full case ii ltd

G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000.*SECOND DIVISION.SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents.Appeals; Evidence; As a rule, the Supreme Court is bound by the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.-Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioners admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.Succession; Partition; It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the dece-_______________* SECOND DIVISION.310310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals

dent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.Same; Collation; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Collation cannot be done where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the compulsory heirsthe petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present.Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.Land Registration; Land Titles; Title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law, otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Let 943 in favor of petitioner and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latters name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack .A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu and Co vs. Court of Appeals . In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, 311VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 311 Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals

enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ermitao, Sangco, Manzano and Associates for petitioners. Cirilo T. Ganzon, Jr. and Claro Aligaen for private respondent.QUISUMBING, J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the reversal of the decision1CA Records, pp. 49-60. of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision2Id. at 29. of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of private respondents claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale executed by Flavio Zaragoza covering Lot 943 as valid.The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are as follows:Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children.On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta ZaragozaMorgan filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She fur-_______________1 CA Records, pp. 49-60.2 Id. at 29.

312312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals

ther alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots No. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her fathers lifetime.Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their fathers name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiffs claim against defendants over Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each other.3Rollo, p. 116._______________3 Rollo, p. 116.

313VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 313 Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals

In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.4Id. at 115.Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-GR CV No. 12587.On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.5CA Records, p. 59.The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by private respondent to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance share of private respondent. Specifically, it noted the admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private respondents counsel, that their father had given them their inheritance.6Id. at 58-59. Further, public respondent found that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different from his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed from January to February 1957.7Ibid.The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution8Id. at 107. dated June 26, 1992.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,9Rollo, pp. 16-64. with a supplemental petition, raising the following assigned errors: _______________4 Id. at 115.5 CA Records, p. 59.6 Id. at 58-59.7 Ibid.8 Id. at 107.9 Rollo, pp. 16-64.


A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO ZARAGOZA HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING THESE TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT;B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS OTHER DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUEZ AND NOTARIZED BY NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN THE LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF PETITIONERS FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE.10Id. at 17-18._______________10 Id. at 17-18.


In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992, petitioners additionally raised:I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943 DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO IN EXH. M-11-A APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. 1, FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT 943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES THE LATTERS OWNERSHIP THEREOF.11Id at l33.Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioners that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer.

Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent, _______________11 Id at l33.


through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioners admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.12Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596, 605-606 (1997).Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.13NCC, Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioners and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latters name. Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in _______________12 Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596, 605-606 (1997).13 NCC, Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.


favor of petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis--vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,14257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996). citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu 1545 SCRA 557, 562 (1972). and Co vs. Court of Appeals. 16196 SCRA 705, 711 (1991). In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the Court decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. _______________14 257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996).15 45 SCRA 557, 562 (1972).16 196 SCRA 705, 711 (1991).


ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSED without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Petition granted, judgment vacated and set aside. Complaint for delivery of inheritance dismissed.Notes.Collation contemplated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title. (Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 [1997])A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased. (Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 345 [1998])o0o [Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 309(2000)]G.R. No. 137739. March 26, 2001.*FIRST DIVISION.ROBERTO B. TAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORP., HELEN LEONTOVICH VDA. DE AGUINALDO and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.Land Titles; It is well-settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.The Court of Appeals (CA), in its decision, correctly denied respondent banks prayer to reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel petitioners title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioners title was regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon. As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title._______________* FIRST DIVISION.293VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 293 Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation

Same; Torrens System; The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent banks prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Nelson M. Reyes for petitioner. Jose, lyog, Guan & Bool for respondent Philbank. Agustin Sundiam for Helen Leontovich Vda. de Aguinaldo.KAPUNAN, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Roberto Tan (petitioner) seeking to reverse and set aside the resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. In the said resolutions, the CA directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 194096 and 194098 in the name of Philippine

294294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation

Banking Corporation (respondent bank) over the same parcel of land already covered by petitioners valid and subsisting TCT No. 296945.The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the decision1Rollo, pp. 70-73. of the CA are as follows: On 29 December 1995, petitioner bought from Helen L. Aguinaldo (respondent Aguinaldo) a parcel of land at the Valley Golf Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal. The lot was then covered by TCT No. 294192 in the name of respondent Aguinaldo. No claims, liens or encumbrances appeared on the said title. After payment of the agreed purchase price, TCT No. 294192 was cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 296945) in the name of petitioner was issued.On 29 February 1996, two (2) months after he bought the property, petitioner was served a copy of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent bank in CA-G.R. SP No. 39903. Said petition stated that petitioner was being sued here as a nominal party as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296945. It was only then that petitioner learned that the lot he bought from respondent Aguinaldo was subject of legal dispute between her and respondent bank.It appears that respondent Aguinaldo and her husband Daniel R. Aguinaldo obtained a loan in the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from respondent bank some time in December 1977. To secure the payment of this obligation, the Aguinaldos executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Antipolo and Cainta, Rizal covered by TCT Nos. 234903, 153844 and 151622. In January of 1985, Daniel Aguinaldo obtained three more loans from respondent PBC totalling over five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). He died without having paid these loans.Upon maturity of these loans, respondent bank sent a demand letter to respondent Aguinaldo, as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Despite said demand, the loans remained unpaid. Respondent bank thus initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the real estate mortgage. In the public auction sale, the _______________1 Rollo, pp. 70-73.

295VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 295 Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation

mortgaged properties were sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder.On 15 February 1990, before the expiration of the redemption period of one year, respondent Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1705-A, with Branch 71, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal. In said proceedings, the parties (respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank) entered into a Joint Partial Stipulation of Facts stating, among others, that they agree that the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court [RTC] shall be final and unappealable, subject only to the filing within the reglementary period of the usual motion for reconsideration.On 20 April 1995, the trial Court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:(1) The Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated February 10, 1989, Certificate of Sale dated March 10, 1989, Affidavit of Consolidation executed by the defendant bank, and the deed of sale dated February 1, 1995 executed by the bank in favor of the Terraces Realty & Development Corporation are hereby declared null and void and of no legal force and effect;(2) The Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title No. 194096 and 194008 in the name of the bank and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty & Development Corporation, and to issue, in lieu thereof, new titles in the name of the plaintiff or her successor-in-interest upon proof by the latter of the payment to be made by them to the bank or by similar proof that such amount is deposited by the plaintiff in trust for the bank.The plaintiff shall pay to the bank or deposit the amount in trust for the bank within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of this decision the amounts as follows:(a) on the promissory note for P176,623.24The amount of P176,623.24 plus the stipulated 12% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P176,623.24 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid.(b) on the promissory note for P380,000.00The amount of P380,000.00 plus 14% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until


March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum on said amount of P380,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid; and(c) on the promissory note of P31,000.00The amount of P31,000.00 4% interest per annum from January 24, 1985 until March 10, 1989; and 12% interest per annum of said amount of P31,000.00 from March 11, 1989 until fully paid.(3) The claim of plaintiff for damages and attorneys fees is hereby denied.No pronouncement as to costs.2Id., pp. 71-72.Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. Pending resolution thereof, respondent bank moved for the inhibition of the presiding judge. The motion for inhibition was granted, thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 72. The presiding judge thereof subsequently denied respondent banks motion for reconsideration. Respondent bank then filed a notice of appeal but the same was denied on the ground that it (respondent bank) already waived its right to appeal pursuant to the joint stipulation. The decision was declared final and executory.On 6 October 1995, the Clerk of Court of Branch 72 issued a certification that the decision had become final. Upon presentation of the trial courts decision and certification, the Register of Deeds of Marikina canceled respondent banks TCT No. 194096 and 194098 and Terraces Realty & Development Corporations TCT No. 275504 and issued new titles in lieu thereof, all in the name of respondent Aguihaldo. She subsequently sold the lot covered by one of these titles to petitioner who was then issued TCT No. 296945 therefor.Respondent bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court but the same was denied. It then brought the case to the CA by way of certiorari. In its decision, dated 27 February 1998, the CA substantially granted the reliefs prayed for by respondent bank and directed the trial court to, among others, give due course to respondent banks appeal and elevate the records of the case to the CA for review. The CA, however, denied respondent banks prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs stating that the _______________2 Id., pp. 71-72.


averments as against petitioner are insufficient to make up a cause of action against the latter.3Id., p. 80.Respondent bank thereafter moved for a partial reconsideration of the CA decision insofar as it denied its prayer for the reinstatement of its TCTs. For his part, petitioner filed a motion to cancel notice of lis pendens while respondent Aguinaldo filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on these motions, the CA issued the assailed resolution of 28 August 1998 the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens dated 23 March 1998 filed by respondent Roberto B. Tan and the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Helen Leontovich Vda. de Aguinaldo dated 23 March 1998 are hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 20 March 1998 is hereby GRANTED and par. (d) of the dispositive portion of our decision promulgated on 27 February 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:Directing the Registrar of Deeds to reinstate the cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 194096 & 194098 in the name of petitioner and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275504 in the name of Terraces Realty & Development Corporation, or issue new ones in the event this is not legally feasible in their favor, pending review of the case on appeal.SO ORDERED.4Id., p. 25.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of 23 February 1999. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition assigning the following errors:1. The Court of Appeals erred and committed serious irregularity in directing the reinstatement of Philbanks cancelled TCT No. 194096 (or the issuance of a new one in its place), in the face of an existing TCT in Roberto Tans name over the same parcel of land, and absent any proper direct action and judgment for reconveyance against him which rescinds or cancels his TCT No. 296945;_______________3 Id., p. 80.4 Id., p. 25.


2. The Court of Appeals erred and acted without jurisdiction in deciding upon the question of whether Philbanks cancelled TCT No. 194096 should be reinstated, or a new title issued in its place, this being within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts, and outside the scope of a certiorari proceeding.5Id., pp. 16-17.The Court required respondent bank and respondent Aguinaldo to file their respective Comments. Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda.The Court finds the petition meritorious.The first assailed CA resolution (28 August 1998) directing the Register of Deeds of Marikina to reinstate the TCTs of respondent bank had the effect of canceling petitioners title over the same parcel of land. The CA clearly committed reversible error in issuing the aforesaid resolution. Petitioner was not even a party to the action between respondent Aguinaldo and respondent bank in the court a quo. Petitioner was impleaded only in the certiorari case filed by respondent bank in the CA. In fact, the petition filed by respondent CA merely stated that petitioner was being sued as a nominal party in his capacity as the new registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 296945.6Id., p. 30. Other than this averment, there were no allegations to constitute a cause of action against petitioner. As the CA held in its main decision:Private respondent Roberto Tan has filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, one of which is x x x the petition states no cause of action against Roberto B. Tan. In his submission to support this ground, Tan claims being a buyer in good faith and for value (P2.5 Million), P2 Million of which came from a loan directly paid by the lender bank to the seller, and the full consideration was fully paid.Under the circumstances obtaining, the prayer under paragraph 3.5 cannot be granted. The aforequoted averments as against private respondent Roberto B. Tan are insufficient to make up a cause of action for the desired relief.7Id., p. 80._______________5 Id., pp. 16-17.6 Id., p. 30.7 Id., p. 80.


The CA, in its decision, correctly denied respondent banks prayer to reinstate its canceled TCTs because to do so would effectively cancel petitioners title on the same lot. It must be noted that petitioners title was regularly issued after the lot covered by the same was sold to him by respondent Aguinaldo. Petitioner relied on the sellers title, which was then free from any claims, liens or encumbrances appearing thereon.As such, petitioners title can only be challenged in a direct action. It is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.8Carreon vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 78, 89 (1998). Having obtained a valid title over the subject lot, petitioner is entitled to protection against indirect attacks against his title. The CAs original ruling on the matter, as stated in its decision, denying respondent banks prayer for reinstatement of its canceled titles without prejudice to the filing of proper action should thus stand. It is more in keeping with the purpose of the adoption of the Torrens system in our country:The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of the titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 557 (1994).WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions, dated 28 August 1998 and 23 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals are _______________8 Carreon vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 78, 89 (1998).9 Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 557 (1994).300300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision, dated 27 February 1998, is REINSTATED in toto.SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.Court of Appeals resolutions of August 28, 1998 and February 23, 1999 reversed and set aside, its judgment of February 27, 1998 reinstated in toto.Notes.The Torrens system of land registration, though indefeasible, should not be used a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of the real property. (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113 [1991])Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. (Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 208 SCRA 215 [1992])It is an elementary principle that the owner of land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. (Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 636 [1992])The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994])o0o [Tan vs. Philippine Banking Corporation, 355 SCRA 292(2001)]G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001.*SECOND DIVISION.CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM,1Itom in the petition for review, but Etom in the signature portion of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, Rollo, p. 20. petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO BONILLA, respondents.Appeals; Well-entrenched is the rule that the Supreme Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, findings of fact below being generally conclusive on the Court.In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of possession by private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. There are instances where the Court departs from this rule. However, petitioners did not show that involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first two assignments.Land Registration; Land Titles; Torrens System; Fraud; The indefea-sibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud.In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), we ruled that a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud. These two cases refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated by the government, through the Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for quieting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to the possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the parties. The _______________* SECOND DIVISION.1 Itom in the petition for review, but Etom in the signature portion of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, Rollo, p. 20.484484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Omandam vs. Court of Appeals

last case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions.Same; Same; Courts; Administrative Law; Homesteads; Courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Landsonly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third assigned error, the real issue raised in this case involves the trial courts jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies. What is the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent? Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands. In this regard, courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the DENR Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does hot negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rufino Y. Aloot for petitioners. Jose A. Bersales for private respondent.QUISUMBING, J.:This petition1Rollo, pp. 6-25. for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44442, _______________1 Rollo, pp. 6-25.

485VOL. 349, JANUARY 18, 2001 485 Omandam vs. Court of Appeals

reversing and setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23, dated November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City issued in favor of Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40 covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada, Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in his name.On April 28, 1983, respondent Bias Trabasas bought the land from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of said land. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of the OCT. Upon Say sons advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989, Trabasas acquired a new transfer certificate of title.On April 16, 1990, spouses Bias Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they were the true and registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it.Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heard, the Regional Trial Court issued its decision on November 15, 1993 declaring that neither respondents herein nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. Citing Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992), the trial court disposed:WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no equitable right to the possession of the land under litigation, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff

486486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Omandam vs. Court of Appeals

1) Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the possession of the land in litigation.2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of the land under litigation in the name of the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30 days from the date this decision becomes final and executory, and upon their failure to so comply, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute in behalf of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of conveyance over the said land in favor of the defendants which deed would be considered sufficient to authorize the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in the names of the plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof, to issue another in the common names of the defendants.SO ORDERED.2Rollo, p. 42.Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region IX dismissed Omandams protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands.3Executive Order No. 192 providing for the reorganization of the Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, transferred to the regional field offices the line functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandam failed to prove that Lasola, respondents predecessor-in-interest, committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for its revocation and cancellation of its corresponding title.On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It decided thus:WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land and surrender it to plaintiff-appellant.Cost against defendants-appellees.SO ORDERED.4Id at 31._______________2 Rollo, p. 42.3 Executive Order No. 192 providing for the reorganization of the Department of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, transferred to the regional field offices the line functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands.4 Id at 31.


The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners collateral attack on the homestead title, to defeat private respondents accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and title of Camilo Lasola, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 21, 1997. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners make the following assignment of errors, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in:I . . . HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IS THAT On April 28, 1983, plaintiff bought the subject land from Dolores Sayson who presented herself to be the true owner of the subject land;II . . . HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT . . . sometime in 1984 plaintiff discovered that defendants had entered and had occupied the subject land. Upon instructions of Dolores Sayson, plaintiff approached Camilo Lasola and again bought the subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;III . . . IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD NO EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT LAND, WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESSION MAKES SOME OF THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.5Id., at 7.In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim of possession by private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. The appellate court had stated firstly that respondent Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Courts jurisdiction in a _______________5 Id., at 7.


petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.6Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995); Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472 (1995). There are instances where the Court departs from this rule.7Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 (1994). However, petitioners did not show that involved here is an exceptional instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first two assignments.In the third assignment of error, petitioners aver that public respondent erred in ignoring the trial courts finding that private respondents had no equitable possession of the subject land. Again, we are confronted with a question of fact. But petitioners claim the appellate court had disregarded or even contradicted our holdings in the cited cases of Director of Lands, Abanilla, and Padre.In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), we ruled that a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of title acquired through fraud. These two cases refer to actions for cancellation of title initiated by the government, through the Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for quieting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to the possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the parties. The last case refers to determination of rightful possession in possessory actions.Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third assigned error, the real issue raised in this case involves the trial courts jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies. What is the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action on the order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent? _______________6 Co vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995); Gobonseng, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472 (1995).7 Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 (1994).


Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and manage public lands.8CA 141, Sec. 3: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.Sec. 4: Subject to said control,... In this regard, courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands.9Maximo vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 182 SCRA 420, 426 (1990). Only the DENR Secretary can review, on appeal, such decree.It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasolas homestead application on May 21, 1968. No appeal was made therefrom. Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987, Omandam filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, respondents Trabasas and Bonilla instituted the present action in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or ownership. As mentioned earlier, the trial court held that petitioners were entitled to a declaration of equitable possession over the area in question. Said trial court then ordered the cancellation of respondents title and the issuance of a new one. In effect, the courts order reversed the award made by the Director of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for the proper administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not set-_______________8 CA 141, Sec. 3: The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.Sec. 4: Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.9 Maximo vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, 182 SCRA 420, 426 (1990).


tied the respective rights of public land claimants.10Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 331, 339 (1969). But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the contested area in 1967. His application was granted on May 21, 1968. The Order for the issuance of the patent was issued by the Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds on April 28, 1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal was made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years from the date of the Order directing the issuance of the patent that petitioners protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of Lands. Despite the said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to the protest relying on our ruling in Director vs. Abanilla11124 SCRA 358 (1983). that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not apply when the grant is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation. From this date, Lasolas right of possession based on his OCT and eventually that of respondents were put on issue. In their desire to get possession of the property, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership on April 16, 1990 with the Regional Trial Court. Said court rendered its decision against respondents on November 15, 1993. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995, the DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest on the ground of absence of fraud and misrepresentation committed by respondents predecessors-in-interest.12Rollo, pp. 110-113. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the decision subject of this petition in favor of respondents. Petitioners then brought the instant case to us.We note that the parties did not manifest as to whether an appeal was made from the decision of the Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention was ever made in their pleadings regarding the matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Director up to the present, five years have lapsed. From this, we can _______________10 Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 331, 339 (1969).11 124 SCRA 358 (1983).12 Rollo, pp. 110-113.


conclude that no appeal has been made and that the DENR decision dismissing the petitioners protest and upholding respondents right on the contested area has attained finality.By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents clearly have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners Omandam and Itom. The appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents, and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution dated February 21, 1997, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Petition denied, judgment affirmed.Notes.The Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent or homestead patent becomes as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 335 [1996])Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not contain any prohibition to convey homestead land but grants the homesteader, his widow or legal heirs a right to repurchase said land within a period of five years in the event that he conveys said land. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 650 [1999])A homestead applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his own benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. (Saltiga de Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 180 [1999])o0o [Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 483(2001)]No. L-26324. August 31, 1983.*SECOND DIVISION.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIA ABANILLA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ISABELA, defendants, MARIA ABANILLA, defendant-appellant.Judgment; The final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals shows that appellant Maria Abanilla committed fraud in securing the free patent at bar.Said decision became final and executory on July 18, 1960. Therefore, it is beyond question that fraud was committed by Maria Abanilla in securing her patent and original certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela.Same; Public Lands; Land Registrations; A Certificate of Title cannot be used as shield to perpetuate fraud.In the light of the above-quoted provisions, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. No amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus numquam cohabitant (Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., supra).Public Lands; A false statement in application for land patent shall ipso facto produce cancellation of title granted.Section 91 of the C.A. No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title, shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted.Same; Same; Land Registration; Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens Title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud.The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail, and other cases cited by the appellant regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever._______________* SECOND DIVISION.359VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 359 Director of Lands vs. Abanilla

Same; Same; Same; Same.The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog, L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938 page 38).Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec. 38, Act 496 and may still file action for cancellation of certificate of title even after six years from its issuance.Considering that it is the State that is seeking the cancellation of the title of respondent Isagani Du Timbol, said title has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against the State. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General, x x x.Same; Same; Same; Prescription is waived by appellant who submitted herself to an administrative investigation on the existence of fraud in securing her free patent.Even granting that the Director of Lands can no longer question the validity of a torrens title after the lapse of one year from its registration under Section 38 of Act 496, still appellant Maria Abanilla is estopped from claiming that this action has already prescribed. The established facts on the record of the administrative case in the Lands Department involving the same subject matter in this case show that defendant Maria Abanilla even before the grant of the subject patent in her favor had allowed herself to submit to an administrative investigation of this case when she appeared on one occasion in the course thereof and requested for the postponement of the same on the ground that she desired to settle the case amicably. Thereafter, she pursued her alleged right to the patent by exhausting all her administrative remedies in the Lands Department. Appellant Maria Abanilla is now estopped from claiming that this action had already prescribed, for the simple reason that she can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the filing of the instant action (p. 26, rec.).APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Br. I.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

360360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Director of Lands vs. Abanilla

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Adriano Dasalla for defendant-appellant.MAKASIAR, J.:This is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, 1st Judicial District, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 1308, ordering the cancellation of Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 issued in favor of defendant-appellant.Plaintiff-appellee (Director of Lands) in his complaint alleged that defendant-appellant (Maria Abanilla) had, through fraudulent means, secured a free patent and an original certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls 62, situated in Roxas, Isabela; that the said free patent and original certificate of title included portions of land occupied by Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and that the portion occupied by Wilson Nuesa was sold to him by Dominador Cullanan, who also bought the same from defendant-appellant Abanilla herself.Defendant-appellant Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free patent over a parcel of public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, and the subsequent issuance of the original certificate of title, were lawful, since the occupancy of Esteban Esquivel of the portion claimed by him of Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, was merely tolerated by her and was never adverse, and Wilson Nuesas occupancy never affected her right over the portion he claims, because the sale made by her to Dominador Cullanan was void ab initio.The trial court entered a judgment, declaring Free Patent No. V-2317 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-2317 null and void; ordering the Director of Lands to cancel said patent and issue another patent in favor of Maria Abanilla, excluding the respective portions of land possessed by Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa; and ordering Maria Abanilla to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Isabela Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723, who was thereby ordered to cancel the same (p. 16, CFI rec.).

361VOL. 124, AUGUST 31, 1983 361 Director of Lands vs. Abanilla

This being an appeal on question of law exclusively, We therefore consider as conclusive the following findings of fact made by the trial court:The evidence shows that on April 5, 1949, Maria Abanilla applied for Free Patent over a public land known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela; That on March 19, 1952, Esteban Esquivel having discovered that the said Free Patent Application included a portion of land occupied by him since before the early part of 1949, registered his opposition therein and asked the Bureau of Lands to investigate the matter (Exh. G); that on May 12, 1952, Dominador Cullanan also registered his opposition to the said Free Patent Application upon the ground that it included a portion of the land sold to him by Maria Abanilla by virtue of a public document dated April 20, 1950 (Exh. J); that on July 3, 1952, for and in consideration of the sum of P1,000.00, Dominador Cullanan sold the same portion of land to Wilson Nuesa by virtue of a public instrument notarized before the Municipal Judge of Roxas (Exh. K); that pursuant to the protest filed by Esteban Esquivel, the Director of Lands, on March 29, 1952, ordered the investigation of said protest (Exh. E); that by reason of the acquisition of the same land holding of Dominador Cullanan by Wilson Nuesa, the latter intervened in the Administrative Investigation of the land conflict between Esteban Esquivel and Maria Abanilla, as claimant-intervenor (Exh. I); that while the aforesaid administrative case was pending investigation by the Fact Finding Committee composed of representatives of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), Maria Abanilla, on February 11, 1953, secured the issuance of Free Patent No. V-2317 in her name covering the entire Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, with an area of 2.1664 hectares; that by virtue of the said patent, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Isabela on June 16, 1953 (Exh. I); that on June 25, 1953, the Fact Finding Committee heard the administrative case aforesaid and submitted its report on July 31, 1953, sustaining the claim of preferential right of Esteban Esquivel, and that of Claimant-intervenor Wilson Nuesa and recommending the annulment of Patent No. P-2317, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 in the name of Maria Abanilla insofar as the portions claimed by them are concerned (Exh. I); that acting upon the said report the Director of Lands rendered a decision holding that Maria Abanilla acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the aforesaid patent thru misrepresentation and directing that appropriate steps be taken to institute court action for the


voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another patent for the correct area adjudicated to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the portions claimed by Nuesa and Esquivel (Exh. N); that Maria Abanilla filed a motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 1954 (Exh. O); to set aside the aforesaid decision, and on August 30, 1956, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the Director of Lands (Exh. P), that upon the denial of her motion she filed a second motion for reconsideration dated September 28, 1956 (Exh. Q), which was similarly denied by the Director of Lands in his Order dated October 19, 1956 (Exh. R); that on November 19, 1956, she filed a notice of appeal against the decision of the Director of Lands and asked that the same be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh. S); that on January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands appealed from and dismissed the appeal; and that on August 27, 1958; the Secretary denied the motion for reconsideration to set aside his confirmatory decision (Exh. U).That on November 5, 1956, Maria Abanilla filed an action with this Court against Esteban Esquivel, Wilson Nuesa and three others for the recovery of possession of the portions of land involved in the administrative case between them in the land department; that after due trial, the Court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Wilson Nuesa and Esteban Esquivel and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint; that Maria Abanilla brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision appealed from, on June 14, 1960 (Exh. V); that on August 11, 1959, the Director of Lands filed this present case to annul the patent and original certificate of title issued to Maria Abanilla (pp. 13-14, CFI rec.).The case is now before this Court on a pure question of law: Whether the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said patent can still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6) months from their issuance.Defendant-appellant now claimed that the lower court erred: [1] in ordering the cancellation of both Free Patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2327 of the Register of Deeds of Isabela, both in the name of Maria Abanilla; and [2] in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six (6) years and six (6) months had already elapsed from February 11, 1953 when the land patent was issued, to August 11, 1959


when the present action was instituted in the trial court (pp. 48-49, rec.).WE find that the trial court did not commit either of the assigned errors.It should be noted that, pursuant to explicit and repeated averments in the complaint, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla had acted in bad faith, with full knowledge of the factual background of the case, particularly of the public, continuous and adverse possession of Esteban Esquivel at the time she applied for patent over the land in question, and up to the time she secured the issuance of an original certificate of title over the said land. The fact that Maria Abanilla acted fraudulently in securing patent No. V-2317 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 was clearly and definitely established in the decision of the Director of Lands (Exh. N), where it was held that Maria Abanilla acted in bad faith and procured the issuance of the aforesaid patent thru misrepresentation and directed that appropriate steps be taken to institute a court action for the voidance and cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance of another patent for the correct area adjudicated to her in the said decision, excluding therefrom the portions claimed by Nuesa and Esquivel. Appellant Maria Abanilla even exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Minister of Natural Resources) [Exh. S], who affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands [Exh. U].This Court held in the case of Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin (L-21519, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 569) that the factual findings of the Director of Lands, approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud, imposition, error or abuse of discretion.This Court reiterated said principle in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals (L-23591, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 297).In the previous case filed by Abanilla herself against the same claimants Esquivel and Nuesa, decided on June 14, 1960, the Court of Appeals, speaking thru then CA Justice, later


Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Conrado V. Sanchez, concurred in by then CA Justices Natividad and Angeles, both of whom were promoted as Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, found:x x x So that, as the case now stands, the dispute solely is between appellant Maria Abanilla, on the one hand, and appellees Esteban Esquivel and Wilson Nuesa, on the other.On April 5, 1949, appellant Maria Abanilla filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for free patent over Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, aforesaid.On March 19, 1952, appellee Esteban Esquivel registered his opposition to appellants application upon the ground that the same included a portion of landcircumscribed by the letters C, D, G and H of the sketch shown in Exhibit 5which pertained to said appellee.On May 12, 1952, Dominador Cullanan opposed appellants application upon the averment that the same also covered an areadesignated in the sketch set forth in Exhibit 5 by the letters A, B, E and Fwhich was sold to him by the very same applicant Maria Abanilla. In view of the fact that Dominador Cullanan had since conveyed his holding to appellee Wilson Nuesa, the latter intervened in the proceedings.On February 11, 1953, while the protests heretofore mentioned were pending investigation, Free Patent No. V-2317, covering the entire Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, with an area of 2.1664 hectares, was issued in the name of appellant Maria Abanilla.On June 16, 1953, Original Certificate of Title No. P-2723 covering the same land was issued by the Register of Deeds of Isabela to said Maria Abanilla.On June 25, 1953, the fact-finding committee of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development Corporationobviously unaware of the prior issuance of a patent and title over the landopened hearings on the protests of appellee Esquivel, and Cullanan who was substituted by appellee Wilson Nuesa.On March 20, 1954, decision was rendered by the Director of Lands holding that applicant Maria Abanilla was guilty of bad faith and that she procured the free patent over the land thru misrepresentation, and stating that steps would be taken to institute the necessary court action for the cancellation of Patent No. V-2317 and the issuance to Maria Abanilla of another patent for the correct


area adjudged to her in said decision, that is, excluding the portions claimed by Esquivel and Nuesa.On August 30, 1956, the motion for reconsideration filed by appellant Maria Abanilla was denied by the Director of Lands.On October 19, 1956, appellants second motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.On November 5, 1956, appellant started the present suit. It subsequently developed that on November 22, 1956, appellant perfected an appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands aforesaid to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.On January 16, 1958, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed in toto the decision of the Director of Lands.On August 27, 1958, the said Secretary denied appellants motion to reconsider the confirmatory decision.We will take up the case piecemeal.Appellee Esteban Esquivel, as aforesaid, claimed the portion inclosed by corners C, D, G and H in the sketch appearing in Exhibit 5. The evidence shows that he first entered that land in 1949 when the same was still covered with forest. He cleared and levelled the same. Since then, his occupancy was open, continuous and without molestation or interference from anyone, much less from appellant. He introduced improvements thereon, i.e., his house, an annex thereto for restaurant and store purposes, a pumpwell, and a fence around the premises.Appellant claims that this portion of the land, together with a house used as a shed for drying leaf tobacco, was ceded by her in 1952 to Esquivel on a temporary basis as the latter had no place to live in; that one time she sent her son to cut bamboos behind that house but Esquivel objected and claimed that he owned the land and forthwith told appellants son to get out therefrom; and that she requested Esquivel to pay P30.00 for the use of the lot, and P20.00 for the use and occupation of the house.Apart from the fact that the foregoing version runs counter to the decision of the Director of Lands which was confirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the improbability of the same is quite apparent. If appellants claim were true, it is strange that no attempt was ever made by her to promptly oust Esquivel from the land. Indeed, if at any time appellant ever asserted that the portion occupied by Esquivel was part of the land applied for


by her and that she made known this fact to Esquivel, the latter, doubtless, would not have placed valuable improvements thereon. That he did, is indicative of the fact that nobody ever challenged his occupancy thereof.On the defense of appellee Wilson Nuesa, we find that on April 20, 1950, in consideration of P500.00, appellant Maria Abanilla executed in favor of Dominador Cullanan a deed of sale covering the portion hereinbefore described. In that deed, Exhibit 1, appellant warranted that she was the absolute owner of the portion sold, the same being her share of the conjugal partnership with her late husband Donato Pilar. She never mentioned in that document that said property was part of the public domain which, on April 5, 1949, she previously applied for under a free patent. Of course, in court she tried to avoid the effects of this writing. When confronted with her thumbmark thereon, she stated in varying terms that she Probably executed that document, or that I do not know whether that is my thumbmark, or that I doubt if I impressed my thumbmark. The obvious weakness of this explanation prevents us from accepting the same. Exhibit 1 is a notarial document. A rule so well settled as to require citation of authorities is that which says that oral evidence to overcome a notarial document must be clear, convincing and beyond a mere preponderance. Here, appellants evidenceher sole testimonyis notches below the legal yardstick.Alternatively, appellant states that the deed, Exhibit 1, is null and void because the subject thereof is public land which is beyond the commerce of man. The sale was executed before the order for the issuance of the patent in her favor. The same could, therefore, be treated as a disposition of her rights as a free patent applicant which is sanctioned by law. In pari materia: Gabon, et al. vs. Amboy, et al., CA-G.R. No. 20556-R, July 22, 1959.Appellee Wilson Nuesa acquired the rights of Dominador Cullanan to the portion sold to the latter by appellant under the deeds of sale, Exhibits 2 and 4. Neither Dominador Cullanan nor Wilson Nuesa was ever disturbed in their possession of said land.It will be observed, however, that upon examination of the sketch in Exhibit 5, the land acquired from appellant by Cullanan and subsequently sold to Nuesa included the strip of land in the actual possession of Esteban Esquivel. As a result of the investigation of the protests against appellants application, Nuesa recognized the rights of Esquivel to the portion occupied by him. So that no quarrel exists as between Esquivel, on the one hand, and Nuesa, on the other.


We do not believe that appellant has any lawful claim against appellee Wilson Nuesa. The portion of land here involved was sold by appellant herself as her own private property. She cannot now turn back and say that said portion is public land. Here, the matter is exclusively between her and Wilson Nuesa, her vendees successor-in-interest. The government is not involved. As against appellee Wilson Nuesa, therefore, appellant is in estoppel. Section 68(a), Rule 123, Rules of Court; Article 1431 and 1434, Civil Code; Llacer vs. Muoz de Bustillos, et al., 12 Phil. 328, 334.Furthermore, assuming that the area sold by appellant to Cullanan was public land, the free patent in favor of the former cannot be used as a weapon to oust appellee Wilson NuesaCullanans vendeefrom that land. In the same way, said free patent did not give appellant protection against the adverse claim of Esquivel. She knew or was charged with knowledge, of Esquivels actual possession of the portion claimed by him. And, the patent in her favor is in fraud of the rights of both Nuesa and Esquivel. Accordingly, she must respect the rights of the two to their respective holdings.It would not help appellant any to say that the Director of Lands was without jurisdiction in sustaining the claims aforesaid. For, said adverse claims were filed long before the patent was issued. As we have heretofore intimated, that patent literally passed thru the backdoor.The following from Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., 55 Off. Gaz., No. 16, pp. 2907, 2912, is illuminating: We start with the premise that appellant acquired the patent and Torrens title through fraud. Appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. But piercing the shard of his paper title, we find that appellant has no equitable right to the possession of the land covered thereby. He cannot use that title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Our reason is that no amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.WHEREFORE, finding that the decision appealed from is in conformity with the facts and the law, the same is hereby affirmed.Said decision became final and executory on July 18, 1960.Therefore, it is beyond question that fraud was committed by Maria Abanilla in securing her patent and original


certificate of title over a public land, known as Lot No. 5798, Pls-62, situated in Roxas, Isabela.In this regard the controlling provisions of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, as amended), reads:Sec. 90. Every application filed under the provisions of this Act shall be made under oath and shall set forth:x x x x x x x x x(g) Whether all or part of the land is occupied or cultivated or improved, and by whom, giving his post-office address, and whether the land has been occupied or cultivated or improved by the applicant or his ascendant, the date when the possession and cultivation began, and a description of the improvements made, accompanying satisfactory evidence of the relationship of the applicant with the ascendant, and of the death of the latter and the descendants left by him, in case it is alleged that he occupied and cultivated the land first; or whether there are indications of its having been occupied, cultivated or improved entirely or partially, and if so, in what such indications consist, whether he has made investigations as to when and by whom such improvements were made, and if so, how such investigations were made and what was the result thereof; or whether the land is not occupied, improved or cultivated either entirely or partially, and there are no indications of it having ever been occupied, improved, or cultivated, and in this case, what is the condition of the land (italics supplied).Sec. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying, the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. x x x (italics supplied).In the light of the above-quoted provisions, defendant-appellant Maria Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. No amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. Fraus et jus numquam cohabitant (Acot, et al. vs. Kempis, et al., supra).


Section 91 of the C.A. No. 141, as amended, expressly provides that any false statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title, shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted.Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She claimed that the lower court erred in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six years and six months had already elapsed when the present action was instituted, in view of the line of decisions of this Court sustaining the indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued in pursuance of a public land patent.The doctrine in Heirs of Carle, Sumail, and other cases cited by the appellant regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since said grant is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. As We held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindog (L-15398, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 938):We are in accord with appellants contention that Act 496 is not intended to shield fraud and that registration thereunder merely confirms titler but does not vest any, when there is none, because registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.Furthermore, appellant Maria Abanilla cannot pretend that her title has become indefeasible because no petition for review thereof was filed within one year from its issuance, since proceedings for the review of her patent was actually pending before and after the issuance of appellants torrens title. According to the findings of fact of the trial court, the patent of Maria Abanilla was under administrative investigation by the office of the appellee Director of Lands at the time she obtained her torrens title pursuant thereto (Exhs. G, H, and I), and that the decision of the appellee ordering the cancellation of appellants patent on the ground of fraud was rendered on March 20, 1954 (Exh. N), or less than a year from the issuance


of her torrens title on June 16, 1953 (Exh. I). It was also less than a year from the issuance of said torrens title that appellant, on May 5, 1954, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision of the Director of Lands (Exh. O), which motion for reconsideration was denied on August 30, 1956 (Exh. P), from which denial appellant Abanilla filed a second motion for reconsideration (Exh. Q), and when said motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (Exh. R), appellant Abanilla even appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Exh. S), who, however, affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands ordering the cancellation of her patent.In the previous action aforeci

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