From Words to Action : Targeting and scope at grassroots levels of Russian

propaganda warfare psy-ops in the cases of Bulgarian paramilitary

organizations

Dr.Kiril Avramov, Department of Political Science at the New Bulgarian

University, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Focus of interest • Analysis of the types and aims, as well as,

targeting, scope, intensity and efficiency of the Russian propaganda warfare psychological operations at grassroots levels in the cases of Bulgarian paramilitary organizations in the general framework of the Russian supported project titled “Balkan Front Bulgaria”.

Background • Number studies[1][2] in the recent years

unanimously demonstrate that Bulgaria has become a classic “target country”[3] for intensive Russian disinformation campaigns and various psy-ops, this paper focuses on the analysis of the types, scope, intensity and targeting of Russian propaganda warfare psy-ops aimed at the formation, guidance and grassroots influence of newly unified “patriotic” Bulgarian paramilitary organizations – i.e. “border patrol” vigilante units.

[1] Conley, H. A., Stefanov, R., Vladimirov, M., & Mina, J. (2016). The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Център за изследване на демокрацията. [2] De Liedekerke, A. (2016). The Paramilitary Phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington Post. [3] Avramov, K. (2016) “By Another Way of Deception: the Use of Conspiracy Theories as a Foreign Policy Tool in the arsenal of the Hybrid Warfare”, “Interagency and International Cooperation in Countering Hybrid Threats” Working Papers, G. S. Rakovski National Defense College, Defense Advanced Research Institute (DARI), Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) International, South East European Region, AFCEA Sofia Chapter.

Background • The analysis attempts to “dissect” the

genesis, foreign connectivity, support, susceptibility and the local specifics of the recent for Bulgaria phenomenon of “semi-invisible” from state’s legal and counterintelligence perspectives “peoples’ / civic border patrols” geared towards “border protection against illegal migration and minorities disregard for law and order”.

Why is it important • Demonstration of the “induction to action

effect” of Russian disinformation efforts and psy-ops in Bulgaria at grassroots levels pertaining to the unification of the various heterogeneous units and sub-unit milieus aimed towards mobilization and enlargement of the size and influence of the Bulgarian paramilitary movement under the auspices of the Russian supported projects

Why is it important • Gaining understanding on the mechanics

of the “microcosm” of complex interrelations and forging of interdependencies of Russian-backed proxies from various parts of Europe that are under the direct or indirect guidance, as a peculiar testing lab for local and regional institutional and social resilience

Why Bulgaria? • NATO and EU member country • Part of the ex-communist block • Split loyalties of the population • Deep cleavages – “Russophiles” vs.

“Russophobes” • Long “saturation” with Russian disinformation

and propaganda • Relatively weak institutions • = perfect testing lab

General aims of the info warfare

• In the past several years we are witnessing an increased and intensified host of activities of Kremlin’s administration to “reclaim” its place on global the arena of international relations.

• Substantial part of these efforts are concentrated initially in Eastern Europe and are directed against the former ex-communist countries' foreign policy orientation – lab experiment

• Later they have gone beyond – Western Europe and the U.S.

• These activities can be grouped in three meta-categories, namely (1) informational (2) ideological and (3) financial.

Information as an offensive weapon • Mostly because these activities are aimed to affect

personal and group decision-making, influences attitudes and voting behavior in these respective countries.

• Because some of them are an “extension” of the so-called “hybrid / non-linear warfare” against targets designated by Kremlin (i.e. countries, institutions, parties, individuals).

• Because they represent part of the orchestrated campaign of the Russian Federation’s leadership to shift the current global balance of power.

Information as an offensive weapon • The propaganda warfare, as a part of the wider

information warfare is often used instrument in the arsenal of the so-called “hybrid warfare” aimed at the opponents of certain regime and/or “targets” of aggressive foreign policy aimed against democratic regimes;

• The end goal of the propaganda warfare is to attain solid support for the positions of the attacking side and undermining the social support and institutional legitimacy, political and decision-making processes, as well as the public figures that embody them in the “target” designated countries;

• Case in point – the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine – where the ratio of non-military to military instruments is 4:1

GERASIMOV DOCTRINE

Information as an offensive weapon • Effective and efficient instrument in comparison

with other instruments, • Cheaper instrument for influencing targeted

auditoria in designated countries; • It is used in different forms – from “selective

segmentation” and “accent”/”bias” of “news”, sensationalism, “extraordinary reporting” up to outright fostering of propaganda clichés, manipulation of public fears, concentrated flow of disinformation, as well as duplication and “hybridization” of endless “conspiracy theories” and fake news;

Information as an offensive weapon

• What is the end goal?

• Attaining the effect of “skewing” of the cognitive evaluation of the targeted auditoria, with an end aim of log-term support or rejection of concrete policies and initiatives of “third party/ies interests” in following their meta foreign policy goals.

Information as an offensive weapon • Where is the new “battlefield” for re-conquering the

“hearts and the minds” of European and American audiences, then?

• The new battlefield = the good old public discourse in all of its traditional and new forms, outlets and channels – from TV and newspapers to social networks;

• The variety and access to communication channels in all forms in combination with the phenomenon of “infotainment” and relatively low quality journalism do not guarantee “objectivity”;

• Thus, the targeted auditoria are not capable of critical assessment of all aspects of the information overflow regarding strategically important topics, in order to create independent opinion regarding key topics (i.e. bounded rationality effect).

VARIOUS TECHNIQUES FROM THE INFORMATION WARFARE ARSENAL

• The vary from disinformation ”implantation” in foreign media to generation of “post-truth” stories and proliferation of conspiracy theories;

• But this is not a new phenomena – well-known and developed continuously during the Cold War, and used from the time of Tzarist Russia’s Okrhanka

• What is new then?

VARIOUS TECHNIQUES FROM THE INFORMATION WARFARE ARSENAL

• Novelty: all listed methods and techniques bear the sign of the process of “weaponization of information, culture and money”(Pomerantzev&Weiss:2014) in the current offensive of Kremlin;

• Novelty: „fusion effect”; • Novelty: radical departure from the so-called “soft power”

approach (Nye : 1990); • Novelty: Massive diffused effort to reach maximum effect

in diverse fronts from the U.S. elections to Western European elections to daily Balkan politics to undermine the legitimacy of the democratic process;

• Novelty: testing the “induction to action effect”

CONSPIRACIES, FAKE NEWS AND DISINFORMATION – POTENT TOOL IN THE

ARSENAL OF INFORMATION WARFARE • The mechanics of spread of fake news,

disinformation and conspiracy theories are not a new phenomenon also – see the Soviet tradition of “kompromat”;

• Examples from East and West – nation identity formation, political regimes consolidation, populism backlash, etc.

• Why should we be bothered then by conspiracies, fake news and disinformation spread?

• Because they are aimed at influencing the formation of individual and group values;

CONSPIRACIES, FAKE NEWS AND DISINFORMATION – POTENT TOOL IN THE

ARSENAL OF INFORMATION WARFARE • Because they directly affect the individual and

group cognitive framing of information; • Because they directly affect the individual and

group decision-making via “critical mass” formation;

• Because they are used as a leverage and foreign policy tool to apply pressure over national governments, political parties and individuals on key positions, public opinion influencers at critical junctures in taking strategic long-term decisions.

It only takes a crisis… • Disinformation offensives work best in

times of crisis • That is the case of the spike of Russian

propaganda efforts in 2015 and 2016 • EU copes with migration crisis • Fears run high – perfect time for public

hysterias

From Words to Action • Main argument – massive disinformation

inflow prepares ground to test “readiness for real life action” beyond cyberspace

• Main argument – indirect and direct support for Bulgarian paramilitary organizations and “civic patrols” = litmus test for institutional and social reaction

• Support – logistics, training, finance and information

From Words to Action • Information support – proliferation of fake

news, conspiracies and disinformation in own language via marginal outlets

• Possible training of vigilantes on “voluntary principle” – see ZDF documented case

• Logistics – a case for interconnectivity between local and foreign anti-systemic milieus – from Byelorussian “Balkan Front Bulgaria” to PEGIDA

From Words to Action • Main takeaways – the case of Bulgarian

paramilitary formations is illustrative for the “fusion effect” between info offensive, logistical support and testing local resilience

• Undermining institutions from a “marginal perspective”

• Litmus test for social and institutional reactions • Platform for international marginal and anti-

systemic actors’ interaction

From Words to Action • Main takeaways – high intensity propaganda

targeting of marginal local and international groups

• Creation of “invisible milieus” of radicalized individuals that are induced to real-life action

• Wider psychological effect targeting the “losers of transition” that harbor hostile attitudes towards liberal democracies and their institutional modus operandi

• Creation of direct and indirect support for Russia as a global “underdog” and “keeper of traditional values”