gal restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...bankscope data, kareman,2008, gál,...

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Központja RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL Sciences Kutatások SERVICES SECTOR IN CRISIS ENVIRONMENT: ademy of A Regionális ENVIRONMENT: International Financial Centre f ti i CEE garian Aca MT A functions in CEE udies Hun GÁL, Zoltán (PHD, Dr habil.) galz@rkk.hu egional Stu Centre for Regional Studies (RKK), Hungarian Academy of Sciences University of Kaposvár, Faculty of Economics ntre for Re Cen

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Page 1: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Köz

pont

ja

RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL Sci

ence

sK

utat

ások

SERVICES SECTOR IN CRISIS ENVIRONMENT: ad

emy

of

A R

egio

nális

ENVIRONMENT: International Financial Centre

f ti i CEEgaria

n A

caM

TA functions in CEE

udie

s H

un

GÁL, Zoltán (PHD, Dr habil.)[email protected]

iona

l Stu

g @Centre for Regional Studies (RKK),Hungarian Academy of Sciences

University of Kaposvár, Faculty of Economicsntre

for R

e

y p , y

Cen

Page 2: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Contentsna

l Stu

dies

1. Impact of financial reintegration on IFC

e fo

r Reg

ion

formation in a transition economies

HA

S C

entre 2. Factors and constraints of IFC formation (role of

SSC )H SSC-s)3 I t f th i i CEE it l3. Impact of the crisis on CEE capitals

2

Page 3: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Theories on International Financial Centres & on Financial system (re)integration of CEE are revisitedFinancial system (re)integration of CEE are revisited

nal S

tudi

es I. Hierarchical view of geography of IFCs needs rethinking (Reed, 1981; Budd 1998)• Embeddedness of IFCs in relational networks (Faulconbridge 2004, Beaverstock et

al 2005)

e fo

r Reg

ion al. 2005)

• Researches on second-tier European IFC (Engelen, Grote, Faulconbridge)• Researches on successful emerging IFCs (Poo et al. 2003, Xiaobin Zhao, Sokol,

HA

S C

entre 2007)

II Reintegration & Transition theory: Banking in Transitions Economies developing H II. Reintegration & Transition theory: Banking in Transitions Economies, developing market Oriented Banking Sectors in Eastern Europe. (Bonin et al. 1998)

• How does foreign entry affect domestic money markets? Why do banks establish foreign subsidiaries? (Claessen et al 2001 Buch 2003 Berger et al 2004)foreign subsidiaries? (Claessen et al. 2001, Buch, 2003, Berger et al. 2004)

• Entry EU banks and FDI in banking (brownfiled & greenfield privatization (Wachtel 1998) M d i ti th S ti b k i ti ti b f i t t i i t • Modernization theory: Supporting bank privatization by foreign strategic investors vs. state ownership, (Várhegyi 1993, Király 2005)

• Emerging dual banking system and its implication for spatial polarization and uneven

3

g g g ydevelopment (Alessandrini&Zazzaro, 2009, Gál, 2005)

Page 4: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Changing conditions of Financial Centre formation in CEE

Post-socialist transformation (neoliberal maket-led

nal S

tudi

es

Post-socialist transformation (neoliberal, maket-led, internationalized)

1. Systemic transformation: changing ownership structure

e fo

r Reg

ion 1. Systemic transformation: changing ownership structure

2. Gobal reintegration (into global & EU market; world-city network), 3. Metropolitan transformation (Shift to services)

HA

S C

entre

p ( )4. Privatization, de-nationalization of financial sector (almost exclusively by

foreign investors)

H

Integration into the EU market Integration into the EU market 1. Modernization and better access to services2. Concentration in the core & capital city regions (highly uneven regional p y g ( g y g

development)3. EU-wide consolidation: challenging local IFCs & exchanges 4 Attracting financial services jobs that can be outsourced” from the old EU

4

4. Attracting financial services jobs that can be „outsourced from the old EU members in the form of captive SSC and thirdf party vendors

Page 5: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Evolution of financial centre functions in CEE CEE

Stages of transition Main trends Elements of financial centre formation

Limits of higher order international financial functions

Systemic transformation

“outer directed

Changing ownership structure strategic foreign

Relatively small financial markets As a percentage of EU 15:

nal S

tudi

es

transformation directed capitalism”, with strong reliance on FDI

structure, strategic foreign investors; strong centralization legacy of CPE (Top-down financial reforms)

As a percentage of EU 15: - GDP 22.5 - Market capitalization: 16.4 - Financial assets: 6.0 - Banking assets: 4 2 (1 8)*

e fo

r Reg

ion FDI

Banking assets: 4.2 (1.8)

- Financial Assets/GDP: 26.7 (147 EU15)

Metropolitan transformatio

− Shift to business services − Exploiting comparative

Global transformation:

Subordinated power relations in finance (Under Ifs’ control): Strong dependence on foreign investors

HA

S C

entre n:

re-integration into the world-city network

p g padvantages on global market

− Interactions & symbiotic metropolitan competition

Re-integration into the Global Financial Market and International Fi i l C t

) g p g1. TNCs built their subsidiaries parallel, rather than promote regional focus 2. Little evidence on internal connectivity within CEE (only OTP bank has built a intra-regional network) 3 Littl id i l HQ f ti H for investors Financial Centre

network

Evidences of national financial centre

1. Growing share of financial services, 2. Gateway functions 3 Presence of foreign

3. Little evidence on regional HQ functions − Low level of inst. Concentration: global investment

banks, , assets managers − Low level of specialization: lack of sufficient

advisory equity & debt support centre formation

3. Presence of foreign TNCs, FIs, 4 Expansion of capital market 5 Concentration of HQ

advisory, equity & debt support − Failure of creation Pan-CEE capital market:

Exchanges showing no sign of a regional focus” − Still few core ‘controlling point’ rather ‘gateway’

functions 5 Concentration of HQ functions of subsidiaries,

functions − EU-wide consolidation of IFC network prevents RFC formation

Post-Transition: EU-accession, full

Re-positioning/

CEE: a rapidly growing offshoring hot spot

− Lack of concentration of indigenous FS Firms − Lack of complex range of financial services

5

,market integration (GVC)

p gweakening IFC functions

g pBPOs/SSCs are not IFCs

Lack of complex range of financial services − Lack of control & command functions

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Cen

tre FACTORS & CONSTRAINTS OF IFC FORMATION IN CEEH FORMATION IN CEE

6

Page 7: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Factors of IFC formationna

l Stu

dies Macro-location factors (hard)

• Large scale concentration of FIs and related services (attracting foreigninstitutions)

e fo

r Reg

ion institutions)

• Successful economy (size matters, expansion market)• Open & international: embeddedness in relational networks (connectivity)

HA

S C

entre • Power relations: control & surveillance functions/subordinated

• Lenient tax regime(soft)H (soft)

• Political & legal stability (EU accession, sound regulatory framework )

Micro-location factors (hard)• Localization and urbanization advantages (proximity and accesibility, size

of agglomerations)of agglomerations)• Institutional and information base (developed infrastructure) • Strong human capital base (scale and quality)

7

Page 8: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Employment in finance

St t ti f fi i l i i th it l iti

nal S

tudi

esStrong concentration of financial services in the capital cities– Higher share in K sector ratio in Warsaw

e fo

r Reg

ion

– Largest K sector concentration within the country in Budapest– CEE IFCs: Lower general share of high-order services & lower for

HA

S C

entre

CEE IFCs: Lower general share of high order services & lower for financial employment (Zürich 16.7%, Frankfurt 15.3%, NY 14.8%, Tokyo 3.8%, Shanghai 2.2%)H

Share of financial employment in total employment of capital cities, % Warsaw Share

within the

Budapest Share within the

Prague Share within thethe

Countrythe Country

the Country

1995 6.0 - 3.5 - 3.2 - 2001 7 8 22 1% 3 8 52% 4 7 30 3%

8

2001 7.8 22.1% 3.8 52% 4.7 30.3%2008 10.1 27.0% 5.4 43% 5.3 30%

Page 9: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Size of the CEE financial marketna

l Stu

dies

e fo

r Reg

ion

Bn USD GDP Market capitalization

Banking assets

Total financial assests

Total financial assests/GDP, %

Eastern 3 527 2 417 1820 (653) 5,178 146.8

HA

S C

entre Europe*

( ) ,

As a percentage

22.5 16.4 4.2 (1.8) 6.0 26.7

H p gof EU-15 EU15 15 688 14 730 43 146 86,098 548.8 Eurozone 12 202 10 040 30 137 63,461 520.1

* Incl. (CEE), SEE,CIS Incl. (CEE), SEE,CIS

9

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Size of the financial sector

60 0%

nal S

tudi

es • Banking still dominates within finance (~60%) 30,0%

40,0%

50,0%

60,0%

e fo

r Reg

ion

( )• Banking assets /GDP: 83%

(EMU: 250%) 0,0%

10,0%

20,0%

ank

vs ito vs vs VB NG vs up

HA

S C

entre

( %)• Assets of overall Polish

banking sector are smaller than Pola

nd v

s C

omm

erzb

a

Pola

nd v

Uni

cred

Pola

nd v

HVB

Pola

nd v

UC

I/HV

Pola

nd v

s IN

Pola

nd v

Citig

rou

H gassets of a single foreign parent bank, 2006

6 000 0

7 000,0

8 000,0

• Banking profit growth was the highest (globally) in CEE: by 20%/ in R ssia b 40%/ 2 000 0

3 000,0

4 000,0

5 000,0

6 000,0

20%/y, in Russia by 40%/y between 2000-2008 0,0

1 000,0

2 000,0

UKerm

any

Franc

eIta

lySpainhe

rland

Belgium

Irelan

dmbo

urgAus

triaen

markSwed

en

Greece

Greece

Finlan

dPola

nd

10

Ger F

Nethe Be Ir

Luxe

mb ADen Sw G G Fi P

Page 11: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Presence of foreign banks

• Domination of foreign banks as a financial intermediaries

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es

• Domination of foreign banks as a financial intermediaries• Foreign banks control the majority of assets (mainly West European),

and penetrated very early in retail segment

e fo

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ion and penetrated very early in retail segment

HA

S C

entre

H

1111

Page 12: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Lower presence of global investment banksna

l Stu

dies

Presence of the largest investment bank within the CEECs, 2004

Warsaw Prague Budapest

e fo

r Reg

ion Warsaw Prague Budapest

1) J.P. Morgan X X - 2) Merill Lynch X - - 3) Morgan Stanley - - - 4) Goldman Sachs

HA

S C

entre 4) Goldman Sachs - - -

5) Deutsche Bank X X X 6) Citibank X X X 7) Bank of New York - - - 8) B lH 8) Barclays - - -9) State Street - X - 10) UBS X - - 11) Nomura - - X

)12) CSFB X - -13) Shroeders - - - 14) Lehman Brothers - - - 15) HSBC X X X 16) Brown Brothers

Harriman - - -

Total 7 (2) 5 (1) 4 (1) ( 1) Single presence o fan investment bank witin the region

12

( ) g p g

Page 13: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Fragmented capital markets

2007 Budapest Warsaw Prague* Vienna C it li ti 46 195 211 000 101 772 236 448

nal S

tudi

es • Bank finance still has a priority over capital market finance

Capitalization (million USD)

46 195 211 000 101 772 236 448

- % of GDP 41 63 86 76 Listed companies 41 375 n.a 119

- of which 2 23 n.a 17

e fo

r Reg

ion

• At 2007 market capitalization of Warsaw,Prague and Budapest was 2% f th t t l it li ti f ll

of which foreign

2 23 n.a 17

Percentage of cross-listed companies **

74 29 36 n.a.

HA

S C

entre 2% of the total capitalization of all

European exchangesMarket turnover (million USD)

47 586 87 962 50 115

129 974

*2004; ** 2001 Forrás: a szerző számításai a World Federation of Exchanges alapján, Corporation of London; Future of stock exchanges in EU accession countries, 2003 H

• Future of CEE exchanges:– Self-survival strategies: too

smalls to stand alone” WB

Central European E h G

CEEG holding’s tasks: – Collect capital (accumulation) – Acquisition of new exchanges

Pan-CEE Stock Exchange Group

smalls to „stand alone WB, WSE, BSE large enough to offer sufficient liqudity

– Creation of a Pan-CEEC

Exchange Group(CEEG)

Budapest Vienna ??? Local Exchanges tasks (listed joint-stock

q g– International Marketing – Attract international IPOs – Lobbying at Brussels

– Creation of a Pan-CEEC exchange & common trading platform (Warsaw-Sibiu?)

SE SE( jcompanies): –Activate local investors – Domestic marketing – Attract domestic IPOs – Lobbying at local authorities, goverments

13

Common Trading Platform

Page 14: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Implications for IFC formation: transnational network connectivity with unequal power y q p

relations

nal S

tudi

es • Parent-subsidiary relations (outcome of previous FDI)• Power relations: CEE centres in subordinated by West

e fo

r Reg

ion • Power relations: CEE centres in subordinated by West

European IFCsC ti it th h t b idi t k

HA

S C

entre • Connectivity through parent-subsidiary network

– Concentration of outdegree connections forms Western gateways t CEE (I t ’ h b Vi P i Ath F kf t)H to CEE (Investors’ hub: Vienna, Paris, Athens, Frankfurt)

– Concentration of indegree connections forms bridgehead centres i CEE (H t h b M W B d t)in CEE (Host hubs: Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest)

• Lack of control function in IFCs located in CEE capital cities – Only exception is Budapest: control functions of OTP Bank, the

only regionally based MNC with regional subsidiaries network)

1414

Page 15: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Parent (HQ)-subsidiary (CEE) relationsna

l Stu

dies

e fo

r Reg

ion

HA

S C

entre

H

15Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010

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Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relationsy

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16Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010

Page 17: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Why does non of the NMS host real IFC function?The main constraints of IFC formation in The main constraints of IFC formation in

CEECEE cities: rather gateways than regional financial centres (RFCs)

nal S

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es

CEE cities: rather gateways than regional financial centres (RFCs)1) Lack of critical mass of host economies and financial markets2) EU IFIs control financial sectors in CEE (Subordinated power relations)

e fo

r Reg

ion 2) EU IFIs control financial sectors in CEE (Subordinated power relations)

a) Global financial players built up their activities parallel rather than promote regional focus

HA

S C

entre

gb) Little evidence on internal connectivity within CEE (except OTP)c) Budapest is the only capital that host regional control & surveillance function in finance

(OTP MKB)H (OTP, MKB)3) Little evidence in regional HQ functions

a) Low level of of institutional concentration: e g low presence of global investment a) Low level of of institutional concentration: e.g. low presence of global investment banks, institutional investors and assets managers

b) Low level of specialisation; lack of sufficient advisory, equity&debt supportc) EU-wide consolidation of IFC network and the dependency on relations networks

of western IFIs overcompensate the organisational and geographical proximity can be provided by a RFC

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can be provided by a RFCd) Negative impacts of stock exchange consolidation on CEE capital cities

Page 18: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Possible role of offshoring in IFC formation: the difference between formation: the difference between

BPO/SSC and IFC• IFCs are more embeded to their national and regional hinterland

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IFCs are more embeded to their national and regional hinterland• BPO/SSC are more footloose• BPO/SSC involve low and medium value skill tasks highly codified

e fo

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ion • BPO/SSC involve low and medium value skill tasks, highly codified

• Service exporting hubs will not result in natural evolution to IFC.BPO/SSC centres are not IFCs (Mumbai’s plan to shift)

HA

S C

entre – BPO/SSC centres are not IFCs (Mumbai s plan to shift)

– No strong indigenous institutional base, no control/command functions– Impact on host location (Multiplicator effects are limited)H p ( p )– Low level of territorial (regional, local) embeddedness

• IFCs criteria: – Geographical concentration of indigenousand internationally well-known financial firms– Generating comlex range of financial services

Concentration of control & command HQ functions

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– Concentration of control & command HQ functions

Page 19: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Geographical landscape of services offshoring in CEEna

l Stu

dies

e fo

r Reg

ion

HA

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entre

H

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IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON CEE CAPITALS

HA

S C

entre IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON CEE CAPITALS

H

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Page 21: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Earlier banking crisis and privatization resulted in unprecedented shares of foreign ownershipp g p

in CEE banking

nal S

tudi

es • First banking crisis in the early 1990s: collapse of local economy incresed bad debts low equity base

e fo

r Reg

ion local economy, incresed bad debts, low equity base

• Bank and credit consolidation on the expenses of

HA

S C

entre

pthe states (11% of GDP in Hungary, 1990s)

• FDI flew into the banking sectors: customer seeking H • FDI flew into the banking sectors: customer-seeking • One of the fastest growing regions of the world in

terms of banking ROE, ROA after the Millenium (high rate of profitability, cushions of parent bank (high rate of profitability, cushions of parent bank liqudity)

2121

Page 22: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

High level of financial dependency on global (EU) financial markets

“Great capitalist transformation” of Eastern Europe has been expressed over the last decade by a high level of debt and financial dependence on Western European banks which is

nal S

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es

financial dependence on Western European banks, which is without precedent since decolonization… Samary, 2009(Towards a Western/Eastern Europe Banking and Social Tsunami)

e fo

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ion

TRANSITION & POST-TRANSITION– Heavy reliance on FDI (in export-led industries & financial services)

HA

S C

entre – Deterioration of „endogenous” capital, rapid privatization

– Dual-economy/finance): core-periphery/dependent power relations

H

– Debt and credit dependence on subsidiaries of foreign banks (foreign debt fuelled growth and consumption) L ti l t l f ti i fi i d – Loss on national control functions in finance is more pronounced

IRREGULAR SPREAD OF THE CRISISEra of crises: transnational networks are channels of financial shocks – Era of crises: transnational networks are channels of financial shocks (Current account imbalances, currency crisis, profit repatriation)

– Shortage in liqudity in the developed coutries spread to East Central

22

Shortage in liqudity in the developed coutries spread to East Central Europe

– Divided Europe? two-tier EU?, (Vienna initiative)

Page 23: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Problem Originating from a Parent banks and Subsidiaries during the Crisisg

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2323

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Implications for the capital citiesna

l Stu

dies • There are signs of national financial centre development with certain

international functions (weak institutional base) but no RFC.

e fo

r Reg

ion international functions (weak institutional base) but no RFC.

• CEE cities: rather gateways than regional financial centres (RFCs)• Alternatives to RFC? to attract new vawes of financial sector jobs

HA

S C

entre • Alternatives to RFC? to attract new vawes of financial sector jobs

through offhoring (relocation) & outsourcing servicesBPO/KPO centres are not IFCs (Mumbai’s plan to shift)H – BPO/KPO centres are not IFCs (Mumbai’s plan to shift)

• Crisis environment (de-valuation of CEE shift to Asia)– Future of banking subsidiaries (relocation, consolidation)– Declining Warsaw, Prague, Budapest in terms of GFC index (local

diversified/evolving centres)diversified/evolving centres)– Could Moscow become IFC (global contender (2009, GFCI)

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Page 25: GAL Restructuring financial services sector [tryb zgodności]...Bankscope data, Kareman,2008, Gál, 2010 15. Concentration of control functions of parent-subsidiary relations n al

Stagnatiing IFCsna

l Stu

dies

Global Financial centre Index

e fo

r Reg

ion

7080

HA

S C

entre

506070

s

Warsaw

H

304050

Ran

ks BudapestPragueMosco

1020

Moscow

02006 2007 2008 2009

25

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Conclusions

• Future role of CEE in the global financial landscape

nal S

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Future role of CEE in the global financial landscape• The chance for gaining stronger position in the global

division of labour without control and command functions is

e fo

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ion division of labour without control and command functions is

impossible• Implications for transformation of the crisis-prone

HA

S C

entre Implications for transformation of the crisis prone

European financial landscape – EMU in crisis H U c s s– Slowest recovery of CEE among the emerging regions– CEE suffers from its heavy reliance on western Europe– Past dependence on foreign investment (narrow ranges of export

platforms)Increasing role of the nation state (in IFC formation too)– Increasing role of the nation state (in IFC formation too)

– Weakening states in CEE (no ability to support IFC formation vs. Asian counterparts and handling heavy dependencies on TNCs)

26

– EBRD president’s recipe

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