france and the unknown second generation: preliminary results on social mobility

France and the Unknown Second Generation: Preliminary Results

.I

on Sociul Mo&iliy Patrick Simon INED

The growing concern about the future of the offspring of immigrants in France has prompted the rise of a “second generation question.” Access of “new second generations” ( i e . , those born from the waves of immigration of the 1950s and 1960s) to the job market and their visibility in social and cultural life have challenged the “French model of integration.” Moreover, the ebbing of social mobility in the France of the 1970s led to a process of social downgrading which may affect significantly the second generation due to their social background and the persistence of ethnic and racial discrimination. It is thus important to investigate what kind of social mobility is actually experienced by people of immigrant ancestry, and what could hinder their mobility. This article uses the data from a new survey, the Enqukte Histoire Familiale (family history survey) conducted in 1999 and based on 380,000 individuals, which analyzes the positions of second generations of Turkish, Moroccan and Portuguese origin. We argue that they follow different paths: a reproduction of the positions of the first generation; a successful social mobility through education; or a mobility hindered by discrimination.

Immigration and French history have been closely interrelated ever since the mid-nineteenth century. Mass immigration not only contributed to population increases, but it also transformed the economic, political and cultural dimensions of society, Thus, French national identity was partially shaped by it (Noiriel, 1988; Brubaker, 1992; Weil, 2002). But strangely enough, although the “foreigners question” has been much debated in France for more than a century, the “second generation issue” was never raised, as numerous recent studies have clearly shown (Simon, 2000b; Blanc-ChalCard, 2001; Viprey, 2002). This, indeed, is odd considering its widespread discussion in the United States (Pones, 1996; Perlman and Waldinger, 1997; Zhou, 2001). The discrepancy can be explained by the representations of a highly political and normative French model of integration whose main goal is to make French citizens out of immigrants within one generation (HCI, 1991). This model obviously prevents the reproduction of “foreignness” or “otherness.” The very concept of the code de la nationalitL (law on French citizenship)

0 2003 by the Center for Migration Studies of New York. All rights reserved. 0198-91 83/03/3704.0144

IMR Volume 37 Number 4 (Winter 2003):1091-1119 1091

1092 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION h W E W

encourages naturalization and automatically grants French citizenship to the children of foreigners when they come of age, ensuring that there will be no more foreigners into the next generation. The implicit doctrine here is that immigrants and their descendants should not be different from other citizens as they become French (by being awarded French citizenship). In deference to the “invisibility” of the cultural practices of minority groups in the public sphere, the system grants them, dejuzlre, equal rights before the law, regardless of their origin.

In its efforts to retard the creation of a second generation, the French model of integration minimizes the transmission of cultural legacies from the immigrants to their children, simultaneously denying any collective acknowl- edgement of immigrant origins. Until the early 1970s, the model quite suc- cessfully pursued the second point. One may still doubt whether it has ever managed to prevent any forms of distinctive socialization by the children of immigrants, because the sheer concept of second generation for a long time seemed utterly nonsensical to the forces behind social representations, i. e., politicians, intellectuals, and public opinion (including the media). Access of new second generations (ie., those born from the waves of immigration of the 1950s and 1960s) to the job market as they became adults, and especially their emergence, over the past few years, as a collective protagonist in social events, challenged this model of integration, aiming at invisibility through social mobility (Lapeyronnie, 1987). The ebbing of social mobility in the France of the 1970s led to a process of social downgrading, which has inten- sified the social violence in deprived neighborhoods where ethnic minorities are segregated. Still, beyond media coverage and a few scattered studies, the social trajectories of people of immigrant ancestry remain unclear.

It is thus important to investigate the kind of social mobility actually experienced by people of immigrant ancestry, as well as any hindrance to such mobility. The political assumption that social mobility would automatically result from integration into French society should be strongly reconsidered in view of two sociological facts: 1) a vast majority of immigrants belong to the poorer classes; and 2) their children initiated their social trajectories at a time when socioeconomic structures were undergoing transformations in a process described as post-Fordism or the post-industrial society. Poor prospects for social mobility derived from leaving school early with limited job skills and qualifications, as conditions for entering the job market became more selective. Numerous qualitative studies have shown less favorable integration trajectories for the second generation than for native French youth. A major

FRANCE AND THE UNKNOWN SECOND GENERATION 1093

explanation for this is the discrimination against the descendants of North African, Turkish and African immigrants. High drop out rates from school combined with the very high levels of unemployment among these groups draw attention to their subordinate position in the social hierarchy and point to a systemic discrimination. Yet, the results also indicate that the second generation do experience some degree of social mobility, at least compared to their parents.

The social position of the second generation is much debated. Are they reproducing the positions, practices and trajectories of their parents, are they converging with “native nationals” of the same age groups according to the theory of assimilation, or do they experience a “segmented assimilation” as described by Portes and Zhou (1993)? And when the social mobility of the second generation is hindered, is it the result of the indiscriminate impact of the socioeconomic system regardless of their origin, or is it because of a systemic discrimination which leads to an ethnic or racial distribution of social positions and opportunities? We will try to address these issues by focusing on the positions of Turkish, Moroccan and Portuguese second generations at school and on the job market, while comparing them with the position of “natives” from the same age groups. Our data is taken from the Enqukte Histoire Familiale (family history survey) conducted jointly with the 1999 population census and based on 380,000 individuals (Cassan et a l , 2000). The survey includes ques- tions on the country where the parents were born and is a good way to identify second generation groups from different ethnic backgrounds.

POSTWAR IMMIGMTION: DECOLONIZATIONAND THE NEW FORMS OF INTEGRATION Postwar immigration in France saw the end of the Italian and Spanish waves and the beginning of the post-colonial waves. A great number of “French Muslims” of Algeria had been “imported to metropolitan France during World War I, some of whom had stayed. They were granted a right of free movement in 1947. More than 200,000 of them came to metropolitan France as workers in the early 1950s, and the phenomenon increased after the Independence of Algeria in 1962. They were now Algerians and belonged to the largest immigrant community in France, numbering more than 800,000 in 1982. Portuguese immigration occurred later and took place over a short- er period of time, starting in 1963 and ending in 1973. Over this ten-year period, more than 700,000 Portuguese immigrants, initially male workers and shortly afterwards whole families, settled in France. Over the same peri-

1094 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION &VIEW

od, immigration from Morocco and Tunisia also grew, as these countries had a privileged relationship with their former tutelary metropolitan state. Turk- ish immigration, already established in Germany, Belgium and the Nether- lands, began in France in the early 1970s, boosted further in the 1980s by the Kurdish crisis.

Immigration flows in France since the mid- 1970s have been stabilized at a low level, and the proportion of immigrants1 living in France has changed little since the beginning of the 1980s (Boeldieu and Borrel, 2000). France had slightly more than 4 million immigrants in 1982 and 4,310,000 in 1999, an increase of 6.8 percent, slightly below the increase of the French population as a whole over the same period (+7.7%). By 1999, 36 percent of immigrants had become French nationals versus 3 1.4 percent in 1990. The effects of a relatively liberal naturalization policy were visible in the long term and are also perceptible in annual statistics: 150,000 foreigners became French citizens in 200 1, through various procedures (naturalization, marriage or birth on French territory) .2

The demographic growth between the last two censuses is mostly due to the family entry and settlement policy, resulting in a better sex balance. The proportion of immigrant women was 50 percent in 1999 versus 46 percent in 1982. The geographical origin of immigrants has dramatically changed since the 1950s, now including Africa and Asia (Table 1). While the Italians and the Spanish represented a gradually smaller proportion of the total immigrant population (now together representing hardly more than 15%, as opposed to 25% in 1982 and 45% in 1968), new migration groups have become very prominent, i.e., Portuguese, Moroccans, Turks or Sub- Saharan Africans. The latter have experienced the most significant increase in numbers (43%) between 1990 and 1999 (when compared with an overall 3.4% increase in the immigrant population over the same period). To com- plete the picture of immigrant communities in France, one should also mention immigrants from Southeast Asia (160,000 representing a 4% share), comprised more recently of Chinese from the People's Republic of China, and immigrants from the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh) and from Eastern European countries.

'Since 1990, the definition of the immigrant category has been a person who was a nonciti- zen at birth, born in a foreign country. It does not include French nationals born abroad (most of whom are repatriates from Algeria) and people from the French Antilles and Rbunion Island. 23,260,000 foreigners lived in France in 1999, 510,000 ofwhorn were born in France (16%).


TABLE 1 DISTRIBUIION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY ORIGIN'

1982 1990 191') Total YO Total % Toral %

Total population 54,295,612 56,651,955 58,518,395

TABLE 1 DISTRIBUIION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY ORIGIN'

1982 1990 191') Total YO Total % Toral %

Total population 54,295,612 56,651,955 58,518,395 . _ Immigrants 4,037,036 7.4 4,165,955 7.4 4,306,232 7.4

Algeria 597,644 14.8 555,715 13.3 574,208 13.4 Morocco 367,896 9.1 457,456 11.0 522,504 12.1 Tunisia 202,564 5.0 207,127 5.0 201,561 4.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 122,392 3.0 275,182 6.6 400,000 9.3 Italy 570,104 14.1 483,695 11.6 378,649 8.8 Spain 471,968 11.7 397,126 9.5 316,544 7.3 Portugal 638,492 15.8 599,661 14.4 571,874 13.2

EU Total 2,014,148 49.9 1,782,598 42.8 1,629,094 37.1 Turkey 121,212 3.0 168,359 4.0 174,160 4.1 Sourheast Asia 124,420 3.1 158,075 3.8 159,750 4.0 Other 820,344 20.3 863,559 20.7 997,249 23.1

Source: INSEE, 1982, 1990 and 1999 Censuses Note: 'Foreign born with a foreign citizenship at birth. At the time of the census, the immigrant can be either a foreigner 01 a French citizen.

The immigrant communities are very dissimilar, demographically, eco- nomically, residentially and culturally. These differences can be partly explained by the seniority of immigration groups. The proportion of those with French citizenship varies between 70 percent for those originating from Southeast Asia and Poland, 55 percent for the Italians, 27 percent for the Algerians, 20 percent for the Portuguese, and 5 percent for the Turks. The populations from the earlier groups are now aging. Three quarters of Poles and 60 percent of Italians are older than 60, as opposed to only 15 percent for the Portuguese and 11 percent for the Moroccans. Immigrants in France are now more equally divided between men and women, are aging, and have more often acquired French citizenship.

Immigration from Morocco really started in the late 1970s. In the beginning, immigration consisted of male, mostly rural and poorly educated immigrants. From the early 1980s, this pattern of migration faded out as more women arrived. The characteristics of the immigrants also changed. More immigrants originated from urban areas, and they had more education and better qualifications. For instance, only 5 percent of immigrants arriving after 1975 never attended school, and, regardless of age, 12 percent of males and 10 percent of females immigrating from Morocco have passed a degree either equivalent or more advanced than the French baccalaureate, while three fourths of them have never studied beyond primary school. More than 22 percent of younger immigrants (between 25 and 39 years of age) have at least passed their baccalaureate, while only 62 percent have achieved no degree at all. Moroccans represent a major share among the new immigration

1096 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

groups, especially in the category of family entry and settlement. The age structure is still dominated by working-age people, but the proportion of people over 60 is already on the increase.

The socioeconomic profile of Moroccan immigrants has been transformed by the emergence of a middle class of top professionals and middle executives, which, while still smaller than the French average, remains more significant than among most other immigrant groups. Despite the emergence of this new middle class, Moroccan immigrants are nevertheless experiencing high levels of unemployment, with high differences by gender. Moroccan women have low rates of activity in the labor market and, when they try to get work, there are few opportunities for them.

Turkish immigration is also fairly recent and took place at the time when the recruitment of low-skilled immigrant workers was stopped in 1974. After the immigration of laborers came a wave of political refigees who fled the dic- tatorship regime established in Turkey in 1980. In the first phase it was mostly ethnic Turks while in the second phase it included large Kurdish and Assyrian- Chaldean minorities who settled in France. More than 70 percent of the Turks came from rural areas, and they settled evenly in the various French regions. Some concentrations however exist in the Ile-de-France region, in the eastern “departments,” and in the RhBne-Alpes region. The levels of elementary and secondary school attendance for males are fairly high, for females it is lower (80% of males and 85% of females never studied past secondary school). Although Turkish immigrants maintain low illiteracy rates in their own language, their illiteracy in French is quite high, especially among women (nearly half of them cannot assume an administrative procedure on their own).

More than twenty years after they came to France, very few immigrants from Turkey have become French nationals (5%). Professionally, they still mostly hold working class positions, with a significant group of independent workers, ie., shopkeepers and craftsmen. Like Moroccan women, few Turk- ish women attempt to integrate into the job market, contributing to the highest unemployment rate among immigrant women. With no qualifications and poor French language skills, opportunities seem limited for them. Fami- ly networks, residential concentration and associative structures are all contributing to the social organization of the Turkish community and make up a pool of resources. Such structuring, in return, makes the community visible in the public sphere and tends to isolate its members from other groups.

Portuguese immigration occurred over a very concentrated period of time, between 1963 and 1973. Its aging process has just started, and, because


family entry and settlement following the initial male migration happened very quickly, the sex imbalance became reduced. Similarly, gender inequalities both at school and in activity rates in the labor market, seem very limited. Immigrant women from Portugal, on average, are more active in the labor market than other women living in France. They hold positions in the service industry, while men are mostly manual workers in the building and car indus- tries. Although immigrants from Portugal were confronted with very poor living conditions when they arrived in France - the old Portuguese shantytowns of the Paris suburbs testify to this fact - they later enjoyed ascending social mobility. Many became homeowners, including owning private houses, and are now relatively less affected by unemployment than the other groups. The Portuguese community is an example of a so-called “perfect integration,” despite the fact that they have developed their own ethnic infrastructure and kept very close ties with their home country. The Portuguese associative net- work is very dynamic and efficiently passes the cultural and linguistic heritage on to the second generation.

TABLE 2 SELECTIVE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VAFUALILFS CONCERNING THREE GROUPS OF IMMIGRANTS.

FRANCE, 1999 (IN Yo) Morocco Turkey Portugal

Age structure 0-17 18-59 60 and over

Male ratio % of French citizens Occupational structure

Farmers“ Independent workersb Top professionals Middle executives Employees Service staff Manual workers

Unemployment rate Total Males Females

Activity rateC Total Males Females

6.9 81.8 11.4

25.6

6.9 5.6 6.2

10.1 13.7 9.7

42.8

119

30.8 27.2 37.9

53.7 74.2 32.3

8.6 83.8

7.6 113

5

3.8 8.4 1.9 5.1 7.7 4.4

64.1

33.3 27.2 48.2

56.6 78.9 32.9

3 82.3 14.6

20.3

2.6 6.3 2.2 8.5

11.7 18.3 50.1

10.6 9.8

11.6

105

80.2 87.7 72.1

Source: INSEE, Census and Labor Survey, 1999. Notes: ’Including agricultural workers.

‘Entrepreneurs, craftsmen and retailers. ‘Population between 15 and 59.


THE SECOND GENERATION

Until recently, France had no statistical data that could be used to describe and analyze the second generation. The only census data collected referred to the nationality and country of birth of individuals. Administrative sources do not give more information than nationality, and, in most cases, handling of this variable is not published in causal tables. The contours of “immigrant” populations were often defined on the basis of the legal nationality of a person and this has only recently been changed (Simon, 1998). While censuses since 1881 consistently mention nationality and country of birth, all figures published until 1990 only made the distinction between French born, French by naturalization and foreigners.

Fully aware of the conceptual and methodological irrelevance of the “foreigner” category, the Haut Conseil A I’Integration (High Council for Inte- gration) submitted the “immigrant” category for adoption in 1990. This new category is now used for the census publications, in combination with its usual classifications by nationality. The “immigrant” category, of course, does not cover the total populations “of immigrant ancestry,” but only includes the “foreign-born’’ (primo-migrants in French), regardless of whether they arrived in France as adults or as children. One should also clarify an additional com- plexity of the French classification which has to do with specific aspects of the “Code de la nationalite”‘: not all foreigners are actual immigrants, as the French-born children of immigrants are considered to be foreigners until they come of age, except in a few specific cases. The different combinations of categories are shown in Table 3.

The definition we will use for the second generation in this article is: all individuals born in France from at least one parent born abroad. Data on this category could not be collected through the national census. An approximation was made by extending the characteristics of parents onto their children

TABLE 3 POPULATION LMNG IN METROPOLITAN FRANCE ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY AND PLACE OF BIRTH,

IN 1999 (IN THOUSANDS) Placenfhirth

Nationality Born in France Born abroad Total YO French by birth 5 1,340 1,560 52,900 90.4 French by naturalization 800 1,580 2,360 4.0 Foreigners 510 2,750 3,260 5.6

Foreign stock 1,310 4.3 10 5,620 9.6 Total population 52,650 5,870 58,520 100.0 -

Foreign-born 4,310 7.4 Source: INSEE, Census, 1999.


who still lived with them3 (Tribalat, 1993). In the 1999 census, 2.6 million children born in France lived in households whose reference person or his or her partner was an immigrant. Another approximation using the data from the vital statistics shows that, between 1946 and 1999, 3.6 million births came from at least one foreign parent, reaching almost 10 percent of the total number of births for this period.

These estimates were confirmed by the results of the Engu2te Histoire Furniliale, which we will use later in this article. Table 4 shows the distribution of second generations according to the origin of the immigrant parent(s). The second generation makes up 11 percent of the population over age 18, and this share is going to increase when the children born in the 1980s become adults (especially among Turkish, Asian and African immigrants) .* The Italian second generation has the largest size, closely followed by the Algerian. Both are by far more numerous than the Spanish second generation. More recent immigration groups, i. e., Portuguese, Moroccan, Tunisian, African, Turkish, are starting to produce their own second generations. The proportion of mixed couples among parents is a major element in the distinction of the second generation. Approximately half of the Spanish, Italian, Algerian or Moroccan second-generation youth are from mixed parentage, i.e., one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent. This is even more so for Tunisians, Africans and Asians, while the Portuguese and Turkish groups are less involved in intermarriage.

TABLE 4 THE SECOND GENERATION, FRANCE, 1999 (IN 1000s)

Oripin of the Parents

Total Spain Italy

AIgeria Morocco Tunisia Africa Tiirkev

Portugal

Numbers 4,602

527.1 983.0 237.5 937.6 268.1 216.2 125.5 44.2

in % 11 11 21

5 20

5 4 3 1

2 Parents from 37.5 39.7 39.7 68.6 41.9 37.6 30.6 23.4 61.2

French" 57.9 53.0 54.7 26.7 49.4 48.4 56.0 66.9 28.0

Other Mixedb 4.6 7.3 5.6 4.7 8.6

14.0 13.4 9.7

10.8 ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~

Southeast Asia 79.2 2 18.2 71.9 9.9 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation. Notes: 'Percentage of the group having one parent born in France and the other born in the mentioned country.

bCornbinations of two foreign origins.

3An evaluation technique also developed in the United States by Jensen and Chitose (1996). *The distribution by origin reflects the history of migration with an average delay of about 30 years. It also depends on the total number of immigrants and on family size, which has a mul- tiplier effect.


These results require careful interpretation, as the different groups of immigration have their own specific history. For instance, the African group represented by the second generation is made up of people from the intelli- gentsia who came to France during the 1960s, and do not describe the more rural and less educated African labor immigration of the 1980s.

We will also compare the second generation to the immigrants who came to France at an early age. This subgroup of immigrants is often called “generation and a half” (generation 1.5) in the literature, according to a distinction initiated by Warner and Srole in their famous study of the system of ethnic relations in Yankee city (Warner and Srole, 1345). To check the impact of socialization in the host country, we will use the distinction between immigrants of the first generation (who came after 10 years of age), generation 1.5 (born abroad but who immigrated before 10 years of age), and the second generation. Table 5 shows the variations in the share of various generations in the “foreign stock” of the three groups. With the highest proportions of immigrants and generation 1.5, the Turkish group still features the specific demographic structures of recent migration, whereas the second generation is comprised of a more significant proportion of Moroccans and Portuguese.

TABLE 5 THE IhfMIGRANT “GENERATIONS” ACCORDING TO ORIGIN, FRANCE, 1999 (IN yo)

Immigrants Generation 1.5 Generation 2 Total Morocco 57 11 32 100 Turkey 64.2 14.2 21.6 100 Portugal 58.1 11.8 30.1 100 All origins 34.9 9.9 55.2 100 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation.

An important difference between generation 1.5 and the second generation has to do with the status of citizenship (Table 6). The Code de Iu nution- ditkstates that children born in France from foreign parents are foreigners by birth but are automatically granted French citizenship when they turn 18, except those who refuse French citizenship. In practice, refusals amount to an average of 7 to 8 percent of second generations (Richard, 1998). Children from generation 1.5 have to follow the longer and more uncertain ordinary naturalization procedure, and for this reason, they remain largely foreigners. The group of Turkish immigrants has the largest proportions of foreigners, including a record 16 percent in the second generation. The proportion of foreigners in the second generation reflects a higher than average proportion of refusals among Turks. This attitude to citizenship reveals a closer relation-


ship to the country of origin of their parents and may thus have consequences for their opportunities in French society.

TABLE 6 DISTRIBUTION OF IIIE FOREIGN STOCK BY CITIZENSHIP ACCORDING TO THE GENERATION,

FRANCE, 1999 (IN %)

Immigrants 11 89 French Foreigners -

Turkish Generation 1.5 Generation 2 Immigrants

Generation 2 Immigrants

Generation 2 Immigrants

Moroccan Generation 1.5

Portuguese Generation 1.5

All origins Generation 1.5

20.9 83.8 29.4 46 96.7 14 35 90 34.8 54.1 -

Generation 2 36.7 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation.

79.1 16.2 70.6 54 3.3

86 65 10 65.2 45.9

To control the age structure effects - the second generation is on average much younger than the French population - we will focus our analysis on the age groups under 40. Based on this age group, Table 7 shows the distribution of parents of the Moroccan, Portuguese and Turkish second generations along occupational status. Assimilation theories interpret intermarriage, and more generally the “ethnic heterogamy,” as an indicator of the openness of the group and as a means for social mobility. The meaning of “mixity” is still con- troversial in the scientific literature, and mixed couples between partners from a minority group and the majority group do not always result in or benefit from upward social mobility. Still, one can expect that mixed couples do enjoy an improved social status.

The Moroccan second generation is a very typical example of this improvement. Although the expected stratification (father a manual worker and mother a housewife) is observed among parents born in Morocco, a high, above-average representation of middle and upper classes5 is found among mixed couples with second generation children, with a very clear-cut 57 percent for the fathers (as opposed to 40% among fathers born in France), and also for the mothers (who are better represented in positions such as middle executives or employees). As mixed parents are a significant trend in the Moroccan second generation, this kind of profile has a big influence on the trajectories of the whole group. Such social selection through intermarriage

SHere, the middle and upper classes mean independent workers, top professionals and middle executives.


seems less prevalent among parents of Portuguese second-generation children. Although their stratification is less focused on manual workers’ jobs than the group as a whole, the Franco-Portuguese nevertheless largely portray a working class profile. Internal dissimilarities within the second generation are not as sharp, as we will later observe. Finally, mixed parents among Turkish second generation are so limited in numbers that any distinction of parents’ origin is of little relevance and statistically quite unreliable. The occupational stratification of parents of second generation Turkish children is strongly focused on manual workers’ and independent workers’ jobs among the fathers, and on the position of housewife among the mothers.

EDUCATIONAND SCHOOLING The position of children of immigrants at school is determined by their family characteristics, and such characteristics of immigrant parents are not favored in the school market. They belong to the working classes, have not attended school or have attended only for a short period, and they face a major language problem in French. Social mobility surveys, however, show that immigrant children enjoy a substantial social mobility compared to their parents. Clearly, even when a child attends school over a short period in the host country, he or she usually attains higher skills than his or her parents. Thus, one should assess the immigration-specific social conditions in school trajectories and then evaluate 1) the strategies developed by immigrant families in order to obtain an education, and 2) whether the school system offers comparable educational conditions, despite the origin of students. The concept of equal opportunities, i.e., of possible discrimination or preferences in treatment according to the origin of students, is an underlying aspect of such a study of students’ positions in schools.

Skills and Success at School

To understand the figures on education, we first briefly introduce the French educational system. Almost all the children start school at the age of three (in maternelk). The rate of attendance is about 95 percent by the age of 5. School is obligatory from 6 to 16 years old. Children begin primary school (Pculepri- maire) at age 6 and, after five years, they attend the cull2ge (at the age of 11 on average). There is no selection process for entrance to the cu&ge, because selection occurs at the end of this cycle, leading eventually to the general hcPe or to a vocational school. School drop out is mainly observed at the end of the culkge and during the &eke and in vocational school.

TABLE

7 O

CC

UPA

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NA

L STATUS

OF THE P

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OF

SEC

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(IN

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Col

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rs

Inac

tives

To

tal

14 Tw

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rent

s 5

from

Por

tuga

l Fa

ther

Mix

ed P

aren

tage

Fat

her

Tota

l Por

tuga

l Fa

ther

Two

Pare

nts

from

Mor

occo

Fa

ther

Mix

ed P

aren

tage

Fat

her

Tota

l Mor

occo

Fa

ther

Tota

l Tur

kef

Fath

er

Fran

ce

Fath

er

Mot

her

Mot

her

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her

Mot

her

Mot

her

Mot

her

Mot

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3.2

2.7

0.7

0.2

1.2

0.6

1.1

0.2

1.1

0.3

0.8

0.2

2.4

0.4

8.3

8.2

1.2

15.9

6.

6 9.

5 2.

2 8.2

2.2

12.9

5.

7 10

.6

4.1

14.6

9.

4 12

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0.8

0.0

4.2

0.8

1.7

0.2

3.6

1.3

24.6

7.

2 14

.4

4.8

1.1

0.7

11.6

7.1 1.3

10.5

7.

3 8.

4 2.

9 5.8

3.4

19.4

22

.2

13.4

14

.5

3.5

2.5

16.1

4.0

32.0

10

.5

35.1

5.

7 35

.8

9.6

19.6

19

.5

34.0

14

.8

27.9

4.

0 3.4

16.3

75.8

0.

9 30

.4

32.5

57

.0

1.2

17.5

32

.4

72.5

1.

1 28

.9

29.4

70.3

1.

4 13

.0

60.2

22

.2

0.4

6.1

24.5

45

.1

1 .o

9.3

39.2

73

.8

0.6

23.8

59

.8

35.0

0.

7

100

f3 10

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100

100

100

100

v,

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100

100

8 # 3 B 10

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100

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100

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6.1

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100

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ce: I

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ensu

s. 19

99.

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d: A

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roup

s bet

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n 18

and

40.

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ote:

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the

mix

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e Tu

rkey

gro

up is

too

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ixity

.


The data produced by the French ministry of education (Education Nationale) contain little information on the school careers of the children of immigrants. The main results were achieved in a recent study based on a special panel by L-A. Vallet and J-I? Caille (1996), which analyzed in detail the school performance and careers of students of “immigrant ancestry.” Its conclusions stated that under equal socioeconomic conditions, and especially under similar family situations, the school performance of children of immigrants in elementary school was comparable to or slightly less than those of students of nonimmigrants. In junior high school (colkge), the effect of being a child of immigrants is even rather positive, again, given equal social and family conditions.

To understand these results, which contradict common representations that children of immigrants have a specific handicap, one should make a clear distinction between the explanation, which points to the overwhelming role of the social origin and type of family of children of immigrants, and the blunt observation that students of immigrant ancestry are by far less successful than other students. This is what the survey shows: that while immigrant ancestry in itself is not detrimental to students, belonging to larger families and having parents in lower social positions by and large explains why children are less successful at school. Vallet and Caille (1996) found that:

nearly one foreign pupil out of two has repeated at least one year during his time in a French elementary school, as opposed to one French student out of four. Less than 3% of young French students, and twice that proportion of their foreign counterparts, integrated the specialized education sections when they left primary school. When going into sixth grade (classe de be), major discrepancies are observed in the success rates to the national evaluation exams between the average performance of young foreign pupils and that of French students, the latter having a lead of more than 6 points in mathematics and nearly 9 points in French on the former. Finally, only one third of foreign junior high school children as opposed to nearly half of their French counterparts had been offered to integrate a long second cycle, i.e., the most direct way towards the baccalaureate, by the time they had spent four years in secondary education (pp.141-142).

In order to begin to explain these phenomena, we should stress that the occurrence of larger families is very high among immigrants (6 1 % of children of immigrants live in families of at least 4 children, as opposed to 15% for children of native parents), especially among North Africans, Turks and Africans. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of immigrant fathers were or still are manual workers when they are employed at all. In these specific conditions, the statistical technique “all other things being equal’’ can only invalidate the racist stance arguing that children with immigrant parents have a genetic or


cultural inability to achieve successful studies. It confirms, instead, how family situations have such a strong influential impact. To summarize: all things being unequal, performance of children of immigrants in school is not so bad. These conclusions can be fruitfully integrated with new data from an EHF survey. The school performance of the second generation can be evaluated by examining the diplomas and educational levels achieved by students. The three groups of second generations included in the survey experienced three types of trajectories in school (Table 8).

TABLE 8 EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT ACCORDING TO SEX AND WHETHER PARENTS ARE A MIXED COUPLE,

SECOND GENERATION BY ORIGIN, FRANCE, 1999 (IN yo) Drop outa Vocational School Baccalaureat University

’Turkey Males 40.1 27.8 19.1 13.1 Females 51.6 15.3 23.3 7.7 Total 46.4 22.1 21.3 10.1

Morocco Males 26.1 25.1 25.6 23.3 Females 22.6 21.9 27.3 28.3 Two parents 30.9 29.8 24.1 15.2 Mixed parentage 19.8 18.6 27 34.6 Total 24.3 23.5 26.5 25.7

Portugal Males 27.5 36.8 18.8 17 Females 23.5 29 25.7 21.8 Two parents 24.1 34.2 21 20.7 Mixed parentage 30.1 30.6 24.6 14.6 Total 25.5 32.8 22.3 19.4

Total Population Males 24.1 32.7 19 24.3

Females 24 24.6 22.5 28.9 Total 24 28.7 20.7 26.6

Children of the French Working Class Males 26.9 40 17 16.1

Females 26.2 30.5 21.8 21.5 Total 26.7 35.2 19.5 18.6

Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation. Note: ’By “Drop Out,” we mean people leaving school with no diploma, mainly after the coll&ge. People aged 18 to 40.

Exiting the school system without achieving any degree is a much more common experience for Turkish students (more than 46% of them, as opposed to an average 24% in France), compounded by gender inequalities. Just like their immigrant parents, the Turkish second generation reproduces gender inequalities, as young girls leave school early while boys keep attending vocational classes at school. Although school attendance is more frequent than in the parents’ generation, university attendance among the second generation remains rare.


The Portuguese second generation is less likely to follow the general curriculum and is generally engaged in short-term, vocational training courses. There are three types of “baccalaureat”: general, technical and vocational. The general and the technical lead to the university or to vocational high school, whereas the vocational ends with a direct entry into the labor market. The Portuguese second generation usually obtains vocational or technical baccalaureates. In their case, it would be relevant to add the vocational and baccalaureate categories to describe the whole set of vocational training classes. The proportion of students exiting school early, however, is comparable to the French average. Moreover, if we compare the data among French with the same social background, ie., the children of the working class, the results show even a slight advantage for the Portuguese second generation.

The descendants of Franco-Portuguese mixed couples are less successful than students whose parents are both immigrants. A possible explanation could be that mixed couples are marginalized in the Portuguese community because they may sever their links with the rest of the community to follow their own course. Perhaps this has produced negative effects on their children’s school performance. Such a process has been documented among the Algerian second generation whose parents had pioneered mixed couples in the 1960s, a time when such couples were not acceptable to French society. The children of those Franco-Algerians couples were less successful at school than those of immigrant couples (Tribalat et aL., 1996).

The Moroccan second generation, in contrast with the two groups mentioned above, enjoy relatively good educational positions, close to the general average for France. Their rate of access to more general, nonvocational classes is even higher, while their attendance of vocational classes, a typical choice for working-class children, is less than the French average. The data for the group as a whole are very much influenced by the performances of the children of mixed couples, whose rate of access to the baccalaureate and to university are higher than the French average. The ranking of children with two Moroccan parents is much more consistent with the Turkish and Por- tuguese second generations. The strong impact of French-and-Moroccan mixed couples on the school performance of their children can be related to the higher socioeconomic status of the mixed couples. If we take into account the socioeconomic status of the parents, the social mobility of second generations from the two groups are actually quite moderate. Differences between mixed parent couples and couples with two Moroccan parents will later be important when explaining differences in the transition to the labor market.


The relatively limited gender differences in educational positions, in favor of women, among the Moroccan second generation contrasts sharply with the experience of first-generation immigrant women, who did not have the same educational opportunities as men. This improved and significant change in gender balance can be explained by a more equalitarian school system and, surprisingly enough, by selective family involvement that depends on a child's sex. Second-generation Portuguese and Moroccan boys are more focused on short-term studies and drop out more, while girls seem to invest more seriously in education. A possible explanation could be that they consider school and work as a way to become more independent from their families. In contrast, women from the Turkish second generation are still at a seri- ous disadvantage, even though the difference with males has become much reduced compared to the generation of immigrants.

One would have expected that the situation of generation 1.5 would have been intermediate between the immigrants and the second generation. They benefit from their socialization and schooling in France, but may have some negative consequences due to their late arrival (compared to those born in France). But the results give a more complex picture. The Portuguese group fol- lows this pattern, with a move towards baccalaureate and university from generation 1.5 to the second. The Turkish and Morrocan generation 1.5 reach an educational level very similar to that of the second generation. A shift from vocational school to baccalaureat can be observed mainly for the Turkish women who seem to stay longer at school when they are born in France.

TABLE 9 EDU~.~~IONAL ACH- ACCORDING TO SPX, &NERAT~oN 1.5, BY ORIGIN, FRANCE, 1999 (IN %)

Drop out Vocational School Baccalaureat University Turkey Males 40.8 36.5 15 7.8

Females 60.1 24.5 5.7 9.7 Total 51.7 29.6 9.7 8.9

Morocco Males 25.2 36 20.9 17.8 Females 24.6 29.1 21 25.3 Total 24.9 32.3 21 21.8

Portugal Males 40.6 43.2 5.6 10.6 Females 34.2 40.1 14.1 11.6 Total 37.4 41.7 9.7 11.1

Source: INSEE, EHF, 1797, personal calculation. Note: People aged 18 to 40.

The better results of the second generation seem to derive from an increased interest in education among immigrant families. ZCroulou (1 988) argued that immigrant families, and especially those from North Africa, attempt to compensate their lack of cultural and social resources by devoting

I108 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION &VIEW

extra attention to the education of their children. For these parents, school would compensate for social disadvantages and would represent an opportunity for social mobility for their children, an unexpected example of how the French republican creed on education can be taken up by immigrant families. Tribalat also showed evidence of a “family effect” on the successful studies of immigrant children, but this is subject to the existence of a sibling who attends university. The “priming” effect of having a family member enrolled at university seems to establish a “family standard” that presumably affects brothers and sisters (Tribalat, 1996).

All indicators describing relationships between immigrant families and the school system, however, usually tell a story of less contact and of com- munication problems. The ‘‘Eforts dgducation des Familles” (family education efforts) survey conducted in 1992 by INSEE (the French national insti- tute for statistics) showed evidence that foreign parents meet schoolteachers less frequently than average, and when they do meet them, only the father will usually be present (Gissot, HCran, Manon, 1994: 193). Immigrants from North Africa, however, meet teachers more frequently than French families do, but in most cases they simply were summoned by teachers to do so (51% of their meetings are summoned by teachers as opposed to 20% among French families). In the end, one may say that although there is immigrant family involvement, there seem to be no clear positive consequences in terms of student success. Is commitment a sufficient condition in itself to compensate for the lack of knowledge about the school system and the lack of educational skills? Our results show that structural trends that reproduce existing social positions still predominate and that at least one group which featured high rates of access to university was one that already enjoyed a favorable, dominant social position.

School Chses and Avoidance Strategies toward Sensitive Schools

Contextual effects regarding the characteristics of schools attended by students are increasingly being taken into account by educational science research. Public policies have tried to address these “neighborhood effects” on schools by creating special areas, the ZEP (Zones dEducation Prioritaire or priority education zones). Schools designated in a ZEP receive those students who are confronted with the greatest educational difficulties. They get extra budget and staff, have reduced numbers of students per class, and develop special monitoring programs for students facing difficulties. In 1998- 1999, foreign pupils represented a 7 percent average of the total numbers of stu-


dents in primary education schools, as much as 22 percent of students admit- ted in ZEP schools, and only 5 percent of students in non-ZEP schools (DPD, 2000). The statistics below also shed interesting light on what kind of concentrations foreign pupils may experience: a third of foreign pupils attending a ZEP school are registered in schools with more than a 50 percent share of foreign pupils. The relationship between residential segregation and school segregation has now been clearly established: the trends which deter- mine the social and ethnic make-up of “poor neighborhoods” also have an influence on schools. The consequences of having poor urban equipment or concentrations of socially precarious populations are made worse by the lack of resources with which schools increasingly must cope (Barrdre and Martu- celli, 1997; Payet, 1999).

Common representations of the “quality” of schools, and high parent expectations in trying to ensure the best possible studying conditions for their children have induced the emergence of a “school market” (Broccolichi and Van Zanten, 1997 ). A commonly accepted idea is that high proportions of students of immigrant ancestry will have a negative influence on overall school performance. Similarly, more and more people have started equating concentrations of students of immigrant ancestry and violence at school. The relationship between the visibility of “minorities” at school and the degrada- tion of the school’s own reputation has considerably influenced parental strategies and public policies on education.

Confronted with the school avoidance strategies of middle-class parents, schools are themselves conducting internal segregation policies to deal with the flight of their best students to government schools with better repu- tations, or when they cannot obtain special dispensations to do so, to private schools (Payet, 1997). The more frequent integration of special classes (called adaptation classes, initiation classes, school integration classes) - although justified for nonfrancophone students - still tend to be assigned even after language problems are solved, and attendance of the most disregarded classes (short term technical classes, vocational high school or the most disregarded general, nontechnical classes) not only negatively affects the rate of access to the baccalaureate, but also provides students with lower degrees (Laacher and Lenfant, 1997). Unequal opportunities at school, therefore, should not just be evaluated by comparing degrees, but also by taking into account the kinds of opportunities they bring in terms of integration of further university studies or of the job market.


EMPLOYMENTAND THE LABOR MARKET Despite the educational achievement and skills acquisition of the second generation who attended school, a new form of discrimination has emerged that addresses them to jobs requiring less skill than their ability, or that simply just deprives them of jobs. Social mobility surveys show that if the immigrant parents have been exploited, their children are now excluded from the labor market (Viprey, 1998; Dayan eta!., 1997).

The French situation features a major split between the training system and the job market. The transition between school and the professional world is much more problematic than in other European countries, such as Ger- many or Austria for instance. Hence, France’s very high unemployment rates among young people (under 25) and the growing number of subsidized jobs schemes specially targeted at this age group to assist their integration into the job market, are indicators of these problems. The apprenticeship system that has been implemented in the last few years to ease the transition to the labor market has not benefited young people of immigrant ancestry (Deroche and Viprey, 1998). Most of them have been sent to subsidized schemes, which offer few stable jobs. The consequence of, on the one hand, the unequal treatment in the apprentice system and, on the other, the growth of subsidized job schemes that guarantee some earnings to young people in precarious circumstances is the dramatic rise in “atypical jobs” (interim jobs, salaried or unsalaried training courses, subsidized jobs, fixed-term contracts) at the expense of stable, permanent jobs.

In order to define the position of the second generation in the job market, I look at job levels in order to identify any social mobility compared to their parents or the in-between generation or the gaps that exist between groups or the native group. The level of unemployment among the second- generation groups is another indicator for their position in the labor market. Together, they indicate the openness of the labor market and how the second generation actually benefits from the improvement in education.

Data from various statistical sources provide clues on the conditions experienced by young people of immigrant ancestry when entering the job market. Using the panel set up by Cereq, one may follow the job history of young people from the time they leave school (Brinbaum and Werquin, 1997). Unemployment figures among young people without the baccalaureate and whose parents were both born in Turkey or Morocco are nearly twice as high compared to youth in the total population. The difference is even more dramatic for young men than for young women, but the trend is simi-


lar. Higher educational skills are not necessarily sufficient to eradicate above- average unemployment, meaning that the lack of training cannot be the sole reason for the high unemployment rates. The same database was used by Sil- berman and Fournier (1999), who have developed a very detailed analysis of the mechanisms at work in the job market. According to their conclusions, the trajectories followed by young people of North African immigrant ancestry are much less successful than those of other young people of immigrant origin (especially from the EEC), and even more so than those of native French youth. During the first four years after they leave school, they experienced more periods of unemployment and benefited less from measures that encouraged employment than others.

This situation remains consistent regardless of the degree they have earned and is dependent, first on the kind of social capital available (families and networks to the job market) and second on the bigger differences between their levels of qualifications and the level of jobs offered in the labor market. These conclusions confirm the analyses made from the MGIS survey conducted in 1992 (Simon, 2000).

The results of the EHF survey included in this article show that the situation is not really any better ten years later. The unemployment rates for the Turkish second generation are twice as high as the national average (seeTable 10). Despite their good school qualifications, the Moroccan second generation still faces major difficulties entering the job market. Entry into the labor market for the Portuguese second generation, however, seems relatively less precarious, as their unemployment levels are very similar to the French average. These major discrepancies are even sharper for the 1.5 generation of Moroccans and Turks whose unemployment rates are close to the prevailing figures among immigrants. Attending school and experiencing socialization partly in France did not produce the expected effects related to their employ- ability. Finally, all generations of the Turkish group feature sharp gender inequalities, while sex differences are limited in the Moroccan second generation, and even below the average national figures. This relative equality between sexes in terms of unemployment is not visible in the 1.5 generation, which confirms that they are more similar to the immigrant generation. The proportion of mixed couples is a major explanation of the differences between generations.

The differences in unemployment rates relate first to the level of educational qualifications of individuals. De-industrialization has destroyed great numbers of jobs requiring lower qualifications, where the skills now required


TABLE 10 UNEMPLoYMWrT RATES ACCORDING TO SEX AND GENERATION, BY ORIGIN,

FRANCE, 1999 (IN yo) Males Females Together

Turkey Generation 1.5 26.7 50.2 38.3 Generation 2 22.8 47.0 34.0

Morocco Generation 1.5 30.6 41.5 36.1 Generation 2 25.7 29.7 27.5

Generation 2 18.4 20.4 19.4 Total Population 14.3 20.1 17.0 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation. Note: People aged 18 to 40.

Portugal Generation 1.5 12.1 19.4 15.4

for most jobs are altogether higher than they used to be. Consequently, those who leave school early, with no degree, are more likely to be affected by unemployment as the variation of unemployment rates according to the degree also clearly shows (Table 11). The colineariry between the level of education and unemployment is not absolutely verified for the different groups.

The Turks and Moroccans who have high diplomas are more affected by unemployment than the average with the same qualification. The unemployment rate of the Portuguese “generations” is close to the national average or even below in the case of the 1.5 generation who, unlike those from other groups, are not as affected by unemployment when they leave school without achieving degrees. The typical reversed relationship between diploma and unemployment rate does not work here, which suggests that specific conditions of access to jobs exist for the Portuguese second generation.

TABLE 11 UNEMPUIYMENT RATE ACCORDING TO THE LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND BY GENERATION AND ORIGIN,

FRANCE, 1999 (IN %) Drop Out Vocational School Baccalaureat University

Turkey Generation 1.5 54.9 30.2 34.4 Generation 2 56.2 33.5 32.3 17.2

Morocco Generation 1.5 49.6 42.1 46.3 12.5 Generation 2 48 36.8 25 17

Portugal Generation 1.5 15.7 14.4 18.7 15.7 Generation 2 29.6 21.9 16.4 10.4

Total population 30.5 18.2 17 10.9 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation Notes: ‘Nonsignificant numbers. People aged 18 to 40.

Various reasons related to characteristics and strategies of the individuals or to the organization of the labor market may account for the deviations observed. The survey does not include the necessary variables to actually explore them all, so we shall just voice a few hypotheses based on our present knowledge. The three groups have different models of integration. The pattern followed by the Portuguese second generation is the reproduction of the


manual worker’s model, with short vocational training courses, and leads more frequently to manual workers’ positions, especially for men (Table 12). Social mobility between generations is limited, regardless of whether parents are mixed couples or not (Table 13). A big advantage is that the levels of unemployment are low (Table 14). Entering the job market is made easier for members of this group because the family at large partly controls it or at least is strongly involved in it (parents, cousins and uncles). The model is based on cooptation inside professional circles where they have a positive reputation. The preliminary steps taken before one is offered a job testify to the impor- tance of the family networks in access to jobs for young people of Portuguese origin (Simon, 2000, Table 6:20). The existence of a Portuguese “ethnic niche” in the construction industry and in trade positions are sources of opportunities for the second generation, who capitalize on the social capital accumulated by the immigrant generation.

TABLE 12 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE SECOND GENERATION BY GENDER AND ORIGIN, FRANCE, 1999 (IN %)

Independent Top Middle Manual Farmers Workers Professionals Executives Employees Workers Unemployed”

Turkey Males 0 15.7 8.3 1.5 10.8 63.8 0 Females 2.3 0 2 13.7 34.5 36.7 10.9 Together 1 8.4 5.4 7.1 21.8 51.2 5

Morocco Males 0.9 4.2 11.6 22.2 15.8 39.1 6.2 Females 1 2.7 9 25.9 37.4 17.8 6.2 Together 0.9 3.5 10.4 23.9 25.8 29.3 6.2

Portugal Males i.6 4.3 4.9 16.8 8.9 61.8 1.8 Females 0.5 2.4 2.4 17.4 47.4 27.3 2.6 Together 1 3.4 3.7 17.1 27.5 45.1 2.2

Whole of France Males 4.2 4.9 11.1 20.8 12.6 44.6 1.9 Females 1.5 2.6 7.9 23 41 21.3 2.7 Together 2.9 3.9 9.6 21.8 25.8 33.8 2.2

Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation Notes: “Unemployed concern- the people who have never worked before. People aged 18 to 40.

TABLE 13 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE SECOND GENERATION BY hRENTAGE, FRANCE, 1999 (IN ”0)

Morocco PortuPal Two parents Mixed Parentage Two parents Mixed Parentage

Farmers 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.9 Independent workers 3.4 3.9 3.4 2.7 Top executives 5.6 11.9 3 4.1 Middle executives 16.2 30.3 15.8 19.2 Employees 30.5 26.9 31 32 Manual workers 32.4 24.2 44.2 39.3 Unemployed 10.9 2.1 2 1.8 Source: INSEE, EHF, 1999, personal calculation. Note: People aged 18 to 40.


TABLE 14 UNEMPLoVMENT RATE OF THE SECOND GENERATION BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND ORIGIN,

FRANCE. 1999 (IN YO) Independent Top Middle Manual

Farmer Workers Executives Executives Employees Workers Total Turkey 25 13.5 34.7 33.7 34 Morocco 23.4 4.5 11.6 27.3 32.9 27.5 Portugal 27.3 10 17.8 21.1 19.4 Totaliopulation 11.3 14 5.2 9.7 17.8 19.8 17 Source: INSEE. EHF. 1999. oersonal calculation. Notes: ’Numbers too limited or not significant. The total unemployment rate integrates unemployed people who have never worked before and cannot be distributed by occupational status. People aged 18 to 40.

This model of professional integration is partly shared by the Turkish second generation, but with far less marked results. Because Turkish immigration is more recent, the immigrant generation is confronted with greater difficulties and higher rates of unemployment. As the second generation is reproducing the exact positions of the first generation, just like the Portuguese before them, the high proportions of students leaving school at early stages are reflected in the concentration in manual workers’ jobs with operative jobs or employees’ positions. Although above-average unemployment is widespread regardless of their occupational status, it is particularly high among manual workers and employees. Their case shows that they are not integrated in a protected segment of the job market, but are actually rather strongly exposed to the effects of industrial restructuring, just like their parents before them.

The Moroccan second generation exhibits a totally different dynamic. The obvious comparison in their case is with the social mobility trajectories of French working-class children in the 1960s. Their school history tends toward longer studies, with some variation according to whether their parents are mixed couples or not. This strategy of improving their social position through studying, however, is not all that successful. They experience greater difficulties than others when they enter the job market, including those with 4cLe degrees. There is a much greater diversity of occupational statuses among them than in the other two groups, which is partly explained by a specifically Franco-Moroccan profile. The emergence of a middle and upper class is splitting the Moroccan second generation into two social groups. Those with high qualifications have no problem entering the job market and their unemployment rates are similar to the French average, while the second group of people who attended short vocational tracks, or who left school without achieving any degree, generally work in low-skilled job positions with very high risks of unemployment. Above-average unemployment of Moroccan and


indeed Turkish manual workers and employees reveals a segmentation of the job market along ethnic lines, in which a “capital of representation” seem to be more important than actual skills or qualifications.

CONCLUSION The French debate on the existence of a second generation stems from a normative position based on a certain model of citizenship. The bias against “eth- nicizing” or “racializing” social relationships encourages the rejection of any categories of “origin.” This attempt at making second generations invisible can also be explained by the concern about not relating the descendents of immigrants with an immigration which they themselves have not directly experienced and which is probably only a distant reference to most of them (De Rudder, 1997). But consistent indications that some of these descendents of immigrants have indeed been confronted with discrimination do under- score the theory that special social experiences actually exist. In other words, the specific condition of the descendants of immigrants gives some consis- tency to the second generation category and provides an opportunity to investigate the reality of such hypotheses.

This article attempted to do just that, based on data from the EnquPte Histoire Farnilide survey which, as a rare opportunity in the French statistical system, made possible the construction and elaboration of the second generation immigrant category. We investigated the situation of Turkish, Moroc- can and Portuguese second generations in the field of education and in the job market. Results increasingly reveal that although social mobility does exist from one generation to another, social status among second-generation immigrants is still being widely reproduced despite a general improvement of school abilities and occupational positions.

The reproduction model is particularly relevant in the Turkish second generation, who combines a limited access to higher training courses and great difficulties in entering the job market. The persistence of gender inequalities reinforces this reproduction model, i. e., lower rates of school attendance, lower employment rates and higher women’s unemployment figures are typical of a negative differentiation which is all the more specific, as nothing similar happens among the Moroccans or the Portuguese. These observations are still provisional due to the recent arrivals from the Turkish migration into France. However, if the trend that has been initiated by the first-generation immigrants continues, we will be confronted with the formation of what one could term a Turkish underclass. The Portuguese second


generation is following a fairly close path to the Turkish second generation if we look at vocational reproduction alone. Although middle executives are more numerous, manual workers remain vastly predominant among men, while women are employees. A limited social mobility, in this case, is combined with an efficient integration of the job market, thanks to an optimal use of family and community networks. The relatively low unemployment rates experienced by those Portuguese having achieved no degrees is an indication that they have access to fairly “protected” jobs. This is very different from the Moroccan second generation, who is experiencing a strong general mobility, especially because of the great influence of the children of mixed couples. The latter attend university courses and are no longer exposed to high unemployment when they achieve executive positions. Children of Moroccan couples, on the other hand, experience much more disrupted school careers and usually get basic low-skilled jobs. In this case, they face high, well above average levels of exclusion from the job market, which is an indication that their mobility is being specifically hindered. To elucidate such job integration barriers, more sources will need to be used. At that point, one may consider possible active discrimination in accessing unqualified jobs.

Our observation of facts and trends of the second generation in the educational and occupational fields deserves to be extended further into other fields. For instance, residential positions will indicate whether housing strategies and the reproduction of similar types of housing do exist and if new ethnic neighborhoods grouping the second generation are now rising. These preliminary results present strong arguments in favor of discussing “second generation decline” (Gans, 1992). The transition from a demographic fact - the reality that immigrants have children in their host countries - to a sociological phenomenon - the second generation as a social group - is actually occur- ring in France, despite the control exerted by a political philosophy of uni- versalism. The reproduction of class position and the legacy of ethnicity from one generation to the next determines quite a diversity of patterns of integration by the second generations. For the moment, the model of “segmented assimilation” may not fully explain this diversity. But in light of ongoing discrimination, any social improvement of the post-colonial second generations remains an elusive outcome.

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