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The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

The George C. Marshall Center, a leading transatlantic defense educational andsecurity studies institution, bilaterally supported by the US and Germangovernments, is dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment byadvancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active,peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations ofNorth America, Europe, and Eurasia.

The Marshall Center Papers

The Marshall Center Papers seek to further the legacy of the Center’s namesake,General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly monographs that contributeto his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are democratic, free, undivided, andat peace in the 21st century. Papers selected for this series are meant to identify,discuss, and influence significant defense–related security issues. The MarshallCenter Papers’ focus is on comparative and interdisciplinary topics to includeinternational security and democratic defense management, civil military relations,strategy formulation, defense planning, arms control, peacekeeping, crisismanagement, and cooperative security. The Marshall Center Papers are authored byMarshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, invitedcontributors.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center forSecurity Studies, the United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry ofDefense, or the United States and German Governments. This report is approved forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

We invite comments and ask that you address them to:

International Address: US Address:Director DirectorGeorge C. Marshall Center George C. Marshall Center ECMC-CL-O-MCP ECMC-CL-O-MCPGernackerstrasse 2 Unit 2450282467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen APO AE 09053Deutschland

Address Changes and Requests for Copies of Marshall Center Papers: Please writeto the above address, or TEL 49-(0)8821-750310, FAX 49-(0)8821-750688, or viathe internet at [email protected].

ISBN 1-930831-04-8

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Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International OrderBy Richard Cohen

and Michael Mihalka

Mr. Richard Cohen is the Director of the Senior Executive Seminarand a professor of NATO and European Security Studies at theGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Dr. Michael Mihalka is a professor of Eastern Europe Studies at theGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

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Foreword

No single trend, over the past decade, deserves more careful analysis than theremarkable growth of cooperation among the countries of Eurasia and NorthAmerica. Many new international organizations have been born, and a few of theold ones have been successfully transformed. NATO Secretary General Robertsonremarked on September 28, 2000, in Tbilisi, that NATO has changed fundamentally— indeed, “beyond recognition” — as shown by its cooperation with non–membercountries. So much has happened so quickly that we need new theories to explainthe recent past, let alone to shape the opportunities, challenges, and threats of theera that lies ahead.

It is for that reason that the Marshall Center takes such pride in publishing thisedition of the Marshall Center Papers. Here we present two different approaches tothe topic of Cooperative Security. Both are controversial. They take exception totraditional thinking, in many respects, and they do not entirely agree with eachother.

Richard Cohen presents a compelling and highly original model of CooperativeSecurity — a term that once was applied almost exclusively to the Organization forSecurity and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE). Cohen advocates concrete steps fortranslating this idealistic but vague concept into reality, contending that NATO hasbecome the world’s best example of a Cooperative Security organization. He arguesthat NATO remains a Collective Defense system, to the extent that it focuses onexternal threats, but only in part. In addition, NATO has acted as a CollectiveSecurity organization — restoring international stability first inBosnia–Herzegovina and then in Kosovo — on behalf of the United Nations, whenpossible, but without United Nations approval, when necessary. Cohen explores allof these diverse functions, presenting his own, normative vision of how NATOshould develop in the future, as a Cooperative Security institution, and urging closercontact between NATO, the European Union, and Russia. Cohen notes, however,that “the breadth of . . . Cooperative Security is probably limited” by a lack of “corevalues and . . . common geo-strategic interests.”

Michael Mihalka both broadens the analysis of Cooperative Security anddeepens its theoretical underpinnings. He traces the history of Cooperative Securityorganizations, arguing that they date from the early 19th century and extending theconcept beyond the Northern Hemisphere to include the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN).

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Mihalka points out that many members of OSCE and ASEAN arequasi–authoritarian or transitional democracies, and not consolidated liberaldemocracies. Even states that do not share common values can still cooperate, butonly if their ruling elites have confidence in their common future and believe thatworking together is better than proceeding alone. However, Mihalka warns thatnon-democratic countries are limited in their ability to pursue cooperation. Theymay succeed in averting war with each other — as in the case of ASEAN — butthey are unlikely to develop a common position on regional threats to stability. ThusMihalka argues that the future success of Cooperative Security depends not only onspreading liberal democracy, but also on intensifying economic ties with the non-democratic countries and fostering their sense of a “security community” thatserves the interests of all its members. Mihalka, in contrast to Cohen, concludes that“Even among states that lack common values, cooperative security is possible.”

These two, contrasting essays raise many questions about the future of the newlyindependent countries and the new democracies. Are they entering a new era, inwhich one state’s gain is not necessarily another state’s loss? What is the connectionbetween their rhetorical support for Cooperative Security abroad and their actualprogress toward liberal democracy at home? How much importance should theyassign to projecting stability beyond their borders? Can they pursue cooperation asopposed to confrontation, reassurance instead of deterrence, and mutual benefit inplace of unilateral advantage? What concrete steps should they take to benefit fromthe experience of previous centuries and other regions?

Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka have performed a major service bypresenting their views in this single volume. Their disagreements testify to thecomplexity and the importance of the issues that they raise.

Robert Kennedy, PhDDirectorGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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Cooperative Security

From Individual Security to International Stability by Richard Cohen p. 1

From Theory to Practiceby Michael Mihalka p. 29

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— Richard Cohen is the Director of the Senior Executive Seminarand a professor of NATO and European Security Studies at theGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Prior tohis position at the Marshall Center, he was a British Army Officerwho served as Chief of the Military Cooperation Branch and wasthe founder and Chairman of the Military Cooperation WorkingGroup at NATO Headquarters, Brussels. His Army career includeda wide variety of command and operational staff appointments inCanada, Germany, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong, Borneo, theFalkland Islands, Zimbabwe, and the United States.

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Cooperative Security: From IndividualSecurity to International Stability

by Richard Cohen

Executive Summary

The term Cooperative Security has become a popularcatch–phrase since the end of the Cold War. It has beengenerally used to describe a more peaceful, but rather idealistic,approach to security through increased international harmonyand cooperation. This paper presents a more pragmatic andconcrete model of Cooperative Security. The CooperativeSecurity model proposed is based on established institutionsand on two well–recognized forms of international security. Tothese two concepts of security it adds two new dimensions.

The Cooperative Security model advanced here embracesfour concentric and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”:Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense,and Promoting Stability. Of these four rings, CollectiveSecurity — a political and legal obligation of member states todefend the integrity of individual states within a group oftreaty signatories — and Collective Defense — thecommitment of all states to defend each other from outsideaggression — are well–known and generally well–understood.The new elements of this Cooperative Security model are acommon commitment to Individual Security and to PromotingStability.

This paper argues that although many international securityorganizations, including the League of Nations, the UnitedNations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co–operationin Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), and the Warsaw Pact, were founded on the basis ofeither Collective Security or Collective Defense, only NATOcan claim to effectively operate in all four rings of thisCooperative Security model.

Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

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Richard Cohen

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The idea that true security must be based, first and foremost,on the security of the individual human being has gainedwidespread popularity in recent years. Individual Security issynonymous with Human Security and Human Rights. Thepaper argues that Individual Security must form the core orfirst, inner ring, of any long–lasting and robust cooperativeinternational security arrangement. For this reason, membersof a Cooperative Security system must share basic liberaldemocratic values.

The Cooperative Security system must also be proactive. Itsmembers must be prepared to engage in collective diplomatic,economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outsidetheir common space which may threaten their welfare andstability. This is the fourth and outer ring of CooperativeSecurity, Promoting Stability. Non–member states that exist“within” this fourth ring will also benefit from increasedsecurity and from cooperation with states inside the system,and indeed they may aspire to become part of its coremembership.

The paper argues that with its new interest in defense andsecurity, the European Union (EU) is moving towardbecoming a de facto Cooperative Security organization.Together with NATO, it actively seeks to bring stability andprosperity to the area around it. At the same time, like NATO,it works closely with and holds out the prospect ofmembership to countries not already part of the Union. As theEU and NATO move closer together in the defense andsecurity field and as both organizations enlarge, theCooperative Security space will widen and deepen. Theultimate goal, in the longer term, is that all the countries of theOSCE, including Russia, are brought into a largerEurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security organization thatcould bring harmony and stability to much of the northern halfof our planet. �

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Cooperative Security: From IndividualSecurity to International Stability

. . . to see established a peace which will afford allnations the means of dwelling in safety within theirown boundaries, and which will afford assurance thatall the men in all the lands may live out their lives infreedom from fear and want.1

– The Atlantic Charter

What is Cooperative Security?

The term Cooperative Security has become popular sincethe end of the Cold War. Although it does not yet have agenerally accepted definition, it has been widely used to heralda new approach to international relations. It appeared to offeran escape from narrow Cold War “zero–sum” strategies intothe broad sunlit vistas of international peace and harmony.However, as is often the case in life, events have demonstratedthat this early burst of optimism was, at best, premature.

This paper proposes a model of Cooperative Security thatencompasses the traditional international securityarrangements of Collective Security and Collective Defenseand adds two new elements, Individual Security andPromoting and Projecting Stability.

Rebirth of a Concept

The concept of Cooperative Security is not a post–Cold Warinvention. Indeed, Immanuel Kant introduced the idea in the


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Richard Cohen

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late 18th century in his “Second Definite Article of PerpetualPeace.” Kant proclaimed that “The law of nations shall befounded on a federation of free states.”2 Today, at the start ofthe 21st century, the term Cooperative Security has becomemuch more fashionable as strategists and policy–makersstruggle to frame a new approach to security for a turbulentpresent and an unpredictable future.

In the early 1990s, many strategic thinkers were caught upin a tide of optimism generally hailed as the New World Order.The term Cooperative Security became a catch phrase for arather idealistic approach to the swiftly changing internationalclimate. In 1992, three leading American strategists — AshtonCarter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner — spoke ofCooperative Security in terms of providing new avenuestoward world peace: “Organizing principles like deterrence,nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations ofthe cold war . . . Cooperative Security is the correspondingprinciple for international security in the post–cold war era.”3

In 1994, writing in Foreign Policy, former Australian ForeignMinister Gareth Evans described Cooperative Security astending “. . . to connote consultation rather than confrontation,reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather thansecrecy, prevention rather than correction, andinterdependence rather than unilateralism.”4

These attempts to define and shape the concept ofCooperative Security generally reflect a liberal/idealistic viewof the future of world security. Unfortunately, this vision hasbeen rudely jolted by an unwelcome “return of history” in theBalkans, in parts of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.



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It seems to me that a more pragmatic approach toCooperative Security is necessary if the concept is to be of realuse in an unstable and dangerous world. In other words, wemust seek a way of “operationalizing” the term. To achievethis we must narrow ourexpectations of what CooperativeSecurity can achieve. We need tobuild a system based uponmechanisms and institutionsalready in place, i.e., institutionsthat have proven themselveseffective in providing relativepeace, stability, and prosperity tonations and groups of nations in the last half of the 20thcentury.

But before we look at how to construct a realistic andeffective approach to Cooperative Security, it might be helpfulto briefly examine two of the other major security conceptsthat came into prominence in the 20th century.

Collective Security and Collective Defense

Though the concept of cooperation and alliances betweenfamilies, tribes, and states, in peace, but more generally in war,has been a common feature of the history of mankind, theterms Collective Security and Collective Defense areinventions of the last century. Both concepts imply along–term, formal commitment between groups of states toprotect the security interests of individual members withintheir common spheres.

A pragmaticapproach toCooperativeSecurity isnecessary in anunstable anddangerous world


Richard Cohen

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Collective Security. Collective Security looks inward toattempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states.The first modern Collective Security organization was theLeague of Nations founded in the aftermath of World War I.Its members pledged to protect each other from attack by othernations within that organization. The idea was simple: an actof aggression by one or more members against another wouldbe opposed, if necessary by force, by the other member statesof the League. For a variety of reasons, the League of Nationswas ultimately not successful in achieving security andstability. This was almost certainly due in large part to whatMarshall Center Professor Michael Mihalka has called the“…fundamental incompatibility of liberal democracy, fascismand communism…”5 that co–existed within its membership.

At the end of World War II, the newly formed UnitedNations (UN) took up the mantle of Collective Security fromthe League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charterprovide for action by member states to preserve and restoreinternational peace and security.6 In the 1970s, the Conferenceon Co–operation and Security in Europe (CSCE), now theOrganization for Co–operation and Security in Europe(OSCE), was formed to provide Collective Security tovirtually all of the states of the Eurasian–Atlantic region. Atbest, however, both of these organizations have been onlypartially effective.

Collective Defense. A Collective Defense organizationlooks outward to defend its members from external aggression.Collective Defense organizations blossomed during the daysof the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization



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(NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the CentralTreaty Organization (CENTO), the South East Asia TreatyOrganization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Pact were founded inthe aftermath of World War II. Collective Defense commits allnations, bound by treaty, to come to each other’s defense in theevent any member is threatened by, or is actually subjected to,military attack by a state or states outside the treaty area. TheBrussels Treaty of 1948, the founding document of theWestern Union (now the WEU), and the Washington Treaty of1949, NATO’s founding document, both contain theseprovisions as their central theme.

Cooperative Security: Two New Elements

To be both useful and effective, Cooperative Security mustlook both ways, inward and outward. But, it also mustincorporate two further dimensions not covered explicitly byeither Collective Security or Collective Defense. The first ofthese is the concept of Individual Security and the second is theActive Promotion and Projection of Stability into areasadjacent to the Cooperative Security space where instabilityand conflict might adversely affect the security of its members.

Individual Security. Individual Security, or what formerCanadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, has popularizedas “Human Security”7 stands at the center of any realinternational security system built around liberal democraticideals. The furtherance and protection of the basic freedoms ofthe individual is the nucleus from which all other forms ofsecurity must radiate. Dr. Bill McSweeney, in his investigationof the meaning of security, makes the telling point that


Richard Cohen

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“Contrary to the orthodox view ofsecurity studies, security must makesense at the basic level of theindividual human being for it tomake sense at the internationallevel.”8

In an age of growinginterconnectivity between states and

peoples, concern about the human condition within a state hasbecome the direct and immediate interest of the worldcommunity. Violations of human rights in one state becomevery quickly known to the citizens of other states. Damage tothe security of individuals in one country, by external or moreoften by internal forces, now means that other peoples andtheir governments feel that their own security is diminished.

Recent gross violations of the individual security of largenumbers of human beings in such widely flung countries asRwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor have had a dramatic impacton the international community. These examples and othersare clear illustrations of what we might call the “globalizationof concern.” Individual Security is now at the heart of theinternational agenda. The Westphalian concept of the absoluteright of states to act as they see fit within their own territoriesis no longer accepted by liberal democratic states nor,increasingly, by nations within international organizationssuch as the United Nations. The concept of state sovereigntycannot be a screen behind which mass violations of humansecurity can take place with impunity, even within otherwiserecognized international boundaries.

Damage to thesecurity of

individuals in onecountry now means

that othercountries may findtheir own security

diminished



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Promoting Stability. The secondnew component of CooperativeSecurity is the active promotion ofstability outside the boundaries ofthe states forming the CooperativeSecurity system. Instability in areasadjacent to the territory of theCooperative Security system, orfurther afield, that might threaten the security of its members,will become a matter of serious concern. Stability may beupset by the danger of conflict between states, but also bymass violations of individual security within neighboringstates, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in 1998 andearly 1999. This provoked a strong reaction from NATO andothers. How stability can be developed, restored, andpreserved in the world around them should remain the activeconcern of the states within the Cooperative Security system.

Here we must sound a word of caution. Promoting Stabilitycould be seen as a license for unwarranted intervention bylarger powers or international organizations in the legitimateinternal affairs of other, mainly smaller states. Activeintervention — diplomatic, economic, or military — must,therefore, be very carefully sanctioned and monitored. I willsay more about this below.

The following model, Figure 1 — Cooperative Security:The Four Rings, is built on a series of widening concentriccircles, or rings. It attempts to bring together the four elementsof Cooperative Security in a practical framework to form a realand effective security system:

The states withinthe CooperativeSecurity systemwill remain activelyconcerned with thestability of theworld around them


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Figure 1

Cooperative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleusof liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal orinformal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values andpractical and transparent economic, political, and defense cooperation. Ina Cooperative Security system, individual states’ national securityobjectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

Ring One: Promoting and protecting human rights within their ownboundaries and further afield (Individual Security)

Ring Two: Maintaining peace and stability within their common space (Collective Security)

Ring Three: Mutual protection against outside aggression (Collective Defense)

Ring Four: Actively promoting stability in other areas where conflictcould threaten their shared security, using political, informational, economic, and, if necessary, military means (Promoting Stability)

Promoting StabilityCollective Defense

Collective Security

Individual Security

Cooperative SecurityThe "Four Rings"



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The Four Rings: Explaining the Concept

“Strategic System.” Cooperative Security is described as a“strategic system,” as it does not easily fit the generallyaccepted definition of a “strategy” which has been described as“the integrated application of means to achieve desired ends.”The word “system” implies that the concept cannot be fullyrealized in the abstract. As we have seen, it must be manifestedin concrete form to achieve its complete potential. Thus, it willbe based on existing or newly created, strong and resilientinstitutions.

“Nucleus of Liberal Democratic States.” CooperativeSecurity must have at its core a nucleus of liberal democraticstates adhering to common values. There are two points to bemade here. First, there are those who argue that the state itselfhas become a less relevant player in the realm of national andinternational security and that sub–state and trans–state actorsnow play the leading role on the modern security scene. It istrue that non–state organizations, trans–national corporations,non–governmental organizations (NGOs), pressure groups,and even international criminal and terrorist groups areincreasingly influential in the security area. There is, however,in my opinion, no early prospect that a realistic alternative tothe system of sovereign states and the institutions they formwill be replaced as the dominant providers of security to thecitizens of this planet.

Second, I believe that only liberal democratic states can betrusted with the protection andfurtherance of human rights in theirwidest sense, the core of theCooperative Security system. Statesthat UN Seceretary General Kofi Annan

Human rights arebest protected byliberal democraticstates


has called “fig leaf democracies,” and clearly, non–democraticstates may work with the member states of the system forshort–term, specific purposes. Several of the countries thatprovide contingents to SFOR, in Bosnia, and to KFOR, inKosovo, are certainly not liberal democracies. However, theymay make a helpful political and military contribution to theCooperative Security system in specific and limited ways. Inthe longer term, their own values and perceptions may changethrough contact and cooperation with the liberal democracieswithin the system.

Because of the ultimate unreliability and fragility ofundemocratic states as allies — for example, Iran, Libya, andYugoslavia have all been, at one time or another, helpful towestern interests — it seems abundantly clear that only liberaldemocratic states are capable of developing and sustaining thecommon objectives, the spirit of compromise, and theflexibility essential for the long–term maintenance of aCooperative Security system. As we have seen, the League ofNations ultimately foundered on a lack of basic politicalcompatibility amongst its members.

“Practical and Transparent Cooperation.” RealCooperative Security should link states in many ways. Theymust be committed to a dialogue amongst themselves,spanning a whole range of activities and interests. If we acceptthat the broader definition of security includes political,economic, and human rights aspects, then the nations formingthe Cooperative Security system must be linked by allelements of the web of security. These include: close andcontinuing political consultations; free and open traderelations; and closely aligned foreign and security policies,including integrated or multi–national military formations.Most importantly, they must develop mechanisms for

Richard Cohen

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peacefully and amicably resolving differences betweenindividual states or groups of states within the system,including perceived violations of individual security withinone or more of the member states. Recent European Union(EU) members’ sanctions against Austria, whatever the actualrights or wrongs of that particular case, were a demonstrationthat even the most solid of liberal democracies can come underclose scrutiny and pressure from its peers when itscommitment to individual security and human rights isbrought into question.

“Individual States’ National Security Objectives.” Withina system of Cooperative Security, individual nations mustsometimes forego or modify pursuit of their own individualnational interests for the sake of the longer–term commongood. They do so because they judge their shared interests tobe ultimately more important to them than their ownshort–term concerns. This element is fundamental to thesuccess of a Cooperative Security system. During the 1999Kosovo crisis, the Greek government reluctantly went alongwith NATO’s decision to bomb the Serbs. It did so because itrightly perceived the potential long–term damage to NATOand ultimately to its own security and prosperity of blockingconsensus. Failure to reach agreement within NATO on such avital issue would ultimately have done more damage toGreece’s own national interests than any benefit that mighthave been gained in protecting traditional economic, cultural,or political ties with Serbia.

Ring One: Promoting and Protecting Human Rights.The essential basic value upon which a Cooperative Securitysystem rests is an unquestioned conviction by its members touphold and maintain the Individual Security of its own citizensand those of their fellow members. This is the inner ring of theCooperative Security system, which will ultimately hold it


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together over time under inevitable pressures and stresses,internal and external. Only the ideals and values of liberaldemocracy can keep this vital nucleus together.

Ring Two: Maintaining Peace. This ring of CooperativeSecurity embodies the concept of Collective Security, i.e.,protection from threats and aggression by fellow members ofthe Cooperative Security system. Collective Security will alsoinclude close cooperation between members in counteringcommon threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegalimmigration, drugs, pollution, and joint planning and actionsin the event of natural or man–made disasters, etc.

Ring Three: Mutual Protection. An essential feature of aCooperative Security organization is that, unlike the UN or theOSCE, it provides its members with “hard” security. That is, itpromises reliable and credible military protection againstaggression or the threat of aggression from outside the system.This is the Collective Defense ring of Cooperative Security.

Ring Four: Actively Promoting Stability. Finally, aCooperative Security system attempts to prevent and preemptinstability, which will almost certainly include widespread abuseof human rights, in the area around it. It does so by activelyPromoting Stability through a wide variety of means, including, asa last resort, the use of force. This is the fourth and outer ring ofCooperative Security, and arguably its most sensitive element.

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, in 1999, was an example ofan attempt to restore and then to promote stability in an areadangerously close to its borders. In Kosovo, massiveviolations of individual security were an important factor inswinging public opinion behind the NATO action. No lessimportant was the fact that the organized and widespreadpersecution of ethnic Albanians by the Yugoslav governmentrisked destabilizing the region and threatened NATO membersHungary, Greece, and Turkey, as well as NATO Partners



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Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria. This fear ofdestabilization and the spread of conflict were certainly thedetermining factors in the decision to use military force oncepolitical, diplomatic, and economic tools proved ineffective.

Institutionalizing Cooperative Security

As we have seen, Cooperative Security must be built arounda strong institutional framework. Figure 2 attempts to matchthe current leading international security organizations withthe characteristics of the Cooperative Security system that wehave described above. This chart is based on the perceivedeffectiveness of the institution in a particular role, rather thanon its formal organizational commitment to one security roleor another. “Yes?” indicates, at best, only partial effectivenessin fulfilling a particular role:

Institutionalizing Cooperative SecurityFigure 2

Institution

RingOne:

IndividualSecurity

Ring Two:

Collective Security

RingThree:

CollectiveDefense

RingFour:

PromotingStability

UN Yes? Yes? No Yes?

OSCE Yes? Yes? No Yes?

EU Yes Yes No Yes?

NATO Yes Yes Yes Yes


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If we agree with this description ofCooperative Security, then NATOis, for the moment, the world’s onlyworking model of a CooperativeSecurity system.

NATO — A Practical Example of Cooperative Security

It can be reasonably argued that although the large majorityof NATO’s 19 member states qualify as liberal democraciesand upholders of Individual Security and human rights withintheir own borders, the record is not perfect. Some would claimthat the use of the death penalty in the United States puts intoquestion America’s commitment to human rights. Others willpoint to Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minorities; to theCzech Republic’s handling of its Roma community; or toBritish actions in Northern Ireland. However, in an imperfectworld, most reasonable observers would agree that NATOmembers come close to the championing of Individual Security,which stands at the core of a Cooperative Security system.

For many years NATO has been held up as a successfulexample of a Collective Defense organization. Article 5 of theWashington Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document, putthis role firmly at the center of the Alliance’s core functions.However, even during the Cold War, the Alliance served as anunofficial, yet de facto, guarantor of the security of itsindividual member states against threats from fellow members.

Greek–Turkish friction over a variety of issues wouldalmost certainly have resulted in at least one war betweenthese states, had they not been firmly embedded within theNorth Atlantic Alliance. On more than one occasion, informal,but intense, bilateral and multilateral consultations within theNATO Alliance averted a Greek–Turkish conflict. Such a warwould have dealt a severe blow to NATO solidarity and wouldcertainly have put at risk the long–term future of the Alliance, afact not lost on the two protagonists. In a wider context, French,

NATO is currentlythe only working

model ofCooperative

Security



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Danish, Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and Britishmembership of NATO has made armed conflict, historically anot infrequent occurrence between these states, virtuallyunthinkable. More recently, “fishing wars” between NATOmembers (between Britain and Iceland, and Canada and Spain)never risked escalating into armed conflict. In short, the Alliancehas functioned very effectively as a de facto Collective Securityorganization throughout much of its 50–year history.

In the years since the end of the Cold War, NATO hasvigorously pursued the fourth dimension of CooperativeSecurity, Promoting Stability, in the states adjacent to theterritory of its members. The Alliance has sought to encourageand to promote stability both institutionally and practically. TheNorth Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and its successor,the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), theNATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), theNATO–Ukraine Joint Commission, and the MediterraneanDialogue are examples of the institutional framework thatNATO has put in place to promote stability in the areas beyondits boundaries.

Crisis Management has become NATO’s operational tool for thepromotion and maintenance of stability in areas on its periphery.Crisis Management includes Conflict Prevention (activediplomacy and preventive deployments) and Crisis Responseoperations, like Bosnia and Kosovo. Crisis Management wasadopted as a “fundamental security task” in the new NATOStrategic Concept approved at the Washington summit of April1999.9 Crisis Management seeks to include NATO partner stateswhenever possible. It, together with the NATO enlargementprocess, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) Initiative, have become major vehicles forpromoting stability outside the traditional NATO area as originallydefined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty.

NATO, therefore, embodies the description of CooperativeSecurity that we describe above. This model depicts the concept:


Richard C

ohen

18 Cooperative Security:A NATO Model

OtherInstitutions

WMDInitiative

MediterraneanDialogue

EAPC

NATO/Russia

Enlargement

PfP

CrisisManagement

NATO/Ukraine

CrisisResponse

Promoting Stability

Collective Defense

Collective Security

IndividualSecurity

Figure 3



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The Balkans: Cooperative Security on the Firing Line

NATO operations in Southeast Europe are clearly animportant test of Cooperative Security in action. The airattacks on Yugoslavia, the NATO–led humanitarian missionsin Albania and Macedonia, the KFOR mission in Kosovo, andthe SFOR mission in Bosnia, are part of a coordinated effort toreestablish stability in this sensitive part of Europe. NATO andother international institutions have made a long–termcommitment to Balkan stability. If the situations in Bosnia andin Kosovo can be stabilized, then the NATO model ofCooperative Security will be enormously strengthened.Although they were not welcomed by everyone, NATO’sOperation “Allied Force” in 1999 and the Alliance–ledsecurity and nation–building tasks in Kosovo and Bosniamight, in the longer term, point the way toward a more hopefulera in Southeastern Europe and in the wider world.

It is possible, however, that the SFOR/KFOR internationaloperations in Bosnia and Kosovo and the EU–led StabilityPact for Southeastern Europe will ultimately fail to bring ameasure of stability and reconciliation to the Balkans. Such afailure would be the result of a loss of interest anddetermination on the part of NATO, the EU, and theinternational community to persevere despite the difficultiesand setbacks. If this does happen, the concept of CooperativeSecurity will be dealt a severe blow. It will be seen to havefallen short of the hopes and expectations of its creators. Sucha development would not necessarily invalidate the conceptaltogether. But it would mean that the Cooperative Securitymodel we have discussed had failed to clear the obstacles ofindecisive political leadership, insufficient militarycapabilities, and the inevitable compromises inherent in anycooperative and consensual relationship between states.


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The European Union and Cooperative Security

As the European Union moves somewhat unsteadily towarda Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), prospects forextending Cooperative Security in Europe beyond the NATOspace look hopeful. Still, despite the recently announced“Headline Goals” and the subsequent promised commitmentof forces by EU and non–EU states, European determination todevelop a real defense capability remains to be tested. Are theEuropeans really ready to make the financial and politicalsacrifices to give their armed forces the weapons, theinteroperability, the deployability, and the sustainability tocredibly conduct a Kosovo–style operation withoutultimate reliance on American political will and militarypower?

If EU declarations of intent are indeed turned into substance,a true CFSP will herald, probably unannounced, a de factomutual defense arrangement between members of the Union,including the so–called “neutral” nations of Sweden, Finland,Austria, and Ireland. The eventual incorporation within theEU of the Western European Union, along with Article 5 of itsfounding document, the Brussels Treaty, would make thiscommitment official and legally binding. The EU would thenmove into the Third Ring of Cooperative Security, CollectiveDefense.

If a capable European Rapid Reaction Force based on aCommon Foreign and Security Policy can be created within areasonable time frame, the EU will be able to join NATO inoccupying the Fourth Ring of the Cooperative Security model,



21

Promoting Stability outside itsterritory. It would then effectivelyoperate in all four Rings of theCooperative Security system.Assuming that NATO and the EUcan come to satisfactory operationaland institutional arrangements, thiswould broaden and strengthen theCooperative Security space now occupied only by NATO. Inaddition, the parallel enlargements of both the EU and NATOwill further expand the circle of states within the CooperativeSecurity system.

The Fourth Ring States

What of the states which presently lie outside both theNATO and EU areas? Many have expressed their wish tobecome members of these organizations, either by taking anactive role as candidates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace asMembership Action Plan (MAP) members and/or by being onthe EU’s official list of candidates for early accession? Arethese states and those who are not at present moving towardmembership of NATO or the EU excluded from the benefits ofthe Cooperative Security system? It seems clear, by virtue oftheir active candidacy and/or their increasingly closecooperation with these institutions, that these states in the“Fourth Ring” have gained implied, but not guaranteed,security commitments from the states within the CooperativeSecurity space. Even states such as Ukraine, Moldova,Georgia, and Azerbaijan, that are not yet candidates formembership of either NATO or the EU, may benefit in security

Parallelenlargement of EU and NATO will further expand theCooperativeSecurity space


terms from their increasingly close arrangements with theseorganizations. They already enjoy the advantages ofcooperation in the fields of joint planning and actions in theevent of natural or man–made disasters.

The Limits of Cooperative Security

. . . if a powerful and enlightened people should form arepublic. . . this would serve as a centre of federalunion for other states in accordance with the idea ofthe law of nations. Gradually, through differentunions of this kind, the federation would extendfurther and further. 10

– Immanuel Kant

In their 1992 work on Cooperative Security, Carter, Perry,and Steinbruner foresaw that “The formation of a new securityorder requires that cooperative security arrangements be extendedto other forces and potential theaters of military engagement.”11

But how much of the world can a practical and effectiveCooperative Security system cover? What should be the limits ofits ambitions and its interests? These are questions which are noteasy to answer.

Given that the members of a Cooperative Security systemmust be open and democratic with a close commonality ofvalues and interests, there is clearly a practical limit to the sizeof a Cooperative Security organization. There is also theimportant question of geography. For otherwise like–minded

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23

nations living far apart, the absence of common, geo–strategicconcerns may also limit membership of the system. As anexample, Japan, an open and democratic society with a strongeconomy and relatively powerful and well–equipped armedforces, would not fit easily into a Eurasian–AtlanticCooperative Security system. Its core security concerns are tooremote from those of most European states. This, of course,would not preclude close cooperation and possibly joint actionwith such an organization.

It is conceivable, and certainly desirable, that in the longerterm Russia and the other independent states of the formerSoviet Union could become partof a huge Eurasian–AtlanticCooperative Security system. Thisvast region of strength, stability,and harmony, stretching fromVancouver to Vladivostok, couldresult from a gradual drawingtogether of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. However, many ofthe states on the southern periphery of this area and, indeed,further afield in Africa, the Middle East, and South and EastAsia, may not share the values and the interests of such a“western” and “northern” oriented system, nor might theyhave any desire to join it.

In the longer term, the ultimate goal should be a stable andstrong Eurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security systemincorporating Russia and the other states of the former SovietUnion. Such an organization might look something like this:

Russia couldbecome part of a huge Eurasian–AtlanticCooperativeSecurity system


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Figu

re 4



25

Conclusion

Cooperative Security, as we have described it, can becomethe basis for a more peaceful and harmonious future. Itcombines four basic security arrangements: IndividualSecurity, Collective Security, Collective Defense, andPromoting Stability in widening rings of security. ACooperative Security system requires from the democraticstates that form it a willingness to closely cooperate with eachother and to reach out, if necessary, to intervene in areasoutside their territories that might affect their common peaceand security.

NATO provides a real–life model for such a CooperativeSecurity system. It embodies all four of the basic functions.The EU is in the process of enlarging this NATO core into awider and deeper Euro–Atlantic Cooperative Security space.Ultimately, this space should be expanded to include otherparts of the Eurasian–Atlantic region, including Russia.Beyond this region, the breadth of a Eurasian–AtlanticCooperative Security is probably limited by virtue of thenon–acceptability to other states of its core values and of itscommon geo–strategic interests.

In the final analysis, the success of any international securitysystem depends on strong and united leadership, a spirit ofcompromise, and a determination of its members to persevere.This is especially true for an institution as closely knit andcomprehensive as a Cooperative Security system. If theseelements are lacking, the system will fail. It will do so notnecessarily because the concept itself is faulty, but because its


practitioners lack the courage and the wisdom to surmount theinevitable difficulties and disagreements to see it through tolong–term success. However, if prudent, far–sightedleadership can overcome these obstacles, a real and practicalmanifestation of Cooperative Security may yet bring new hopeto an unsettled world. �

Endnotes

1. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, The Atlantic Charter,Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, July 14, 1941. The Atlantic Charter wassubsequently incorporated in the Declaration of the United Nations.2. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 1795, quoted in Classics of ModernPolitical Theory: Machiavelli to Mill, ed., Steven M. Cahn,London/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.3. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A NewConcept of Cooperative Security, Washington, DC: The BrookingsInstitution Press, 1993.4. Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra–State Conflict,” ForeignPolicy, No. 96, Fall 1994.5. Michael Mihalka, “Concepts of Cooperative Security,” paper preparedfor the Senior Executive Course, College of International and SecurityStudies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany: July 1998.6. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945.7. Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, HumanSecurity: Safety for People in a Changing World, Ottawa: CanadianDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April, 1998. 8. Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, A Sociology ofInternational Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.9. North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington,DC: April 24, 1999, para. 10.10. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 1795.

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11. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A NewConcept of Cooperative Security.


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— Michael Mihalka is a professor of Eastern Europe Studies at theGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Prior tohis position at the Marshall Center, he was a senior analyst at theOpen Media Research Institute in Prague, Czech Republic. He hasalso served as a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation in SantaMonica, California. His teaching positions included the Universityof Michigan at Ann Arbor, the University of Texas at Austin, theRAND Graduate School, and the Private Institute for InternationalBusiness Studies (affiliated with Clemson University). In additionto his work on international relations theory, his research alsocovers internal violence and the democratic transition.

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Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

29

Cooperative Security:From Theory to Practice

by Michael Mihalka

Executive Summary

Almost all observers believe that cooperative security isdesirable, but few agree on exactly what it means or how bestto achieve it. Thus the goals of this paper are twofold: first, toprovide a theoretical analysis of cooperative security, and then,to reflect upon the practical results, not merely in Europe andEurasia, but also in Southeast Asia.

Cooperative security may be defined in the following way:sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directedagainst a specific state or coalition of states. Cooperativesecurity can only take place when countries develop a sense ofa common future. They begin to realize that unilateral attemptsto increase their security may be doomed to failure becauseone state’s actions cause corresponding reactions by anotherstate, degrading the security of both. This is the so–called“security dilemma.” The realization that this action–reactionsequence cannot be avoided has led to the best example ofbilateral cooperative security — the series of arms controlagreements between the United States and Russia.

Early examples of multilateral cooperative security systemsinclude the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and theUnited Nations. Since World War II, more and more countrieshave adopted cooperative security as a mechanism forfostering international stability. Their governments believethat they have much to gain from working with their neighbors


to decrease the likelihood of conflict, as opposed to actingunilaterally or to forming military alliances. In WesternEurope, cooperative security has become the norm. Its citizensassume that they will never again go to war against each other.Consequently, such international organizations as theEuropean Union (EU) are characterized by increasingly denseinstitutionalization of contacts and the continuingdenationalization of security policy. NATO has fostered thisprocess, adopting a wide range of entirely new missions thatcan best be characterized as cooperative security. All of thesetrends are bolstered by economic interaction within the region,mutual respect for the rule of law, and the fact that all of theWest European countries are liberal democracies.

Outside Western Europe, the nature of cooperative securityis quite different. Here we find two major groupings of statesassociated with the term cooperative security: theOrganization for Security and Co–operation in Europe(OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). They differ sharply from the EU and NATO. Theyare not bound together by a comparable body of laws, and theeconomic relationships within each security community aremuch less intense. Perhaps most importantly, many of theirmembers are not liberal democracies. Yet OSCE and ASEANhave taken some notable steps to prevent conflict in theabsence of a specific threat. They demonstrate that cooperativesecurity can at least begin to take shape among states that havelittle in common.

NATO and the EU show that liberal democratic values anda shared economic system permit much higher levels of

Michael Mihalka

30


cooperative security. The closer the interaction among statesand their citizens, the more they will find ways to further theirsecurity cooperatively. Liberal democracy may not benecessary for cooperative security to begin or to continue, butit expands the range of options and benefits for all. �


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Introduction

Traditional concepts of security do not provide adequatesolutions to the current challengesof intrastate conflict and regionalinstability. The major schools ofthought in international relations —realism and liberalism — reflect anera when war was considered to bea legitimate instrument of policy.Today, many states, especially inWestern Europe, are less concernedabout deterring or defendingagainst aggression than aboutpreserving the overall stability of their region. Such countrieshave much to gain by working together to decrease thelikelihood of conflict. Their goal has often been called“cooperative security.”

Unfortunately, many states claim to engage in cooperativesecurity when, in fact, they mean simple cooperation. But,their rhetoric does reflect this shift in the primary securityperception of states: a shift away from defending against amajor threat and toward promoting stability. Historically,many groupings of states have tried to promote stability. Theirexperiences foreshadowed current cooperative security efforts.Today, three groupings of states view themselves as engagedin cooperative security — the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), the Organization for Security andCo–operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN).


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Traditional securityconcepts do notprovide adequatesolutions to thecurrent challengesof intrastateconflict andregional instability


The first part of this paper defines cooperative security andrelies heavily on the concepts of the security dilemma and theprisoner’s dilemma. The second part explains how states andgroupings of states have engaged in cooperative securityaccording to this definition. The final section addresses thefuture of cooperative security.

Defining Security

Since the end of the cold war, there have been so manydefinitions to the term security that some scholars have calledit an “essentially contested concept” — i.e., a concept sovalue–laden that no amount of argument or evidence couldlead to agreement on its meaning.1 The confusion lies morewith the values and social units that need protecting, than withthe concept itself. Hence, security can be defined as thefreedom to exercise certain values, or, as Arnold Wolfers hasput it, security can be measured as “the absence of threat toacquired values.”2 The conceptual problem then becomes oneof defining which social units (e.g., individuals, states,international institutions, and state systems) and values (e.g.,physical safety, political independence, and economic

well–being) apply.3 Answers tothese questions tend to vary withrespect, among other things, to whenthe question is asked and to whichapproach is taken to understandinternational relations. Thus, afterthe cold war, West Europeans turnedfrom concern about the continuedsurvival of the state (so–called“hard” security) to an interest ineconomic well–being (“soft”security). This shift reflects the real

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After the cold war,West Europeans

turned fromconcern for thesurvival of thestate — “hard

security” —to an interest in

economicwell–being —“soft security”


decline in the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union andits successor state, Russia.

In this paper, we will focus on the state as the major unit ofanalysis and on freedom from coercion as the major value tobe protected. It is common for the literature to deal withspecific states, or groups of states, posing a threat to anindividual state’s security. Concerns about transnational orenvironmental threats change that focus and require newthinking about security. Much of what is written aboutcooperative security attempts to address that void. Thus, thispaper’s definition of cooperative security deals with issuesother than traditional threats:

Cooperative security is activity among states tolessen the likelihood of war, or itsconsequences should it occur, that is notdirected at any specific state or group of states.

This definition separates two very distinct spheres ofinternational relations activity: 1) activity directed at specificstates, or groups of states, perceived to pose a threat to thepeace; and, 2) activity directed to improve the environmentwithin which states operate. Cooperative security attempts todeal with the second definition, improving the broader securityenvironment.

Cooperative security can occur between two states, oramong many. The simplest, and traditionally the mostcommon, case is one consistent with the neo–realist model ofinternational relations. Few assumptions need be made aboutstate behavior. The state is the unit of analysis and tries toimprove its security, often at the expense of others. Underthese circumstances, cooperation is difficult.


35


The Security Dilemma and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Astheorists have de–emphasized the struggle for power in favorof the pursuit of security as the major motivating factor forstates, they have recognized the “security dilemma.”4 Thesecurity dilemma, in which a state’s actions, meant to increasethe security of its citizens, result in responsive actions on thepart of an adversary — countervailing actions that mayultimately diminish the security of all. Military preparationsby one country, regardless of its intentions, are perceived topose a threat to others. Robert Jervis has said that “the securitydilemma can not only create conflicts and tensions but alsoprovide the dynamics triggering war.”5 The concept of thesecurity dilemma is crucial for understanding the trend towardcooperative and common security in the early 1990s. Themajor state–level cause for conflict along the East–West axiswas ideologically defused with Gorbachev’s arrival in theSoviet Union. The security dilemma, however, remains;although it may be circumvented through arms controlagreements.

The prisoner’s dilemma further illustrates the problems thatarise when a state unilaterally improves its own security, andanother state responds in kind, resulting in both states beingless secure than before. As an example, two countries face thesame choice: to arm or not to arm. If one side arms, and theother does not, then one side gains a unilateral advantage. It is,therefore, rational for both sides to arm. This logic, however,leads to resources being diverted from civilian to militarypurposes and a general escalation of arms.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

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36

Russia arms Russia does not arm

US arms Arms race US unilateral advantage

US does not arm Russia unilateral Arms controladvantage


The prisoner’s dilemma is a recurring international problem. Ifit is rational for both sides to arm, what would it take for themto cooperate instead? The answer lies in the fact that theprisoner’s dilemma is iterative. Once both sides recognize thespiraling effect, they have an incentive to cooperate.6 Bynegotiating, they can avoid increased military expenditures.

It is a sense of a common futurethat leads them to cooperate. Aprime example of this form ofcooperative security is the nucleararms negotiations between theUnited States and the Soviet Union— once likened to two scorpions ina bottle — during the cold war. The iterative prisoner’sdilemma provides sufficient conceptual underpinnings toexplain cooperative security between pairs of states. We needto look further to account for cooperative security amongseveral states.

The Security Community. The notion of a securitycommunity, developed originally by Karl Deutsch, goes a longway toward accounting for cooperative security among severalstates. Deutsch and his colleagues sought to explain theinternational community that developed in Western Europeimmediately following World War II (WW II).7 Here, heidentified the evolution of a “pluralistic security community,”in which states had a shared “expectation of peaceful change.”States in a pluralistic security community expect other states inthe community not to use or threaten to use military force as ameans of resolving disputes. Such a community developsthrough extensive transaction and communication that aid andabet the consolidation of shared norms and values. Thiscontinued interaction is reinforced by cooperation, whichfurther develops shared norms, which then creates moreinteraction, in a positive feedback loop.


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It is a sense of acommon future thatleads tocooperation


Cooperative security is thus oneconsequence of a securitycommunity. States within a securitycommunity work together toaddress security threats in theirimmediate environment. Some ofthis action is cooperation in the

traditional sense, such as the formation of the NATO alliance.But, much of this action, such as the deepening and wideningof the European Community (EC), is not directed at anyspecific state threat and thus falls within the domain ofcooperative security.

The interaction inherent to a security community leads toshared norms. Sustaining the security community also leads tothe development of a common identity. Shared norms and acommon identity increase trust among participating states andmake cooperative security a further norm regulating theirbehavior.

Practical Examples of Cooperative Security

Cooperation between adversaries and potential adversarieshas often occurred. Agreements and conventions not to usechemical weapons and to limit the use of violence againstcivilians have long existed.

However, conventions have sometimes been rudely ignored.For example, a series of agreements prohibited the use ofchemical weapons. An agreement in Brussels in 1874,followed by one at the Hague in 1899, outlawed the use ofprojectiles filled with poison gases. Nevertheless, the use ofchemical weapons in World War I (WW I) resulted in over1,300,000 casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities.8

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Cooperativesecurity

is a consequenceof a security

community


Given the experience of WW I, chemical weapons weresubsequently used largely against the defenseless — theItalians against the Abyssinians (mustard gas, 1936), or morerecently the Iraqis against the Kurds (hydrogen cyanide andmustard gas, 1987–88). However, there was a tacit agreementnot to use chemical weapons in WW II — no major WW IIcombatants used them. And, the Iraqis did not use chemicalagents against the United Nations (UN) coalition in the 1991Persian Gulf War, although they had previously used suchweapons against Iran. In both WW II and the Gulf War, thecombatants had a clear sense of a common future that keptthem from employing chemical weapons. Any temporaryadvantage conveyed by an initial use would be wiped out bysubsequent retaliation.

Arms control generally providesfruitful ground for cooperativesecurity, especially if both sides canbe made to see that the securitydilemma they face puts them into aniterative prisoner’s dilemma.Ashton Carter, William Perry, andJohn Steinbrunner had the following to say about cooperativesecurity in a 1993 publication:

The central purpose of cooperative securityarrangements is to prevent war and to do soprimarily by preventing the means for successfulaggression from being assembled, thus alsoobviating the need for states so threatened tomake their own counterpreparations. . . .Cooperative security differs from the traditionalidea of collective security as preventivemedicine differs from acute care.


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Arms control generally providesfruitful ground forcooperativesecurity


Focused on restraining the organizedpreparations of established militaries,cooperative security does not address itselfdirectly to sub–state violence.9 [emphasis added]

Carter, et al., clearly address the security dilemma when theyargue that military forces must be configured so as not to posea threat to their neighbors, thus provoking a response. TheBrookings team thought that although no post–cold war statewas pursuing world domination, the security dilemma couldlead states into competition, when they might prefercooperation.

Indeed, virtually every arms control regime can be viewedas an example of cooperative security. The successive effortsbetween the United States and the Soviet Union (and itssuccessor state — Russia) to manage their common securityspace through strategic arms control provides an importantbilateral example. The Nonproliferation Treaty, theConventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, etc., illustratemultilateral efforts. However, such unique, one–offarrangements are limited and do not necessarily enhancesecurity in other areas. Therefore, we need to look atinstitutionalized efforts at cooperative security.

Institutionalizing Cooperation

Cooperative security arrangements have repeatedly evolvedthroughout the last two hundred years, whenever states havebecome convinced that they need to improve the conditionsleading to security within their environment. These effortsrange from the Concert of Europe — set up after the end of theNapoleonic Wars — to the Organization for Security andCo–operation in Europe.

Michael Mihalka

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The Concert of Europe —Early Cooperative Security.What came to be called the Concertof Europe emerged from the Viennatreaties ending the wars againstNapoleonic France in 1815. Thequadruple alliance of the four victorious powers — Austria,Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain — agreed to meet on a regularbasis to discuss matters concerning European security. Francejoined in 1818. The Concert of Europe is most often referredto as the mechanism whereby the balance of power wasadjudicated in the 19th century.

In the decades immediately following the Napoleonicsettlement, the primary concern was countering the liberalthreat fomented by the French revolution. Revolution was seenas the source of instability in Europe. Revolution infectedFrance and led to the Napoleonic wars. In the immediateaftermath of those wars, revolution, and not any one state,posed the major threat to order and was perceived as a futurethreat to dynastic survival. Austrian Chancellor Metternichbelieved that intervention and repression were necessary toeliminate revolution and revolutionary ideas. The Concertserved as the main vehicle for intervention.

However, the British found the continental enthusiasm fordynastic intervention unacceptable. British diplomatCastlereagh argued in the House of Commons that he “couldnot recognize the principle that one state was entitle[d] tointerfere with another, because changes might be effected in itsgovernment which the former state disapproved.”10 Only animmediate threat to vital interests justified state intervention.


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Cooperativesecurity hasevolved over thelast 200 years


Disagreement over the Concert’s prevailing conservativepolitical objectives, as evidenced by the continental powers’intervention in Spain in 1823, led Britain to withdraw from theConcert. Britain did not share the conservative, indeedreactionary, values of its erstwhile Continental allies, andcould not accept anti–liberal interventions as legitimate.

Even so, some Britishauthorities had kind words for theConcert of Europe at the end of the19th century. During the Armenianand Cretan crises of 1897, Britain’sLord Salisbury recognized theConcert of Europe as the “inchoate

federation of Europe” — a federation with the capability ofbecoming an international organization.11 It was, in effect, thefirst real effort at cooperative security.

The League of Nations — Failure to Achieve CollectiveSecurity. The League of Nations is best remembered forfailing to prevent World War II, but deserves better press for itsactual accomplishments, especially its efforts to manageconflicts among its members. The League accomplishedimportant innovations. Premier among them was theagreement to consider an act of war against one member stateto be an act of war against all. The term “collective security”derived from this form of security agreement. Membersconsulted on military matters, but were required toimmediately engage in financial and economic sanctions.Second among the League’s important innovations was theinstitutionalization of agreements. They were accomplished inan Assembly, consisting of the member states; a Council,comprising the victorious powers at the Versailles Conference;and four additional states, drawn from the Assembly. Third,

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The Concert ofEurope was the

first real effort atcooperative

security


the League assumed responsibility for adjudicating disputesamong its members. Fourth, the League assumedresponsibility for overseeing the political development ofcertain territories and colonies of the defeated countries.

The League’s ineffective handling of Germany in the 1930sfollowed failures to act against Japan over its invasion ofManchuria and against Italy over its invasion of Ethiopia.Agreement was not possible. Failure to act effectively againstItaly merely confirmed the League’s inability to deal withdisputes raised by major powers.

The League failed in part because it lacked sufficientlegitimacy among the major powers. After World War I, onlytwo of the six major powers — Britain and France —supported League principles and practices, among them thepost–war territorial status quo. The United States Senateprevented the United States from joining. Bolshevik Russiaand Germany were specifically excluded at first. Italy wasseverely disaffected, not having gained the territories itdeemed it deserved due to its switch of allegiances during thewar. Italy continued to undermine League principles, first byits intervention in Corfu in 1923, and then later by its invasionof Ethiopia. Germany finally joined in 1926, but quicklyexited when the National Socialists came to power in 1933.Russia joined in 1934.

Clearly betraying his liberal instincts, Wilson rejectedmembership of autocratic governments. Non–democraticcountries had to adopt democratic forms of government to gainmembership. Restricting membership ran counter to the ideathat the more universal a collective security system was, themore effective it would be. Yet, if liberal theorists are right,Wilson’s instincts were correct. Only liberal states would liveup to their obligations.


43


In the final analysis, the League of Nations failed because itwas unable to develop a security community. Its members didnot share values. There was no agreement on how Europeancountries should organize themselves politically. France andBritain wanted to retain their parliamentary democracies. Italy

quickly opted for fascism, andRussia for Bolshevism. Germanyfailed at parliamentary democracybefore finally following Italy intofascism in the 1930s. Japan becamea military corporatist state.Territorially, France and Britainwanted to maintain the status quo.

Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan did not. TheLeague’s collective security system presumed a global securitycommunity — a group of states with a clear common identity.The League failed because it could not develop that identity.

The United Nations — Collective Security andCooperative Security. The United Nations, like the Leaguebefore it, is a collective security system, but was designed tocorrect the perceived major shortcomings of its predecessors.The United Nations, unlike the League, has universalmembership. The UN requires a consensus among the fivemajor powers that are permanent members of the SecurityCouncil, with only majority consent from the entire council.The League required unanimity. United Nations enforcementactions are guaranteed if the permanent members agree. Notsurprisingly, UN collective security operations have onlyoccurred twice.

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The League’scollective security

system failed when it did not

develop aglobal security

community


The United Nations has predictably, given the conflictingvalues of member countries, been largely ineffective as acollective security system. Agreement is rare when theinterests of Security Council permanent members’ conflict.The two collective security operations that have been“successful” illustrate the need for common interests andvalues.

The United Nations effectively acted against North Korea in1950, but only because the Soviet Union boycotted theCouncil sessions. At that time the permanent membersincluded the United States, the United Kingdom, France,Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union. The end of the coldwar made possible the second successful UN cooperativesecurity operation, against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.At this time, the Soviet Union, soon to be Russia, expressed adesire to join the Western community of nations and did notblock action against Iraq, its former client.

There was no UN enforcement action against Serbia overKosovo in 1999. The inevitable vetoes of both Russia andChina kept the issue from even coming to a Security Councilvote. NATO proceeded, arguing the requirement for urgenthumanitarian intervention. Some felt that the UN SecurityCouncil lacked the legitimacy to authorize humanitarianintervention because it was not a coalition of liberaldemocratic states. Russia and China opposed the action, in partbecause an intervention in Serbian internal affairs wouldestablish a difficult precedent for their own domesticsituations — Chechnya in the case of Russia, Tibet for China.

Nevertheless, the United Nations has engaged in a numberof peacekeeping operations that many would consider


45


cooperative security efforts. TheUN authorized the peacekeepingoperations in Bosnia and Kosovo(operations not funded by theUnited Nations, and, therefore, notstrictly UN operations) and Russiaparticipates in both. Moreover,many countries that take part inthese “UN peacekeepingoperations” do so for reasons other

than a simple commitment to the furthering of peace — theyparticipate for economic reasons, as they profit from rentingtheir troops to the UN.

The League of Nations and the Concert of Europe suggestthat security communities and, hence, cooperative security areindeed possible among states that are not liberal democracies,but that such security communities may be unstable. TheConcert of Europe did achieve routinized cooperation and aform of cooperative security. Its members shared the commonideology and purpose of the suppression of liberalism. Assome of the states participating in the Concert saw the majorproblems in international relations differently, the Concertbroke down.

The failure of the League of Nations revealed the need forliberal democratic states as the basis for a security community.It would appear that Wilson’s instinct that League membersshould be liberal democratic states was essentially correct.The League’s problems were with its non–democraticmembers. The League was able to accommodate a fascistItaly, but not a fascist Germany. Once Germany turned fascistand left the League, the League was no longer viable.

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The United Nationshas engaged in a

number ofpeacekeeping

operations thatmany would

considercooperative

security efforts


The United Nations provides a different cooperativesecurity lesson. Much of what the United Nations does iscooperative security, although the term is rarely used. The UnitedNations does not comprise a security community — several warshave occurred between its members. Nevertheless, manymember countries have participated in UN multilateralpeacekeeping operations. Most importantly, major collectivesecurity enforcement actions have only occurred when thenon–democratic members of the UN Security Council wereeither absent or willing to defer to their liberal democraticcounterparts.

Western Europe — The Prototypical Security Community.The integration of Western Europe after World War II focusedon the creation of security communities, particularly on thedevelopment of the European Community, now called theEuropean Union (EU). Karl Deutsch has pointed out that instark contrast to the interwar period, West European states nolonger planned for war against each other and, thus, had begunto form a security community.12 Indeed, the founders of theEuropean Community made a conscious effort to build asecurity community in Western Europe by furthering acollective identity. Jean Monnet, one of the EC’s architects,wrote in 1944:

There will be no peace in Europe if statesre–establish themselves on the basis of nationalsovereignty, with all that this implies by way ofprestige policies and economic protectionism.If the countries once more protect themselvesagainst each other, it will once more benecessary to build up vast armies . . . Europewill be reborn yet again under the shadow offear.13


47


The EC’s precursor, the European Coal and Steel Commission(ECSC), was proposed by Robert Schuman in May 1950.British Member of Parliament, and sometime Prime Minister,Harold Macmillan said:

To the great majority of Europeans, by far themost significant aspect of M. Schuman’sinitiative is the political. It is not, in itsessentials, a purely economic or industrialconception; it is a grand design for a newEurope; it is not just a piece of convenientmachinery; it is a revolutionary, almostmystical, conception.14

The Schuman Declaration setting up the European Coal andSteel Community is worth quoting at length:

The solidarity in production thus establishedwill make it plain that any war between Franceand Germany becomes not merely unthinkable,but materially impossible. The setting up of thispowerful productive unit, open to all countrieswilling to take part and bound ultimately toprovide all the member countries with the basicelements of industrial production on the sameterms, will lay a true foundation for theireconomic unification.

This production will be offered to the world asa whole without distinction or exception, withthe aim of contributing to raising livingstandards and to promoting peacefulachievements. In this way, there will berealized simply and speedily that fusion of

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interest which is indispensable to theestablishment of a common economic system;it may be the leaven from which may grow awider and deeper community betweencountries long opposed to one another bysanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by institutinga new High Authority, whose decisions willbind France, Germany and other membercountries, this proposal will lead to therealization of the first concrete foundation of aEuropean federation indispensable to thepreservation of peace.15

In a speech given in 1999, Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzekquoted Schuman: “Europe has to shape its own soul. Europeagain has to become a direction for mankind. Europe is notagainst anything or anyone. United Europe is a symbol ofall–embracing solidarity for the future.”16 The ECSC providedthe material basis — cooperation in coal and steel — for asecurity community to develop in Europe and thusincreasingly for more cooperative security among members ofthe EC and later the European Union.

The end of the cold war proved to be one of the larger testsfor the European Union. Some feared that the United Stateswould withdraw from Europe and that West Europeans would“renationalize” their security policies. Some Germans fearedthat their now reunited country would set off again on itsSonderweg, i.e., its special path. Some of Germany’sneighbors, in turn, were slow to endorse reunification. Yet,Germany remained on the European path.


49


In the waning years of the Bush presidency, the UnitedStates did in fact lose interest in Europe and conceded to theWest Europeans the leading role in the 1991 Yugoslav conflict.Flush with enthusiasm after embarking on the Maastrichttreaty negotiations, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Poosproclaimed the “hour of Europe.” Wishful thinking led the EUto believe that the Yugoslav conflict could not be resolvedthrough military means. They were wrong.

The European Union’s intention is to remain a liberaldemocratic security community. Applicants must meet theEU’s three major membership criteria: progress towardbecoming a liberal democracy; progress toward engaging amarket economy; and progress toward adopting the EU’scommon law, the acquis communitaire. Thus, a country needsto be a relatively mature liberal democracy before it can join.

A “re–nationalization” of security policy has not occurredand the European Union has made slow, but halting, progresstoward coordinating respective national security policies.Several members of the European Union have participated inthe Eurocorps, which now has assumed responsibility for theoverall Kosovo mission. The European Union displays almostall of the characteristics of a mature security community withcooperative security as the norm.

NATO — From Collective Defense to Cooperative Security.Many of the same analysts who thought that the EuropeanUnion would “renationalize” its security policy after the end ofthe cold war, also believed that NATO would disappear onceits “main threat,” the Warsaw Pact, collapsed. These analystswere entrenched in the realist tradition and did not reckon with

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the common transatlantic identity developed among theAlliance members.

Robert De Wijk, a senior advisor to the Dutch government,argues that “NATO’s task as a collective defense organizationhas been completed, because the threat from the East no longerexists. NATO must change into an ‘organization forcooperative security’ that draws its right to exist above all fromcarrying out military operations aimed at conflict managementand humanitarian aid.” De Wijk realizes that obtainingpolitical support among the member states for this neworientation would be very difficult. But, he says: “If you regardNATO as a classic defense alliance, then it can be closeddown. After all the objectives have been reached.” In fact, heargues that NATO should be folded into the OSCE.17

NATO, of course, was never simply a classic defensealliance, but its political component was obscured during thecold war. After the cold war, NATO launched severalPartnership for Peace (PfP) program initiatives and throughoutthe 1990s expanded on them. The PfP program is not simply awaiting room for those countries wishing to join NATO. Manyof the former so–called neutrals — Ireland, Finland, Sweden,Austria, and Switzerland — have used the PfP to promote theirown security cooperatively.

For example, Ireland, having participated in theUN–mandated (but not operated) peacekeeping operations inBosnia and Kosovo, wanted to institutionalize its relationshipwith NATO — the United Nations designee as the regionalorganization responsible. The Irish government requested itsparliament’s approval to apply for PfP membership and in sodoing defined the PfP as: “a voluntary, non–binding andcooperative security framework of cooperation between NATO


51


and non–members of NATO that has evolved into a majorframework for cooperation, training and preparation for UNpeacekeeping, humanitarian tasks and crisis management.”18

NATO has launched other efforts to promote cooperativesecurity, including its special relationship with Ukraine and theFounding Act with Russia. Particularly notable is that even thepreamble to the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act connectsdemocracy, that is the promotion of internal liberal democraticvalues, with cooperative security:

The Russian Federation, on the one hand, andthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization and itsmember States, on the other, hereinafterreferred to as Russia and NATO, based on anenduring political commitment undertaken atthe highest political level, will build together alasting and inclusive peace in the Euro–Atlanticarea on the principles of democracy andcooperative security. [emphasis added]

NATO has also asserted its promotion of cooperative securityin Europe. The final communiqué from its December 1997Brussels ministerial asserts:

As Foreign Ministers, we attach particularimportance to the far–reaching, positivepolitical developments, which have occurredsince 1991 in the security landscape in Europeand to new cooperative security structures,which are being built throughout theEuro–Atlantic region.

We reaffirm our commitment to furtherstrengthening the OSCE as a primary

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instrument for early warning, conflictprevention, crisis management andpost–conflict rehabilitation as well as forenhancing cooperative security and advancingdemocracy and human rights. NATOenlargement is linked to and part of acomprehensive process which comprises thefollowing elements: broad cooperation withPartners within the Euro–Atlantic PartnershipCouncil and the enhanced Partnership for PeaceProgramme; a strong, stable and enduringpartnership with Russia based on the FoundingAct on Mutual Relations, Cooperation andSecurity between NATO and the RussianFederation, signed in Paris on 27th May 1997;a distinctive Partnership with Ukraine, whichwas founded by means of the Charter, signed inMadrid on 9th July 1997; and an enhancedMediterranean Dialogue. All these elementscontribute to establishing the foundation of aEuro–Atlantic area characterized bycooperative security and reliable stability, andare supplemented by the work of the OSCE(Organization for Security and Co–operation inEurope), in particular on a ‘Common andComprehensive Security Model for the 21stCentury’ in accordance with the decision of theOSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996. [emphasis added]

Expanding on the theme of cooperative security, NATOSecretary–General Javier Solana identified the,

. . . various elements of a comprehensiveapproach to cooperative security as a


53


wide–ranging and continually deepeningprogramme of military and defence–relatedpractical cooperation through the Partnershipfor Peace; the establishment of a new forum —the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council — toprovide for regular, intensified politicalconsultations with all Partners on a wide rangeof security issues, from peace support to policyplanning; new and dynamic partnerships withRussia and Ukraine; and the process of openingNATO to new members.

Solana views the Partnership for Peace program as the“flagship” of NATO’s program for cooperation. He alsostresses the importance of NATO enlargement in furtheringcooperative security:

An enlarged NATO gives us better means —and, indeed, greater incentives — for Partnerswishing to join NATO to deepen their ties withthe Alliance as well as with other Partners. Theprospect of NATO membership has alreadyproven it to be an important instigator ofdomestic reform and improved bilateralrelations among countries of Central andEastern Europe. And that cannot but contributeto building cooperative security.

Solana argues that NATO has redefined itself based on adefinition of security that sharply contrasts with one usedduring the cold war:

In broadening our concept of security, in takingon new roles and missions, in carrying out wide

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adaptation, the NATO of today is no longerabout defending against large–scale attack. It isabout building security within societies,creating the conditions of stability in whichrespect for human rights, consolidation ofdemocratic reforms and economic patterns oftrade and investment can flourish. . . . In short,it is about a new cooperative security order forthe Euro–Atlantic region.19

He is not alone in seeing a fundamental change in thesecurity basis for Europe. Jozef Sestak, State Secretary at theSlovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foresees a Europe dividedinto two security systems: one, a collective security systembased on a NATO core; and, the other, a cooperative securitysystem made up of broader NATO cooperative programs, suchas the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE,and the Western European Union (WEU).20 Solana and othersseem to be moving away from a state–centric view of securityto an individual–based definition of security favored byliberals. NATO had become a cooperative security system longbefore Solana used the term to describe NATO activities.These efforts at promoting liberal order in Europe were anecessary precursor for theinterventions in Bosnia andKosovo.

NATO’s humanitarian interventionin Kosovo represents a cooperativesecurity enforcement action. NATOacted without a UN mandate. Thisoccurred in part because the normfor action did not exist at the UN Security Council, while it didexist among NATO members. Another indication that NATO


55

NATO’shumanitarianintervention inKosovo representsa cooperativesecurityenforcement action


serves as a security community is the failure of repeated andconsiderable tensions between Turkey and Greece to lead towar.

OSCE — A Venue for Cooperative Security? TheOrganization for Security and Co–operation in Europe differsfrom NATO and the EU. OSCE members do not form a securitycommunity and do not hold common values — despite theofficial adherence to the Helsinki Principles. The OSCE regionextends from Vancouver to Vladivostok and is quite diverse,providing little basis for a common identity. Nevertheless,despite what appears to be infertile ground, many view theOSCE as the quintessential cooperative security example. TheOSCE Handbook lists its priorities as follows:

– to consolidate the participating State’s common values and help in building fully democratic civil societies based on the rule of law;

– to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war torn areas;

– to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new political, economic, or social divisions by promoting a co–operative system of security.

The Handbook itself is rife with cooperative securityreferences:

The comprehensive nature of security in theOSCE context is closely related to theOrganization’s co–operative approach tosolving problems. Starting from the premisethat security is indivisible, participating Stateshave a common stake in the security of Europe

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and should therefore co–operate to preventcrises from happening and/or to reduce the riskof already existing crises getting worse. Theunderlying assumption is that co–operation canbring benefits to all participating States, whileinsecurity in one State or region can affect thewell–being of all. The key is to work together,achieving security together with others, notagainst them.

‘We are determined to learn from the tragediesof the past and to translate our vision of aco–operative future into reality by creating acommon security space free of dividing lines inwhich all States are equal partners. We faceserious challenges, but we face them together.’— Lisbon Declaration on a Common andComprehensive Security Model for Europe forthe Twenty–first century, December 1996. 21

OSCE’s drive for cooperative security appears most clearlyin the efforts to further politico–military security. Guidelinessuch as the OSCE’s Charter on European Security or the Codeof Conduct on politico–military aspects promote the notionthat security should be accomplished jointly without any onestate achieving an advantage. Some analysts suggest that theseagreements have no teeth, given that states would not besanctioned if they did not honor them.

All the OSCE does is cooperative security, in that it is aconsensus–based organization. However, the OSCE shouldalso be viewed as a norm–setting agency. States, and evenother international organizations, are free to participate as theysee fit. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999, a


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“Platform for Co–operativeSecurity” was embedded within theCharter for European Security. Theplatform offers the OSCE as acoordinating framework forinternational organizations and forstates wishing to work in asub–regional context. The OSCE ismore like a bazaar than a factory —

states and international organizations can pick and choose howthey wish to cooperate.

Despite these strengths, the OSCE does not meet all of thecriteria for a security community. Some OSCE members haverecently been at war with each other and plan for suchcontingencies in the future. The OSCE’s strength lies inproviding an opportunity for states to cooperate, if and whenthey wish, setting regional benchmark norms. Nevertheless, itis no accident that those states that most frequently exploit theOSCE capabilities come from the western end of the Eurasianland mass. European countries merely proceed to cooperate onsecurity matters based on existing memberships in institutionsthat are a part of the OSCE.

ASEAN — Limited Cooperative Security WithoutDemocracy. The Association for South East Asian Nationsdoes not seem particularly fertile ground for developing asecurity community or promoting cooperative security.Arguably, none of its member countries is a mature liberaldemocracy. ASEAN member states do not have commonforms of governments, and, in fact, have very little in commonwith each other, prompting one observer to distinguish them asa “chaos of cultures.”22 Nevertheless, no war has occurred

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OSCE is more likea bazaar than a

factory — statesand international

organizations canpick and choosehow they wish to

cooperate


between these states since 1964. The ability of the countrieswithin this region to deal with their security problemsconstructively and cooperatively reflects the continuedcommitment of their respective elites.

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, andThailand formed ASEAN in 1967 as a forum for regionalcooperation, mindful of the recent regional conflict.Indonesia’s failed policy of confrontation with Malaysia andSingapore, resulting in Sukarno’s 1965 fall, allowed regionalpolitics to be put on a more cooperative footing. Its neighborsconceivably wanted to lock Indonesia into the ASEANcooperative security structure, just as France wanted to bindGermany into European cooperation after World War II. TheUnited States exit from the region in 1974, with the end of theVietnam War, raised fears of Vietnamese aggression. The firstASEAN summit took place in 1976. Brunei joined ASEAN in1984; Vietnam joined in 1995. Laos and Myanmar followed in1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

The norms that bind countries in this region appeared in the1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia:

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non–interference in the internal affairs of one another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;f. Effective cooperation among themselves.


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One scholar, Amitav Acharya, argues that the originalmembers of ASEAN diverged considerably in theirperceptions of external threat. However, all agreed thatinternal insurgency, in particular communist–backed internalinsurgency, posed the major threat.23 ASEAN membersrealized that interstate war would only exacerbate the political,ideological, and economic conditions feeding these internalconflicts. Cross–border cooperation was required to contain, ifnot defeat, insurgent groups.

Archarya also argues that “the practice of multilateralism,the ASEAN norms, the ‘ASEAN Way,’ and principle ofregional autonomy constitute the basis of ASEAN’s collectiveidentity.”24 The term “ASEAN Way” refers to the perceptionthat regional disputes should be solved by consensus, outsideof formal mechanisms. In essence, disputes should be solved“among friends” and not by outsiders — an approach toconflict management that promotes ASEAN’s regionalautonomy.

ASEAN’s sense of collective identity has been maintainedthrough its relatively exclusive membership. Remaining

largely within Southeast Asia,ASEAN has deflected the desires ofcountries such as Sri Lanka to join.

ASEAN, thus, contrasts sharplywith Western Europe as a securitycommunity. ASEAN governmentsare either quasi–authoritarian ortransitional democracies, notconsolidated liberal democracies.The economic material basis forregional cooperation is quite small.

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ASEAN is asecurity

communitybecause its

members, nationalpolitical elites,

have chosencooperation over

competition toaccomplish

regional security


Intraregional exports represent only a third of all exports, afigure consistent with the export–driven growth strategy oftheir economies. Institutionalism is quite limited — there areno supranational organizations in ASEAN and nothing tocompare with the EU’s acquis communitaire. Nevertheless,ASEAN has become a security community largely through itsnational, political elites’ efforts to avoid competition and tochoose cooperation as a means for assuring regional security.

The ASEAN states have, in fact, made material steps towardcementing their relationship. In 1992, ASEAN agreed toestablish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) committed tothe gradual lowering of tariffs by 2008. This date wassubsequently moved forward to 2002. Trade between ASEANcountries grew from $44.2 billion in 1993 to $73.4 billion in1998.25 Before the 1997 financial crisis, intra–regional tradehad an annual growth rate of 30%, compared to 19% forexternal trade. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 financialcrisis, intra–regional trade contracted much more sharply thanexternal trade. Attempts to extend AFTA to include NewZealand and Australia have met strong resistance.

The lack of strong, underlying, common values sharplylimits ASEAN’s effectiveness. No war has broken out amongits members. It has brought into its fold former threats such asVietnam. Yet, ASEAN has not developed a common positionon such regional threats to stability as the situation in EastTimor. Indonesia invaded East Timor, a former Portuguesecolony, in 1975 and annexed it in 1976. The United Nationsnever recognized this annexation. On August 30, 1999, EastTimor voted for independence. Anti–independence militiasperpetrated a blood bath, destroying East Timor’sinfrastructure, displacing 600,000 of its original 850,000population, and convincing Australia to lead a multinationalpeacekeeping mission into East Timor. The second largest


61


contingent, 1,500 troops (to Australia’s 4,500), came from anASEAN member, Thailand. The Philippines also sent troops.

ASEAN clearly failed to develop a coherent East Timorpolicy, particularly because one of its founding members,Indonesia, considered East Timor to be an internal matter.ASEAN’s failure to form a cohesive policy contrasts sharplywith the readiness of NATO to act in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, several commentators see a growingconvergence of values among the ASEAN states. Adevelopment of common values bodes well for futurecooperative security. In particular, ASEAN Secretary–GeneralRodolfo Severino said in his keynote address at the ninthannual conference of the Harvard Project for Asian andInternational Relations in Beijing on August 29, 2000:

Political diversity is inevitable, necessary, andeven desirable. But in the light of globalizationand regional economic integration, in the faceof global competition for markets andinvestments, some political convergence willhave to take place, within Southeast Asia andelsewhere, and it will likely be in the directionof greater openness, greater freedom, andgreater pluralism. It will proceed at differentpaces, and political diversity will remain. Butthe direction is emerging into view.Globalization and the technological revolutionwill also have a significant impact on thediversity and convergence of cultures.26

The Future of Cooperative Security

The success of cooperative security hinges upon severalfactors. Above all, it requires the belief that certain countries

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share a common future, and thatcooperation offers the best possiblemeans of achieving their nationalinterests. Historically, theperception of a common threat wasthe most frequent, as well as the mosteffective, basis for establishing asecurity system. This was surely thecase for the Concert of Europe,NATO, the EC/EU, and ASEAN.

Because national elites were willing to work together in theface of a common threat, they developed a common identitythat transcended national borders and intensified their sense ofa common purpose. Once formed, that new identity can bequite tenacious, permitting security arrangements to outlivethe threats that first brought them together. Just as the Concertof Europe long outlasted the danger of another Frenchrevolution, so NATO and the EU have transformed themselvessince the fall of communism and the full integration ofGermany into Europe.

Today, the threats to Europe are increasingly transnationalphenomenas. They include corruption, organized crime,migration, epidemic diseases, environmental catastrophes, andterrorism. Such complex problems can only be overcome byunited action across national frontiers. To the extent thatthreatened states work together, they gain a critical awarenessof their common future, and we can expect cooperativesecurity to become the norm.

In Western Europe and North America, cooperative securityhas become a way of life that is steadily moving to the east andthe southeast. The security communities of these regions draw


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Cooperativesecurity requires abelief in a commonfuture and thatcooperation offersthe best possiblemeans of achievingnational interests


their unusual strength from one main factor: they consist ofconsolidated, liberal democratic states. As securitycommunities, both NATO and — even more so — the EU havedeveloped dense networks of multilateral institutions thatfoster the denationalization of security policy and serve theneeds of entire regions. It is no accident that NATO and the EUboth promote liberal democracy. They do so because theybelieve, in part, that security is better assured cooperativelyamong countries that have adopted the liberal democratic formof government.

Interdependence leads to a common identity — especiallyeconomic interdependence. The fact that Central and EasternEuropean countries seek validation of their European identitythrough EU membership, while several countries find itimportant to actively reject their Balkan identity, is indicativeof this strong need for an economically protective commonidentity.

At the same time, a need for multilateral approaches tosecurity builds toward cooperative security. This is especiallytrue among small countries that need to pool resources. TheBaltic countries provide a good example, and recent effortsmade in Southeastern Europe are promising. Consensualdecision practices often aid this multilateral security approachto establishing a common identity, and hence the felt need forcooperative security. ASEAN countries share only twocommon factors: a geographical propinquity and a belief in acommon future, but it has succeeded as a cooperative securityunit.

Cooperative security has been increasingly adopted as amechanism for furthering national security. As the prisoner’sdilemma illustrates, countries will behave individually in a

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rational manner, but in so doing will act against their ownlong–term interests. Relying on self–help and old–stylebalancing behavior has given way to cooperative efforts topromote stability. Even among states that lack common values,cooperative security is possible. ASEAN is an importantpractical example. Cooperative security has been approachedon a case–by–case basis, but since the end of World War IIseveral security communities have developed — most notablyin Western Europe.

The EU in contrast with ASEAN, gives credence to the factthat common values and a common economic destiny leads tomore cooperative security. The more dense the interactionamong states and their citizens, the more they will find waysto further their security cooperatively. It is the EU members ofthe OSCE who take the organization most seriously as a venuefor cooperative security. Should they wish, non–democraticOSCE members can participate in the OSCE’s cooperativeopportunities. However, it is clear that those members of theOSCE already united by the common values of liberaldemocracy best use the organization. Liberal democracy maynot be necessary for cooperative security to begin or tocontinue, but it expands the range of options and benefits for all.

Since military force usedunilaterally has become largelydiscredited as an instrument ofpolicy, countries will band togetherto use force collectively to furthersecurity in their immediateneighborhood. Moreover they willtake other steps, economic andotherwise, to improve their security environment to lessen thelikelihood that new threats will arise. Older traditionalconcepts of security have proved inadequate to deal with these


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Modern securitychallenges lead

inexorably to theincreasing use of

cooperativesecurity


issues. The nature of modern security challenges leadsinexorably to the increasing use of cooperative security. �

Endnotes

1. David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of InternationalStudies, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 3-26. 2. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol,”Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4, December 1952, p. 485.3. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security.” 4. Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1977, pp. 171–201.5. As cited in Andrew Butfoy, Common Security and Strategic Reform: ACritical Analysis, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.6. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books,1984.7. Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.8. The French first used gas in grenades in 1914. The Germans followed bycarrying out the first large–scale chemical attack on April 22, 1915 atYpres, Belgium. Chlorine gas was released from gas cylinders along sixkilometers of the front line. The Germans claimed that they did not violatethe 1899 agreement because they did not use projectiles.9. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D.Steinbrunner, A NewConcept of Cooperative Security, Washington, DC: The BrookingsInstitution Press, 1993.10. Carsten Holbrad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and BritishInternational Theory, New York: Longman, 1970, p. 124.11. Holbrad, The Concert of Europe, p. 7.12. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.13. Quoted in Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the WestEuropean Non–War Community,” in Emmanuel Adler and MichaelBarnett, eds., Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998, p. 83.14. Statement by Harold Macmillan, British MP, quoted at:http://www.liv-coll.ac.uk/europetrip/Europe%20journey/schuman.htm;accessed December 2000.

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15. The Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950; available online athttp://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html; accessedDecember 2000.16. Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Jerzy Buzek, “Priorities of thePolish Foreign Policy,” speech at the Paaskivi Society, Helsinki, November 4,1999; available online at http://polcon.tripod.com/buzek.html; accessedDecember 2000.17. Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad, June 26, 1997. Translation by ForeignBroadcasting Information Service, FBIS–WEU–97–177.18. Irish Department of Foreign Affairs Press Release, October 13, 1999;available online at http://www.irelandemb.org/press/46.html; accessedDecember 2000.19. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, “NATO's Role in BuildingCooperative Security in Europe and Beyond,” speech at the YomiuriSymposium on International Economy, Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997.20. Jozewf Sestak, State Secretary at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs,“Harbingers of Gloom Will Not Help,” interview by Leopold Moravcik,Bratislava Pravda, July 18, 1997.21. Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe(OSCE) Handbook, Prague: 2000, p. 17–18; available online athttp://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/index.htm; accessed January2001.22. Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management inSoutheast Asia,” in Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, p. 203.23. Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in SoutheastAsia,” p. 203.24. Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in SoutheastAsia,” p. 213.25. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update, November 1999; availableonline at http://www.asean.or.id/general/publication/afta-upd.htm;accessed September 2000.26. ASEAN Web Site, http://www.asean.or.id/; accessed September 2000.


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Acronyms

ASEAN – Association for South East Asian NationsCENTO – Central Treaty OrganizationCFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)CSCE – Conference on Co–operation and Security in EuropeEAPC – Euro–Atlantic Partnership CouncilEC – European CommunityECSC – European Coal and Steel CommissionEU – European UnionMAP – Membership Action Plan (PfP)NACC – North Atlantic Cooperation CouncilNATO – North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO – Non–governmental OrganizationOSCE – Organization for Co–operation and Security in EuropePJC – NATO–Russia Permanent Joint CouncilPfP – Partnership for PeaceSEATO – South East Asia Treaty OrganizationUN – United NationsUNSC – United Nations Security CouncilWEU – Western European UnionWMD – Weapons of Mass DestructionWTO – World Trade Organization


CThe George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Dr. Robert KennedyDirector

MG (Ret.) Michael J. McCarthy, USAFDeputy Director

MG (Ret.) Franz Werner, GEDeputy Director

Ambassador Victor JackovichAssociate Director for International Affairs

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. Gary L. GuertnerDean

Dr. G. Paul Holman, Contributing EditorProfessor of National Security Studies

Ms. Sara C. HolmanEditor, Marshall Center Papers

Mr. Michael J. McNultyDistribution

Marshall Center Papers Editorial Board Reviewers

Prof. Dr. Heinz GaertnerDr. Jacob Kipp


The Marshall Center Papers

No. 1 - Europe’s New Defense Ambitions:Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia

by Peter van HamApril 2000

No. 2 - The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned

from Kosovo and Chechnya by Alexei G. Arbatov

July 2000


The Marshall Center PapersEditorial Advisory Board

Prof. Evgeniy BazhanovVice-President, Russian Diplomatic Academy

Prof. Dr. Wilfried von BredowInstitut für Politikwissenschaft,Universität Marburg

COL Joseph R. Cerami Chairman, Dept. of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Dr. Paul CornishCentre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Dr. Christopher DandekerHead, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Dr. Robert H. DorffDepartment of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Prof. Dr. Heinz GaertnerInstitut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien

Prof. Dr. Ferenc GazdagDirector, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest

Dr. Thomas B. GrasseyDirector, US Naval War College Press

Prof. Dr. Ali M. KaraosmanogluChairman, Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent University

Dr. Jacob KippSenior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office

US Army Combined Arms CenterDr. Charles A. Kupchan

Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, WashingtonDr. Friedemann Müller

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, BerlinDr. Frances Pilch

Political Science Department., US Air Force AcademyDr. Andrew L. Ross

Strategic Research Department, US Naval War CollegeDr. Dmitri Trenin

Deputy Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow CenterDr. Thanos Veremis

Constantine Karamanlis Professor in Hellenic and SoutheasternEuropean Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Tufts UniversityProf. Dr. Peter M. E. Volten

Director, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen Dr. Stephen L. White

Department of Politics, University of Glasgow


Cooperative Security:New Horizons for International Stability

by Richard Cohen, Professor of NATO & European SecurityArchitectures, and Michael Mihalka, Professor of EasternEuropean Security Affairs, George C. Marshall European Centerfor Security Studies

No single trend, over the past decade, deserves more carefulanalysis than the remarkable growth of cooperation among thecountries of Eurasia and North America. This Marshall CenterPaper presents two different approaches to the topic ofCooperative Security.

Richard Cohen presents a compelling and highly original model ofCooperative Security. He offers a powerful vision of how NATOshould develop in the future and urges closer contact betweenNATO, the European Union, and Russia. Michael Mihalkabroadens the analysis of Cooperative Security and traces itshistory. He argues that the success of Cooperative Securitydepends on spreading liberal democracy, intensifying economicties, and fostering multilateral security arrangements. Thesecontrasting essays explore the prospects for a new era ofinternational relations, characterized by reassurance instead ofdeterrence, cooperation as opposed to confrontation, and mutualbenefit in place of unilateral advantage.

The Marshall Center Web Site:http://www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIBApril 2001


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