Measuring Gender with GamesIFPRI Gender Methods Seminar

October 25, 2013By Jessica Hoel, PHND Postdoctoral Fellow

How I came to study gender with games

Why games are good

Answer very specific questions

Controlled environment

Abstract away from many things going on in the background

Put specific numbers on abstract concepts

What games miss

Answer only the specific question you asked

Context

Subtlety

Contingency

Heterogeneity

Goals for this presentation

Framework for thinking about gender differences in outcomes

Helped me to get to more specific questions

Examples of laboratory games used to measure different factors

Not comprehensive

Inspiration for future work

Tips for new lab experimentalists

An Economist thinks about Gender

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An Economist thinks about Gender

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An Economist thinks about Gender

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An Economist thinks about Gender

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An Economist thinks about Gender

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Agency

An Economist thinks about Gender

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Constraints

Agency

An Economist thinks about Gender

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Constraints

Preferences

Agency

An Economist thinks about Gender

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Constraints

PreferencesBeliefs

Agency

Reasons for Gender Differences in Outcomes

Agency

Constraints

Preferences

Beliefs

Beliefs

Exploring gendered behavior in the field with experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a Nairobi slum by Fiona Grieg and Iris Bohnet JEBO 2009

Research Topic: Why are informal savings groups most often composed of only women?

Research Question: Do people contribute differently to public goods in mixed gender v. same gender groups?

Voluntary Contribution Game

Voluntary Contribution Game

Voluntary Contribution Game

First Stage

Everyone gets same endowment; can contribute to Common Pot or keep for self

Voluntary Contribution Game

Second Stage

Multiply Common Pot by 20 KSH, then distribute evenly

Tokens kept for self are worth 10 KSH

Beliefs

270 slum dwellers outside Nairobi

Men and women give equally in same gender groups

Men give the same in mixed and same gender groups

But women give less in mixed gender groups.

Women in mixed gender groups say they expect other participants to contribute less

Women have different beliefs about how much men will contribute.

Preferences

Gender differences in risk attitudes: Field experiments on the matrilineal Mosuo and the patriarchal Yi by Binglin Gong and Chun-Lei Yang JEBO 2012.

Research Question: do men and women have different preferences for risk?

If so, are gender differences consistent across matrilineal and patrilineal societies?

Investment Game

100% chance tokens will payout 10 RMB

50% chance tokens will payout 30 RMB

50% chance tokens will payout 0 RMB

Categorizing Games

Note that Investment Game is a twist on the Voluntary Contribution Game

VCG Outcome determined by other players

Distribution of outcomes is wide

Investment Game Outcome determined by chance

Only two possible outcomes

Preferences

132 men and women from two villages, one matrilineal and one patrilineal.

Men invest more in risky asset than women in both groups, but difference between them is smaller in matrilineal society.

Suggests men and women have different risk preferences, and that the difference is partially influenced by culture.

Constraints

Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies by Pamela Jakiela and Owen Ozier (November 2012)

Research Question: Do men and women feel different social pressure to share income with relatives and neighbors?

Twist on Investment Game

50% of people get BIG endowment: 18 tokens

50% of people get SMALL endowment: 8 tokens

Twist on Investment Game

PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE

50% of people get Private Treatment

50% of people get Public Treatment

Constraints

If social pressure doesn’t matter, people who get big endowment should invest the same amount in the risky cup regardless of public v. private treatment.

But if social pressure matters, and respondent gets the big endowment in the public treatment, should invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup.

2145 subjects from rural villages in Kenya.

Constraints

Men invest the same amount in the risky cup in the Private and Public treatments.

Women are substantially more likely to invest no more than 8 tokens in the risky cup when their decision is public and they receive the large endowment.

Suggests that women face different pressures to share with their friends and relatives than do men.

This reflects different constraints on choices.

Agency

What Causes Inefficiency between Spouses? A Within-Subject Structural Test of the Relative Importance of Asymmetric Information and Limited Contracting with Experimental Evidence from Kenya by Jessica Hoel (September 2013)

One Research Topic: do spouses act as if they have equal control over household resources?

One Research Question: are spouses willing to sacrifice household income to maintain some personal control?

Dictator Game

Tokens pay 30 KSH

Tokens pay 20 KSH

PUBLIC DECISION

Agency

If husbands and wives share resources, respondents should put all tokens in the Spouse cup. Maximizes total winnings for the household.

Can go home and reallocate later.

But if a respondent doesn’t believe that settling up will happen, may keep some tokens for Self.

Play Public Spouse dictator games with 370 couples in Kenya

What this looks like

Agency

Not very many people play efficiently.

Lots of people split the money exactly evenly.

Agency

Efficient

Women more likely than men to split money exactly evenly.

Even distribution of money.

Agency

Suggests that men have more control over household resources than women do.

Women sacrifice more household resources to maintain personal control over some.

Women choose even allocation more often, perhaps because they don’t believe reallocation will happen later.

Women have different agency than men do.

Structural Behavioral Model

Model that parameterizes motives to give money in dictator game

Play 5 types of dictator game with spouses and strangers

Structurally estimate parameters of model for each individual

Measure 5 motives to share money

Efficiency between spouses

Limited Contracting between spouses

Asymmetric Information between spouses

Altruism to strangers

Fairness with strangers

Tips for new lab experimentalists

Be creative

But “read” the literature (i.e. ask someone who knows the literature)

Be specific

Keep your design and script as simple as possible

Questions and Discussion