for bar ops

7/27/2019 for bar ops

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156318 September 5, 2011

SPOUSES ANSELMO1

and PRISCILLABULAONG, Petitioners,vs.VERONICA GONZALES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J .:

Petitioners Anselmo Bulaong and Priscilla Bulaongcollectively referred to as the Bulaongs seek, through theirpetition for review on certiorari, the reversal of thedecision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2002in CA-G.R. SP No. 55423 and the subsequent resolution ofNovember 27, 20023reiterating this decision. These CArulings reversed and set aside the decision4of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, thatordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)No. T-62002 and TCT No. T-62003.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This case traces its roots to the conflicting claims of two setsof parties over two parcels of land. The first parcel of land,

with an area of 237 square meters and covered by TCT No.T-249639,5was originally registered in the name ofFortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha Limpo.6 The otherparcel of land, with an area of 86 square meters andcovered by TCT No. T-249641,7was originally registered inthe names of Pacifica E. Limpo, married to Nicanor C.
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Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo, married to BerthaLimpo.8

These parcels of land were mortgaged by the daughter of

Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina Christi Limpo, upon theauthority of her father,9 to the Bulaongs, to secure a loan inthe amount of P4,300,000.00. The mortgage was evidencedby a Deed of Mortgage dated January 13, 1993.10

The Bulaongs alleged that before they executed themortgage, Regina gave them the owners duplicates of titleof the two properties. In early January 1993 (the exact date

is unknown but prior to the execution of the mortgage),Anselmo Bulaong, together with his counsel, Atty. RobertoDionisio, allegedly went to the Office of the Register ofDeeds of Bulacan to check the titles of the properties to bemortgaged. According to the Bulaongs, the Register ofDeeds, Atty. Elenita Corpus, assured them that TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 were completely clear of any liens or

encumbrances from any party. Relying on this assurance,Anselmo Bulaong agreed to the execution of the mortgageover the two properties.11

After the execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs onceagain went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacanto register and annotate the mortgage on the titles. Theylearned then that the Register of Deeds copies of the two

titles were among the records that were burned in the firethat destroyed the entire office of the Register of Deeds ofBulacan on March 7, 1987. Atty. Elenita Corpus convincedthem to cause the reconstitution of the originals of the titles,and further assured them that the mortgage over theproperties would be protected since a copy of the Deed of
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Mortgage had already been given to her office forannotation.12

On February 4, 1993, the newly reconstituted titles were

issued TCT No. RT-29488 replaced TCT No. T-249639,and TCT No. RT-22489 replaced TCT No. T-249641, still inthe names of Fortunato Limpo, and of Pacifica Limpo andFortunato Limpo, respectively.

Thereafter, on February 24, 1993, new titles were againissued upon the extrajudicial settlement of the estate ofReginas parents. Thus, TCT No. RT-29488 was cancelled

and TCT No. T-30395 was issued in its place, with Reginareplacing her parents as the registered owner; similarly,TCT No. RT-22489 was cancelled and TCT No. T-30396was issued in the names of Pacifica Limpo and ReginaLimpo, as her parents heir.13

To the Bulaongs astonishment, the new titles in Reginasname now contained the following entries:

TCT No. T-30395

Entry No. 5306; Kind: Condition: The property hereindescribed is subject to the prov. of sec. 4, rule 74 of therules of court. date of instrument: 1-13-93; date ofinscription: 2-24-93 at 10:42 a.m.

(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUSRegister of Deeds

Entry No. 5484; Kind: Mortgage: Exec. In favor of: Sps.Anselmo Bulaong & Priscilla Bulaong; Condition: Coveringthe parcel of land herein described, for the sum of
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P4,300,000.00 subject to all the conditions stipulated in thedeed of mortgage on file in this office. Doc. No. 428, Page86, Book XXX, S. of 1993, N.P. Roberto Dionisio of Mal.Bul. Date of Instrument: 1-13-93; date of inscription 3-1-93at 9:20 a.m.


/5306

(NOTE: Proceed to Entry no. 5484)

Entry No. 7808: Kind: NOTICE OF LEVY ON EXECUTION:Conditions: Notice is hereby given that by virtue of the Writof Execution, issued in Crim. Cases Nos. 9638 to 9646-M,entitled "People of the Philippines v. Reggie ChristiSchaetchen Limpo and Maria Lourdes (Bong) Diaz y Gamir,et al., Accused" by the Regional Trial Court, Third Jud.Region, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, under date of Dec.

29, 1992, and at the instance of the private complainantVeronica R. Gonzales, thru counsel, levy on execution ishereby made upon all the rights, shares, interests andparticipations of accused Reggie Christi Schaetchen14overthe real properties described in T-249641 and T-249639, byvirtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by formerregistered owners in favor of Reggie Christi Schaetchendated November 5, 1991, together with all theimprovements existing thereon, was levied on executionpreparatory to the sale of the same without prejudice to thirdpersons having better right thereof and to any valid lien andencumbrances. Date of instrument Jan. 4, 1993; Date ofinscription Jan. 4, 1993 at 11:50 a.m.
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(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUSRegister of Deeds/negm15(emphasis ours)

TCT No. T-30396

Entry No. 5306; Kind: Condition: One-half (1/2) of theproperty herein described is subject to the prov. of sec. 4,rule 74 of the rules of court. date of instrument: 1-13-93;date of inscription: 2-24-93 at 10:42 a.m.


Entry No. 5484; Kind: Mortgage: Exec. In favor of: Sps.Anselmo Bulaong & Priscilla Bulaong; Condition: Coveringthe parcel of land herein described, for the sum ofP4,300,000.00 subject to all the conditions stipulated in thedeed of mortgage on file in this office. Doc. No. 428, Page86, Book XXX, S. of 1993, N.P. Roberto Dionisio of Mal.Bul. Date of Instrument: 1-13-93; date of inscription 3-1-93

at 9:20 a.m.


/5306

(NOTE: Proceed to Entry No. 5484)

Entry No. 7808: Kind: NOTICE OF LEVY ON EXECUTION:Conditions: Notice is hereby given that by virtue of the Writof Execution, issued in Crim. Cases Nos. 9638 to 9646-M,entitled "People of the Philippines v. Reggie ChristiSchaetchen Limpo and Maria Lourdes (Bong) Diaz y Gamir,


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et al., Accused" by the Regional Trial Court, Third Jud.Region, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, under date of Dec.29, 1992, and at the instance of the private complainantVeronica R. Gonzales, thru counsel, levy on execution ishereby made upon all the rights, shares, interests andparticipations of accused Reggie Christi Schaetchen overthe real properties described in T-249641 and T-249639, byvirtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by formerregistered owners in favor of Reggie Christi Schaetchendated Nov. 5, 1991, together with all the improvementsexisting thereon, was levied on execution preparatory to the

sale of the same without prejudice to third persons havingbetter right thereof and to any valid lien and encumbrances.Date of instrument Jan. 4, 1993; Date of inscription Jan.4, 1993 at 11:50 a.m.

(SGD.) ELENITA E. CORPUSRegister of Deeds/negm16(emphasis ours)

It appears that a certain Veronica Gonzales had filed acriminal case for estafa against Regina with the RTC ofBulacan, Branch 12.17On October 28, 1991, the RTCrendered a decision acquitting Regina, but at the same timeordering her to pay Veronica actual damages in the totalamount of P275,000.00.18 By virtue of a writ of executionissued on December 29, 1992, the above-quoted notice oflevy was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Registry

of Bulacan on January 4, 1993. However, this was notannotated on the titles themselves because at the time ofthe levy, the properties had not yet been transferred toRegina, but were still registered in the name of herparents.19
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Based on the annotation referring to the notice of levy, thesubject of the levy was Reginas interest in the propertieswhich, in turn, was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Saleallegedly executed by her parents on November 5, 1991 totransfer their interest in both properties to her. Notably,Regina never registered this sale with the Register ofDeeds.

To satisfy Reginas judgment debt, the two lots were sold atpublic auction on June 8, 1993 to Veronica, the only bidder,for P640,354.14.20The Certificate of Sale was annotated on

the titles on June 8, 1993 as Entry No. 2075. Upon the lapseof the one year redemption period on June 20, 1994,Veronicas titles over the properties were consolidated. Afinal deed of sale was issued in Veronicas name andannotated as Entry No. 40425 on TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 on June 24, 1994.21

On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had the mortgage

extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff conducting theauction sale on August 22, 1994. The Bulaongs were thehighest bidders, buying the properties for the sumofP4,300,000.00. They also paid the corresponding capitalgains tax of P215,000.00, plus P64,500.00 for thedocumentary stamp tax, which were required before thetitles to the lots could be transferred in their names. TheCertificate of Sale in their favor was inscribed on August 23,

1994 on TCT No. T-30395 and TCT No. T-30396 as EntryNo. 46739.22

Veronica thereafter filed a petition for the surrender to theRegister of Deeds of the owners copies of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 with the RTC of Malolos, docketed as
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LRC Case No. P-292. On December 16, 1994, the RTCgranted the petition and ordered Regina to surrender herowners copies of the titles; should Regina fail to comply, theRTC ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel these titlesand issue new ones in Veronicas name. Complying withthis order, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396, and issued TCT No. T-62002 inVeronicas name, and TCT No. T-62003 in the name ofVeronica and Pacifica Limpo. These new titles were "clean"and did not contain any annotations, liens or encumbrances.

The Bulaongs thus filed a petition for mandamus with theRTC of Bulacan against Ramon Sampana, the incumbentRegister of Deeds of Bulacan, and Veronica, praying thatthe court order Sampana to cancel TCT Nos. T-62002 andT-62003, and issue new titles in their names; and order therespondents therein to pay them moral and exemplarydamages, and attorneys fees.

On July 30, 1999, the RTC ruled in favor of the Bulaongs.According to the RTC, allowing Veronica to levy on theproperties worth at least P5,000,000.00 for a judgmentof P275,000.00 would result in gross unjust enrichment. TheRTC thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issuenew titles in the name of the Bulaongs, but only after theBulaongs had reimbursed the amount of P275,000.00 toVeronica, with interest. The RTC also ordered Veronica to

pay the Bulaongs P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. Thedispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, judgmentis hereby rendered:


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1. Annulling and cancelling Transfer Certificates ofTitle Nos. T-62002 in the name of defendant VeronicaGonzales, and T-62003 in the name of defendantVeronica Gonzales and Pacifica E. Limpo married toNicanor C. Sincioco;

2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan toexecute a final deed of sale in favor of petitionerspouses Anselmo Bulaong and Pr[i]scilla Bulaong onthe basis of the registered Certificate of Sale executedby said court officer on August 23, 1994, in favor of said

spouses-mortgagee, without the owner-mortgagorsexercising the right of redemption since then;

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issuenew titles, in place of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.T-62002 and T-62003, this time in the name ofpetitioner spouses Anselmo Bulaong and Pr[is]cillaBulaong, as soon as the aforesaid final deed of sale in

their favor is executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff ofBulacan and only after said spouses shall have paidand/or reimbursed Veronica Gonzales lien as judgmentcreditor in the amount of P275,000.00, plus interests atthe legal rate computed from November 19, 1995, untilfully paid and satisfied;

4. Order[ing] herein defendants Veronica R. Gonzales

and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan upon notice ofthis judgment, not to effect any transfer, encumbranceor any disposition whatsoever of the parcels of landcovered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62002and T-62003, or any part thereof, right or interest


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therein, either by sale or any form of conveyance, lienor encumbrance; and

5. Ordering only defendant Veronica R. Gonzales to

pay herein petitioners P50,000.00 as just and equitableattorneys fees, and the costs of suit, defendant RamonC. Sampana as the Register of Deeds of Bulacanhaving merely performed his ministerial duty offollowing the court order of issuing titles to defendantGonzales.

No pronouncement as to moral and exemplary damages

alleged in the petition but not even testified to by petitionersat the trial.23

Both parties appealed to the CA, with the case docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 55423.

THE COURT OF APPEALS D E C I S I O N

In its July 31, 2002 decision, the CA upheld the validity ofthe Notice of Levy on Execution, noting that it created a lienin favor of the judgment creditor over the property.

According to the CA, when the Bulaongs received theowners copies of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396, theNotice of Levy was already annotated on the titles and, thus,should have put them on guard. As mortgagees of the lots,the Bulaongs had the option to redeem the properties within

the redemption period provided by law. Since they failed toavail of this remedy, the consolidation of titles in Veronicasname was proper.

THE PETITION
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The Bulaongs filed the present petition, raising the followingissues:

a) Whether Entry No. 7808 is valid;

b) Whether Veronica has a superior right over theproperties; and

c) Assuming the notice of levy earlier annotated in favorof Veronica to be valid, whether there was a validforeclosure sale.

THE COURTS RULING

We GRANT the petition.

Procedural issues

Time and again, we have stated that petitions for review oncertiorari shall only raise questions of law, as questions offact are not reviewable by this Court. The main issue of who

has a better right over the disputed properties is not only aquestion of law but one that requires a thorough review ofthe presented evidence, in view particularly of the Bulaongsallegation that fraud attended the annotation of Entry No.7808 in the titles. Thus, in the usual course, we would havedenied the present petition for violation of Section 1, Rule 45of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1.Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A partydesiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment or finalorder or resolution of the Court of Appeals, theSandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courtswhenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme


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Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petitionshall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly setforth. (emphasis ours)

This rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Questionsof fact may be reviewed, among others, when the lowercourt makes inferences that are manifestly mistaken, andwhen the judgment of the CA is based on amisapprehension of facts.24As will be apparent in thediscussions below, these exceptional circumstances arepresent in the present case. A review of the evidence,

therefore, is not only allowed, but is necessary for theproper resolution of the presented issues.

It has not escaped our attention that the Bulaongs appear tohave erroneously filed a petition for mandamus for what isessentially an action to assail the validity of Veronicascertificates of title over the subject properties. This lapse,however, is not legally significant under the well-settled rule

that the cause of action in a complaint is not the title ordesignation of the complaint, but the allegations in the bodyof the complaint. The designation or caption is notcontrolling as it is not even an indispensable part of thecomplaint; the allegations of the complaint control.25We thusproceed to resolve the case, bearing in mind that the reliefthe Bulaongs sought before the lower court was to nullifyVeronicas certificates of title and to order the Register of

Deeds to issue new titles in their name.

Redemption not the proper remedy

The CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming theproperties from Veronica when they had the option of doing
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so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA concluded thatthe consolidation of the titles to the lots in Veronicas namethus became a matter of course.

We disagree.

At the outset, we observe that this is not a simple case ofdetermining which lien came first. A perusal of the Bulaongssubmissions to the Court shows that they have consistentlymaintained that the levy and the corresponding executionsale in Veronicas favor are null and void. Had the Bulaongsmerely exercised the right of redemption, they would have

been barred from raising these issues in court, pursuant toour ruling in Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court:26

The respondent appellate court's emphasis on the failure ofthe petitioner to redeem the properties within the periodrequired by law is misplaced because redemption, in thiscase, is inconsistent with the petitioner's claim of invalidity oflevy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of theregularity of the sale and would estop the petitioner fromlater impugning its validity on that ground.27(emphasis ours)

The Bulaongs were thus justified in their refusal to redeemthe properties.

Annotation is valid

The Bulaongs assail the validity of Entry No. 7808 (relatingto the Notice of Levy on Execution in Veronicas favor) onthe two titles, asserting that it is null and void for being afraudulent entry. In support of this contention, they note thefollowing suspicious circumstances: (a) although Entry No.7808 has a higher number and appears after Entry No. 5484
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(corresponding to the Bulaongs mortgage) on the titles,Entry No. 7808 appeared in an earlier volume of the Book ofEntries; and (b) although the Notice of Levy on Executionwas purportedly presented to the Registry of Bulacan onJanuary 4, 1993, or prior to the date when the Bulaongsdeed of mortgage was presented on January 13, 1993, theNotice of Levy on Execution, Entry No. 7808, was numberedand placed after the mortgage, Entry No. 5484, on the titles.

We agree that these circumstances render the Notice ofLevy on Execution, annotated on the titles, highly

suspicious. These circumstances, however, can besufficiently explained when the records are examined.

The records show that on January 4, 1993, Veronica went tothe Registry of Bulacan with the Notice of Levy onExecution, requesting that the notice be registered. Whilethe Register of Deeds placed the Notice of Levy onExecution in the Primary Entry Book, she did not

immediately make a registration when a question aroseregarding the registrability of the notice; the questionnecessitated the submission of a consulta to the LandRegistration Authority (LRA) on January 25, 1993.28

The LRA Administrator responded to the consulta only onFebruary 10, 1993.29Thus, the Notice of Levy on Executionwas not immediately annotated on the newly reconstituted

titles, which were issued on February 4, 1993. It was onlywhen new titles were again issued to reflect the extrajudicialsettlement of the estate of Reginas parents on February 24,1993 that the Notice of Levy on Execution appeared on thetitles as Entry No. 7808.


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The apparent discrepancy in the numbering of the Notice ofLevy on Execution and the date of inscription on thecertificates of title is suitably explained by Section 56 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529 whose pertinent portionstates:

Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies.Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book inwhich, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in theorder of their reception, all instruments including copies ofwrits and processes filed with him relating to registered land.

He shall, as a preliminary process in registration, note insuch book the date, hour and minute of reception of allinstruments, in the order in which they were received. Theyshall be regarded as registered from the time so noted, andthe memorandum of each instrument, when made on thecertificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same date:Provided, that the national government as well as theprovincial and city governments shall be exempt from the

payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled toentry and registration. [emphases ours]

In other words, the order of entries in the Primary EntryBook determines the priority in registration. Thus, theRegister of Deeds merely complied with the law when shefixed Entry No. 7808s date of inscription as January 4,1993, to coincide with the date when the Notice of Levy on

Execution was presented and inscribed in the Primary EntryBook.

The late annotation of the levy on execution on the titles didnot at all lessen its effectivity. Jurisprudence has alreadyestablished the rule that the entry of the notice of levy on


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execution in the Primary Entry Book, even without thecorresponding annotation on the certificate of titles, issufficient notice to all persons that the land is alreadysubject to the levy.30 As we explained in Armed Forces andPolice Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Santiago:31

The notice of levy on attachment in favor of petitioner maybe annotated on TCT No. PT-94912. Levin v. Bass (91 Phil.420 [1952]; see also Dr. Caviles, Jr. v. Bautista, 377 Phil.25; 319 SCRA 24 [1999]; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184Phil. 358; 95 SCRA 380 [19890]) provided the distinction

between voluntary registration and involuntary registration.In volu ntary regist ration, such as a sale, mortgage, leaseand the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be notsurrendered and presented or if no payment of registrationfees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day bookof the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affectthe land sold. Ininvo luntary regist ration, such as anattachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like,

entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to allpersons of such adverse claim.

The entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primaryentry book or day book of the Registry of Deeds onSeptember 14, 1994 is sufficient notice to all persons,including the respondent, that the land is already subject toan attachment. The earlier registration of the notice of levy

on attachment already binds the land insofar as thirdpersons are concerned.32 (emphases ours)

Consequently, when the Register of Deeds placed theNotice of Levy on Execution in the Primary Entry Book on
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January 4, 1993, this entry already bound third persons tothe notice entered.

Validity of the Levy

i. Reginas interest in the properties is not established

The levy on execution for judgment is "the act x x x by whichan officer sets apart or appropriate[s,] for the purpose ofsatisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the

judgment debtors property."33Every interest which thejudgment debtor may have in the property may be subjected

to levy on execution.34As established by the Court in Reyesv. Grey:35

The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehendsevery species of title, inchoate or complete; legal orequitable. This statute authorizes the sale under executionof every kind of property, and every interest in propertywhich is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and

transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as itdeals with legal, without anywhere expressly recognizing ormaking any distinction between them. [emphases ours]

In Reyes, the Court set the standard to be applied indetermining the kind of property that can be subject toattachment:

We think the real test, as to whether or not property can beattached and sold upon execution is does the judgmentdebtor hold such a beneficial interest in such property thathe can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does,then the property is subject to execution and payment of hisdebts.36(emphasis and underscoring ours)


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Applying the test in Reyes, the Court, in Gotauco & Co. v.Register of Deeds of Tayabas,37recognized as valid theinscription of a notice of levy on execution on the certificatesof title, even though the titles were not in the name of the

judgment debtor (Rafael Vilar). According to the Court, whilethe certificates of title were still registered in the name ofFlorentino Vilar, since Rafael Vilar presented a copy of apetition filed with the lower court, from which it could beinferred that Florentino Vilar was dead and Rafael Vilar wasone of his heirs, Rafael had an interest in Florentinosproperty that could properly be the subject of attachment,

even if his participation in Florentinos property wasindeterminable before the final liquidation of the estate.

Similarly, in Pacific Commercial Co. v. Geaga,38the Courtheld that although the Register of Deeds may properly rejectan attachment where it appears that the titles involved arenot registered in the name of the defendants (debtors), thatrule yields to a case where there is evidence submitted to

indicate that the defendants have present or future interestsin the property covered by said titles, regardless of whetherthey still stand in the names of other persons. The fact thatthe present interests of the defendants are stillindeterminate, and even though there was no judicialdeclaration of heirship yet, is of no consequence for thepurpose of registering the attachment in question. This isthe case since what is being attached and what may be latersold at public auction in pursuance of the attachment cannotbe anything more than whatever rights, titles, interests andparticipations which the defendants may or might have inthe property so attached. In other words, if they had actuallynothing in the property, then nothing is affected and the


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property will remain intact.39This rule is expressed inSection 35, Rule 39 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure,which provides:

Upon the execution and delivery of said deed [ofconveyance and possession], the purchaser, orredemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to andacquire all the right, title, interest and claim of the judgmentdebtor to the property as of the time of the levy[.] [emphasesours]

Although we recognize the validity of the annotation of the

levy on the execution in the present case, the question ofwhether the levy itself is valid remains to be determined. Todo this, Reginas interest in the subject properties at thetime of the levy has to be ascertained. To recall, Veronicasnotice of levy on execution is based on Reginas interest inthe two properties, which she acquired via the Deed of

Absolute Sale purportedly executed by her parents in her

favor on November 5, 1991. But is this Deed of AbsoluteSale a sufficient evidence of Reginas interest in the subjectproperties?

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record, we rule inthe negative.

To begin with, not only were the properties subject of theattachment not registered in Reginas name, the Deed of

Absolute Sale on which Regina based her interest was noteven annotated on these titles. While Regina purportedlypurchased her parents rights to the subject properties in1991, she never asserted her rights over these properties bypresenting the Deed of Absolute Sale to the Register of


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Deeds for registration and annotation on the titles. As amatter of fact, it was Veronica, and not Regina, whopresented the Deed of Absolute Sale to the Register ofDeeds.

More importantly, from the records, it is clear that thesubject properties were finally registered in Reginas name,not by virtue of the 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale, but byvirtue of succession, specifically by the "Adjudication" thatRegina filed with the Register of Deeds on February 24,1993,40pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court.

41

The procedure by which the properties wereregistered in Reginas name suggests that when Reginasparents died, the subject lots still formed part of Reginasparents estate, and were not, as Veronica claims, sold toRegina in 1991, thereby casting doubt to the validity of theDeed of Absolute Sale. As the Bulaongs reason in theirmemorandum, if the subject properties had already beensold to Regina as early as 1991, why would they still be

considered a part of her parents estate in 1993?42

Another point to consider is that Regina dealt with theBulaongs as her fathers representative when they werenegotiating the mortgage over the properties.43If she hadalready acquired her parents interest in these properties in1991, she would not have needed any authority from herfather to execute the mortgage with the Bulaongs; she

would have done so in her own capacity.

These facts, taken together, lead us to doubt that Reginahad any interest in the properties at the time of the levy.Thus, unlike in the previously cited cases where the debtors,although possessing merely an inchoate interest in the


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properties at the time of the levy, had interests that wereestablished with reasonable certainty and could be thesubject of attachment; in the present case, the evidence onrecord fails to prove that Regina actually had any interest inthe properties which could be the subject of levy.

The spring cannot rise higher than its source.44SinceRegina had no established interest in the subject propertiesat the time of the levy, Veronicas levy had nothing to attachto in the subject properties.

ii. Unregistered sale of land cannot bind third parties

Even assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Reginasfavor was valid, we still cannot uphold the validity of the levyand execution sale in Veronicas favor.

The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth inSection 51 of P.D. No. 1529:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registeredowner. An owner of registered land may convey,mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same inaccordance with existing laws. He may use such forms ofdeeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments asare sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or othervoluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey oraffect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or

bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract betweenthe parties and as evidence of authority to the Register ofDeeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to conveyor affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned,


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and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall bemade in the office of the Register of Deeds for the provinceor city where the land lies. [emphases ours]

From the standpoint of third parties, a property registeredunder the Torrens system remains, for all legal purposes,the property of the person in whose name it is registered,notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance,unless the corresponding deed is registered.45Simply put, ifa sale is not registered, it is binding only between the sellerand the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.

Undoubtedly, Veronicas claim on the properties is rooted inthe unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale between Reginaand her parents. The Bulaongs do not appear to have hadany knowledge that this sale ever took place. To recall,Regina gave the Bulaongs the owners duplicate certificatesof the properties, which showed that the properties wereregistered in the names of her parents, Fortunato and

Bertha Limpo. It thus appears that the Bulaongs first learnedabout the sale between Regina and her parents when theyreceived the newly issued titles in Reginas name whichcontained the annotation of the levy in Veronicas favor.

One of the principal features of the Torrens system ofregistration is that all encumbrances on the land shall beshown, or at least intimated upon the certificate of title and a

person dealing with the owner of the registered land is notbound to go behind the certificate and inquire intotransactions, the existence of which is not thereintimated.46Since the Bulaongs had no knowledge of theunregistered sale between Regina and her parents, theBulaongs can neither be bound by it, nor can they be
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prejudiced by its consequences. This is but the logicalcorollary to the rule set forth in Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529,in keeping with the basic legal maxim that what cannot bedone directly cannot be done indirectly.

Execution sale in Veronicas favor was highly irregular

We also find that the execution sale in favor of Veronica isinvalid because Reginas interest in both lots was soldtogether, in violation of Sections 15 and 21, Rule 39 of theold Rules of Court. The pertinent portions of theseprovisions provide:

Section 15. Execution of money judgments.The officermust enforce an execution of a money judgment by levyingon all the property, real and personal of every name andnature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value,of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on asufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, andselling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or hisattorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the

judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgmentand accruing costs must be delivered to the judgmentdebtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or orderof the court. When there is more property of the judgmentdebtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruingcosts, within the view of the officer, he must levy only on

such part of the property as is amply sufficient tosatisfy the judgment and costs.

Section 21. How property sold on execution. Who maydirect manner and order of sale. All sales of propertyunder execution must be made at public auction, to the


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highest bidder, between the hours of nine in the morningand five in the afternoon.After sufficient property has beensold to satisfy the execution, no more shall be sold. Whenthe sale is of real property, consisting of several knownlots,they must be soldseparately; or, when a portion ofsuch real property is claimed by a third person, he mayrequire it to be sold separately. [emphases ours]

Where the property to be sold consists of distinct lots,tracts or parcels, or is susceptible of division withoutinjury, it should be offered for sale in parcels and not en

masse, for the reason that a sale in that manner willgenerally realize the best price, and will not result intaking from the debtor any more property than isnecessary to satisfy the judgment. It will also enable thedefendant to redeem any one or more of the parcelswithout being compelled to redeem all the land sold.47Asale of additional land or personal property afterenough has been sold to satisfy the judgment is

unauthorized.48

While the general policy of the law is to sustainexecution sales, the sale may be set aside where thereis a resulting injury based on fraud, mistake andirregularity.49Where the properties were sold togetherwhen the sale of less than the whole would have beensufficient to satisfy the judgment debt, the sale may be

set aside.50lawphi1

In Caja v. Nanquil,51we took judicial notice of the fact thatthe value of a property was usually bigger than the amountfor which it could be mortgaged. Since the two properties,taken together, were mortgaged to the petitioners to secure
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a loan worth P4,300,000.00, we can easily assume thatthese properties are worth at least this amount. EvenVeronica does not contest this assumption.

From this premise, we can logically assume that the sale ofjust one of the lots would have been sufficient to satisfythe judgment debt. Yet no explanation was provided asto why the sheriff sold both parcels of land at theexecution sale for the paltry sum of P640,354.14. Thisact undoubtedly resulted in great prejudice to theBulaongs. To our minds, this renders the execution sale

defective, and provides sufficient ground for us to setthe sale aside.

For the foregoing reasons, we rule and so hold that thelevy and the corresponding execution sale in Veronicasfavor are invalid, and must be set aside. Veronica,however, is not without recourse, as she may still seek toenforce the judgment debt against Regina.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT thepetition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appealsdated July 31, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55423. WeREINSTATE the decision of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, dated July 30, 1999 in CivilCase No. 170-M-95, with the MODIFICATION thatpetitioners Anselmo Bulaong and Priscilla Bulaong are no

longer required to reimburse Veronica Gonzales for her lienin the amount of P275,000.00, plus interest.

SO ORDERED.


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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009

SPS. LEONARDO AND MILAGROS CHUA, Petitioners,vs.HON. JACINTO G. ANG, DENNIS R. PASTRANA, INTHEIR CAPACITIES AS CITY AND ASSISTANTPROSECUTOR OF PASIG, RESPECTIVELY, FERDINANDT. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN L. SOBREPEA, NOEL M.CARIO, ROBERTO S. ROCO, ALICE ODCHIQUE-BONDOC,*ROMULO T. SANTOS AND ENRIQUE A.SOBREPEA, JR., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J .:

Before us is the petition forcertiorari1]filed by the spousesLeonardo and Milagros Chua (petitioners) to assail the

Resolution dated November 4, 2002 of the City Prosecutorof Pasig in I.S. No. PSG 02-02-09150. The City ProsecutorsResolution dismissed the complaint filed by the petitionersagainst Ferdinand T. Santos, Robert John L. Sobrepea,Noel M. Cario, Roberto S. Roco, Alice Odchique-Bondoc,Romulo T. Santos and Enrique A. Sobrepea, Jr. (privaterespondents) for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and

Condominium Buyers Protective Decree."

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The antecedent facts, drawn from the records, are brieflysummarized below.
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On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed aContract To Sell2a condominium unit. Despite the lapse ofthree (3) years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver thecontracted condominium unit to the petitioners.

As a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 aComplaint-Affidavit3before the Office of the City Prosecutorof Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as officersand directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957, specificallyits Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39.4 These

provisions state:Sec. 17. Registration. - All contracts to sell, deeds of saleand other similar instruments relative to the sale orconveyance of the subdivision lots and condominium units,whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall beregistered by the seller in the Office of the Register ofDeeds of the province or city where the property is situated.

x x x

Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developershall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,infrastructures and other forms of development, includingwater supply and lighting facilities, which are offered andindicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans,brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in anyform of advertisement, within one year from the date of theissuance of the license for the subdivision or condominiumproject or such other period of time as may be fixed by the

Authority.
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x x x

Sec. 39. Penalties. - Any person who shall violate any of theprovisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that

may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, uponconviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twentythousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of notmore than ten years: Provided, That in the case ofcorporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, thePresident, Manager or Administrator or the person who hascharge of the administration of the business shall be

criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/orthe rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.[Emphasis supplied]

The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did notconstruct and failed to deliver the contracted condominiumunit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with theRegister of Deeds.

Of the seven (7) private respondents, only privaterespondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc filed a Counter-

Affidavit.5She countered that the City Prosecutor has nojurisdiction over the case since it falls under the exclusivejurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB).

On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R.Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (publicrespondents), respectively issued and approved theResolution6dismissing the complaint for being premature.The Resolution held that it is the HLURB that has exclusive
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jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business andpractices.

THE PETITION and THE PARTIES POSITIONS

On December 12, 2002, the petitioners filed the presentpetition7 anchored on the following ground:

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED MANIFESTERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION, WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S

COMPLAINANT (sic) ON THE GROUND THAT THEHLURB, NOT THEIR OFFICE HAS JURISDICTION TOCONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND FILETHE CORRESPONDING INFORMATION IN COURT FORCRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF P.D. No. 957.8

The petitioners argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminalcomplaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that the

jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. No. 957 is limited tothe enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigationof criminal complaints.

In their Comment,9the private respondents submit that thepetition should be dismissed outright because thepetitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided by law,such as (a) the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the

City Prosecutor of Pasig City, (b) the filing of a petition forreview with the Secretary of the Department of Justice(DOJ), (c) the filing of a motion for reconsideration of any

judgment rendered by the DOJ, or (d) the filing of an appealor a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals (CA);
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that even ifcertiorariis a proper remedy, the petition wasfiled in violation of the hierarchy of courts; and that even onthe merits, the petition must fail since the publicrespondents correctly dismissed the complaint as areasonable interpretation of P.D. No. 957 which requires aprior determination by the HLURB that a corporationviolated P.D. No. 957 before criminal charges may be filedagainst its corporate officers.

In their Reply, the petitioners reiterate that the publicrespondents abdicated their authority to conduct a

preliminary investigation and to indict the privaterespondents for criminal violations of P.D. No. 957 whenthey dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature.10

OUR RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

At the outset, we note that the petitioners indeed filed the

present petition forcertiorariwithout prior recourse to otheravailable remedies provided by law and the observance ofthe judicial hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the rules onprior recourse to these available remedies are not withoutexceptions, nor is the observance of the judicial hierarchy ofcourts an inflexible rule; the peculiarity, uniqueness andunusual character of the factual and circumstantial settingsof a case may allow the flexible application of theseestablished legal principles to achieve fair and speedydispensation of justice.

A prior motion for reconsideration is unnecessary: (a) wherethe order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no


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jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by thelower court, or are the same as those raised and passedupon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgentnecessity for the resolution of the question and any furtherdelay would prejudice the interests of the Government or ofthe petitioner; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motionfor reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitionerwas deprived of due process and there is an extremeurgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from anorder of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the

trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in thelower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) wherethe proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner hadno opportunity to object; or (i) where the issue raised is onepurely of law or where public interest is involved.11

On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrativeremedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be

validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violationof due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legalquestion; (c) when the administrative action is patentlyillegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) whenthere is estoppel on the part of the administrative agencyconcerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when therespondent is a department secretary whose acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumedapproval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion ofadministrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when itwould amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when thesubject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j)when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and


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adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstancesindicating the urgency of judicial intervention.12

On the non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of

courts, it must be remembered that this rule generallyapplies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations.Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannotbe brought immediately before us as we are not triers offacts.13A strict application of this rule may be excused whenthe reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in thepresent case, where the issues are not factual but purely

legal. In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimatesay so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we,because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose tohear and decide the legal issues outright.14

In the present petition forcertiorari, we find that there arefour (4) compelling reasons to allow the petitioners'invocation of our jurisdiction in the first instance, even

without prior recourse to a motion for reconsideration or tothe exhaustion of administrative remedies, and even indisregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

First, the petitioners raise a pure question of law involvingjurisdiction over criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No.957. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversyconcerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a

certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for anexamination of the probative value of the evidencepresented, the truth or falsehood of facts beingadmitted.15 As noted earlier, this Court is the undisputedfinal arbiter of all questions of law.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_156164_2009.html#fnt12


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Second, the present case requires prompt action becausepublic interest and welfare are involved in subdivision andcondominium development, as the terms of P.D. Nos. 957and 1344 expressly reflect.16 Questions of conflictingprocesses, essentially based on jurisdiction, will consistentlyrecur as peoples need for housing (and hence, subdivisionsand condominiums) escalate. Shelter is a basic human needwhose fulfillment cannot afford any kind of delay.17

Third, considering that this case has been pending fornearly seven (7) years (since the filing of the Complaint-

Affidavit on September 3, 2002) to the prejudice not only ofthe parties involved, but also of the subdivision andcondominium regulatory system and its need for the promptdetermination of controversies, the interests of justice nowdemand the direct resolution of the jurisdictional issue thisproceeding poses. As mentioned, at stake in this case isshelter a basic human need and to remand the case to theDOJ for a determination of the merits of the parties

jurisdictional tug-of-war would not serve any purpose otherthan to further delay its resolution.18Thus, the practicality ofthe situation and the need for the speedy administration of

justice justify a departure from the strict application ofprocedural rules. Besides, the issue before us presents nospecial difficulty, and we feel it should be decided now,without going through the procedural formalities that shallanyway end up with this Court.

Fourth, the petition is meritorious. The public respondentscommitted grave abuse of discretion in dismissing thecriminal complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on theground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.
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Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency mayexercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on theprovisions of the statute creating and defining the terms ofthe agencys mandate. P.D. No. 1344 clarifies and spells outthe quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction tothe HLURB in the following specific terms:19

SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the realestate trade and business and in addition to its powersprovided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the NationalHousing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear

and decide cases of the following nature:A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed bysubdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against theproject owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractualand statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivisionlots or condominium units against the owner,developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The extent of its quasi-judicial authority, on the other hand,is defined by the terms of P.D. No. 957 whose Section 3provides:

x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - TheNational Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdictionto regulate the real estate trade and business in accordancewith the provisions of this Decree.


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The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompassall questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. Theintention was to provide for an appropriate governmentagency, the HLURB, to which all parties buyers andsellers of subdivision and condominium units - may seekremedial recourse. The law recognized, too, that subdivisionand condominium development involves public interest andwelfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB,that has technical expertise.20 In the exercise of its powers,the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to interpretand apply contracts, and determine the rights of private

parties under these contracts. This ancillary power,generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts tothe extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.21

Viewed from this perspective, the HLURBs jurisdiction overcontractual rights and obligations of parties undersubdivision and condominium contracts comes out veryclearly. But hand in hand with this definition and grant of

authority is the provision on criminal penalties for violationsof the Decree, provided under the Decrees Section 39,heretofore quoted. Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authorityof the HLURB to impose administrative fines under Section38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing theSubdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.This Section of the Decree provides:

Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority mayprescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousandpesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any


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rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to theAuthority and enforceable through writs of execution inaccordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

The Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that "Theimplementation and payment of administrative fines shallnot preclude criminal prosecution of the offender underSection 39 of the Decree." Thus, the implementing rulesthemselves expressly acknowledge that two separateremedies with differing consequences may be sought underthe Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy and

criminal prosecution.Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law(and in this case no such provision applies), thedetermination of the criminal liability lies within the realm ofcriminal procedure as embodied in the Rules of Court.Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide that theprerogative to determine the existence or non-existence of

probable cause lies with the persons duly authorized by law;as provided in this Rule, they are (a) Provincial or CityProsecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of theMunicipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c)National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) otherofficers as may be authorized by law.

In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen

to pursue the criminal prosecution as their remedy but theprosecutor dismissed their complaint. The prosecutorsdismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that anadministrative finding of violation must first be obtainedbefore recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. Thisview is not without its model in other laws; one such law is in


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the prosecution of unfair labor practice under the LaborCode where no criminal prosecution for unfair labor practicecan be instituted without a final judgment in a previousadministrative proceeding.22The need for a finaladministrative determination in unfair labor practice cases,however, is a matter expressly required by law. Where thelaw is silent on this matter, as in this case, the fundamentalprinciple that administrative cases are independent fromcriminal actions23 fully applies, subject only to the rules onforum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules ofCourt.24In the present case, forum shopping is not even a

matter for consideration since the petitioners have chosen topursue only one remedy criminal prosecution. Thus, wesee no bar to their immediate recourse to criminalprosecution by filing the appropriate complaint before theprosecutors office.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the publicrespondent prosecutors should have made a determination

of probable cause in the complaint before them, instead ofsimply dismissing it for prematurity. Their failure to do soand the dismissal they ordered effectively constituted anevasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform aduty enjoined by law; they acted on the case in a manneroutside the contemplation of law. This is grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to a lack of or in excess of jurisdictionwarranting a reversal of the assailed resolution.25In theconcrete context of this case, the public prosecutorseffectively shied away from their duty to prosecute, acriminal violation of P.D. No. 957 as mandated by Section 5,Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No.


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5180,26as amended,27otherwise known as the Law onUniform Procedure of Preliminary Investigation.

As a final word, we stress that the immediate recourse to

this Courtthat this Decision allows should not serve as aprecedent in other cases where the prosecutor dismisses acriminal complaint, whether under P.D. No. 957 or any otherlaw. Recourse to (a) the filing a motion for reconsiderationwith the City or Provincial Prosecutor, (b) the filing a petitionfor review with the Secretary of the DOJ, (c) the filing amotion for reconsideration of any judgment rendered by the

DOJ, and (d) intermediate recourse to the CA, are remediesthat the dictates of orderly procedure and the hierarchy ofauthorities cannot dispense with. Only the extremelypeculiar circumstances of the present case compelled us torule as we did; thus our ruling in this regard is a rare onethat should be considered pro hac vice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and

accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolutiondated November 4, 2002 of the City Prosecutor of Pasig inI.S. No. PSG 02-02-09150. The complaint is hereby orderedreturned to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City forthe determination of probable cause and the filing of thenecessary information, if warranted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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