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Sussex Migration Working Paper no. 11

The Root Causes of Migration: Criticising the Approach andFinding a Way ForwardSaskia Gent

September 2002

Summary

The focus of this paper is a critique of the root causes approach to migration. More specifically it examines howthe approach has been used to formulate policy at a European level and applies a critical appraisal of the rootcauses approach in general, to this policy, in particular the work of the High Level Working Group onImmigration and Asylum (HLWG). It is argued that a failure to successfully accommodate theories of migrationundermines the approach in both theory and practice. A range of theories which could usefully be encompassedwithin the root causes approach are identified and elucidated. One key area of concern within the root causesapproach, rural to urban migration, is examined to provide material for a suggested way forward.


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Table of contents

Preface p.4

Introduction p.5

1. Criticising the root causes approach p.6 Emergence of the approach p.6 Political criticisms p.7 Empirical criticisms p.8 Structural criticisms p.9

2. Root causes in practice? P.11 The root causes approach in European policy p.11

i. Communication from the Commission to the Council 1994 p.11ii. Austrian Presidencys strategy paper on Migration and Asylum Policy 1998 p.12

The High Level Working Group p.14 Root Causes in the Action Plans p.14

i. Political, economic and human rights situations p.15 Activities of the HLWG

i. Measuring the HLWG against its own aims p.18ii. The HLWG and criticisms of root causes p.19

3. Is there a way forward for the root causes approach? p.21 The sedentarist bias p.21 Misunderstanding migration p.22 Migration and development p.23 The role of urban migration in improving the root causes approach p.24

Conclusion A Way Forward? p.26

Bibliography p.28 Primary sources p.28 Secondary sources p.29


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Preface

Why root causes?The contested nature of the root causesapproach emerged from a reading of Zolberg etal.s Escape to Violence (1989). It appeared

that the approach claimed to have one aim, theimprovement of conditions in the countries oforigin, but was in fact resulting in a quitedifferent outcome, an increase in control,deterrent and prevention mechanisms towardsthose seeking asylum or other unwantedmigrants (Martin & Taylor, 2001, p.95). Indeed,the very existence of root causes activity or anintegrated approach (EU, January 1999a, point12) provided justification for the EU tostrengthen its preventative measures.

Further reading revealed that some positionsheld by root causes proponents seemedinconsistent with a full understanding ofmigration processes. The role of rural-urbanmigration, an undifferentiated view of migrationand a failure to incorporate segmented labourmarket theory provided justification for theactivities and approaches of root causesproponents. These concerns initiated the topicas a dissertation but were augmented by thesuggestion from my supervisor, Dr. RichardBlack, that the High Level Working Group(HLWG) demonstrated the root causes approach

in action, and so the topic was broadened toinclude analysis of this group.

MethodologyDiscussion here of the theoretical elements ofthe root causes approach, and its historical andpolitical context are informed by existingliterature (see bibliography). The materialcovering EU policy and the HLWG is based onprimary documentation from the EU and NGOsas outlined in the bibliography, and interviewswith policy makers. The documents have beenused to identify the activities of the group, to

assess its success or failure by its own criteriaand as sources for assessing the failure of theroot causes approach, and the HLWG inparticular, to incorporate an adequateunderstanding of migration processes.Interviews were designed to contextualiseprimary documentation, to add backgroundinformation, to address criticisms of the projectand to gain an insight, not so far apparent in

existing literature, into the workings of thegroup. I am particularly indebted to LarsLonnback and Maureen A. Barnett at the EU, Dr.Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazos and Lars Olsson at Amnesty International, Areti Siani at ECRE forsharing time, knowledge and documentation

with me.


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Introduction The Root Causes ofMigration

Criticising the Approach and Finding a WayForwardThe presidency conclusions from the Seville

European Council, (EU, July 2002), summariseEuropean thinking on a joint immigration andasylum policy which focuses on the need tocombat illegal immigration (EU, July 2002, p.7).There are nodding references to internationalobligations and the integration of immigrants(p.7 and p.8) but the main focus is on barriersto prevent migration via a penal framework(p.9), a European border police force (p.9) andImmigration Liaison Officers (p.10). In additionto these home affairs instruments it is statedthat an integrated, comprehensive and balanced

approach to tackle the root causes of illegalimmigration must remain the European Unionsconstant long-term objective (EU, July 2002,p.10). However, apart from a passing mentionof the benefits of economic development, themeat of this objective relies on readmissionagreements and the threat of removing closerelations (p.11) between third countries and theEU. This paper will examine this root causesapproach, highlight the origins of the debateand the theory behind it to see how it evolvedinto the restrictive policies advocated by the EUtoday. It will also seek to find a more

productive way forward.

Commentators on the root causes approachhave identified criticisms of it which can begrouped into political, structural and empirical.Political criticisms look at the motivations ofstates, structural at how different world systemsviews affect the root causes approach andempirical criticisms focus on questioning thecauses that have been identified, the effect thatthese causes have and the effect of actions totackle causes. Once these different criticismsare established, the paper will argue that they

can also be applied to the application of rootcauses within policy. It will review thedevelopment of root causes in European policyand then examine the work of the HLWG in thelight of established criticisms.

After this critical assessment of the root causesapproach in theory and in practice, the paperwill turn to a more specific area of criticism. It

will suggest that one reason for theshortcomings of the root causes approach is itsfailure to adequately conceptualise migration.By failing to understand and integrate well-established theories of migration, the failures ofthe root causes approach are inherent within it.

The paper will look at several problematicaspects of the root causes understanding ofmigration including: a failure to see migration inits historical context, a failure to conceive of thetwo-way process that is migration, and a failureto understand the complexities, variety ofexperiences and multiple causes and effects ofdifferent contexts within which migrationhappens.

After establishing the limitations of the rootcauses in theory and practice, with regard tothese three areas, the paper will suggest an

alternative root causes approach that could usemigration theory to constructively model anapproach that reflects more realistically howmovement of people can enhance internationaldevelopment objectives while preserving statesrequirement to limit international migrationtowards the north.


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1. Criticising the root causesapproach

The emergence of the approachThe root causes approach, also termed a

comprehensive approach (Thorburn, 1996, p.120) focuses on identifying causes of forcedmigration and attempting to modify themthrough activities in the countries of origin.There are obvious merits in tackling causes ofconflict and other causes of distress to people indeveloping countries but when it is motivatedspecifically by the desire to prevent migrationthis can be counter-productive. In addition theroot causes approach emerged as a policysolution to migration issues and is notadequately supported by theory. It

encompasses some misconceptions of the realityof migration which undermines its raison dtreas well as its strategies. This paper will drawout these issues and analyse some alternativeapproaches.

There is no consensus in this area about exactlywhat a root causes approach is, what the rootcauses are or how they affect the movement ofpeople. One area, which requires someclarification, is how far this approach candistinguish or chooses to distinguish betweendifferent types of migration. Originally the

approach was designed to tackle refugee flowsbut there is increasing consideration of allmigration under the root causes approach, asdeveloped countries have gone through thecycle of closing down migration opportunities,attempting to restrict all migration and nowmoving towards a stance in which migration is managed (EU, Sept. 1998, p.2) but stillextremely restricted, and the focus is onpreventing illegal immigration, which conflatesasylum seekers and labour migrants.

As policy makers became more concerned with

the movement of asylum seekers, particularlytowards developed countries, and distinguishedbetween those seeking asylum and not grantedit and genuine refugees (Kaye, 1998, p.167)policy documents began to distinguish lessclearly between refugees and other types ofmigrants (EU, Nov. 2000c). In a world wherethe political incentives for welcoming refugees

are less clear-cut, the motivations for refugeesto leave are increasingly scrutinised. The 1951Convention definition of a refugee as someonewho is persecuted1 has been under pressuresince the 1960s when the Organisation ofAfrican Unity (OAU) extended the definition to a

broader range of people. In developedcountries the tendency has been to offer othertypes of humanitarian or B status resulting infewer applicants being granted refugee statusand allowing states the opportunity to stigmatiseapplicants as bogus (Hassan, 2000, p.195, &see Kaye, 1998, p.167). With this distinctioncomes the assumption that a large proportion ofasylum seekers are what is termed economicmigrants (Sztucki, 1999, p.70) or illegal. In aRefugee Council poll of UK residents, the termmost associated with media coverage ofrefugees and asylum seekers was "illegal

immigrant", selected by 64% of respondents(Refugee Council, 2002).

Despite the development of these terms it hasnever been possible to divide migrants easilyinto those who are forced and those who movepurely for economic reasons. Motives arealways mixed and Wood outlines the complexityof decision making for migrants and asserts thatthe borderline between political refugees andthose dissatisfied economically can indeed beblurred (1994, p.608). Zolberg et al. identifyexamples of the collapse of weak states wherethe very character of root causes makes itimpossible to distinguish between flight fromviolence and flight from hunger (Zolberg et al.,1989, p. 257) and Bissell & Natsios stress economic, social and political factors in bothsending and receiving countries (2001, p.298 &310).

In addition to the difficulty of isolating differenttypes of migrants, the recent restrictions onmigration and international movement ingeneral mean that people who in the past may

1According to the 1951 Convention article 1A, the definitionof a refugee is one who owing to well-founded fear of beingpersecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,membership of a particular social group or political opinion,is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, orowing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of theprotection of that country; or who, not having a nationalityand being outside the country of his former habitualresidence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing tosuch fear, is unwilling to return to it.


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have qualified as refugees but did not need tobe part of the refugee regime (Zolberg et al.,1989, p.18 & passim) because they were able tomove under family reunion rules or labourmigration programmes, are now forced into theasylum system. On the other side of the coin,

people who want to move to work in developedcountries may also use the asylum system in theabsence of any other routes. This path may beexacerbated by the increasing use of agentswho provide the necessary documents androutes for people hoping to enter developedcountries. In the light of these factors it is easyto see how the root causes approach has cometo apply as much to migration, which is assumedto be economic as it is to that which is oftencalled political migration. Despite thecomplexity of motivations accompanyingmigrants, policy makers must be aware that

there are some people, denied the safety oftheir own state, who need safeguards to ensurethat they can reach asylum in a country that willprotect them.

The convergence of asylum and migration in thepolicy context has a strong political element toit. The refugee regime has its roots in the post-World War Two situation and in the Cold War.During the Cold War there was a strongideological incentive for states to acceptrefugees, which initially mainly came fromcommunist countries and then tended to comefrom countries where one or other side had astrategic interest (Loescher, 1993, p.55).

After the oil-crisis of 1973 and economicretrenchment by powerful states, migrationbecame less acceptable but states discovered itwas not possible to close the door entirely.Family reunion meant that migration continuedand continuing conflict and easier modes oftravel meant that more asylum seekers werereaching developed countries (Zolberg et al.,1989, p.229). The end of the Cold War meant

that refugees were no longer ideologically useful(Chimni, 1995, p.298) and this coincided withfears that uncontrolled East-West migrationcould result (Westin, 1999, p.35). These factorsmeant that migration and asylum increasinglybecame seen as problematic, whilst the end ofthe Cold War opened the door to politicalsolutions.

During the Cold War the political paralysis ofthe bi-polar world (Chimni, 1998, p. 360) hadprevented any actions towards tackling theunderlying causes of forced migration buttowards the late 1980s this was no longer arestriction. During the 1980s and 1990s

migration became a matter of high politics(Thorburn, 1996, p.120,) and forced migrationbecame linked to security issues. This is partlydue to an erroneous emergency mentality asidentified by Zolberg (2001, p.1) which, inconjunction with the increased targeting andexpelling of civilian populations as a tactic ofintrastate conflicts (Loescher, 2001, p. 171),resulted in the increasing use of humanitarianinterventions to stave off further conflict and toprevent massive outflows of refugees (Loescher,2001, p.172).

The post-Cold War political environment with itsdesire to control migration, rejection of claims ofasylum seekers and the increasingly political roleof immigration has created the context for thedevelopment of the root causes approach.Outlining the political and historical context forthe emergence of the root causes approachreveals some of the key criticisms of the rootcauses approach. Here political criticisms will beoutlined as well as some criticisms of theempirical content and those which identify flawsin the way the approach is constructed.

Political criticismsThe investment in military or humanitarianintervention instead of conflict prevention orearly warning systems (Loescher, 2001, p.172)is symptomatic of the political quandary of theroot causes approach. Most developed statesare concerned about migration but few have thepolitical will to intervene in another statesaffairs to the extent necessary to preventrefugee-producing situations. Instead, afterflows of refugees are beginning or are inevitable preventive protection (Frelick, 1993, p.7) or

regional solutions such as safe havens (Frelick,1993, p.7) become part of a military solution.This regionalised approach was established inthe early days of the UNs involvement with rootcauses. One of the reasons why focus wasturned to the root causes of forced migrationwas the movement of people from Vietnam.International concern about this movement ledto the development of a Comprehensive Plan of


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Action (CPA) for Vietnam, which establishedregional solutions as a target of the root causesapproach (Loescher, 1993, p.190 & Adelman,1999, p.98). Regional solutions prevent statesfrom having to accept responsibility for refugeesseeking asylum with them and maintain the view

that flows of migrants are the responsibility ofthe sending country.

The desire of states to devolve responsibility forforced migrants is well served by the rootcauses approach. The long-term nature of mostof the issues covered by this approach conflictswith the immediate needs of migrants in theNorth and the South but it allows states toderogate their responsibility. Hathaway pointsout that states are happy to engage with rootcauses as they have few immediateconsequences and that agreements in principle

and statements of intention are a small price topay for a deflection of focus from the failure ofthe international community to come to gripswith the protection needs of todays involuntarymigrants (Hathaway, 1991, p.117).

As well as these political criticisms,commentators have identified a number ofcriticisms about the empirical content of the rootcauses approach. Looking at these areas willprovide material for comparison with the rootcauses approach in practice. The areas to lookat are criticisms of the causes that have beenidentified, the effect that these causes have, theeffect of actions to tackle causes, and then itsstructural approach.

Empirical criticismsMany commentators have observed thedifficulties of identifying underlying causes forhighly complex situations (Zolberg et al., 1989,p. 260, Thorburn, 1996, p.123, Schmeidl, 2001,p.85). There are problems in terms ofidentifying cause and effect and some inherentcontradictions within the conclusions drawn by

advocates of the root causes approach. Assessments of the causes of refugee flowsrange from evaluations of different types ofconflict (Zolberg et al., 1989, Weiner, 1996,Schmeidl, 2001) to unpicking multi-layeredcomplex emergencies (Bissell & Natsios, 2001,p.301). The root causes are generally agreed toinclude conflict and oppression and its relationto economic development, governance and

human rights (Castles & Loughna, 2002, p.18and see Westin, 1999, p.31) and the solutionsare seen with a very broad brush to be development and democratisation (Zolberg,2001, p.13). However there is no consensus onhow to bring this about in a way that fulfils the

requirements of the root causes proponents;namely without migration. One of the keyelements that has been identified as a cause ofrefugee and mixed flows is economicunderdevelopment. Its importance in thiscontext is reflected in the use of the phrase stay-at-home growth (Martin & Taylor, 2001,p.96). Schmeidl comments that more and morescholars have identified economic problems as acause of refugee migration (2001, p.82).Looking at differing views on this key rootcause will show a range of criticisms of theapproach.

In the 1980s two major reports on refugeeflows identified economic underdevelopment asa key root cause (Zolberg et al., 1989, p.258)and this is echoed in more recent policy papers.The Communication from the Commission to theCouncil and the European Parliament of 1994says that in terms of dealing with root causes economic disparities will generally represent themost significant pressure (EU, 1994 p.13).However, Wood identifies that the factorsinfluencing refugee flows are murky and saysthat insight into the causes of forced migrationis not enhanced by simplistic correlations withaggregate measures of national economicdevelopment (Wood, 1994, p.611). As early as1989 Zolberg et al. challenged the assumptionof a straightforward association betweeneconomic underdevelopment and refugee flowsby establishing that the poorest people rarelymove, even when poverty is used as a tool ofaggression, and when they do, they rarely movevery far (1989, p. 260). The perpetuation ofthis correlation in policy and by commentatorshas forced scholars to make similar comments

more recently. Schmeidl analyses countries thatdo, and do not, produce refugees and concludesthat as not all poor countries produce refugees this disqualifies poverty as a direct andnecessary push factor of refugee migration(2001, p. 82).

Most commentators do acknowledge some,more complex, relationships between economic


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development and forced migration. Schmeidlsees that poverty could be a trigger (2001,p.82) for refugee movements and points outhow geo-political changes at state level havehappened more peaceably for wealthier states(2001, p.83). Castles & Loughna review the

arguments about the role of underdevelopment,stressing the complexity of the relationship.They concentrate on the role thatunderdevelopment can play in conflict, whenunderdevelopment is a result of corruption andauthoritarian rule (2002, p.13).

Another criticism of this aspect of the rootcauses approach is that the process of economicdevelopment (as indeed of any change tosocieties) can itself lead to forced migration.One aspect of this is that improvedcircumstances may lead to emigration of those

who were previously prevented from leaving byinadequate resources. This is known as themigration hump (Martin & Taylor, 2001, p.105)and is matched by a refugee hump (Zolberg,2001, p.14) created by the process ofdemocratisation. Economic development canalso create forced migration if developmentperpetuates inequitable distribution. Zolberg etal. point out that policies for economic reformcan contribute to uneven development and thateconomic aid can have an uncertain orunexpected impact on the structure of socialconflict (1989, p. 262). Chimni looks at how thespecific features of the international globaleconomy can exacerbate ethnic tensions(Chimni 1998, p.361). Meanwhile, Weinerstresses the political roots of forced movementand asserts that economic development may beneither necessary nor sufficient to remedy thesepolitical conditions (1996, p.32), while higherincomes or a reduction in inequality could reduce conflict in some countries but actuallyintensify it in others (1996, p.31).

A criticism of the roots causes approach which

takes these objections a step further says thatwhile economic and social change can drivemigration, any attempt to stop migration canalso hinder this change, and that an attempt toprevent population movements is the equivalentof trying to oppose social change which is both impossible and undesirable (Zolberg et al.,1989, p. 262). Even conflicts have a role to playin certain circumstances and not all conflicts can

or should be prevented (Weiss, 2001, p.210) as violent change may be a necessary pathtowards a more just social order (Zolberg et al.1989, p.263).

Structural criticisms

Conceptions of a just social order are also at thecentre of a structural critique of the way that theroot causes approach is applied. We have seenon page 8 how the root causes approachassumes responsibility for forced migration lieswith the countries of origin (Loescher, 2001,p.173, Chimni, 2000, p.258). The approachconcentrates on turning to the countries oforigin to provide solutions for the conditions thatare assumed to give rise to migration, withouttaking into account the influence of internationalor global conditions. Zolberg et als bookEscapefrom Violence is quite firmly placed in the geo-

political conditions of the 1980s with the ColdWar and apartheid South Africa dominatinginternational relations, but it more widelyestablishes the role of external influences onrefugee-producing regimes which have emergedunder conditions shaped by external strategicand economic interests (1989, p.264). Morerecently Zolberg has reiterated this point withreference to France and the U.S. in Indochina(Zolberg, 2001, p. 9). In a speech on RefugeeDay 2002, the UKs Minister for the Departmentfor International Development alluded to theexertion of external influences in the conflicts ofdeveloping countries when she said Countriessuffering most from conflict are those with therichest resources this is not an accident2.

Zolberg et al. criticise the root causes approachfor failing to grasp the implications of itsinternalist viewpoint and for maintaining anapolitical stance because the causes of refugeeflows are not apolitical (1989, p.32). As well asthe political structures of the world, whichZolberg at al. analysed within the specifichistorical conditions of the late cold-war years,

they also identified global economic conditions.They pointed out that poor countries have nochoice but to participate in the global economyon disadvantageous terms (1989, p. 231).More recently Chimni has criticised theinternalist approach of root causes advocates by

2 Clare Short, Refugees and Conflict, lecture presented at theRoyal Geographical Society for the International RescueCommittee, London, 2002.


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critiquing global relations of domination(Chimni, 2000, p.244) which render thedevelopment process inequitable and lead to the mass violation of human rights (2000, p.251).He sees that the internalist approach exculpatesthose countries that are truly responsible for

refugee flows caused by the geographicalspread of capitalism and the politics ofimperialism (Chimni, 1998, p. 359) andtherefore absolves them from responsibility.These structural criticisms make an importantpoint about the contradictory nature of the rootcauses approach, which demands changes fromcountries of origin while perpetuating conditions,which encourage migration. This isencapsulated in the response of AbdelkrimBelguendouz commenting on the High LevelWorking Group Action Plan on Morocco at aconference in 2001. He said, if you dont want

to allow Moroccan tomatoes to enter, well, youllget Moroccan people3.

These criticisms of the root causes approach:the political (absence of political will, abrogationof responsibility for asylum), issues addressingthe empirical content of the approach(questioning the causes that have beenidentified, the effect that these causes have andthe effect of actions to tackle causes) andcriticisms of its structural approach (theinternalist/externalist debate) underline thepremise of this paper. Most of the criticisms ofthe root causes approach have been based ontheories of economics or conflict prevention.The root causes debate is, however based onthe movement of people and as such should beevaluated in the light of migration theory. Thispaper will therefore also look at the emergenceand development of the root causes debate tosee where a failure to adequately account fortheories of migration will lead to its failure. Itwill go on to look at how a re-conceptualisationcould provide a beneficial rather than repressiveroot causes approach. Below, theapplication of

the root causes approach in European policy isevaluated in the light of these criticisms.

3Abdelkrim Belguendouz, University of Rabat, at Frontireset zones dattente, une libert de circulation sous contrle,Palais du Luxembourg, 19 -20 October 2001, ANAFE.


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2. Root causes in practice?

The root causes approach in European policyThe political and historical context for theemergence of the root causes approach to

migration shows how certain circumstances,particularly the end of the Cold War, gave rise tothis policy development. In Europe there werespecific conditions which enhanced thismovement and made the root causes approachof particular relevance. Within the context ofthe end of the Cold War we have seen how fearof East-West migration contributed to arestrictive approach to migration, and asylum inparticular. Conflict in the Balkans and increasedrefugee flows to the developed countries ofWestern Europe exacerbated this tendency.

Alongside these historic developments, theEuropean Community (EC) was engaged indeveloping a single market. Since the SingleEuropean Act of 1987 (via the Schengen Agreement of 1985) this had meant removinginternal borders to facilitate free movement ofEuropes citizens (Myers, 1996, p.5). Theprospect of people being able to move betweencountries with few checks began to make theimmigration policy of one country of directrelevance to the other European countries. Theeffect of this was to move immigration and

asylum concerns from the realm of bilateral andintergovernmental fora such as the Club deVienne or the Ad Hoc Immigration Group(Myers, 1996 p.4) gradually towards the remit ofthe EC. During this period increasinglyrestrictive immigration laws were introduced inEuropean countries including stricter visarequirements for more countries, and carriersanctions for companies found to be carryingpeople without the correct documents.

By 1994 little progress towards a unified policyhad been made and the European Commission

introduced the idea of a comprehensiveimmigration policy in its 1994 Communication tothe Council (EU, 1994). The comprehensiveapproach covers many areas of the root causesapproach including a focus on working withthird countries (EU, 1994, p.4). This documenthas subsequently become something of areference text in the area (Myers, 1996, p.15)and so merits some specific analysis.

Communication from the Commission to theCouncil (COM 94)This document is essentially conservative in itsscope, although still more forward looking thansome of the discussion that came after it. The

comprehensive approach outlined by the 1994document has three strands action onmigration pressure through working with thirdcountries, action on controlling immigration tokeep it manageable and integration policies for legal migrants. Underpinning the document isa belief that uncontrolled migration isresponsible for public disorder (EU, 1994, p.4)and that this is exacerbated by unemploymentin the countries of origin (EU, 1994, p10).Successful integration, it assumes, is dependenton control of migration flows (EU, 1994, p.11).The policy approach is to match short-term

control measures with long-term cooperationwith countries and regions of origin (p.11).These long-term issues are addressed underthe root causes banner (p.13) and offer a salveto the main intention of restricting or controllingmigration. Despite the complexity of the rootcauses issue, twice as much space is devoted tooutlining policies for controlling migration flows(p. 20) than to addressing root causes.

The EUs root causes approach, adopted by theHigh Level Working Group (HLWG), ofintegrating migration policies into developmentand economic policies with third countries, isestablished here. A principle of the HLWG isenshrined in this document; the suggestion thatspecific actions should be taken to controlspecific flows of migrants. This emphasises theroot causes approach to the underlying causesof migration and stresses that concern is limitedto ending migratory movements. As the sectionon the HLWG will show, this short-termapproach sows the seeds of its own failure.

Despite addressing refugees and other types of

migration within one document, the Commissionfailed to conceptualise the continuum betweenforced and economic migration and in additionfailed to see the links between this continuumand illegal migration. Each of these is treatedas a separate group of migrants and thereforethe document fails to see or acknowledge thelinks between restrictive asylum practices andillegal migration (although it does look at limited


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labour migration opportunities in this context).It does not acknowledge that restricting themovement of illegal migrants has apreventative effect on all migrants includingrefugees.

The 1994 communication identifies conflict as acause of forced migration as well as two othercauses, which are considerably morecontroversial: Demographic and ecologicalpressures. Work by Kibreab and Black hasquestioned the role of ecology within forcedmigration. Kibreab suggests the emergence of environmental refugees is an attempt to de-politicise the causes of displacement (1997,p.21) while Black is concerned that writing onenvironmental refugees has more to do with bureaucratic agendas of internationalorganizations and academics than with any real

theoretical or empirical insight (2001, p.14). Ondemographic issues Schmeidl specificallyaddresses the issue of population pressure andforced migration. She looks at both Weinersapproach of population pressure as anunderlying cause and at population pressure asan accelerator (2001, p.82). However herquantitative analysis leads her to conclude noneof these variables could significantly predictrefugee migration once political factors werecontrolled for (2001, p.83) and indeed she alsofinds that countries with higher populationdensities can produce less out-migration insituations of civil war (2001, p. 83). This debateabout the causes of migration is not engagedwith in the 1994 EU document.

Despite these flaws there are some elements ofthis 1994 paper, which provide a moresophisticated view of migration processes, whichcould have contributed to the development of aroot causes approach. One is that despite itsfailure to adequately distinguish thecharacteristics of migrants whether forced,economic or illegal the paper does make some

statements about the necessity of differentiatingbetween different groups of migrants withdifferent experiences as not all groups behavealike (EU, 1994, p.18). The suggestion thatthese differences should be looked at seems agood one but unfortunately the agenda of thepaper reveals itself in the technique suggested,which is profiling (EU, 1994 p.18) a term more

commonly used with respect to criminals than tobroad-based sociological research.

The other area, which seems to suggest somepotential for innovative thinking within the rootcauses approach, even if belatedly and half-

heartedly, is an acknowledgement that countriesof origin have an important role to play inmigration issues which affect their citizens. Itraises the suggestion of looking at the patternsof movement within a country and how thatrelates to international migration. As this paperwill show, if the EU could adapt its root causesapproach to the extent that real dialogue withother countries and real understanding ofmigration processes could inform its activities,this concept could offer some chance ofprogress.

Despite the groundwork that was laid for aEuropean migration and asylum strategy noprogress was made on the back of the 1994communication. The third pillar structure, andthe difficulty of co-ordinating the differingapproaches of states in an area that touches sodirectly on sovereignty, could be a reasonableexplanation of the slow progress, but anotherexplanation was put forward in a strategy paperon Immigration and Asylum by the Austrianpresidency of the EU in 1998. This outlined theshortcomings in the Commissionscommunication in terms of no comprehensivepolitical approach no operational workprogramme and no action plans (EU, Sept.1998, p.3). In addition, the strategy paperclaims that developments in terms of rights forimmigrants have been constrained by theincessant influx of illegal migrants and theeffects of migration crises on demographicpolicy. This paper will show how theseassumptions led to the adoption of the particularroot causes approach of the High Level WorkingGroup which limits its effectiveness and resultsin a highly restrictive policy. The 1998 paper

therefore merits some analysis.

Austrian Presidencys Strategy Paper onMigration and Asylum Policy 1998The Austrian presidencys strategy paper wasnot uncontroversial. It was subject to muchrevision and complaints from a number of NGOsparticularly regarding a proposed overhaul ofthe Geneva Convention which would have


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moved from protection concepts based only onthe rule of law to include politically orientedconcepts (p.16). However one of the trends itperpetuated was the conflation of all migrationunder the banner of illegal immigration, whichis said to be the main concern of political

interest (EU, Sept. 1998, p.6). Indeed thistrend has continued with a CommissionCommunication on illegal immigration in 2001,and a focus on combatting illegal migrationunder the heading of asylum and immigrationat the Seville Summit (EU, July, 2002).

The potential danger in categorising allmigration as illegal is revealed in the exampleschosen by the Austrian presidency to illustrateits case. The assumption is made that there isan increasing influx of asylum seekersirrespective of the situation in the countries of

origin (p.5). However, studies by academicsand commentators have shown that this is anincorrect assumption. Patterns of migration ofasylum seekers are directly related to dangerousconditions in the countries of origin (see Bocker& Havinga, 1998; Castles & Loughna, 2002; andSchmeidl, 2001).

This erroneous conception of Europes migrationexperience is perhaps framed by its anti-immigration stance, which detracts from thereality of the situation. This lack of perspectiveis tellingly revealed in the way the Bosnian waris described as a migration catastrophe (EU,Sept. 1998, p.12) making the state-centricposition of this paper patently clear. A betterunderstanding of migration would show thatmany of the Bosnians quickly became settled inaccommodation and found work throughexisting social networks, proving themselveseconomically useful in a way which denies theexistence of a migration catastrophe (Koser &Black, 1999, p.530). For the purposes ofanalysing the contribution of the 1998 paper tothe EUs root causes approach it is clear that the

alarmist view of migration as a result of theBosnian war contributed to a desire for instruments of prevention and control (EU,Sept. 1998, p. 12).

Another justification for creating restrictivemigration policies is also based on amisunderstanding of migration processes. The1998 paper picks up on the 1994 communication

from the Commission in terms of concerns aboutunemployment and the effect of migration onunemployment. However there is anunderstanding amongst scholars of migrationand economics that immigration does notappear to affect aggregate unemployment rates

adversely (Skeldon, 1997a, p.82). In fact thepresence of more people can create jobs andeconomic growth (Simon, 1992, p.289). Overtime, through networks, certain migrants arechannelled towards certain areas of workcreating a segmented labour market (Skeldon,1990, p.40). This means that immigrants oftendo jobs that the resident population refuses todo (Harris, 2002, p.3). The unsophisticatedview of immigration and unemployment in this1998 paper does not acknowledge the role oflabour demand in migration where thoseseeking work travel only if there is work (Harris,

2002, p.3).

Aside from the fact that the view of the 1998paper contradicts that held by manycommentators on migration it also seems to beinternally inconsistent. The paper states thatcountering illegal immigration is a priorityincreasingly so in view of unemployment trendsbut at the same time it is also concerned about economic pull factors encouraging illegalmigration (EU, Sept. 1998, p.10). Without asegmented labour market, unemployment wouldmean that economic pull factors were notstrong, but conversely as we have seen, asegmented labour market means thatimmigration and unemployment have a morecomplex relationship than the one assumedhere. This further example of the EUpolicymakers limited understanding of migrationprocesses points towards the emergence of adeeply flawed root causes approach dominatedby the urge to reign in migration at any cost.

The final example of how flawed assumptionscontribute directly to a failing root causes

approach lies in the Austrian presidencysattitude to urbanisation and migration. The1994 paper had raised the issue of internalmigration within countries of origin as an areaworth exploring. The 1998 paper from the Austrian presidency picks up on this idea butunfortunately does not pursue it constructively.Instead it adopts the restrictive approach ofmany root causes protagonists by condemning


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rural-urban migration via a very limitedunderstanding of this type of movement. Thepaper assumes that rural-urban migration is anunstoppable and inexplicable trend. It assumesthat rural-urban migration is a one-way, one-time event resulting in an explosion of

unemployment in the third world (EU, July1998, p.8). In fact, Skeldon shows howmigrants to cities often have higher rates ofemployment than non-migrants (1997b, p.9).This example shows how a flawedunderstanding led to the emergence of aparticular type of root causes approachdominated by a concern to restrict all types ofmigration and to prevent movement not onlyfrom one region of the world to another but alsowithin regions or even countries. The influencethat these policies have had on the High LevelWorking Group is reviewed below.

The High Level Working GroupThe 1998 strategy paper was debated inDecember 1998. As a result of this debate theNetherlands suggestion of a cross-pillar taskforce (initially temporary) was adopted, to takeup some of the issues discussed in the strategypaper (EU, January 1999a). This became theHigh Level Working Group (HLWG), establishedon 7th December 1999 (EU, January 1999a).The Austrian presidencys strategy paper wassaid to be a useful contribution to the work ofthe HLWG (Statewatch, 1999) and it was notedthat the Justice and Home Affairs Councilsuggested that account be taken of the Austrianstrategy paper when preparing the brief for theHLWG. The intention and method of the HLWGis as follows:

By a cross-pillar combination of measures, theworking group is to help reduce the influx ofasylum seekers and immigrants into the MemberStates of the European Union. Its main aim isto analyse and combat the reasons for flighttaking account of the political and human rights

situation (EU January 1999, p.2).

This would be achieved through a number ofaction plans for countries where migrantsoriginate. On the 25th and 26th January 1999the European Council approved the mandate ofthe HLWG and the countries to be consideredfirst. A final report was to be submitted atTampere in October 1999 (EU, Sept. 1999g). At

Tampere, action plans were submitted andapproved and the group was requested to reportback on progress at the meeting of theEuropean Council in December 2000 (EU, Nov.2000a, p.3).

In the final report of the HLWG, the groupasserts that its remit has demonstrated that it isin the interest of both the citizens of the unionand the citizens of the countries of origin andtransit of asylum seekers and migrants toaddress root causes of migration and flight aswell as consequences (EU, Sept. 1999g, p.5).However, the strategy documents and policydevelopments leading to the emergence of theHLWG do not suggest that the interests of othercountries are seriously considered and in theNice report the problems of imposing the planson the target countries are revealed (see p.23).

Table 1: Countries selected for Action Plans

Target country EU country responsible

Afghanistan NetherlandsAlbania and the

neighbouring regionItaly

Morocco SpainSri Lanka UKSomalia SwedenIraq European Commission

Root causes in the Action Plans

The intended features of the Action Plans wereto be comprehensive, maintained over the longterm and responsive to changes of situation(EU, Sept. 1999g, p.6). There were three areastargeted for examination: foreign policy,development and economic assistance [and]migration and asylum (EU, Sept. 1999g, p.6)and the methods selected were dialogue,cooperation and co-development (EU, Sept.1999g, p.6). This paper will assess criticallyhow far the HLWG has been able to meet itsown objectives as well as answer criticismsestablished by commentators on the root causes

approach in general.

Each Action Plan has a standard structure. Theconditions in each country are assessed in termsof the political situation, the economic situationand the human rights situation. There is astatistical section devoted to the numbers oftheir citizens in EU countries, in other countries,and the numbers of third country nationals


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transiting the country, where relevant. Theexisting actions by the EU in the country orregion are detailed in the areas of politics,economics, development cooperation,humanitarian aid and Justice and Home Affairs(mainly migration issues such as readmission

agreements or visas, and crime-related activity).The existing measures and actions being takenby the EU are detailed and finally other actionsrequired are outlined.

The Action Plan approach is itself deeply flawed.It assumes that the causes of migration areimmutable whereas in fact, the political andeconomic situation in a country will be liable tocontinuous change and the causes of migrationwill change along with these or parallel to them.As soon as the plans were written they began tobe out of date. Comments by the European

Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) on theplans suggested that they not be set in stone(ECRE, Oct. 1999, p.2) but instead used as astarting point for further discussion. As theHLWGs mandate, set at Tampere, limited it toenacting the measures set out in the ActionPlans, the likelihood of success has been limitedfrom the start. Despite acknowledgement ofvarious drawbacks to the Action Plans in thereport on progress to the Council at Nice (EU,Nov. 2000a, p.13-15), the static nature of theplans was not identified. Indeed the suggestionwas made that further action plans for othercountries be drafted.

Political, economic and human rights situationIt is not within the scope of this paper to assessthe comments made on the political, humanrights or economic situations in each of thetargeted countries, but a quick review isprovided for context highlighting areas of debateand concern which reveal flaws in the HLWGsapproach. The Action Plans have beenevaluated and commented on by a number ofinternational organisations and NGOs including

UNHCR, ECRE and Amnesty International. Asidefrom critiques of the measures to beencouraged, ECRE says that the evaluationsections of the plans contain fairly goodassessments and descriptions of the 6 relevantcountries of origin (ECRE, Oct. 1999). Howeverthis statement hides the numerous criticismsthat ECRE does have of the HLWG in the areasof transparency, responsibility for asylum,

regionalisation, information campaigns,readmission and return amongst others (ECRE,July 1999), which cannot be entirely de-linkedfrom concerns about conditions in the countriesof origin.

Amnesty International specifically reviewed theanalysis of the human rights situations in thesecountries. It says that the human rightsassessments in general may be defined asaccurate (Amnesty, 1999a, p.2) but does havesome detailed and specific criticisms relating toindividual countries. In regard to the Iraq plan, Amnesty comments on an imbalance in thereport that leads to the erroneous impressionthat dismal economic prospects (EU, Sept.1999c, p.7) lead to migration from Iraq ratherthan the well-founded fear of politicalpersecution (Amnesty, 1999d, p.2). Similarly,

Amnesty believes the economic situation in Afghanistan is given too much emphasis overthe human rights situation, leading to a viewthat is too optimistic and too limited in itsanalysis of the human rights situation in Afghanistan (Amnesty, 1999b, p.11). Overall itis concerned that the plans are imbalanced and do not provide for a strategy to addresseffectively such human rights abuses (Amnesty,1999a, p.3). These criticisms reinforce theconcern that the root causes approach of theHLWG is biased towards the pursuit of restrictiveand control programmes at the expense ofactivity to improve the situations in countries oforigin.

In addition, the failure to adequately account forthe situations in the countries covered by the Action Plans leads to potentially dangerouspolicies. The emphasis on readmission, returnand reception in the region of origin risksrefoulement in many of these countries. One ofthe main concerns in the Action Plan on Iraq isto make Turkey into a destination for asylumseekers, rather than a transit country for people

moving to Western Europe. However, in theevaluation section of the report, the protectionproblems (EU, Sept. 1999c, p.6) in Turkey arestressed. In the appendix provided by UNHCRthis is confirmed, with a statement that Turkeywould return asylum seekers who had beenreadmitted from other countries (EU, Sept.1999c, Annex III p.4). As a result of theseconcerns, UNHCRs focus is the opposite of the


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HLWG, with an emphasis on resettlement ofrefugees away from Turkey (EU, Sept. 1999c, Annex III p.4). Similarly UNHCR stresses in itsAnnex to the Albanian plan that Albania cannotbe considered a safe third country for asylumseekers and therefore readmission should be

considered carefully to avoid refoulement.

One of the preoccupations of the MoroccanAction Plan is to prevent migrants using Moroccoas a route to reach the European Union. As aresult there are a high number of restrictivepolicies including encouraging Morocco to use arigorous visa policy particularly towardsnationals of West African states (EU, Sept.1999d, p.16) which reinforces the concern that Fortress Europe is being pushed further outand could prevent refugees being able to seekasylum in safety. Internal contradictions in the

Action Plan on Afghanistan also point directly topossible issues with human rights, particularlyrelevant during Taliban rule. Again there is anemphasis here on encouraging reception in theregion, mainly in Pakistan and Iran where most Afghan refugees reside. However, at the sametime as readmission agreements are beingsought with Iran and voluntary returnencouraged (EU, Sept. 1999a, p.25), there isalso a project underway to address the issue offorced repatriation from Iran to Afghanistan (EU,Sept. 1999a, p.22), still relevant while EU statesdo not consider forced returns safe for Afghanasylum seekers. These contradictory policiessuggest that if the EU returns rejected Afghanasylum seekers to Iran it could result inrefoulement.

There are contradictions within the Action plansin terms of development issues as well ashuman rights. The benefits of migration fordevelopment are mentioned in passing, but inreality legal options for migration are so limited(for example seasonal agricultural workers in theUK, students, or skilled workers such as IT

experts in Germany) that this is unlikely to be aviable option in the short to medium term. Infact the emphasis of the Action Plans onrestriction of migration and asylum could have adirectly negative impact on development asindicated within the Albanian plan. In theanalysis of migration the plan states that it iscommonly acknowledged that one person pereach Albanian family is living abroad and

contributes to the family maintenance. Albanianeconomy currently relies heavily on emigratoryremittances (EU, Sept. 1999b, p.12). It alsoacknowledges that this is likely to continue (EU,Sept. 1999b, p.30). Bearing thisacknowledgement in mind it seems counter-

productive to stress the importance ofpreventative measures such as increased visarequirements (p.37), and an emphasis onreturn, readmission (p.39, p.41) and an attemptat deterrence through information campaigns(p.39).

Activities of the HLWGOne of the main concerns with the root causesapproach as encapsulated by the HLWG is thatwhile some of the restrictive and control policiesare focused, actionable and measurable, mostpolicies on the political, economic and

development side are vague, ill-defined andunmeasurable. This confirms the impressiongiven in policy documents that the root causesapproach is in fact only concerned withrestricting migration at any cost rather than withalleviating the situation in countries of origin. Inaddition the very nature of these root causespolicies encourages a restrictive approach in theinterim period. The 1998 strategy paper saysthat the root causes approach is not asubstitute for restrictions on immigration andborder controls (p.20) but the failure to engagewith improving conditions in the countries oforigin means that only the restrictive policieshave any effect.

The approaches outlined in the sections of theAction Plans on foreign policy and developmentassistance are quite wide-ranging, reflecting thedifferent situations in the various countries, withemphasis on diplomatic, economic orhumanitarian efforts depending on the situation.However most of them cannot be described asactions when they are as vague as stimulationof the democratic process for Northern Iraq

(EU, Sept. 1999c, p.16), measures to stimulatethe respect for human rights and minorities inAlbania and the neighbouring region (EU, Sept.1999b, p.35), or consider ways of supportingSomalis in achieving sustainable development ofpeace, stability and economic development,(EU, Sept. 1999e, p.24) amongst many others.By contrast, the prescriptions in the migrationsection of the Action Plans are remarkably


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consistent, despite the differing conditions. The migration section of the Action Plans includevoluntary repatriation, return of failed asylumseekers, measures to tackle illegal immigrationracketeering (EU, Sept. 1999e, p.27 and EU,Sept. 1999f, p.14), increased use of Airline

Liaison Officers, training of officials, especiallywith regard to visas and false documents, andinformation campaigns. There are still some ill-defined policy suggestions such as theintegration into society of citizens of these stateslegally residing in the EU and measures toimprove reception and protection in the ActionPlan countries and those neighbouring them but,as can been seen in the following assessment ofprogress, it is only the restrictive migrationpolicies which have made any progress at all.

The HLWG has made very little progress in

implementing any of the objectives of the ActionPlans. It made a report to the European Councilin Nice where it outlined the reasons for its slowprogress including the difficulties of workingacross the different policy areas whose interestsdo not necessarily coincide (EU, Nov. 2000a, p.14), the difficulty of reconciling the priorities of national administrations (EU, Nov. 2000a,p.14), and the difficulty of trying to divertresources from other departments budgetsrather than having a dedicated budget. Inaddition to these internal difficulties the HLWGhas been the target of criticisms fromcommentators who have expressed concernabout the weight given to restrictive migrationpolicies and from the target countriesthemselves who are understandably concernedto be presented with plans dictating policies thatwill affect their internal, economic and foreignpolicy activities, with very little consultation (EU,Nov. 2000a, p.15). The Nice report suggeststhat these criticisms rest on misunderstandings(EU, Nov. 2000a, p.15) and a sense of a lack ofconsultation, which can be overcome withoutchanging the fundamentals of the HLWG

approach but instead by improvingcommunication.

The presentation of the achievements of theHLWG in 2000 (EU, Nov. 2000b) is as vague andill-defined as its original aims. The measurescarried out are not related directly to the ActionPlans and there is no indication of how successor otherwise could be measured or assessed.

The actions are a combination of administrativeelements such as meetings, spending from non-HLWG budgets such as ECHO (humanitarian)and MEDA (Mediterranean-Europe project) andactions carried out by individual states. Despitethe concerns of the introductory document (EU,

Nov. 2000a) to stress the balance betweenforeign affairs, economic and migration activity,most of the measures and actions are migration-related. In the Morocco section only four out of19 measures are not directly migration-related,in the Afghanistan section only six out of 17 arenot migration issues and in Iraq seven out of 14.

The emphasis of the HLWG on restrictivemigration measures has been exacerbated bythe introduction in 2001 of a budget line (B7-667) dedicated to enacting some of thesemigration-only measures (EU, Sept. 2001). The

justification for this new budget is that althoughthere are Community budget lines for the areasof development and economic assistance no appropriate budgetary allocation (EU, Nov.2000a, p.17) is available for migration issues.This justification does not acknowledge thedifficulty of integrating objectives relating tomigration into development policies (EU, Nov.2000a, p.14), despite the availability of funds,thereby risking further over-emphasis of thecontrol and restriction elements of the HLWGsactivities. In 2002 some efforts have beenmade to overcome this barrier by attempting toinvestigate links between migration anddevelopment. The Spanish presidencyinstigated a questionnaire and report process formember states on the issue (EU, Feb. 2002) butthis has not yet resulted in any meaningfulcontribution from most member states4.

One of the main difficulties for the HLWG inattempting to meet its objectives is thatdevelopment practitioners, departments andNGOs have a different agenda from the HLWG.Their concern is with improving the conditions of

the poorest in developing countries regardless ofthe outcomes for migration. On occasion thisconflict comes out into the open in policydiscussions, for instance in the discussion aboutpunitive aid policies for countries that do noteffectively tackle illegal immigration, which were

4 Interviews, Areti Siani, Head of Policy, ECRE, June 2002and development policy advisor, June 2002.


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aired before the Seville summit in June 2002.The development commissioner (Poul Neilson)was moved to declare that it makes no sense tolink development assistance to a countrysperformance on migration both because of thelimited contribution aid makes to economies and

because these sanctions would harm the poorersections of society (Guardian, 2002). Theseconflicts illustrate how the aims of the HLWG toinsert migration into all aspects of EU externalpolicy are frustrated.

Since the 2000 report to the Council at Nice theHLWG seems to have reduced its publicexposure. Until July 2001 NGOs would meetwith the HLWG twice every six months. Thiswas an informal process and little informationwas exchanged beyond the fact that the HLWGwas progressing5. However, the Belgian

presidency discontinued this process ofconsultation in July 2001 and NGOs have notmet representatives of the HLWG for over ayear. Budgetary activity in Europe is usuallysubject to close scrutiny by the Commission andthe European Parliament but the budget lineallocated to the HLWG is for what is describedas preparatory actions (EU, Sept. 2001). Thismeans that for three years the available budgetis limited (2001 - 10m, 2002 - 12.5m, 2003 15m, estimate) but it provides a mechanismwhich is not subject to the more formalmeasures of rigorous scrutiny6.

This reluctance on the part of the HLWG tosubject itself to public scrutiny has led tocomments about its aura of secretiveness(Nadig, 2001). Recently this has beenexacerbated by considerations of the HLWGmandate. In particular, the problems created bythe Action Plans being obsolete (EU, March2002, p.1) has raised questions of theireffectiveness and rather than develop actionplans for new countries it looks as if the HLWGis likely to enlarge its scope using analysis from

the Commission Country strategy papers (EU,March 2002, p.1). The budget proposals for2002 expand the remit of the HLWG from thosecountries identified by the Council meeting inJanuary 1999 to other areas including Peoples

5 Interview, Dr. Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, AmnestyInternational, July 2002.6 Interview, Lars Lonnback, Immigration and Asylum Unit,Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission, June 2002.

Republic of China, Sub-Saharan Africa, CentralAsia and Northern Africa (EU, March 2002, p.3).It also extends the activities of the HLWG fromthose measures outlined in the Action Plans toother measures including pre-frontiermeasures. The remit of the HLWG is due to be

formally debated by the General Council meetingin December 20027, but in the meantime itappears that the remit is being broadened on anad hoc basis.

Measuring the HLWG against its own aimsThe above review of the HLWGs emergence andactivities, have revealed a number of flaws inhow it aims to achieve its goals. Structurally thedrawbacks are that it was created before the Amsterdam treaty came into force so itsstructure does not benefit from the first pillarinstitutions and it is not adequately scrutinised.

It is driven by presidency initiatives, whichchange every six months and give it a short-term outlook. It is inadequately integrated withareas outside the Justice and Home Affairs pillar,which it aims to influence, and it has a verylimited field of engagement with externalorganisations. No development agencies havebeen involved in its deliberations; only migrationbodies and refugee organisations have beenconsulted. The Action Plan concept is flawedand the drafting of Action Plans with noparticipation from the target countries hascaused problems of acceptance but also in termsof the content and emphasis of the reports (EU,Nov. 2000a, p.15).

The aims of the HLWG action plans were thatthey were: comprehensive, maintained over thelong term and responsive to changes ofsituation (EU, Sept. 1999g, p.6), but we haveseen how in fact they are limited in scope, havenot been updated and have not been adapted tochanges in circumstance. Of the three areastargeted for examination: foreign policy,development and economic assistance [and]

migration and asylum (EU, Sept. 1999g, p.6),emphasis has been firmly on migrationmeasures to the extent of budgeting separatelyfor these measures. Achievements in the otherareas have been limited to recording activitiesby other organisations or by member states.

7Interview, Lars Lonnback, Immigration and Asylum Unit,Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission, June 2002.


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The ambition for dialogue, cooperation and co-development (EU, Sept. 1999g, p.6) can also beseen to be over ambitious. The countriestargeted by the HLWG have been presentedwith a fait accomplisand there has been a lackof consultation (EU, Nov. 2000a, p.15).

Countries targeted for action have beenthreatened with sanctions should they fail tocomply. In discussions with Turkey (regardingthe Iraq action plan), a report from the Spanishpresidency states that Turkey had to bereminded of its candidate-country statusparticularly with regard to potential funds andcredits (EU, Feb. 2002, p.4) which denies theHLWG claims to cooperation and co-development. The HLWG has failed even thelimited aims it set itself. As a tool of the rootcauses approach it also lays itself open tocriticisms in more general terms.

The HLWG and criticisms of root causesThe mainstream criticisms of the root causesapproach were outlined above (pp.10-14) andinclude the lack of political will to tackle the rootcauses issues, structural criticism of theinternalist stance of the approach and empiricalcriticisms of the content of the approach. Here,the HLWG is measured against these criticisms.

There are two strong indicators that the HLWGsfailings are at least partly related to issues ofpolitical will. Firstly the migration agenda of theHLWG undermines any attempt to make lastingchanges to the conditions in countries of originas we have seen from the action plans shift offocus. Related to this, the agenda of the HLWGdoes not accord with that of other EUdepartments, particularly the developmentDirectorate and as a result there is a clash ofpolitical will which, so far, the HLWG has notresolved and is unlikely to, due to the existenceof national agendas for development. Theforeign affairs element of the HLWG is more

likely to include migration considerations in itsdealings with other countries (for examplereadmission agreements) but the major changesthat have happened in Kosovo or Afghanistansince late 1998 have not been driven by theHLWG and, although there is a migrationelement in each of these interventions they havebeen prompted by very specific circumstances.By comparison the Sri Lankan government

refused all international intervention in itsinternal conflict for years (EU, Sept. 1999f, p.7)and the EU did not have the will to intervenebeyond diplomatic manoeuvres.

Internalist criticisms can certainly be, and have

been, levelled at the HLWG. The examplesabove of the lack of consultation with the actionplan countries are an obvious starting point. Inaddition, criticisms of the emphasis on regionalsolutions for asylum problems also point to aninternalist approach. Most damningly ECREpoints out that despite the emphasis onensuring that countries in the regions of originor transit countries can provide support for anasylum system and protection for refugees thereis no reference to the responsibility of EUcountries to provide asylum for refugees (ECRE,Oct. 1999, p.2). The issue of free trade as

encapsulated by Belguendouz8 and alsodiscussed by Myers (1996, p.18) is at the heartof the root causes dichotomy for the EU.Economic development issues are highlighted asone of the priorities for tackling root causes, butthe limited market for goods from some of theaction plan countries (Myers, 1996, p.19) beliesany semblance of good intentions.

The empirical criticisms of the root causesapproach also coincide with some of the failingsof the HLWG. Where the root causes approachis unable to agree on what the root causes ofmigration are, the HLWG has bypassed thisdiscussion. There are assumptions about theroot causes that the HLWG should tackle, only inthe broadest of terms. The HLWGs mandaterefers to the requirement of the Action Plans toprovide an analysis of the causes of the influx(EU, Jan. 1999b, p.4), but the Action Plansthemselves deal with this aspect of theirmandate in cursory terms. An average of onepage is dedicated to Analysis of the causes ofmigration and flight (EU, Sept. 1999d, p.7)despite the fact that they acknowledge that

these issues are complex. As we have seenabove (pp.21-22) other commentators areconcerned that the analysis of causes within the Action Plans is too heavily weighted towardseconomic factors, but how far the numerous

8Abdelkrim Belguendouz, , University of Rabat, atFrontires et zones dattente, une libert de circulation souscontrle, Palais du Luxembourg, 19 -20 October 2001,

ANAFE, p.14


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factors implicated in such a complex causalrelationship can be unpicked is debateable, asthe criticisms of the empirical content of theroots causes approach has shown. It is certainthat the limited attention paid to these issues bythe Action Plans cannot hope to accurately

represent the causes of migration in suchdiverse countries.

This analysis of the HLWG shows that the EUsroot causes policy has so far failed to engagewith root causes either on its own terms or onthe terms of those commentators who havecriticised the root causes approach in general.The failure of the HLWG to enact its policies orto engage with a wide range of actors whocould help it in its aims can be ascribed tofailures of the underlying approach. In the lastsection of the paper I will examine the

conceptual failings of the root causes approachwhich suggest that policy measures such asthose of the HLWG will never be able to achievetheir stated aims.


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3. Is there a way forward for theroot causes approach?

This final section of the paper will show how afailure to incorporate a theoretical

understanding of migration processes has led tothe difficulties of the root causes approach. Itwill also consider whether, if these flaws wereaddressed there would be a way in whichaddressing root causes could be used to makemigration issues more of a choice and less of anecessity for those in developing countries.Could root causes become more in tune withother policy aims such as those of developmentorganisations? Bearing in mind the requirementof states to control immigration, is there a wayin which the root causes approach could use a

better understanding of migration to informimmigration issues? These issues will beconsidered by addressing the conceptual basisfor root causes, some more useful concepts thatcould be integrated into root causes and finallyhow migration itself could be used to improvethe root causes approach.

The sedentarist biasPolicy and writing on the root causes approachis dominated by a sedentarist bias (Malkki,1995, p.509). This assumes that in their idealstates populations are sedentary, they do not

move except as a result of economic, ecologicalor political upheaval. Associations are madebetween functioning and moral (Skeldon,p.142, 1990) societies, which are sedentary, anddysfunctional and problematic societies, whichare associated with people moving, particularlytowards cities. Malkki elucidates this idea in apaper on return in which she describes adiscourse which sees something dysfunctionalabout refugees being out of their country oforigin. Conceptually this discourse sees statesas separated into culture gardens (Malkki,1992, p.28) where people are naturally

supposed to be. When people are displacedthey are out of place or uprooted (Malkki,1992, p.25) and have to be put back in theirright place to ensure moral and spiritual as wellas political, security (Malkki, 1992, p.30 & p.32).Bissell & Natsios in their paper on Development Assistance and International Migration (2001)reveal a similar set of assumptions about

migration in general which is typical of the rootcauses approach.

Bissell & Natsios (2001) position themselves astaking a critical stance towards the root causesapproach. They are keen to unpick the

complexities of migration and the intricate linksbetween migration and development,particularly development aid, but taking a lookat the attitudes they endorse and theirterminology reveals an underlying sedentaristbias, which undermines their critical position.Bissell & Natsios voice the sedentaristassumption that people would prefer to stay intheir ancestral homes, and that they emigratedue to intolerable conditions of one kind oranother (2001, p.311). They go on to contestthis but only in terms of the multiple reasonswhy people do move. The paper does not

engage with the assumption implicit in ancestralhomes that the natural existence for people isto stay at home and it does not acknowledgethe ineluctable history of movement. In linewith Malkkis reasoning, Bissell & Natsios alsouse the language of pathology to indicate theirbias arguing that the movement of people tocities is a symptom (2001, p.311) and theiropening paragraph outlines that they areengaging with the search for remedies. Theyadvocate development programmes to helppeople maintain their roots in their own cultures(2001, p.318). In contrast, De Haan quotesMoch to show that migration itself can constitute part of the social glue of subcultures (1999,p.8.)

Present even within the work of those whowould engage with the complexities of rootcauses, these assumptions are explicit in policyinformed by the root causes approach and thisdiscourse leads to certain inevitable outcomes.Many development policies target sedentarypopulations or may even have sedentarism astheir goal (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002, p.29

and see De Haans review of the approcheterroir, 1999, p.3) while Malkki points out thatthis discourse validates certain mechanisms ofcontrol such as refugee camps (1995, p.512).In addition this assumption validates andunderpins the preventative measuresencapsulated in the root causes approach sothat if movement itself is disruptive anddamaging to societies, it must be repressed.


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This is encapsulated within the root causesapproach and demonstrated by Romano Prodi,President of the European Commission, callingon third countries to work with the EU toaddress the root causes of destabilisingmigration (Prodi, 2002, my emphasis).

Misunderstanding migrationConcern with the rightness of stability androotedness goes hand in hand with a limitedunderstanding of movement and migration anda failure to conceptualise the root causesapproach adequately. It allows the idea that allmovement should and could be stopped to enterinto the underlying concerns of the root causesapproach. The obvious impossibility of thisimplicit aim undermines the whole approach andblinds practitioners and commentators to somepossibly useful ways forward. There are a

number of inaccuracies concealed within thisaspect of the sedentarist concern. Theseinclude a failure to see migration in its historicalcontext, a failure to conceive of the two-wayprocess that is migration and a failure tounderstand the complexities, variety ofexperiences and multiple cause and effect ofdifferent contexts within which migrationhappens. In the context of this paper we areconcerned with how these assumptions andmisunderstandings contribute to the failings ofthe root causes approach as it stands. Theseconcerns are now examined and put intocontext.

The first erroneous assumption of thesedentarist bias is that populations were oncesettled and did not participate in migration.This is referred to as the myth of the immobilepeasant (Skeldon, 1997a, p.7) which assumesthat both pre-industrialisation Europeans andpresent day rural inhabitants of developingcountries are not essentially mobile except inreaction to crisis. Skeldon highlights examplesto refute this (1990, pp36-40, and 1997a, pp.7-

8) and De Haan also illustrates the history ofmigration in Africa and Asia since before colonialtimes (1999, p.7-8). He also points out thatthere is evidence that population movementshould be seen as the norm, rather than theexception (1999, p.7) whether in Europe, pre-colonial developing countries or present daydeveloping countries. Despite the assumption ofroot causes proponents (and others) migration

is not a crisis situation but a normal part oflivelihood strategies. As Nyberg-Sorensen et al.conclude, evidence suggests that populationmobility often is a central element in thelivelihoods of many households in LDCs [LessDeveloped Countries] (2002, p.28).

The second misunderstanding in the root causesconception of migration is that migration is asevering of links with a certain place. Bissell &Natsios refer to a migrants exit (2001, p.311)as if they are then removed from their place oforigin entirely. This belief exacerbates thesense of migration as a bad thing, in thisinstance for both the regions of origin anddestination. Regions of origin lose productivemembers of society and those trying to combatinternational migration in destination regionsface difficulties because the severing of ties with

a mythical moral and sedentary society makespeople rootless and likely to seek furthermigration abroad. Loescher citesPapademetriou who argues that developmentweakens the individuals attachment to histraditional way of life. This results in a move toa capital city where unable to find steady work the internal migrant becomes a primecandidate for entering the internationalmigratory flow (Loescher, 1993, p.231). Someinternal migrants might take this route but themajority do not. In reality most migrants do notsever links, they do not leave in order to start anew life elsewhere, but rather to better the onethey already have back home (Nyberg-Sorensenet al. 2002, p.25).

Migration is not a one-time and one-way event.Rather, it is more complex, and can be morefruitfully understood as the circulation of people,money and information between two or moreplaces. Migrants themselves do not sever linkswith one place but have simultaneousengagement in countries [or places] of originand destination (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002,

p.18). Transnational communities and socialnetworks maintain these links particularly to andbetween rural areas, towns and cities andbetween countries where there are fewerbarriers to movement. The links between placesof origin and destination are not fullyappreciated by the root causes approach eitherin social or economic terms. In particular, theroot causes interest in economic motivations


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and causes means that the issue of remittancesis discussed but as we have seen in the issue ofthe Albanian Action Plan (above, p.23), notresolved.

Finally, the sedentarist bias, as expressed in the

root causes approach, does not acknowledgemultiple actors, multiple migration experiencesand the multiple outcomes of these experiences.Instead migration is aggregated into a reactionto an economic, political or ecological crisis withcertain social, economic and political outcomes.This is expressed in the EU Strategy documenton Immigration and Asylum which refers to atide of illegal immigration (EU, July 1998, p.32)offering no differentiation between types ofmigrants, origins or circumstances, as doesProdis comment on destabilising migrationcited above. These assumptions lead to an

expectation that the outcomes of migration arelikely to be negative for countries of destination,and negative for the places of origin.

Migration and developmentThe complexity of these variables is particularlyrelevant when looking at the relationshipbetween migration and development which, aswe have seen (above p.8), is at the heart ofmuch of the root causes debate. De Haanreviews the conflicting opinions on therelationship between migration and developmentin four key areas: how development affectsmigration in areas of origin and destination, andhow migration affects development in areas oforigin and destination. He concludes that thereis little consensus in the literature (1999, p.22),a view echoed by Skeldon who says thatwhether migration is seen as positive ornegative for development will depend verymuch on the context (1997a, p.195), andNyberg-Sorensen et al. who believe currentthinking is still tentative and available evidencesketchy (2002, p.40). The number of variablesincluding differences in time, economics, issues

of equity and distribution, gender relations,distances and the functioning of social networksbetween places make it difficult to drawconclusions across regions, different people andtimes.

Despite the complex relationships betweenmigration and development it is important todraw out some generalisations in order to

consider a useful way forward for the rootcauses approach. There is an understandingthat policies that accept the wider mobility ofthe population are likely to accord with policiesthat will enhance the well-being of greaternumbers of people (Skeldon, 1997b, p.3 &

p.15). However this is tempered by a number ofother observations about the relationshipbetween migration and development. One isthat migration policies have different impacts onthe poor and the better off, whilst another isthat the effect of migration is likely to be consistent with populations social and culturalvalues and embedded in social relations (DeHaan, 1999, p.15). This can result in migrationincreasing inequality, because of the differentopportunities available to different people (DeHaan, 1999, p.27 & Nyberg-Sorensen et al.,2002, p.26).

There is some debate about whether it isgenerally the poor who move (De Haan, 1999,p.26-7). While there are empirical studies thatshow the poorest do move (De Haan, 1999,p.27), the weight of evidence seems to suggestotherwise. Skeldon claims that all the evidencesuggests that it is not the poorest who moveand suggests that there is a level of povertybelow which migration is not possible (1997b,p.5). Above this level, the poor who do movewill move less far and less frequently than thewealthier migrants (Skeldon 1997b, p.7). Thereis some evidence that despite potentialinequalities the economic benefits of migrationcan be greater for the poor than the better off(De Haan, 1999, p.24) and in accordance withthat policies that reduce migration [will] hurtthe poor more than the rich (Nyberg-Sorensenet al. 2002, p.20). Therefore reducing migrationcan conflict with poverty related developmentaims (such as the International DevelopmentTarget to reduce by half the proportion ofpeople living in extreme poverty by 2015).

One of the ways in which policies to reducemigration will hurt the poor more than the rich isby increasing barriers which are costly toovercome, whether it be the cost of bribingofficials in China (De Haan p.30) or payingagents to facilitate travel across borders. Theroot causes approach, and the HLWG inparticular, do not acknowledge this relationship.The Action Plan for Sri Lanka is a case in point.


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The Action Plan acknowledges that barriers toflight prevent the poorest from leaving (EU,Sept. 1999f, p.7) but at the same time actionpoints within the Development and EconomicCooperation sections focus on targeting thepoorest, a trend confirmed by the Nice report

(EU, Nov. 2000b) which details actions beingtaken to enact the Action Plans. This conflictswith the HLWGs aim to reduce migration to theEU and is likely to be the effect of developmentpriorities having a higher profile in the SriLankan Action Plan drafted by the UK and whichincorporated input from DFID (The Departmentfor International Development).

The above issues identify where the root causesapproach fails to incorporate an adequateunderstanding of migration issues but they alsopoint to areas where migration theory could

inform a more useful version of the root causesapproach. Looking at the issues raised by rootcauses proponents abhorrence of rural to urbanmigration will elucidate how this could happenand what might be a more effective way forwardfor the root causes approach, embracing a moreholistic understanding of migration issues.

The role of urban migration in improving theroot causes approachThe sedentarist bias of the root causes approachreveals itself in concerns, not exclusively withinternational migration, but with internalmigration as well. Bissell & Natsios reveal thattheir concern is not only with internationalmigration but with all movement, citing urbanization as a symptom of the destructionof a stable, integrated social and economicsystem (2001, p.311). This anxiety aboutmovement to the cities is characteristic of thesedentarist bias. In Papademetrious assertion,quoted earlier, that development and migrationweaken attachment to traditional ways of life,there is no engagement with the questionsraised by the reference to a traditional way of

life, especially those concerned with the role ofmigration within a traditional society.

Papademetrious stance is typical of those whosee movement as severing previouslyinseparable ties. The EU strategy document of1998 also identifies rural-urban migration as adestructive and destablilising force leadinginexorably to unemployment causing internal

migrants to drift into international migration(EU, Sept. 1998 p.8). Governments also oftensee rural to urban migration as a threat tostability (De Haan, 1999, p.4 and Harris, 1991,p.55) as the traditional view of rural-urbanmigration is of a flood of migrants destabilising

the political, social and economic equilibrium ofthe city (Skeldon, 1990, p.152 and see Kaplan,1994). Governments often want to slowmigration to the cities or stop it altogether butthese policies have not been successful (Harris,1991, p.58; De Haan, 1999, p.4; Skeldon,1997b, p.14 & Sommers 2000, p.1).

Despite the fact that most movement is betweenrural areas (De Haan, 1999, p.5; Skeldon 1997a,p.8) this type of migration is not of concern toroot causes commentators in the same way asrural-urban migration. To some extent this

could be because of the concerns and interestsof governments who see rural-urban migrants asimposing a cost on the settled population and asnot politically useful (Lipton in De Haan, 1999,p.33). In addition it preserves the link to theland, which sedentarist commentators see asvital for social cohesion.

There has been a great deal of debate about therole of cities as centres of development andduring the 1970s and 1980s an anti-city or pro-rural view of development emerged. This waspremised on a range of ideas including the factthat the poor are found disproportionately inrural areas (Skeldon, 1997a, p.165), a morenuanced understanding of development andhow it affects different groups of people,criticisms of the trickle-down theory ofdevelopment (Potter, 1995, p.16) and adifferentiated view of development based on amore bottom-up model of development(Gardner & Lewis, 1996, p.22) and focussed onbasic needs (Gardner & Lewis, 1996, p.7). Thishad emerged to some extent as a reaction towhat was seen as urban-bias in development

policy (Lipton, 1977, passim) unjustified becauseof the failure of trickle down policies, the rate ofpoverty in rural areas and caused by theinternational, political and administrativeinfluence of cities.

Commentators on rural-urban migration tend totake a more inclusive view of the relationsbetween rural and urban populations. Skeldon


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believes that the transfer of population fromrural to urban areas seems to be an integral partof any process of development not one poorcountry is highly urbanised (Skeldon 1997a, p.2) although there is nothing inevitable abouturbanisation in all parts of the world (Skeldon

1997a, p.197) it does appear inevitable in thoseareas where rapid development is occurring. Inaddition it is impossible to consider rural andurban environments separately as there iscontinual interaction between urban and ruraland any attempt to delimit them into separatesectors will be artificial (Skeldon, 1997a, p.54).Theories of circulation and networks stress thelinks between places of origin and destination or simultaneous engagement in [places] of originand destination (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002,p.18) including flows of remittances, informationand which may or may not include return. This

can also be true of urban refugees as well asother types of migrants. Refugees sometimesembody all the fears of migration in terms ofexacerbating urban poverty and presentingsecurity risks (Sommers, 2000, p.2-3) but theytend to reflect other patterns of movementwithin the country, and for some parts of theworld that is seen as a movement towardsurban areas (Sommers, 2000, p.4). However,refugees and other migrants alike continue tosend remittances to their country of origin(Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002, p.26). Forexample, Bissell & Natsios outline the seasonalmovements of refugees from Cambodian andLib

gent 2002 the root causes of migration

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