fpif task force on terrorism a secure america in a secure ... · p. 2 a think tank without walls...

FPIF Task Force on Terrorism

Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF)w w w. f p i f . o r g

TTask Force Membersask Force Members

Robert Alvarez · Salih Booker

Elsbeth L. Bothe · John Cavanagh

Marcus Corbin · David Cortright

Kristen Dawkins · Lloyd J. Dumas

Rev. Dr. Robert W. Edgar

John Feffer · Van Gosse

William D. Hartung

Colleen Kelly · Michael Klare

Lawrence J. Korb · Jules Lobel

Robert K. Musil, PhD, M.P.H.

Col. Dan Smith (Ret.) · Joe Stork

Joe Volk · Bruce Zagaris

John Zavales · Stephen Zunes

A Secure America in a Secure WorldPrincipal Author: John Gershman

Foreign Policy In Focus, established in 1996, is a “think tank without walls” thatfunctions as an international network of more than 650 policy analysts andadvocates. A joint project of the Institute for Policy Studies and theInterhemispheric Resource Center, its mission is to make the U.S. a moreresponsible global leader and global partner, with a special emphasis on provid-

ing resources to ground and inform social movements. Through its extensive publications, media outreach, organiz-ing events, and congressional work, the project has, since its inception, worked to make a wider space for progres-sive voices in foreign policy debates on a wide variety of topics—from the war in Iraq, to the spread of economicglobalization, to the militarization of Latin America policy, to the threats of global environmental degradation.

FOREIGN POLICY

IN F CUS

Cover Design: Tonya Cannariato, Interhemispheric Resource Center, IRC

© 2004 by Foreign Policy In Focus / Interhemispheric Resource Center

All rights reserved. This publication is a creative work and fully protected by all applicable laws, as well as by mis-appropriation, trade secret, unfair competition, and other applicable laws. No part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means electronic, mechanical, photo-copied, recorded, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the author.

Cost: $10.00

TTAABBLLEE OOFF CCOONNTTEENNTTSS

I. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A New Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A. Strengthen Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home and Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4D. Attack Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Changing Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

III. A Failed Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8A. Overemphasis on Military Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10C. Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10D. Undermining Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11E. Weakening International Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11F. Failure to Attack Root Causes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

IV. A New Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13A. Strengthen Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1. Improve Intelligence Gathering and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162. Strengthen Border Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173. Protect Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184. Support Emergency Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245. Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Home and Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31D. Attack Root Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

1. Strengthen and Democratize International Bodies for Effective Global Governance: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332. End Support for Repressive Regimes: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333. Deal with Failed States: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344. Reorient U.S. Policy in the Middle East and Central Asia: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355. Address Poverty and Inequality: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366. Promote Clean Energy:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

V. Changing Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

App. 1: Funding for Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

App. 2: Major U.N. Conventions Against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

App. 3: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Terrorism Post-September 11, 2001. . . . . . . . 47

Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

p. i www.fpif.orgA Think Tank Without Walls

p. 1www.fpif.orgA Think Tank Without Walls

The Bush administration’s “war on terrorism”reflects a major failure of leadership and makesAmericans more vulnerable rather than more secure.The administration has chosen a path to combat ter-rorism that has weakened multilateral institutionsand squandered international goodwill. Not only hasBush failed to support effective reconstruction inAfghanistan, but his war and occupation in Iraq havemade the United States more vulnerable and haveopened a new front and a recruiting tool for terroristswhile diverting resources from essential homelandsecurity efforts. In short, Washington’s approach tohomeland security fails to address key vulnerabilities,undermines civil liberties, and misallocates resources.

The administration has taken some successful stepsto counter terrorism, such as improved airline andborder security, a partial crackdown on terroristfinancing, improved international cooperation insharing intelligence, the arrest of several high-level al-Qaida figures, and the disruption of a number ofplanned attacks. But these successes are overwhelmedby policy choices that have made U.S. citizens morerather than less vulnerable. The Bush White Househas undermined the very values it claims to bedefending at home and abroad—democracy andhuman rights; both Washington’s credibility and itsefforts to combat terrorism are hampered when itaids repressive regimes. Furthermore, the administra-tion has weakened the international legal frameworkessential to creating a global effort to counter terror-ism, and it has failed to address the political con-texts—failed states and repressive regimes—thatenable and facilitate terrorism.

Six factors explain the failure of the Bush adminis-tration’s approach:

A. Overemphasis on Military Responses: The Bushadministration has used everyone’s legitimate con-cerns about terrorism to justify a massive increasein military spending that has little or nothing todo with combating terrorism. According to theCenter for Defense Information, only about one-third of the increase in the FY2003 Pentagon

budget over pre-Sept. 11 budgets funds programsand activities closely related to homeland securityor counterterrorism operations. In addition, byenshrining preventive war in the national securitystrategy both as a general policy doctrine and forcountering terrorism in particular, the administra-tion has further reduced everyone’s security.

B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing: The White Househas failed to develop better mechanisms to sharecritical information both among intelligence agenciesand between federal and local agencies. The recent-ly created Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center isunaccountable to Congress and fails to place thecoordination of intelligence gathering in the handsof those who must act on the findings.

C.Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties: TheBush administration has undermined democracyat home through increased government secrecy.On the civil liberties front, the USA PATRIOTAct imposes guilt by association on immigrants,expands the government’s authority to conductcriminal searches and wiretaps, and underminesfundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill ofRights—none of which have proved necessary oreffective in tracking down terrorists.

D.Undermining Homeland Security: Bush’s approachto homeland security has two key flaws. First, hisadministration has been far too laissez-faire in itsapproach to ensuring the security of the 85 per-cent of the nation’s critical infrastructure owned orcontrolled by the private sector. Second, it hasfailed to meet the basic needs of emergencyresponders, has underfunded key national agencieslike the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customsand Border Protection, and has created newunfunded mandates for local governments, forcingthem to transfer scarce funds from social servicesand public safety to homeland security tasks.

E. Weakening International Institutions: The Bushadministration has been hostile to a whole set ofmultilateral institutions that are central to enhanc-ing international law and security, from the

II.. EExxeeccuuttiivvee SSuummmmaarryy

p. 2 www.fpif.orgA Think Tank Without Walls

International Criminal Court to nearly all multi-lateral arms control and disarmament efforts,including the Biological and Chemical WeaponsConventions, the ABM Treaty, and theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

F. Failure to Attack Root Causes: The Bush WhiteHouse has failed to addressthe root causes of interna-tional terrorism and thesocial and political con-texts in which such terror-ism thrives, includingrepressive regimes, failedstates, and the way inwhich poverty andinequality can create con-ditions of support for ter-rorist acts. Addressing the basic causes and condi-tions that facilitate terrorism in no way impliesappeasement. Rather, it reflects both a pragmaticcommitment to diffuse terrorism’s political rootsand a normative commitment to respect the valuesthe United States preaches. Yet, heedless to thetime bomb of widening global wealth disparity,the Bush administration has taken advantage ofthe crisis surrounding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacksto justify its pursuit of an expanded trade andinvestment liberalization agenda. This agenda failsto address the central challenges of reducingpoverty and inequality and of promoting sustain-able growth in developing countries.

A New Framework

A different approach would not fight a “war on ter-rorism.” Rather, it would treat terrorism as an ongo-ing threat that needs to be tackled through a strong,coordinated strategy focused on strengthening civilianpublic sectors and enhancing the international coop-eration necessary to prevent and respond to terroristattacks. Although the military has a clear role to play,it is a supporting actor in the fight against terrorismand Washington must restructure the military inways that enhance its capacities to respond to thethreat posed by international terrorism. The safetychallenge of terrorism exposes the weakness ofWashington’s conventional ideas of national security

and the folly of traditional responses—typically mili-tary—to threats against U.S. citizens.

America needs a new agenda for combating terrorism,one that secures citizens against attacks and that situates the use of force within an international legaland policy framework. This agenda must bring interna-

tional terrorists to justice,debilitate their capacity towage terrorism, and under-mine the political credibilityof terrorist networks byaddressing related politicalgrievances and injustices.Below, we outline a four-partframework for a new agendato counter terrorism.

A. Strengthen Homeland Security

To do this, the emphasis needs to be on preventingterrorist attacks and mitigating the effects of terroristviolence. Specific initiatives should:

Improve Intelligence Gathering and Oversight: Thecoordination of intelligence gathering related todomestic security should be based within theDepartment of Homeland Security, since this isthe agency responsible for acting on the informa-tion. The CIA—current home of the TerroristThreat Intelligence Center—has proven unable tocoordinate well with other intelligence agencies.The key issue facing the improvement of domesticcounterterrorism intelligence capabilities does notinvolve a choice of organizational form (i.e.,boosting the FBI’s capabilities or creating a newdomestic intelligence body) but rather an effort toreinstate civil liberties and reinforce judicial andcongressional oversight of intelligence operations.

Strengthen Border Security: Adequately fund key bor-der security programs and agencies such as theContainer Security Initiative, the Coast Guard,and the Bureau of Customs and BorderProtection.

Protect Critical Infrastructure: It is essential that gov-ernment step up security for critical infrastructure,especially regarding:

The 9/11 Commission recommendations,while important, remain inadequate

to forging the comprehensive strategy necessary to effectively combat terrorism.


• Nuclear Power Plants: Spent reactor fuel poolsat U.S. commercial nuclear power plants rep-resent potentially the most consequential vul-nerability to terrorist attacks. The mostimportant step that can be taken to signifi-cantly reduce this vulnerability is to learnfrom several European nations that haveplaced all spent fuel older than five years intothick-walled, dry storage modes.

• The Chemical Industry: The Department ofHomeland Security needs to establish andenforce minimum requirements for theimprovement of security and the reduction ofpotential hazards at chemical plants and otherindustrial facilities that store large quantitiesof hazardous materials.

• Food and Agriculture Safety: There is a needfor a comprehensive national plan both todefend against the intentional introduction ofbiological agents in an act of terror and tocreate a network of laboratories to coordinatethe detection of bioterror agents in the eventof an attack.

• Information Technology: There are numerousserious proposals to better secure informationtechnology in virtually all of the nation’s criti-cal infrastructure, from the air-traffic-controlsystem to aircraft themselves, from the elec-tric-power grid to financial and banking sys-tems, and from the Internet to communica-tion systems.

Support Emergency Responders: In addition to improv-ing emergency preparedness plans, the administra-tion needs to provide training, equipment, andincreased support to all levels of government tostrengthen emergency response capabilities by fire,police, and rescue departments as well as publichealth systems, all of which will be frontline emer-gency responders in case of a terrorist attack.

Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons: To preventterrorists from obtaining conventional or otherweapons of mass destruction, specific initiativesshould:

Strengthen International Conventions: There is aneed to fortify the conventions for the con-

trol, nonproliferation, and elimination ofweapons of mass destruction and their deliv-ery systems.

End the National Missile Defense Program (alsoknown as “Star Wars”): The Sept. 11 attackshighlight how imminent security threats areposed not from missiles but from other typesof delivery systems. Combined with concernsabout the destabilizing effects of the missiledefense system and the false promise of secu-rity it offers, the United States should endefforts to build a National Missile Defensesystem and redirect those monies toward armscontrol and disarmament efforts.

Control Weapons in Russia: There is a need forincreased funding for the Defense ThreatReduction Agency and other efforts to moni-tor and control weapons material in Russiaand the former Soviet Union.

B. Strengthen International and National LegalSystems to Hold Terrorists Accountable

An effective response to terrorism requires bolster-ing the national and international legal infrastructurenecessary to identify and prosecute the individualsand organizations that facilitate, finance, perpetrate,and profit from terrorism.

Specific initiatives should:

Expand international police cooperation;

Adopt the Princeton Principles on UniversalJurisdiction for prosecutions of crimes againsthumanity;

Strengthen the institutions of international law bysupporting the creation of a specialized tribunalfor judging international terrorists; and,

Provide technical assistance to countries to imple-ment all the recommendations of the FinancialAction Task Force with respect to money launder-ing and terrorist financing.

In those instances where military force is necessaryto combat nonstate actors like al-Qaida, workingthrough international institutions is justified on bothnormative and pragmatic grounds. The use of force


should require specific authorization from the UnitedNations Security Council that includes specific goalsand a time line, and military operations wouldpreferably be under U.N. control. In any event, theexercise of such force should adhere to internationalhumanitarian law and the principles of the “just war”tradition.

C. Defend and Promote Democracy at Homeand Abroad

Antiterrorist efforts should not sacrifice the veryvalues that Americans are trying to defend.Washington must listen closely to the mounting con-cerns of civil libertarians and constitutional rightsgroups who caution that the new counterterrorismcampaign may lead to a garrison state that under-mines all that America stands for while doing little toprotect citizens against unconventional threats. TheUSA PATRIOT Act is perhaps the greatest threat tocivil liberties in the country today, and we applaudthe numerous states, cities, towns, and counties thathave passed resolutions demanding that local lawenforcement not implement the provisions of thoseregulations that infringe on basic rights.

In forging international coalitions against terrorism,the administration should strengthen restrictions onthe provision of military aid, weapons, and trainingto regimes that systematically violate human rights.Proactively, the White House and Congress shouldmore rigorously condition such programs on adher-ence to internationally recognized human rights stan-dards. In addition, the United States should supportefforts to strengthen international legal and humanrights norms, conventions, and organizations andshould evaluate its own foreign policies in light ofthose norms.

D. Attack Root Causes

Combating terrorism requires looking beyond anyone terrorist event—horrific as it may be—to addressthe broader socioeconomic, political, and militarycontexts from which international terrorism emerges.Because terrorism is a particular kind of violent actaimed at achieving a political objective, a preventivestrategy must address its political roots.

U.S. policy must recognize a distinction betweeninternational terrorism in general and the specificthreat posed by al-Qaida and other extremist Islamistmovements, so as not to be perceived as waging a waron Islam. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example,is careful to make such a distinction. This requiresthat U.S. policymakers learn to distinguish betweenillegitimate demands and legitimate demands pursuedthrough illegitimate means. The anti-democratic andjihadist character of al-Qaida’s ideology suggests thateven if the United States were to pursue the kinds ofalternative policies outlined here, Americans wouldstill be the target of attacks by committed membersof al-Qaida and similar groups. Addressing root caus-es is one way of insuring that terrorist group effortsto mobilize support meet as inhospitable a social,economic, and political climate as possible.

The success of these policies will only be fully realizedwhen there are no more breeding grounds for terror-ist politics. These political contexts include: repressivepolitical regimes, which spawn terrorism; failed andfailing states, which can provide terrorists with arenasfor operations; poverty and inequality, which canenhance support for terrorist acts and provide asource of recruits, even though poverty itself does notcause terrorism; and efforts by the United States toinstitutionalize its positions of global dominance,including through alliances with repressive regimes.


Strengthen and Democratize International Bodies forEffective Global Governance: By proclaiming globaldominance as its overarching strategic objective,the United States has made itself a target. Bush’spursuit of the preventive war doctrine as the foun-dation of such dominance—embodied in theinvasion and occupation of Iraq—can be used tojustify the argument that the current “war on ter-rorism” is in fact a war on Islam. AndWashington’s current foreign policy has furtherreinforced the beliefs of those who argue that theUnited States is an imperial power intent on hold-ing itself above the law.

In addition to strengthening the U.N. and othermultilateral institutions, the United States mustreconfigure its approach to security. We suggest a


dual focus: on the cooperative arrangements nec-essary to insure our protection in an era of inter-national terrorist networks with global reach, andon deterrence against possible threats from stateantagonists. Such efforts require a vibrant networkof global, regional, and bilateral alliances wherebythe security of the world strengthens the securityof America.

End Support for Repressive Regimes: The United Statesmust, in both word and deed, make a clean breakwith its history of support for repressive regimesthroughout the world. Such a move would entailcurbing military aid, expanding human rights anddemocracy, and reducing the dependence of theUnited States and its allies on oil imports fromrepressive regimes. Additional steps would include:(1) withholding military aid and opposingweapons sales to countries that systematically vio-late basic human rights, and (2) increasing sup-port for human rights and democracy in NorthAfrica, the Middle East, Central Asia, SoutheastAsia, Colombia, and elsewhere through bilateraland multilateral initiatives.

Deal with Failed States: The Afghanistan situation,and the broader reality that weak and failing statescan provide enabling conditions for the operationsof terrorist networks, has highlighted the need forincreasing the U.N.’s capacity to engage in peaceenforcement, peacekeeping, and other “nation-building” activities.

Reorient U.S Policy in the Middle East and CentralAsia: A broader U.S. policy along the lines ofrespecting basic human rights and democraticfreedoms in the Middle East and elsewhere couldstill contribute to easing—though not eradicat-ing—the conditions associated with terrorism.Such efforts would involve eliminating weapons ofmass destruction and addressing the politicalgrievances behind continuing unrest in the region.This includes opposing the bigotry embodied inboth al-Qaida’s and other extremist groups’ oppo-sition to Israel’s existence. The United Statesshould continue its strategic and moral commit-ment to Israeli sovereignty, but there is a distinc-tion between Israel’s right to exist and support forthe occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.

Washington’s tacit approval of the occupationplays a major role in fueling anti-Americanextremism, sentiments that al-Qaida has oppor-tunistically used to its own advantage. Specific ini-tiatives should:

End U.S. financial and military backing for theIsraeli occupation of the West Bank andGaza;

Advocate Palestinian self-determination and anegotiated settlement as outlined in U.N.Security Council resolutions;

Promote efforts to create a zone free fromweapons of mass destruction in the MiddleEast;

Strengthen the multilateral forces involved inAfghanistan to provide the security necessaryfor reconstruction and development; and

Set an immediate timetable for the withdrawalof U.S. troops from Iraq and channel supportprimarily through the United Nations to pro-mote reconstruction and development.

Address Poverty and Inequality: An expansion ofbroad-based development can, under certain con-ditions, weaken local support for terrorist activitiesand discourage terrorist recruits. Since approval ofsome organizations engaged in terrorist acts is duein part to the social services and financial incen-tives that those organizations provide, an expan-sion of economic opportunities can decrease directparticipation in those organizations or dampenenthusiasm for their activities.

Development policies that weaken states’ capaci-ties to insure access to, or provision of, basic serv-ices can create conditions in which terroristgroups can more easily mobilize support. At theglobal level, the Bush administration should endits promotion of trade and investment agreementsthat reinforce the discredited policies of theWashington Consensus. Instead, the United Statesshould reorient discussions at bilateral, regional,and global economic organizations and meetingstoward creating a multilateral framework moreconducive to the development of poor countries.Washington should also reduce the debt owed toit by developing countries, champion debt reduc-


tion efforts at the international financial institu-tions, and seek an end to structural adjustmentlending by the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund.

Promote Clean Energy: The United States should pur-sue an energy policy at home and abroad thatemphasizes conservation, energy efficiency, andrenewables and that makes itself and its allies lessreliant on imported oil supplies.

Changing Course

No single component of this framework is an ade-quate response to terrorism. Only by joining all fourstrategies—pursuing prevention and preparedness,strengthening the international framework for multi-lateral action, defending and promoting civil rights,and addressing root causes—will the U.S. govern-ment be able to truthfully tell the American peoplethat it is doing all that it can to prevent future terror-ist attacks. Our proposed security strategy would bemore effective at making the U.S. a safer place for allits citizens. It would also have the added advantages

of improving the nation’s quality of life by improvingpublic safety, health care, and air quality.

The 9/11 Commission has accomplished a greatdeal by placing this debate at the forefront of policydebates. But its recommendations focus somewhatnarrowly on intelligence operations and congressionaloversight without addressing the broader foreign poli-cy, military, and homeland security issues that areequally important to constructing an effectiveresponse to terrorism. Its contribution, while impor-tant, remains inadequate to forging the comprehen-sive strategy necessary to effectively combat terrorism.

The challenge is to construct a national securitypolicy that demonstrates America’s new commitmentto protecting U.S. citizens by incorporating effectivecounterterror measures into the national securitystrategy. At the same time, American citizens mustdemand and U.S. foreign policy must assert arenewed commitment to constructing an internation-al framework of peace, justice, and security that locksterrorists out in the cold—with no home, no sup-porters, no money, and no rallying cry. With thatresponse, the events of September 11, 2001, willindeed have changed America and the world.


Everything changed on September 11, 2001, andthe United States will never be the same. This con-ventional wisdom has become a mantra, repeatedover and over again by the media, and it continues toecho throughout America. The immediate aftermathof Sept. 11 offered the United States and the Bushadministration a fateful choice. The Bush administra-tion could have chosen a path to respond to terror-ism that built upon a renewed sentiment of interestin foreign policy, diplomacy, and international affairson the part of U.S. citizens and that leveraged thespirit of international solidarity and goodwill towardAmericans that emerged in the immediate aftermath

of the attacks, represented most dramatically in thefamous Le Monde headline: Nous sommes tousAméricains—We are all Americans, now.

Nearly three years after the tragic and criminalattacks, the Bush administration has clearly squan-dered that opportunity and chosen a path to combatterrorism that has weakened multilateral institutions,undermined the international legal architecture, andtransformed international support into growing anti-American sentiment. Its efforts in this area, despite itsavowed successes, reflect a major failure of leadershipand—more importantly—have made Americansmore vulnerable rather than more secure.

IIII.. IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn

Box 1: What Is Terrorism?

There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism. Even U.S. government agencies use different defini-tions. For the purposes of this agenda, we adopted the definition of terrorism used by the Bush administration in itsHomeland Security Strategy: “any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intendedto intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.” We consider this a useful definition, both because it cap-tures the essence of what is involved in terrorist violence and because it is broad enough to include as terrorism actscommitted by states as well as nonstate groups. According to this definition, a whole range of nations—including theUnited States—and numerous international terrorist groups like al-Qaida have engaged in terrorist acts.

A consensus definition of terrorism has eluded even the U.S. government. The Pentagon, the FBI, the StateDepartment, and the Department of Homeland Security as well as key government policy documents all use differentdefinitions of terrorism, distinguished mainly by whether state agents are included. For example, the National SecurityStrategy articulated in September 2002 defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetratedagainst innocents.” But the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism published in February 2003 adopts a version ofthe State Department definition, which excludes states: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated againstnoncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Meanwhile, the Department of Defense defines ter-rorism as “the calculated use, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimi-date governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”

Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act, adopted in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, adds yet another definition of terrorismto the U.S. criminal code (domestic terrorism) and amends three legal definitions of terrorism already on the books (fed-eral terrorism, international terrorism, and terrorism transcending national borders). Section 802 of the PATRIOT Actdefines domestic terrorism as involving “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of theUnited States,” if the actor’s intent is to “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.” This could beused to define as terrorism a whole range of nonviolent forms of political activism and dissent.


After Sept. 11, 2001, Americans began to think ofnational security in terms of ensuring their individualsafety and protecting the American homeland.Suddenly, foreign policy and military policy becamenot just about the U.S. role in global affairs butabout the security of Americans at home. Foreignpolicy has entered popular consciousness in such away that it is no longer about distant lands and theirpeoples but about U.S. families, homes, communi-ties, and workplaces. For a short time, defense policywas redefined as defending America and Americansrather than as force projection. Moreover, thereremains a popular consensus—disregarded at theupper levels of the Bush administration—that inter-national cooperation and multilateralism constitutethe only viable approach to preventing and combat-ing terrorism. In other words, most Americans knowwe cannot do it alone.

There exists no universally accepted definition ofterrorism, nor is there a single definition shared bythe U.S. government. The Bush administration’s defi-nition of terrorism (stated in its Homeland SecurityStrategy) is adequate: “any premeditated, unlawful actdangerous to human life or public welfare that isintended to intimidate or coerce civilian populationsor governments.” For the record, this means thatboth states and nonstate entities can be guilty ofcommitting acts of terrorism. Also, by such a defini-tion, the United States government and its allies havealready engaged in and supported acts of terrorism.1

Although most acts of terrorism are politically moti-vated, political grievances do not justify terrorism. Allacts of terrorism are crimes, and terrorists retain soleresponsibility for their actions. If a state of war exist-ed, many activities would also be judged as violationsof the rules of war. Worldwide, the number of inter-national terrorist attacks has declined in recent yearscompared to the mid-1980s, but the lethality of suchattacks has increased. According to the Departmentof State, the annual number of international terroristattacks peaked at 666 incidents in 1987 and haddeclined to 348 by 2001, declining further to 208 in2003. But the number of significant terrorist events

(as defined by the State Department) in 2003 was175, which represents a 20-year high. Casualtiesresulting from international terrorist attacks during2001 were the highest ever recorded—3,572 personskilled and 1,083 injured. (In 2003 the number ofpeople killed was 652). The terrorist attacks againstthe United States on September 11, 2001, represent-ed the most lethal international terrorist attack ever.Since then, significant terrorist attacks (as classifiedby the U.S. Department of State in its Pattern ofGlobal Terrorism) have increased.2

Why We Shouldn’t Fight a “Global War on Terrorism”

Unfortunately, the Bush administration has sustainedan emphasis on military responses to terrorism, fram-ing the efforts as a “global war on terrorism.” Thisdeclaration of war is a mistake for two reasons.

First, it is meaningless to say we are fighting a “waron terror.” Terrorism is a particular type of politicalviolence. As former National Security AdviserZbigniew Brzezinski noted, declaring a war on terroris like declaring a war on blitzkrieg.3 It is more accu-rate to say that the United States is engaged in fight-ing a particular group of Sunni extremists. Thatgroup—al-Qaida and its sympathizers—has trans-formed itself into a dual identity: a cadre and amovement.4 The cadre is still mostly at large and ableto communicate, plan, and mobilize support,although less easily than before Sept. 11, 2001. Themovement is a geographically and politically diversenetwork oriented around a common set of imagesand rhetoric that numbers at least 18,000 accordingto the International Institute for Strategic Studies.5

Second, many of the real successes in combating al-Qaida in the two years since Sept. 11, 2001, havecome from international cooperation on intelligenceand from police work and domestic investigations.War—the use of military force—has been secondaryat best. In the case of the invasion and occupation ofIraq, which is presented (falsely in our view) as partof the “global war on terrorism,” it has been directly

IIIIII.. AA FFaaiilleedd PPoolliiccyy


counterproductive. As the International Institute forStrategic Studies notes, the impact on al-Qaida of thewar in Iraq has been to “accelerate recruitment.”6

The Bush administration has failed to provide acompelling strategic vision that would uniteAmericans and the world in an effort to combat ter-rorism.7 It has produced a wide array of strategypapers dealing in whole or in part with terrorism,such as the National Security Strategy, the Strategy toCombat Terrorism, Weapons of Mass DestructionStrategy, Homeland Security Strategy, MaritimeSecurity Strategy, Critical Infrastructure ProtectionStrategy, and Cyberspace Security Strategy. Butthough these strategies “identify goals, subordinateobjectives and specific activities, they generally donot discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or per-formance measures—elements that are desirable forevaluating progress, obtaining results, and ensuringeffective oversight.”8 In a report released just prior tothe Sept. 11 attacks, the General Accounting Officenoted that “the federal government lacks a nationalstrategy to guide resource investment for combatingterrorism.” That assessment still applies nearly threeyears after the attacks, and as we discuss below, manyof the Bush administration’s priorities in pursuing the“global war on terrorism” have increased, rather thandecreased, our vulnerabilities.

Success and Failure

There have been some successes: improved airlineand border security, a crackdown on terrorist financ-ing, improved international cooperation in sharingintelligence, the arrest of high-level al-Qaida figures,and the disruption of planned attacks. Also, the warin Afghanistan succeeded in disorganizing the topleadership of al-Qaida and in ousting the Taliban.

But some of these successes have come at highcosts, and the failures and weaknesses of the Bushapproach to combating terrorism appear to over-whelm the successes. The costs of the “war on terror-ism” relative to democracy and domestic civil libertiesare paralleled by new alliances with repressive regimesabroad. The administration’s efforts to combat terror-ism are hampered by the hypocrisy demonstratedwhen it shelters perpetrators of state terrorism andaids repressive regimes. Furthermore, the administra-

tion has weakened the international legal frameworkessential to creating a multilateral effort to combatterrorism, and it has failed to address the politicalcontexts—failed states, repressive regimes—thatenable and facilitate terrorism. Finally, the invasionand occupation of Iraq resulted in the creation of anew recruiting vehicle for al-Qaida while essentialhomeland security measures are shelved due to theever-growing cost of this unnecessary and counter-productive war. The price tag so far for that misguid-ed operation is $151 billion and rising.9 The U.S. issimply on the wrong path when it comes to reducingthe threats posed by terrorists.

Six factors explain the failure of the White House’s approach:

A. Overemphasis on Military Responses

First, the Bush administration has emphasized mili-tary responses to terrorism, framing the efforts as a“war on terrorism.” And it has used legitimate con-cerns about terrorism to justify a massive increase inmilitary spending that has little or nothing to dowith combating terrorism. According to the Centerfor Defense Information, only about one-third of theincrease in the Pentagon’s FY2003 budget (whencompared with pre-Sept. 11 budgets) appears to bedirected at programs and activities closely related tohomeland security or counterterrorism operations.10

The Pentagon’s spending priorities downplay non-military approaches, even though many of the realsuccesses in combating al-Qaida in the two yearssince the Sept. 11 attacks have come from interna-tional intelligence sharing and police work. Byenshrining preventive war as a policy doctrine in thenational security strategy in general and for combat-ing terrorism in particular, the administration hasactually reduced rather than increased U.S. security inseveral ways. For starters, it reinforces the image ofthe United States as eager to use military force andwilling to do so without regard for international lawand legitimacy. This can make it more difficult forthe United States to gain international support for itsuse of force, and it may lead others to resist U.S. for-eign policy goals more broadly, including efforts tofight terrorism. Advocating preemption also warns


potential enemies to hide the very assets thatWashington might wish to take action against.Finally, if the United States enshrines preemption as acore policy doctrine, it legitimates its adoption byother countries, which increases overall global insta-bility and reduces security, as other countries areemboldened to justify attacks on their enemies as pre-emptive in nature.

B. Failure in Intelligence Sharing

Second, the Bush administration has failed to facili-tate the sharing of information among intelligenceagencies and between federal and local agencies. InCongress’ Joint Inquiry into Intelligence CommunityActivities before and after the Terrorist Attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, the initial and final reports ofthe independent 9-11 Commission clearly identifiedthe failure of intelligence agencies to “connect thedots” and to share information between themselves.11

The Bush administration has responded by creatingthe Terrorist Threat Integration Center, coordinatedby the Director of Central Intelligence. The newTTIC has several problems that will reduce its effec-tiveness and undermine accountability. Placed underthe authority of the DCI rather than under the secre-tary of homeland security, the TTIC is disconnectedfrom those with direct responsibility for safeguardinghomeland security. This impedes its ability to developan effective, integrated approach for countering theterrorist threat to the United States. The TTIC alsolacks effective congressional oversight, since its direc-tor is appointed by the DCI without congressionalapproval. Moreover, the FBI needs a massive overhaulif it is to effectively coordinate domestic intelligenceoperations, due to the fact that it remains at its core acrime-fighting agency.

The failure of the TTIC to constitute an effectiveresponse to terrorism is recognized by groups acrossthe political spectrum.12 It has already failed in two ofits most basic tasks: producing reliable data and shar-ing information with agencies responsible for imple-menting counterterrorist activities or monitoring theperformance of counterterrorism programs and poli-cies. The fact that the Department of State had tocorrect its Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003—the first

report whose data was gathered by the TTIC—doesnot bode well for the collection of reliable intelligencedata. In addition, despite repeated requests, in early2004 the TTIC had still not made available to theDepartment of State and the Congressional ResearchService an unclassified version of its database.13

C. Undermining Democracy and Civil Liberties

Third, the Bush administration has undermineddemocracy at home by rolling back governmentaltransparency in a manner that reduces accountabilityand unnecessarily infringes on civil liberties. TheWhite House has impeded the investigation by theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon theUnited States of the conditions that facilitated theSept. 11 attacks, it has failed to declassify importantdocuments regarding possible ties between SaudiArabian citizens and the Sept. 11 attackers, and it hascompromised the integrity of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency by pressuring it to alter its reportson environmental health in lower Manhattan in theaftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

On the civil liberties front, Attorney General JohnAshcroft has demonstrated a consistent willingness tospearhead what a broad range of citizen groups—from the American Civil Liberties Union to theNational Rifle Association—have viewed as an intru-sive and dangerous effort to expand the government’sability to spy on its citizens. It was only with a broadrange of citizen mobilization that the most repressiveelements of the initial draft of the USA PATRIOTAct were deleted from final legislation.

Some provisions of the act, such as those relating tomoney laundering and aviation security, are laudable.But as legal analysts David Cole and James Dempseyhave noted, the USA PATRIOT Act imposes guilt byassociation on immigrants; authorizes executivedetention on the suspicion that an immigrant has atsome point engaged in a violent crime or providedhumanitarian aid to a proscribed organization; allowsthe government to deny entry to aliens for “purespeech” reasons, resurrecting a relic of the McCarthyera; expands the government’s authority to conductcriminal searches and wiretaps without first showing


probable cause that the subject is engaged in criminalactivity; sanctions secret searches in cases that havenothing to do with terrorism; gives the CIA access tothe power of grand juries; reduces judicial oversightof intrusive information-gathering activities; andexpands the access of the FBI to a broad range ofrecords.14 Finally, the Bush administration weakensU.S. claims to support democracy and the rule of lawthrough its use of military commissions to try“enemy combatants.”

D. Undermining Homeland Security

Fourth, current policy undermines domestic securi-ty. Despite some successes in improving airline andborder protection, the Bush administration’s plan forhomeland security is flawed in both strategicapproach and resource allocation.

In addition to the unnecessary restriction of civilliberties discussed above, the White House has undu-ly relied on immigration restrictions to address bor-der security and has been lax in protecting criticalinfrastructure, an estimated 85 percent of which isowned or controlled by the private sector. The Bushadministration has taken a laissez-faire approach tothe private sector’s role in homeland security, expect-ing that voluntary efforts—rather than regulations—will be sufficient to achieve domestic safety objec-tives. But even in the absence of terrorist attacks, it isclear that national security will not be providedthrough voluntary initiatives alone, as demonstratedby a series of system failures ranging from blackoutsin the Northeast in 2003 to recurring computer virusoutbreaks. As a classic public good, adequate securitycannot be produced by the market.15

On the resource side the Bush administration hasfailed to meet the basic needs of emergency respon-ders, has underfunded critical agencies like theBureau of Customs and Border Protection and theCoast Guard, and has created new unfunded man-dates for local governments, forcing them to transferscarce funds from social services and public safety tohomeland security tasks. For example, only about$750 million in federal funds apparently was directedto the nation’s three million emergency responders in2002 for training and equipment needed to react to

terrorist attacks, although the administration hadpromised $3.5 billion. There is also inadequate fund-ing for basic services in the fight against terrorism.For example, the administration’s 2004 budgetincluded $2 billion in cuts from crime preventionand public safety programs, and the proposedFY2005 proposed budget cuts $805 million fromemergency responders over FY2004 levels.16

Moreover, the administration’s anti-terrorism pro-grams in the public health sector are not strengthen-ing the public health infrastructure in an integratedway but are instead creating new funding and pro-gram categories, exacerbating existing fragmentation.For example the administration has diverted fundsfrom multipurpose infrastructure-building to single-agent preparedness (namely smallpox), according tothe Institute of Medicine. The focus on bioterrorismhas diverted state and local health departments fromother urgent public health work on a range ofissues.17 One report suggests that the diversion ofpublic health resources to instead focus on bioterror-ism contributed to the worst outbreak of tuberculosisin Seattle in 30 years.18

E. Weakening International Institutions

Fifth, White House posturing is weakening interna-tional institutions. The Bush administration has beenhostile to a whole set of multilateral institutions thatare central to enhancing global law and security, fromthe International Criminal Court to nearly all multi-lateral arms control and disarmament efforts, includ-ing the Biological and Chemical WeaponsConventions, the ABM Treaty, and theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Strengthening theseagreements, however, represents one of the bestmeans of preventing access by terrorists to weaponsof mass destruction. Furthermore, the Bush adminis-tration has been unable or unwilling to demandgreater funding for bilateral WMD threat reductionprograms, which now total about $1 billion annually.

The Bush administration’s campaign against theInternational Criminal Court is a good example ofhow to mobilize the political will to link other coun-try’s positions on human rights issues with militaryaid. The tragic dimension is that this linkage is serv-


ing to undermine rather than strengthen internation-al law and is weakening U.S. claims to be a worldleader in the struggle for human rights. The revela-tions of torture and abuse in Afghanistan and at AbuGhraib prison in Iraq, the efforts to unilaterallyexempt U.S. counterterror operations from theGeneva Conventions, the return or transport of ter-rorists or other national security suspects to countrieswhere torture is a widespread or systematic prob-lem,19 and the continued legal limbo of detainees inGuantanamo all reflect a cavalier approach to globalhuman rights and international law. Such behaviormakes hypocrisy and double standards appear to bethe norm.

F. Failure to Attack Root Causes

Sixth, the Bush administration has failed to addressthe root causes of terrorism and the social and politi-cal contexts in which terrorism thrives, such as failedstates, repressive regimes, and the role of poverty—global wealth inequality can create conditions of sup-port for terrorist acts and can provide an environ-ment for recruits, even though poverty doesn’t causeterrorism.

These strategic flaws are easily visible in the 2002National Security Strategy, which recognizes that“America is now threatened less by conquering statesthan we are by failing ones.” However, the 2002 NSSoffers no vision of how to deal with failed or failingstates, let alone a concrete set of policies or programsaimed at addressing the security challenges posed byfailed states. Administration officials are unwilling torecognize a need for the kind of “nation building”activities that they denigrated prior to the Sept. 11attacks. Such efforts would require a more systematicand constructive engagement with the United Nationsand with other countries, a redirection of resourceswithin the Pentagon toward various forms of peaceoperations for the military, and an expansion of non-military humanitarian and development programs.

At the national level, the Bush administration’sNational Security Strategy identified failed states as acritical U.S. security concern in part due to theirlinks with international terrorism and in part becausefailed states harbor other global security threats such

as transnational crime, drugs, and HIV/AIDS.Despite this warning in the NSS, the White Househas neither articulated a comprehensive strategy forengaging failed states nor identified the scale ofresources needed to do so. A delicate balance of uni-lateral and multilateral approaches would need tocharacterize such a operations, which could easilyconflict with the administration’s current emphasison promoting free trade agreements.

Washington has launched new foreign aid efforts,but much of the debate has bypassed failed or weakstates and focused on “good performers,” democracypromotion efforts (a difficult task in failed states),and allies in the war on terrorism. Such restrictionsmay actually facilitate further state failure rather thanstrengthening the mechanisms of governance neces-sary to provide basic security and legitimacy. The for-eign economic policy debate needs to be enriched toincorporate the creative use of aid, trade, and invest-ment in creating the conditions necessary forstrengthening weak and failed states and thusenhancing overall governance.

As the first target in the post-Sept. 11 war on ter-rorism, Afghanistan represents a cautionary tale.Since the successful toppling of the Taliban and thedisorganization of al-Qaida’s leadership, the Bushadministration has not demonstrated a willingness tocommit the human and financial resources necessaryto promote reconstruction and development inAfghanistan, failing to even request any monies forAfghanistan in its initial budget request for FY 2004.This approach is shortsighted for three reasons. First,it repeats the same errors of the late 1980s, whenWashington backed the Mujahedeen against theSoviet Union. While U.S. support did not “create” al-Qaida, that assistance did create the conditions thatfacilitated the creation of al-Qaida, destroyed theAfghan state, and internationalized the extremistjihadist movement. Second, it ignores the need forstrengthening the Afghan state so as to underminethe remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban, subordi-nating the warlords to central control, and providingan enabling environment for an effective and broad-based reconstruction and development program.Third, it reinforces the view that the U.S. war inAfghanistan was about vengeance, further undermin-


A different strategy would not fight a “war on ter-rorism” but would treat terrorism as an ongoingthreat that needs to be tackled through a strong,coordinated strategy focused upon strengtheningcivilian public sectors and nurturing the internationalcooperation so necessary for preventing and respond-ing to terrorist attacks. Although the military has aclear role to play, it should be a supporting actor inthe fight against terrorism. The challenge that terror-ism poses to everyone’s safety necessitates a reevalua-tion both of conventional ideas about national securi-ty and of the dominant responses—typically mili-tary—to terrorist threats.

One shortcoming of the current approach has beenthe Bush administration’s failure to adequately under-stand and articulate the nature of the threat posed byterrorist networks with international reach—like al-Qaida—to the American people and the world atlarge. Indeed, as University of Bradford analyst PaulRogers and Oxford Research Group Director ScillaElworthy have argued, “the general [U.S.] politicalprocess has concentrated almost entirely on seeingthe perpetrators simply as fundamentalists actingfrom motives of sheer hatred for the United Statesand all it stood for ... little attempt has been made to

understand the motivations for this action, or to seeit as part of a longer-term strategy, or, indeed, toinvestigate the political context.”21 It is not uncom-mon to hear al-Qaida simply dismissed as a bunch ofcrazy madmen. This is misguided at best and coun-terproductive at worst. Pretending that terrorism hasno link to other forms of politics is ahistorical andwill provide poor guidance in crafting an effectiveresponse.

Terror is not a creed but a political strategy toextract resources and increase power.22 No longerdependent on sponsorship by sovereign states, mod-ern terrorists engage in a potpourri of transnationalcrimes to finance their operations. These include ille-gal immigration, contraband smuggling, visa fraud,piracy, illegal trafficking in human beings, diamondsmuggling and tobacco diversion, and associated taxfraud. Although the vast majority of terrorist attacksworldwide continue to be carried out with conven-tional weapons, such as firearms and bombs, there isa growing concern about terrorists using unconven-tional weapons, namely, weapons of mass destructionsuch as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclearweapons.23

ing what remaining reservoirs of support America hasin the Arab and Muslim world.20

In an equally troubling development, the Bushadministration has taken advantage of the crisis sur-rounding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to pursue anexpanded free trade agenda justified on the groundsthat free trade leads to growth, which reduces povertyand thereby reduces terrorism. It has pursued thisagenda despite the evidence that terrorism is drivenby political and ideological grievances rather thaneconomic injustices. The White House argument isalso based on the unfounded claim that the currentlydominant approach to economic globalization

reduces poverty. According to the World Bank,extreme poverty increased in every region of thedeveloping world outside Asia during the pastdecade, a period when nearly all countries pursuedreforms aimed at opening their countries to the glob-al economy.

Finally, the Bush administration has failed toaddress the issue of energy security and to reorientdomestic U.S. energy policy to promote conservationand the use of renewables. Such steps would increaseAmerica’s autonomy with respect to the Middle Eastand would strengthen the security of the energyinfrastructure at home.

IIVV.. AA NNeeww FFrraammeewwoorrkk


Emphasizing military responses to terrorism—aninevitable outcome of using “war” as the policyframework for U.S. anti-terrorism policy—fails onpractical grounds alone, independent of any moral orethical considerations. In such a war the nature ofvictory is unclear, and the faith leap into war risks adestructive spiral into open-ended conflict and mili-tarization.24 Even worse, the prosecution of a “waragainst terrorism” risks incurring civilian casualties,triggering a backlash, and intensifying violence andconflict.

War, in other words, is the least effective approachto combating terrorism and should represent the last,rather than the first, resort. America needs a newagenda for combating terrorism—one that securesAmericans against terrorist attacks and that integratesthe use of force within an international legal and pol-icy framework. This agenda must bring internationalterrorists to justice, debilitate their capacity to wageterrorism, and undermine the political credibility ofterrorist networks by addressing related politicalgrievances and injustices. The following four-partframework for a new national security policy coun-ters terrorism and propagates justice using anapproach that:

Strengthens homeland security by preventing terror-ist attacks and mitigating the effects of terroristviolence.

Strengthens the national and international legal sys-tem to insure that those responsible for planning,financing, directly supporting, and engaging interrorist violence are held accountable. Militaryforce may only be used to advance the rule of lawwithin a multilateral and international legal frame-work.

Defends and advances civil liberties, human rights,and democracy both at home and abroad.

Attacks the root causes of terrorism by addressing thesocioeconomic and political conditions that enableterrorism (in whatever form and for whateverends) to appear to be a viable strategy for pursuingpolitical objectives.

A. Strengthen Homeland Security

Prevention must have a central place in counterter-rorism policy. Prevention requires tightened bordersecurity, improved intelligence and oversight of intel-ligence agencies, strengthened protections for criticalinfrastructure, and denying terrorists access toweapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons,and other items that can be used as weapons (truckscontaining hazardous materials, airplanes, etc.).Mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks requireshoning disaster preparedness and emergency responseplans and strengthening the infrastructures and pub-lic services that might either be targets of an attack orthat would be necessary to respond effectively to suchan attack.

It is too soon to tell if the Department ofHomeland Security will be able to effectively coordi-nate the range of activities essential to insuringdomestic safety. However, creation of the new depart-ment itself illustrates the degree to which theDepartment of Defense and other security agencieshave focused their efforts on the exercise of militaryforce abroad rather than effectively addressing theunconventional menaces that pose the most immedi-ate threat to the safety of the United States and itscitizens. This is not an argument for the Pentagon totake responsibility for directly insuring homelandsecurity, but it does reflect the fact that “nationalsecurity” has more often focused on the capacity toproject U.S. military force abroad than to insure thesafety of U.S. citizens and the U.S homeland. InAmerica’s new, heightened sense of the threats toindividual and national security, citizens and policy-makers should insist that the Defense Departmentreduce its focus on increasing its global reach andconcentrate more on providing the elemental securityAmericans should expect.

Homeland security is a complex job that requiresthe coordination of activities by federal, state, andlocal governments as well as the private sector andindividual citizens. Estimates of the federal share intotal homeland security spending (including state andlocal governments and the private sector) are ham-pered by a lack of reliable data on such spending bynon-federal government agencies and businesses. For


FY2004 the Office of Management and Budget iden-tified net non-Department of Defense federal govern-ment expenditures on homeland security at $33.4billion, which was between 40 percent and 80 per-cent of total homeland security expenditures,depending on the estimates used for state and localgovernments and the private sector.25

The question is, with the creation of theDepartment of Homeland Security, have the admin-istration and its allies in Congress effectively declaredvictory? If so, they have made a fatal mistake. Manyof the most critical steps remain to be taken, andmost of them appear boring, almost mundane, andcertainly not prime “photo-op” material. Such stepsinclude insuring that local first responders can com-municate with each other, protecting all transporta-tion networks, and reinforcing security at privatefacilities such as office buildings, nuclear powerplants, and chemical manufacturing and storage sites.

There are errors of commission and omission in theadministration’s approach to homeland security (asembodied in the Homeland Security Strategy and theHomeland Security Act). The errors of commissioninvolve an overly restrictive approach toward civil lib-erties, civil rights, and transparency in governmentpolicymaking and an overreliance on immigrationrestrictions for border security, addressed in Section 2below. The errors of omission involve major strategic

gaps with respect to the private sector and intelli-gence operations as well as underfunding critical pro-gram areas. (see Box 2).

In terms of economic and educational impacts, theNational Academy of Sciences and over 20 othereducational and academic associations have notedthat problems with the visa security system—includ-ing the lack of transparency, arbitrariness, and stigmaassociated with the current visa processing system—are,

discouraging and preventing the best and brightestinternational students, scholars and scientists fromstudying and working in the United States, as well asattending academic and scientific conferences here andabroad. If action is not taken soon to improve the visasystem, the misperception that the United States doesnot welcome international students, scholars and scien-tists will grow, and they may not make our nationtheir destination of choice now and in the future. Thedamage to our nation’s higher education and scientificenterprises, economy and national security would beirreparable. … In the long run, a robust network ofglobal interactions is essential to winning this war.Our nation needs a visa system that does not hindersuch international exchange and cooperation.26

Box 2: National Strategy for Homeland Security

In advance of congressional authorization, this government document outlined and made the case for the largest fed-eral reorganization in 50 years to create the Department of Homeland Security. It comprises strategies: to prevent terror-ism, including intelligence and warning as well as border and transportation security, to reduce vulnerability to terrorism,including protecting critical infrastructure, and to minimize the damage from attacks, including emergency preparednessand response. The National Strategy for Homeland Security is far more detailed than either of the companion strategydocuments on National Security and Combating Terrorism, listing pages of recommendations ranging from recapitalizingthe Coast Guard, to securing cyberspace, to restructuring the FBI for a counterterrorist mission, to creating “smart bor-ders” that will (somehow) both increase the efficiency of transferring goods and people across borders and intensify thescrutiny of them. At the same time, it promises—with virtually no detail—to “develop a national infrastructure protectionplan” and “create a national incident management system.” Ideologically opposed to regulation of private business, thedocument mentions that it intends to rely on the voluntary efforts of these companies. This plan puts a great deal of faithin the public-spiritedness of private interests, since 85 percent of U.S. infrastructure is in private hands.

Source: White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/>.


The visa review system must be reformed so that theneed to conduct adequate security checks does notoverwhelm understaffed offices and so that more effi-cient and timely decisions can be made. Such stepsare essential if there is going to be an effective publicdiplomacy program. The United States must demon-strate that past and potential future terrorist attackswill not result in the creation of a fortress America.

1. Improve Intelligence Gathering andOversight

The Bush administration made several changessince the Sept. 11 attacks to address the intelligencefailures that contributed to the success of theattacks.27 These efforts culminated in the creation ofthe Terrorist Threat Integration Center.28 The TTICincludes elements of the Department of HomelandSecurity, the FBI, the CIA, and the Department ofDefense, and its head reports to the director of theCIA. Furthermore, states and localities have createdsimilar bodies, such as the California TerrorismInformation Center, the Los Angeles OperationalArea Terrorism Early Warning Group, and similargroups in New York City.

In response to The 9/11 Commission Report, theBush administration has proposed the creation of anational intelligence director and a national countert-errorism center. The former would play a coordinat-ing role in the intelligence community, similar to oneof the roles played by the director of central intelli-gence (the other role is as head of the CIA). The lat-ter would largely build on the TTIC and would bemoved from its current home at the CIA to report tothe proposed new intelligence director.

The TTIC has several problems that reduce itseffectiveness and undermine accountability. Since theTTIC is under the authority of the director of centralintelligence rather than the secretary of homelandsecurity, it is disconnected from those with directresponsibility for safeguarding homeland security.This arrangement impedes the TTIC’s ability todevelop an effective, integrated approach to counter-ing the terrorist threat to the United States, and itrisks duplication that could harm homeland securityefforts.29 Furthermore, the TTIC lacks effective con-

gressional oversight, as its director is appointed by theCIA director without congressional approval.30

Finally, the FBI must continue to overcome severeorganizational weaknesses with respect to counterin-telligence operations. The 9/11 Commission Reportdetails numerous recommendations which, if imple-mented, would significantly enhance the FBI’s effec-tiveness as a counterintelligence agency.31

What is most important about intelligence gather-ing activities is that they are done effectively and thatthere is coordination both among and between intel-ligence agencies as well as close interaction with thoseresponsible for operationalizing that intelligence.Furthermore, though there is a need for improvedintelligence collection, analysis, and operationaliza-tion, such efforts should not run roughshod overbasic civil liberties and should not compromise thelevel of transparency necessary to insure accountabili-ty in intelligence operations.


Establish a national intelligence director who wouldbe able to exercise budgetary and appointmentcontrol over the intelligence community, as pro-posed by the 9/11 Commission.

Restructure the TTIC (or similar counterterrorismcenter) to have it report directly to the head of theDepartment of Homeland Security.

Improve intelligence operations through greaterinternational coordination and cooperation insharing intelligence, developing improved humanand technical intelligence capabilities that do notinfringe on basic civil liberties.

Improve oversight of intelligence agencies, in part byrequiring greater transparency in the budget forthe CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Increase the personnel assigned to counterterroristoperations, since both the CIA and the FBI con-tinue to operate without adequate support staff fortheir counterterrorist operations, including, criti-cally, foreign language specialists.32

Expand federal funding for foreign language study inorder to insure an adequate level of skilled transla-tors and interpreters.


2. Strengthen Border Security

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration hastaken several steps to make U.S. borders more secure,including the Container Security Initiative, new visaand immigration systems under the Department ofHomeland Security, efforts to combat forgeries ofidentity documents, and greater security in airlines,airports, and seaports. Effective border security beginswell beyond the actual U.S. borders, in the visaoffices of U.S. embassies and consulates and in air-ports and ports abroad. Bilateral programs will havean important role to play, but more multilateralefforts will be essential if airports, ports, and contain-ers are to be effectively secured.

Several glaring weaknesses remain:

Information from visa and immigration data systemsmust be fully linked to establish complete immigrationhistories of visitors and residents, and governmentagencies must greatly improve their information-sharing capabilities as well as their systems formaintaining watch lists. The State Department hastried for 10 years to get access to FBI information

to add to TIPOFF, its terrorist watch list, as theCIA has already done. Centralizing this informa-tion in TIPOFF will avoid long visa processingdelays, which damage U.S. political and economicrelations abroad. The fact that this sharing ofinformation has not yet happened is an appallingexample of failed interagency cooperation.Moreover, the United States has still not created asingle database of suspected terrorists, relyinginstead on lists from eight different agencies. Thissituation has persisted for more than a decadesince the first World Trade Center bombing, whenthe problem first received national attention, andfor more than two years since the Sept. 11 attacks,despite the fact that President Bush on severaloccasions committed the government to creating asingle, effective list. On December 1, 2003, aninteragency body, the Terrorist Screening Center,was opened within the FBI to consolidate data,weed out obsolete information, and develop newtechnology to better identify suspected terrorists.However, the TSC suffers “from the lack of a ded-icated budget” and “ongoing failures to obtain thecooperation of several agencies to share their

Box 3: Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security

This government document outlines the Coast Guard’s role in homeland security. While expressing the agency’s com-mitment to improving its protection of U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastalapproaches and boundaries, and the seams between them, it is, among all the security documents, the least specificabout how these goals will be achieved. The Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security promises to conduct ongoing vul-nerability assessments of major sea lines of communication and to allocate resources toward more stringent reportingrequirements, more thorough ocean surveillance, and the tracking of high-interest vessels and cargoes. Its new mis-sions, such as closing port security gaps, will however require “additional and upgraded capabilities,” which will have tobe “recapitalized,” that is, given more money. These include the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Forces, whose targetsexceed the capabilities of shore-based small boats, its National Strike Force, focusing on hazardous substance releas-es, and its Sea Marshals, which will inspect suspect vessels before they reach U.S. ports, giving priority to those fromcountries with terrorist links and those otherwise unfriendly to the United States. To fulfill its mandates, the Coast Guardwill need more cutters, coastal patrol boats, aircraft, and command and control technology.

The document cites one example of the Coast Guard’s potential role in executing the new doctrine of preemptivestrikes, namely, to intercept a shipment of smuggled plutonium on its way to a rogue state. It also reports that the CoastGuard is now newly involved in national security missions overseas, operating in areas such as the Persian Gulf.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,<http://www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/Maritime_strategy/USCG_Maritme_Strategy.pdf>.


information ….” In the view of one congressionalstaff member, the TSC “is a hollow box.”33

The Container Security Initiative, which aims toprovide security for container shipments, is nowoperable in nearly all of the countries targeted forthe first phase of the program. Yet the programremains underfunded by an order of magnitude,according to the Brookings Institution.34 CindyWilliams, a former Congressional Budget Officedefense budget specialist, has estimated that shift-ing $5 billion from the Defense Departmentwould boost inspection of containers by the neces-sary factor of ten.35 Broader port security alsoremains an issue as an estimated 70 percent of theports slated to meet international standards forcontainer security by July 1, 2004 did not meetthe target, and U.S. port security remains uncer-tain due to a lack of staffing and resources.36

The Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs andBorder Protection remain woefully underfunded,receiving far below what they need to meet theirnew missions, which incorporate a whole host ofnon-homeland security as well as homeland secu-rity tasks. (see Box 3).

3. Protect Critical Infrastructure

The Department of Homeland Security has identi-fied at least 16 sectors for critical infrastructure pro-tection: chemical, electricity, energy, emergency man-agement and response, financial services, food, infor-mation technology, multistate public transit, realestate, research and education networking, surfacetransportation, telecommunications, highway, water,and public health. (see Box 4).

The private sector plays a crucial role in securingcritical infrastructure, because that sector operatesabout 85 percent of the nation’s infrastructure. Butthe Bush administration has taken a laissez-faireapproach to the private sector’s role in homelandsecurity, expecting that voluntary efforts by thesebusinesses will be sufficient to achieve homelandsecurity objectives. For example, the Department ofHomeland Security has yet to conduct basic risk andvulnerability assessments to help the private sectorguide its own investments.

The Department of Homeland Security has pro-moted the creation of private-sector informationsharing and analysis centers (ISACs) on a voluntarybasis to facilitate private-sector coordination with thefederal government on homeland security programsand to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing,and appropriately sanitizing and disseminating infor-mation to and from infrastructure sectors and thefederal government. Because of the voluntary natureof participation, membership and outreach throughthe information sharing and analysis centers coversjust under two-thirds of the private-sector criticalinfrastructure in the country, according to theGeneral Accounting Office.37

According to the ISAC council, the Bush adminis-tration has not made adequate provision for the par-ticipation of the private sector in national-levelhomeland security exercises conducted by the federalgovernment, such as the Department of HomelandSecurity’s May 2003 national terrorism exercise(TOPOFF 2), which was designed to identify vulner-abilities in the nation’s domestic incident manage-ment capability. (In that exercise the participation ofthe private sector was simulated).38 Furthermore,additional government resources will be necessary tofacilitate the operations of these industry associations,to support operations, to increase membership, todevelop metrics, and to support capacity-buildingactivities. Four of the most significant private-sectorissues of concern involve spent reactor fuel pools atnuclear power plants, the chemical industry, foodsafety, and information technology.

Nuclear Power PlantsSpent reactor fuel pools at U.S. commercial nuclear

power plants represent potentially the most conse-quential vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Unlike reac-tors, which are housed inside steel vessels surroundedby heavy structures and containment buildings, spentfuel pools, containing some of the largest concentra-tions of radioactivity on the planet, are in much morevulnerable buildings. If water is caused to drain fromthe pools, a catastrophic fire could contaminate anarea many times greater than that devastated by the1986 Chernobyl accident.


Box 4: The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets

This government document targets “a core mission area identified in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.” Theelements of critical infrastructure are identified as: agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services,defense industrial base, telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardousmaterials, and postal and shipping. Key assets are defined as individual targets whose destruction could cause large-scale damage to life, property, and/or national prestige. These are: national monuments, nuclear power plants, dams,government facilities, and “commercial key assets” (which refers to the nation’s 460 skyscrapers).

The report includes a rough inventory of each of these categories (e.g., “telecommunications: two billion miles ofcable,” “oil and natural gas: 300,000 producing sites”) and commits the Department of Homeland Security to developinga comprehensive database of these assets and an assessment of the vulnerabilities of each. Analyzing each sector, thedocument briefly assesses vulnerabilities, problems in addressing them, and plans for doing so.

For example, for the “chemical industry and hazardous materials,” the report warns there is no clear federal legal orregulatory authority to help ensure comprehensive, uniform standards for chemical facilities. But, it says, since risk pro-files vary widely across the industry, because of differences in technologies, product mix, etc., no single security regimewould be appropriate for all. Cautioning that many current laws governing toxics are outdated, the report applauds tradeassociations for developing voluntary security codes for their members, though it acknowledges that many of thesemembers don’t comply. The document commits the Department of Homeland Security and the Environmental ProtectionAgency to developing legislation requiring the most hazardous facilities to undertake vulnerability assessments (self-evaluation) and to “take reasonable steps” to reduce vulnerabilities. The report also promises to evaluate whether meas-ures are necessary to regulate the sale of pesticides. Those are its only recommendations for action.

One of the most potentially vulnerable and hazardous sectors, the nuclear power plant complex, receives one of themost cursory treatments. Security procedures have been enhanced, we are assured, and the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission is evaluating additional measures. Those mentioned are: criminalizing the act of bringing unauthorizedweapons and explosives into nuclear facilities, legislation authorizing security guards to carry more powerful weapons,applying sabotage laws to nuclear facilities, and public awareness campaigns.

Among the collection of counterterrorism strategy documents, this one wrestles most directly with the conflict betweenthe administration’s ideological impulse to protect private interests and government’s responsibility for the public interest.The report applauds the many businesses that have increased their security to an extent “economically justifiable … in acompetitive marketplace.” The private sector will “look to” the federal government when the threat appears to exceed a“reasonable” security investment, the report says. It speaks of developing incentives for businesses to do more, sug-gesting that “early adopters” might be rewarded.

Discussing the role of states and localities, the document acknowledges that they are being asked to do more, andthat their fiscal crises make this extremely difficult. As to what the federal government might be able to do about this(i.e., help make up the shortfall), the document limits itself to a few extremely vague observations about the need for“unprecedented cooperation across all levels of government” to deal with issues of “informed resource investment.”

Source: White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets,<http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html>.


The most important step that can be taken to sig-nificantly reduce this risk is to place all spent fuelolder than five years into thick-walled, dry storagemodes. Germany has done this for the past 25 yearsto protect against airplane crashes and terroristattacks. The cost of putting the U.S. spent reactorfuel inventory into dry, hardened storage modes overthe next 10 years is estimated at $3.5 billion to $7billion, which could be paid from existing funds col-lected from nuclear-generated electricity for the dis-posal of this material.

The Chemical IndustryThe risk of terrorist attack on industrial facilities

that store large quantities of hazardous chemicals is apressing homeland security issue. According to theEnvironmental Protection Agency, there are 123facilities where a release of chemicals could threatenmore than one million people. There are more than750 additional facilities where such a release couldthreaten more than 100,000 people.39 The Bushadministration is expecting that voluntary measuresby the U.S. chemical industry will provide effectiveprotection against terrorist attacks. But without mini-mal standards, enforcement requirements, or moni-toring, such efforts will be inadequate. For example,the members of the chemical industry ISAC cannoteven estimate what percentage of the industry is par-ticipating in the ISAC.

The Department of Homeland Security needs toestablish minimum requirements for the improve-ment of security and the reduction of potential haz-ards at chemical plants and other industrial facilitiesthat store large quantities of hazardous materials, asvoluntary standards remain inadequate.40 Specific ini-tiatives should:

Conduct a vulnerability/hazard assessment.

Develop a prevention, preparedness, and responseplan that incorporates the assessment results andincludes actions to reduce vulnerabilities byimproving security and using safer technology.

Food and Agricultural SafetyAlthough a bioterrorism attack on U.S. agriculture is

highly unlikely to result in famine or malnutrition, itcould have significant human and economic costs and

could cause widespread public concern and confusion.41

The recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that arosenaturally in the United Kingdom, for example, led tothe destruction of millions of animals and cost billionsof dollars.42 There is a need for a comprehensive nationalplan to defend against the intentional introduction ofbiological agents in an act of terror. Such a plan wouldoutline a research agenda including filling gaps in knowl-edge about foreign pests and pathogens, defining appro-priate roles for federal and state agencies, and makingspecific preparations to respond to attacks conductedwith a shorter list of pathogens and pests representa-tive of the various bioweapons and the plant or ani-mal species they would target. Developing counter-measures for this subset of agents would be valuableto officials and front-line personnel in the event of anattack, even if the agent ultimately confronted doesnot happen to be on the short list.

And finally, a network of laboratories needs to becreated to coordinate the detection of bioterroragents in the event of an attack. A nationwide agri-cultural bioterrorism communications system, mod-eled after the Centers for Disease Control andPrevention’s “Health Alert Network,” is also neces-sary. And new technologies are needed to aid in theearly detection of bioterror agents, especially geneti-cally engineered ones. Early detection is key to stop-ping the spread of an agricultural bioterror attack.43


Consolidate the responsibility for inspecting food intoa single agency; increase the number of food inspec-tors and their resources to insure security at foodprocessing facilities, and expand capacities foridentifying and treating exotic animal diseases.44

Information TechnologyInformation technology is essential to virtually all of

the nation’s critical infrastructures, from the air trafficcontrol system to the aircraft themselves, from theelectric power grid to the financial and banking systemsand, obviously, from the Internet to communicationsystems. In sum, this reliance of all of the nation’scritical infrastructures on information technologymakes any of them vulnerable to sabotage throughtheir computer or telecommunication systems.45


An attack involving information technology cantake different forms. The technology itself can be thetarget. A terrorist could also either launch or exacer-bate an attack by exploiting the IT infrastructure orcould use IT to interfere with attempts to achieve atimely response. Thus, IT is both a target and aweapon. Likewise, IT has a major role in counterter-rorism—it can prevent, detect, and mitigate terroristattacks. For example, advances in information fusionand data mining may facilitate the identification ofimportant patterns of behavior that help to uncoverterrorists or their plans in time to prevent attacks.Second, emergency response involves the agencies,often state and local, that are called upon to respondto terrorist incidents—firefighters, police, ambu-lances, and other emergency health care workers.These agencies are critically reliant on IT to commu-nicate, to coordinate, and to share information in aprompt, reliable, and intelligible fashion.46

The threat of a terrorist attack on IT, or “cyberter-rorism,”47 is seen today by policymakers and the pub-lic as being one of the greatest dangers to the UnitedStates. As the director of the Department ofHomeland Security, Tom Ridge, warned, a “terroristcan sit at one computer connected to one networkand can create worldwide havoc.”48 The notion ofcyberterrorism links the fear of random, violent vic-timization with the distrust and outright fear of com-puter technology.49 It is this union that has com-pounded the fear of cyberterrorism.

Despite such fear, the possibility of a cyberterroristincident remains small. (see Box 5). A RAND study found

that “while most of the current interests have focusedon newer, trendier threats to information systems …our analysis showed that some of the ‘old fashioned’threats pose a greater danger.”50 Al-Qaida’s trainingmanual, “Military Studies in the Jihad Against theTyrants,” bears this in mind, noting that explosivesare the preferred terrorist weapon, because “explosivesstrike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”51

Those who warn about cyberterrorism often raisethe possibility of terrorists hijacking nuclear weapons,airliners, military computers, electrical grids, andfood supplies from across the globe. However, mostcritical government systems, such as those at theDepartment of Defense, FBI, and CIA, are not con-nected to the Internet and thus are protected fromoutside attacks. Other government agencies thatdeveloped proprietary systems in a fit of bureaucraticself-preservation left only a select few who under-stand the systems well enough to compromise it.52

Government systems connected to the Internet aremore vulnerable, but since the Internet itself had itsbeginnings in a Department of Defense projectdesigned to ensure open communications after anuclear attack, the possibility of taking the entireInternet off-line is remote at best.

Many officials also point out the danger to powergrids, oil pipelines, and dams that use “supervisorycontrol and data acquisition” systems. Increasingly,such systems are operated over the Internet, makingthem more vulnerable to a cyberterrorist. In the pastfew years, dam and water systems have been hacked,but even after such a breach, it is difficult to cause

Box 5: Information Technology Attacks and Terrorism, 1996-2003Computer Security Incidents: 312,337International Terrorist Attacks: 2,463Cyberterrorist Incidents: 0

Source: Terrorist attacks data from Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (revised),<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33777.htm>, computer security incident data from Carnegie MellonUniversity Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), <http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html>. Also seeJames A. Lewis, “Cyber Attacks: Missing in Action,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2003,<http://www.csis.org/tech/0403_cyberterror.pdf>.


mass disruption. Emulating government proprietarysystems, utility companies use complex processes thatrequire specific technical know-how. Even if such sys-tems were taken over by cyberterrorists, the effect ofbringing down an electrical grid would be likened torecent power outages in New York City, a majorinconvenience at worst.

Despite these built-in protections, the vast complex-ity of the Internet, security weaknesses in commercialsoftware, and a movement away from proprietary sys-tems demand that further defenses against cyberter-rorism be employed. The Bush administrationreleased the “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace”in February 2003 (see Box 6) to help meet the chal-lenges presented by cyberterrorists and wider abuse of

the Internet. Although the strategy advances theissues of centralizing security responses, testing civil-ian agency preparedness, and further securing govern-ment cyberspace, it fails to propose new legislation orgovernment oversight to implement the variety ofpublic-private initiatives it proposes.

The National Cyber Security Division of theDepartment of Homeland Security is responsible forimplementing the National Strategy to SecureCyberspace. Although the division has been effectiveat creating new organizations to strengthen federalinformation technology defenses, coordinate respons-es to systems threats, and improve information shar-ing, the department’s own inspector general hasreleased two reports criticizing DHS performance in

Box 6: National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

This government document outlines the strategy for protecting what it calls “the control system of our country.” Itdescribes this task as mostly a private sector responsibility, and it suggests that government intervention be limited tosuch roles as ensuring the continuity of government and deterring cyber attacks capable of inflicting debilitating damageto the economy.

The strategy has five facets. The task of developing a National Cyberspace Security Response System includes suchcomponents as rapid identification, information exchange, and remediation by means of a public-private architecture forresponding to national-level cyber incidents (concerns for protecting privacy and civil liberties are explicitly mentionedhere); expanding the Cyber Warning and Information Network to support the Department of Homeland Security in coor-dinating crisis management for cybersecurity; and coordinating processes for voluntary participation in developingnational public-private contingency plans.

The National Cyber Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program is to include enhancing law enforcement’scapabilities to prevent and prosecute attacks, reducing and remediating software vulnerability, and understanding infra-structure interdependence and improving the physical security of cyber systems. The National Cyber SecurityAwareness and Training Program will focus mainly on educating the public about its role in securing its own parts ofcyberspace. Securing Government’s Cyberspace will involve tasks like continuously assessing threats, authenticatingauthorized users of federal cyber systems, improving security in government outsourcing and procurement, and encour-aging state and local governments to consider establishing information technology security programs. National Securityand International Cyberspace Security Cooperation will include strengthening cyber-related counterintelligence effortsand improving coordination within the national security community.

Although this last domain does include encouraging other nations to accede to the Council of Europe Convention onCybercrime, international cooperation is the weakest and most timid area in the strategy. Beyond endorsing this singleconvention, multilateral collaboration aims mainly to “facilitate dialogue among international public and private sectorsfocused on protecting information infrastructure and promoting a global ‘culture of security.’”

Source: White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/>.


these areas. The first highlights failures in determin-ing priorities, focusing resources to address vulnera-bilities, and setting benchmarks to guide the imple-mentation of the national cyberspace strategy.

The report specifically notes that the DHS hasfailed to:

Prioritize its initiatives for addressing the recommen-dations in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace;

Identify the resources needed to ensure that it canidentify, analyze, and reduce long-term cyberthreats and vulnerabilities;

Develop strategic implementation plans, includingperformance measures and milestones, focusing onthe division’s priorities, initiatives, and tasks;

Institute a formal communications process bothwithin the DHS and for interactions with thepublic, private, and international sectors;

Initiate and implement a process to oversee and coordi-nate efforts to develop best practices and createcybersecurity policies in collaboration with othergovernment agencies and the private sector; and

Review or update the actions and recommendationsin the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.53

Equally troubling, the inspector general also foundthat the Department of Homeland Security’s manage-ment of intra-departmental IT issues lags far behindother federal agencies. In particular, the chief infor-mation officer at the DHS does not have adequateauthority or resources to insure effective strategicmanagement of IT resources within the department.He also lacks the resources to insure effective identifi-cation and implementation of information securitystandards for the department as a whole.54

These DHS shortcomings highlight key challengesfacing the implementation of an effective cybersecuri-ty strategy and underscore the need for an alternativepolicy agenda that would devote adequate resources,legislation, and attention to a balanced and measuredresponse to the vulnerabilities of IT systems.


Create Greater Incentives in the Private Sector: Thoughnot likely to be a primary terrorist target, the pri-

vate sector and individuals are subject to economicdamage from cyber-criminals. Nearly $12.5 billionin damages were inflicted on the global economyin 2003 from viruses, worms, and other tools usedby hackers, according to the research companyComputer Economics. This was more than the2002 figure of $11.1 billion, but much lower thanthe 2000 level of $17.1 billion.55 Furthermore,hijacking of individual computers could lead to“denial of service” or other types of attacks oncritical infrastructure. Thus, private businesses andindividuals have a role to play in cybersecurity.Specific initiatives should:

• Promote tax incentives to increase networksecurity expenditures;

• Pass laws to create or enhance liability on the partof manufacturers or network operators for neg-ligent actions or omissions that harm others;

• Mandate insurance requirements or incentivesfor security investments;

• Require public companies to include a discus-sion of potential cyber risks or actual securitybreaches in their annual Form 10-K disclo-sure, in order to promote attention to securityon the part of chief executive officers andboards of directors (similar to the approachutilized by the Securities and ExchangeCommission to address Y2K concerns); and

• Create general standards for hardware andsoftware manufacturers.56

Improve Cybersecurity in Critical Public Agencies andPrivate Organizations:

As supervisory control and data acquisition sys-tems move from relying on dedicated, propri-etary networks to the Internet, systems mustbe tested and certified to be secure by a state-designated testing agency authorized by theDepartment of Homeland Security;

The security of our nation’s cyber networksdepends on well-trained computer personnel.Equally important is the security risk thesepeople pose. All personnel responsible forsecurity at government agencies and criticalinfrastructure locations should have back-


ground checks conducted and should pass acomputer security certification test;

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace’srecommendation to test government agencies’preparedness and contingency planningshould be fully implemented.

Improve Emergency Response Systems: Emergencyresponders must have a robust information infra-structure in the face of a real or potential terroristattack. Since many systems rely upon the Internetand voice communication systems, backup sys-tems must be able to be rapidly deployed. TheNational Research Council has identified the fol-lowing areas of priority research:

• Develop communication systems to handlemore capacity for emergency communicationand coordination;

• Create first-responder communication sys-tems that are interoperable between federal,state, and local agencies;

• Be able to rapidly deploy secure wireless net-works in case of emergency.

Additional specific initiatives to address criticalinfrastructure security should include:

• Make ventilation systems on large skyscrapersless accessible to terrorists by modifying airintakes and installing new air filtering systems.This would cost an estimated $1 billion.57

• Insure compliance with the provisions of theAviation Security Act and expand security forthe air cargo system.

• Increase resources and coordination for theprotection of information and communica-tions technologies through the CriticalInfrastructure Assurance Office and theNational Infrastructure Protection Center.

4. Support Emergency Responders

In addition to improving emergency preparednessplans, the White House needs to provide support toall levels of government to strengthen infrastructuresand public services such as information and commu-nications networks, water and food distribution

channels, public health and emergency response sys-tems, utilities and energy, transportation and finan-cial services. Critically, most of these systems consistof civilian public servants, such as fire, police, andrescue departments and public health personnel, allof which will be frontline first responders in case of aterrorist attack.

Strengthening such infrastructures and public serv-ices would have significant positive side effects, sincenatural disasters, ordinary criminals, and infectiousdisease outbreaks also threaten these systems. Thepublic health system is critical due to its roles both insurveillance (i.e., determining if a terrorist attack hasinvolved biological or chemical weapons) and in thetreatment of victims. Recent exercises of mock terror-ist attacks have indicated that public health infra-structures are rapidly overwhelmed in cases of WMDattacks, suggesting that the public health systemshould be a key area for increased spending. Theseservices require both international and national levelcollaboration, as some of the infrastructures—such aspublic health and the Internet—cannot just beaddressed nationally.

The burden of preparing for and responding to cat-astrophic terrorist attacks lies primarily outside thefederal government at the local and state levels andimpacts the private sector companies that own andoperate much of the nation’s critical infrastructure.Most of the expertise about both the vulnerabilitiesand the most practical protective measures to savelives and avert mass societal and economic disruptionis to be found outside the federal level as well.

The current federal budget for emergency respon-ders is $27 billion for five years beginning in 2004.Based on assessments from emergency respondergroups nationwide, a recent Council on ForeignRelations report estimates that federal, state, andlocal efforts in this area will fall short by about $100billion over the next five years.58 Federal fundingshould make up at least half of this shortfall in orderto support a series of improvements including:upgrading public health and hospital preparedness,enhancing urban search and rescue operation capabil-ities, supplying protective gear and WMD remedia-tion equipment to firefighters and police, and provid-


ing training and equipment, and purchasing interop-erable communication systems.

The National Guard will play a critical role whenthe next catastrophic terrorist attack happens onAmerican soil, and it must be well-trained and -equipped. Governors will expect National Guardunits in their states to help with detecting chemicaland biological agents, treating victims, managing sec-ondary consequences, and maintaining civil order.When called up by governors, the National Guardcan be used to enforce civil laws—unlike regular mil-itary forces, which are bound by posse comitatusrestrictions against performing law enforcementduties. The National Guard’s medical units, engineer-ing units, military police units, and ground and airtransport units will likely prove indispensable in help-ing to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.The National Guard is currently equipped andtrained primarily for carrying out its role in support-ing conventional combat units overseas. Its homelandsecurity mission can draw on many of these capabili-ties but requires different emphases.59

Specific initiatives should include:

Adequate financial support for first respondersnationwide;

Increased funding for public health at the local, state,and federal levels to improve surveillance of infec-tious disease outbreaks, provide adequate amountsof vaccines and medicines to respond to a bioter-rorist attack, and ensure a functioning hospitalsystem capable of treating victims. This includesfunding for the biomedical and psychologicalimpacts of terrorist attacks;60 and

Federally financed training for National Guard unitsto facilitate collaboration with state civil authori-ties and to include exercises with local emergencyresponders in support of the new homeland secu-rity plans being developed by each governor.

5. Prevent Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons

The anthrax scares in late 2001 showed that terror-ist attacks using weapons of mass destruction do notrequire large numbers of casualties in order to triggersignificant social disruption and fear. One key differ-

ence between states and terrorists regarding acquisi-tion of weapons of mass destruction is that states canbe deterred from using WMDs by the likelihood ofretaliation. Because terrorists are harder to locate,they are less easily dissuaded. As a recent report fromthe Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’sNonproliferation Program noted: “the nexus of great-est danger comes at the intersection of terrorists andstate stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materi-als. It remains very difficult for a terrorist group toproduce nuclear weapons material on its own.Therefore, the security and elimination of state stock-piles of weapons and weapon-usable materials mustbecome the primary objective.”61 Most stockpiles ofweapons-grade material are not held by rogue or out-law states but rather by entities otherwise seen assympathetic to the United States, such as therepublics of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, andcivilian nuclear power facilities throughout the world.The Bush administration has been unwilling to allo-cate greater funding for WMD threat reduction pro-grams, which now cost about $1 billion annually.62

At the same time, one should not overestimate thelikelihood of terrorists using weapons of massdestruction in an attack. An excessive focus on aWMD attack may lead to inadequate preparationsfor defending against attacks utilizing conventionalweapons. Though terrifying to contemplate, the lowprobability/high consequence WMD attacks may notrepresent the most significant terrorist threats. Moreappropriate risk and threat assessments are necessaryto be able to develop appropriate strategies and toprioritize spending effectively.

On the global level, the Bush administration has beenhostile to most arms control and disarmament efforts,including the Biological and Chemical WeaponsConventions, the ABM Treaty, and the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. Strengthening these regimes, howev-er, represents one of the best means of preventingaccess by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, reforms of the export control processshould mean strengthening the current U.S. systemand pursuing better multilateral controls. Especiallyin this time of heightened security risks, the questionthe U.S. government should be asking is whethercurrent controls will keep arms, technology, and


weapon components out of the hands of terroristsand away from unstable regimes. To do so wouldrequire not only improving controls over U.S. equip-ment but ensuring that recipients of U.S. defensegoods and services share U.S. values and protect sen-sitive U.S. equipment. It would mean creating a trulytransparent system, so the public can provide essen-tial commentary on arms transfers. And it wouldmean working with other nations to establish inter-national arms control regimes of the highest quality.63


Extend the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. militaryassistance to foreign military units that violatehuman rights with impunity, to all weapons trans-fers and make it permanent. Since 1997, the

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act has pre-vented U.S. military aid from going to foreignmilitary units where there is credible evidence ofhuman rights abuses. The law is intended to pre-vent those specifically accused of abuses from ben-efiting from U.S. security assistance. But the lawwould be more effective if it prevented all militaryequipment—no matter who paid for it—fromgoing to such units. It should also be made per-manent instead of needing to be reapproved on anannual basis.

Follow through on the International Code ofConduct Act, which passed as part of the FY2001State Department Authorization Act and directedthe State Department to pursue a multilateralagreement on arms transfers. The agreement was

Box 7: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Among the component documents of the Bush administration’s national security policy, this one is framed most openlyas including elements that represent a “fundamental change from the past.” The most important is “our new concept ofdeterrence,” namely the doctrine asserting the right of the United States to commit preemptive strikes against those sus-pected of planning to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its friends, or its allies. The documentasserts that some states that sponsor terrorism have WMDs and see them as militarily useful weapons of choice toovercome the overwhelming U.S. advantage in conventional forces. The first element of the Bush strategy is counterpro-liferation. This encompasses interdiction by using military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement tools to preventWMD transfer to hostile states and terrorist organizations; deterrence, which reserves the right to respond to the use ofWMDs against the United States, its friends, or its allies with “all options” (sanctioning a U.S. nuclear strike in responseto a chemical or biological attack); and defense and mitigation, again permitting preemptive measures against potentialfuture attacks as well as active defenses to disrupt or destroy WMDs en route to their targets.

The nonproliferation component of the strategy advocates international action to strengthen the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Threat Reduction cooperative programs. Theadministration’s track record gives reason to suspect that rather than taking a leadership role in these efforts, the UnitedStates may, as with the Kyoto Protocols, use the failure of other nations to act as a reason for its own inaction. Thestrategy’s call for “constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention” will presum-ably continue to emphasize voluntary measures that don’t require inspections of U.S. manufacturers. The section onexport controls promises to give “full weight to both nonproliferation and commercial interests,” that is, the interests ofU.S. weapons exporters.

This policy outline acknowledged that its new doctrine of preemptive deterrence would require improved intelligenceand strengthened alliances. It is worth noting that the administration then proceeded to implement the doctrine in Iraq onthe basis of intelligence that was flawed and in a way that has left our alliances substantially weakened.

Source: White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf>.


supposed to prevent arms from going to states thatdo not respect human rights, are engaged in actsof armed aggression, or support terrorism or theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Under the Clinton administration, the StateDepartment began informal discussions withEuropean exporters regarding such an agreement.But beyond a U.S.-E.U. Declaration onResponsibility in Arms Exports issued at theDecember 2000 U.S.-E.U. Summit, no realprogress has been made, and the code appears tohave been put on the back burner. The StateDepartment should recommence talks with othermajor arms exporters about international norma-tive controls, perhaps beginning with a formalcommitment to use the criteria set out in theEuropean Union’s Code of Conduct.

Develop an international arms trade treaty. Althoughthe International Code of Conduct is intended tobe politically binding, the United States shouldalso endorse the idea of a legally binding treaty onthe arms trade. Arms control and human rightsgroups have already developed a draft treaty thatwould prohibit arms transfers where there is ahigh risk of weapons being used either to violateinternational human rights and humanitarian lawor to contravene the U.N. Charter’s rules onnonaggression and nonuse of force. This drafttreaty sets out minimum core standards designedto prevent the most egregious arms transfers. It isbased on the international legal principle that anystate aiding another state in the violation of inter-national law (in this case through the transfer ofweapons used in the violation) shares in theresponsibility for the illegal act.

Strengthen the conventions for control, nonprolifera-tion, and elimination of weapons of mass destruc-tion and their delivery systems, including theChemical and Biological Weapons Conventions,the Missile Technology Control Regime, theFissile Material Control Regime, the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty, and the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. This includes enhancing verifica-tion measures and reporting requirements, increas-ing transparency, and insuring adequate resourcesfor agencies responsible for onsite inspections.

Support the action agenda for the G-8 GlobalPartnership against the Spread of Weapons andMaterials of Mass Destruction and other multilat-eral initiatives to combat proliferation, as outlinedin a series of recent reports on nonproliferation.(see Box 7).64

End efforts to build a National Missile Defense sys-tem (also known as “Star Wars”) and redirectfunds to nonproliferation efforts.

Increase funding for the Defense Threat ReductionAgency and other efforts to monitor and controlweapons material in the former Soviet Union, andprovide funding for engaging former Sovietweapons scientists in peaceful, commercially sus-tainable activities.

Ratify the Protocol on the Illicit Manufacture orTrafficking in Firearms to the Convention onOrganized Crime, which the United States has notsigned. Implement the action plan on small armsapproved at the recent U.N. conference on thetrade in small arms.65

Support the efforts of the new independent interna-tional commission on weapons of mass destruc-tion proposed by the Swedish government, chairedby Hans Blix, that was set up in the fall of 2003.

B. Strengthen International and National Legal Systems to Hold Terrorists Accountable

An effective response to terrorism requires strength-ening the national and international legal infrastruc-ture necessary to identify and prosecute the individu-als and organizations that facilitate, finance, perpe-trate, and profit from terrorism. A strengthenedUnited Nations should be the primary instrument forpursuing this objective. Unilateralist elements withinthe U.S. Congress and a lack of enthusiasm by mem-bers of the administration have been major obstaclesto a more sustained and constructive U.S. engage-ment with the U.N. system. In the immediate after-math of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administrationmade an apparent U-turn with respect to the UnitedNations, suddenly recognizing its importance incombating terrorism. For example, there are 10 major


U.N. conventions and two protocols dating back to1963 related to terrorism. (see Appendix 2). BeforeSeptember 11, 2001, only two countries were partiesto all 12 instruments. By the end of 2002, 16 coun-tries, including the United States, had become partiesto each of the 12 conventions and protocols.(Currently over 40 countries are parties to all 12). Inaddition to its rapid campaign to ratify counterterror-ism conventions, Washington supported a series ofU.N. Security Council resolutions identifying com-mitments for countries to help combat terrorism. (seeAppendix 3).

But that momentary honeymoon seems to haveended with the debate over the invasion of Iraq andwith the Bush administration’s ongoing campaign toundermine the International Criminal Court. Suchmoves weaken the international legal architecture thatrepresents a globalization of America’s firm principlesand beliefs in the centrality of the rule of law.Revelations of torture sanctioned by Bush adminis-tration personnel and efforts to exempt U.S. troopsfrom Geneva Convention restrictions in waging the“war on terrorism” have also raised legitimate ques-tions over the seriousness of the Bush administration’scommitment to international law.


Encourage international police cooperation and bol-ster Interpol, while avoiding repression of politicaldissidents; expand extradition treaties, while pro-tecting the rights of dissidents to gain asylum inexile; and strengthen law enforcement cooperationwith other countries in counterterrorism efforts.

Strengthen the U.N. Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and work to create anorganization within the U.N. that is solely respon-sible for issues relating to terrorism, with a focuson monitoring compliance with U.N. conventionson international terrorism.

Promote the adoption of the Princeton Principles onUniversal Jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes againsthumanity under international law, in nationalcourts, and based on universal jurisdiction.66

Strengthen institutions of international law by pro-posing the creation of a specialized tribunal for

judging international terrorists, joining theInternational Criminal Court, ratifying humanrights conventions, and increasing financing forthe U.N. human rights regime.

Exercise military force only to implement the rule oflaw under an international legal framework.Going to war is always legitimate, if there is immi-nent danger of an attack, but otherwise the use ofmilitary force should be a last resort.

The Use of Force and Preemption

A major weakening of the international legal archi-tecture as it relates to security comes from the Bushadministration’s elevation of preemption [actuallypreventive war] to a policy doctrine as part of thenational security strategy in general and for combat-ing terrorism in particular. This has actually reducedrather than increased U.S. security in several ways.First, it reinforces the image of the United States astoo quick to use military force and to do so outsidethe bounds of international law and legitimacy. Thiscan make it more difficult for the United States togain international support for its use of force and,over the long term, may lead others to resist U.S. for-eign policy goals more broadly, including efforts tofight terrorism. Second, elevating preemption to thelevel of a formal doctrine may increase the adminis-tration’s inclination to reach for the military lever as afirst choice, even when other tools still have a goodchance of working. Third, advocating preemptionwarns potential enemies to hide the very assets thatU.S. leaders might wish to take preemptive actionagainst or to defend the country from. Finally, if theUnited States enshrines preemption as a core policydoctrine, it legitimates the policy’s adoption by othercountries, which increases overall global instabilityand reduces security, as other countries are embold-ened to justify attacks on their enemies as preemptivein nature. (see Box 8).

Let us be clear: preempting terrorist attacks throughthe use of intelligence and police enforcement meth-ods is to be valued as an important component in thestruggle against terrorism. But there needs to be a dif-ferent emphasis on the use of military force than theBush administration’s focus on preventive war.67

Deterrence should be the first step, recognizing that


preemption is always legitimate under internationallaw, if there is a clear and demonstrable imminentthreat. The leadership of al-Qaida and similar groupsmay not be deterrable and may require a militaryresponse. If so, that use of force should have specificauthorization from the United Nations SecurityCouncil, should include specific goals and a timeline, and should be under U.N. control. Any exerciseof force should adhere to international humanitarianlaw and the principles of the “just war” tradition.These principles require that: the objective must beto establish peace, not to exact retribution or revenge;the force used must be only the level necessary toachieve a military objective, not to inflict unnecessarysuffering; the weapons used must discriminatebetween combatants and noncombatants; and everyeffort must be taken to avoid killing civilians.68


Support the creation of a U.N. Rapid DeploymentPolice and Security Force.

Follow the steps outlined in international law whenconfronting states accused of sponsoring terror-ism, as was done with regard to Libya followingthe bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Unilateralactions through aid, trade, and sanctions policiesor the use of military force are not prohibited, butsuch actions should be grounded in internationallaw, and, all things being equal, multilateral actionis preferred to unilateral action.69

Limit the Ability of Terrorists to Mobilize FinancialResources: In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, theBush administration has supported a series of multi-

Box 8: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

By focusing on efforts to interdict terrorists outside of U.S. borders, this broad policy blueprint is intended to complementthe National Strategy for Homeland Security, which addresses security within U.S. borders. The National Strategy forCombating Terrorism outlines an array of methods for dismantling terrorist networks and bringing terrorists to justice:coordinating intelligence through the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, using carrots (incentives) and sticks(diplomatic and military pressure) to induce compliance among states suspected of harboring terrorists, and shuttingdown terrorist financial channels. The national security state is alive and well: All bilateral and multilateral discussionsundertaken by all federal government departments and agencies are to include combating terrorism as a standard agen-da item. There is even rhetorical attention given to addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism through economicand political development efforts; however, only market-based economies are interpreted as anti-terrorist mechanisms.

The State Department—working with U.S. military regional commanders—is given the lead role in coordinating region-al strategies with international partners. As part of this strategy, the United States promises increased anti-terrorist train-ing to foreign police and military forces. However, U.S. citizens have experienced counterterrorism being used to justifyconstrictions of their own civil liberties, and the history of U.S. foreign military training indicates that the current countert-errorist mission may likewise be used overseas as one more pretext for violations of human rights.

The strategy endorses the 12 U.N. counterterrorism protocols and gives particular mention to the international stan-dards for combating terrorism contained in UNSCR 1373. Yet, although “expand[ing] our law enforcement effort to cap-ture, detain and prosecute known and suspected terrorists” is a declared priority, the principal international institutiondedicated in part to that purpose, the International Criminal Court, is ignored.

Released on the eve of an Iraq war defined as the new centerpiece of the war on terrorism, the strategy proclaimedthat “we will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might.” However, the post-Sept. 11 expenditure ratio ofmilitary to nonmilitary activities allocated to combat terrorism, well over 5-to-1, would certainly dispute this declared intent.

Source: White House, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf>.


lateral, bilateral, and domestic initiatives to target thefinancial assets of terrorist organizations. This is animportant first step, and it reflects a 180-degree turn-about from the administration’s prior opposition toincreased monitoring of money laundering andtougher regulation of tax havens and offshore finan-cial centers. Under provisions of the USA PATRIOTAct, the United States came into full compliance atthe end of 2003 with all of the recommendationsthat require special action by the leading internation-al group working on money laundering and terroristfinancing, the Financial Action Task Force.70

Some terrorist groups, such as those in Europe, EastAsia, and Latin America, rely principally on commoncriminal activities including extortion, kidnapping,narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and fraud. Othergroups, such as those in the Middle East, rely prima-rily on commercial enterprises, donations, and fundsskimmed from charitable organizations both tofinance their activities and to move materiel and per-sonnel. Still other groups rely on state sponsors forfunding. In this latter case, a more sophisticatedapproach is required to combat terrorist financing,including efforts to regulate the trade in conflict dia-monds or to develop alternatives to crops like opiumpoppies and coca. Confronting state-funded terror-ism also requires greater exercise of diplomatic skills,technical assistance, and foreign aid than the Bushadministration has been willing to provide.71

Several recent reports have detailed weaknesses ofthe broader efforts to crack down on terrorist financ-ing.72 The U.S. General Accounting Office, the inves-tigative arm of Congress, concluded that federalauthorities were struggling to halt terrorist fundingand still did not have a clear understanding of howterrorists move their financial assets. According to theUnited Nations Monitoring Group, “al-Qaeda con-tinues to receive funds it needs from charities, deep-pocket donors and business and criminal activities,including the drug trade. Extensive use is still beingmade of alternative remittance systems, and al-Qaedahas shifted much of its financial activity to areas inAfrica, the Middle East and South-East Asia wherethe authorities lack the resources or the resolve toclosely regulate such activity.”73

There has been a dramatic expansion of legislationto combat money laundering and terrorist financingat global, regional, and national levels. Except injurisdictions that do not have adequate legislation,the major emphasis at the moment needs to be oninsuring effective implementation. This is the casewith many poor countries, which are still buildingthe capacity of regulators and law enforcement. Insuch an effort, international cooperation is essential.As a senior Treasury Department official toldCongress on March 24, 2004, “we have found thatour success is also dependent on the political will andresources of other governments.”74 Both the Bushadministration’s broader failure to support multilater-alism and the growing anti-American sentimentworldwide hamper such cooperation. The UnitedStates needs to be a leader in this realm, but suchefforts are hindered both practically and symbolicallywhen it wasn’t until 2004 that the Office of ForeignAssets Control, the bureau of the U.S. Treasury pri-marily responsible for combating terrorist finance,deployed more personnel to combat illegal financialflows to al-Qaida and other organizations involved interrorism than to tracking illegal flows to Cuba.75


Implement all the recommendations of the FinancialAction Task Force, support the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development’s initia-tive on tax havens, and increase transparency ininternational financial flows.76

Ratify the International Convention on the Suppressionof Financing of Terrorism and the U.N.Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,both of which the United States has signed.

Work with the Bank for International Settlements tofacilitate greater international cooperation amongcentral banks in order to develop effective meansto monitor financial flows.

Support the activities of the Egmont Group (the networkof government agencies responsible for addressingmoney laundering) with both funding and techni-cal assistance in order to expand the capacities ofother nations to combat money laundering.


C. Defend and Promote Democracy atHome and Abroad

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a littletemporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.

Benjamin Franklin, 1759

Counterterrorist and anti-terrorist efforts shouldnot sacrifice the very values Americans are trying todefend while combating terrorism. Washington mustlisten closely to the mounting concerns of civil liber-tarians and constitutional rights groups who cautionthat the new counterterrorism campaign may lead toa garrison state that undermines all that Americastands for while doing little to protect citizens againstunconventional threats.

Many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Actgo far beyond what previous anti-terrorist commis-sions have prescribed regarding the need to expandlaw enforcement’s power to fight terrorism. Forexample, bipartisan commissions—such as theAdvisory Panel to Assess Domestic ResponseCapabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons ofMass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission) and theNational Commission on Terrorism (the BremerCommission)—noted that already-existing guidelinesfor FBI investigations regarding terrorism were “ade-quate in scope.” The commissions’ reports emphasizethe more difficult—but more important—tasks ofeffective cooperation and management of interagencyinvestigations and improved coordination among lawenforcement agencies at both the domestic and inter-national levels. Such low-profile, low-impact activitiesrequire greater attention but don’t translate intosound bites and press coverage.

Popular opposition to the chilling impact of theUSA PATRIOT Act and to executive orders on civilliberties has led numerous states, cities, towns, andcounties to pass resolutions demanding that local lawenforcement not implement the provisions of thoseregulations that infringe on civil rights.77 Such effortsindicate how out-of-step the Bush administration iswith the broad American public regarding the bal-ance between liberty and security.

In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks,the Bush administration arrested or detained morethan 1,200 people, although the government hasrefused to disclose exactly how many were appre-hended, who they are, or what has happened to all ofthem. Of these 1,200, at least 762 foreigners whowere inside the United States illegally were detainedas part of the FBI’s investigation. More than 500have been deported so far. A recent audit by theinspector general at the Justice Department found“significant problems” with the detentions, includingallegations of physical abuse. Only one of thedetained foreigners, Zacarias Moussaoui, has beencharged with a terrorism-related crime.

These roundups failed to locate terrorists and dam-aged one of the country’s greatest potential assets inthe war on terrorism: the communities of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans. The overemphasison the immigration system as a tool of border securi-ty has resulted in the arrest of a large number ofnoncitizens on grounds not related to domestic secu-rity. This approach has been largely ineffective andhas provided the nation with a false sense of security.

In some cases, the administration simply usedimmigration law as a proxy for criminal law enforce-ment, circumventing constitutional safeguards. Inother cases, the government seems to have acted outof political expediency, creating a false appearance ofeffectiveness without regard to the cost. The govern-ment’s major successes in apprehending terroristshave not come from post-Sept. 11 immigration ini-tiatives but from other efforts, such as internationalintelligence activities, law enforcement cooperation,and information provided by arrests made abroad.

Washington’s harsh measures against immigrantssince September 11, 2001, have failed to make U.S.citizens safer, have violated fundamental civil liber-ties, have weakened the economy, have reducedworldwide support for the United States, and haveundermined national unity.78 In terms of the econo-my, the costs can include the potential to reduce thenumber of foreign workers and foreign students inscience and technology, thereby possibly reducingincome to U.S. higher education institutions and,ultimately, the strength and dynamism of a futureU.S. science and technology workforce. Half of all


doctoral degrees in engineering, mathematics, andcomputer science are issued to foreign students, andunnecessarily restrictive immigration rules have madeit more difficult for them to work here, reducingpotential productivity in the U.S. economy.

Not satisfied with the new powers granted to itunder the USA PATRIOT Act, the JusticeDepartment drafted the Domestic SecurityEnhancement Act of 2003 (or PATRIOT Act II),which would continue to reduce checks and balanceson presidential power and which contains severalmeasures of questionable effectiveness that continueto erode civil liberties.79 When the draft of PATRIOTAct II was leaked, a public outcry forced AttorneyGeneral Ashcroft to withdraw his explicit support.But parts of the legislation are now being submittedas amendments to other bills.

It is possible both to defend the country and toprotect core American values and principles, butdoing so requires a different approach, an approachthat does not sacrifice the very values that terroristsseek to destroy, thereby granting them a de facto vic-tory. A new approach would recognize that a balancebetween liberty and security need not require sacrific-ing the former for the latter, and it would refuse tosacrifice the fundamental elements of transparencyand accountability, which are necessary for democra-cy to remain vital. Specific initiatives should:

Review the USA PATRIOT Act’s amendments to theForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowing sur-veillance where foreign intelligence is a “significantpurpose.”

Pass legislation that preserves those provisions of theUSA PATRIOT Act that do not violate civil rightsprovisions and are effective against terrorism, suchas the Civil Liberties Restoration Act and theSecurity and Freedom Ensured (SAFE) Act.80

Oppose the use of military commissions to try terroristsuspects under existing military orders and instruc-tions. Such trials would undermine the basic rightsof defendants to a fair trial, would yield verdicts—possibly including death sentences—of question-able legitimacy, and would deliver a dangerousmessage worldwide that the fight against terrorismneed not respect the rule of law.

Regarding foreign policy, the administration’sapproach to combating terrorism should embodyrespect for the very human rights that Americadefends and promotes at home. This means that citi-zens should loudly proclaim opposition to religiousextremism and to actions taken in its name, no mat-ter who is the perpetrator. This also means that citi-zens should reject zealous policies that underminehuman rights norms—including inflicting casualtieson innocent civilians—in the name of a war on ter-rorism, such as proposals for lifting restrictions onthe CIA to allow assassinations and the hiring ofhuman rights violators—both measures that the CIAhas itself rejected.

In forging international coalitions against terrorism,the administration must not ease restrictions on theprovision of military aid, weapons, and militarytraining to regimes that systematically violate humanrights. According to Human Rights Watch, both theexecutive and legislative branches “have taken steps toloosen legal controls on foreign military assistance,paving the way for future arms transfers to govern-ments that are known human rights abusers.”81 Thisis clearly the wrong path to take. Instead, the UnitedStates should strengthen the international legal andhuman rights regimes and should evaluate its ownforeign policies in light of those norms.

In a positive step, the U.N. Security Council has madecounterterrorist measures mandatory for all states.However, it has excluded human rights from the workof its Counter Terrorism Committee. Many regionalorganizations have adopted their own counterterroristprograms, often with sweeping definitions of terror-ism and no reference to human rights. Some U.N.human rights bodies and experts have raised concernsbut have been unable, by virtue of their limited man-dates, to present a comprehensive analysis.

The U.S. should be at the forefront of insuring thatcounterterrorism operations are intimately linkedwith human rights concerns. It should insure ade-quate support for the newly created post of an inde-pendent expert to assist both individual nations andthe U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights inmaking recommendations on states’ obligations topromote and protect human rights while counteringterrorism. The United States should also insure that


the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee expands itsscope to include monitoring the impact of countert-errorist measures on human rights.82

D. Attack Root Causes

Combating terrorism requires looking beyond anyone terrorist event—horrific as it may be—to addressthe broader socioeconomic, political, and militarycontexts from which terrorism emerges. Because ter-rorism is a particular kind of violent act aimed atachieving a political objective, a preventive strategymust also address its political roots. Addressing rootcauses is neither a panacea nor appeasement but isinstead both a pragmatic effort to address the condi-tions that enable terrorism and a normative commit-ment to shape government policies to embody thevalues that America espouses. A focus on addressingthe political origins of terrorism does not mean thatU.S. and international authorities should refrain fromhunting down those responsible for terrorist acts. Thesuccess of these policies will only be fully realizedwhen there are no more breeding grounds for terror-ist politics.

U.S. policy must recognize a distinction betweeninternational terrorism in general and the specificthreat posed by al-Qaida and other extremist Islamistmovements. Care must be taken to insure that theUnited States is not perceived as waging a war onIslam, and attention must be focused on the contrastbetween illegitimate demands and legitimatedemands pursued through illegitimate means. Theanti-democratic and jihadist character of al-Qaida’sideology suggests that even if the United States wereto pursue the kinds of alternative policies outlinedhere, Americans would still be targets of attacks bycommitted members of al-Qaida and similar groups.Some political and economic contexts that nurture ortrigger terrorism include: repressive political regimes,which limit the opportunities for nonviolent expres-sions of political grievances; failed and failing states,which provide terrorists with unregulated arenas foroperations; poverty and inequality, which canenhance support for terrorist acts and provide asource of recruits, even though poverty itself does notcause terrorism; and efforts by one country to institu-

tionalize a position of global dominance, includingthrough alliances with repressive regimes. Addressingroot causes is one way of insuring that the efforts ofterrorist groups to mobilize support meet as inhos-pitable a social, economic, and political climate aspossible.


1. Strengthen and Democratize InternationalBodies for Effective Global Governance:

By proclaiming global dominance as its overarchingstrategic objective, the United States has made itself atarget. Bush’s pursuit of the preventive war doctrineas the foundation of such dominance—embodied inthe invasion and occupation of Iraq—can be used tojustify the argument that the current “war on terror-ism” is in fact a war on Islam. And Washington’s cur-rent foreign policy has further reinforced the beliefsof those who argue that the United States is an impe-rial power intent on holding itself above the law.

In addition to strengthening the U.N. and othermultilateral institutions, the United States mustreconfigure its approach to security. We suggest adual focus: on the cooperative arrangements neces-sary to insure our protection in an era of internation-al terrorist networks with global reach, and on deter-rence against possible threats from state antagonists.Such efforts require a vibrant network of global,regional, and bilateral alliances whereby the securityof the world strengthens the security of America.

2. End Support for Repressive Regimes:

Longstanding U.S. government support for repres-sive regimes—particularly in the Arab world, but inthe Muslim world more broadly—has facilitated con-ditions where terrorism can emerge. U.S. support forautocratic governments such as Saudi Arabia,Pakistan, and Indonesia under Suharto closed offnonviolent forms of political competition among thelocal citizens. Local rulers, like those in Saudi Arabia,have largely turned a blind eye to the financing ofmovements and organizations that promote anti-democratic ideologies and, in some cases, engage interrorist acts. Washington must, in both word and


deed, make a clean break with its history of supportfor such regimes throughout the world.

Despite claims by the Bush administration and oth-ers that poverty is a key cause of terrorism (a pointwe discuss in more detail below), it is political condi-tions that most shape terrorism. As a NationalAcademy of Sciences study noted, “terrorism and itssupporting audiences appear to be fostered by policiesof extreme political repression and discouraged bypolicies of incorporating both dissident and moderategroups into civil society and the political process.”83

Similarly, the global projection of U.S. militarypower abroad, represented by a growing archipelagoof overseas military bases, often serves as a physicalreminder of U.S. political and military support forrepressive governments. Recognizing that this in noway absolves terrorists of culpability in their attacks,reorienting U.S. policy along the lines of respectingbasic human rights and democratic freedoms couldstill contribute to easing—not eliminating—the con-ditions associated with terrorism.

Let us be clear: democracy is not a panacea, nor arethere any panaceas for combating terrorism.Democratic countries such as Spain, Italy, Japan, andGermany have confronted sustained activities by ter-rorist organizations. Furthermore, there is no reasonto believe that increased democracy will necessarily,in the short term, lead to a decline in radical Islamistpolitical movements that oppose many U.S. policies,including U.S. support for Israel. But increasing thepolitical space for nonviolent political conflict is thebest long-term solution for minimizing the choice byeither organizations or individuals to use terrorism toadvance their goals.

As a global power, the United States is always likelyto be a potential target for terrorists, whatever poli-cies Washington pursues. America’s best defense is toinsure that its foreign policies defend and promotebasic human rights and democracy. This is bothbecause these values embody the best of America andbecause when democratic institutions are present andhuman rights are respected, terrorism of any sort isless likely. When Washington’s policies underminerather than promote human rights and democratic

institutions, the United States is more likely tobecome a target of terrorists.

The kinds of policies that would be most effective inreducing U.S. support for repressive regimes wouldinclude: withholding military aid and opposing weaponssales to countries that systematically violate basichuman rights; increasing support for human rightsand democracy in North Africa, the Middle East,Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Colombia, and else-where through bilateral and multilateral initiatives;reducing the dependence of the United States and itsallies on oil imports from repressive governments.

3. Deal with Failed States:

Since the early 1990s, wars involving failed stateshave resulted in the deaths of about 8 million peo-ple—most of them civilians—while displacing anoth-er 4 million. These states include Afghanistan,Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, andthe Sudan, where those impoverished, malnourished,and deprived of fundamental needs such as security,health care, and education number in the hundredsof millions. Before the toppling of the World TradeCenter buildings, the issue of failed states was rou-tinely framed as an issue of humanitarian concern(i.e., refugees and reconstruction). But the events ofSeptember 11 and its aftermath have placed the issueof failed states squarely in the mainstream of tradi-tional “national security” policy both in the UnitedStates and abroad. Although foreshadowed by earliersecurity strategy documents under the Clintonadministration, post-Sept. 11 concern over failedstates has dominated policy debates regarding securi-ty, development, humanitarian intervention, and thebalance of unilateral and multilateral approaches toforeign policy.84

Failed states have become central elements of con-cern for security policy for several reasons: they canserve as operational bases and safe-havens for interna-tional terrorists; they can often spawn wider regionalconflicts, which can substantially weaken security andretard development in their subregions; and they caninduce significant costs for the United States in termsof refugee flows, lost trade and investment opportu-nities, increased spread of infectious diseases,


weapons proliferation, billions of dollars in humani-tarian aid, and the emergence of regional complexesof war and organized crime.

The failure of the Bush administration to developan effective strategy to deal with the complex securitychallenges posed by failed, failing, and flailing statesis by now apparent and illustrates, yet again, the dan-gers of framing efforts to combat terrorism as a “waron terrorism.” The Afghanistan situation, and thebroader reality that weak and failing states can pro-vide enabling conditions for the operations of terror-ist networks, has highlighted the need for increasingthe U.N.’s capacity to engage in peace enforcement,peacekeeping, and other “nation-building” activities.Yet Washington remains unwilling to expand supportfor U.N. peacekeeping operations. MichaelO’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimates thatthe world should double its capacity to engage inpeacekeeping operations, which would provide avaluable and constructive role for U.S. military assis-tance that might otherwise be channeled to repressivegovernments.85 These missions are important notonly for humanitarian reasons but for national securi-ty ones as well—to deprive terrorists of sanctuariesand sources of income (from diamonds, drug trading,and the like) that they can often obtain in failed orfailing states.


Strengthen the multilateral forces involved inAfghanistan to provide the security necessary forreconstruction and development; and

Expand support for peacekeeping initiatives throughthe U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability OperationsInstitute at Carlisle Barracks and expand militaryassistance aimed at strengthening other countries’efforts to engage in peacekeeping operations.

4. Reorient U.S. Policy in the Middle East andCentral Asia:

U.S. policy in the Middle East and Central Asiamust also shift. Such a reorientation would includeefforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction andto address the political grievances behind continuingunrest in the region. But U.S. efforts to advance

democratic politics in the Middle East face a seriouscredibility gap due to Washington’s longstanding sup-port for authoritarian regimes in the region, its con-tinued support for the Israeli occupation, and itsinvasion and occupation of Iraq, exacerbated by reve-lations of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.86 As the U.S.Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Araband Muslim World highlighted in its October 2003report, “hostility toward America [in the Muslimworld] has reached shocking levels.”87

Such a reorientation is perfectly compatible withopposing the bigotry embodied in both al-Qaida’sand other extremist groups’ opposition to Israel’s exis-tence. Washington should continue its strategic andmoral commitment to Israel’s right to exist, but thereis a distinction between a country’s right to exist andits decision to occupy neighboring lands (i.e., theWest Bank and Gaza). Support for the Israeli occupa-tion plays a major role in fueling anti-Americanextremism, sentiments that al-Qaida has opportunis-tically used to its own advantage. For example, it wasnot until Osama bin Laden’s fourth call to arms,issued on the eve of the bombardment of Afghanistanon October 7, 2001, that he focused on Israel’s occu-pation of Palestinian lands.88 U.S. credibility in theregion and prospects for advancing other objectivesare essentially nil until a political settlement isreached in Palestine. As Thomas Carothers has noted,“Real progress with the credibility gap probably can-not be achieved without a substantial rebalancing ofthe U.S. approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,which appears unlikely to occur under the Bushadministration.”89

At the rhetorical level, the Bush administration hasacknowledged the valuable role that democracy canplay in reducing the attractiveness of terrorism. Bush’sinitiatives include: a new aid program—the MiddleEast Partnership Initiative—to support democraticchange, the reorientation of existing aid programs inthe Arab world to sharpen their pro-democratic con-tent, a diplomatic stance consisting of giving greaterpraise to those Arab governments that do take posi-tive political steps and putting a little more pressureon those that do not, and a new push to promoteArab economic reform and free trade (with the hope


that improved economic conditions will, over thelong term, stimulate political reform).

Iraq is not likely to serve as a demonstration projectfor democratization in the region, even if a stabledemocracy is installed, which does not seem likely inthe foreseeable future, because Iraq does not representa model of internally generated democratization thatcould be emulated elsewhere in the region, as hap-pened in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the1980s and 1990s. Instead, “it hinges on the muchless appealing example of what the application ofenormous foreign military force and subsequentpolitical intervention and economic aid can makepossible.”90

Moreover, the Bush administration’s predilection forunilateralism has weakened even its small efforts at pro-moting democratic reform in the region. After a draftcopy of its Greater Middle East initiative was leakedin February 2004, the White House had to quicklybackpedal.91 The final version of the Broader MiddleEast and North Africa Initiative has been largelydefanged of any significant goals or benchmarks. Inmoving ahead, the Bush administration would dobetter to work with the Europeans and to start withsmaller, focused initiatives. As Thomas Carothersnotes, “The effort can succeed only if it eschewssome of the signature elements of that campaign todate, such as the dubious philosophy of ‘you’re eitherwith us or against us’ and the misguided notion thatcreating fear in the Arab world breeds respect.”92


End U.S. financial and military backing for theIsraeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza;

Advocate Palestinian self-determination and a negoti-ated settlement as outlined in U.N. SecurityCouncil resolutions;

Spearhead efforts to create a zone free from weaponsof mass destruction in the Middle East;

Strengthen the multilateral forces involved inAfghanistan to provide the security necessary forreconstruction and development;

Set an immediate timetable for the withdrawal ofU.S. troops from Iraq and channel support prima-

rily through the United Nations to promotereconstruction and development;

Encourage Iraqi efforts to form a Truth andReconciliation Commission, a tribunal, or someother mechanism to hold accountable those guiltyof crimes against humanity and other human rightsviolations. An immediate step would be to openthe files on all U.S. government involvement andrelations with the reign of Saddam Hussein; and

Underwrite efforts to provide secular and nonsectari-an education as an alternative to religious schoolsthat promote violent jihadist ideologies.

5. Address Poverty and Inequality:

An expansion of broad-based development canweaken local support for terrorist activities and dis-courage terrorist recruits. Sincere, bottom-up, indige-nous-guided development can thwart efforts by ter-rorist groups to entice destitute recruits by offeringsocial services or financial incentives. On the otherhand, promises of development that are unfulfilled orunderfunded, or development projects and programsthat exacerbate inequalities and grievances, can back-fire and actually reinforce support for extremistgroups.93 Current research suggests that there is noeasy, generalizable conclusion in either direction, butpoverty deserves to be fought on its own terms, inde-pendent of its connections, presumed or otherwise,to terrorism.

The Bush administration has justified its push forgreater free trade on the grounds that free tradereduces poverty, which in turn reduces terrorism.There is good reason to doubt all the connections inthat syllogism.94 In September 2002, the administra-tion included a chapter in its National SecurityStrategy of the United States of America on theimportance of trade and investment liberalization inthe fight against terrorism. The argument is based onthe unfounded claim that the current approach toglobalization reduces poverty.

According to the World Bank, extreme povertyincreased in every region of the developing worldoutside Asia during the past decade, a period whennearly all countries pursued reforms aimed at open-ing their countries to the global economy. Excluding


China, which still maintains strong governmentintervention in many areas of its economy, the num-ber of extremely poor people in the developing worldincreased in the 1990s. So it is entirely unclear thatthe Bush administration’s emphasis on trade liberal-ization has had a significant impact on reducingpoverty. Furthermore, there appears to be greater evi-dence that terrorism on the part of subnationalgroups is associated with political repression, especial-ly the repression of efforts to articulate national andreligious identities.95

Development policies that weaken states’ capacitiesto insure access to, or provision of, basic services cancreate conditions in which terrorist groups can moreeasily mobilize support. At the global level, the Bushadministration should end its support for trade andinvestment agreements that reinforce the discreditedpolicies of the Washington Consensus. Instead, theUnited States should reorient discussions at bilateral,regional, and global economic organizations and meet-ings toward creating a multilateral framework moreconducive to the development of poor countries.96

Washington should also reduce the debt owed to itby developing countries, champion debt reductionefforts at the international financial institutions, andseek an end to structural adjustment lending by theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Critics may note that such an agenda does notaddress the root causes of terrorism, since poor peo-ple are not, by and large, leaders of terrorist move-ments, or even, in the case of al-Qaida, the actualfoot soldiers in attacks such as the Sept. 11 skyjack-ings. Furthermore, critics argue, even the countries oforigin of the Sept. 11 highjackers do not rank amongthe poorest countries. But anti-poverty policies andprograms are one important element of the broaderarsenal of anti-terror programs, embodying, if noth-ing else, a healthy dose of enlightened self-interest.

An effective strategy to combat terrorism would pro-mote a policy agenda including the following threedistinct but related poverty-alleviation approaches:

First, although rarely drawn from the poorest of thepoor, terrorists can use poor peoples’ grievances to

legitimate terrorist actions and to raise funds aspart of their proclaimed efforts at combatingpoverty or providing relief and welfare programsto communities that are neither reached by eco-nomic growth nor helped by government pro-grams. Genuine, redistributive development canweaken the ability of terrorists to claim the mantleof legitimacy and can thereby serve to weakentheir cause.

Second, the United States can gain greater interna-tional cooperation in the effort to combat terror-ism if it is seen as a good partner with other coun-tries around issues of primary concern to themand their citizens. Poverty and development aresuch issues.

Third, carefully crafted development projects canhelp strengthen the capabilities of states whosecooperation is necessary in efforts to combat ter-rorist financing. Sustainable economic growth canbe both a source and a product of increasing statecapacity for regulation.

A commitment to this three-pronged approach woulddemonstrate that the United States is concernedabout the deepening social and economic polarizationaround the world and, instead of pursuing economicstrategies that contribute to these deepening divides,is committed to formulating policies that hold morepromise for the world’s poor and disenfranchised.Pursuing policies that strengthen the developmentaland democratic prospects for peoples worldwide willnot render America immune from terrorist attacks.But such a commitment would likely be more effec-tive in diminishing terrorist threats than a reliance onmilitary responses, and it would help solidify aworldwide alliance uniting Northern and Southernnations to hold terrorists accountable for theircrimes. Terrorists would then have nowhere to hide.

6. Promote Clean Energy:

The United States should pursue an energy policy athome and abroad that emphasizes conservation, ener-gy efficiency, and renewables and that makes itselfand its allies less reliant on imported oil supplies.97


The sobering reality of terrorism is that it consti-tutes a threat to individual, national, and internation-al security that can never be completely eliminated.Despite America’s best efforts, there will always beideologues, fanatics, and alienated groups that mayresort to terrorism to express their frustration and tomake their political point.

No single component of the framework outlinedabove is an adequate response to terrorism. Only byjoining all four strategies—pursuing prevention andpreparedness, strengthening the international frame-work for multilateral action, defending and promot-ing civil rights, and addressing root causes—will theU.S. government be able to tell the American peoplethat it is doing all that it can to prevent future terror-ist attacks. Our proposed security strategy would bemore effective at making the U.S. a safer place for allits citizens. It would also have the added advantagesof improving the nation’s quality of life by improvingpublic safety, health care, and air quality.

The 9/11 Commission has accomplished a greatdeal by placing this debate at the forefront of policydebates. But its recommendations focus somewhatnarrowly on intelligence operations and congressionaloversight without addressing the broader foreign poli-cy, military, and homeland security issues that areequally important to constructing an effectiveresponse to terrorism. Its contribution, while essen-tial, remains inadequate to forging the comprehensivestrategy necessary to effectively combat terrorism.

Combating terrorism should not become a crusadethat trumps all other policy concerns. Commitmentsto environmental protection, human rights, demo-cratic political transitions, economic development,poverty alleviation, disarmament, and gender equali-ty—to name a few of the stated U.S. policy goals—must remain strong. But neither can counterterrorismsimply be appended to these policy imperatives.

The challenge is to construct a national securitypolicy that demonstrates America’s new commitmentto protecting U.S. citizens by incorporating effectivecounterterror measures into the national securitystrategy. At the same time, American citizens mustdemand and U.S. foreign policy must assert arenewed commitment to constructing an internation-al framework of peace, justice, and security that locksterrorists out in the cold—with no home, no sup-porters, no money, and no rallying cry. With thatresponse, the events of September 11, 2001, willindeed have changed America and the world.

This framework for a new counterterrorism policyrepresents the views of FPIF co-directors and staffbut does not necessarily reflect the views of either theFPIF Advisory Committee or the board members ofFPIF’s two sponsoring organizations, theInterhemispheric Resource Center and the Institutefor Policy Studies. John Gershman, <[email protected]>, who is a co-director of Foreign Policy InFocus (online at www.fpif.org), was the principalauthor of this reform agenda along with EmiraWoods, Erik Leaver, Miriam Pemberton, EmilySchwartz Greco, Theo Rose, and Julie Ajinkya.

We appreciate the advice, comments, and criticismsoffered by Robert Alvarez, Sarah Anderson, TomBarry, Salih Booker, Elsbeth L. Bothe, JohnCavanagh, Marcus Corbin, David Cortright,Kristen Dawkins, Margot Dick, Lloyd J. Dumas,Rev. Dr. Robert W. Edgar, John Feffer, Van Gosse,William D. Hartung, Colleen Kelly, Michael Klare,Charles Knight, Lawrence J. Korb, Saul Landau,Jules Lobel, Steve LaMontagne, Robert K. Musil,Dan Smith, Joe Stork, Joe Volk, Bruce Zagaris, JohnZavales, and Stephen Zunes while not holding themresponsible for any of the positions or conclusionsherein.

VV.. CChhaannggiinngg CCoouurrssee


EEnnddnnootteess1 The General Assembly’s Sixth Committee is currently considering a

draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism thatwould include a definition of terrorism, if adopted. For more onthis, refer to the Web site of the Sixth Committee at:<http://www.un.org/ga/57/sixth/index.html>.

2 All data is from the corrected version of the Patterns of GlobalTerrorism 2003 report issued by the State Department. A “signifi-cant” international terrorist event is defined as such by the StateDepartment if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons,major property damage (more than $10,000), and/or is an act orattempt that could reasonably be expected to create the conditionsnoted. Controversy over the original version of the Patterns of GlobalTerrorism 2003 report raised concerns about methodology and possi-ble political manipulation of the document. The report was revisedto show an increase in significant terrorist attacks in 2003 over 2002and 2001. This report was the first to use data generated by therecently created Terrorist Threat Integration Center. See<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/> for the revised data.

3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or GlobalLeadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 28.

4 Steven Simon, “Update on the War on Terror,” RANDCorporation, September 17, 2003. See also Gilles Kepel, Jihad: TheTrail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,2002) and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, forthcoming). For a discussion of the nature of theAfghan-Pakistan network, see: Mariam Abou Zahab and OlivierRoy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (New York:Columbia University Press, 2004); Rohan Gunaratna, Inside alQaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Jason Burke,Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003);Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (NewYork: Random House, 2003); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name ofGod (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); and Jessica Stern, “TheProtean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003.

5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey,2003/2004 (London: IISS, 2004).

6 Ibid.7 See Thomas P. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: G.P.

Putnam, 2004), p. 31.8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Randall A. Yim,

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,“Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics inNational Strategies Related to Terrorism,” Testimony to theSubcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, andInternational Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House ofRepresentatives, GAO-04-408T, February 3, 2004, at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04408t.pdf>.

9 For the cost of the Iraq War see Institute for Policy Studies andForeign Policy In Focus, Paying the Price: The Mounting Costs of theIraq War, June 2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/0406cost-sofwar.html>. Also see U.S. Government Accountability Office,Military Operations: Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War onTerrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DOD to Shift Funds

from Other Uses, GAO-04-915, July 2004 at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04915.pdf>.

10 Center for Defense Information, Security after 9/11: Strategy Choicesand Budget Tradeoffs, January 2003, p. 7. For example, theDepartment of Defense’s FY 2003 budget is about $48 billion high-er than the last pre-Sept. 11, 2001, annual defense budget. This rep-resents a real increase of 15 percent. Yet only about one-third of thisincrease appears to be for programs closely related to homelandsecurity and combating terrorism. Such activities continue to absorba relatively small share of the DoD’s overall budget. The Office ofManagement and Budget and the DoD estimate that the DoDspent roughly $20 billion on these activities in FY 2003 and willspend about the same in FY 2004. This is approximately 5 percentof the annual defense budget. Even given ambiguities in classifica-tion, it is difficult to consider more than 20 percent of the DoDbudget as essential to counterterrorism operations or capabilities.Also see Foreign Policy In Focus/Center for Defense InformationTask Force, A Unified Security Budget For the United States, March2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.

11 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United Statesat: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry intoIntelligence Community Activities before and after the TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/seri-alset/creports/911.html>.

12 See, for example, William Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a MoreSecure America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003)among others.

13 See Congressional Research Service, The Department of State’sPatterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and RelatedIssues, June 1, 2004, at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32417.pdf>.

14 David Cole and James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution(New York: New Press, 2002). Also see: Nancy Chang. SilencingPolitical Dissent (New York: Seven Stories, 2002); Richard C. Leoneand Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Libertiesin an Age of Terrorism (New York: Century Foundation and PublicAffairs, 2003); and see the work on these issues by the AmericanCivil Liberties Union at:<http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12126&c=207>, the Center for Democracy and Technology at:<http://www.cdt.org/security/010911response.shtml>, the Centerfor Constitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and theRights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.

15 For example, several participants in the Information Sharing andAnalysis Centers noted that some companies were unwilling to shareessential information because of potential malicious misuse by otherprivate businesses. U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement ofRobert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, “CriticalInfrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharingwith Infrastructure Sectors,” Testimony before the Subcommittees onCybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and onInfrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on HomelandSecurity, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 33. This is asmall example of the broader problem—absent a more active gov-ernmental role in facilitating collaboration among the private com-


panies that control and operate critical infrastructure, responses arelikely to be suboptimal, with potentially disastrous results.

16 For a general resource on issues relating to first responders, see theNational Academies at: <http://search.nap.edu/shelves/first/>.

17 Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “War, Terrorism and PublicHealth,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter2003, pp. 516-23 and Victor W. Sidel, R.M. Gould, and H.W.Cohen, “Bioterrorism Preparedness: Cooptation of Public Health,”Medicine and Global Survival, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 82-9.

18 Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “War, Terrorism and PublicHealth,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter2003, p. 518.

19 Human Rights Watch, “Empty Promises:” Diplomatic Assurances NoSafeguard against Torture, April 15, 2004, at:<http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/>.

20 For additional discussion on the failures of the Bush administrationto adequately address the challenge of reconstruction inAfghanistan, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance:Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery ThreatenAfghanistan’s Stability, GAO-03-607, June 2003 at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03607.pdf> and AfghanistanReconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources HaveImpeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403, June 2004 at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04403.pdf>and work from Foreign Policy In Focus, such as Mark Sedra,Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction: Where Do We Go FromHere? March 2003 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/03afghan/> andMark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, Afghanistan’s Problematic Path toPeace: Lessons in State Building in the Post-September 11 Era, March2004 at: <http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html>. Foran excellent overview of the impact of U.S. assistance to the resist-ance against the Soviet Union see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The SecretHistory of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the SovietInvasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2003).

21 Cited in David Mepham, “Tackling the Roots of Terrorism:Broadening the International Security Agenda,” New Economy, vol.9, no. 4, December 2002, pp.189-193.

22 For examples of the kind of work that represents such a framework,see: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror(New York: Random House, 2003); Bruce Hoffman, InsideTerrorism (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998); Paul Pillar,Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: BrookingsInstitution Press, 2001); Charles Tilly, The Politics of CollectiveViolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); CharlesTilly, “Violence, Terror and Politics as Usual,” Boston Review, vol.27, nos. 3-4, Summer 2002 at:<http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.3/tilly.html>; Charles Tilly,“Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory, vol. 22, no. 1,March 2004; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve:Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security,vol. 27, no. 3, Winter 2002/03, pp. 30-58. For previous works, seeIan O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt,Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering the NewTerrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999).

23 See, for example, the much more nuanced understanding present inMatthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,”Parameters, Spring 2004 at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/morgan.pdf>.

24 For discussions of the dangers of declaring a war on terrorism aswell as problems with this particular global war on terrorism, seePhilip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning with-out War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, September 2003) andJeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (StrategicStudies Institute of the Army War College, December 2003). Otherviews include Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (New York:Interlink, 2003).

25 Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget ofthe United States Government FY2005 (Washington: OMB, 2005),pp. 25-39. See also Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H.Daalder, I. M. Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and JamesSteinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xii. Reliable data onprivate sector expenditures on homeland security is particularly dif-ficult to obtain. The most-cited study by Deloitte Consulting andAviation Week estimate that private sector spending on homelandsecurity was between $45.9 billion and $76.5 billion in FY2003 andwould be around $46 billion for FY2004. See Anthony L. Velocci,Jr., “Emerging Security Market Promising But Diffuse,” AviationWeek and Space Technology, June 10, 2002, at: <http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020610/aw46.htm>. This study relied on a survey of executives, but othersurveys by the Conference Board find little evidence of large increas-es in homeland security spending after FY 2003. A more recentstudy estimated the amount of private sector homeland securityexpenditure that would be accessible to homeland security productand service providers at between $6 and $7 billion annually. CivitasGroup LLC, The Homeland Security Market, June 2004 at:<http://www.civitasgroup.com/reports/20040627.pdf>.

26 For the statement, see “Statement and Recommendations on VisaProblems Harming America’s Scientific, Economic, and SecurityInterests,” May 12, 2004, at:<http://www.aau.edu/resources/JointVisaStatement.pdf>.

27 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United Statesat: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Joint Inquiry intoIntelligence Community Activities before and after the TerroristAttacks of September 11, 2001, at: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.

28 The CIA has: doubled the size of its Counterterrorist Center,quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorismanalysis, detailed 25 experienced analysts to work with their coun-terparts at the FBI, and created the position of associate director ofcentral intelligence for homeland security to facilitate the flow ofintelligence to agencies engaged in homeland security. The FBI has:disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil; established 66 Joint Terrorismtask forces across America with full participation from and enhancedcommunications with multiple federal, state, and local agencies; cre-ated a National Joint Terrorism task force at FBI headquarters;established a Counterterrorism Watch center; initiated new coun-terterrorism “Flying Squads” to deploy at a moment’s notice; set upIntelligence Reports offices to facilitate the vital flow of information;and trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division.

29 See, for example, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/steinberg20030214.htm>.

30 See, for example, the discussions of an alternative approach, the cre-ation of a National Counter Terrorism Center, proposed by theAdvisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for


Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (GilmoreCommission) in its Fourth Annual Report to the President and theCongress, December 15, 2002, at: <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf>.

31 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United Statesat: <http://www.9-11commission.gov/> and Statement of Laurie E.Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, andRandolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architectureand Systems Issues, “FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to MakeProgress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities,”Testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, andthe Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, March 23,2004.

32 U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Madein Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003, p. 13.

33 Robert Block, Gary Fields, and Jo Wrighton, “U.S. ‘Terror’ List StillLacking,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2004.

34 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M.Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg,Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington:Brookings Institution, 2003), p. xix.

35 Cindy Williams, “Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. SecurityChoices since 9/11,” Paper prepared for ECAAR panel, Allied SocialSciences Association annual meetings, January 5, 2004, at:<http://www.ecaar.org/Articles/williams.pdf>.

36 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Maritime Security: SubstantialWork Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into EffectivePort Security, GAO-04-838, June 30, 2004, at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf>. For weaknesses in thesecurity of international ports, see International MaritimeOrganization, ISPS Code Status Update 05: Continued Improvementin ISPS Code Implementation, June 30, 2004, at:<http://www.imo.org/home.asp>.

37 U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Robert F. Dacey,Director, Information Security Issues, “Critical InfrastructureProtection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing withInfrastructure Sectors,” Testimony before the Subcommittees onCybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development and onInfrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on HomelandSecurity, House of Representatives, April 21, 2004, p. 30.

38 Ibid., p. 37.39 U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of John B. Stephenson,

Director Natural Resources and Environment, “Homeland Security:Federal Action Needed to Address Security Challenges at ChemicalFacilities,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security,Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee onGovernment Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-04-482T,February 23, 2004, at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04482t.pdf>.

40 U.S. General Accounting Office, Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Wayat Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness IsUnknown, GAO-03-439, March 14, 2003, at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03439.pdf>.

41 Discussions of the vulnerabilities of the food system predate theSept. 11 attacks. For example: T. M. Wilson, L. Logan Henfrey, R.Weller, and B. Kellman, “Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and

Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture,” in C. Brown andC. Bolin, eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals (Washington: ASMPress, 2000), p. 2357; Dorothy B. Preslar, Director,AHEAD/ILIAD, “The Role of Disease Surveillance in the Watchfor Agroterrorism or Economic Sabotage,” November 2000 at:<http://www.fas.org/ahead/bwconcerns/agroterror.htm>; J. Ban,“Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview,” The Arena, no. 9(Washington: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, June2000); R. Casagrande, “Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture:The Threat to U.S. National Security,” Nonproliferation Review, vol.7, no. 3, 2000, p. 92105; and A. S. Kohnen, “Responding to theThreat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the UnitedStates Department of Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs discussion paper 200029, Executive Session onDomestic Preparedness discussion paper ESDP200004 (John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October2000) at: <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Responding_to_the_Threat_of_Agroterrorism.pdf>.

42 Committee on Biological Threats to Agricultural Plants andAnimals, National Research Council, Countering AgriculturalBioterrorism (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002).

43 Ibid.44 For other discussions, see S. M. Whitby, Biological Warfare Against

Crops (Baskingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002).45 National Research Council, Information Technology for

Counterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities(Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), p. 2.

46 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, NationalResearch Council, Cybersecurity Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now orPay Later (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002) andNational Research Council, Information Technology forCounterterrorism: Immediate Actions and Future Possibilities(Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), pp. 97-98.

47 As with the definition of terrorism, defining “cyberterrorism” is alsofraught with difficulties. We have adapted the definition by MarkPollitt, “Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivatedattack against information, computer systems, computer programs,and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets bysubnational groups or clandestine agents,” in Mark Pollitt,“Cyberterrorism—Fact or Fancy,” Proceedings of the 20th NationalInformation Systems Security Conference, October 1997 at:<http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>.

48 Remarks by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge to theElectronics Industries Alliance, April 23, 2002, available at:<http://www.eia.org/events/springconf/remarks_ridge_1.phtml>.

49 Mark Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism—Fact or Fancy,” Proceedings of the20th National Information Systems Security Conference, October 1997at: <http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html>.See also Dorothy Denning, “Is Cyberterror Next?” at:<http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm>.

50 Glenn C. Buchan, “Implications of Information Vulnerabilities forMilitary Operations,” in Zalmay M. Khalilzad, John P. White, eds.,The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.:RAND, 1999) at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1016/MR1016.chap10.pdf>.

51 Alan Feuer and Benjamin Weiser, “Translation: ‘The How-to Bookof Terrorism,’” New York Times, April 5, 2001.


52 Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly,November 2002, available at:<http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html>.

53 Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security,Progress and Challenges in Securing the Nation’s Cyberspace, July 2004at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_CyberspaceRpt_Jul04.pdf>.

54 Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security,Improvements Needed to DHS’ Information Technology ManagementStructure, July 2004 at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_CIOReport_0704.pdf>.

55 George V. Hulme, “Investments In Antivirus Software Are PayingOff,” Information Week, May 3, 2004, at: <http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19205575>.

56 Michael A. Vatis, “Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing OurNation in Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Testimony before theU.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform,Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, IntergovernmentalRelations and the Census, April 8, 2003, at: <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/ists_docs/testimony_whatsnew.htm>.

57 Large skyscrapers are defined as the roughly 500 skyscrapers withoccupants of 5,000 or more. See Michael O’Hanlon et al., op. cit.,p. 55.

58 See Council on Foreign Relations, Emergency Responders: DrasticallyUnderfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, July 2003, p. 2.

59 For a detailed discussion, see CFR Task Force, Council on ForeignRelations, America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York:Council on Foreign Relations, October 2002) at:<http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf>, pp. 34-36.

60 On the broad public health issues, see Joshua Shemer and YehudaShoenfeld, Terror and Medicine: Medical Aspects of Biological,Chemical and Radiological Terrorism (Lengerich, Germany: PabstScience Publishers, 2003). On the methodology for establishing cri-teria to evaluate the readiness of metropolitan regions to respond toterrorist attacks, see Frederick J. Manning and Lewis Goldfrank,eds., Preparing for Terrorism: Tools for Evaluating the MetropolitanMedical Response System Program (Washington: National Academy ofSciences Press, 2002). For issues involving psychological impacts, seeInstitute of Medicine, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences ofTerrorism: A Public Health Strategy (Washington: National Academyof Sciences Press, 2003). Concerns about weaknesses in the publichealth infrastructure that were highlighted in the anthrax attackswere addressed prior to the Sept. 11 attacks. See National ResearchCouncil, Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical orBiological Terrorist Incidents Interim Report on Current Capabilities(Washington: National Academies Press, 1998).

61 George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B.Wolfsthal, and Jessica T. Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategyfor Nuclear Security (Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2004), p. 26.

62 For discussions of the steps needed to enhance controls over biologi-cal and biotechnological research while not stifling scientificadvancement, see: Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Defending AgainstBiodefence: The Need for Limits,” Biological Weapons Convention

special paper no. 1, January 2003 at:<http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/spec01.htm>; John Steinbruner,“The Protective Management Of Biotechnology,” presented at theconference “Biosecurity: Science in the Balance” sponsored by theAmerican Association for the Advancement of Science, February 15,2003, Denver, CO, at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/AAASpresentation.htm>; John D. Steinbrunerand Elisa D. Harris, “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens,” Issues inScience and Technology, Spring 2003 at:<http://www.nap.edu/issues/19.3/steinbruner.htm>; and JohnSteinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther,“Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Protective Oversight System,”CISSM Working Paper, February 2003 at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/finalmonograph.pdf>. For discussionof the issues involved in verification of these agreements and thekind of cooperative security approaches necessary to make themwork, see Nancy Gallagher, “Verification and Advanced CooperativeSecurity,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., VerificationYearbook 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002) and Nancy Gallagher, ThePolitics of Verification (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Forspecific discussion of the Biological Weapons Convention and theChemical Weapons Convention, see Elisa D. Harris, ResearchFellow, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland,Testimony on “Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes, Weapons of MassDestruction and the War on Terrorism,” before the Subcommittee onInternational Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of theCommittee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 12, 2002,at: <http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/People/SEN%20GOV%20AFFS%202-12-02.htm>.

63 Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., Challenging ConventionalWisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks of Arms ExportReform (Washington: Federation of American Scientists and Centerfor Defense Information, 2003), pp. 213-19.

64 See the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Protecting against the Spread ofNuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for theGlobal Partnership, 3 volumes (Washington: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, January 2003) and George Perkovich, JosephCirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica T.Mathews, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

65 For discussions on the efforts to weaken controls on arms exports,see Tamar Gabelnick and Rachel Stohl, eds., ChallengingConventional Wisdom: Debunking the Myths and Exposing the Risks ofArms Export Reform (Washington: Federation of American Scientistsand Center for Defense Information, 2003).

66 See them at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf>.67 For a discussion of what an alternative security budget would look

like based on a different strategic approach see Foreign Policy InFocus/Center for Defense Information Task Force, A UnifiedSecurity Budget For the United States, March 2004 at:<http://www.fpif.org/pdf/defensereport/fulltext.pdf>.

68 For a deeper discussion of such a strategy see Richard Falk, TheGreat Terror War (New York: Interlink, 2003).

69 On Libya, see Christopher Boucek, Libya’s Return to the Fold,Foreign Policy In Focus special report, April 2004, at:<http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004libya.html>.

70 Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorist Financing (New York:Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) and Council on Foreign


Relations, Update on the Global Campaign Against TerroristFinancing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on TerroristFinancing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2004).The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental bodywhose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, bothat national and international levels, to combat money launderingand terrorist financing. There are currently 33 members. For moresee: <http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.htm>.

71 U.S. General Accounting Office, Terrorist Financing: U.S. AgenciesShould Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative FinancingMechanisms, GAO-04-163, November 14, 2003, at:<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf>.

72 See, for example: Ibid; various reports from the United Nations1267 Monitoring Group; Council on Foreign Relations, TerroristFinancing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); andCouncil on Foreign Relations, Update on the Global CampaignAgainst Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent TaskForce on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council on ForeignRelations, June 2004).

73 Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule, “Fighting TerroristFinance,” Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 87-104 andU.S. General Accounting Office, “Combating Terrorism: FederalAgencies Face Continuing Challenges in Addressing TerroristFinancing and Money Laundering,” Testimony before the Caucus onInternational Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-501T, March4, 2004, at: <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-501T>.

74 Cited in Council on Foreign Relations, Update on the GlobalCampaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of anIndependent Task Force on Terrorist Financing (New York: Council onForeign Relations, June 2004), p. 7.

75 At the end of 2003, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had fourfull-time staff working on tracking potential violations of laws for-bidding financial flows to al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein and 21working on illegal flows to Cuba. In early 2004, the Bush adminis-tration created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence tolead Treasury’s efforts to cut the lines of financial support to interna-tional terrorists, a critical component of the administration’s overalleffort to keep America safe from terrorist plots. The TFI is led by anew undersecretary and two assistant secretaries and consolidates thesupervision of OFAC, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,the Office of Asset Forfeiture, and the Office of IntelligenceSupport. But as of May 2004 Senator Max Baucus, the rankingminority member of the Senate Finance Committee, claimed thatthe Treasury Department still has more staff assigned to trackingmoney to Cuba than to al-Qaida. See Statement of Senator MaxBaucus, Oversight Hearing of the Treasury Department andTerrorist Financing, May 19, 2004, at:<http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/statements/051904mb.pdf>.According to the Department of the Treasury, they currently have55 staff within OFAC tracking terrorist finance and 40-45 trackingthe various sanctions programs against countries like Cuba.

76 For details on the Financial Action Task Force, see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/> and for the listing of the 2003 version ofthe 40 Recommendations, see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/40Recs-2003_en.pdf>.

77 For up-to-date information regarding such resolutions see the Bill ofRights Defense Committee at: <http://www.bordc.org/index.html>.For analysis of PATRIOT II, see the work of the American Civil

Liberties Union at: <http://www.aclu.org/>, the Center forConstitutional Rights at: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/>, and the RightsWorking Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>.

78 See Migration Policy Institute, America’s Challenge: Domestic Security,Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11 (Washington:2003) at:<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf>.On the issue of weakening our economy, see Genevieve J. Knezo,Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions onResearch, Development, and Higher Education, CongressionalResearch Service, April 8, 2002.

79 See <http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11817&c=206> and documents at the Paul Revere project at:<http://freedom.idahogreenparty.org/>.

80 For more information on the Civil Liberties Restoration Act, see theanalysis by the Rights Working Group at: <http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/>. For more information onthe SAFE Act, see the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s analysis at:<http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/PATRIOT/safe_act_analysis.php>.

81 Human Rights Watch report, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S.Military Assistance After September 11, February 2002, pp. 34.

82 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: HumanRights Abuses Worldwide, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper forthe 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,March 25, 2003, at: <http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.htm>.

83 Neil J. Smelser and Faith Mitchell, eds., Discouraging Terrorism:Some Implications of 9/11 (Washington: National Academy ofSciences, 2002).

84 See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, Summer2002, pp. 85-96, and Commission on Weak States and U.S.National Security, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. NationalSecurity (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2004) at:<http://www.cgdev.org/docs/Full_Report.pdf>.

85 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M.Destler, David Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James Steinberg,Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On (Washington:Brookings Institution, 2003).

86 For further discussion, see Thomas Carothers, “Democracy:Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History, December 2003,pp. 403-6 as well as work from the Democracy and Law Project thathe leads at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at:<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/drl/drl_home.asp>.

87 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and MuslimWorld, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Directionfor U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington:U.S. Dept. of State, 2003), p. 15, at:<http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/Testimony/Peace.pdf>.

88 See the text of the message at:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/south_asia/1585636.stm>. Healso discussed the suffering of Iraqi children under the U.N. sanc-tions regime, another concern broadly shared by Muslims world-wide.

89 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,”Current History, December 2003, p. 405. Other issues with respect


to credibility are discussed in Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracyin the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of LawProject, working paper no. 35 at:<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.

90 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,”Current History, December 2003, p. 405.

91 See the discussions by Tamara Cofman Wittes in The New U.S.Proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative: An Evaluation, SabanCenter Middle East Memo #2, May 10, 2004, at:<http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/wittes20040510.htm> and Marina Ottaway, Promoting Democracy inthe Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility, CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of LawProject, working paper no. 35 at:<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp35.pdf>.

92 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,”Current History, December 2003, p. 406.

93 For the negative view, see Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova,“Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?”Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. For the positive view, see Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism& Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit aResurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), casestudies of Northern Ireland, Palestine, and the Philippines. But, asCragin and Chalk note, inadequately funded or administered pro-grams can create rising expectations, which are subsequently unmet.This can generate a backlash and reinforce nascent support for ter-rorist activities.

94 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, andTerrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of EconomicPerspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. See also DavidGold, “The Economics of Terrorism,” Columbia International AffairsOnline (CIAO) Case Studies (May 2004) at:<http://www.ciaonet.org/frame/casefrm.html>; C. Berrebi,“Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty andTerrorism Among Palestinians” (Princeton University, September2003) at: <http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/477.pdf>; BaselA. Saleh, “Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation inthe West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection,”Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economics, vol. 6, 2004at: <http://www.sba.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume6/saleh.htm>; BaselA. Saleh and David Laitin, “Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study ofthe Origins and Targets of Terrorism,” Mimeo (Princeton University,November 2003); and Alan Richards, “Socio-Economic Roots of

Radicalism? Toward Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals,”Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2003 at:<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/radcalsm.pdf>.

95 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, andTerrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of EconomicPerspectives, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 119-44. Also see, ScottAtran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, vol. 299, 2003, pp.1534-1539, and Scott Atran, The Strategic Threat from SuicideTerror, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,December 2003 at: <http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=311>.

96 There is no shortage of proposals as to what such a framework orframeworks would look like. For representative examples, see fourpublications by Dani Rodrik: “Getting Institutions Right,” April2004 at: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/ifo-institutions%20article%20_April%202004_.pdf>; “How toMake the Trade Regime Work for Development,” February 2004 at:<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/How%20to%20Make%20Trade%20Work.pdf>; The GlobalGovernance of Trade as If Development Really Mattered (New York:United Nations Development Program, 2001) at:<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/UNDPtrade.PDF>; Making Openness Work: The New GlobalEconomy and the Developing Countries (Washington: OverseasDevelopment Council, 1999) as well as Lance Taylor, SantoshMehrotra, and Enrique Delamonica, “The Links Between EconomicGrowth, Poverty Reduction, and Social Development: Theory andPolicy” in Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, eds., Developmentwith a Human Face (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999);Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W.Norton, 2002); and Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, ReclaimingDevelopment—A Manual of Alternative Economic Policy (London:Zed Press, 2004). Though some of these proposals differ, they sharean essential common ground: there needs to be room for diversity inapproaches to industrialization and development, such diversitywould provide for a range of acceptable forms of state interventionby poor and rich countries alike, and the current set of trading rulesserve largely to benefit corporations in wealthier countries.

97 For examples of what an alternative strategy would look like seeForeign Policy In Focus, PetroPolitics, January 2004 at:<http://www.fpif.org/papers/03petropol/> and the Apollo Alliance<http://www.apolloalliance.org/>.


AAppppeennddiixx 11:: FFuunnddiinngg ffoorr CCoouunntteerrtteerrrroorriissmm((iinn mmiilllliioonnss ooff ddoollllaarrss))

2002 Enacted 2002 Supp. 2003 Enacted 2003 Supp. 2004 RequestDepartment of Agriculture $230.5 $322.2 $385.0 $110.0 $368.2 Department of Commerce 96.8 18.7 110.3 - 153.4 Department of Defense 11,153.0 3,047.0 17,550.0 - 15,172.0 Department of Energy 1,232.9 303.1 1,482.3 77.5 1,588.1 Department of Health and Human Services 434.0 1,479.4 3,602.8 142.0 3,775.5 Department of Homeland Security 11,398.6 5,981.5 19,058.7 4,305.0 23,890.9 Department of Housing & Urban Dvlpment. - - 2.0 - 2.0 Department of the Interior 14.6 92.6 110.9 25.0 114.8 Department of Justice 1,018.7 1,124.4 1,973.8 457.2 2,289.4 Department of Labor 71.4 5.9 69.4 - 67.2 Department of State 1,693.1 330.6 1,871.3 214.0 2,365.7 Department of Transportation 634.5 784.4 382.8 - 282.9 Department of the Treasury 85.0 31.7 80.0 - 90.4 Department of Veterans Affairs 47.0 2.0 147.2 - 145.0 Corps of Engineers-Civil Works - 139.0 36.0 39.0 104.0 Environmental Protection Agency 12.5 175.0 107.7 - 123.1 Executive Office of the President Activities 2.0 138.0 43.0 - 37.0 General Services Administration 46.4 51.0 94.6 - 95.7 International Assistance Programs 88.6 483.0 701.3 969.6 1,157.3 National Aeronautics and Space Admin. 114.0 109.0 163.0 - 170.0 National Science Foundation 239.9 19.6 284.6 - 307.5 Office of Personnel Management 2.5 - 3.0 - 3.0 Social Security Administration 113.0 8.0 132.0 - 147.0 District of Columbia 13.0 200.0 25.0 - 15.0 Federal Communications Commission - - 1.0 - 1.0 National Archives and Records Admin. 7.0 3.0 11.0 - 12.0 National Capital Planning Commission - - 1.0 - - Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6.5 36.4 35.3 - 53.2 Postal Service - 587.0 - - - Smithsonian Institution 62.5 27.8 82.8 - 80.1 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 7.0 - 8.0 - 8.0 Corp. for National and Community Service 29.0 - 57.0 - 118.0 Total, Combating Terrorism Budget Authority $28,854.9 $15,501.4 $48,611.6 $6,339.3 $52,737.2Source: Office of Management and Budget

AAppppeennddiixx 22:: MMaajjoorr UU..NN.. CCoonnvveennttiioonnss AAggaaiinnsstt TTeerrrroorriissmm


Convention on Offenses and Certain Other ActsCommitted on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo onSeptember 14, 1963.

Convention for the Suppression of UnlawfulSeizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague onDecember 16, 1970.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Actsagainst the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed atMontreal on September 23, 1971.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofCrimes against Internationally Protected Personsincluding Diplomatic Agents, adopted by theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations onDecember 14, 1973.

International Convention against the Taking ofHostages, adopted by the General Assembly of theUnited Nations on December 17, 1979.

Convention on the Physical Protection of NuclearMaterial, signed at Vienna on March 3, 1980.

Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts ofViolence at Airports Serving International CivilAviation, supplementary to the Convention for theSuppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety ofCivil Aviation, signed at Montreal on February 24,1988.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Actsagainst the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done atRome on March 10, 1988.

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Actsagainst the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on theContinental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10,1988.

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosivesfor the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal onMarch 1, 1991.

International Convention for the Suppression ofTerrorist Bombings, adopted by the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations on December 15,1997.

International Convention for the Suppression of theFinancing of Terrorism, adopted by the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations on December 9,1999.

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,Conventions Against Terrorism, at:<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_conventions.html>

AAppppeennddiixx 33:: UUnniitteedd NNaattiioonnss SSeeccuurriittyy CCoouunncciillRReessoolluuttiioonnss RReeggaarrddiinngg TTeerrrroorriissmm PPoosstt--SSeepptteemmbbeerr 1111,, 22000011


Resolution 1368: Adopted September 12, 2001

Condemns the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, and those responsible for the support of therelevant terrorist organizations and calls on the inter-national community to participate in the cooperationand full implementation of relevant internationalanti-terrorist conventions and Security Council reso-lutions; in particular, Resolution 1269.1

Resolution 1373: Adopted September 28, 2001

Reaffirms previous commitments to anti-terrorismand obligates all member states—under Chapter VIIof the Charter of the United Nations2—to criminal-ize terrorist funds and states harboring or supportingterrorists and to establish effective border control reg-ulations. The resolution creates the Counter-Terrorism Committee as a subsidiary body of theSecurity Council to monitor the implementation ofResolution 1373 and to increase the capability ofstates to fight terrorism.

Resolution 1377: Adopted November 12, 2001

Calls on all states to implement the affirmations inResolution 1373, welcomes the commitment of statesto fight international terrorism, and encourages allstates to become parties to the relevant internationalconventions and protocols.

Resolution 1438: Adopted October 14, 2002

Strongly condemns the bomb attacks in Bali,Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, and urges all states,in accordance with Resolution 1373, to cooperate tocombat such terrorist activities.

Resolution 1440: Adopted October 24, 2002

Strongly condemns the hostage situation inMoscow, the Russian Federation, on October 23,2002, and urges all states, in accordance with

Resolution 1373, to cooperate to combat such terror-ist activities.

Resolution 1450: Adopted December 13, 2002

Strongly condemns the terrorist bomb attack at theParadise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya, and theattempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines onNovember 28, 2002, and urges all states to cooperatein efforts to combat such terrorist activities.

Resolution 1456: Adopted January 20, 2003

Reaffirms all previous commitments to combat ter-rorism and then calls upon states to cooperate closelyto implement the sanctions against terrorism and tobring to justice those who “finance, plan, support orcommit terrorist acts or provide safe havens,” inaccordance with international law. All states musttake urgent action to prevent and suppress all activeand passive forms of terrorism.

Resolution 1465: Adopted February 13, 2003

Strongly condemns the bomb attack in Bogota,Colombia, on February 7, 2003, and reaffirms theneed to combat terrorism by all means in accordancewith the U.N. Charter.

Resolution 1516: Adopted November 20, 2003

Strongly condemns the bomb attacks in Istanbul,Turkey, on November 15, 2003, and November 20,2003, and urges all states, in accordance with theirobligations under Resolution 1373, to cooperate inefforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators,organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.

Resolution1526: Adopted January 30, 2004

Enumerates a list of sanctions to be imposed againstal-Qaida members and others officially identified asmembers of terrorist organizations (including freezing


funds, denying entry, etc.) and strengthens the man-date of the assigned committee to include monitoringthe implementation of these measures underResolution 1267 (1999).

Resolution 1530: Adopted March 11, 2004

Strongly condemns the bombings in Madrid, Spain,on March 11, 2003 (although the resolution identi-fies the perpetrators as the ETA) and reaffirms theneed to combat terrorism by all means in accordancewith the U.N. Charter.

Resolution 1535: Adopted March 26, 2004

Restructures the organization of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Resolution 1540: Adopted April 28, 2004

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of theUnited Nations, this resolution forbids states fromproviding any form of support to nonstate actors that

attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or bio-logical weapons and their means of delivery, and itrequires all states to adopt and enforce effective lawsthat prohibit any nonstate actor from developing,acquiring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons and their means of delivery, in particular forterrorist purposes. The resolution further requiresstates to submit a report detailing the steps they havetaken.

* Note: Only resolutions 1373 and 1456 haveenforcement mechanisms. All other resolutionseither reaffirm previous resolutions or simply con-demn terrorist acts.

Endnotes:1 Resolution 1269, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on October

19, 1999, condemns all acts of terrorism and calls upon all states tocooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist activities within theirborders and to exchange intelligence regarding terrorist activities.

2 These are actions with respect to peace, breaches of peace, and actsof aggression.

FFoorreeiiggnn PPoolliiccyy IInn FFooccuuss TTaasskk FFoorrccee oonnTTeerrrroorriissmm


PRIMARY AUTHOR

JOHN GERSHMANCo-director, Foreign Policy In FocusGlobal Affairs Program Director, Interhemispheric ResourceCenter(609) 688-0065<[email protected]><www.fpif.org>

TASK FORCE MEMBERSThe members of the Task Force support this report as a positivealternative agenda to combat terrorism, without necessarilyendorsing each program proposal within it. Organizational affili-ations for identification purposes only.

ROBERT ALVAREZSenior ScholarNuclear Policy ProjectInstitute for Policy Studies(202) 234-9382<[email protected]><www.ips-dc.org>

SALIH BOOKERExecutive DirectorAfrica Action(202) 546-7961<[email protected]><www.africaaction.org>

JOHN CAVANAGHDirectorInstitute for Policy Studies(202) 234-9382, ext. 224<[email protected]><www.ips-dc.org>

MARCUS CORBINSenior AnalystCenter for Defense Information(202) 797-5282<[email protected]><www.cdi.org/mrp>

DAVID CORTRIGHTPresidentFourth Freedom Forum(800) 233-6786, ext. 14<[email protected]><www.fourthfreedom.org>

KRISTEN DAWKINSVice President for International Programs and Director for theTrade and Global Governance ProgramInstitute for Agriculture and Trade Policy(612) 870-0453<[email protected]><www.iatp.org>; <www.wtowatch.org>

LLOYD J. DUMASProfessor of Political EconomyUniversity of Texas at Dallas(972) 883-2010; (972) 394-4637<[email protected]>

REV. DR. ROBERT W. EDGARGeneral SecretaryNational Council of the Churches of Christ(212) 870-2025<[email protected]><www.ncccusa.org>

JOHN FEFFERPolicy AnalystForeign Policy In Focus(301) 779-3941<[email protected]>

VAN GOSSECo-ChairHistorians Against War(717) 291-4246<[email protected]><www.historiansagainstwar.org>

WILLIAM D. HARTUNGPresident’s FellowArms Trade Resource CenterWorld Policy Institute(212) 229-5808, ext. 106<[email protected]><www.worldpolicy.org >

COLLEEN KELLYCo-directorSeptember 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows(212) 598-0970<[email protected]><www.peacefultomorrows.org>

MICHAEL KLAREProfessor of Peace & World Security StudiesHampshire College(413) 559-5563<[email protected]><www.pawss.hampshire.edu>

DR. LAWRENCE J. KORBSenior Fellow, Center for American ProgressSenior Adviser, Center for Defense Information(202) 682-1611; (202) 332-0600<[email protected]><www.americanprogress.org>; <www.cdi.org>

JULES LOBELProfessorUniversity of Pittsburgh Law School(412) 648-1375<[email protected]><www.law.pitt.edu>

ROBERT K. MUSIL, PH.D, M.P.H.Executive Director & CEOPhysicians for Social Responsibility(202) 667-4260, ext. 221<[email protected]><www.psr.org>

COL. DAN SMITH, U.S. ARMY (RET.)Senior FellowMilitary and Peaceful Prevention PolicyFriends Committee on National Legislation(202) 547-6000<[email protected]><www.fcnl.org>

JOE STORKWashington DirectorMiddle East / North Africa DivisionHuman Rights Watch(202) 612-4321<[email protected]><www.hrw.org>

JOE VOLKExecutive SecretaryFriends Committee on National Legislation(202) 547-6000, ext. 144<[email protected]><www.fcnl.org>

BRUCE ZAGARISPartnerBerliner Corcoran & Rowe, L.L.P.(202) 293-5555<[email protected]><www.bcr-dc.com>

JOHN ZAVALESResearch FellowCuny Center(703) 549-1261<[email protected]><www.thecunycenter.org>

STEPHEN ZUNESProfessor, Department of PoliticsUniversity of San Francisco(415) 422-6981<[email protected]><www.fpif.org>

Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC, online at www.irc-online.org) and theInstitute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at www.ips-dc.org). ©2004. All rights reserved.

Foreign Policy In Focus“A Think Tank Without Walls”

Established in 1996, Foreign Policy In Focus is a network of policy analysts, advocates, and activists committed to “making the United States a moreresponsible global leader and global partner.” For more information, visit www.fpif.org.

Recommended citation:Foreign Policy In Focus Task Force on Terrorism, “A Secure America in a Secure World,” (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus,September 2004).

Web location:http://www.fpif.org/

Production Information:Primary Author: John Gershman, IRCLayout: Tonya Cannariato, IRC

p. 50

w w w. f p i f . o r gA Think Tank Without Walls

HOW THIS REPORT WAS WRITTEN

This report builds upon FPIF’s previous efforts in articulating a strategy to combat terrorism produced in 2001.This report was drafted by a team of FPIF staffers led by John Gershman and includes contributions from EmiraWoods, Miriam Pemberton, Erik Leaver, Julie Ajinkya, Emily Schwartz Greco, and Theo Rose.

The first draft of the report was circulated to task force members in July 2003. The report was revised based onfeedback from task force members and others, and a revised version was circulated in June 2004. Additional revi-sions were made and the final report was issued in September 2004. The members of the Task Force support thisreport as a positive alternative agenda to combat terrorism, without necessarily endorsing each program proposalwithin it. Organizational affiliations for identification purposes only.

Task Force Members

Robert Alvarez, Nuclear Policy Project • Salih Booker, Africa Action • John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies• Marcus Corbin, Center for Defense Information • David Cortright, Fourth Freedom Forum • Kristin Dawkins,Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy • Lloyd J. Dumas, University of Texas at Dallas • Rev. Dr. Robert W.Edgar, National Council of the Churches of Christ • John Feffer • Van Gosse, Historians Against War • WilliamHartung, World Policy Institute • Colleen Kelly, September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows • MichaelKlare, Hampshire College • Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Center for Defense Information • Jules Lobel, University ofPittsburgh Law School • Robert K. Musil, Ph.D, M.P.H., Physicians for Social Responsibility • Col. Dan Smith,U.S. Army (Ret.), Friends Committee on National Legislation • Joe Stork, Human Rights Watch • Joe Volk,Friends Committee on National Legislation • Bruce Zagaris, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe, L.L.P. • John Zavales,Cuny Center • Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco (Organizational affiliations for identification purposesonly.)

Interhemispheric Resource CenterPO Box 2178Silver City, NM 88062(505) 388-0208www.irc-online.org

Institute for Policy Studies733 15th St. NW, Suite 1020Washington, DC 20005(202) 234-9382www.ips-dc.org

A Foreign Policy In Focus publication

Cost: $10.00

FOREIGN POLICY

IN F CUS

fpif task force on terrorism a secure america in a secure ... · p. 2 a think tank without walls...

Documents