for the rest of the course… how do we explain democratic stability? why is democracy the “only...

For the rest of the course…

• How do we explain democratic stability? Why is democracy the “only game in town” in some countries but not others?

• Different answers:– Level of economic development – Culture– Institutions

And culture is?

• Political culture = the set of attitudes, beliefs, and norms held by a population toward politics.

And culture is?

• Attitudes = dispositions towards politics (political leaders, events, institutions, governments, policies, etc.).

– Examples: support for the government, tolerance for opposing view points, trust in political institutions, feelings of political efficacy and so on.

And culture is?

• Beliefs: cognitive ideas about cause and effect.

– Example: the “domino theory” in the 1950s.

And culture is?

• Norms: evaluative ideas about the world, judgments about good and bad.

– Example: “Democracy is good.”

Liberalism

• Liberalism arose in Western Europe response to feudalism, which was very hierarchical and involved very little social mobility.

• Feudalism = individuals at the mercy of the social hierarchy.

• Liberalism = individuals over social hierarchy.

Liberalism’s Key Norms

• The protection of individual rights from powerful groups and governments.

• Competition and disagreement versus harmony and consensus.

• Tolerance of dissent rather than unanimity.

• Egalitarianism over hierarchy.

• Society should have a separate, protected realm from the state.

Liberalism and democracy

• Historically, liberalism was a precedent to democracy in Western Europe and the US.

• This has lead some to see liberalism as a necessary condition for democracy.

• Why?

Liberalism and democracy

• Norms like egalitarianism and tolerance of dissent may improve the quality of competition.

• Emphasis on individual rights may make majority rule less frightening for minorities.

Huntington’s cultural argument

• Samuel Huntington: liberal norms are associated with some religions (Protestantism) but not others (Catholicism, Confucianism, Islam).

• No democracy where these “non-liberal” religions are found.

Huntington’s cultural argument

• Catholicism: hierarchical, emphasizes a single, collective good. Values harmony and consensus.

• Confucianism: authority, hierarchy, responsibility, harmony. Sees conflict as dangerous. Merges state and society.

• Islam: rejects separation of religion and state.

Huntington’s cultural argument: problems

• Religions and cultures are diverse and dynamic.

• All religions have aspects that conform with liberal norms and others that contradict them.

• Consensus building may be as important to democracy as competition.

• And the empirical record is bad!

Liberalism and Democracy

• Do we throw the baby out with the bathwater?

• Even if we do not buy Huntington, perhaps specific liberal norms – eg. tolerance – none-the-less matter for democratic consolidation?

Political Tolerance in Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and South Africa

Great Britain United States

Russia South Africa

Enemy should be allowed to hold a public rally

34 33 6 15

Enemy should be allowed to make a public speech

51 50 10 25

Liberalism and Democracy

• But what comes first, the chicken or the egg? Democracy or liberalism, liberalism or democracy? Can living in a healthy democracy teach people to be liberal?

• More generally: correlation is not the same as causation! Just because x and y are often found together, doesn’t mean x causes y. Maybe y causes x?

The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba

• Two components:– A participatory attitude toward politics.

Individuals value participation and become involved in their communities (not just their own narrow self interest). Communities therefore have a rich associational life.

– Trust in other people and a willingness to cooperate.


• In contrast to “Amoral Familism.”– All loyalty and trust is centered in the family.

– People are not public-spirited: they don’t participate in community life, are not informed about politics, etc.

– No trust of “outsiders,” no willingness to cooperate.

– Maximize material, short-run advantage of family.

– Communities lack much associational life.


• Hypothesis:

– Civic Culture => Stable Democracy

– Amoral Familism => Unstable Democracy


• Test: – Measure civic culture in 5 countries that vary

in their level of democratic stability– Prediction: Civic culture high in US and GB,

low in Mexico and Italy, moderate in Germany.

• Results: hypothesis confirmed!

• Conclusion: culture => democratic stability


• BUT: Couldn’t the relationship run the other way? Perhaps high levels of civic culture are an effect of stable institutions, not their cause!

• AND: Perhaps both cultural values and democratic stability are caused by something else, namely, economic development?

• In general: correlation is not the same as causation!!!

The Civic Culture revisited: Putnam’s Making Democracy Work

• Why does democracy work well in some places but not others?

• The Italian experiment: 15 identical regional governments situated in different economic and cultural contexts. Would they perform differently? If so, why?

The Civic Culture revisited: Putnam’s Making Democracy Work

• In fact: performance has been quite varied. Government in the north = good; government in the south = not so good.

• The institutions are the same but their performance varies. WHY?

Explanations for the difference between the North and the South?

• Explanation One: Economic development. The North is rich, the South is poor.

• Explanation Two: Culture. Civic culture in the North, amoral familism in the South.

• So which is it? And what causes what?

Explanations for the difference between the North and the South?

• Putnam: Culture.

• Why? Because the cultural differences observed in Northern Italy emerged first, before the economic differences, and long before the political ones.

The historical argument . . .

• Medieval Italy: a time of great violence and anarchy. Insecurity was a constant fact of life.– In the South: the solution was to strengthen

the power of the king, who could then secure the area. Cost: community autonomy.

– In the North: the solution was self-governance and mutual aid and defense.

The historical argument . . .

• These different solutions had a long-lasting impact on the cultural traditions of the areas. A rich associational life flourished in the North, atrophied in the South.

• Furthermore, these cultural traditions emerged well before economic differences became entrenched.

• Thus, culture preceded politics and economics.

Okay, so why?

• Rich associational life (“social capital”) => Solves collective action problems.

– Rich associational life means people interact repeatedly with one another, which helps them identify and punish free-riders.

– Rich associational life also promotes “norms of reciprocity.”

Questions and Problems

• Cooperation might be good or bad for democracy.

• Not all associational life is created equal. Associational life has a dark side too.

• Trust may not be all it’s cracked up to be. Liberalism: good government is founded on distrust!

Institutions

• Want stable democracy? Get the institutions right!

• Institutions: humanly devised constraints that shape and guide behavior. Can be informal or formal.

• Examples of political institutions: term limits, the Supreme Court, the House of Representatives, campaign finance laws, and so on.

Institutions

• Do institutions matter?

– Traditionally in Comparative Politics: NO. Institutions are subordinate to social, economic, and cultural forces.

– More recently: YES. Institutions do not simply reflect culture or economics, they actually shape outcomes.

Presidential Democracy

• Original presidential system: ours! But also very common in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. Not popular in Europe.

• Core element of presidential systems: separation of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. This does not imply that the branches are independent. Rather, it refers to their separate origin and separate survival.


• Separate origin: Both branches are elected separately, in different elections.

• Separate survival: Both branches are elected for a fixed term, neither can dismiss the other.

• Cabinet answers only to president.

• Personnel of each branch is non-overlapping.


• Implications:

– Divided government is possible.

– Power is fragmented.

Parliamentary Systems

• Original parliamentary system: Great Britain. Very common form of government in Western Europe, former British colonies.

• Core element: the executive and legislature are fused. Survival and origin of each branch are not separate.


• Origin not separate: – One popular election fills parliament (the

legislature), then cabinet (the executive) is selected from parliament. The executive is a subset of the legislature. Members of the cabinet are also members of parliament (MPs).

– Head of cabinet is the Prime Minister. PM is not directly elected.


• Survival not separate:

– Cabinet must “maintain the confidence” of parliament (sustain the support of a majority of MPs) or resign.

– Terms of office are not fixed, so cabinet can dissolve parliament and call new elections when it sees fit.

– Thus, the executive can dissolve the legislature and the legislature can axe the executive!


• Implications:

– Divided governments are constitutionally impossible.

– Power is concentrated: cabinets rule with the entire weight of parliament behind them.

Types of Parliamentary Systems

• Majority rule: one party has a majority in parliament, can form a cabinet and rule on its own. Power is highly concentrated. (Most common in two party systems). “Westminster” system after British, as it is very common there.


• If no party has a majority (more common in multiparty systems in Continental Europe):– Minority rule: a minority party forms a cabinet

and rules alone but depends on support from other parties in parliament to stay in office.

– Coalition government: formal agreement between multiple parties to form a cabinet and rule together.


• Rare events: – Minority coalition government (Netherlands)– No government! (Belgium, Greece)

• When no party wins a majority, can’t predict beforehand what will happen.

The Pres/Parl debate

• Do these differences matter?

• One argument: YES. Presidential democracies are less stable than parliamentary ones.

• The retort: NO. Both systems can be stable or unstable, depending on context. Furthermore, we can’t study them in isolation. They interact with the party system to shape outcomes.

The case against presidentialism

• Divided government => Deadlock => War between branches of government => Democratic breakdown.

– In contrast, in parliamentary systems, you can’t have divided government, so this never happens.


• Because of the fixed term of office, coups are the only way to get rid of a unpopular president.

– In contrast, in parliamentary systems, parliaments can remove unpopular cabinets at any time. This produces cabinet instability, but not democratic instability.


• Presidentialism is “winner takes all.” The office of the president can’t be shared. The winner gets all of it. The loser gets nothing. Loser gets mad: has a coup!


• And the winner gets to rule however he wants – even if he won by a small margin, and even if he won less than a majority.

– In contrast, coalition governments in parliamentary systems are more inclusive and force parties to work together.

The counter-argument

• Presidential systems have better “identifiability,” i.e the link between voting and government formation is more transparent.

– Presidential systems: very transparent. The candidate with the most votes wins.

– Parliamentary systems: when there is no majority, government formation is a result of bargains between parties, not just voting. So transparency is lower.

A hypothetical election result . . .

• An election is held and five parties win seats:– The Greens: 45% of the seats– The Reds: 30% of the seats– The Blues: 15% of the seats– The Purples: 10% of the seats

• What coalition forms?


• Lower identifiability => Voters peripheral?

• Lower identifiability => Less accountability

– Accountability: degree to which elected leaders rule in the interests of the electorate. The threat of losing an election is said to promote accountability.

– However, if there is a coalition in power:• How do you vote it out if you didn’t vote it in in the first place?• If things are going badly, who do you blame?


• Presidential systems are not necessarily more “winner-takes-all.”

– Presidential branch might be this way, but the system as a whole splits and divides power.

– Furthermore, parliamentary government can be extremely winner-takes-all, i.e. under majority rule.


• Cabinets can be highly unstable in parliamentary systems, especially when there is no majority. Not the same as democratic instability, but can still be problematic!


• The performance of each of these systems depends the party system.

• Parliamentary systems:– Majority rule: stable, high identifiability, winner-takes-

all. Most likely with 2 parties.

– Coalition government: unstable, low identifiability, inclusive. Most likely with >2 parties.


• Presidential systems:– Divided government is most severe when the

President’s party is weak in the legislature – This is most likely when many small parties split the

vote.

• Thus, we can’t consider presidential and parliamentary systems in isolation. We also have to look at their interaction with the party system.

The severity of divided government

• Thought experiment: you are a president and you have a set of policies you want to pass. To pass your policies, you need majority support in the legislature (51 out of 100 legislators).

• Scenario 1: your party controls 20 seats. You need to find 31 more. Hard!

• Scenario 2: your party controls 49 seats. You need to find 2 more. Not as hard!

What about the empirical record?

• Most stable democracies since WWII have been parliamentary, not presidential.

• Coups are much more common in presidential systems.

• Amongst new democracies, countries with parliamentary systems have been more likely to stay democratic.

What about the empirical record?

• BUT, correlation is not the same as causation! – Most parliamentary systems are located in Western

Europe. Most presidential systems are located in Latin America and Africa.

– Western Europe is rich, LA and Africa are poor.– Democracy is established in Western Europe, but not

in LA and Africa.

• Thus, correlation between democratic stability and parliamentary government may simply reflect the European context of these institutions.

Conclusions

• First, prior to debating which institution is best, we must first deal with the more fundamental question: “when are institutions complied with in the first place?”

• Second, assuming we can solve this initial problem, then the effects of institutions may indeed be profound.

• However, the effect of these institutions cannot be considered in isolation. We have to look at how they interact with other factors, namely, other institutions.

Parties!

• What affects the number of parties in the party system? Why do some countries have lots of parties while others have few?

• Do the sources of variation lie in society or in institutional factors like electoral rules?

Why do parties matter?

• They help politicians act collectively in government to produce legislation.

• They help mobilize people into politics, especially people who might otherwise not participate.

• They help voters resolve uncertainty about electoral options.

Why do parties matter?

• They aggregate diverse interests and identities into a single, cohesive political front.

• They help voters hold politicians accountable for their behavior in government.

• They improve the quality of leaders.

Explaining the number of parties

• Explanation One: Society. Societies that are more diverse and have more social divisions are likely to have more parties.

• Why?

– People in the same group have common interests and vote in a similar fashion. May demand a party to “represent” them.

– Parties play to divisions that have social meaning.


• BUT: In most countries, there are far more divisions in society than there are parties. Not all divisions get translated into the party system.

• Our explanation for party systems therefore must go beyond social diversity.


• Explanation Two: Institutions. The rules of the electoral system profoundly shape party systems.

• Electoral system: the set of rules governing how votes get converted into an allocation of political offices.

• Electoral system has two parts: electoral formula and district magnitude.


• Districts: geographic units that elect members to the legislature.

• For example: Britain has 650 parliamentary districts, the US has 435 congressional districts, Ghana has 230, etc.


• District magnitude: the number of seats up for grabs in a particular district.

– Single member districts: one seat up for grabs. US, UK, Canada, India, most of Africa.

– Multi-member districts: multiple seats up for grabs. Continental Europe, most of Latin America, South Africa.


• The more districts there are in a country, the lower the average district magnitude.

• For example, if a country has a legislature with 400 seats, this can be 400 single member districts, or 40 districts each with 10 seats, or 1 district with 400 seats.


• Multi-member district (extreme) example: South Africa, where there is only one district and it is the whole country. All seats in parliament are elected in that one district, so district magnitude is 400!


• Electoral formula: how votes in a district get translated into seats for the district.– Majoritarian: the party winning the majority of votes

wins all the seats up for grabs in a particular district.

– Plurality: the party winning the most votes wins all the seats up for grabs in a particular district.

– Proportional representation: seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes won.


• Most countries have one of two combinations: – Plurality rule plus single member districts, or SMP.– PR plus multi-member districts.

• PR systems can be closed list or open list. In closed list, voters have no say over the order in which candidates from the list get seats. In open list, they do.


• Duverger’s Law: SMP systems tend to produce two parties. Duverger’s Hypothesis: PR systems tend to produce more than two parties.

• The generalization of DL is Cox’s M+1 Rule: the number of parties in a district will be bounded by the number of seats up for grabs in that district (plus one).– M = 1, then at most 2 parties– M = 4, then at most 5 parties– M = 400, then at most 401 parties


• Empirically, Duverger’s Law is well established. SMP rules tend to produce fewer parties than PR rules.– Israel: M = 120. Lots of parties.– US/UK: M = 1. Mostly 2 parties.– New Zealand: changed from SMP to more

proportional system, average number of parties went from 2.5 to 7.

• How do we explain the correlation?


• Two components: one mechanical, one psychological.

• The mechanical component: SMP rules are tough on small parties, especially those with dispersed support. A party can win lots of votes yet fail to win seats if its votes are not geographically concentrated.


• Hypothetical example: A country with three parties (X,Y,Z) and 3 districts.

– District 1: X wins 60%, Y wins 10%, Z wins 30%. X WINS SEAT.

– District 2: X wins 10%, Y wins 60%, Z wins 30%. Y WINS SEAT.

– District 3: X wins 51%, Y wins 1%, Z wins 48%. X WINS SEAT.

• Overall, Z wins NO SEATS, even though it won at least 30% of the vote. OUCH!


• Psychological effect: The psychological effect exacerbates the mechanical effect of SMP rules. It kicks in when voters abandon parties they think will be disadvantaged.

• This implies strategic voting (voting for your favorite from amongst the set you think has a chance of winning) versus sincere voting (voting for your absolute favorite).


• An example: There are 3 candidates (X,Y,Z) running for a single seat. Your preference ordering is: Z>X>Y. But you believe that Z has no chance of winning the election. The real race is between X and Y. What do you do?

• Sincere voter: you vote for Z.

• Strategic voter: you vote for X, because it is the lesser of two evils.


• Thus, SMP rules tend to produce 2 parties because of the double whammy of the mechanical and psychological effects.

• In contrast, PR allows a large number of parties to win seats. Consequently, voters are less concerned about wasting votes. PR systems are therefore associated with a proliferation of parties.

So what?

• More parties => fragmentation, no majority party.

– In parliamentary systems, this forces coalitions or minority governments. Good because inclusive, bad because of identifiability/accountability and instability concerns.

– In presidential systems, this can created severe divided government and deadlock, which can be bad.

So What?

• More parties => More choice, “better” representation. Representation: the degree to which the party system reflects and responds to voter interests and preferences.

• Two party system leaves some interests unrepresented, may increase inclination to express preferences in other ways.

So what?

• Two parties => less polarized, more moderate.

– Polarization: ideological divergence between parties. Example: Weimar Germany.

– Too much polarization: winning or losing elections assumes a “life or death” significance. This can be destabilizing because people will do anything do avoid losing.

So what?

• The Median Voter Theorem: In a two party system, both parties have strong incentives to compete for the median voter. Thus, political competition produces moderation, even if the electorate itself is polarized.

• In contrast, there are no such incentives in multiparty systems. Any polarization in the electorate gets translated into the party system.

So what?

• So, the number of parties influences fractionalization, representation, and polarization. All of these things in turn may relate to stability. Hence, electoral rules, through their effect on the number of parties, can have a potent impact on democracy.

Limitations to Institutional Theories

• The same rules can produce very different outcomes! Example: the Netherlands and Israel. Very similar rules, both have large party systems (as Duverger’s Law would predict), but Israel’s is almost twice the size of the Netherlands.


• Other aspects of the party system might matter at least as much or more than the number of parties, and yet these are not explained by electoral rules.

• Example: Volatility of support– Too low: no accountability, permanent losers.– Too high: governability problems, short time

horizons of leaders.


• How much do the rules explain about voting in South Africa?

– Electoral system: single electoral district, M=400. Very proportional. Could support a huge number of parties, so why are there only 7?

– Why does the ANC always win 2/3’s of the vote? Why so skewed? Why so stable? Not a function of the electoral rules.

– To understand these outcomes, probably also need to look at society, in particular, significance of race to voting.

Conclusion

• It is the interaction between institutions and social context that ultimately shapes outcomes. We need to understand both.

Review Session and Exam

• Review Session: 6/12/12, Tuesday night, 6:30 – 7:50pm, HSS 1330.

• Exam: 6/13/12, Wednesday Morning, 8-11. Location?

• IDs and 2 essays. More on material since midterm, but everything is fair game.

• Bring TWO bluebooks, do not write in them.

General Background: 1919-1933

• Weimar was born in 1919, following the defeat of Germany in WWI.

• At the time, Germany was relatively economically developed. – 19th Century: rapid industrialization– Urban, educated population


• However, Germany never-the-less faced large challenges . . .

• Economic challenges:– Reparation payments strained the economy

– Inflation raged: In 1923, it reached 26 billion percent (!?)


• Social/cultural challenges:

– People were not convinced of democracy’s value. Liberal norms were not fully established in the population.

– Public opinion was polarized between the extreme right and the extreme left.

• Add to this: institutional (state level) challenges.


• System was neither presidential nor parliamentary, but an awkward combination of both.

– Both president and parliament (Reichstag) were elected by popular election.

– President selected cabinet, which came from parliament and was headed by PM (Chancellor).

– Both parliament and president could dismiss Cabinet. President could dismiss Parliament.

– Chronic and intense conflict between branches. Frequent elections.


• The party system was based on PR rules and was highly fragmented.

– Coalition governments were the norm. They were highly unstable.

– The power of small parties was magnified.

– No incentive to compete for the median voter, so the party system reflected the underlying polarization of preferences in society.


• Given economic, socio-cultural, and institutional factors, it is not surprising that politics were highly conflictual.

– November 1923: Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch. Easily contained, but speaks to general instability.


• Beginning around 1925, Weimar stabilized. “Golden era.”

– Economy improved

– Political tensions eased

– Institutional instability persisted, but it was less threatening.


• Late 1920s: economic crisis returns.

– 1929: Wall Street crashes.

– German unemployment escalates: terrifies German middles class, who fear the rise of Communism.


• The rise of Hitler and the Nazis

– Ideological appeals: Hitler portrayed himself as the one who could stop Germany’s economic and political decline.

– Nazis were incredibly organized on the ground.

– Nazis: 2% of the vote in 1928, 18% of the vote in 1930. 18% of the vote was enough to be a power broker in fractionalized party system.


• Institutional problems came into full flower:

– No stable coalition in parliament. Open conflict between executive and legislature. President began issuing laws “over the head” of the Reichstag.

– In 1932, Paul Von Hindenberg beats Hitler and wins re-election to presidency. To stave off conflict, he appoints Hitler as chancellor in January 1933. Once in power, Hitler moves to shut down democracy.

The Rise of the Nazis in Northeim

• The Nazis exploited class tensions. Democracy resulted in the rise of the Social Democratic Party, which the middle class hated. The Nazis portrayed themselves as the opposition to the SPD.

• The middle class had luke warm feelings about democracy to begin with.

• The Nazis were extremely organized on the grass-roots level.


• Class tensions and organizations were not alone sufficient: up until 1929, the Nazis were very small.

• What pushed the middle class into the arms of the Nazis? Economic crisis. By 1932, the party had a majority in Northeim.


• NOT a lack of social capital or civic culture

– 161 clubs in Northeim, 1 for every 60 people.

– Highly participatory population: turnout rates in elections ranged from 94 to 97 percent.

Implications for theories?

• Cultural factors

– Putnam’s social capital argument is challenged. Not only did social capital not prevent the rise of Hitler, it may have actually facilitated it.

– Perhaps it’s not the level of social capital, but the type. Bridging social capital may be key.

– Liberal norms were not fully entrenched in the population – this may also have been important.


• Political factors

– Entrepreneurial skills of the Nazis, the charisma of Hitler => probably important.

– Weimar’s institutions amplified and exacerbated social tensions, rather than helping to manage them.


• Economic factors

– When the economy was good, Weimar functioned in spite of its tensions.

– When the economy was bad (Great Depression), the tensions proved impossible to manage.

– So, not economic development in this case, but economic crisis very important.

Overview: Explaining Democratic Instability

• Cultural Explanations– Liberalism– Civic Culture– More generally, a wide-spread acceptance of democracy as the

“real” rules of the political game.

• Institutional Explanations– Pres/Parl debate– Party systems

• Economic Explanations– Modernization theory– Economic Crisis

for the rest of the course… how do we explain democratic stability? why is democracy the “only...

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