicious use of OPSEC techniques andassets and the manner in which it conducts its realoperations. For instance, a reserve force for the in-tended course of action may go to radio silence orcoordinate a passage of lines face to face. This mayhide the existence and intent of the unit. An engi-neer unit might lay a deliberate minefield at night.Logistic supply points might be hidden in a built-uparea. These techniques reduce signatures and avoiddetection.

Simultaneously, key signatures associated with thedeceptive courses of action are highlighted throughmore visible activities. For example, the reserveforce could support the deception course of action.It could coordinate a passage of lines along a majoravenue of approach via radio. Logistic supply pointscould be poorly camouflaged or even left out in theopen. Dummy logistic assets, such as mockups andempty containers, can augment the signature.

ExecutionAll staff sections must carefully control and monitorexecution of deception operations. Resource avail-ability within the division, or the lack thereof, mayrequire the division to request resources to providepeople and assets to replicate C2 signatures.

To properly evaluate deception activities, the divi-sion must determine their impact on the enemy.This requires reliable feedback. Without feedback,the division cannot be confident the enemy decision-maker is intentionally reacting to the deception inways contrary to his interest. The division obtains

7-12 FMFM 6-1

feedback in one of three ways. It can use the estab-lished intelligence-gathering infrastructure, or it canestablish a special means with which to collect infor-mation about the deception, or it can use a combina-tion of the aforementioned. This involves usingmany of the same assets used routinely to collect in-telligence, an intelligence support force specificallytask organized to support the deception or a combi-nation of the two.

The division may require only a reasonable assur-ance that intended signals reached the decisiomnakerand had their intended effect. This will not alwaysbe possible to confirm. The division must rely oninformation available and knowledge of the enemy todetermine his reaction to the deception.

The termination of a deception can be as critical asits execution. The concept of playing out the decep-tion should present a dilemma for the enemy. Thedivision should continue the deception for as long aspossible with the intent of never allowing the enemyto know he has been deceived, or to phase out thedeception in such a manner that the enemy views itas a perfectly plausible activity. If the enemy dis-covers the deception for what it is, he may becomethe exploiter instead of the exploited. The enemymay also review the signals he received throughoutthe operation and view them skeptically, reducingthe division's ability to deceive him in futureoperations.

Mobility, Countermobility, andSurvivabilityTo succeed on the fluid battlefield, the commandermust ensure that his own forces are free to maneuverand must take measures to deny the enemy the same.Few factors can enhance friendly mobility and re-duce the enemy's mobility as much as the intelligentand aggressive use of combat engineers. The divi-sion and subordinate commanders must understandand emphasize combat engineer support if they areto realize the full effectiveness of combined arms.Combat engineer support has three primary functions— mobility, countermobiliry, and survivability. Eachfunction contains several tasks.

MobilityEngineers assist in enhancing the mobility of friendlyforces. Mobility operations reduce the effects of ex-isting or reinforcing obstacles to improve the move-ment of forces and critical supplies. Support mayvary from simply filling a crater on an importantroute to breaching a complex barrier. Mobility op-erations are part of both offensive and defensiveoperations. Tasks involved include engineer recon-naissance, repair of roads and bridges, gap crossing,and minefield and obstacle breaching and clearance.

Engineer Reconnaissance

Engineer reconnaissance is the primary method ofobtaining engineer intelligence. It does not have tobe conducted by engineers. Reconnaissance or in-fantry units may conduct engineer reconnaissance.They may satisfy engineer intelligence requirementsin the course of other reconnaissance missions ifgiven the proper guidance. Ordinarily, the bestsolution is to include qualified engineer personnel toaccompany one of these units on a reconnaissancemission to gather and interpret technical data.

Repair of Roads and Bridges

Combat engineers with heavy equipment are capableof providing temporary repair of main supply routesand bridges. When reinforced with personnel andequipment from the engineer support battalion,FSSG, or the naval mobile construction battalion,combat engineers can provide more permanent re-pair to main supply routes and repair or replacedamaged/destroyed spans of bridges.

Gap Crossing

In addition to construction of nonstandard bridgesfor crossing rivers or streams, engineers can also as-sist in crossing dry gaps such as tank ditches or dryriver beds by filling or leveling the banks when aug-mented with required equipment.

Minefields and Obstacles Breachingand ClearanceEngineers should be used for those breaching andclearing tasks beyond the capability of the supportedcombat troops. Engineers with forward combat unitsshould be equipped to breach minefields and

Marine Division 7-13

obstacles. Complete removal will be assigned tofollow-on engineers and other support forces.

CountermobilityCountermobility involves those actions that impedemovement of the opposing forces with minimal im-pairment to the movement and activities of the divi-sion. Countermobility tasks include emplacement ofor improvement of obstacles and barriers, and theuse of demolitions.

Emplacement or Improvements in Obstaclesand Barriers

Obstacles are any natural or man-made obstructions,including mines, that canalize, delay, restrict or di-vert movement of a force. Barriers are coordinatedseries of obstacles. Both should be covered by fireto achieve the greatest effect. Obstacles and barri-ers alone cannot stop an advancing enemy alto-gether. However, they can enhance the effec-tiveness of friendly fires and can cause the enemylosses in personnel, equipment, and time.

Employment of Obstacles and Barriers

When employing obstacles and barriers in defensiveoperations, commanders must be prepared to dealwith the same obstacles when a transition is made tooffensive operations. The method used depends onMETT-T. In all cases, the need for coordinationwith all subordinate, senior, and adjacent commandsis seldom more urgent than in obstacle and barrieremployment. Some solutions are —

• Planning to bypass the barriers when the transi-tion is made.

• Leaving lanes in minefields and barriers for thespecific use of friendly forces.

• Planning for removal or destruction of the ob-stacle before offensive operations begin.

When using demolitions, caution must be exercisedin authorizing the blocking of roads or the destruc-tion of bridges. The commander must weigh the im-mediate need to delay the enemy with demolitionsagainst the possible loss of maneuver options if thesame roads or bridges are required by friendly forceswhen they transition from defense to offense is

made.

SurvivabilitySurvivability operations are characterized by the em-ployment of protective measures that decrease the le-thality of the enemy's firepower while units fight andmaneuver. Survivability measures include the use ofcountersurveillance measures, deception, smoke, andthe construction of protective positions. The major-ity of survivability tasks are actually accomplishedby the units of the division. Engineers enhance theireffectiveness by providing guidance, technical assis-tance, some special materials, and equipment sup-port. Hardening of artillery positions, using engi-neer support when available, is often preferable tosurvivability moves because there is no need to inter-rupt fire support.

Engineer survivability tasks include development ofprotective positions and terrain reinforcement. De-velopment of protective positions may be dug-in,have overhead protection, and incorporate reinforc-ing materials. Terrain reinforcement includes suchtechniques as increasing natural defilade by buildingbeams or by integrating existing terrain features intothe needs of the friendly forces.

Sources of Engineer Support

Engineer support for the division is provided by thefollowing units:

Combat Engineer Battalion. Within the division, theprimary source of engineer support is the combat en-gineer battalion. Close combat engineer support forthe division, especially in the functions of mobilityenhancement and countermobility, is normally ac-complished by attaching or assigning direct supportmissions to combat engineer companies or platoons.However, some centralization of combat engineersby the division will nearly always be required to en-sure that the full range of engineer requirements canbe satisfied. Engineer support to the rear of forwardelements, such as maintaining supply routes in thedivision's area of responsibility, will generally beperformed under the centralized control of the com-bat engineer battalion. The combat engineer battal-ion has no organic bridging assets.

Engineer Support Battalion. Although the primarymission of the engineer support battalion of theFSSG is general engineering support, the battalion is

7-14 FMFM6-1

the main source of assets for gap crossing, a combatengineer function. The bridge company providesthis capability. The current capability ranges frompontoon floats to medium girder bridges. These as-sets are considered assault bridging assets and re-quire the seizure of the far side of the crossing siteand free from direct or observed indirect fires.There are two methods by which the bridge com-pany supports a division unit — a detachment of thebridge company may be attached to the combat engi-neer unit in support of the division maneuver unit orthe bridge company may simply provide the bridgingequipment and some supervisory personnel to thecombat engineer unit.

Nonengineer Units of the Division. The bulk of en-gineer work is done by Marines of the supportedunits, supervised by engineers. The main responsi-bility of the combat engineer battalion and its subor-dinate units is to provide advice, technicalassistance, and supervision for engineer tasks. Evenin those cases where direct supervision by engineersis not possible, most division units have some capa-bility to accomplish many of these functions. Infan-trymen, for example, are trained in preparing hastyfield fortifications. Artillery units have organicearthmoving equipment. The assault amphibian bat-talion has the mobility/countermobility platoon withthe three-shot line charge for clearing minefields.The tank battalion has the mine rake and mineplowfor proofing minefields and the armored vehicle-launched bridge and towed assault bridge for gapcrossing.

PlanningEngineer planning must be coordinated at all levelsand must encompass both combat support and CSSengineer requirements of the supported forces. Theunit engineer officer must ensure that the general orexecutive staff and subordinate commanders keephim fully informed during planning. Engineer plan-fling is based on the concept of operations of the sup-ported force, the engineer mission assigned, thepriority of tasks, and the engineer assets available.Primary considerations that the engineer officer andthe support commander must take into account whenestimating the situation and developing their plansare as follows:

• Topography and terrain of the area ofoperations.

• Personnel, supplies, and equipment needed forthe engineer tasks and the sequence in whichthey should be phased into the area ofoperations.

• Status of training of engineer units to accom-plish any special tasks required by the sup-ported commander.

• Anticipated rate of consumption of engineersupplies.

• Enemy engineer capability.• Friendly task organization, with special atten-

tion to quantities of wheeled and trackedvehicles.

Chapter 8

Fire Support

FirepowerFirepower is the amount of fire that may be deliv-ered by a unit, position, or weapon system. It pro-vides destructive force and is essential in defeatingthe enemy's ability and will to fight. Firepower con-tributes significantly to combat power and is an inte-gral component of maneuver. Firepower is

exploited through autonomous fires, deep supportingfires, and close supporting fires. Autonomous firesare those delivered by direct fire weapons in self-defense or as part of• self-supporting offensive ac-tions. Close supporting fires are those delivered byarmed aircraft, cannons, rockets, missiles, navalguns, mortars, and electronic attack systems againstenemy troops, weapons, or positions which, becauseof their proximity, present the most immediate andserious threat to the supported unit. Close support-ing fires require detailed integration and coordina-tion with the movement and autonomous fires of thesupported force. Deep supporting fires are those de-livered by armed aircraft, cannons, rockets, missiles,naval guns, and electronic attack systems against en-emy forces or objectives not in the immediate vicin-ity of our forces to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroyenemy potential before it can be employed. Collec-tively, deep and close supporting fires against landtargets are commonly referred to as fire support.Fire support can be delivered by indirect-fire weap-ons and aircraft or direct-fire weapons.

Fire support consists of four inextricably linked ac-tions — fire support planning, fire sipport coordina-tion, the delivery of fires, and assessment. Firesupport at the division level focuses primarily on tar-geting, target acquisition, and coordinating the em-ployment of the indirect fire component of firepowerthroughout the division. Targeting methodology isan integral part of tactical decisionmaking through-out the planning process. It is a commander respon-sibility and a commander-driven process thatcombines intelligence, planning, leadership, tactical

decisionmaking, weaponeering, operational execu-tion, and combat assessment. Targeting methodol-ogy contains four functions — decide, detect,deliver, and a.sess. These functions occur both si-multaneously and sequentially throughout fire sup-port planning and attack of enemy targets. Targetacquisition assets are arrayed in depth based on theIPB and the commander's estimate to provide suffi-cient coverage, early warning, and identification oftargets. The division G-3 and FSC coordinate theemployment of fire support through the dissemina-tion of the division's task organization, assignmentof subordinate unit tasks, establishment of fire sup-port priorities, and overall supervision that ensuresunity of effort.

For it to be effective, fire support requires the inte-gration of three systems — command and control,target acquisition, and weapons. The C2 assets ofthe division enhance information connectivity be-tween sensors, decisionmakers, and weapon systemsto ensure the effectiveness of attacks against enemyforces and capabilities. Target acquisition assets,properly located based on METT-T, enhance earlyand accurate target identification which permits deci-sioninakers to formulate the most decisive responseand to permit weapons to orient to the intended tar-get. Weapons maintain situational awarenessthrough division command and control and are lo-cated in depth to enhance responsiveness and surviv-ability. The fires of indirect and direct fire weaponsare integrated with each other, with other assets andcapabilities (electronic warfare), and with maneuverto generate combat power.

Fire Support PlanningFire support planning is the continuous process ofanalyzing, prioritizing, allocating, and schedulingfire support. It determines how fire support will beemployed, what types of targets will be attacked,when they will be attacked, and with what means.

8-2 FMFM 6-1

The division commander maximizes the effectivenessand efficiency of his available fire support throughfire support planning. Fire support planning starts assoon as the mission is identified and must be fully in-tegrated into all steps of the planning process. Divi-sion fire support planning includes several keyactions. The degree to which each of these actions isconducted is dependent on METT-T. These key ac-tions, which are discussed in detail in chapter 5 ofFMFM 6-18, include —

• Obtain information and guidance from theMEF, ACE, and CSSE as part of missionanalysis.

• Establish and disseminate commander's plan-ning guidance for fire support.

• Consider fire support in developing courses of-action.

• Prepare estimates of supportability.• Allocate fire support assets and resources.• Conduct targeting.• Effect coordination with subordinate units and

with other elements of the MEF.• Prepare the fire support plan.• Disseminate the fire support plan.• Adjust the fire support plan as required.

Decide FunctionThe decide function of targeting process is the mostimportant function and is encompassed throughoutthe planning process. As the first step in the target-ing process, the decide function provides the overallfocus and helps prioritize intelligence collection andattack planning. IPB provides much of the informa-tion for the decide function and is the foundation onwhich the rest of the targeting process is built. IPBis a continuous, systematic approach to analyzing theterrain, weather, enemy doctrine, and current enemyactions to arrive at enemy courses of action. IPBhelps identify any critical enemy activities or named

• areas of interest (NA!) in which specific enemy ac-tivities or events will help confirm the enemy's in-tent. Designating NAIs allows for observation of allthe enemy's viable options without wasting coverageon areas of little importance.

In addition to IPB and the intelligence estimate, akey staff product that supports the decide function istarget value analysis (TVA). TVA is normally per-formed by the target infonnation officer in conjunc-tion with the target intelligence officer. Given aselected friendly course of action and the input gen-erated during the IPB process, TVA is conducted toidentify potential high value target (HVT) sets asso-ciated with critical enemy functions that could inter-fere with the friendly course of action or that are keyto enemy success. HVTs are those assets the enemycommander requires for successful completion of hismission. HVTs are briefed during the missionanalysis brief, first as target sets and then as specificunit types or echelons and/or specific systems. Tar-get sets include maneuver; fire support; engineer; re-connaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition;air defense; command and control; nuclear/chemical;radio electronic; and CSS (lines of communication,lift, maintenance, ammunition, and POL). The ulti-mate products of TVA and the identification of HVTare target selection standards, the sensor/attack sys-tents matrix, high-payoff targets (HPTs), the high-payoff target list (HPTL), and the attack guidancematrix (AGM).

Target Selection Standards

Target selection standards are criteria, applied to en-emy activity used in deciding whether that activity isa target. See figure 8-1. Target selection standardsbreak nominations into two categories — targets andsuspected targets. Targets must meet accuracy time-liness require- ments for attack, while suspected tar-gets must be confirmed before any attack. Targetselection standards are established based on enemyactivity and available attack systems and are ex-pressed by one or more of the following standards:target location error inherent in the acquisition sys-tem, size of the enemy activity (point or area), statusof the activity (moving or stationary), and timelinessof the information. HPTs that meet all the criteriashould be tracked until they are attacked in accor-dance with the AGM; targets that do not meet targetselection standards should be confirmed before theyare attacked.

Marine Division

HPTL

8-3

Figure 8-1. Target Selection Standards Matrix.

Sensor/Attack Systems Matrix

A targeting tool that may be used to determinewhether the HVTs critical to friendly success can beacquired and attacked is the Sensor/Attack SystemsMatrix. This matrix allows wargamers to recordtheir assessment of the ability of sensor-systems toacquire and attack-systems to engage specified HVTsfor each critical event or phase of the battle. Mar-ginal information at the top has blanks for the battle-field event being assessed and the associated HVTs.Blank spaces on the left are for entering availablesensor systems; blank spaces on the right are for en-tering attack systems. Using this matrix, the war-garners annotate systems selected for use to acquireand attack a target by marking the appropriate blockwith an S for sensOr and A for attack. As the war-game progresses from one phase to the next, theability of sensor and attack systems to perform de-sired tasks is determined. If sensors and attack sys-tems cannot support the mission, they must bemoved or an alternate system selected. If no systemis available within the command, support must be re-quested from higher headquarters. An example ofhow the Sensor/Attack Systems Matrix may be usedis shown in figure 8-2. Note that there is no

horizontal linear relationship between the sensor sys-tems and the attack systems.

High-Payoff Targets (HPTs)

TVA continues during course of action development,particularly in wargarning. During the wargamingprocess, as critical events are identified, HPTs aredeveloped and prioritized on a HPTL. HPTs areHVTs that must be acquired and successfully at-tacked for the success of the friendly commander'smission. They are normally identified for specificpoints or phases in the battle, in order of importance,on the HPTL. The best places to attack HPTs in re-lation to the friendly course of action are identifiedand expressed as target areas of interest (TA!). TAIare engagement points or areas, usually along anavenue of approach or mobility corridor, where theinterdiction of an enemy force by fire, maneuver, orjamming will reduce or deprive that force of a par-ticular capability. Unlike a NA!, which is designatedfor observing enemy activity to confirm or deny hiscourse of action, the TA! is an area in which the en-emy activity is interdicted to cause the enemy toabandon a particular course of action. Examples ofTAIs are bridges, road junctions, chokepoints, drop

EXAMPLE TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS MATRIX

ATTACK SYSTEM TLE I ACQ TIME

MRL GSARTYBN <1KM/1OMIN

BDECP MLRS 100MI2HRS

2S5 BTRY MLRS/ACE 200M 1 20 MIN

SA-1 1 OS ARTY BN ZOOM 1 20 MIN

ARMORED RESERVES ACE 1KM / 2 FIRS

LEGEND:

TLE TARGET LOCATION ERROR. Attack system target locationaccuracy requirements.

ACQ TIME ACQUISITION TIME. The length of time from acquisition toattack that the target information is valid. Based on estimateddwell time of the target.

8-4

EXAMPLE SENSOR/ATTACK MATRIX

FMFM 6-1

EVENT: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

ARTYOp's

A

A

S

S

A

MAL

A

A

S

SA

S: SENSOR

BDECP

S

S

S

SA

A

A

A

A

LOGSITES

S

SA

A

A

S

A: ATTACK

Figure 8-2. Sensor/Attack Matrix.

zones and landing zones, known fording sites, andforward and rear refueling and rearming points.TATs can also indicate where HPTs might be mostvulnerable to attack.

High-Payoff Target Lists (HPTLs}

The HPTL, an example of which is depicted in fig-ure 8-3, identifies the HPTs for a specific point inthe battle in the order of their priority. The targetcategory of the HPT is shown on the list either byname or by number. The number of target prioritiesshould not be excessive so as to dilute intelligencecollection, acquisition, and attack efforts. The ap-proved list is used as a planning tool to determine at-tack guidance and to refine the collection plan.

Attack Guidance Matrix AGM)The commander must express his guidance onwhether specific HPTs should be disrupted, delayed,limited, damaged, or destroyed. Based on the

commander's attack guidance, the FSC recommendshow each target should be engaged in terms ofeffects and attack options.

Effects can range from harassment, suppression,neutralization, to destruction. The attack guidancemust be approved by the commander. This guidanceshould detail a prioritized list of HPTs; when, how,and the desired effects of attack; any special instruc-tions; and HPTs that require battle damage assess-ment (BDA). Attack guidance is visually condensedin the AGM as shown in figure 8-4.

The division has only a finite capability to detectHPTs and deliver attacks against HPTs while con-ducting tactical operations. The division must bal-ance its capability to detect HPTs with its capabilityto engage them. The division must also consider theeffect on subordinate commanders and their plans.Although it is the division commander's responsibil-ity to shape the division battlespace, detection and

HVT

SENSOR

2S5

ITT

SA-l I

CIT

MECHBNS

RECON

RADIO RECON

HVT

A A

FOIFAC/SPOTTER

A

SA

TPQ-36

ATK SYSTEM

A

S

TPQ-37

MVR UNITS

SA

UAV

CANNON ARTY

S

S

MLRS

ACE

SA

S

JSTARS

NSFS-NGF

A

S S

NSFS-TLAM

SA

ACE-CAS

S

SA

S

ACE DAS

S

AC-i 30

CVBG-OAS

EA: RADIO RECON

A

EW: EA-6B

PSYOPS

DECEPTION

Marine Division 8-5

Figure 8-3. High-Payoff Target List.

EXAMPLE ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX

EVENT OR PHASE: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

HPTL WHEN HOW EFFECT REMARKS

MRL A MLRS N

BDE CP P TLAM• PLAN IN

SA-1 1 A GS ARTY N/S SUPPRESS

2S5 P ACE N PLAN IN

LOG SITES P NGF D PLAN IN

OPS P GS ARTY S PLAN IN

MECH BNS P ACE/MLRS N INTENT TO

Figure 8-4. Attack Guidance Matrix.

PRIORITY

EXAMPLE HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST

EVENT OR PHASE: ATTACK THROUGH SECURITY ZONE

CATEGORY TARGET

1 FIRE SPT WEAPONS MRL

2 C3 BDECP

3 ADA SA-il

4 FIRE SPT WEAPONS 2S5

5 POL/AMMO LOG SITES

6 RSTA OPS

7 MANEUVER MECH BNS

8-6 FMFM 6-1

delivery assets may not be able to adequately supportthe targeting requirements of subordinate units ifthese assets are totally committed to the detectionand attack of division targets.

Fire PlansThe derivative of fire support planning is the firesupport plan, a tactical plan containing the informa-tion necessary for the employment of fire support inthe operation. The fire support plan is an umbrelladocument prepared by the division FSC and his staffto both expound upon and execute the division com-mander's guidance. The division FSC and his staffmust focus the division commander's attention on theinformation and intelligence products required tocreate the division fire support plan.

Each supporting arm agency and its representativesconduct fire planning. Fire planning consists ofthose activities necessary for implementation of firesupport. Targeting, scheduling of fires, provisionsfor attacking targets of opportunity, positioning,communications, combat service support, and com-putation of firing data are some of the aspects in-volved in fire planning. Information resulting fromfire planning, which is needed by the supported unitfor employment of a specific supporting arm, is con-tained in applicable tabs to the fire support plan;e.g., air fire plan, artillery fire plan, NGF plan. De-tailed procedures, instructions, and information ofuse by the supporting arms agency is recorded in ap-plicable orders.

Air Fire Planning

Aviation assets are made available through an appor-tionment process. Apportionment is the determina-tion and assignment of the total expected effortdevoted to the various air operations and/or geo-graphic areas for a given period of time based on theMEF and ACE mission. The MEF commander mayreceive taskings from higher commanders in the ap-portionment process.

Following apportionment, the MEF and ACE com-manders determine the allocation of aviation effortwithin the MEF. The division air officer (AO)works closely with the ACE in air fire planning tofocus those facets of air operations which may im-pact on ground operations. Air control measures

(e.g., control points) are established to allow aircraftmaneuverability while minimizing interference withindirect fires. AOs in the division identify and an-ticipate aviation requirements and pass tactical air re-quests up the chain of command. At each echelon,these requests are reviewed for approval or disap-proval, prioritized, additions made as required, andrequired coordination initiated, and then the requestis forwarded to the next echelon. Once all require-ments have been identified and received at the tacti-cal air command center (TACC), air tasking ordersare prepared.

The AO prepares the air fire plan to provide air sup-port procedural information to the supported unit.The air fire plan is made in coordination with thesupporting ACE and the development of the air op-erations annex which addresses aviation specific pro-cedures and information. The air fire plan providesinformation on the delivery of air support which isknown in advance. Examples include aircraft alertstatus, coordination measures and procedures inci-dent to air safety, air target list annotated with neces-sary attack instructions, air delivery procedures(e.g., target marking, SEAD, etc.), codes, and airrequest procedures. It includes a graphic illustrationof the preplanned air strikes. When possible, refer-ence is made to other publications and parts of theorder; e.g., SOPs, air operations annex.

The DASC (see chapter 2) receives the air taskingorder (ATO) from the TACC and coordinates pre-planned direct air support. The link between theDASC and the division FSCC is vital for coordina-tion and integration of direct air support missionswith the employment of other supporting arms, andfor the expeditious processing of immediate tacticalair requests and assault support requests. An airsupport liaison team may be employed to make thiscoordination and integration more efficient. The di-vision FSC is the final arbitrator of all supportingarms integration conflicts and will decide all cases ofconflicting requests for fire support assets. TheFSCC continuously provides the DASC with updateson the unit boundaries and fire support coordinationmeasures, friendly and enemy unit positions, perti-nent intelligence data, and other prearranged dataitems as they are received at the FSCC. The FSCCprovides the DASC with information on gun posi-tions, gun-target lines, and gun trajectories in the

Marine Division 8-7

vicinity of aircraft flight routes. The DASC is re-sponsible to the FSCC to provide timely informationon —

• Predicted flight paths for aircraft under theDASC's control.

• BDAs.• Status of outstanding requests.• Pertinent intelligence.• Delays or cancellations to the ATO.

Other prearranged data items.

Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP)TACPs establish and maintain facilities for liaisonand communications between division units and theDASC, inform and advise the ground commander onthe employment of supporting aircraft, and requestand control air support means. The division TACPconsists of one forward air controller (FAC) quali-fied naval aviator/naval flight officer, one air sup-port control officer, and ten radio operators. The airsupport control officer is a contingency billet. Thedivision TACP assists the division AO by monitoringall immediate air support requests from subordinateunits, supervising the operation of aviation nets inthe FSCC, and keeping the FSC advised of the gen-eral air situation. The division TACP coordinatesand consolidates all preplanned air support requestsfrom the division level and subordinate TACPs withthe division FSC. TACPs are tasked to —

• Provide liaison and communications betweenthe commander of the ground unit to which as-signed and the appropriate air control agency.

• Provide the commander of the ground unit withcurrent information on the employment andavailability of aircraft assigned to the support ofhis unit.

• Advise the ground unit commander and hisstaff on matters concerning the employment ofaviation assets. Prepare and forward requestsfor air support in accordance with instructionsspecified in the MEF's air employment plan.

• Prioritize and resolve duplication and conflictsof air support requests.

• Advise the commander of the AAW situation.• Coordinate with air defense units.

• Exercise control of aircraft during the terminalphase of CAS to ensure accuracy of weaponsdelivery and to minimize the danger to friendlytroops.

• Recommend fire support coordination measuresas they relate to air support.

• Keep the target intelligence officer or G-2 ad-vised of all target information received throughair support channels.

The more liaison between the supported unit and theACE, the quicker the plan can be developed and thebetter the plan will work. For example, the ACEcommander or his designated representatives maycome to the supported unit for a brief/update of thetactical situation and exchange of information.Then, concurrent coordinated planning by the twounits can occur. During planning, the two unitskeep each other informed of changes that may affectthe operation.

Artillery Fire Planning

The artillery regimental S-3, in coordination with theFSC and G-3, prepares the artillery fire plan for thedivision's fire support plan. The artillery fire planincorporates the requirements of subordinate artilleryunits and fire support requirements of the division.The plans of the battalions assigned DS missions arereviewed, duplication eliminated, additions andchanges made as required, and all are integrated intothe division artillery fire plan. The execution of theportion of the fire support plan pertaining to generalsupport (GS)/general support-reinforcing (GS-R) ar-tillery battalions is planned by the artillery regiment.These fires are employed on targets requested by thebattalions in direct support, on targets identified bythe artillery regiment, and on targets designated bythe division commander. The artillery regimentplans counterfires and fires involved with specialammunition. Coordination with subordinate units isaffected if fires are planned within the unit's zone ofaction short of the CFL or if the Unit's operationswill be affected. Targets, which are out of artilleryrange or are unsuited for artillery attack, are for-warded to the division FSCC for possible attack byother fire support means.

8-8 FMFM 6-1

The focal point of artillery fire planning at the infan-try regiment or separate battalion is the FSC. Hedevelops a concept of fires to support the com-mander's intent. The DS artillery battalion S-3 de-velops a plan to support the concept of fires. Hereceives information regarding targeting and firesupport requirements from the S-2 of the infantryregiment as well as from the subordinate liaison offi-cer at each battalion.

The battalion S-3 conducts top down fire planningwhich is passed to each respective liaison section forbottom up refinement. Once the refinement is re-ceived from the battalion liaison officer located withthe supported commander, the S-3 takes the informa-tion and completes fire planning. When completed,the fire plan is distributed to the firing batteries, re-inforcing artillery, and the artillery regiment.

Artillery liaison officers receive the plan and ensurethat all forward observers are notified of the firesplanned in their sectors. The artillery unit continuesits planning to ensure that the required support canbe rendered, e.g., positioning, ammunition availabil-ity, firing restrictions. For additional discussion onartillery fire planning, see FMFM 6-9, Marine ,lrtil-lery Support.

Naval Gunfire Planning

During planning, NGF requirements are prepared bythe MEF commander and submitted to the appropri-ate naval commander. The naval commander exam-ines overall naval and MEF requirements andsubsequently allocates NGF assets to support theMEF. In amphibious operations, the CATF pub-lishes an ATF NGF plan. A LF NGF plan is pre-pared by the LF naval gunfire liaison officer. TheLF naval gunfire officer (NGFO) coordinates closelywith the ATF NGFO in planning NGF. He providesinformation concerning the LF concept of operationsthat allows the ATF NGFO to plan NGF employ-ment to meet LF requirements, e.g., positioning offire support areas and stations. The use of NGF de-pends to a large degree on the number and type ofNGF support ships available and on the prioritiesand guidance set forth by the commander.

The LF NGF plan contains pertinent information andinstructions pertaining to naval gunfire support ex-tracted from the ATF NGF plan. Subordinate eche-lons may refer to higher echelon plans and not issuetheir own NOF plan. NGF plans normally includespecific instructions on the tactical use of NGF.NGF plans prescribe operations and procedures forthe LF NGF organizations, e.g., shore fire controlparties (SFCPs) and the regimental NGF liaisonteams.

The NGF plan contains a NGF operations overlay, aschedule of fires, and instructions on communica-tions, radar beacon employment, and reports. Whenpossible, reference is made to SOPs. Upon deploy-ment, much of the planning between the supportedunit and the supporting ship may occur via radio orteletype.

Other PlansThe fire support plan may also inchide other planssuch as countermechanized and SEAD fire plans,fire support coordination, fire support communi-cations plans, and the target list. The fire supportplan is prepared in close coordination with the devel-opment of other plans to ensure compatibility be-tweenplans, supportability of the fire support plan,and integration with other assets to achieve com-bined arms.

CommunicationsCommunications are focused on the fire support co-ordination nets at the various levels from division tobattalion. All coordination essential to the use ofavailable supporting arms can be done on these nets.There are other nets for both air and ground forcesthrough which fire support can be requested,planned, executed, and coordinated. These otherfire support nets are used primarily for the purposefor which they were designed, but depending on thetactical situation, any fire support net, or any otherradio net, may be used to accomplish the mission.This does not imply the routine use of other radionets for fire support coordination.

Marine Division 8-9

Communications Security

Use of secure fire support coordination nets is deter-mined by METI'-T. If the threat demands increasedcommunications security (COMSEC), then every netshould be covered. Additionally, reducing COMSECdoes not necessarily improve communications. Theuse of COMSEC procedures on an uncovered netshould have a minimal effect on communications ifoperators are well trained.

LEG END:C-Net ControlX-GuardR-As Required

(1) Net control located in SAAC until displaced ashore.(2) Net control at Battalion (centralized FO) of Battery (dece(3) LAAD nets established a required.(4) May be voice of digital.

Fire Support Communications ArchitectureFMFM 6-18 and FMFM 3-30 describe radio netsused for fire support and fire support coordination.Figure 8-5 lists nets and stations required to controlor guard each one. "As required" nets are activatedonly when a particular fire support element is avail-able. Automated fire support coordination is con-ducted on the Marine Corps Fire Support System(MCFSS). FMFM 6-18-1, MCFSS Techniques andProcedures, provides guidance on the employmentand procedures for MCFSS.

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8-10 FMFM 6-1

Fire Support CoordinationFire support coordination is a continuous process ofevaluating fire support needs or missions, analyzingthe situation, and planning and orchestrating the im-plementation of the fire support plan while in a con-tinually changing environment. The process enablesthe commander to use his available firepower to in-fluence the action while ensuring the safety of histroops. Target acquisition and intelligence are keyto maintaining responsive fire support coordination.Target acquisition is the detection, identification, andlocation of a target in sufficient detail to pennit theeffective employment of weapons. The detect func-tion of the targeting process promotes responsive tar-get acquisition.

Detect FunctionThe detect function of the targeting process includesallocating resources, developing the collection plan,assigning intelligence acquisition tasks, processinginformation into target intelligence, and disseminat-ing target intelligence to attack systems. In the de-cide function, the more specific the HPTs, the morelikely the 0-2 can identify, locate, and accuratelytarget them.

The detect function of targeting has a relationship tothe attack system. The fire support means are evalu-ated in terms of accuracy, responsiveness, and avail-ability (including on-station time for aircraft). TheG-2 identifies, locates, tracks, and targets HPTs inhis recommendation for intelligence task organiza-tion and the division collection plan. Because oflimited range of division intelligence assets, the G-2must coordinate with the MEF collection manager torequest intelligence for deep HPTs.

The heart of the detection function is the IPB proc-ess. The IPB is continually updated to confirm ordeny enemy courses of action and projected events,using information provided by organic, supporting,higher, adjacent, and subordinate assets.

Reconnaissance reports support targeting in close op-erations. Intelligence acquisition tasks in the collec-tion plan or specific reconnaissance missionsassigned to units by the 0-3 provide this informa-tion. Counterfire radars provide accurate locationsof artillery firing locations. These targets may have

already been engaged, depending on their priorityand division's attack guidance. However, their loca-tions may assist the intelligence section to locateother HPTs. The artillery regiment, through its tar-geting processing center, must routinely pass radaracquisitions to the G-2.

Terrain analysis helps detect HPTs for rear opera-tions. The rear echelon identifies likely LZs and as-signs surveillance responsibilities. This is integratedwith the air defense planning of the MEF and ACE.

The 0-2 coordinates HPT detection in deep, close,and rear operations. Committed forces detect HPTsin close operations. These include ground maneuverunits, division C2W assets, artillery radars, and avia-tion units. These forces detect division HPTs as aresult of intelligence acquisition tasks in the collec-tion plan and through the reporting of combat infor-mation to the tactical echelon.

The division commander and subordinate command-ers may have different HPTs. The G-2 section at themain echelon coordinates the collection effort withsubordinate commander's S-2s, integrating it into thedivision collection plan. Likewise, the G-3 sectioncoordinates the attack plan with the subordinate com-mander's S-3s and integrates it with the division'sattack.

The G-2 section at the tactical echelon coordinatesHPT detection in close operations using the HPTL,combat information from committed forces, and in-telligence received from the main echelon. He coor-dinates with S-2s of committed forces and the G-2section at the main echelon to ensure collection as-sets focus on HPTs. As HPTs are detected, he in-forms the FSC and 0-3 for commitment of attackresources or attacks per the attack guidance matrix.

The G-2 section in the rear echelon coordinates de-tection of HPTs in rear operations with the 0-2 inthe main echelon and commanders in the rear area.His primary means of detecting HPTs are reconnais-sance and surveillance efforts of units in the reararea. He integrates and coordinates the reconnais-sance and surveillance effort into one plan. Thisplan incorporates reports from military police, infor-mation from MEF counterintelligence, and interro-gation of detainees.

Marine Division 8-11

Detection of HPTs in an enemy force requiring alevel II or III response to a rear area threat dependson contingency planning between the rear and mainechelons G-2 sections. Intelligence and C2W assetsmay be required to detect HPTs quickly and accu-rately to engage them with the TCF, supporting artil-lery, and CAS. The G-2 section at the main echeloncoordinates and integrates reallocation of assets.

Fire Support Coordination ProceduresThe division FSCC plans and coordinates fires ontargets of interest to the division. The divisionFSCC assists the regimental FSCCs in fire supportcoordination. If the division generates a target to befired, the fire support coordinator may use any of thefire support means available to the division. Coordi-nation with adjacent or higher fire support coordina-tion facilities must be effected to fire on targetsoutside the division boundary. Some typical firesupport coordination tasks include —

• Advising the commander on the employment offire support.

• Responding to intelligence reports by request-ing supporting arms to attack high-payofftargets.

• Selecting the best supporting arm to attack atarget.

• Clearing requests for fire support.• Integrating fires with maneuver.• Coordinating the execution of fires.• Requesting additional fire support when

needed.• Establishing fire support coordination measures

to aid the rapid engagement of targets and pro-vide safeguards for friendly forces/installations.

• Resolving fire support conflicts.• Disseminating pertinent information within the

FSCC and to other sections of the COC and toother units.

The fire suppOrt coordination procedures describedbelow can be used in most situations. The generalprocedures portray the quick, effective fire supportused in all types of division operations. Offensiveand defensive procedures are fire support coordina-tion actions taken after an attack has started and inresponse to an enemy attack, respectively. Theselast two procedures deal with coordination ofplanned and immediate fire support.

General Procedures

The following procedures are used both in offensiveand defensive operations for the coordination ofplanned and immediate fire support.

• Track all fire missions originating in, impactingin, or crossing through the unit's zone of actionon a map.

• Maintain overlays.• Maintain a HPTL.• Integrate fire support, as required through em-

ployment of MCFSS. Monitor the progress offriendly aircraft through the division airspace(DASC). The AO makes recommendations tothe FSC concerning any airspace coordinationwhich may be required. Included are the useof ACAs and the use of suppression fires onany known or suspected air defense weapons.

• Keep supporting arms advised of the situation,particularly when periods of intense activity areanticipated. This allows them to make the nec-essary preparations.

• Ensure a method for timing the delivery of firesis well-understood by all units/agencies in-volved in fire support.

Offensive Procedures

To effectively coordinate fire support for an attack,the fire support plan and SOPs must be establishedand understood by all personnel concerned with firesupport. The plan must be flexible; remember, thatit is usually easier to modify a plan than to develop anew one.

All personnel concerned with fire support must keepabreast of the developing friendly and enemy situa-tions including dispositions, capabilities and weak-nesses, and their tactics. Supporting arms com-manders and their representatives must know, under-stand, and anticipate the supported commander's ac-tions and requirements. Once the attack has started,the offensive procedures for coordinating fire sup-port are to —

• Keep track of the targets fired on, the damageassessments received, and the targets not firedon in scheduled fires, if conducted. Also,know which supporting arms assets will beshifted from scheduled fires if an important tar-get is reported unexpectedly.

8-12 FMFM 6-1

• Keep track of execution of fires planned in sup-port of the attack. These will usually be neu-tralization or suppression missions and willusually by fired when the assault elementsreach a certain point or request the fires.

• Use aviation only against targets which othersupporting anus cannot effectively attack.Bunkers and fortifications, for example, nor-mally require heavy ordnance which only air-craft can deliver. If they cannot be bypassed,an air strike is the logical choice of supportingarm to attack them.

• Make use of priority targets. Shift priority tar-gets with the maneuver units movement.

• Key clearance of artillery movement to cross-ing of phase lines by the supported maneuverunit. Report this movement to the artillery unitimmediately.

• Know if fires are to be shifted when the leadelement crosses any control measure and ensurethat communications are maintained with who-ever directs those fires.

All staff sections must keep abreast of the location ofthe lead elements. This facilitates rapid clearance offire missions. The FSC and G-3 working in proxim-ity to each other allow the lead unit's reports to beused for fire support coordination purposes and toeliminate the need for separate reporting by the sup-porting arms representatives to the FSCC.

Position location reporting system (PLRS) provides aposition and navigation service to users and makesposition location information available to designatedC2 systems. Observers can fix their own locationwhich enhances their ability to locate targets accu-rately and rapidly. PLRS can also provide a digitaldata communications capability which allows usersto send and receive formatted as well as free textmessages.

Global positioning system (GPS) is a space-based ra-dio navigation system which provides position, ve-locity, and time both globally and continuously.GPS will be used for different purposes, includingnavigation for space, air, sea, and land vehicles, pre-cise positioning, time transfer, attitude reference,surveying, etc..

Defensive Procedures

Prompt and effective measures by FSCCs can becritical to defeating an enemy attack. Although theenemy seeks surprise in the attack, there are usuallysome warnings. When these indicators appear, theG-2 should rapidly notify the FSCC watch officerwho should —

• Have the principals (FSC, artillery liaison offi-cer (LNO), AO) recalled.

• Alert the supporting artillery, NGF ships,DASC, and the MEF.

• Ensure NGF ships are within range and havedesired ordnance available.

• Correlate the G-2's track of the enemy's ad-vance with critical targets/engagement areas inthe fire support plan. Modify planned fires asrequired to ensure fires are on the probable lo-cations of the enemy's forward units, his com-mand and control, his reserves, the combatservice support for his maneuver units, androutes over which he will move reserves. Useweapons with large dispersions on the deep tar-gets and use the weapons with small dispersionson the forward units.

• Pass target data to supporting arms.

During the attack, the FSC should monitor the over-all operation and allow his subordinates to attend tothe details. There will be more targets than can behandled immediately. One of the keys to success isto use the supporting arms where they most influ-ence the entire action.

Procedures for Coordinating Scheduled Fires

Scheduled attacks are often the most effective way toprovide fire support. The FSC must verify that thesituation has not changed sufficiently to warrant achange in the scheduled attack. Actions to be takenare to —

• Verify target with requesting unit and control-ling agency.

• Verify target location. Since fire mission or airstrike was scheduled, the target may havemoved, been overrun, or destroyed by othersupporting arm.

Marine Division 8-13

• Consider nature of the target. Priorities mayhave changed since the air strike or fire missionwas scheduled.

• Ensure that the delivery of fires does not poseunnecessary danger to friendly units and, in thecase of air strikes, that the planned route of air-craft does not cause unnecessary interferencewith friendly operations.

• Verify that the scheduled ammunition or ord-nance is still the right choice for the target.

• Discuss situation and supporting arms missionwith representatives of other sections of thecombat operations center, with senior and sub-ordinate FSCs, and within the FSCC, as re-quired. This identifies and resolves conflicts.

• Cancel mission if no longer required or if pre-viously granted clearance has been canceled.

• Determine if any temporary fire support coor-dination measures are needed.

• Monitor the mission. At the completion of themission, record and pass damage assessmentdata to the G-2, higher headquarters, and adja-cent units, as appropriate.

• Cancel fire support coordination measures im-plemented for that mission.

Procedures for Coordinating Immediate Fires

The procedures for coordinating call for fire mis-sions and/or immediate air strikes do not signifi-cantly differ from those for planned fire support.Many of the actions are the same. The difference isthey must be executed much more quickly. Anotherkey difference is that the FSC is normally the firstperson in the FSCC to know of the requirement for aplanned mission. The FSC then discusses it with thesupporting arms representatives before selecting thesupporting arm. In call for fire missions, it is usu-ally the supporting arms representative in the FSCCwho monitors/receives the request on a conduct offire or tactical air request net and then effects finalcoordination with the FSC. The actions are to —

' Identify requesting unit.• Check the target location.• Consider the target's nature and quickly verify

that the right supporting arm is being re-quested. Even if another supporting arm wouldbe more effective, interceding to recommend achange causes delay. It may be better to let the

mission proceed as requested and then use amore appropriate arm for reattacks.

• Identify what unit is to fire and its location, andverify that trajectories from surface fires do notcreate an airspace conflict.

• Identify what ordnance is being used. Somemunitions require clearance with adjacent orsenior units.

• Quickly clear the request with the FSC, othersupporting arms representatives, and the sup-ported S-3 or his representative.

• Clear the request with that unit if the fires im-pact in or pass through another unit's zone.Coordinate directly with the affected unit, whenpossible.

• Approve or disapprove the fire support mis-sion. This consists of two separate considera-tions: the u of the supporting arm andclearance to engage the target.

• Implement fire support coordination measures,if needed.

• Monitor the mission.• Record and pass data to G-2, higher headquar-

ters, and adjacent units, as appropriate.• Cancel fire support coordination measures im-

plemented for that mission.

Fire Support Coordinating MeasuresFire support coordinating measures are used to fa-cilitate timely and safe use of fire support. Whenproperly used, fire support coordinating measuresenhance the accomplishment of the mission. For ex-ample, a properly placed coordinated fire line makescounterfire easier, which allows the supported unit tomaneuver freely and use its direct support from itssupporting unit effectively. The application of firesupport coordinating measures varies with the opera-tion and target density.

Coordinated Fire Line

The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyondwhich conventional surface fire support means mayfire at any time within the zone of the establishingheadquarters without additional coordination. It ex-pedites the attack of targets beyond the CFL withoutcoordination with the ground commander in whosezone of action targets are located. It also providesthe ground commander with an area within his zone

8-14 FMFM 6-1

where his forces can operate in safety from friendlysurface delivered indirect fires.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is a lineestablished by appropriate land force commanders toensure coordination of fires not under their controlbut which may affect current tactical operations.The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground,or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunitionagainst surface targets. The FSCL should followwell-defined terrain features, if possible. The estab-lishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with theappropriate air commanders and other supportingelements. Supporting elements may attack targetsforward of the FSCL provided the attack will notproduce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of,the line. Both the land force and joint special opera-tions commanders should be informed of attacks be-yond the FSCL. Attacks against ground targetsbehind this line must be coordinated with the appro-priate land force commander to reduce the possibilityof friendly casualties. If a land force desires toshoot or maneuver beyond its lateral boundaries, itmust first coordinate with the appropriate com-mander.

The FSCL allows the land force and supportingforces to attack expeditiously targets of opportunitybeyond the FSCL. Forces attacking targets beyondthe FSCL must inform all other affected command-ers in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction toavoid friendly casualties. In exceptional circum-stances, the inability to do so will not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failureto coordinate this type of attack increases the risk offriendly casualties and could waste limited resourcesthrough duplicative attack.

The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the for-ward line of own troops in the defense rather than inthe offense; however, the exact positioning is situa-tion dependent. The decision on where to place oreven whether to use an FSCL requires careful con-sideration. All those involved in the decision mustunderstand that the FSCL is a permissive measureused to expedite fires. Its greatest utility is in facili-tating the attack of time-sensitive targets of opportu-nity while reducing the possibility of friendlycasualties.

Free Fire Area IFFA). A FFA is a specifically desig-nated area into which any weapons system may befired without any additional coordination with the es-tablishing headquarters. Its purpose to expedite fireand to allow jettisoning of CAS munitions if an air-craft is unable to drop on a target.

Restrictive Fire Line (RFL). A RFL is a line estab-lished between converging friendly forces that pro-hibits fires, or effects from fires, across the linewithout coordination with the affected force. Thepurpose of a RFL is to prevent interference betweenconverging friendly forces.

No Fire Area INFA). A NFA is an area into whichno fires or effects of fire are allowed. The purposeof the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in thearea, normally to protect civilians. There are twoexceptions. The establishing headquarters may ap-prove fires temporarily within the NFA on amission-by-mission basis. Also, if an enemy forcewithin the NFA engages a friendly force and the en-gaged unit leader determines there is no time for co-ordination, he may order fires in the NFA.

Restrictive Fire Area (RFA). A RFA is an area inwhich specific firing restrictions are imposed andinto which fires that exceed those restrictions willnot be delivered without coordination with the estab-lishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA is toregulate fires into an area according to the stated re-strictions. This means that fires or certain types ofordnance can be controlled in an area where friendlyforces are or will be located.

Airspace Coordination Area (ACA). An ACA is athree-dimensional block of airspace in which friendlyaircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surfacefires. The purpose of an ACA is to act as a safetymeasure for friendly aircraft while allowing the othersupporting arms to continue fire in support of theground force. ACAs are normally referred to as ei-ther formal or informal. Formal ACAs require de-tailed planning. When time for coordination islimited, an informal ACA is used. Informal ACAsare temporary and are not as widely disseminated asformal ACAs. ACAs can vary from physically de-fined areas or locations to various methods of sepa-ration or deconfliction. Physical areas can includeroutes or areas. Methods of separation or

Marine Division 8-15

deconfliction include lateral separation, altitude sepa-ration, timed separation, or a combination of these.

Other Control Measures

Even though they are not fire support coordinationmeasures, some control measures play a role in firesupport planning and coordination.

Boundaries. Boundaries designate the geographicallimits of the zone of action or sector of a unit.Within his own boundaries, unless otherwise re-stricted, a commander enjoys complete freedom offire and maneuver. Normally, units do not fireacross boundaries unless the fires are coordinatedwith the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond a per-missive fire support coordination measure such asthe CFL. This does not preclude a commander fromdeciding that his subordinate units may fire acrossboundaries at positively identified enemy units with-out coordination.

Zone of Fire. A zone of fire is an area within whicha designated ground unit or naval gunfire ship deliv-ers, or is prepared to deliver, fire support. Fire mayor may not be observed. ft is not used as a controlor coordinating measure as much as it is used to tellsupporting arms organizations what their responsi-bilities are. It is used to designate a specific areawhich the supporting unit must be able to cover withits fires. The zone should be so selected that the fir-ing unit can best support the actions of the supportedunit. Normally zones of fire correspond with zonesof action, sectors of defense, or tactical areas of re-sponsibility (TAOR) of the supported unit.

Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). The AOA is ageographical area, delineated in the initiating direc-tive, for purposes of command and control withinwhich is located the objectives to be secured by theATF. This area must be of sufficient size to ensureaccomplishment of the ATF's mission and must pro-vide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea,air, and land operations.

Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). The TAORis a defined area of land for which responsibility isspecifically assigned to the commander of the area asa measure for control of assigned forces and coordi-nation of support. Commonly referred to as TAOR.

Delivery of FiresDelivery of fires is the execution of fire plans andnecessary coordination in operations. The deliverportion of the targeting process enhances the deliv-ery of the appropriate ordnance to achieve thedesired effect on the target. Fires are delivered toproduce a variety of effects which are destruction,neutralization, harassment, interdiction, suppression,screening, and illumination.

• Destruction Fire. Destruction fire is firedelivered for the sole purpose of destroyingmaterial objects. To achieve destructive ef-fects on a target, it is not necessary to com-pletely demolish the target. A target may beconsidered destroyed if it cannot perform itsprimary mission.

• Neutralization Fire. Neutralization firesare delivered to render the target ineffectiveor unusable. The fires are used to temporar-ily hamper the movement and/or the firing ofthe weapon.

• Harassing Fire. Harassing fire is fire de-signed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, tocurtail movement and, by threat of losses, tolower morale. These fires are delivered oc-casionally, usually at night or during periodsof reduced visibility.

• Interdiction Fire. Interdiction fire is fireplaced on an area or point to prevent the en-emy from using the area or point. Roads,railways, routes, and other lines of commu-nications may be interdicted to prevent, re-duce, or disrupt the enemy forces, supplies,and communications.

• Suppressive Fire. Suppressive fires arefires on or about a weapon system to de-grade• its performance below the levelneeded to fulfill its mission objectives, dur-ing the conduct of the fire mission. The ef-fects are only temporary.

• Screening Fire. Screening fires are firesusing smoke projectiles to obscure the en-emy's observation of friendly forces andtheir movement.

8-16 FMFM 6-1

• Illumination Fires. Illumination fire maybe used to observe enemy operations andmovements, to adjust observed fire duringhours of darkness, and to provide assistanceto friendly night operations.

Deliver FunctionThe deliver function is the execution of the attackagainst the target. The prioritized HPTL, target in-telligence from the 0-2, target selection standards,and attack guidance guide the attack. Where tacticaldecisions on the time of attack, desired effect or de-gree of damage, and attack system to be used arelargely the result of actions taken during the decidefunction, several technical decisions must be com-pleted in the deliver function. The G-3/FSC con-firms HPTs and directs their attack by maneuverforces or fire support assets once they meet attackguidance. Based on guidance from the decide func-tion and results of the detect phase, planners mustdetermine the number and type of munitions, the unitto conduct the attack, and the response time of theattacking unit.

Attack of HPTs in deep operations normally involvesemployment of aviation. The range of division at-tack assets may not reach uncommitted enemyforces. Deep maneuver, though an attack option, isa high risk action. The FSC and 0-3 section in themain echelon coordinate and integrate attack ofHPTs by aviation. The FSC directs previously allot-ted sorties against the target or requests additionalaviation support from the MEF. The division FSCsubmits periodic updates on the location and status oftargets to the MEF force fires coordinator. The 0-2section provides information for these updates. Thedivision FSC informs the 0-3 of the impending at-tack. The 0-3 section either confirms the attack orrequests diversion to a different target.

Committed forces attack HPTs in close operations.Committed forces' headquarters echelons and the di-vision tactical and main echelons coordinate and in-tegrate the attacks. Attack assets include maneuver,fire support, and engineers. Maneuver forces mayattack enemy reconnaissance as part of counter-reconnaissance efforts. They may conduct limitedobjective attacks to disrupt enemy air defense duringaviation operations. Smoke may be used to disruptenemy reconnaissance and target acquisition. Fires

may be employed to attack a range of targets includ-ing enemy mortars, artillery, air defense, reconnais-sance, and command and control. Engineers mayplace mines or demolitions to limit the enemy's ave-nues of approach or delay his arrival.

Attack of HPTs in support or rear operations mayactually be conducted as part of the deep or close op-erations. These may include engaging air trans-ported forces and support assets and long-range firesupport. In the rear area, attack of HPTs may sup-port counter-reconnaissance, surveillance, and secu-rity against special forces, or a level II or IIIresponse to a rear area threat.

The rear echelon coordinates and integrates rear areasecurity plans to attack HPTs in the rear. It coordi-nates with the main echelon to change priorities offire support to engage HPTs. It directs level II andIII responses to rear area threats. The main echeloncoordinates and integrates these actions with deepand close operations. For example, it may have todivert CAS to support rear operations or change thepriorities of CAS to integrate with those of the closeoperation. The use of attack helicopters to supportthe rear echelon may also impact on deep operations.

The main echelon commands and controls the divi-sion targeting effort by executing branches to deepoperations and integrating and coordinating actionsto support branches implemented by the tactical orrear echelons. The tactical echelon may direct exe-cution of branches of the close operations plan andcoordinate them with the main echelon. This en-sures that the attack of HPTs in the deep operation iscoordinated with the close operations branch. As aresult, the tactical echelon may direct a new or re-vised I-IPTL and place attack guidance in effect.This may require changes to collection plans and pri-ority to detect the HPTs.

Counterf ireThe division commander must realize that counter-fire is not solely the responsibility of the division'sartillery regiment. Counterfire requires integrationof intelligence, fire support, and maneuver. It is aconcurrent operation the division commander andstaff must coordinate with the MEF and ACE duringboth offensive and defensive operations.

Marine Division 8-17

Counterfire assists the division by protecting forces,thus allowing freedom of movement and agility. Theenemy's entire fire support system is targeted in or-der to deny him the ability to disrupt friendly forces.A fully integrated counterfire plan allows targets tobe engaged, upon acquisition, by either ground-based or airborne assets by linking the detect asset tothe delivery means. These fires can affect bothfriendly and enemy movements throughout the bat-tlefield.

Counterfire may be proactive or reactive. Proactivecounterfire is the detection and attack of enemy non-firing and firing systems before they engage friendlyforces. It is linked with the targeting effort. Reac-tive counterfire is a response to the enemy's engage-ment of the division.

Proactive Counterfire

Proactive counterfire requires the intelligence systemto identify, locate, and accurately target elements ofthe enemy fire support system. The MEF usuallyconducts the proactive portion of counterfire. It hasthe intelligence and attack systems to identify, lo-cate, and attack targets before their commitment, ar-rival, and employment against the division. Thedivision may conduct proactive counterfire againstenemy fire support systems within range of organicand supporting intelligence and fire support systems.

Reactive Counterfire

Reactive counterfire requires integration of intelli-gence, target acquisition, fire support, maneuver,and command and control. The intelligence systemmust use the IPB to predict likely locations of enemyfire support systems. Using this prediction, the divi-sion positions and tasks intelligence sensors and tar-get acquisitions assets to confirm the IPB andprovide target information. Fire support assets en-gage enemy fire support systems on the basis of thisinformation. Maneuver elements provide informa-tion from reconnaissance and surveillance. Theymay also engage enemy target acquisition assets lo-cated on or near the FLOT. The C2 system providesthe reporting network for counterfire and identifiespriorities for protection of the force.

Responsibilities

The division commander is responsible for counter-fire throughout the division area of responsibility.His counterfire responsibilities include —

• Developing, planning, and describing his vi-sion, concept, and intent for counterfire withinthe total division operation.

• Portioning the battlefield through maneuverboundaries or assignment of area of responsi-bilities (AORs). This delineates responsibilitiesfor counterfire within the division zone.

• Prioritizing the counterfire effort within the di-vision zone.

• Allocating resources within the context of theoverall division operation.

• Coordinating and integrating the division coun-terfire effort.

Within the division, key staff members for counter-fire are the G-2, G-3, and FSC. The G-2 developsand updates the IPB, tasks resources to acquire tar-get information, and disseminates information to theG-3 and FSC. The G-3 integrates and prioritizescounterfire into the concept of operations. He allo-cates resources in the context of the overall mission.The FSC integrates counterfire into the division'sfire support plan.

The artillery regiment commander advises the divi-sion commander on enemy fire support capabilities;makes recommendations on counterfire means, pri-orities, surveillance and defensive measures, and at-tack guidance; assists in the preparation of thedivision counterfire plan; and ensures the artillery isorganized for combat and positioned to support thecounterfire effort.

The G-4 and combat engineer battalion commanderare also involved in the counterfire process. The en-gineer may be required to provide survivability sup-port to the artillery. The G-4 orchestrates class Vsupport for the fire support systems.

Planning Considerations

Division planning considerations for counterfireinclude —

• The MEF counterfire plan.• C2 capabilities

8-18 FMFM 6-1

• Capabilities of friendly and enemy fire support.• Capabilities of friendly and enemy target

acquisition.

The division must understand its role within theMEF counterfire plan. The MEF counterfire plan isdefined through the MEF commander's concept andintent. MEF fire support plans further define MEFand division roles.

Within the division, the first counterfire considera-tion is the enemy's capabilities. The G-2 providesthis information as part of the IPB and targetingprocess. These considerations include the enemy'smission and whether the division is facing the enemymain effort. Both impact on the division's counter-fire requirements. His considerations are not onlyenemy mortars and artillery, but also enemy elec-tronic warfare and fixed- and rotary wing assets. Heincludes ranges, echelon, and types of artillery in theestimate. Less counterfire is required against towedartillery than self-propelled artillery. Range andechelon affect not only the enemy's capability to en-gage the division in depth, but also where the enemypositions his artillery on the battlefield. Munitionscapabilities of enemy fire support are also a consid-eration in the counterfire planning. Weapons thatfire improved conventional munitions are a greaterthreat than those capable of firing only standard highexplosive munitions. The G-3 and FSC must con-sider these same types of capabilities of friendlyweapons systems.

Enemy target acquisition capabilities also impact thedivision's counterfire planning. The division mustplan to attack and destroy enemy artillery reconnais-sance elements and observation posts through an ag-gressive counter-reconnaissance effort. The divisionmust strictly employ and enforce C2W efforts to ne-gate or limit enemy direction-finding capabilities. Ifthe enemy artillery target acquisition threat is great,friendly artillery must move frequently to survive.The division must locate and destroy enemy counter-fire radars to enhance survivability of mortars andartillery.

The commander and staff must consider the divi-sion's target acquisition capabilities. These capabili-ties include C2W systems, radars, UAVs, forwardobservers, and FACs employed with maneuver units.

Each of these resources provide a different degree ofaccuracy and speed of targeting data. The divisionmust also consider threats to each of these.

The C2 organization of division artillery is also aconsideration. The division must decide whether tocentralize or decentralize execution of counterfire bythe artillery. Centralization facilitates massing of ar-tillery and precludes duplication of effort. It also en-hances the use of counterfire radars. However,centralization places a heavy burden on the head-quarters responsible for executing artillery counter-fire. If the division has reinforcing indirect fireassets (such as Army MLRS), it may be assigned toexecute counterfire. This allows the FSC to focusand employ a dedicated fire support asset to counter-fire while the artillery regiment focuses onartillerysupport to committed forces.

Activities

Counterfire activities are conducted using the decide-detect-deliver-assess methodology. The MEF shoulddelineate counterfire responsibilities between theMEF, division, and ACE. This allows each to focuson a specific area of the battlefield and prevents du-plication of effort. Counterfire begins with the tar-geting process during course of action developmentand wargaming. The targeting team identifies high-value targets and refines them into high-payoff tar-gets for the division. It recommends what targets toattack, how to detect and engage them, and how todetermine the results. The targeting team does thisas part of the total targeting process and not as aseparate action.

The division commander prioritizes counterfire tar-gets within the division zone. Normally, enemy firesupport facing the division's main effort will receivepriority for counterfire. However, when the divisionemploys a unit in an economy of force role, it mayreceive priority for counterfire.

The use of counterfire radars requires several deci-sions. First, the division examines the threat to de-cide if radars will operate in a continuous orcommand-cued manner. If threat of acquiring theradars is low, then the commander may direct con-tinuous cueing. If the threat is high, the divisionnormally employs command cueing. Command cue-ing requires cueing agents to direct the radar to

Marine Division 8-19

radiate. These agents are normally battalion or regi-ment FSCs, but may include individual forward ob-servers (FOs) and forward air controllers (FACs).

Once the commander decides what to attack withcounterfire, his staff can plan how targets will be de-tected. The IPB process is the first step. Using theIPB, the G-2 and FSC orient and position collectionresources on likely positions of enemy fire support.The counterfire radars identify and provide locationsof mortars, artillery, and rocket units as they are fir-ing. Call for fire zones (CFFZ) should be estab-lished in the counterfire radars around likely enemyfiring positions. CFFZ are used to generate an im-mediate fire mission when incoming rounds are re-ceived from a specific area. The counter-batteryradar is programmed with a zone of search whichranges templated enemy indirect fire positions.Ground surveillance radars may provide combat in-formation on enemy firing units occupying likely fir-ing positions. They also may provide a degree ofbattle damage assessment indicating units are dis-placing after a likely firing position has been en-gaged. They also may cue other target acquisitionassets.

Electronic direction finding assets may locate keyfire support headquarters for lethal attack or jam-ming. Assets may also be used to identify and locateartillery reconnaissance elements or command OPsas part of the division counter-reconnaissance effort.

The division uses a variety of techniques to executecounterfire. The counterfire program is a counter-fire technique used when there is little movement ofenemy fire support assets and sufficient time avail-able to identify, locate, and target them. It is used todisrupt enemy fire support systems at critical times,such as during a counterattack or a penetration. Re-active counterfire is a counterfire technique whichinvolves attacking enemy fire support assets duringor immediately following enemy engagement offriendly forces. A cueing agent normally initiatesthis technique. He directs the counterfire radar toradiate, acquire the target, and transmit a fire mis-sion to its reporting headquarters.

Another technique is to have all radars report to theartillery regiment. This allows the regiment to cen-trally command and control radars and artillery

counterfire. It also allows the artillery regiment tomaintain continuous coverage of the division sectorby coordinating the movement of counterfire radarsand firing units.

The division may employ maneuver forces againstenemy fire support systems. This may include useof small maneuver units to engage reconnaissance,surveillance, and target acquisition elements. Thedivision may request the employment of aviationagainst artillery groups. The division may employ amix of these techniques.

AssessmentAssessment is the determination of overall effective-ness of force employment during division operations.It informs the division commander of strike effectsagainst specific targets and target sets. Based on thisinformation, the enemy s operational capabilities arecontinuously estimated. During this review, muni-tions effectiveness is evaluated and reattack recom-mendations are proposed or executed.

Assess FunctionThe principle tool for the division commander duringthe assess function is battle damage assessment(BDA). BDA is the timely and accurate estimate ofdamage resulting from the application of militaryforce, either lethal or nonlethal, against a target.BDA within the targeting process pertains to the re-suits of attacks on targets designated by the divisioncommander. Producing BDA is primarily an intelli-gence responsibility, but requires extensive coordi-nation with operational elements to be effective.BDA requirements must be translated into priorityinformation requirements. BDA accomplishes thefollowing purposes:

• It provides the division commander an estimateof the enemy's combat effectiveness, capabili-ties, and intentions.

• It helps to determine if a reattack is necessary.• It is used to determine allocation or redirection

of attack systems to make the best use of avail-able resources and combat power.

The requirement for BDA for specific HPTs is deter-mined during the decide function in the targetingprocess. BDA requirements should be recorded on

8-20 FMFM 6-1

the AGM and the intelligence collection plan. Thecommander and the staff must be aware that re-sources required for BDA are the same resourcesused for target development and acquisition. There-fore, the commander's decision must be made withthe realization that an asset used for BDA may notbe available for target development and acquisition.BDA information is received and processed to ana-lyze the results of target attack in terms of desiredeffects. The results are disseminated to the targetingteam. The targeting team must keep the following inmind:

• BDA must measure that which is important tothe commander, not what is easily measured.

• BDA must be objective.• The degree of reliability and credibility of the

assessment relies largely upon collection re-sources. The quantity and quality of collectionassets reporting on the target significantly influ-ence whether the assessment is highly reliableor has low reliability. The best BDA usesmore than one collection asset to verify eachconclusion.

Battle Damage AssessmentSubcomponentsBDA may take different forms besides the determi-nation of the number of casualties or the amount ofequipment destroyed. Other information of use tothe targeting team include the following:

• Whether the targets are moving or hardening inresponse to the attack.

• Changes in deception efforts and techniques.• Increased communications efforts, as the result

of jamming.• Whether the damage achieved is affecting the

enemy's combat effectiveness as expected.

Each BDA has three subcomponents. They are asfollows:

Physical Damage Assessment

These estimates provide a quantitative assessment onthe extent of physical damage occurring through mu-nitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage ef-fects to a target. This assessment is based onobserved or interpreted damage.

Functional Damage Assessment

These estimates provide the effect of force appliedon the functional or operational capability of the tar-get to perform its intended mission compared to theoperational objective established against the target.This assessment is inferred based upon all-source in-telligence and includes an estimate of the time re-quired for reconstitution or replacement of the targetfunction. A functional damage assessment is a tem-porary assessment used for specific missions.

Target System Assessment

This is a broad assessment of the overall impact andeffectiveness of the full spectrum of military opera-tions against an entire target system's capability, forexample, enemy air defense systems. It may also beapplied against enemy unit combat effectiveness. Atarget system assessment may also address significantsubdivisions of the system compared to the com-mander's stated operational objectives. A target sys-tem assessment is a relatively permanent assessment(compared to a functional damage assessment) thatwill be used for more than one mission.

Chapter 9

Operations Other Than War

OverviewOperations other than war (OOTW) encompass awide range of activities where the military instru-ment of national power is used for purposes otherthan the large-scale combat operations usually asso-ciated with war. Although these operations are oftenconducted outside the United States, they also in-clude military support to U.S. civil authorities.They may be regional in nature, may developquickly, and may or may not be long term. A divi-sion employed in response to a crisis serves to con-tain or limit its immediate effects and strives toachieve the peaceful resolution of the issues that cre-ated it. There are two broad categories of OOTWbased on the general goal — operations to deter warand resolve conflict and operations to promotepeace.

The forward-deployed MAGTF integrated with theNEF is uniquely capable of conducting OOTW.Though trained and equipped primarily for combat,the division can be task-organized to meet the mis-sion requirements of the contingency at hand fromdirect combat against a capable enemy force to thecivil assistance necessary to maintain the basic essen-tials of life for a disaster-stricken populace.

OOTW are often conducted in a politically sensitiveenvironment. Marines must consider every individ-ual action as it may have significant political or op-erational impact. This places increased importanceon small unit discipline, decentralized execution oflawful orders, cultural training, and proper use of in-dividual language capabilities within the force. Forexample, one act of civil disturbance or intoleranttreatment of civilians can turn a supportive populaceagainst the force and be exploited by a potential ad-versary. This same act may become a lighting rodin turning domestic public opinion against a contin-ued effort.

The commander must consider his activities in rela-tion to similar activities carried out by agencies ofthe U.S. government, allies, and host nation, as wellas nongovernment and private volunteer organiza-tions. Additional considerations include —

• Media scrutiny will by extensive.• Rules of engagement will be more restric-

tive.• Identification of hostile parties may be more

difficult.• Military assets may be routinely used to sup-

port noncombat functions.• Interaction with civilian noncombatants will

be routine at every level of command.

PrinciplesPlanning and conduct of OOTW should encompassconsideration of the following five principles.

ObjectiveA clearly defined and attainable objective, with aprecise definition of success, is critical. Multina-tional forces must come to a unanimous agreementas to what the objective is, recognizing that individ-ual nations may desire to achieve it by vastly differ-ent means. Leaders of disparate organizations,military and otherwise, must understand the strategicaims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that theycontribute to overall unity of effort.

Unity of EffortThis principle is similar to unity of command associ-ated with combat operations. In OOTW, unity of ef-fort may be more difficult to attain because ad hocalliances, coalitions, and the introduction of nonmili-tary agencies will pose unique problems of coordina-tion and cooperation. Organizations such as theUnited Nations, NATO, the State Department, the

9-2

U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID), and other regional alliances establish thepolitical, economic, military, and psychological at-mosphere of the operation. The MEF and divisionwill normally support the efforts of these organiza-tions and the host nation. Multinational commandrelationships may be loosely defined. This will re-quire senior military and political decisionmakers tobe on the scene as early as possible and commandersto emphasize cooperation and coordination ratherthan command authority to achieve objectives.

In multinational coalitions, even if unity of commandis established, unity of effort may still be elusive.The division commander must understand that par-ticipating forces will be compelled to take directionfrom their own national authorities and respond totheir own national interests. Likewise, most partici-pating forces receive logistical support through theirown sustainment system.

SecuritySecurity deals primarily with force protection andprotection of civilian noncombatants. The presenceof military forces may generate opposition by vari-ous elements that adhere to different social, political,or military objectives. These factions might attackthe force to gain legitimacy, weaken U.S. or interna-tional resolve, or undermine the authority of the hostgovernment. U.S. forces are a particularly lucrativetarget as they represent the world's sole superpower,and may have difficulty appearing as impartial undera scrutinizing media. Protected parties may be per-ceived as supporting or supported by the U.S. gov-ernment. This perception could place thatorganization at greater risk. Division units mustmaintain constant vigilance regardless of their appar-ent acceptance by the population. They must beready to exercise their inherent right to self-defenseby rapid transition from peaceful activities to a com-bat posture.

RestraintRules of engagement (ROE) are established by thecommander in chief (CINC) and based on NationalCommand Authorities' (NCA) guidance, mission,threat, law of war, and host nation restraints onforce deployment. These rules are communicated tothe division through the chain of command. ROE

FMFM 6-1

must be thoroughly briefed, understood, and en-forced by all Marines. The use of force is character-ized by the judicious and prudent selection,deployment, and employment of forces most suitableto the situation. This never precludes units from ex-ercising their inherent right to self-defense or the ap-plication of appropriate combat power to demon-strate U.S. resolve. Changes to ROE are made byrequesting supplemental guidance through the chainof command. Meanwhile, the division commandershould publish his own unclassified "Commander'sGuidance on the Use of Force" to ensure every indi-vidual understands the restrictions. Intelligenceplays an important part in developing ROE as re-quired by the changing situation. Anticipation of un-foreseen conditions and timeliness of getting changesapproved is critical. For OOTW, the division com-mander develops his guidance with the following inmind:

• Explain the mission and commander's intent.• Assess the threat accurately.• State guidance clearly.• Recognize that use of force is justified in

self-defense.• Anticipate that guidance is subject to change.

LegitimacyLegitimacy of the operation and host governmentmust be maintained. During operations where a le-gally constituted government does not exist, extremecaution must be applied when dealing with indige-nous individuals and organizations. The appearanceof formal U.S. recognition when such U.S. supportdoes not exist must be avoided. The divisioncommander should incorporate psychological opera-tions/public affairs programs in his planning toinfluence both foreign and domestic perceptions.Activities that attempt to solve immediate problemsyet undermine the authority or legitimacy of the hostgovernment may undermine our ultimate aim.

Agencies Routinely Involved inOOTWThe division can expect to work in cooperation witha variety of agencies and private organizations notnormally encountered during combat operationswhen conducting OOTW. Though most coordina-tion and liaison with these organizations is conducted

Marine Division 9-3

by the MEF, the division commander and staff canexpect these organizations to be participants in theoperation and to provide significant expertise and re-sources to the overall effort.

Department of StateThe Department of State (DOS) is responsible for theformulation and implementation of U.S. foreign pol-icy. In a given country, DOS authority is delegatedto one of several principal staff assistants.

Regional Liaison

Regional liaison groups are established as necessaryto ensure coordination of planning in the field andprovide advice and guidance in operations planningand execution.

Emergency Action Committee

The Emergency Action Committee (EAC) is thepoint of contact for DOS/DOD evacuation site inter-face. Its mission is to brief, coordinate, and plan forthe evacuation or protection of U.S. noncombatantsand certain designated aliens in case of emergency.It normally consists of DOS representatives, localU.S. government representatives/country, thirdcountry nationals, and host nation personnel.

Country Team

The country team consists of the ranking representa-tives of embassy sections and other U.S. governmentagencies operating within a country. Chaired by theambassador or the deputy chief of mission, the coun-try team meets regularly to advise the ambassador onU.S. matters and to review current developments inthe country.

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID is an agency under the policy direction ofDOS that coordinates U.S. foreign assistance efforts.In peace support operations, the armed forces willwork closely with USAID staff. Foreign economicassistance provided by USAID includes grants,loans, funding for infrastructure, and food adminis-tered in cooperation with the Department of Agricul-ture. USAID efforts are focused on four areas:

• Use of market forces. Stimulation of marketeconomies and investment by U.S. companiesin developing nations.

• Institution building. Improvement of schools,colleges, training organizations, supportivegovernment ministries, and other institutions tosupport economic growth.

• Policy dialog. Emphasis on policy reform toadvance development.

• Technology transfer. Transfer of technologyto help countries produce their own resources.

U.S. Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

The U.S. Aid Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance(AOFDA) is the federal agency responsible for pro-viding prompt nonmilitary assistance to alleviate lossof life and suffering of foreign disaster victims.AOFDA may request DOD assistance during hu-manitarian assistance operations.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)coordinates federal, state, and local resources on is-sues of national security emergency preparedness,civil defense, continuity of mobilization prepared-ness, and continuity of government and technologicaldisasters within the U.S., territories and possessions.

American Red Cross

The American Red Cross operates under Congres-sional charter and fulfills peace support operationsobligations primarily in the U.S. However, it doesoperate internationally. International support thatmay involve the Red Cross includes assistance to dis-aster victims, blood programs and education, andsupport to other Red Cross societies during crises.

World Health Organization

The main focus of the World Health Organization ishealth program development. World Health Organi-zation representatives work directly with any exist-ing health organization concerning health programdevelopment. During emergencies, they may beable to provide advice and guidance, mobilize spe-cialists, and provide urgently needed medications

FMFM 6-1

and supplies. For normal operational matters in acountry, they depend on the regional director, whileduring emergencies they may deal directly with boththeir regional offices and the World Health Organi-zation headquarters.

United Nation's Children's Fund

United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF) pro-vides health services, emergency food relief, andeducation programs.

InterAction

InterAction is an association of 154 U.S.-based, pri-vate, humanitarian organizations working throughoutthe world. The central focus of its members is to al-leviate human suffering and to promote sustainabledevelopment. Members of this association includeagencies such as CARE, International Aid, Inc., andFood for the Hungry.

Civil Military Operations Center

The civil military operations center (CMOC) is anagency that coordinates execution of military andU.S. assistance (as appropriate) for relief operations.It can serve as the primary interface between all hu-manitarian organizations and military forces. ACMOC is normally established at the JTF level.Key members of the CMOC should include selectedJTF and Service component staff members and DOS,AOFDA, and disaster assistance response team(DART) representatives. To ensure continuous co-ordination and cooperation among all the players inthe region, members of the CMOC, as well as U.N.agencies representatives, military liaison personnelfrom participating countries, representatives fromnongovernmental and private volunteer organiza-tions, and representatives from other governmentalagencies should meet frequently to discuss problemsand coordinate actions. This will facilitate bettercommunications among all participants in the opera-tion. A sample CMOC organization is depicted infigure 9-1.

Types Of Operations Other ThanWarOOTW can be characterized as operations to deterwar and resolve conflict and operations to promotepeace.

Operations to Deter War and Reso'veConflictIn spite of internal or external efforts to promotepeace, factions within a country or region may resortto armed conflict. A deteriorating situation may re-quire military force to demonstrate U.S. resolve andcapability, support the other instruments of nationalpower, or terminate the situation on favorable terms.The general goals of U.S. military operations duringperiods of conflict are to support national objectives,deter war, and return to a state of peace. These op-erations involve a greater risk as they may escalateinto large-scale combat operations. Operations todeter war and resolve conflict include the following:

Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The U.S. may support insurgencies that share U.S.values and counterinsurgencies of friendly govern-ments against insurgents that proclaim support ofideology incompatible with U.S. national interests.Fundamental to supporting insurgencies or counter-insurgencies is the recognition of the political, eco-nomic, and/or ideological motivation of the insurgentmovement. Leaders must understand the culture ofthe population and the geographical nature of thecountry or countries involved. This understanding iscritical to the decision to commit U.S. forces, theextent of the military operation, and the threat the in-surgency poses to our national interests.

Support to InsurgencySince most insurgencies are covert, MEF supportmay be limited to supporting the efforts of specialoperations forces. Division support to insurgencieswill principally involve training and advising insur-gent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, tech-niques, and procedures. Insurgency support isclassified as a special activity and is subject to ap-proval by the U.S. Congress.

Support to Counterinsurgency

The division may be tasked to provide support acrossthe full range of conventional capabilities to the sup-ported government against a hostile insurgent force.The division may be employed to support counterin-surgencies by assisting with foreign internal defense,training of military and law enforcement personnel,and the conduct of strikes, raids, and limited ground

Marine Division 9-5

Figure 9-1. Sample Composition of a CMOC.

combat. Though the division may participate incombat operations in support of a friendly country'scounterinsurgency effort, in many instances, this ac-tive role may detract from the political legitimacyand effectiveness of the host government. There-fore, the employment of the division and its contri-bution to the host nation must be continually assessedbased on the changing situation. The spectrum ofsupport provided by the division includes —

• Advisory and training assistance.• Intelligence support.• Logistic support.• Civil-military operations.• C2 support.• Combat operations.

Combating Terrorism

Terrorism is designed to influence public support fora stated policy or program by successful attacksagainst citizens and property. Terrorist attacks mayreduce the credibility of the U.S. or diminish the

Nation's ability to influence international events.The lead agency for combating terrorism overseas isthe DOS, within the U.S. is the Department of Jus-tice. The DOD is responsible for providing techni-cal assistance and/or forces when directed orrequested by one of these lead agencies. Since ter-rorism can be international in scope and, in some in-stances, aided and abetted by state sponsors, thethreat posed to U.S. citizens and security interestsabroad may require a U.S. military response. Thetwo levels of response are categorized as counterter-rorism and antiterrorism.

CounterterrorismCounterterrorism is the offensive portion of combat-ing terrorism and involves the employment of forcesto directly address terrorist situations including pre-emptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The ex-tent of division participation depends upon location,type of incident, the degree of force required, andthe impact of legal and political constraints. Na-tional assets are normally used to conduct

JTF

Children's Fund

MEFMarDiv"\

InterActionCARE

World Food ProgrammeDept of Peacekeeping OperationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees

Doctors of the WorldSave the ChildrenInternational RescueCommittee

Other Relief andBenefit Organizations

OFDNDARTCountry Team

American Red Cross

9-6 FMFNI 6-1

counterterrorism operations. A forward-deployedMEF or division unit in striking distance of a terror-ist action may be tasked to support an in-extremiseffort.

Antiterrorism

Antiterrorism is the deterrence of terrorism throughactive and passive measures. The basics of such aprogram begin with a well-trained division, Continu-ing actions, and security procedures. It also includesthe collection and dissemination of timely threat in-formation, the conduct of information awarenessprograms, personal training, and coordinated secu-rity plans. Protective plans and procedures arebased on the threat and should strike a reasonablebalance between protection, mission requirements,the criticality of assets and facilities, and availablemanpower and resources. The division may provideantiterrorism assistance to foreign countries as partof the overall U.S. military foreign internal defenseand development programs. This support may in-clude training in bomb detection and disposal, physi-cal security, and the detection, deterrence, andprevention of acts of terrorism.

Show of Force

Show of force lends credibility to U.S. policies andcommitments, increases its regional influence, anddemonstrates resolve. In shows of force, the divi-skin plans for combined and joint training exercisesand the transition to combat operations. As withother contingency operations, the division plan mustsupport regional campaign and operation plans. Thedivision plans training that supports its requirementsand facilitates transition to combat operations. Thisrequires —

• Coordinating in detail with other Services andthe host nation.

• Developing a training plan.• Selecting ranges and training areas located in or

near the terrain where combat operations mayoccur.

• Maintaining and positioning the basic load ofammunition.

• Planning deception.• Conducting rehearsals.• Planning fire support.

• Establishing reconnaissance and surveillancelocations.

• Establishing security.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) removethreatened civilian noncombatants from locations in aforeign nation. The methods and timing for theevacuation will be significantly influenced by diplo-matic considerations. NEO may entail the evacua-tion of U.S. citizens and/or citizens of nonbelligerentcountries and the host nation. Ideally, there is noopposition to an evacuation and it will be supportedby the host country. However, the division com-mander must be prepared to participate in NEO in ahostile environment that requires the use of force.NEO resembles a raid in that it involves the swift in-troduction of forces, evacuation of the noncombat-ants, and a planned withdrawal. Detailed coordi-nation is required between the MEF and the repre-sentatives of the DOS responsible for U.S. interestsin the region. The U.S. Ambassador, or Chief ofthe Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the prepa-ration and update of the regional Emergency ActionPlan that covers the military evacuation of U.S. citi-zens and other designated foreign nationals. Execu-tion of the military portion of the Emergency ActionPlan is the sole responsibility of the supporting mili-tary commander.

Recovery

Recovery operations are sophisticated activities re-quiring detailed planning and precise execution, es-pecially when conducted in hostile areas. Whenconducted by the military, recovery operations maybe clandestine or overt. They may include the re-covery of U.S. or friendly foreign nationals or sensi-tive equipment critical to U.S. national security.Recovery operations may be conducted by speciallytrained units or conventional forces organized intoraid forces.

Attacks and Raids

Attacks and raids may be conducted by the divisionto create situations which permit seizing and main-taining the political initiative, Successful attacks andraids place considerable pressure on governmentsand groups supporting terrorism. The decision toexecute an attack or raid must include precise

Marine Division 9-7

identification of the target to ensure that its neutrali-zation will produce the desired political effect.

Maritime Interception Operations

Maritime interception operations (MIO) consist ofport denial and vessel intercept. Port denial is theact of prohibiting access to specific ports to preventthe import/export of contraband. Vessel intercep-tions are based on international law associated withmaritime visit and search. Boarding parties exercis-ing the right of visit and search may be placed onmerchant ships to examine ship's documents, bills oflading, and cargo, searching for evidence of contra-band. The division may be tasked to provide forcesto conduct boarding operations or support to navalspecial warfare units conducting the intercept.

Peace OperationsThere are three distinct types of peace operations —peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping.Peacemaking is primarily a diplomatic process be-yond the purview of military personnel. The divi-sion may conduct the following missions in supportof peace operations.

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement includes appropriate forcefulmilitary actions to separate belligerents involved in aconflict, with or without their consent. Forces em-ployed in peace enforcement conduct all doctrinalmilitary operations to force a cessation of hostilities.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic effortsto maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.They stabilize a conflict between belligerent nationsor factions and require the consent of all parties in-volved in the dispute. It may be more appropriatelyreferred to as truce-keeping since a negotiated truceis maintained. The most important requirements fora peacekeeping operation are a negotiated truce andconsent to the operation by all the parties in a dis-pute. Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situa-tions requiring the peacekeeping force to deal withextreme tension and violence without becoming aparticipant. The essential elements that must be pre-sent at the time a peacekeeping force is established,

as well as throughout its operation, include thefollowing:

• The consent, cooperation, and support of theauthorities of all the parties in the conflict.

• Political recognition of the peacekeeping opera-tion by most, if not the entire, internationalcommunity.

• A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate ormission with specified and easily understoodrules of engagement (ROE).

• Sufficient freedom of movement for the forceand observers to carry out their responsibilities.

• An effective C2 system.• Well-trained and impartial forces.• An effective and responsive all-source intelli-

gence gathering and dissemination capability.• Coordinated logistic support of the force.

Preventive Deployment. Preventive deployment isthe deployment of a multinational force where a con-flict threatens to occur. It requires neither a trucenor a peace plan between the potential belligerents.The force deploys at the request of any of the partiesinvolved, without agreement between belligerentsexcept to the specific tasks. The division's tasksmay include —

• Interposing itself in order to forestall violence.• Protecting the delivery of humanitarian relief.• Assisting local authorities to protect and offer

security to threatened minorities.

Internal Conflict Resolution Measures. Internalconflict resolution measures are the actions taken bya multinational force to restore and maintain an ac-ceptable level of peace and security. They are ap-propriate to conditions where there is a dispute inwhich the parties may be less easy to identify than inconventional conflict, and the presence of a multina-tional force may not enjoy local consent. Althoughthe level of violence may be low and sporadic, thedanger to multinational personnel is greater than in aconventional peacekeeping operation because the po-tential threat is difficult to identify.

Assistance to (Interim) Civil Authority. The task ofthe multinational force will be to supervise the provi-sions of the peace agreement and ensure that anytransfer of power or the holding of elections will be

9-8 FMFM 6-1

carried out fairly. The role of the military contin-gents is to maintain a level of security which allowsthe civil administration to function effectively.

Protection of Humanitarian Assistance Operations.These operations entail the employment of a militaryforce to ensure the safe and uncontested delivery ofrelief supplies and resources. A joint, multinationaltask force organized for relief protection will need tofocus on three main tasks — establishing a mountingbase; ensuring delivery of resources; and providingsecurity for the victim population at the delivery site.A multinational relief protection operation may haveseveral of the following characteristics:

• The in-country delivery of relief must bemounted through a secured forward base andnot directly from donor nation to victimcommunity.

• Some element of local armed opposition maybe encountered but it is unlikely that it will beof such strength to require intensive combatoperations.

• Protection of delivery should be planned withthe cooperation of regional neighboring states.

• The response agencies, both nongovernmentalorganizations and the military force, should becoordinated. This can be done by an organiza-tion designed to coordinate the needs of reliefagencies with the capabilities of military units.

Operations to Promote PeaceUse of military forces in peacetime helps keep ten-sions between nations below the threshold of armedconflict and maintains U.S. influence in foreignlands. Such operations are typically joint in natureand may involve the MEF, forward-depJoyedMAGTFs, CONUS-based forces, or a combinationof both.

Nation AssistanceThe U.S. may accelerate security assistance when afriendly or allied nation faces an immediate militarythreat. Initial support is frequently focused on pro-viding additional combat systems or supplies. Divi-sion support to security assistance surges mayinclude the full range of training and logisticsupport.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

illicit drug trafficking organizations undermine andcorrupt regional stability. Because our national se-curity directly depends on regional stability through-out the world, drugs have become a major concernof U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of Defense'sguidance directs an attack on the drug problem inthree phases: at the source, in-transit, and in theU.S.

At the Source. The division may be tasked to assistthe counterdrug efforts of cooperating foreign gov-ernments, agencies, and forces. This assistance isprovided through training and operational support tohost country forces, technical assistance, intelligencesupport, and collaboration with host nation law en-forcement agencies to prevent the export of illegaldrugs.

In-transit. The U.S. military is the lead agent forthe detection and monitoring of aerial and maritimedrug smuggling in-transit to the U.S., both outsidethe continental U.S. and at the borders and ports ofentry of the Nation. The division can provideground patrol and surveillance of the border areasand C2 assets in support of these activities.

In the United States. Division units may providesupport to Federal, State, and local law enforcementagencies to include training in planning techniquesand procedures, loan of military equipment, logisticsupport, use of aviation assets, assistance to commu-nity antidrug programs, and providing use offacilities.

Other Civil Support Operations

These operations encompass worldwide humanitarianassistance, military support to civil authorities, andmilitary assistance for civil disturbances. The divi-sion, as part of a larger military operation, may as-sist in disaster relief, which includes support todisplaced persons as well as humanitarian and civicassistance. Units can also augment domestic govern-ments of the U.S. Such operations can include sup-port to medical facilities, emergency response, andassistance to law enforcement agencies.

Marine Division 9-9

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief opera-tions use military personnel, equipment, and suppliesto support emergency relief to victims of natural orman-made disasters in the U.S. and overseas. Thedivision can provide or support logistic efforts tomove supplies to remote areas; extract or evacuatevictims; provide emergency communications, medi-cal support, maintenance, maintenance of law andorder; and civil engineering support. Historically,forward-deployed naval forces have been quick torespond to an emergency or disaster and the inherentflexibility and logistic capabilities of the NEF makeit well suited to provide support to these operations.

PlanningAlthough combat actions differ significantly frompeacetime activities, the process for tactical decisionmaking is similar. While peacetime activities vary,division-level planning consists of four basic compo-nents — mission analysis; task organization; logisticsupport; and command and control and communi-cations.

Mission AnalysisThe mission analysis determines facts, assumptions,an analysis of the MEF mission and intent, and thecommander's guidance.

FactsThe division staff provides the division commanderpertinent facts.

G-1. The G-1 estimate includes —

• Division strength and statistics of low-densityMOSs that may be critical to this particularmission.

• Preparation for overseas movement status ofthe division.

• Language-specific requirements and numbers oflanguage-qualified personnel.

G-2. The G-2 prepares a detailed IPB for the AOthat includes —

• Terrain analysis.

• Infrastructure assessment. A detailed analysisof transportation networks, airfields, port facili-ties, communications systems, power grids, ur-ban areas with emphasis on capacity, systemoperations, and location of critical nodes.

• Weather. Climatic and environmental condi-tions for a region can affect the mission. Forexample, hot, humid areas may require the ac-climation of personnel.

• Political, social, economic factors. Peacetimeoperations have high political visibility. Theend state of peacetime military activities cannotexclude the receptiveness of the host nationpopulation to U.S. forces, sources of politicalinstability, ongoing insurgencies, cultural sensi-tivities, and standard of living.

• Threat. The G-2 identifies known threat capa-bilities which could affect operations and sum-marizes recent and present threat activities thatmay indicate future actions. In many cases, thethreat may not be conventional forces but con-sist of police forces, paramilitary units, insur-gent groups, or terrorist organizations.

G-3. The G-3 coordinates with the MEF and Marineforce component, and U.S. government agencies todetermine the scope of the operation and C2 relation-ships. The G-3 plans and coordinates airlift, sealift,ground transport, and specialized training which maybe required with other agencies. The G-3 uses cur-rent unit status reports and training readiness to de-termine units capable of conducting the operation.

G-4. The G-4 provides logistic status. The 0-4compiles detailed estimates for all classes of supplyand equipment. He determines what combat-prescribed load lists are critical and increases quanti-ties. The G-4 estimates the amount of support need-ed from the MEF and Marine component to supportthe operation. The G-4 also plans for redundancy ofcritical equipment to offset decreased repair and sup-ply capability.

G-5. The 0-5 reviews regional studies of AOs and,through the MEF staff, coordinates civil affairs andpsychological warfare units. The 0-5 also examinesneeds assessments conducted for the AO to see whatactually must be done. The G-5 identifies the hostnation agency responsible for the operation, the levelof host nation participation, and points of contactwithin the host nation government.

9-10 FMFM 6-1

Assumptions

Having identified the facts available, the divisionstaff develops assumptions needed to replace neces-sary but missing facts and facilitate planning. As-sumptions developed during the initial planning mayinclude —

• Availability and type of transportation assets.• Force protection requirements.• Training requirements.• Joint conventional and special operations

participation.• Security assistance organization role.• Use of reserve forces.• Other U.S. agency and private organization

roles.• Host nation requirements and expectations.• Special equipment requirements.

Analysis of Mission and Intent

Once tasked to support peacetime military opera-tions, the division staff analyzes the theater strategy,campaign plans, and concept plans of the gainingcombatant command. The theater strategy articu-lates the CINC's vision for his theater. In mostcases, it provides guidance, direction, and opportuni-ties for peacetime operations in general terms. Cam-paign plans and concept plans identify theaterobjectives, sustainment concept, needed resources,and specified and implied tasks. Supporting plansdeveloped by the Marine Service component com-mand provide more definitive guidance on essentialtasks.

Commanders Guidance

Commander's guidance can be the most critical ele-ment of the mission analysis during time of crisis andshort notice warning, such as disaster relief and post-conflict operations. The commander issues guidanceon task organization, logistic support, and command,control, communications, computers, and intelli-gence (C4!) arrangements.

Task OrganizationMission, available lift, in-theater support, and politi-cal factors drive task organization. The divisiontask-organizes forces to be as self-contained as possi-ble. It is critical to define command relationships foreach subordinate unit.

Logistic SupportLogistic support may. involve providing on-hand andcontracted material and supplies to both U.S. andhost nation forces and agencies. It can also involvedeveloping logistic systems and infrastructures andprocedures for host nation logistic personnel. TheG-4 begins to plan for logistic support packages. Hedevelops a concept for support and uses experiencedlogistic staff officers to ensure that the logistic sys-tem works smoothly.

Mission Requirements

The mission dictates the level and type of supportneeded. Logistic planners consider essential tasks tobe accomplished by the division, terrain, and degreeof interagency and host nation support.

Available Theater Support

Maximum reliance on theater support is critical tolong-term sustainment of forces. Early coordinationidentifies all classes of supply, services, and directsupport maintenance available. During disaster re-lief and humanitarian assistance operations, the G-4coordinates with the MEF on availability and move-ment of DOS- or FEMA-stockpiled relief supplies.

Force Protection

The division commander may determine that infantryforces are needed to provide sufficient force protec-tion. He takes appropriate steps to ensure securityof his units. Force protection focuses on two areas:conserving our ability to generate combat power anddenying the enemy the ability to generate combatpower. The commander implements protection ofthe division through his force protection plan. Thisplan addresses all components of protection includ-ing survivability, deception, and countermobility op-erations. This plan addresses both active and passivemeasures.

The political environment may cause a rapid transi-tion from a relatively peacetime environment to con-flict. Detailed ROE contain graduated responses to achanging environment. Some considerations includethe use of riot control agents, use of snipers, stock-piling of basic loads, and augmentation by combatforces.

Marine Division 9-11

Legal Considerations

Generally, legal considerations for commanders con-ducting peacetime operations concern the use ofproper funding authorizations for the type of missionbeing conducted. The staff judge advocate (SJA) is

responsible for monitoring expenditures of ForeignAssistance Act funds and operations and mainte-nance funds.

Command and Control andCommunicationsWell-defined and effective C2 structure and commu-nications are essential to successful peacetime ac-tions. Normally, the U.S. ambassador assumes re-sponsibility for U.S. noncombat operations outsidethe U.S. He heads a country team that interfaceswith civilian and military agencies. They arecharged with ensuring that U.S. actions to accom-plish regional and international objectives within acountry are efficiently and economically adminis-tered. The regional command representative on thecountry team is the chief of the security assistanceoffice (SAO). The defense attaché officer may alsoact as the chief of the SAO. The SAO or defense at-taché can provide information on —

• U.S. ambassador's goals for the host nation.• Current threat.• Involvement of other agencies and points of

contact.• Current political situation.• Usable supply routes.• Airfields.• Movement restrictions.• Customs procedures.• Host nation expectations.• Other ongoing peacetime activities within the

host nation.• Terrain management.• Airspace restrictions.• Weapons restrictions.• Extent of host nation role and support.

If time permits, on-site surveys are conducted and anadvance party precedes deployment of the mainbody. At a minimum, the division headquarters ad-vance party should consist of representatives of the

G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6 sections and the SJA.Initial coordination is made with the MEF and theMarine component. In some cases, the division maybe relieving another force. The advance party of therelieving unit then coordinates the following areaswith the relieved unit:

• Transfer of property and supplies.• Force protection plans.• Contracting procedures.• Completion status of projects.• Engineering data.• Environmental factors.• Use of air and sealift for backhaul of relieved

unit.• Host nation support.

Peacetime military operations may often need specialcommunications requirements due to the type of op-eration and the different agencies involved in the op-eration. Communications are planned to supportcommunications with the JTF, combatant command,host nation, and other U.S. government agencies thatmay not have compatible equipment.

Negotiation and MediationThe division commander or one of his subordinatesmay find himself in the role of negotiator, mediator,and even arbitrator at the point of a confrontation. Ifpossible, negotiations on matters affecting both par-ties should be carried out jointly with the two sidesand should be conducted by specially organized ne-gotiation teams that appear neutral to the belliger-ents. A negotiator must be firm, tactful, and fair ifhe is to retain the trust of both parties. He must becareful not to pass the confidences of one side to theother.

Negotiations are not always successful. Agreementsof all parties may or may not occur. The negotiatormust remain neutral and avoid being used by eitherside. He must expect some of the belligerents to ne-gotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist is-sues to their advantage to prolong negotiations whilethey continue to violate agreements. For furtherguidance on conducting negotiations, see figure 9-2.

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Figure 9-2. Guidelines for Conducting Negotiations

Public Affairs and the MediaThe news media will normally have a significantpresence during OOTW, particularly those opera-tions that are of relatively long duration. Sincemuch of the public's understanding of the operationwill be gained from reports generated by the media,it is critical that the commander establishes a coher-..ent media policy and a working relationship withthose media personnel within the theater. Wheneverpossible, public affairs assets are deployed with theforce to ensure the media does not become a hin-drance to operations, that important events receivemedia attention (when desired), and that details ofthe operation are accurately presented.

Public affairs officers should be viewed asoperational planners. They establish informationpolicy based on guidance received from the com-mander. A public affairs officer assigned to thedivision should plan and conduct media relations re-fresher training for the division. This training willenhance the division personnel's ability to addressvaried interests and agendas of the international me-dia. When the division operates with a JTF, a JointInformation Bureau (JIB) should be established. AJIB representative should then attend briefings the di-vision conducts for the media's benefit. Likewise, adivision representative should attend meetings con-ducted at the CMOC.

Become familiar with the problem.

Cotlect ali available evidence.

Conduct negotiations.

Determine if the issue has been raised before.

Determine what agreements or understandingshave a bearing on the problem.

Remember the customary salutations and ex-changes of courtesies.

Be certain regarding the MEF commander's orpeacekeeping force's policies on the issue.

Introduce yourself and any advisors. All dele-gates are introduced by name.

Prepare for negotiation.

Use some introduction to make delegates feelat ease and to assess their mood.

Select and prepare a meeting place acceptableto both parties.

Allow each side to state his case without in-terruption and premature judgments orconcessions.

Obtain adequate interpreters and communi-cations assets.

side.Make a record of issues presented by each

Secure the meeting area and delegates fromattack.

If one side makes a statement which isknown to be incorrect, be prepared to pro-duce evidence or proof to establish the facts.

Ensure a common map edition and scale is usedby both sides and the peacekeeping force.

Keep the MEF informed

If the peacekeeping force has a preferred so-lution, present it and encourage both sides toaccept it,

Close the meeting by explaining to both sidesexactly what has been agreed to and whataction they are expected to take. Be pre-pared to present this in writing for signaturesif necessary.

Marine Division 9-13

There is a wide range of competence among mem-bers of the media. Most are professional and ethi-cal. They often have no military background andwill work to gather the facts. They may havesources of information not available to the com-mander and their ability to gather information shouldnever be underrated. Most members of the mediawill remain impartial; however, some individualshave their own biases which are difficult, if not im-possible, to overcome. International media will havea widely diverse perspective on the operation. Infact, some may be politically aligned with organiza-tions with an opposing or unsympathetic view of theoperation and the commander's position. Some gen-eral rules for dealing with the media include —

• Deal honestly and in a timely manner with themedia.

• Aggressively counter inaccurate information.• Allow the media to talk to the Marines. Guid-

ance for the troops should include —

Feel free to talk to the media.Stay within your area of expertise.Do not speculate.Do not comment on policy.

• Do not put the media into a position of appear-ing as agents of the force commander.

• Do not conduct staged events ("dog and ponyshows").

• Conduct briefings on a regular basis to keep in-formation flowing to and from the media.

• Understand the media's obsession with speed —maintain daily contact.

• Leaders must take the time to articulate theirpositions — use short, simple language.

• Realize that news is almost always skewed to-ward the side of those willing to talk to the me-dia and against those that say "no comment."

• Realize there are reporters who do not want tobe accurate — political spin may be interjectedinto an otherwise positive story.

• Do not take offense to honestly told stories ofoperational setbacks.

Postcontlict OperationsThe division may be required to transition fromcombat operations to postconflict operations. Post-conflict operations focus on restoring order and

minimizing confusion following the operation, rees-tablishing the host nation infrastructure, and prepar-ing forces for redeployment. Under the guidance ofthe DOS and the JTF, the division may be directedto help reinforce or reestablish formal institutionseliminated during combat operations and improvepostcombat population attitudes toward the U.S.

Many tasks that are not usually done by Marineforces may become the division's responsibility untilhost nation or U.S. government agencies reestablishpresence. Postconflict operations increasingly be-come interagency in nature as the ambassador andcountry team resume a larger role. The objective ofthese activities is to return to an environment ofpeace as expeditiously as possible, but also to in-crease the probability of sustained peace.

The division consolidates in key locations and reor-ganizes during the initial stages of postconflict opera-tions. During this time, equipment and facilities arerepaired, EPWs are processed, and units are reposi-tioned and prepared for future operations. The divi-sion may simultaneously conduct peacetime activitiesand search and attack missions. The priority of ef-fort is always to bring combat operations to a satis-factory conclusion. As hostilities terminate, thedivision prepares to task organize and direct its ef-forts toward peacetime activities.

The G-5 begins to coordinate civil affairs operationswithin the division AO. The division tasks availablecivil affairs (CA) units to —

• Identify available local resources, facilities, andsupport.

• Assist the commander in meeting legal andmoral obligations to the local populace.

• Serve as liaison with other U.S. governmentagencies and the host nation.

• Assist the G-2 in assessing the current threat.• Act as the staff focal point for cultural

considerations.• Conduct a needs assessment of the local

populace.• At the request of the host nation, establish a

temporary civil administration to maintain lawand order and to provide life-sustaining serv-ices until the host nation can resume normaloperations.

9-14

Subordinate units of the division not involved incombat operations may be tasked by the divisionto—

• Assist in the performance of law and orderfunctions in urban areas.

• Provide security.• Establish contact with rural, isolated populace.• Assist special operations forces to stabilize ru-

ral areas of dissent.

FMFM 6-1

• Implement programs designed to disarm thepopulace.

• Respond to threats to the host nation govern-ment at the request of the host nation and thecountry team.

• Train host nation self-defense forces.• Assist in reconstruction of urban areas.• Provide humanitarian assistance.

Chapter 10

Combat Service Support

OverviewCombat service support provides the essential capa-bilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary tosustain all elements of operating forces. CSS func-tions include, but are not limited to, providing sup-ply, maintenance, transportation, general engineer-ing, health services, and other services required topermit supported units to accomplish their mission.

Principles of Combat ServiceSupportThe principles of combat service support are appliedbased on METT-T. The principles are guides forplanning, organization, management, and execution.The principles of combat service support are asfollows:

Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the pro-vision of the right support at the right time andin the right place. Among the principles ofcombat service support, the principle of respon-siveness is the most critical.

• Simplicity. Simplicity is avoidance of com-plexity. It fosters efficiency in both the plan-ning and execution of CSS operations.Mission-type orders and standardized proce-dures contribute to simplicity.

• Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to adaptCSS structures and procedures to changingsituations, missions, and concepts ofoperations.

• Economy. Economy is the provision of sup-port at the least cost in terms of the resourcesavailable and is necessary to accomplish themission.

• Attainability. Attainability is the ability toprovide the essential supplies and services re-quired to begin combat operations.

• Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability tomaintain support throughout the operation.Sustainability is an element of military capa-bility.

• Survivability. Survivability is the inherent ca-pacity of the organization and its capabilities toprevail in the face of potential destruction.

Functional Areas of CombatService SupportThe six functional areas of combat service supportprovide a basis for an integrated, analytical approachto the process of planning and executing logistic sup-port operations. They focus on the readiness and sus-tainability aspects of military capability.

SupplySupply is the procurement, distribution, maintenancewhile in storage, and salvage of supplies, includingthe determination of kind and quantity of supplies.Supplies are all items necessary for the equipmentand maintenance, and operation of military forces.FMFM 4-27. MAGTF Supply Operations (under de-velopment), provides a comprehensive discussion ofthe supply function. For planning, management, andadministrative purposes, supplies are divided into tenclasses, with particular emphasis on classes I, III, V,and IX for the division.

Class I

Subsistence, including gratuitous health and welfareitems.

10.2 FMFM 6-1

Rations. Front-line units carry enough combat ra-tions in organic combat vehicles to last 3-5 days.When the situation permits, hot meals may be pre-pared. It is normal, however, for division units touse combat rations during combat operations. Ra-tions are delivered by the FSSG to supply points inthe division rear area based on strength, environ-mental conditions, and duration of the operation.Within the division, supply point and unit distribu-tion is used. The table of organization (T/O) is usefulfor determining the requirements for food items.Also, the table of authorized material (TAM), underthe class I section, contains data for computation ofrequirements and packing data.

Water. Water requirements depend on the tacticalsituation, personnel consumption, vehicle mainte-nance, decontamination, bath/shower/laundry avail-ability and frequency, and method oftransport/resupply. When calculating the amount ofwater necesary, use the T/O in determining totalnumber of personnel. The table of equipment (T/E)is useful in determining what equipment is availableto carry and store water. FMFRP 4-18, Bulk LiquidsOperations (under development), provides detailedinformation for computing water requirements. Wa-ter distribution is made through water points oper-ated by the FSSG. Water distribution within thedivision may be directed by the division G-4.

Class II

Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organiza-tional tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, and admin-istrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.These supplies are normally issued through supplypoint distribution. However, isolated units may re-ceive these items through unit distribution. Requestsare forwarded to the division G-4, then to the FSSGfor items not stocked at the division.

Class III

POLs: petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and in-sulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressedgases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicing andantifreeze compounds, together with components andadditives of such products; and coal. The G-4 andthe FSSG work together to plan fuel resupply ré-quirements. In developing the plan, they determinehandling, storage, and movement capabilities;

analyze the tactical plan; and establish fuel require-ments. The T/E provides the amount of equipmentwhich require fuel. The TAM provides planning datafor climate conditions, oils, and greases. It also pro-vides a listing of POLs and planning data for all fuelconsuming vehicles and equipment in the MarineCorps inventory. FMFRP 4-18, Bulk Liquids Opera-tions (under development), provides detailed infor-mation for computing class III requirements.

Class IV

Construction: construction materials, to include in-stalled equipment and all fortification/barrier materi-als. The TAM provides data on individual engineerconstruction materials (i.e., barbed wire, sandbags,and lumber).

Class V

Ammunition: ammunition of all types (includingchemical, biological, radiological, and special weap-ons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators,pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propetlants, andother associated items. The objective is to provideammunition as far forward as possible to relieve theburden on the using units since they themselves willbe limited in their ability to conduct normal resup-ply. Planning is the key to successful ammunitionresupply. MCO 8010.1 contains combat planningrates for each type of unit/weapon. Planning must in-elude —

• Basic loads.• Required supply rate.• Controlled supply rate.• Movement capabilities.

Basic Loads. The unit's basic load is that quantity ofammunition that must be on hand to sustain it untilresupply can be accomplished. Commanders at alllevels must carefully analyze the directed basic loadand recommend changes as required. The basic loadshould not exceed what the unit can carry in organictransportation. Units that are not uploaded must es-tablish and frequently exercise loading plans to re-duce deployment time. Upload plans should becontinually reviewed and revised.

Required Supply Rate IRSR). The RSR developmentis the responsibility of the G-3, in consultation with

Marine Division 10-3

the G-4. Early in the planning process, a gross re-quirement may be necessary. Using the best infor-mation available, the G-3 considers the concept ofoperation and the number and types of weapons tobe armed. The subordinate units develop RSRs.These rates are determined at the fighting positionfor each weapon and include a detailed analysis ofthe requirements for the weapon. Leaders determinethe number of targets that may appear and the num-ber that can be engaged in a given period of time.RSRs are consolidated and coordinated by the G-4who compares requirements with ammunition avail-ability. The RSR is expressed in terms of rounds perweapon per day or DOA.

Controlled Supply Rate (CSR). The 0-3 and G-4, incoordination with the FSSG, establish the CSR forthose munitions in short supply. The CSR is thenumber of rounds per weapon per day that will beavailable to the tactical commander. The divisionCSR is published to provide regiment and separatebattalion commanders with their unit's allocation ofshort supply ammunition.

Movement Capabilities. The G-4 must determinehow the ammunition will be moved to the using unit.He coordinates with the FSSG on the location of theammunition supply point and the volume of ammuni-tion that will be moved by FSSG transportation as-sets to the division's ammunition transfer points.When possible, the FSSG vehicles move ammunitiondirectly to an ammunition transfer point in the regi-mental trains areas. A comprehensive movementplan must be developed and exercised to ensure thatthe combat forces can be adequately supported. Ifthe ammunition transfer point does not have the re-quested quantities, the combat unit goes to the am-munition supply point. Other techniques to reducehandling, conserve transportation, and streamline theresupply system include —

• Preconfigured loads for high-demand con-sumers.

• Prepositioning high-demand ammunition.• Establishing type-loads for each type of unit.• Establishing trailer transfer points.• Using throughput delivery to the consumer.• Positioning small stocks near unit battle

positions.

Class VI

Personnel demand (nonmilitary sales items): Becauseexchanges are not usually brought into forward areasearly on in an operation, the sundries pack providesunits with exchange items until exchanges are estab-lished.

Class VII

Major end items: a final combination of end productswhich is ready for its intended use; e.g. launchers,tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles. The TIEprovides allowances for major end items. The TAMprovides the combat active replacement factor(CARP) which reflects the anticipated combat attri-tion of equipment on a monthly basis. Considerationshould be given to weapon systems replacement op-erations. The intensity of future battles will produceheavy losses of both personnel and material. It isimperative that weapon systems and complete crewsbe replaced quickly and efficiently. Weapon systemreplacement operations is a method of supplying thecommander with fully operational replacementweapon systems, both vehicle and crew.

The division manages and allocates weapon systemsbased on priorities established by the division com-mander. The division provides replacement weaponsystems directly to the subordinate units. Whenthere are insufficient weapon system replacements tomeet requirements, the commander or G-3 estab-lishes assignment priorities.

Class VIII

Medical material, including medical unique repairparts. The authorized medical allowance list(AMAL) and authorized dental allowance list(ADAL) assists in determining the initial issue ofmedical and dental supplies.

Class IXRepair parts and components, to include kits, assem-blies and subassemblies, repairable and nonrepair-able, required for maintenance support of allequipment. During the predeployment phase, a classIX block is tailored to support the division. Theblock is built based on historical usage rates.

Io-4 FMFM 6-1

Class X

Material to support nonmilitary programs; e.g., agri-cultural and economic development, not included inclasses 1-IX.

Distribution

The two normal methods of distribution are supplypoint distribution and unit distribution. Supply pointdistribution is the method of distributing supplies inwhich the receiving unit is issued supplies at a sup-piy point (depot, airhead, railhead, combat train site,distribution point) and moves the supplies in organictransportation. Unit distribution is the method ofdistributing supplies in which the receiving unit is is-sued supplies in its own area, the transportation be-ing furnished by the issuing agency. The receivingunit is then responsible for its own internaldistribution.

Distribution Method Selection

As a general rule, the division commander must usea combination of unit distribution and supply pointdistribution. He gives first priority for unit distribu-tion to those engaged units having limited organictransportation. He gives lesser priority to engagedunits having organic transportation. He assigns thelowest priority to units which are not in contact withthe enemy.

From the consumers viewpoint, unit distribution isthe preferred method. However, the division seldomhas enough transportation assets to permit unit distri-bution to all organizations. The division commandermust make the decision on the type of distribution.He makes his decision based on an analysis and rec-ommendations from the CSSE/ACE commander. Adecision to use unit distribution has a significant im-pact on the distribution system.

When the division commander selects unit distribu-tion, the CSSE/ACE commander develops the trans-portation network from the supported organization tothe rear. Their planning must stop when they use upall available equipment. This may generate short-ages in rear areas. The CSS units may be unable tomove enough supplies among wholesale and retailactivities. Conversely, the CSSE/ACE commandermay develop the transportation network from therear forward, relying on supply point distribution.

This has significant impact on tactical operations. Itmay restrict operations for units which have limitedorganic transportation.

Trains

A train is a means of internally task-organizing andemploying the organic CSS assets of the tactical unit.They are the link between the forward/subordinateelements of the tactical units and the supportingCSSE. The organization and capabilities of trainsvary with the mission and tactical situation. Depend-ing on the type of unit and the transportation avail-able, trains may be fully mobile. Usually trains aremoveabte rather than mobile. Ordinarily, trains areused at the regiment and battalion levels. Regimen-tal trains may consist of the S-i and S-4, a limitedstaff, and their equipment. Regimental trains arenormally located in the regiment's rear area. Theregimental S-4 is responsible for the support areasselected, relocation, security, and operations of thetrains. These must be coordinated with the divisionG-4 to ensure continuous support. See FMFM 4-27,MAGTF Supply Operations (under development), fora complete discussion of the trains concept.

Unit Trains. Unit trains centralize the CSS assets ofthe supported unit at a single location under the con-trol of the unit commander. Unit trains are most ap-propriate in the defense or in low tempo operations.The commander uses this option when the tacticalsituation dictates self-contained train operations. Onoccasion, the terrain may require this configuration.Unit trains provide simplicity, economy, and surviv-ability against ground attack.

Battalion Trains. Normally, trains supportingbattalion-sized units will be echeloned into combattrains and field trains. Combat trains are organicelements which provide critical combat service sup-port in forward areas. Combat trains are tailored forthe tactical situation. They contain POL; ammuni-tion and other ordnance items; maintenance contactteams with a recovery and limited repair capability;and medical support. The exact composition de-pends on METT-T. The combat trains area must nottake up space needed by the forward units, and sup-ply and maintenance vehicle traffic must not impedethe freedom of movement of combat and combatsupport units. Combat trains at the battalion levelwill normally include the battalion aid station. Field

Marine Division 10-5

trains consist of the remaining organic CSS elementslocated further to the rear. The commander selectsthis option to improve responsiveness, flexibility,and survivability against air attack. This option ispreferable when the unit is in the offense.

Positioning

Seldom will a site be found which has all of the de-sired characteristics for the ideal train location;therefore, those characteristics most important to themission and tactical situation should be given prior-ity. The most important criterion is responsivenessand survivability.

A good train location has —

• Defensible terrain to allow the best use of lim-ited personnel.

• Enough space to permit dispersion of both vehi-cles and activities.

• Concealment from hostile ground and airobservation.

• Firm ground to support materials handlingequipment operations and heavy ammunitionand POL vehicles.

• A helicopter landing site for helicopter resupplyand medical evacuation.

• An adequate road network between the trainand the forward elements and between the trainand the CSSE.

• Good communications with forward elementsand with the supporting CSSE.

• A source of water.• No terrain features which are obstacles to CSS

operations or which give the enemy targetingsources.

Built-up areas are good locations for trains becausethey provide cover and concealment for vehicles andsheltered areas for maintenance at night. When lo-cated in built-up areas, trains should occupy build-ings near the edge of the area to help prevent beingcut off and trapped.

DisplacementProper positioning of trains minimizes displacementsand increases the quantity and quality of combatservice support. When displacing trains, the tech-nique most suitable to the tactical situation is

selected. Trains may be displaced in their entiretyconcurrently with the maneuver unit or by echelon.Echelonment of the force trains will provide iinmedi-ate responsive support, flexibility in usage, and in-creased survivability of assets. When trains areecheloned into combat and field trains, the S-4 willnormally control the combat trains and designate thecommander of the field trains. Echeloned displace-ment enhances continuity of combat service support.

MaintenanceMaintenance is all actions taken to retain material ina serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceabil-ity. It includes inspection and classification, servic-ing, adjustment, and tuning, testing and calibration,repair, modification, rebuild and overhaul, reclama-tion, and recovery and evacuation. FMFRP 4-15,Commander's Guide to Maintenance, provides amore detailed discussion of the maintenance func-tion. There are three levels of maintenance — organ-izational, intennediate, and depot.

Organizational maintenance. Organizationalmaintenance is that maintenance which is theresponsibility of, and performed by. a using orowning organization on its assigned equipment.Its phases normally consist of inspecting, serv-icing, lubricating, adjusting, and the replacingof parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies.Includes 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance.

• Intermediate maintenance. Intermediatemaintenance is that maintenance which is theresponsibility of and performed by designatedmaintenance activities for direct support of us-ing organizations. It normally consists of cali-bration, repair, or replacement of damaged orunserviceable parts, components, or assem-blies, the emergency manufacture of nonavail-able parts, and providing technical assistance tousing organizations. Some units (tank, AAV,and LAV) are authorized to perform certain in-termediate maintenance. Includes 3rd and 4thechelon maintenance.

• Depot maintenance. Depot maintenance isthat maintenance which is performed on mate-rial requiring major overhaul or a complete re-build of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, andend items, including the manufacture of parts,

10-6 FMFM 6-1

modifications, testing, and reclamation as re-quired. Includes 5th echelon maintenance.

Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forwardas possible at the lowest capable echelon of mainte-nance. When equipment cannot be repaired on site,it is moved only as far as necessary for repair. Ifunit maintenance personnel cannot repair the ve-hicle —

• Additional parts or major assemblies are sentforward, as required.

• Maintenance support teams, if not already onsite, are sent forward with parts and equipmentto assist in repair.

• The vehicle may be evacuated to the rear toawait parts or more specialized maintenancesupport teams from FSSG.

It may be necessary to use controlled substitution (ofparts) — selective interchange — in order to returnother vehicles to combat. This decision must bebased on the tactical situation and the capability ofthe unit and its support unit to deal with the specificmaintenance/recovery problem. It is desired to al-low controlled substitution to be made as close to thesite of damaged equipment as possible, preferably bybattalion maintenance officers. However, guidelinesshould be established by the division commander topreclude uncontrolled cannibalization of damagedvehicles. Maintenance collecting points can be es-tablished where designated forward support mainte-nance personnel determine which of the moreseriously damaged vehicles should be subjected toselective interchange and which should be repairedand returned to action.

TransportationTransportation is the movement from one location toanother by means of railways, highways, waterways,pipelines, oceans, and airways. It includes move-ment by military andlor commercial assets.Throughput is the measurement of the transportationand distribution systems; sustainability is the productof the throughput system. FMFM 4-1, CombatService Support Operations, contains a more detaileddiscussion of the transportation function. The sub-functions of transportation are —

• Embarkation.• Landing support.• Motor transport.• Port and terminal operations.• Air delivery.• Freight/passenger transportation.• Materials handling equipment.

General EngineeringEngineering support is always METT-T dependent.This requires extensive engineer intelligence derivedfrom collection assets, topographic units, and engi-neer reconnaissance. The functions of engineeringare mobility, countermobility, survivability, and gen-eral engineering. There are distinctions between thefunctions and the various types of engineer support,combat support, and combat service support organicto the MEF and division. CSS engineer support pro-vided by the engineer support battalion of the FSSGis largely general engineering. It differs from com-bat and combat support engineering provided by thecombat engineer battalion in that general engineeringis a planned and coordinated activity not directly as-sociated with the immediate support of the division.Refer to FMFM 13, M4GTF Engineer Operations,for a detailed discussion of engineering functions.Subfunctions of general engineering are —

• Engineer reconnaissance.• Horizontal and vertical construction.• Facilities maintenance.• Demolition and obstacle removal.• Explosive ordnance disposal.• Utilities support.• Mobile electric power.• Hygiene and laundry services.• Production and distribution of potable water.• Bulk fuel storage.

Health ServiceThe objective of the health services system is to pro-vide the care to preserve and restore the health of di-vision personnel. This objective has two subordinateobjectives. The first is to return ill or injured per-sonnel to duty as soon as possible. The second is toreduce mortality and disability. The health servicessystem must provide the best possible care to thesick and injured and promote good health and pre-vention of disease and injury. FMFM 4-50, Health

Marine Division 10-7

Service Support, provides a detailed discussion of thehealth service function. The subfunctions of healthservice include —

• Health maintenance• Casualty collection• Casualty treatment• Temporary hospitalization• Casualty evacuation

Patients are treated as far forward as possible.Those requiring a more sophisticated level of medi-cal care are evacuated using complementary systemsof ground and air ambulances. The normal chain ofevacuation is from the point of injury or companycollection point to the battalion aid station, to thetreatment facility operated by the supporting medicalcompany, to a combat zone hospital located in theMEF rear area.

ServicesServices support the commander's decision-makingprocess, the conduct of operations, and the morale ofdivision personnel. See FMFM 4-1 for a detaileddiscussion of the services function. Subfunctions ofservices are —

• Disbursing.• Postal.• Exchange services.• Security support.• Information systems.• Legal services.• Civil affairs support.• Graves registration.

The G-4 advises the division commander and G-3 onthe readiness status of major equipment and weaponsystems. He must keep abreast of the operationalplans which the G-3 is formulating. The availabilityand contemplated employment of organic CSS assetsinfluence his planning and his requirementsdetermination.

The 0-4 focuses on the identification of require-ments, priorities, and allocations for CSS. The focalpoints of his efforts are MEF planning guidance andthe tentative courses of action developed by the G-3.In view of the division's limited organic CSS capa-bilities, early and continuous liaison and coordina-tion is required. The 0-4 and his subordinate S-4smust constantly coordinate with the supporting FSSGunits.

In coordination with the 0-3, the division 0-4 deter-mine CSS requirements, assigns priorities, and allo-cates the CSS resources of the division. Hecoordinates with the MEF G-4 and FSSG G-3 con-cerning the integration of organic CSS capabilities.For example, he would coordinate the integration oftruck company and assault amphibian battalion assetsinto the overall concept of combat service support.

The FSSG G-3 coordinates with the 0-3 of the divi-sion to support development of their concepts of op-erations and schemes of maneuver. He coordinateswith the division G-3 and G-4 to identify require-ments and develop estimates of supportability fortheir concepts of operation. Based on the approvedconcepts of operation, the FSSG G-3 recommendsthe task organization of the FSSG.

PlanningThe 0-4 is responsible for planning logistic supportfor the division. The G4's concept of support mustbe coordinated and integrated with the G-3 's conceptof operations. The concept of support, in fact, le-gitimizes the concept of operations. Throughout theplanning for and execution of the operation, the G-4must constantly reevaluate support requirements andunit capabilities. To provide responsive and sus-tained support, the 0-4 must anticipate requirementswhich exceed organic capabilities.

CoordinationLiaison is essential for coordination of effort be-tween supporting and supported units. Direct liaisonbetween the elements of the MEF simplifies the com-pletion of the staff effort.

Supported Unit Responsibilities

The division commander, through the coordinatedefforts of his G-3/G-4 initiates detailed planning forcombat service support. CSS planning by divisionunits begin with determination of requirements, as-signment of priorities, and allocation of resources.

10-8 FMFM 6-1

Determination of Requirements. The division com-mander determines and identifies those CSS require-ments beyond his organic capabilities necessary toaccomplish his assigned mission. Assignment of amission by the division to a subordinate unit impliesthat the division is responsible for providing themeans to accomplish that mission. This entails acertain analysis of the capabilities of the subordinateunit to be sure the mission is appropriate to that unit.Such an analysis is part of the staff estimate process.

When a subordinate commander receives a mission,he is responsible for evaluating his specific capabili-ties and support requirements. He must evaluate hismission in terms of the specified and implied tasksinvolved in accomplishing that assigned mission.Deficiencies may require additional augmentation ofa specific type. Within its organic capabilities, thedivision will provide assets to alleviate those defi-ciencies. Any other deficiencies that cannot be re-solved by the division require a modified mission orprocurement of more assets.

Assignment of Prioritjes. The division commanderestablishes and assigns priorities associated with theexecution of the division concept of operations andscheme of maneuver. This assignment of priorities,in turn, will significantly affect the concept of sup-port for combat service support developed by theFSSG.

Allocation of Resources. The division commanderallocates available CSS resources to the subordinateunits. This includes those assets which he desires toretain as a reserve. These allocations must supportand complement his concept of operations. In largemeasure, they also reflect his previous decisions con-cerning requirements and priorities.

Tactical Timing. The division commander must con-cern himself with the tactical timing of combat serv-ice support and the availability of required support intime to support the scheme of maneuver. If he initi-ates tactical actions before logistic support is avail-able, the commander is taking a substantial risk.

Lines of Communication. Lines of communication(LOC) link the sources of logistic support and the di-vision's combat units. Overextended LOCs are vul-nerable and require greater expenditures of

transportation assets and time to support forwardunits. For this reason, commanders must frequentlyconsider forward staging of critical CSS assets. Ide-ally, LOCs should be located so that shifts in direc-tion of the operation can be accomplished withoutmajor shifts in the sustaining effort.

Supporting Unit Responsibilities

On a continuing basis, the FSSG commander, withthe MEF G-4, advises the MEF commander on CSScapabilities and the methods which provide the bestsupport of the MEF concept of operations. TheFSSG commander advises the MEF commander ofany deficiencies and recommends resolutions forthose deficiencies. The FSSG commander mustmonitor and support the collective requirements ofthe entire MEF and the separate requirements ofeach element.

Supporting the OffenseThe availability of adequate supplies and transporta-tion to sustain the operation becomes more critical asthe operation progresses. LOCs are strained, and re-quirements for repair and replacement of weaponsmount. NBC contamination on the battlefield com-pounds these problems and degrades the perform-ance of CSS units. CSS commanders and plannersmust anticipate these problems and ensure these con-siderations are included in their planning. Duringoffensive planning, CSS considerations include —

• Forward positioning of essential combat servicesupport such as ammunition, POL, and mainte-nance, preferably at night.

• Increased consumption of POL.• Using preplanned and preconfigured push pack-

ages of essential items including classes I, H,III, V. and VIII supplies.

• Using throughput distribution wheneverfeasible.

• Attaching CSS elements to supported maneuverunits; however, CSS elements need to be asmobile as the units they support.

• Echeloning support forward and initiating op-erations at the new site before ceasing opera-tions at the old site.

• Using captured enemy supplies and equipment,particularly vehicles and POL.

Marine Division 10-9

• Planning for adequate communications betweenmaneuver and CSS units.

• Preparing for increased casualties and require-ments.

• Uploading as much material as possible.• Ensuring that CSS preparations for the attack

do not give away tactical plans.• Coordinating terrain management to preclude

attempted occupation by more than one unit.• Planning for transition to the defense.

Supporting the DefenseThe aims of CSS activities in the defense are to sup-port defensive battles and to facilitate rapid transitionto the offense. Defensive operations take manyforms. They range from strictly positional to whollymobile defenses. CSS commanders must be in-volved early in defensive planning. This allowsthem to plan support for the defense and to anticipatechanging priorities. During defensive planning, CSSconsiderations include the following:

• Consider stockpiling limited amounts of ammu-nition and POL in centrally located battle posi-tions in the forward portion of the main battlearea that are likely to be occupied.

• Ensure the rear echelon monitors and tracks theongoing battle to anticipate CSS requirements.

• Push forward tailored packages of support on ascheduled basis. These regular shipments ofammunition, POL, and previously requested re-pair parts to the combat trains help eliminatethe need to call for supplies repeatedly. Theyreduce the chance that a lapse in communica-tions will interrupt supply. Resupply continuesuntil the receiving unit issues instructions to thecontrary.

• Resupply during periods of reduced visibility toreduce enemy interference.

• Dispatch maintenance support teams forward toreduce the need to evacuate equipment.

• Consider providing the security forces withprepositioned stocks of critical supplies in sub-sequent defensive positions throughout the se-curity force area.

• Plan for increased demand of decontaminantsand MOPP equipment.

• Plan for high expenditures of ammunition.• Plan for decreased vehicle maintenance.• Plan for increased demand for obstacle and for-

tification materials.• Establish ambulance exchange points for effi-

cient use of ambulances.• Coordinate with the G-5 concerning refi.igee

control and CSS requirements.

Support for the RetrogradeOperationsCombat Service Support for retrograde operations isparticularly complex because many activities may betaking place concurrently. Maneuver units at anygiven time may be defending, delaying, attacking, orwithdrawing. All must be supported under the over-all retrograde operation. CSS elements must be pre-pared to —

• Echelon in depth and rearward.• Limit the flow of supplies forward to only the

most essential positions. All other supplies andequipment are evacuated early.

• Evacuate supplies and equipment to plannedpoints along withdrawal routes.

• Keep supply and evacuation routes open anddecontaminated.

• Evacuate patients early, develop alternatemeans of evacuation, and augment field ambu-lance capabilities when possible.

• Recover or evacuate equipment rather than riskbeing overrun while repairing at forward sites.

• Move all nonessential CSS units and facilitatesto the rear as early as possible.

• Supply and evacuate at night and during otherperiods of limited visibility.

• Implement the division commander's policy ofcontrolled exchange.

• Maintain full knowledge of the current tacticalsituation.

(reverse blank)

APPENDIX A

Notional Headquarters Echelon Organization

Figure A-i. Tactical Echelon Organization

G2WK 2111

G2 MAP

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311817

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Figure A-2. Main Echelon Organization

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FMFM 6-1

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Marine Division A-3

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Figure A-3. Information Connectivity (reverse blank)

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26 UYK-8527 STU-328 SIDS

Appendix B

Tactical Decisionmaking

The division commander makes decisions and com-municates decisions. The staff facilitates the corn-mander's decisionmaking process and ensures thatsubordinates conduct operations within the intent ofthat decision. Tactical decisionmaking is a continu-ous and dynamic process that must allow decisionsabout current operations to occur simultaneouslywith the planning and decisions concerning futureoperations.

Rapid PlanningRapid planning is that planning conducted in a time-sensitive environment. It is usually associated withcrisis action where the division must act quickly inresponse to an immediate military need. Operationsother than war (OOTW) such as noncombatantevacuation operations (NEO), operations in supportof diplomatic initiatives, and response to natural ormanmade disasters are conunon, crisis-response op-erations. It should be noted that rapid planning isnot planning by omission but an application of tech-niques designed to reduce the planning time require-ments of a more deliberate planning process.

Deliberate PlanningDeliberate planning is most often associated withconventional military operations and is conductedprior to the onset of hostilities or in support of a fu-ture operational phase of an ongoing campaign. De-liberate planning involves the full participation of thestaff and the coordinated consideration of the tacticalsituation and mission assigned. Rapid and deliberateplanning are product-oriented, the product being thedecision of the commander and the dissemination ofthat decision. The commander must still consider allfactors when deciding which planning process touse, the overarching difference being the time avail-able. An understanding of the deliberate planningprocess, therefore, becomes essential to planning inany environment.

Joint PlanningPlanning of division operations are influenced by theplanning conducted at the MEF and JTF or theaterlevel. Joint force commanders (JFCs) receive guid-ance and direction from the NCA through the Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to theresponsible theater commander. JFCs issue priori-tized mission-type orders to subordinate commandersand define command relationships to facilitate mis-sion accomplishment consistent with their concept ofoperations.

JFCs will conduct campaigns to accomplish their as-signed mission. A campaign is a series of relatedjoint major operations that consist of tactical, opera-tional, and strategic operational objectives. A cam-paign plan describes how these operations areconnected in time, space, and purpose. Within acampaign, major operations consist of coordinatedactions in a single phase of a campaign, and theyusually decide the course of the campaign. Cam-paigns must be kept simple and must be focused onclearly defined objectives. Complex plans will re-quire more time and effort to plan and coordinate.Campaign planning is a continuous activity and isbased on evolving assumptions.

Campaign plans establish command relationshipsamong the subordinate commands by describing theconcept of operations, assigning tasks and objectives,and task-organizing the force. Campaign plans —

• Provide broad concepts of operations and sus-tainment for achieving multinational, national,and theater strategic objectives.

• Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.• Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea,

space, and special operations forces, in con-junction with interagency and multinationalforces, as required.

• Incorporate the combatant commander's strate-gic and operational intent.

B-2 FMFM 6-1

• Orient on the strategic center of gravity and op-erational critical vulnerabilities of the threat.

• Protect the friendly center of gravity and attackthe enemy critical vulnerabilities.

• Phase the operation, as required.• Establish the organization of subordinate forces

and designate command relationships.• Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and

clearly define what constitutes success, to in-clude termination objectives and potential post-hostilities activities.

• Provide strategic direction; operational focus;and tasks, objectives, and concepts to sub-ordinates.

• Provide direction for the employment of nu-clear weapons.

• Form the basis for developing supporting plansand the framework for the series of operationsplans for phases of a campaign.

Supporting plans are prepared by supporting com-manders to satisfy the requirements of the supportedcommander's plan. Typically, supporting commandplans provide forces, force enhancements, or func-tional support such as logistics, communications, andtransportation. They address such operations asNBC, mobilization, deployment, redeployment, andService support operations.

Joint Task Force StaffOrganizationThe JFC will organize a staff as necessary to ensureaccomplishment of the mission. The organization ofthe staff will depend on the tasks and responsibilitiesretained at the unified or joint force command level.The composition, location, and facilities of the uni-fied or joint headquarters will have a major influenceon what the commander and his staff can accom-plish. The composition of the JFCs staff should re-fleet the nature of the forces assigned and thecharacter of the contemplated operations to ensureexpertise is resident in the staff concerning the tac-tics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitationsof the force.

Arranging Joint OperationsJFCs will determine the best arrangement of majoroperations, often a combination of simultaneous andsequential operations to achieve the desired end statequickly with the least expenditure of resources. Ge-ography, strategic lift, command structure, logisticbuild-up, and enemy capability are considered whencommanders determine the arrangement ofoperations.

PhasesA phase represents a period during which a largeportion of the force is involved in similar or mutu-ally supporting activities. Phasing of operations maybe sequential or concurrent. During planning, com-manders establish the conditions for the transitionfrom one phase to another, even though the pointwhere one phase ends and another begins is oftendifficult to define in absolute terms. The com-mander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunitiespresented by the enemy or when benefits of a phaseexceed or fall short of expectations. A transition toanother phase, such as a shift from. deployment todefensive operations, indicates a shift in emphasis.

Phasing assists commanders to think through the en-tire operation. The primary benefit of phasing isthat it assists commanders in achieving major objec-tives that cannot be attained all at once by planningmanageable subordinate operations to gain progres-sive advantages. The MEF and division command-ers must consider the roles their organizations havein each phase. Campaign phasing considers aspectssuch as prehostilities, lodgement, decisive combatand stabilization, follow-through, and post-hostilities.

PrehostilitiesActions during a prehostilities phase may be initiat-ing deterrence, seeking to set the terms for battle,and enhancing friendly freedom of action while con-taining enemy capabilities. The friendly forceshould not seek battle until it has set the terms or es-tablished the conditions for battle in its favor. The

Marine Division B-3

prehostilities phase may also encompass predeploy-ment activities such as task organization of the force,organization for deployment, and establishment of aviable C2W and logistic infrastructure capable ofsupporting the JFC's concept of operations.

LodgmentThe lodgment phase allows the movement andbuildup of a decisive combat force in the operationalarea. Establishment of a lodgment may require hostnation ports and airfields or forcible entry followedby occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

Decisive Combat and StabilizationThe decisive combat and stabilization phase initiallyfocuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabili-ties. Appropriate sequencing for forces into the op-erational area can contribute to the stabilization ofthe situation through the deterrent value of the de-ployed force. Should deterrence fail, the built-upcapabilities allow the JFC to conduct decisive com-bat action as early as possible. Decisive action im-plies winning and may include control of enemyterritory and population and destruction of the en-emy's ability and will to continue.

Follow-ThroughDuring a follow-through phase, the JFC conducts ac-tivities to bring the operation to a successful conclu-sion. These actions include ensuring political ob-jectives are achieved and sustained. In essence, sucha phase focuses on ensuring that the results achievedendure.

Post-HostilitiesJFCs may retain responsibility for operations, orthey may transfer control of the situation to anotherauthority and redeploy their forces. JFCs identifypost-hostilities requirements as early as possible toaccomplish these missions and simultaneously rede-pioy assets that are no longer needed to resolve thecrisis

Deliberate Planning ProcessThe command and staff action of the division for aspecific mission is facilitated by the anticipatory

planning of the staff. The staff determines prelimi-nary estimates based on potential missions and theoutcome of current operations in order to reduce thetime required to arrive at a decision when a newmission is received. There are nine major steps inthe deliberate planning process which are initiated onreceipt of the mission. See figure B-i.

Receive the MissionThe receipt of the mission is not a planning step butthe activity that initiates the division commandersplanning process. The mission may be received viaa number of means to include written orders, oralorders, electronic means, graphic depiction, or acombination of these methods. Missions may also bededuced by the commander based on the highercommander's intent or the outcome of a current op-eration. Regardless of how the mission is received,the commander initiates the planning process for themission at hand and then issues a warning order tohis subordinates. This initial warning order maylack specifics but provides information to the subor-dinate of a pending operational change. Warning or-ders are issued as required throughout the process inorder to update subordinates sufficiently to preparefor the operation.

Mission AnalysisMission analysis consists of command and staff ac-tions related to determining information require-ments through the gathering of facts and makingassumptions, analysis of the MAGTF's mission andintent, and determination of the unit's mission andspecified and implied tasks. The division com-mander's mission analysis is the first and perhaps themost important step in the planning process. It iden-tifies for the commander and staff the salient tasksthat must be performed in order to accomplish theassigned mission. Mission analysis is a continuousprocess, the products of which may be altered basedon new intelligence or a changed tactical situation.A new mission, coming either from a higher head-quarters or from the deduction of a mission throughthe analysis of the current operation, provides newdirection to this continuous process for that particu-lar operation.

B-4 FMFM 6-1

Figure B-i. Staff Planning Steps.

Information RequirementsDuring the course of his mission analysis, the com-mander determines the information requirements onthe area of operations, on the relative combat powerof friendly and enemy forces, and on enemy capa-bilities. That infonnation which is not availablemust be collected and integrated into the estimateprocess.

Facts. The staff determines facts concerning eachstaff officer's functional area. These facts providethe commander an accurate understanding of the cur-rent situation from which he may deduce assump-tions and assessments of capabilities and operationalfactors.

Marine Division B-5

G-1: The 0-1 provides a current report on thepersonnel status of the organization, its subordinateunits, and attached and supporting elements. Thepersonnel status includes assessments of tangible andintangible factors such as —

• Personnel strengths and morale.• Replacements and medical return to duty.• Personnel readiness.• Critical shortages.• Host nation support.• Military law/discipline.

6-2: The G-2 provides a description of thebattlespace and threat. This description will be in-complete at this point but will be as accurate as cur-rent information and analysis permits. Detailedintelligence is developed through the IPB process.The results of the IPB process will —

• Define the battlespace. The area of interestis developed and evaluated in terms of depth,width, airspace, and time. This evaluation isdesigned to focus information collection in sup-port of the CCIRs. Characteristics of the bat-tlespace are identified which require in-depthstudy and evaluation of their potential effectson both friendly and enemy operations.

• Describe the battlespace. The G-2 evalu-ates the effects of the environment and identi-fies the opportunities and limitations that theenvironment offers to both friendly and enemyoperations. Particular factors which are exam-ined include —

• Terrain. The division commander and staffmust fully appreciate the opportunities andlimitations afforded by the terrain and fit anoperational concept to that environment.Particular attention is given to the militaryaspects of terrain — observation and fields offire, cover and concealment, obstacles, keyterrain, and avenues of approach and mobil-ity corridors (OCOKA). This evaluationprovides a variety of information to the staffincluding avenues of approach deep, andclose, rear, key, and/or decisive areas.

Weather. Weather and visibility conditionscreate advantages and disadvantages for op-posing forces. The commander and his staff

• must acquire an understanding of the prevail-ing climate and expected weather conditionsto exploit the opportunities weather offerswhile minimizing its adverse effects.

Infrastructure. The transportation network,telecommunications system, power grid, andother manmade facilities can have a signifi-cant effect on the conduct of operations.The commander and his staff must be awareof the capabilities and functioning of the lo-cal infrastructure to support friendly opera-tions or deny its usage to the enemy.

local population. The presence of a localpopulation cannot be ignored in the planningand conduct of combat operations. Key as-pects of the local population which must betaken into consideration include the size anddensity, ethnic composition, religion, cul-ture, political orientation, education, andlevel of health and sanitation.

• Evaluate the threat. The G-2 provides a de-tailed description of enemy forces in the area ofinterest. In addition to the basic order of battleinformation, the 0-2 attempts to provide insightinto the intangible factors that influence combateffectiveness — training, tactics, status of logis-tics, and leadership. The objective is to de-velop a picture of the enemy that highlights hisstrengths, uncovers his vulnerabilities, andidentifies his center of gravity. In addition, the0-2 provides any indications of future enemyactions revealed during this evaluation.

G-3: The 0-3 will determine the operationalfactors of concern to the commander based on themission and friendly capabilities.

• Mission and commander's intent. The G-3states the mission and intent of commandersthat are one and two levels above his organi-zation.

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• Current task-organization. The G-3 pro-vides the current task organization of the forcedown to battalion level.

• Current unit status. The G-3 provides thecapability of friendly forces based on training,mobility, command and control warfare, andany attrition or shortages in critical personnelor equipment. The commander must appreciateany deterioration in capability and must not as-sume that the enemy has a capability based onthe type-force with full combat strength thatcurrently exists. He also provides informationconcerning current subordinate unit locationsand activities.

• Sister service combat support. This sup-port includes tactical and operational aviationsupport, naval surface fire support, Army ar-mor and long-range artillery support, etc.

• Status of adjacent and supporting units.The G-3 provides current information regard-ing location, mission, and capabilities of flank,forward, and rear adjacent and supportingunits, higher headquarters, uncommitted units,and the higher unit's reserve.

• Time. In-depth analysis of available timeshould be based on reversed planning. Basedon the operation to be conducted, present loca-tion, and the distance from the area of opera-tions, the G-3 should be able to determine theamount of time it will take to move to attackpositions or point of departure. This time com-bined with the division's known decision-cycletime will give an initial indication of theamount of time available for any other actionsdesired by the command.

G-4: The G-4 provides an accurate and currentassessment of the logistic situation of the division,subordinate units, and attached and supporting units.

• Patient-holding capacity and evacuation policy.• Medical assets (class VIII).• Preventive medicine program.• Classes I, H, 111(P), IV, VI, VII, and X.• Class V status and distribution.• Class 111(B) status and distribution.

• Maintenance status, repair times, evacuationpolicy, and assets.

• Critical LOCs and transportation assets.• Rear area security capability.

Assumptions. The division commander receives in-formation available from his staff and from higher,lower, and adjacent headquarters. Gaps in informa-tion at this early stage are covered by making as-sumptions. Assumptions replace necessary butmissing facts. Assumptions listed in the MAGTF'splan may be appropriate assumptions for the divi-sions planning if the assumptions affect the mission.An assumption is appropriate if it meets both tests ofvalidity and necessity. Validity defines whether ornot as assumption is likely to occur. "Assumingaway" potential problems is an example of using aninvalid assumption. Necessity defines whether ornot the assumption is absolutely essential for the de-velopment of a plan. If planning can continue with-out making the assumption, the assumption fails thetest of necessity and is consequently inappropriate.Staff officers must continuously reevaluate assump-tions as part of the estimate process. Additionalfacts should replace assumptions as early as possiblein order to reduce uncertainty in the execution of theplan.

G-1: The G-1 considers personnel factors andmakes assumptions that will be made about thosefactors that could change. TheSe include —

• Percent of personnel strength of the divisionand identification of units with critical short-ages one and two levels down.

• Status of critical MOSs of the force as a wholeand identification of units with critical short-ages one and two levels down.

• Replacement flow.

G-2: The G-2 and the division engineer drawconclusions about the terrain, including the best ave-nues of approach, best defensible ground, proposedforward edge of the battlefield area and line of de-parture, and the effects of terrain on both enemy andfriendly courses of action. The planner should con-sider the potential effects of forecasted weather onfriendly and enemy operations.

Marine Division B-7

• Enemy forces. The G-2 develops possible en-emy courses of action based on known enemylocations and activities, terrain analysis, andsituational and doctrinal templates. He deter-mines enemy capabilities that could affectfriendly operations and identifies high valuetargets for each enemy course of action. TheG-2 will develop as many enemy courses of ac-tion as planning time will allow in order to helpthe commander identify the probable courses ofaction. The most likely and most dangerouscourses of action are developed more exten-sively and become the basis for development offriendly branches and sequels. The staff shouldanticipate the enemy's objectives, missions, andintentions to help plan actions that will preemptthe enemy commanders intent.

• Friendly intelligence capabilities. These ca-pabilities include status of intelligence support,organic and supporting collection assets, effectsof intelligence considerations on possible opera-tions, and effects of the area of operations onpossible courses of action.

G-3: The G-3 makes assumptions about thestatus of forces at the time of the operation and thegeneral ability of the unit to conduct the mission.

• Status of maneuver units. These assump-tions include the leadership, mobility, and theability to transition from current operations tothe contemplated operation.

• Status of combat support units. These as-sumptions concern fire support units, Sisterservice support, and target acquisition assets.They also include air defense concerns andNBC protective and decontamination assets.

• Engineer support. Assumptions for engineersupport encompass obstacle breeching, rivercrossing, obstacle emplacement, and excavationof survivable positions.

• C2W support. Assumptions for command andcontrol warfare include organic and supportingoffensive C2W assets, which include mobilesubscriber equipment, multichannel communi-cations, and tactical satellite assets.

• Aviation. Status of organic and supportingaviation units. MAGTF aviation units organ-ized as maneuver forces are discussed in statusof maneuver units above.

• Military police. Assumptions for MP includebattlefield circulation control, security, andcontrol of EPWs.

• Time. Based on the information collected dur-ing facts and assumptions, the G-3 evaluatestime relative to when the unit must begin move-ment to accomplish the mission.

G-4: The G-4 discusses significant differencesbetween the current status of logistics in the func-tional areas identified and the anticipated status ofthe organization at the time it begins the operation.This includes projected resupply rates and host na-tion support.

Analysis of Higher Mission and IntentThe C/S organizes the staff to analyze the MEF mis-sion and intent. His guidance includes the amount oftime the staff will have for the analysis and whereand when he will be briefed on the results. Eachstaff member has a role to play. The staff shouldhave received copies of the MEF operation order orplan. All staff members continue situation updatesfocused on the new mission and simultaneously be-gin the analysis in their respective areas of responsi-bilities. Each principal staff officer must understandwhat is essential to the commander and the otherprincipal staff officers. This can be achieved onlyafter team training and experience so everyone un-derstands the personality of the commander andcharacteristics of the staff. Once essential informa-tion is known, the principal staff member has hisstaff section focus on that information and has themkeep him apprised of changes so he can evaluatetheir impact and then advise the commander and therest of the staff.

Information may be found in all portions of thehigher order or plan. Much of this information isrequired in later steps of the decisionmaking process;however, it must be identified during mission analy-sis to determine its impact on the mission. Analysisof the higher mission and intent includes —

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• Purpose of the higher headquarters mission andintent of the higher commander and the com-mander two levels up. This is determining thewhy of the mission. Knowledge of the intent isnecessary to allow commanders to developplans that support the overall operation.

• A review of the area of operations to under-stand the higher headquarters mission and in-tent. The area of operations is that areaidentified in the higher order or plan, normallyon the operation overlay, as the responsibilityof the division. The area might be further de-fined in the execution paragraph of the order.For deduced missions, the area is determinedbased on the commander/G-3 estimate of thearea necessary to accomplish the mission.

• A review of the overall deception plan, the de-ception objective and target of the commandertwo levels up. The staff must review the de-ception objective and target of the conunandertwo levels up and the overall deception pro-gram (objective, target, story, plan, and activi-ties) of the MAGTF commander. This reviewensures that none of the division's planningcompromises any higher deception efforts.When higher commands have not developeddeception plans or have produced very simpleplans, greater planning flexibility is possible.

• Identification of tasks to be performed — speci-fied, implied, and essential.

Specified tasks are stated in the higher head-quarters order or plan. They come primarilyfrom paragraphs two and three but may befound elsewhere, such as in coordinating in-structions or annexes. Any task that pertainsto any element of the unit should be identi-fied and recorded.Implied tasks are those tasks not specificallystated in the order or plan that must beaccomplished to satisfy the overall missionor to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Im-plied tasks come from further analysis of theorder and analysis in conjunction with theknown enemy situation and the terrain. EK-

amples of implied tasks include river cross-ing, passage of lines, and clear built-upareas. Inherent, routine, or SOP tasks are

not included in the list of tasks. Examples ofthose tasks note included are establishing li-aison, maintaining roads in sector, refueling.etc.From the list of specified and implied tasksidentified earlier, those tasks that define thesuccess of the mission are identified .as es-sential. Although the commander is respon-sible for the identification of the essentialtasks and the mission, the staff develops atentative list of essential tasks and a prelirni-nary restated mission. To properly identifythe essential tasks, the staff and commandermust be aware of the intent of the com-mander ordering the mission and that of hissuperior.

• Identification of limitations. Limitations arerestrictions placed on a commander specifyingthings that cannot be done and/or things thatmust be done. Limitations, in most cases, pre-scribe some detail or force organization, ma-neuver, or ROE.

• Identification of assets available. The staffconsiders assets allocated in the task organiza-tion, attachments and detachments, or in or-ganizations for combat in the executionparagraph. More importantly, the relationshipbetween mission and assets is critical. Thefolding together of time, space, and assets iscritical to the success of a misswn.

• Acceptable levels of risk. The higher head-quarters might specify a risk the commander iswilling to accept to accomplish the mission ormight provide guidance pertaining to the use offriendly capabilities, etc. The level of accept-able risk can be deduced from analysis of mis-sion and intent.

• Initial time analysis. The element of time isnot clearly identified for analysis in any of thestaff estimates. However, time analysis mustbe an integral part of the mission analysis andmust be conducted continuously until the mis-sion is accomplished. The commander mustbalance detailed planning against attainingspeed and surprise by immediate action. Theanalysis of time uses the following guidelines:

Marine Division B9

• Determine time available. Time availablebegins with receipt of the mission and endswith the time of execution and completion ofthe scheme of maneuver stated in the order.

Know the decision cycle. A decision cycleis the total time required from the time thecommander obtains information, has it proc-essed, makes a decision, issues orders, andhas subordinates execute the operation. Thisis a necessary tool to properly plan timeallocation.

• Time allocation. Once the division com-mander has a general understanding of hismission and the time available, he must allo-cate the time for the various phases of theoperation. This allocation is often by re-verse planning. Knowing the time to exe-cute the operation, the commander mustconsider the amount of time needed for theunit to move to the point of execution; hemust then allocate time for rehearsal and fi-nally for planning. Since subordinate unitsalso require planning time, the amount oftime available for planning must also be allo-cated. The commander should consider the1/3 - 2/3 rule. Each headquarters should useroughly one-third of the planning time avail-able and allow two-thirds of the time forsubordinate units. Each unit should use onlythe minimum amount of time necessary toplan an operation. The allocation of timemust take into account the decision cycle ofthe unit doing the planning and that of theenemy.

The division commander can maximize planningtime available by using timely warning orders, mak-ing sound assumptions, issuing complete guidance,and ensuring close coordination between units andstaffs. Once the time is allocated, the commandermust communicate his decision to the staff.Throughout this analysis, the staff considersinformation that could affect the operation. Time iscritical. During this step, a lack of informationmight cause a poorly trained staff to delay and thuswaste time. When information is not available, thestaff must make reasonable assumptions and move

on with the planning. The important thing here isnot to waste time waiting for unavailable informationbut to continue the process.

Restated Mission

The division's mission addresses the who, what,when, where, and why of the operation. The divi-sion commander and his staff produce a missionstatement derived from the MEF's mission, the divi-sion's tasking, and a mission analysis. The divisioncommander approves the results of the missionanalysis. He makes the final decision on what tasksare essential and provides the restated mission. Themission statement provides the focus for subsequentstaff planning.

Commander's Planning GuidanceOn completion of staff briefings and after he ap-proves the analysis and issues his restated mission,the division commander provides initial planningguidance to the staff. The commander may continueto issue guidance throughout the decisionmakingprocess; however, to focus the attention of the staff,some initial guidance should be given. His planningguidance is important, since it provides a commonstarting point for course of action development. Theamount of planning guidance varies with each mis-sion, the volume and validity of information, and thesituation. The commander's initial guidance is usu-ally incomplete, but is developed and expanded asmore information is obtained. The commander'splanning guidance must include his initial intent andmay also include the purpose of the operation; offen-sive or defensive phases arid forms of maneuver ortype of defense the commander plans to use; andendstate or the relationship between the force as awhole. In addition, the following guidance may beincluded:

Specific courses of action. Specific coursesof action the commander may be developed ornot considered by the G-3. The commander'sguidance forms the latitude the G-3 has to de-velop courses of action. The guidance may bevery explicit, or it may be minimal providing awide latitude for the G-3 to develop courses ofaction. The commander must exercise cautionso his guidance does not stifle the staff's initia-tive or mislead them.

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• Course of action development. A course ofaction is a possible plan open to the commanderthat would accomplish the mission. To developcourses of action, the staff must focus on keyinformation necessary to make decisions andassimilate the data from mission analysis. Thecourse of action may be revised, modified, orchanged during wargaming. The number ofcourses of action developed should bemanageable.

• Feasible courses of action. The ultimategoal is to develop several feasible courses ofaction for every enemy course of actiondevel-oped by the G-2 during the formulation of as-sumptions. If time is limited, the G-3 or thecommander must decide on the number ofcourses of action that will be addressed. Nor-mally, three courses of action are presented,however, regardless of the number presented,courses of action must meet the criteria of suit-ability, feasibility, acceptability, variety, andcompleteness.

Often, courses of action are combined or desired ele-ments moved from one to another. A course of ac-tion should include the five elements listed below:

• What. The type of action.• When. The time the action will begin.• Where. The assigned sectors or zones.• How. The use of available assets addressing

elements of the battlefield in broad terms.• Why. The purpose of the operation.

Courses of Action DevelopmentWhile developing courses of action, the staff goesthrough several steps. These steps are as follows:

Step One: Analyze Relative Force Ratios. Relativeforce ratios are the overall relationship of the combatpower of friendly verses enemy forces including sig-nificant strengths and vulnerabilities. Analyzingrelative force ratios provides conclusions aboutfriendly capabilities pertaining to the operation beingplanned. Itindicates what types of operations maybe possible from the enemy and the friendly points

of view. It also helps determine enemy weaknesses.The basic units compared are maneuver units andsupporting fire support units. Other combat multipli-ers may also be used.

Step Two: Array Initial Forces. This step deter-mines the forces necessary to accomplish the missionand provides a basis for the scheme of maneuver.During this step, the planner must consider the mis-sion and the commanders guidance, the avenues ofapproach, and as many possible enemy courses ofaction as time permits, starting with the most prob-able. Five elements that are considered for the arrayof forces are as follows:

• Determine the ratio of friendly units re-quired. Historical experience has shown that adefender has approximately a 50-50 probabilityof successfully defeating an attacking force ap-proximately three times his equivalent strength.The planner will attempt to defend on each ave-nue of approach with, roughly, a 1-to-3 forceratio or attack with at least a 5- or 6-to-I ratio.

• Determine the size of unit to be arrayed.The size of the unit to be arrayed is determinedbased on the size of the avenue of approach.Normally, a commander will identify avenuesof approach suitable for the maneuver of aforce one level down and array units two levelsdown. For example, the division will identifyregimental-sized avenues of approach and arraybattalion-sized units.

• Determine a proposed FEBA or line of de-parture. Orders from higher headquartersshould indicate the desired location of theFEBA in the defense or line of departure in theoffense. The terrain analysis should attempt tovalidate the selection or determine a recom-mended change which must be resolved withhigher headquarters.

• Develop the deception plan. Identify thedeception objective, the target, and the story.Since aspects of the story may influence the po-sitioning of units, the major elements of thestory must be conceived before developing any

Marine Division B-il

courses of action. Formulation of a plausibledeception plan requires close cooperation be-tween the operations officer and the intelligenceofficer.

• Make initial array of friendly forces. The

initial array of forces begins at the expectedpoint of initial contact. The array of groundforces is done two levels down. Consider forceratio requirements for each task. The initial ar-ray focuses on generic ground maneuver unitswithout regard to specific type. During thisstep, the planner does not assign missions tothese units but merely gains an appreciation ofwhat forces should be allocated to accomplishthe mission. The completed initial array helpsthe planner identify the total number of unitsrequired to be allocated. Most importantly, theplanner will develop a base of knowledgethrough wargaming from which decisions canbe made on items such as reducing the numberof troops in certain areas (economy of force)and accepting risk. Alternate methods of deal-ing with the enemy will be identified during thedevelopment of a scheme of maneuver.

Step Three: Develop the Scheme of Maneuver.The scheme of maneuver is the narrative descriptionof how the forces arrayed in the previous step willaccomplish the commander's intent. The schememust describe how the organization will arrive at theendstate which the commander articulated. Thescheme of maneuver is developed by taking the ini-tial array and refining it to encompass the actions de-termined appropriate to address the variousbattlefield activities (deep,. close, and rear opera-tions, security, and reserve). The following consid-erations apply:

• Reevaluate the terrain and enemy.• Reevaluate the force ratio and accepting risk.• The impact of shortages and/or use for forces

uncommitted during the array of initial forces.• The types of operations identified as possible

during the relative combat power analysis.• Maneuver objectives and identifying specific

targets, e.g., an independent tank regiment.• The location of terrain objectives and counter-

attack objectives.

• The location of the main effort and supportingeffort(s).

• Address all maneuver forces. Any forces re-maining from the initial array should be usedwhen developing the scheme of maneuver toprovide depth to the battle, provide security, oract as a reserve. The planner must considerhow fires will support the maneuver forces inthe various elements of the battlefield. If thereare insufficient maneuver forces, the schemeshould consider the use of combat support as-sets to assist the maneuver forces. The specif-ics of support will not be addressed untilwargaming; however, the scheme of maneuvermust address the use of combat support to ac-complish a particular portion of any of the bat-tlefield activities.

• Convert generic forces, Converting genericforces arrayed to specific type forces is a con-scious decision by the planner to identify whichtype of forces will be allocated for the identi-fied missions. To accomplish this conversion,the planner considers the terrain, the enemy,and the mission of the arrayed forces. Thisconversion is the initial step in identifying thetask organization of the unit.

Step Four: Determine the Fire Support Plan. Afire support plan is a tactical plan which contains in-formation necessary for the employment of fire sup-port in a given operation. The fire support plan isan umbrella document prepared by the FSC. It is

the basis with which each supporting arms agencyconducts its own fire planning. Fire support plan-ning should address at a minimum — how fire sup-port is to be used; how targets are to be acquired;what targets are to be attacked; when targets are tobe attacked; and how targets are to be attacked.

Step Five: Determine Command and ControlMeans and Maneuver Control Measures. A majorsubordinate headquarters should control at least twosubordinate units but normally no more than five.This allocation of forces provides for an adequatespan of control of assigned units and sufficient unitsfor conduct of the subordinate's assigned mission.Maneuver control measures are based on the estab-lishment of C2 means and the scheme of maneuver.Control measures are the minimum required to con-trol the operation. They include major subordinate

B-12 FMFM 6-1

unit boundaries, axes of advance, objectives, phaselines, fire support coordination measures, assemblyareas, etc. The control measures should not nor-mally split avenues of approach or key terrain butshould allow one unit to have responsibility for thearea. In addition, space should be provided on theflanks of each avenue of approach to allow for maneuver and fires. The sector or zone designated forthe main effort may be narrower than others (whichadds weight to that sector.) Sectors or zones for asecondary effort or economy of force may be widerthan that of the main effort. Phase lines are also de-veloped at this time to implement expected branchesand sequels to facilitate changes.

Step Six: Prepare Course of Action Statement(sand Sketch(es). The G-3 prepares a course of ac-tion statement and supporting sketch for each courseof action developed. The statement and sketch coverwhat, when, where, how, and why as they relate tothe battlefield activities. They clearly and brieflystate the purpose of the operation, the main effort,the scheme of maneuver, and significant risk.

The course of action statement provides the how ofthe operation. The sketch provides a generic pictureof the statement. The sketch is the outline of the op-eration overlay. At a minimum, the sketch shouldinclude —

• Avenues of approach, major terrain features,and major obstacles.

• Major subordinate unit boundaries.• Control measures such as phase lines, zones of

action or defensive sectors, assembly areas,strongpoints, battle positions, objectives, en-gagement areas, and the main effort.

• Allocated forces. Allocating forces provides aclearer picture of the scheme of maneuver.

• In both the offense and defense, the sketchshould show the type, composition, and generallocation of ground forces. The sketch may bedrawn identifying units by type or by using de-cision graphics.

• The combination of a course of action state-ment and a course of action sketch must pro-vide a clear picture of how the division willdefeat the enemy. Additionally, it must specifi-cally explain the scheme of maneuver by out-lining how generic subordinate units

accomplish the mission. It should identify themain and supporting efforts. If a significantrisk has been identified during the develop-ment, the amount of risk should be identified inthe statement.

• In many plans, additional course of actionsketches may be desired. Descriptions of theendstate, the deception plan, and branches andsequels are examples of additional sketches thecommander may desire.

Step Seven: Preparation of Staff Estimates. Oncecourses of action have been developed, the staff pre-pares estimates of supportability in their particularfunctional area. This staff analysis identifies the bestcourse of action for recommendation to the divisioncommander. Analysis actually begins during courseof action development as the staff is intimately in-volved in that step of the process. However, coursesof action are subject to approval of the commanderand may be modified prior to formal staff estimates.Furthermore, during course of action development,the staff may have identified a course of action thatis obviously not feasible in an area of responsibility.That course of action is immediately discarded.During this analysis, information identified by anystaff member that might affect another s analysismust be shared. Each staff member analyzes thecourses of action using wargaming techniques.

WargamingWargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize theflow of a battle given friendly strengths and disposi-tions, enemy assets and possible courses of action,and a set piece of ground. It attempts to foresee theaction, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of abattle. The G-3 is responsible for the conduct of thewargame. Wargaming stimulates thought about theoperation so the staff officer will obtain ideas and in-sights that otherwise might not have occurred. Thisprocess highlights tasks that appear to be particularlyimportant to the operation and provides a degree offamiliarity with tactical possibilities that might other-wise be difficult to achieve. During the wargame,the course of action may be changed or modified, ora new one may be developed, because of the identifi-cation of other critical events, tasks, requirements,or problems. As a result, you can determinewhether the force allocation, dispositions, andscheme of maneuver are adequate or need to be

Marine Division B-13

adjusted. Shortfalls; acceptable or unacceptablerisks; and possible future developments, options, andcontingencies are identified for the plan or order.The wargamer must observe the following generalrules:

• List the advantages and disadvantages as theybecome obvious during the wargaming process.

• Remain unbiased.• Continually assess the feasibility of the course

of action to see if it meets the requirements ofthe mission. If the course of action fails to re-main feasible at any time during the wargame,stop the wargame and reject the course of ac-tion without further analysis.

• Avoid comparing one course of action with an-other during the wargame.

• Avoid drawing premature conclusions and thenpresenting facts to support those conclusions.

Wargaming StepsThere are seven steps to wargaming a course ofaction.

Step One: Gather the tools. The commander pri-oritizes the enemy and friendly courses of action tobe wargamed. The wargame will require appropri-ate maps, enemy templates, and the current friendlypositions posted.

Step Two: List all friendly forces. Consider all or-ganic, assigned, attached, and OPCON combat,combat support, and combat service support unitsthat the commander can commit to battle. Includepriority of support provided by higher headquarters.This list should be constant for all courses of actionanalyzed.

Step Three: List the assumptions delivered duringmission analysis. Assumptions are invaluable toolsduring wargaming. An assumption must be logical,realistic, and stated positively.

Step Four: List known critical events and decisionpoints. Critical events are normally those specifiedor implied tasks that are required to be completed formission accomplishment. Decision points relate tocritical events. They identify decisions that must bemade to ensure timely execution and coordinated useof resources to achieve desired effects on the

battlefield. Critical events and decision points canbe anticipated before wargaming. When availabletime is short, the planner must reduce the list to onethat is manageable. This will require military judg-ment to determine which have the highest probabilityof changing the outcome of the battle.

Step Five: Select a wargaming method. A numberof techniques can be used to organize the area to beanalyzed.

• Avenue-in-depth technique. This techniquefocuses on one avenue at a time starting withthe main effort. It is a good technique to usefor offensive operations or in the defense wherecanalizing terrain exists.

• Belt technique. This technique divides thebattlefield into areas that run the width of thesector; it analyzes the subcornponent battles andengagements sequentially across the width ofthe sector. This is the preferred method as itensures simultaneous consideration of all forcesthat could affect a particular event. As a mini-mum, the belts should include initial contact ei-ther along the FEBA or line of contact, or inthe security area; initial penetration or initialcontact along the FEBA; and passage of the re-serve or commitment of a counterattack.

• Box technique. The box technique is a mi-croanalysis of a few critical areas, such as anengagement area, a river crossing site, or aflank avenue of approach into the sector. Thistechnique is less time consuming. An initial as-sumption is made that the friendly units canhandle most of the situations on the battlefieldand the planner can focus on the most essentialtasks. This technique is used when time is ëx-tremely limited such as in a hasty attack.

Step Six: Select a technique to record and displaythe results. Recording the results of the wargamewill ensure that, once the operation has been fullyanalyzed, you will have a record from which theplanner can adjust the original task organization; thecourse of action statement; and the course of actionsketch. Additionally, annotations of the advantagesand disadvantages may be used during comparison.Regardless of the recording method chosen,

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wargaming requires the participation of the entirestaff. Two techniques are narrative and sketch note.

• Narrative technique. This technique de-scribes the visualization of the operation in se-quence in sentence form. It provides extensivedetail and clarity. The major drawback is thevolume of the results and the time required.

• Sketch note technique. This technique usesbrief notes concerning critical locations, re-quirements, or tasks. These notes will refer-ence specific locations on the map or they mayrelate to general considerations covering broadareas on the map.

Step Seven: Wargame the battle and assess theresults. Wargaming analyzes each selected event byidentifying the components of its subevents or tasksone level down and assets two levels down. Beginthe wargame of a course of action by visualizing thebattle from initial unit locations that were determinedduring course of action development. Follow a logi-cal sequence within the method selected for organiz-ing the area of operations.

Wargaming SequenceThe wargame sequence is action, reaction, counter-action. Note the necessary branches and potentialsequels that develop as a result of the drills.

• Action: Wargame by identifying the subeventsrequired to complete the event. Subevents areactions of major subordinate headquarters orbattlefield activities. Start by looking at thoseactions initiated by the command and its subor-dinate units analyzing the event. The question"If I do this, what will the enemy do?" will leadto the second step.

• Reaction: Next analyze the reactions of theopposing forces in relation to the action as wellas the units involved. Consider all possible re-action forces including templated forces outsidethe area of operations that could be assigned acounterattack mission. The question "If hedoes this what can I do?" leads to the final step,counteraction.

• Counteraction: Counteractions are thoseactions that the wargaming command takes inresponse to the reactions of the enemy. Ad-dress these counteractions in the context of thebattlefield activities and identify the assetsrequired.

During the above sequence, the assets required foreach action or counteraction are identified. Thecommander and staff must consider all combat multi-pliers that may enhance the relative combat strengthof the unit.

Wargaming ResultsThe results of the wargame will drive the following:

• Refinements or modifications to the course ofaction. Changes include the composition andlocation of the main effort, supporting efforts,and the reserve; and adjustments to controlmeasures.

• Identification of branches. Branches are of de-cisive importance because they will permit thecommander to retain flexibility. The operationsofficer may identify options for changing dispo-sitions, orientation, or direction of movementand accepting or declining battle in anticipationof the enemy's range of capabilities.

• Identification of essential elements of friendlyinformation (EEFI). Having refined a courseof action, the operations officer identifies itscharacteristic EEFI and is able to develop thedeception plan and force protection measuresassociated with that course of action.

• Identification of tasks to maneuver units.These tasks include responsibility for a particu-lar element of the course of action's scheme ofmaneuver, planning for identified contingen-cies, responsibility for specific deception eventsand priorities of support.

• Identification of high-payoff targets. FromI-IVTs associated with each enemy course of ac-tion, determine which HVTs can be success-fully acquired and attacked. The staff thendevelops the high payoff target list and the at-tack guidance matrix.

• An estimate of battle duration of each criticalevent and the entire battle. Calculate battle du-ration by considering distance, rate of move-ment, terrain, weather, and other factors.

Marine Division B-i 5

• Identification of advantages and disadvantages.These may be in any form, such as acceptableand unacceptable risks, the effectiveness ofcompleting a portion of the event or mission, orthe effect a unit's losses will have on future di-vision operations.

• A projection of the percentage of total enemyforce defeated in each critical event andoverall.

• Identification of additional critical events. Thewargame identifies other events that must besuccessfully handled to assure victory.

• Additional requirements for combat support.• A determination of the information necessary to

plan for sequels. The outcomes of wargamingmay not match perfectly the endstate articulatedby the division commander in his statement ofintent. Therefore, they will affect the planningfor sequels.

• The G-2 identifies enemy reactions, projectsenemy losses, and verifies NAIs and TAIs.

• The G-4 determines the requirements for com-bat service support to include locations forprepositioning, additional obstacle materials,varieties and quantities of ammunition, trans-portation demands, and requirements for

reconstitution.• Estimated attrition. Projected battle losses are

weighed against the risk criteria prevents unduedamage to the command.

• Requirements for external support. This sup-port includes that, from higher and adjacentforces. This is the identification of the short-falls critical to the success of the operation.

• Risk. At the end of the wargame, the purposeof identifying the risk is to allow the com-mander to make an appropriate decision basedon the situation. Risk is inevitable on the battle-field, and an attempt to eliminate it may be un-reasonable and overly cautious. Simply stated,risk is the likelihood that a course of action willnot accomplish the mission or a portion of themission.

• Advantages and disadvantages. The staff mustidentify, analyze, and evaluate advantages anddisadvantages for each course of action. Therationale for each should be annotated for usein the final part, which is comparison.

Staff EstimatesOnce courses of action are analyzed, staffs comparethe feasible courses of action to identify the one thathas the highest probability of success against the en-emy course of action of greatest concern to the divi-sion commander. This course of action also hasbranches that will facilitate success against other pos-sible enemy courses of action. The actual compari-son may follow any technique that will allow arecommendation to be reached. A decision matrix isone of these techniques. Each staff officer may usehis own matrix for comparison in his own area of re-sponsibility. On completion of the staff analyses, thestaff will meet again to identify the course of actionto be recommended to the commander. Led by theG-3, each staff member will present his findings forconsideration by the others. The staff's responsibil-ity is to arrive at a decision on which course of ac-tion to recommend. If the staff cannot reach adecision,the C/S will resolve the differences.

Commander's Estimate of the Situationand DecisionThe staff briefs the commander and outlines eachcourse of action to include the advantages and disad-vantages of each. The brief will include thebranches and sequels identified during the wargame.The method of presentation should not be such as toprejudice the commander. Each member of the staffprepares to answer any questions from the coin-mander and develops appropriate briefing charts forthis purpose. The wargame is not briefed but it maybe used to answer questions or to expand on a par-ticular critical event as needed.

The commander reaches a decision based on his ex-perience, trust and confidence in his staff, and hisestimate of the situation. The commander may agreewith the staff recommendation or he may select an-other course of action. The commander may directthe use of one of the courses of action with modifica-tion or one not previously considered. There is riskin doing this since the staff will not have analyzedthe course of action to determine the advantages anddisadvantages of the results.

On receiving the staff estimates, the commandermust refine the course of action into a clear decision.The decision is a clear, concise statement of his

B-16 FMFM 6-1

intent, the general scheme of maneuver, and sup-porting fires for the operation. The commandershould include in his decision statement the risk he iswilling to accept to accomplish the mission. The de-cision should be directed toward seizing the initiativerather than merely reacting to the enemy's actions.

The decision and concept of operation is announcedby the commander. The commander expands thewording of the selected course of action into a state-ment of the concept of operation. The commanderelaborates on this decision when he outlines his con-cept to the staff. The concept should always addressthe battlefield activities, include his intent, and aclear designation of the main effort. Upon receivingthe commander's decision, the operations officerprepares and issues another warning order to thecommand.

Prepare the PlanMilitary orders seek to communicate informationthat governs action. All orders, whether oral orwritten, should be characterized by the followingprinciples:

• Clarity: The reader should not have to inter-pret words and phrases.

• Completeness: All required information andinstructions must be included.

• Brevity: Orders should avoid unnecessary de-tail without sacrificing clarity and complete-ness.

• Initiative: Orders should be mission-type, tell-ing what should be done, not how to do it, inorder to foster initiative by subordinates.

• Positive expression: Orders should avoid in-decisive, vague, and ambiguous language; theyshould be positive.

• Timeliness: A 70-percent solution on time isbetter than a 100-percent solution that arrives

Commander's ApprovalThe division commander approves the plan preparedby the staff prior to issuance to subordinate com-manders. Ordinarily, the commander is appraised ofthe specifics of the order as it is prepared, thus expe-diting the transmittal to the force.

Issue the OrderOnce approved, the order is issued to the force. Theorder may be issued through oral, written, orgraphic means.

Oral OrdersOral orders are the most direct method of communi-cating the commander's decision to his subordinates.They are best issued by the commander in person tohis subordinate commanders to ensure clarity of in-tent. The recipient records the order verbatim or innote form. Oral orders may be confirmed in writ-ing, especially when the order is issued well in ad-vance of the contemplated action. However, therapidity of action which characterizes modern com-bat frequently makes this impossible.

Written OrdersWritten orders may be issued when subordinates arewidely separated on the battlefield or embarked indifferent ships prior to the operation. Written ordersvary in size and scope depending upon time availableand the complexity of the operation.

Graphic MeansWhen orders are communicated by graphic means,they take the form of overlay orders. Combat plansand orders may be prepared almost entirely bymeans of graphic representation. When this is done,the essential elements of the orders are printed onthe overlay as signs and symbols and a minimumamount of complementary written material is printeddirectly on the overlay. It is essential that the over-lay order contain a reference to the map on which itis based and that it provide a means to register themap on the overlay. The complete mission statementis always written on the overlay even thouglh it is

also shown graphically.too late.

Marine Division B17

Execution and SupervisionThe commander and staff continually process the lat-est information, determining where and how it af-fects the operation. They enter the decisionmakingprocess based on the type of information received,arrive at a decision, determine the actions required,and issue the orders to execute those actions. Ac-tions and orders are ongoing at all levels of com-mand, each dealing with their areas of responsibility.Supervision is ongoing throughout the decisionmak-ing process whether it pertains to current or futureoperations. Through supervision, the commanderensures that his decisions are implemented and hisintent understood.

Targeting and the Decision CycleThe decide, detect, deliver, and assess targetingmethodology is an integral part of the decision cyclefrom receipt of the mission through execution. Eachpart of the methodology occurs both simultaneouslyand sequentially. As decisions are made in planningfuture operations, current operations staff elements

execute detection and attack of targets based on priordecisions. The decide function is the most importantand requires close interaction between the com-mander and intelligence, plans, operations, and firesupport personnel. Key staff products include the in-telligence preparation of the battlespace, target valueanalysis (TVA), and intelligence estimate. The de-cide function gives a clear picture of the prioritiesthat apply to the tasking of target acquisition assets,information processing, the selection of an attackmeans, and the requirement for combat assessment.The resulting operation order contains the com-mander's high-payoff target list (HPTL), the attackguidance matrix (AGM), target selection standards(TSS), and any requirements for BDA. The detectfunction is conducted during execution. The targetpriorities developed in the decide function are usedto expedite the processing of targets. The main ob-jective of the deliver function is the attack of targetsin accordance with the commander's attack guid-ance. The conmunder and staff assess the results ofmission execution in the assess function.

(reverse blank)

GlossarySection I. Acronyms

AAV ... . . assault amphibious vehicleAAW antiair warfare

airspace coordination areaaviation combat element

assistant chief of staffair-to-ground missile

Ti. S. Aid Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance

AO area of operationsAOA amphibious objective areaAOR area of responsibilityarty artilleryATF amphibious task forceATO air tasking orderAVLB armored vehicle-launched bridge

civil affairscall library

close air supportcommander, amphibious task force

command and controlcommand, control, and intelligence

command and control warfarecommand, control, communications,

computers, and intelligencecommander's critical

information requirementscommand element

communications-electronicsoperating instructions

call for fire zonescoordinated fire line

commander in chiefcounterintelligence team

commander, landing forceCMOC civil military operations center

disaster assistance response teamdeep air support

direct air support centerDepartment of Defense

Department of Statedirect support

drop zone

EA electronic attackEmergency Action Committee

electronic counter-countermeasuresessential elements of friendly information

enemy prisoner of warelectronic warfare

forward air controllerfamily of scatterable mines

forward edge of the battle areaFederal Emergency Management Agency

free-fire areaforce fires coordination center

friendly force information requirementforward line of own troops

FO forward observerfire support coordinator

fire support coordination centerfire support coordination line

force service support group

ACAACE...AC/SAGMAOFDA

COC combat operations centerCOMSEC communications securityCONUS continental United StatesCP command postC/S chief of staffCSS combat service supportCSSD combat service support detachmentCSSE combat service support elementCSSOC ... combat service support operations center

DARTDASDASCDODDOSDS....

battle damage assessment DZbattalion

BDABn

CA...CARECAS..CATFCl....

EAC..ECCMEEFIEPWEW

C2wC4!

CCIR

CE....CEO!..

CFFZCFL.CINCCIT.CLF.

FACFASCAMFEBAFEMAFFAFFCCFFIRFLOT

FSCFSCCFSCLFSSG

glossary-2

GCE. ground combat elementGS general support

joint force commanderJoint Information Bureau

joint task force

light armored reconnaissancelanding force

landing force operations centerliaison officer

lines of communicationslanding zone

Marine air-ground task forceMarine Corps Fire Support System

mine countermeasuresMarine expeditionary force

mission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support available-time available

multiple launch rocket systemmilitary occupational specialty

military operations on urbanized terrainmilitary police

main supply route

no-fire areanaval gunfire

FMFM 6-1

naval gunfire officernaval surface fire support

operational maneuver from the seaoperations other than war

observation postoperations security

priority intelligence requirementposition location reporting system

petroleum, oils, and lubricantspsychological operations

reconnaissance and surveillancereconnaissance

restrictive fire arearestrictive fire line

rules of engagementreconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition

supporting arms coordinatorsupporting anns coordination center

security assistance officesurveillance and reconnaissance center

suppression of enemy defensesshore fire control party

staff judge advocatestaff noncommissioned officerstanding operating procedure

TACC tactical air command center (USMC);tactical air control center (USN)

TACLOG tactical-logistical groupTACP tactical air control partyTAI target areas of interestTAOR tactical area of responsibilityTCF tactical combat forceTVA target value analysis

USAID U. S. Agency forInternational Development

NGFO.NSFS

OMFTSOOTWOp....OPSEC

helicopter landing zonehigh-payoff target

• high-payoff target listhelicopter support team

high-value targetPIR....

intelligence preparation of the battlefield PLRSPOL....PSYOPS

HLZ...HPT...HPTLHST...HVT..

IPB

JFCJIBJTF

LAR...LFLFOCLNO..LOC..LZ

MAGTFMCFSSMCMMEF...METT-T

MLRSMOS...MOUTMPMSR...

NAI....NATO..NBC...NCA...NCO.NEF..NFA.

R&S.reconRFA.RFL.ROE.RSTA

SAC.SACCSAO.SARCSEADSFCPSJA.SNCOSop

named areas of interestNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization

nuclear, biological, and chemicalNational Command Authorities

noncommissioned officernaval expeditionary force

NGF.UAV....UNICEF

unmanned aerial vehicleUnited Nation's Children's Fund

Marine Division glossary-3

Section II. Definitions

A

Adjutant - An officer who performs the generalduties of a special staff officer under the cognizanceof the G-1/S-1 with respect to personneladministration and office management.

air mission commander - A mission commanderwho shall be a properly qualified naval aviator ornaval flight officer, should be designated whenseparate aircraft formations, each led by its ownformation leader, are required for a common supportmission or whenever a formation of four or moreaircraft must perform a multiple sortie mission. Themission commander shall direct a coordinated planof action and shall be responsible for theeffectiveness of the mission.

air officer - An officer (aviator/naval flight officer)who functions as chief advisor to the commander onall aviation matters. An air officer is normally foundat battalion level and higher within the groundcombat element and within the Marine air-groundtask force command element and combat servicesupport element headquarters staffs. The air officeris the senior member of the tactical air control party.The battalion air officer supervises the training andoperation of the two battalion forward air controlparties.

air support liaison team - A team task organized bythe Marine air support squadron to maintain liaisonbetween the direct air support center and the firesupport coordination center (FSCC). The ASLT isnot a direct air support center, but may augment anechelon capability during displacement of the directair support center. An ASLT may be used toprovide a team to the senior FSCC when the directair support center is not able to physically collocatewith the fire support coordination center because ofmobility or communications requirements with otheragencies and supporting aircraft.

airspace coordination area - A block of airspace inthe target area in which friendly aircraft arereasonably safe from friendly surface fires.

area reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtaindetailed information concerning the terrain or enemyactivity within a prescribed area such as a town,ridge line, woods, or other features critical tooperations.

assault position - That position between the line ofdeparture and the objective in an attack from whichforces assault the objective. Ideally, it is the lastcovered and concealed position before reaching theobjective (primarily used by dismounted infantry).

assault support - The use of aircraft to providetactical mobility and logistics support for theMAGTF, the movement of high priority cargo andpersonnel within the immediate area of operations,in-flight refueling, and the evacuation of personneland cargo.

attack - An offensive action characterized bymovement supported by fire with the objective ofdefeating or destroying the enemy.

B

barrier plan - The part of the operation order orplan that deals with the use of barriers (obstaclesdesigned or employed to canalize, direct, restrict,delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force),closely integrated with the scheme of maneuver andthe fire support plan, to lend maximum support tothe accomplishment of the assigned mission.

battle position - A defensive location oriented on themost likely enemy avenue of approach from which aunit may defend or attack. Such units can be aslarge as reinforced battalions and as small as

glossary-4 FMFM 6-1

platoons. The unit assigned to the battle position islocated within the general outline of the battleposition, but other forces may operate outside thebattle position to provide early detection of enemyforces and all-round security.

battlespace - All aspects of air, surface, subsurface,land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum whichencompass the area of influence and area of interest.

breach - The employment of any means available tobreak through or secure a passage through an enemydefense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.

C

C2 support forces - The personnel, equipment,facilities, communications, and procedures involvedwith reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, firesupport coordination, tactical air control, electronicwarfare, automated data processing, sensormanagement, signals intelligence, deception, spacesystems, and other information-related areas.

clear enemy in zone - A requirement to eliminateorganized resistance in an assigned zone bydestroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal ofenemy forces that could interfere with the unitsability to accomplish its mission.

close operations - Military actions conducted toproject power decisively against enemy forces whichpose an immediate or near term threat to the successof current battles and engagements. These militaryactions are conducted by committed forces and theirreadily available tactical reserves, using maneuverand combined arms.

combat operations center - The primary operationalagency required to control the tactical operations ofa command that employs ground and aviationcombat, combat support, and combat service supportelements or portions thereof. The combat operationscenter continually monitors, records, and supervisesoperations in the name of the commander andincludes the necessary personnel andcommunications to do the same.

combat patrol - A tactical unit that is sent out fromthe main body to engage in independent fighting. Itmay be to provide security or to harass, destroy, orcapture enemy troops, equipment, or installations.Operations include raids, ambushes, and securitymissions.

combat service support detachment - A separatetask organization of combat service support assetsformed for the purpose of providing rearming,refueling, and/or repair capabilities to the Marineair-ground task force or designated subordinateelements; e.g. a battalion conducting independentoperations or an aircraft squadron operating at aremote airfield. The combat service support elementnormally provides the command element of a combatservice support detachment.

combined arms - The tactics, techniques, andprocedures employed by a force to integrate fire-power and mobility to produce a desired effect uponthe enemy.

command and control support system - Anorganized assembly of C2S forces or elements taskorganized and arrayed to overlay the C2 infra-structure with C2 support that collects, transports,processes, disseminates, and protects informationessential to the commander and subordinate elementsin the generation and decisive application of combatpower. A command and control support systemincludes subsystems that support command, control,communications, computers, surveillance, reconnais-sance, intelligence, interoperability, C2 protection,and counter C2 operations, their associated re-sources, and technology.

composite MAGTF - A MAGTF formed usingforces from two or more other MAGTFs.

converging axes attack - A type of tank-infantryattack where the tank-infantry team approaches acommon objective on two different axes.

coordinated fire line - A line beyond whichconventional surface fire support means (mortars,field artillery, and naval gunfire ships) may fire atany time within the zone of the establishingheadquarters without additional coordination.

Marine Division

______________

glossary-5

countermobility - The construction of obstacles andemplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, anddestroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain.The primary purpose of countermobility operationsis to slow or divert the enemy, to increase time fortarget acquisition, and to increase weaponeffectiveness.

Country Team - The senior, in-country, UnitedStates coordinating and supervising body, headed bythe Chief of the United States diplomatic mission,and composed of the senior member of eachrepresented United States department or agency, asdesired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.

course of action - 1. Any sequence of activitieswhich an individual or unit may follow. 2. Apossible plan open to an individual or commanderwhich would accomplish, or is related toaccomplishment of, his mission. 3, The schemeadopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line ofconduct in an engagement.

critical information - Knowledge crucial to thecommander which requires his immediate attentionand without which his ability to command, control,and conduct combat operations would be degraded.

cross-attaclunent - The exchange of subordinateunits between units for a temporary period.

D

deception operation - A military operationconducted to mislead the enemy . A unit conductinga deception operation may or may not make contactwith the enemy. Deception operations includedemonstrations, diversions, displays, feints, andruses.

deep air support - Air action against enemy targetsat such a distance from friendly forces that detailedintegration of each mission with fire and movementof friendly forces is not required. Deep air supportmission are flown on either side of the fire supportcoordination line; the lack of a requirement for closecoordination with the fire and movement of friendlyforces is the qualifying factor. Note: The acronym

DAS stands for deep air support and not direct airsupport.

deep operations Military actions conducted againstenemy capabilities which pose a potential threat tofriendly forces. These military actions are designedto isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace andinfluence future operations.

defense - A coordinated effort by a force to defeatan attacker and prevent him from achieving hisobjectives.

defensive operations - Operations conducted withthe immediate purpose of causing an enemy attack tofail. Defensive operations also may achieve one ormore of the following: gain time; concentrate forceselsewhere; wear down enemy forces as a prelude tooffensive operations; and retain tactical, strategic, orpolitical objectives.

delaying action - A type of retrograde operation inwhich space is traded for time, and maximumpunishment is inflicted on the enemy withoutaccepting decisive engagement, penetration, or beingbypassed.

direct air support - Air support flown in directresponse to a specific request from the supportedunit.

directed net - A net in which no station other thanthe net control station can communicate with anyother station, except for transmission of urgentmessages, without first obtaining the permission ofthe net control station.

E

encirclement - The loss of freedom of maneuverresulting from enemy control of all ground routes ofevacuation and reinforcement.

encircling force - A force employed in a pursuit toenvelop an enemy force which has lost the capabilityto defend or delay in an organized fashion. It seeksto cut off escape routes and, with direct pressureforces, attacks and destroys the enemy forces.

glossary-6

______ ____

FMFM 61

engineer reconnaissance - The gathering ofspecific, detailed, technical information required bysupporting engineer forces in order to prepare forand accomplish assigned missions.

F

feint - A limited-objective attack involving contactwith the enemy, varying in size from a raid to asupporting attack. Feints are used to cause theenemy to react in three predictable ways: to employhis reserves improperly, to shift his supporting fires,or to reveal his defensive fires.

fire support - Assistance to elements of the Marineair-ground task force engaged with the enemyrendered by other firing units; including (but notlimited to) artillery, mortars, naval surface firesupport, and offensive air support.

force sustainment - Capabilities, equipment, andoperations which ensure continuity, freedom ofaction, logistics support, and command and control.

free-fire area - A specifically designated area intowhich any weapon system may be fired without anyadditional coordination.

frontal attack - An offensive maneuver in which themain action is directed against the front of the enemyforces and over the most direct approaches.

H

helicopterborne operation - A military action inwhich combat forces and their equipment maneuverabout the battlefield by helicopters or vertical-landedaircraft. Aviation activities are under the control ofthe aviation combat element commander who isassigned in direct or general support of one or morecombat element(s).

J

joint inteffigence center - In amphibious operations,a single intelligence organization formed to satisl'

the similar intelligence requirements of thecommander, amphibious task force and commander,landing force. The joint intelligence center is

formed to eliminate duplicate procedures andstreamline intelligence ftmctioning.

L

L-hour - In amphibious operations, the time atwhich the first helicopter of the helicopterborneassault wave touches down in the landing zone.

limit of advance - An easily recognized terrainfeature beyond which attacking elements will notadvance.

line of contact - A general trace delineating thelocation where two opposing forces are engaged.

linkup - An operation wherein two friendly groundforces join together in a hostile area.

M

main body - The principal part of a tacticalcommand or fonnation. It does not include detachedelements of the command such as advanced guards,flank guards, covering forces, etc.

main effort - The designated unit that is given thepreponderance of combat power and support toensure success. All units and organizations supportthe main effort.

maneuver warfare - A philosophy for action thatseeks to collapse the enemy's cohesion andeffectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, andunexpected actions which create a turbulent andrapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannotadequately cope.

maritime prepositioning force- A task organizationof units under one commander formed for thepurpose of introducing a MAGTF and its associatedequipment and supplies into a secure area. Themaritime prepositioning force is composed of acommand element, a maritime prepositioning shipssquadron, a MAGTF, and a Navy support element.

Marine Division - glossary-7

medical regulating - A casualty regulating systemdesigned to coordinate the movement of casualtiesfrom the site of injury or the onset of diseasethrough successive echelons of medical care to amedical treatment facility that can provide theappropriate level of care.

N

naval control organization - in amphibiousoperations, a temporary control agency establishedby the commander, amphibious task force tocoordinate the assault waves of landing craft,amphibious vehicles, landing ships, and helicoptersduring the waterborne and helicopterborneship-to-objective maneuver.

no-fire area - A designated area into which neitherfires nor effects of fires will occur. Two exceptionsoccur: (a) the establishing headquarters asks for orapproves fire or (b) an enemy force takes refuge inthe area, poses a major threat, and there is

insufficient time to clear the fires needed to defendthe friendly force.

0

obstacle - Any obstruction designed or employed todisrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of anopposing force, and to impose additional losses inpersonnel, time, and equipment on the opposingforce. Obstacles can exist naturally or can bemanmade, or can be a combination of both. Theeffectiveness of an obstacle is enhanced considerablywhen covered by observation and fire. Obstaclescan include abatis, antitank ditches, blown bridges,built-up areas, minefields, rivers, road craters,terrain, and wire.

offensive air support - Those air operationsconducted against enemy installations, facilities, andpersonnel to directly assist the attainment of MAGTFobjectives by the destruction of enemy resources orthe isolation of his military force.

P

parallel planning - Planning by parallel chains ofcommand refers to the planning procedures resultingfrom the close and continuous coordinationnecessary between corresponding naval and troopechelons.

position - 1. A location or area occupied by amilitary unit. 2. The location of a weapon, unit, orindividual from which fire is delivered upon a target.

a. primary position - A position whichprovides the best means to accomplish the assignedmissions.

b. alternate position - A position to beoccupied when the primary position becomesuntenable or unsuitable for carrying out its task.The alternate position is located so that the individualcan continue to fulfill his original task.

c. supplemental position - A positionwhich provides the best means to accomplish a taskthat cannot be accomplished from the primary oralternate position.

power projection - The application of measured,precise offensive military force at a chosen time andplace, using maneuver and combined arms againstenemy forces.

priority of fire - Guidance to a fire support plannerto organize and employ fire support means inaccordance with the relative importance of themaneuver units missions.

program of targets - A number of individual targetsor groups, or both, planned on targets of similarnature and fired on schedule, listed in an artilleryfire plan table.

pursuit by fire - When the assault through theassigned objective is completed, the squad fires uponwithdrawing enemy forces until they are no longervisible or are beyond effective range.

glossary-S FMFM 6-1

R

rear operations - Military actions conducted tosupport and permit force sustainment and to providesecurity for such actions.

recovery operations - Those operations executed torecover personnel and/or equipment.

restrictive fire area - An area in which specificrestrictions are imposed and into which fires thatwould exceed those restrictions will not be deliveredwithout coordination with the establishingheadquarters. The purpose of the restrictive firearea is to regulate fires into an area according to thestated restrictions.

restrictive fire line - A line established betweenconverging friendly forces that prohibits fires, oreffects from fires, across the line withoutcoordination with the affected force. The purpose ofthe restrictive fire line is to prevent interferencebetween converging friendly forces.

route reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtaindetailed information of a specified route and allterrain from which the enemy could influencemovement along that route.

ruse - A trick designed to deceive the enemy,thereby obtaining an advantage. It is characterizedby deliberately exposing false information to thecollection means of the enemy.

S

security area - The forward of the three echelons ofa defensive sector. It is the area forward of theforward edge of the battle area out to the forwardpositions initially assigned to the security forces.The ground combat element commander may extendthe lateral boundaries of the subordinate unitsforward of the forward edge of the battle area,giving them responsibility for the security areawithin sector to the forward limit of theirboundaries, or he may assign a security force to beoperated across the entire combat element frontage.

security force - The detachment deployed betweenthe main body and the enemy (to the front, flanks, orrer of the main body) tasked with the protection ofthe main body. The security force may be assigneda screening, guard, or covering mission.

seize - To clear a designated area and obtain controlof it.

show of force - A mission carried out to demonstrateU.S. resolve, whereby U.S. forces are deployed todefuse a situation that may be detrimental to U.S.interests or national objectives.

specified tasks - Those tasks delineated in themission received from the higher headquarters.

strike operation - An operation designed to inflictdamage on, seize, or destroy an objective.

successive positions - Defensive fighting positionslocated one after another on the battlefield. A forcecan conduct a delaying action from successivepositions.

T

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel - Amission performed by an assigned and briefedaircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery ofpersonnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when thetactical situation precludes search and rescue assetsfrom responding and when survivors and theirlocation have been confinned.

targeting - In its largest sense, targeting is theanalysis of enemy situations relative to thecommander's mission, objectives, and capabilities atthe conunander's disposal, to identify and nominatespecific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, willaccomplish the commander's purpose throughdelaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemyforces or resources critical to the enemy (Joint Pub1-02).

target precedence list - The commanders list oftypes of mobile potential targets arranged in theorder in which they are to be attacked. It establishestarget priorities for reactive targeting.

Marine Division glossary-9

techniques - The general and detailed methods usedby troops and/or commanders to perform assignedmissions and functions, specifically, the methods ofusing equipment and personnel.

throughput system - The logistic infrastructure thatlinks; a. production logistics to consumer logistics,and b. the sources of operating forces' militarycapability to the sustainability of those forces. It isassociated distribution systems (ports, bases, andairfields), civilian agencies, and supporting forcesand service troops which operate those facilities andinstallations.

turn away - A turn away amphibious rehearsal isdependent upon time and equipment considerations.If sufficient time or equipment replacements are notavailable for a ramp down rehearsal, a turn awayrehearsal may be in order simply to test timing,communications, and understanding of assignedtasks.

z

zone reconnaissance - A directed effort to obtaindetailed information concerning all routes, obstacles(to include chemical or radiological contamination),terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined byboundaries. A zone reconnaissance normally is

assigned when the enemy situation is vague or wheninformation concerning cross-country trafficability isdesired.

U

uncommitted force - A force that is not in contactwith an enemy and is not already deployed on aspecific mission or course of action.

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References

Joint Publications

Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Fleet Marine Force Manuals

FMFM 0-14 Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms

FMFM 1-7/ Supporting Arms in Amphibious OperationsNWP 22-2

FMFM 3-21 MAGTF Intelligence OperationsFMFM 3-30 CommunicationsFMFM 4-1 Combat Service Support OperationsFMFM 4-27 MAGTF Supply Operations (under development)FMFM 4-50 Health Service SupportFMFM 5-60 Control of Aircraft and MissilesFMFM 6 Ground Combat OperationsFMFM 6-9 Marine Artillery SupportFMFM 6-18 Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support CoordinationFMFM 6-18-1 MCFSS Techniques and ProceduresFMFM 6-21 Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopterborne OperationsFMFM 7-26 River Crossing OperationsFMFM 7-32 Raid OperationsFMFM 13 MAGTF Engineer Operations

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications

FMFRP 4-18 Bulk Liquids Operations (under development)

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