G.R. No. L-22335December 31, 1965AMANTE P. PURISIMA,petitioner,vs.HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GREGORIO CORDERO,respondents.Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.Provincial Fiscal Juvenal K. Guerrero for respondent Provincial Board of CanvassersAntonio Barredo for respondents Judge Salanga and Gregorio CorderoRamon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.BENGZON, J.P.,J.:In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero were among the candidates for any of the three offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. After the election or on November 25, 1963 the provincial board of canvassers met and started canvassing the returns for said office.Purisima noted during the canvass that the returns from some precincts, forty-one (41) in all, showed on their face that the words and figures for Cordero's votes had been "obviously and manifestly erased" and superimposed with other words and figures. For purposes of comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of the returns for the aforesaid precincts were submitted to the board. A discrepancy of 5,042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found, thus:Provincial Treasurer's copy:7,277 votes for Cordero

Nacionalista Party's copy2,235 votes for Cordero

A request for suspension of the canvass was thereupon made by Purisima. The board of canvassers denied said request upon the ground that it was not yet ascertainable if the discrepancies would materially affect the result. Canvass proceeded.After the returns had all been read, the result for the office of third (and last) member of the Provincial Board was the following:Cordero41,229 votes

Purisima39,372 votes.

Difference1,857 votes

Purisima again called attention to the erasures and discrepancies and asked for suspension of canvass for him to have recourse to judicial remedy. Denying said request, the board of canvassers finished the canvass and proclaimed Cordero the winner, on November 28.On November 29, Purisima filed a petition in the Commission on Elections to annul the canvass and proclamation above-mentioned. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution on November 30, annulling the canvass and proclamation, as regards Cordero and Purisima.Purisima, on December 10, filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for recount under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the same were filed by the board of canvassers and by Cordero. In his motion to dismiss, Cordero admitted the erasures and discrepancies on the face of the returns from 41 precincts, but denied that said erasures were due to tampering or falsification.After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of First Instance, on December 27, dismissed the petition for recount. And on December 28, Cordero filed in the Commission on Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.Purisima, on January 2, 1964, moved for reconsideration of the Court of First Instance's order of dismissal. In the same case, he also filed, on January 8, a petition for preliminary injunction to restrain the holding of another canvass. Annexed to said petition were certified photostatic copies of the Comelec's copies of the returns from the 41 precincts in question. Furthermore, Purisima filed with the Commission on Elections, on January 11, an opposition to the resumption of the canvass.Alleging that the Commission on Elections was about to order the canvass resumed, Purisima came to this Court, on January 17, 1964, by petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Petitioner asked that the lower court's order dismissing his petition for recount be set aside and that the Commission on Elections be enjoined from ordering resumption of the canvass until after the judicial recount.On January 22, 1964 we ordered respondents to answer, and allowed preliminary injunction to be issued as prayed for upon the posting of a bond of P500.00. After respondents filed their answer the case was heard and submitted for decision.The requisites for judicial recount are set forth in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code:When statements of precinct are contradictory. In case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number of votes and the difference affects the result of the election, the Court of First Instance of the province, upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to recount the votes cast in the precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the true statement or which is the true result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for the office in question. Notice of such proceeding shall be given to all candidates affected.In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the requisites were not present, namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the copy submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said authentic copy must also be submitted to the board.First of all, it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if he does so alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa v. Del Rosario, L-16837-40, May 30,1960). From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a discrepancy existed.In fact, when Purisima first called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the board of canvassers admitted the discrepancy but stated that it was not yet ascertainable whether the discrepancy would amount to enough votes as to affect the result. There is no more question now that the number of votes involved in said discrepancy is more than enough to alter the result.Finally, in the motion to dismiss filed by the board of canvassers, the existence of the discrepancy is not disputed, and the board merely raises the defense that the recount is up to the court and not to said board (Annex D, Petition).Passing on to the next point, the basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies of the returns. Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in addition, the Commission on Elections' copies were relied upon:That as a result of the aforesaid erasures, tampering and apparent falsifications, there exist discrepancies between the Provincial Treasurer's copies (the basis of the canvass) of the election returns in the precincts in question, on one hand, and the copies pertaining to the Nacionalista Party and those pertaining to the Commission on Elections, on the other, and that said discrepancies materially affect the result of the election as between herein petitioner and respondent Gregorio Cordero;Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce a point we do not here decide that the Nacionalista Party copies are not copies that may be the basis of a petition for recount, the fact remains that the Commission on Elections' copies were said to reflect the same discrepancy with the Provincial Treasurer's copies. It is settled that the Commission on Elections' copies are authentic copies within the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (Laws in v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964; Matanog v. Alejandro, L-22502-08, June 30, 1964.)The trial court. however, ruled that the Commission on Elections' copies had no application to the petition for recount because they were not submitted to the board of canvassers. The record definitely shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to the board said Commission on Elections' copies was because the board declined to suspend the canvass and proclamation.It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in the election returns. In the present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in words and figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers. It was therefore imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on Elections, L-22248, January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on Elections declared the canvass and proclamation, made by respondent provincial board of canvassers, null and void.Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections' copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the failure to submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board should not prejudice Purisima's right to petition for recount before the court. It was therefore grave abuse of discretion for respondent court to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies, regardless of the patent and admitted irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's copies and the alleged discrepancy amounting to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the results.Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the petition for recount is set aside, respondent Judge is ordered to proceed with the petition for recount, and respondents Commission on Elections and Provincial Board of Canvassers are enjoined, until after the termination of proceedings in the petition for recount, from ordering or holding another canvass and proclamation as between petitioner Purisima and respondent Cordero.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-25467 April 27, 1967LUCAS V. CAUTON,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO SANIDAD,respondents.Antonio Barredo for petitioner.Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.Pablo C. Sanidad and F. D. Villanueva and Associates for respondent Sanidad.ZALDIVAR,J.:In the national elections held on November 9, 1965, petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad, along with Godofredo S. Reyes, were candidates for the office of Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur.During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur of the votes cast for the candidates for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur, and particularly after the Board had opened the envelopes containing the copies of the election returns from each of the election precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz that were presented by the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Board, respondent Sanidad brought to the attention of the Board the fact that the entries of votes for the candidates for Representative in those copies of the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the provincial treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from the same election precincts that were in the possession of the Liberal Party.1wph1.tRespondent Sanidad filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying for the opening of the ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to retrieve the election returns deposited therein so that those election returns might be used in the canvass of the votes for the candidates for Representative in the second district of Ilocos Sur, and that in the meantime the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur be ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning candidate for the office of Representative in said district. The Commission on Elections issued the restraining order prayed for by respondent Sanidad and set his petition for hearing.After hearing, the Commission on Elections found "that it had been clearly established that the copies of the election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Santa Cruz have uniform alterations in the entries of the votes cast for representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies, while the copies of the election returns for the Commission on Elections and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies ...."1The copies of the election returns that were furnished the municipal treasurers of Candon and Santiago were never verified because the municipal treasurers of those two municipalities did not comply with the subpoenaduces tecumissued by the Commission on Elections directing them to bring to the Commission the copies of the election returns of the precincts in their respective municipalities that were in their possession.On December 22, 1965, respondent Commission on Elections issued an order providing, among others, that... to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election returns provided by law in the aforementioned precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code, the CommissionResolved... to direct immediately the opening of the ballot boxes of the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago which are now impounded and under the custody of the Zone Commander of the 1st PC Zone in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga solely for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election returns, copies for the ballot box, in all the precincts of said municipalities.Pursuant to the instructions of respondent Commission, contained in the resolution of December 22, 1965, the ballot boxes from all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago were opened by the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the Commission, Atty. Fernando Gorospe, Jr., in the presence of witnesses, and the envelopes containing the election returns found inside the ballot boxes were taken and brought to Manila on December 23, 1965.On the same date, December 23, 1965, herein petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections dated December 22, 1965 ordering the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago in the elections of November 9, 1965 be annulled and set aside. The petition further prays that the Commission on Elections be restrained from opening, the envelopes containing the election returns found in the afore-mentioned ballot boxes and be ordered to return the said envelopes to the corresponding ballot boxes. In his petition, petitioner alleges that the respondent Commission on Elections acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court gave due course to the petition, but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. This petition is now the case before Us.Upon instructions by respondent Commission on Elections, on December 28, 1966, the envelopes that were taken from the ballot boxes were opened and the election returns were taken out and their contents examined and recorded by a committee appointed by the Commission. This was done in a formal hearing with notice to the parties concerned.Respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed his answer to instant petition on January 5, 1966, admitting some of the allegations and denying others, and maintaining that the Commission on Elections had acted well within the bounds of its authority in issuing the order of December 22, 1965. Respondent Commission on Elections also filed its answer on January 5, 1966, maintaining that it has authority under the law to order the opening of the ballot boxes as stated in its resolution of December 22, 1965.In the meantime, on the basis of the discrepancies in the entries of the votes for the candidates for Representative, between the election returns taken out of the ballot boxes that were opened by order of the Commission of Elections and the election returns submitted by the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur, respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Election Case No. 16-N, for a recount of the votes in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, pursuant to the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.On February 14, 1966, petitioner filed before this Court in urgent motion, in this case, praying for the issuance of an order enjoining the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch II-Narvacan) from further proceeding with Election Case No. 16-N, abovementioned, pending final decision of the instance case, upon the ground that the recount of the ballots in that case in the court below would render the instant case moot and academic. This motion was denied by this Court in a resolution dated February 17, 1966.The principal issue in the present case revolves on the of the resolution of the respondent Commission of Elections, dated December 22, 1965, which orders the opening of the ballot boxes used in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, Ilocos Sur, during the elections of November 9, 1965 for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election returns, copies for the ballot box, "to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election returns provided by law in the aforementioned precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code."It is the stand of the petitioner that respondent Commission on Elections is without jurisdiction to issue, or has acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing, the resolution in question, so that said resolution is null and void and should not be given legal force and effect. The petitioner contends that under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the Commission on Elections has authority to order the opening of the ballot boxes "only in connection with an investigation conducted for the purpose of helping the prosecution of any violation of the election laws or for the purely administrative purpose but not when the sole purpose is, as in this case, to assist a party in trying to win the election ...." The petitioner further, contends that "the mere fact that the copies of the returns in the precincts in question in the possession of the Liberal Party do not tally with the returns involving the same precincts in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer, the Commission of Elections and the Nacionalista Party as well does not legally support the validity of the resolution of the respondent Commission in question ...."2We cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner. We believe that in issuing the resolution in question the Commission on Elections simply performed a function as authorized by the Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and ... exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law." The Commission has the power to decide all administrative questions affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote.3This Court in a line of decisions has ruled that the Commission on Election has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. In the case ofAlbano vs. Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962, this Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held as follows:The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon it by the Constitution (Art. X ) for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections. The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed between the various copies of election returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the canvass all the meantime so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance ....'What the respondent Commission on Elections did in the case now before Us is just what is contemplated in the abovequoted ruling of this Court. The power of the Commission on Elections in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory intended to secure the proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the Commission on Elections exercises this power the purpose is not for the Commission to help a candidate win the election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the elections as certified by the boards of election inspectors in every precinct. The object of the canvass is to determine the result of the elections based on the official election returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the people's will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on true, genuine, correct, nay untampered, election returns. It is in this proceedings that the Commission on Elections exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election returns as actually certified by the members of the board of inspectors. Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the taking of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for the canvass is obtained or made available.The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four copies of the election return in each precinct one to be deposited in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal treasurer, one to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the Commission on Elections. In the case of the canvass of the election returns for candidates for provincial or national offices, the election returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of inspectors are used. It is the duty of the provincial treasurer to turn over to the provincial board of canvassers the election returns received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the Commission on Elections is duly informed and it so finds, in appropriate proceedings, that the election returns in the hands of the provincial treasurer are tampered, then the Commission should afford the candidate adversely affected by the tampering an opportunity to show that there exist authentic copies of the same election returns which are not tampered. A recourse may be had to the copies received by the Commission on Elections and to the copies received by the municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the Commission on Elections and of the municipal treasurer are similarly tampered as the copies in the hands of the provincial treasurer, then it becomes evident that all the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass. The only copies left to be checked, whether they are also tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot boxes. Certainly, the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the Commission on Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Thus, the Commission on Elections has thereby made available the proper and reliable basis for the canvass of the votes that will lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of the true winner in the elections. In so doing the Commission on Elections, as we have said, had performed its constitutional duty of administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of elections with a view to promoting clean and honest elections the very purpose for which the Commission on Elections was created by constitutional mandate.In the case now before Us, the Commission on Elections issued the questioned resolution "after hearing the arguments of the petitioner and the opposition thereto and considering that it has beenclearly establishedthat the copies of the election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Sta. Cruz have uniform alteration in the entries of the votes cast for representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies, while the copies of the election returns for the Commission of Elections and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies ..."5Indeed, in the face of this finding by the Commission on Elections, which indicates a clear violation of the election law, and which indicates an attempt to procure the proclamation of the winner in the elections for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur by the use of tampered election returns, can the Commission on Elections be remiss in the performance of its duties as a constitutional body committed with the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections? The Revised Election Code gives to the Commission on Elections the direct and immediate supervision over provincial, municipal and city officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and included among these officials are members of the provincial board of canvassers.6The provincial board of canvassers is enjoined by law to canvass all the votes cast for Representatives on the basis of the election returns produced by the provincial treasurer.7The Commission on Elections has a duty to enforce this law and it has the duty to see to it that the election returns to be used for canvassing must be genuine and authentic, not falsified or tampered with. Where the election returns produced by the provincial treasurer have been shown to have been tampered, and all the other copies outside the ballot boxes have also been shown to have been tampered or falsified, it is certainly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such order as would ascertain the existence of the genuine, authentic and untampered election returns, and thus open the way for the summary recount of the votes, in accordance with law, for the purposes only of the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the candidate found to have obtained the highest number of votes. In the case now before Us, it is found by the Commission on Elections that no other copies can be had except those deposited in the ballot boxes. Hence, the necessity for the Commission to order the retrieving of the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes. An order to this effect does not affect the right to vote or the validity of any vote cast, so that it is perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such an order in the exercise of its exclusive power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections. It would indeed be absurd to say that the Commission on Elections has a legal duty to perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform said duty.The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters.8The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government.9The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.10Technicalities, which are not conducive to free, orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary may defeat the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their votes, should not be allowed to hamper the Commission on Elections in the performance of its duties. To sustain the petitioner in the present case is to deny the Commission on Elections the power to retrieve the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes in order that the true number of votes cast for a candidate may be known and thus permit a canvass on the basis of election returns that are patently falsified. We cannot, and We must not, sanction the stand of petitioner.As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns.11Of all the copies prepared by the board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the one deposited in the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have been uniformly altered, there is no plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to determine whether discrepancies exist in the various copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right to consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does not provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation like this.Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his stand in the present case, authorizes the opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of an official investigation. It provides:The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes unopened in his possession in a secure place and under his responsibility for three months, unless they are the subject of an official investigation, or a component court or tribunal shall demand them sooner, or the competent authority shall order their preservation for a longer time in connection with any pending contest or investigation.Under this section the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may also be opened even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence in the prosecution of election frauds.12Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent authority.13The "competent authority" must include the Commission on Elections which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct of elections. In the instant case the Commission on Elections found that it has been clearly established that the election returns outside the ballot boxes, in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, have been tampered with. It is within the power of the Commission to order the investigation of that apparent anomaly that has connection with the conduct of elections. The investigation may be in connection with the prosecution for the violations of the election laws and at the same time to ascertain the condition of the election returns inside the ballot boxes as compared with the election returns outside the ballot boxes, for the same precincts. The opening of the ballot boxes may, therefore, be prayed for by a candidate who is prejudiced by the apparent falsification of the election returns outside the ballot boxes, and in ordering the opening of the ballot boxes the purpose of the Commission is not to help a particular candidate win an election but to properly administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections.From what has been said We hold that the order of December 22, 1965, being questioned by the petitioner in the present case, was perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue.Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the present case is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 188456 February 10, 2010H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS,Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,Respondents.PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,Petitioner-in-Intervention.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Movant-Intervenor.R E S O L U T I O NVELASCO, JR.,J.:By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic). The Court also denied the petition-in-intervention of Pete Q. Quadra, praying that the respondents be directed to implement the minimum requirements provided under pars. (f) and (g), Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, or theElection Modernization Act,as amended by RA 9369.Petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Court on a motion for reconsideration, as supplemented, praying, as they did earlier, that the contract award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made in violation of the Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence.1Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots after the printing and electronic transmission of the election returns.To both motions, private respondents TIM and Smartmatic, on the one hand, and public respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), et al., on the other, have interposed their separate comments and/or oppositions.As may be recalled, the underlying petition for certiorari, etc. on its face assailed the award by Comelec of the poll automation project to the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, the challenge basically predicated on the non-compliance of the contract award with the pilot-testing requirements of RA 9369 and the minimum system capabilities of the chosen automated election system (AES), referring to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) system. The non-submission of documents to show the existence and scope of a valid joint venture agreement between TIM and Smartmatic was also raised as a nullifying ground, albeit later abandoned or at least not earnestly pursued.The Court, in its September 10, 2009 Decision, dismissed the petition and the petition-in-intervention on the following main grounds: (1) RA 8436, as amended, does not require that the AES procured or, to be used for the 2010 nationwide fully automated elections must, as a conditionsine qua non, have been pilot-tested in the 2007 Philippine election, it being sufficient that the capability of the chosen AES has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction; (2) Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to ensure compliance of the PCOS with the minimum capabilities standards prescribed by RA 8436, as amended, and its determination in this regard must be respected absent grave abuse of discretion; (3) Comelec retains under the automation arrangement its supervision, oversight, and control mandate to ensure a free, orderly, and honest electoral exercise; it did not, by entering into the assailed automation project contract, abdicate its duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and decide, at the first instance, all questions affecting elections; and (4) in accordance with contract documents, continuity and back-up plans are in place to be activated in case the PCOS machines falter during the actual election exercise.Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or grounds:1. The Comelecs public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there will be failure of automated elections;2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in case the PCOS machines fail;4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will assure 100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010 elections; and7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelecs bidding rules.Both public and private respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners motion for reconsideration should be held devoid of merit, because the motion, for the most part, either advances issues or theories not raised in the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and argues along speculative and conjectural lines.Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments earnestly pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration.Petitioners threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public respondent COMELEC2x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be automated failure of elections";3"there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections";4"the unaddressed logistical nightmaresand the lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot testmake an automated failure of elections very probable";5and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a failure of elections."6Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis--vis the possibility of Comelec going manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the purpose a news item onInquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.7Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment, described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelecs contingency plan. Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a misleading spin to the Melo pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to make reference to his succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer and true picture.Private respondents observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out of context from any publication. At any event, the Court took it upon itself to visit the website, whence petitioners deduced their position on the possible failure of automated elections in problem areas and found the following items:Allaying fears of failure of elections in 2010, the x x x [Comelec] said it will prepare for manual balloting, especially for areas with problems in electricity and telecommunications network coverage. x x x"Aside from preparations for poll automation, Comelec is also preparing for manual elections sa mga liblib na lugar [in remote places] x x x, provinces with no electricity and would have issues in electronic transmission. We are ready for manual polls in at least 30 percent or 50 percent of the country as a last contingency measure in case the contingency plans for automation are difficult to implement," said Melo.The poll chief was reacting to statements expressing the possibility of failure of elections due to the novelty of poll automation."The occurrence of nationwide failure of elections as alleged by doomsayers is impossible. Under the laws of probability, all 80,000 PCOS machines nationwide cannot breakdown. Maybe several would but we have standby units for this and we also have preparations for manual elections," he said.8(Emphasis added.)Petitioners next maintain that the Comelec abdicated its constitutional mandate9to decide all questions affecting elections when, under Article 3.310of the poll automation contract, it surrendered control of the system and technical aspects of the 2010 automated elections to Smartmatic in violation of Sec. 2611of RA 8436. Comelec, so petitioners suggest, should have stipulated that its Information Technology (IT) Department shall have charge of the technical aspects of the elections.Petitioners above contention, as well as the arguments, citations, and premises holding it together, is a rehash of their previous position articulated in their memorandum12in support of their petition. They have been considered, squarely addressed, and found to be without merit in the Decision subject hereof. The Court is not inclined to embark on another extended discussion of the same issue again. Suffice it to state that, under the automation contract, Smartmatic is given a specific and limited technical task to assist the Comelec in implementing the AES. But at the end of the day, the Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and lessor of goods and services to the Comelec, which shall have exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process. Art. 6.7 of the automation contract could not have been more clear:6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En Banc, the entire process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall [still] be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials and their performance, completion and final results according to specifications and within specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)The aforequoted provision doubtless preserves Comelecs constitutional and statutory responsibilities. But at the same time, it realistically recognizes the complexity and the highly technical nature of the automation project and addresses the contingencies that the novelty of election automation brings.Petitioners posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines fail, cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that would be implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections.13The overall fallback strategy and options to address even the worst-case scenariothe wholesale breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved unitshave been discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not belabor them again.While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision sought to be reconsideredand this should not be an obstacle for a reconsiderationthe hard reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.Second, petitioners position presupposes that the Comelec is, in the meanwhile, standing idly by, totally unconcerned with that grim eventuality and the scenarios petitioners envision and depict. Comelec, to reiterate, is the constitutional body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the discharge of this responsibility, Comelec has been afforded enough latitude in devising means and methods that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of elections, the Courtor petitioners for that mattermust not, by any preemptive move or any excessive zeal, take away from Comelec the initiative that by law pertains to it.14It should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.15Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue, invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban inLoong v. Comelec,16where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is precluded by the basic features of the automated election system,"17and "the rules laid down in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual election x x x are inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading of the ballots used in the automated system."18Without delving on its wisdom and validity, the view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As such, it is without binding effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the individual view of a member of the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held by the majority.19Petitioners insist next that public respondents cannot comply with the requirement of a source code20review as mandated by Sec. 14 of RA 8436, as amended, which provides:SEC. 14.Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code of Review.Once an AES Technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.Pursuing the point, after citing a commentary of an IT expert on the importance of a source code review, petitioners state the observation that "there are strong indications of [the inability] to comply x x x since the source code, which runs the PCOS machines, will effectively be kept secret from the people."21Again, petitioners engage in an entirely speculative exercise, second- guessing what the Comelec can and will probably do, or what it cannot and probably will not do, with respect to the implementation of a statutory provision. The fact that a source code review is not expressly included in the Comelec schedule of activities is not an indication, as petitioners suggest, that Comelec will not implement such review. Comelec, in its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, manifests its intention to make available and open the source code to all political and interested parties, but under a controlled environment to obviate replication and tampering of the source code, thus protecting, in the process, the intellectual proprietary right of Smartmatic to the source code. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the Court accords the Comelec, which enjoys the presumption of good faith in the performance of its duties in the first place, the benefit of the doubt.And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate the automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in elections abroad, do not comply with Sec. 1222of RA 8436.We are not convinced.As stressed in our September 10, 2009 Decision, the AES chosen by Comelec for the 2010 elections has been successfully deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada and New York, USA,23albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider.Roque, et al., in their petition, had questioned the certifications to this effect, arguing that these certifications were not issued to respondent TIM-Smartmatic, but to a third party, Dominion Voting Systems. Resolving the challenge, the Court, in effect, said that the system subject of the certifications was the same one procured by Comelec for the 2010 elections. And besides, the Licensing Agreement between Smartmatic and the Dominion Voting Systems indicates that the former is the entity licensed by the latter to use the system in the Philippines.Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual dimension to their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court cannot plausibly validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private respondents have even questioned the reliability of the website24whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing the same website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the Dominions PCOS machines.Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence25and on the practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly.26Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas without these facilities."27This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.1avvphi1Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its behalf the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010 elections.29This arrangement, petitioners aver, violates the bid rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant components of the automation project.The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it. And, of course, the Court is at a loss to understand how the sub-contract would, in the scheme of things, constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec so as to nullify the contract award of the automation project. As petitioners themselves acknowledge, again citing news reports, "Smartmatic has unilaterally made the new subcontract to the Chinese company."30Petitioners admit too, albeit with qualification, that RA 9184 allows subcontracting of a portion of the automation project.31The motion of intervenor Quadra deals with the auditability of the results of the automated elections. His concern has already been addressed by the Court in its Decision. As we have said, the AES procured by the Comelec is a paper-based system, which has a provision for system auditability, since the voter would be able, if needed, to verify if the PCOS machine has scanned, recorded, and counted his vote properly. All actions done on the machine can be printed out by the Board of Election Inspectors Chairperson as an audit log.32On the basis of the arguments, past and present, presented by the petitioners and intervenor, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in awarding the automation contract to the joint venture of private respondents.In closing, the Court harks back to its parting message embodied in its September 10, 2009 Decision, but this time even more mindful of warnings and apprehensions of well-meaning sectors of society, including some members of the Court, about the possibility of failure of elections. The Court, to repeat, will not venture to say that nothing could go wrong in the conduct of the 2010 nationwide automated elections. Neither will it guarantee, as it is not even equipped with the necessary expertise to guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That difficult and complex undertaking belongs at the first instance to the Comelec as part of its mandate to insure orderly and peaceful elections. The Comelec, as it were, is laboring under a very tight timeline. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, all men and women of goodwill, to assist Comelec personnel in addressing the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. After all, peaceful, fair, honest, and credible elections is everyones concern.WHEREFORE, the instant separate motions for reconsideration of the main and intervening petitioners are DENIED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,Petitioner,vs.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM,Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xG.R. No. 199085BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,Petitioner,vs.HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION FRAUD,Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xG.R. No. 199118GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPERALTA,J.:For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA)1in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found by the Court in the assailed decision, to wit:On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 74of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.In its Initial Report5dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.6The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao;7and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.8The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit9for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011.10On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee11and respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.13The petitions were eventually consolidated.On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings14before the Joint Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam15to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents.16Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17in view of the pendency of his petition brought before the Court.In an Order18dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration.19On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec.20On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc issued a Resolution21approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day.23On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam24with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.SO ORDERED.26Hence, these motions for reconsideration.IssuesMike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,27Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.28Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.29Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government.30For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised her earnest efforts to defend herself and should not have been deemed by the Court as acts which purportedly tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.31Citing several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults the Court in not upholding her right to ask for additional time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.32GMA highlights that the subject Comelec Resolution creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign prosecutors to assist the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized agency in the conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.33In their Consolidated Comment,34respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue that it does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause.35As to the conduct of the preliminary investigation, respondents maintain that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence.36They, thus, consider GMAs claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to thwart the investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee.37The Courts RulingClearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the Court in the assailed decision. The issues were all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive, thus, we find no reason to disturb the Courts conclusions.At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions attached to the creation of the Joint Panel and, consequently, to the performance of their assigned tasks, we hereby reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections,38the constitutionality of Section 4339of RA 936940had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 346741dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342and 905743mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in Banat.To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.x x x xNone of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.44Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.47Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.48As to the alleged denial of GMAs right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated in view of the limitation of such right as set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed decision, to wit:While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report. Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If there are other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not submitted to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during the trial) as the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x x491wphi1Neither was GMAs right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory character of the rule.50As in any other rule, though, liberality in the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present a compelling justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in support of the complaint or undertake research on novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period because she needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentels complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the only supporting documents available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents because they were not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she was earlier required to follow.And as we held in the assailed decision:There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the information in court.However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The orderly administration of justice remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each case. To be sure, petitioners were given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with the Joint Committees directive, several motions were filed but were denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided.52Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and actively participating therein, she has chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of going back to the Joint Committee for the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed against her.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48938 September 27, 1943THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.AMADEO CORRAL,defendant-appellant.Pedro C. Quitain for appellant.Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor De los Angeles for appellee.OZAETA,J.:Appellant was prosecuted and convicted in the Court of First Instance of Davao of a violation of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows:Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. The penalty ofprision correccionalin its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.It appears that after serving three years, three months, and twenty days of a sentence of eight years and one day ofprision mayorplus a fine of P250 for falsification of a public document, appellant, on July 31, 1913, was released from Bilibid in virtue of a conditional pardon extended to him by Governor-General Forbes and duly accepted by him, the conditions being as follows: (1) "that he shall not reside in the city of Manila nor in the province of Rizal hereafter during the period of his sentence and (2) shall not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more."Because of having voted in the general elections of June 5, 1934, notwithstanding his legal disqualification on account of previous conviction, appellant was prosecuted in criminal cases Nos. 3262 and 3263 in the Court of First Instance of Davao for illegal voting and perjury in election matter, respectively, and was convicted in both cases and sentenced in the first case to suffer six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300 and in the second case to suffer one year of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300. Both sentences were affirmed by this Court on January 31, 1936, in G. R. Nos. 42300 and 42311.The only question for us to decide is whether appellant, in view of his subsequent conviction for violation of the Election Law as above stated, violated that condition of his pardon that he "shall not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more."Appellant's principal contention is that said condition should be interpreted as being limited to the duration of his sentence. The trail court, in a well-prepared decision, analyzed the two conditions of the pardon and pointed out that while the first condition regarding the choice of residence was limited to the duration of the sentence against the prisoner, no such limitation was made as to the second condition regarding any future infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year or more. Counsel for the appellant criticizes the trial court's interpretation as "nothing more than a resort to pedantic technicality." He argues that if the condition of the pardon in question is to be interpreted to extend indefinitely beyond the period of the sentence, or, in other words, for the rest of appellant's life, appellant will "forever be in a situation where the proverbial sword of Damocles will be perpetually hanging over his head, constantly exposed to the danger of being subjected to two punishments, to wit: the punishment for the crime that he might unfortunately commit, and the punishment for the violation of the condition of his pardon." "Under such circumstances," he continues, " the pardon ceases to be a pardon. It becomes an eternal condemnation. The pardon is not a relief. It is a perpetual torture. The pardon is not correctional. It is inhuman. And all these are incompatible with the fundamental concept of pardon."We cannot accept counsel's view. His criticism of the trial court's interpretation as being "nothing more than a resort to pedantic technicality" is unwarranted, ill-measured, and unseemly. His concept of a conditional pardon is manifestly wrong. He considers it unreasonable and unjust for a prisoner, whose remaining term of imprisonment is remitted, to be subjected to the condition that he shall not again violate the law even after the expiration of the time during which he would have been confined were it not for the pardon. We think such condition is perfectly reasonable. Christ Himself in His divine mercy imposed it when He pardoned a sinner and said: "Go and sin no more." We fail to see any injustice in it. In the first place, if the injunction against future violation of law were to be limited to the time of the sentence against the prisoner, society would gain nothing by the remission of that sentence; it could protect itself better against his possible recidivism or relapse into criminality during that period of time by not remitting his sentence. In the second place, a conditional pardon is ordinarily granted on the basis of the prisoner's good behavior in the penitentiary and on the assumption that he has been sufficiently reformed and that if released he would become law-abiding; and to fortify such assumption it is driven home to him that a relapse on his part would subject him to two punishments as indicated by counsel. Therefore, in his case the sword of Damocles is but a sword of Justice, pointing to him the road that leads away from the penal institution towards the goal of happiness and freedom. It would seem to be an aberration to regard such constant admonition to be good as "an eternal condemnation."In his second assignment of error appellant attempts to bolster up his interpretation of the condition of his pardon by invoking his own testimony to the effect that one Clyde B. Ely, who read to him the pardon in Corregidor, explained to him that during the period of his conviction he should not commit any violation of the law or any crime punishable for more than one year; and that because of these explanations he accepted the pardon. Appellant even went to the extent of swearing that "had Mr. Ely explained to me that the conditions imposed in the pardon would continue throughout my life, I would not have accepted the pardon and would have preferred to serve the rest of my sentence in prison." In other words, appellant would have the court believe that he would have preferred to stay for nearly five more long years in the penitentiary rather than be perpetually enjoined from committing a crime. That is abnormal, if not preposterous. And yet counsel for the appellant has the temerity of urging us to believe and accept such testimony in lieu of the terms of the pardon itself, and he even comments thereon in the following language: "Rather than carry forever a burden of not committing a crime punishable by one year or more because he is a social being, the accused-appellant testified that he would have served the full sentence instead." That is plainly another aberration. We are astounded by the incredible fact that a lawyer could in all solemnity assert before this Court that it is a burden not to commit a crime.The only error we find in the sentence of the trial court is the application to the accused of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, thru oversight, no doubt, of section 2 of said law, which says that it shall not apply to those who having been granted conditional pardon shall have violated the terms thereof. The penalty provided by article 1459 of the Revised Penal Code for the offense in question is prision correccional in its minimum period, the medium degree of which is one year, one month, and eleven days to one year, eight months, and twenty days.Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified by sentencing the appellant to suffer on year, one month, and eleven days ofprision correccionaland to pay the costs.Yulo, C.J., Paras and Bocobo, JJ.,concur.Moran, J.,concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPEREZ,J.:This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1(as originally underscored)The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque."2Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14