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KONDA

GEZİ REPORT

Public perception of the ‘Gezi protests’

Who were the people at Gezi Park?

June 5, 2014

KONDA Gezi Report / June 5, 2014 / 94


CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 4

2. PROTESTERS IN GEZİ PARK.......................................................................................... 5

2.1. How was the Field Survey Conducted? .............................................................................................. 5 2.2. Profile of the Protesters in Gezi Park ................................................................................................. 6 2.3. Affiliation ........................................................................................................................................ 16 2.4. Motivation for Coming to the Park ................................................................................................... 19

3. KONDA JULY’13 BAROMETER: Theme Report on ‘Perception and Evaluation of the Gezi

Park Protests’ ..................................................................................................................... 22

3.1. News Source and Use of Social Media ............................................................................................ 25 3.2. Change in the Course of Events ...................................................................................................... 33 3.3. Opinion on the Gezi Protests ........................................................................................................... 39 3.4. Opinion on the Actors Involved in the Gezi Protests ......................................................................... 41 3.5. Allegations about the Protests ........................................................................................................ 58 3.6. TV Channel Preferences and Opinions on the Allegations ................................................................ 68 3.7. Identifying the protesters ................................................................................................................ 75 3.8. Who are ‘the foreign conspirators’?................................................................................................. 80 3.9. Research ID of the KONDA July’13 Barometer ................................................................................. 82

4. EVALUATIONS .............................................................................................................. 84

4.1. On the use of communication technologies ..................................................................................... 84 4.2. What we can learn from Gezi Park .................................................................................................. 88


1. INTRODUCTION

This report aims to present a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the Gezi protests, a

significant milestone in the history of social movements in Turkey, by investigating who

the people at Gezi Park were and how the Gezi Protests were perceived by the general

public.

The data employed in the report were collected via the Gezi Park survey conducted in Gezi

Park on June 6-8, 2013, with 4411 participants, and the field survey conducted for the

KONDA July’13 Barometer1 on July 6-7, 2013, with 2629 participants in 28 provinces,

where respondents were carefully selected to represent the overall distribution of the

adult population in Turkey. Other data referenced in the report were compiled from

various other field surveys carried out for KONDA Barometers.

This report is divided into three sections. The first section is the presentation report for the

Gezi Park survey, titled “Who are they, why are they there, and what do they demand?”2

that was released to the public last year, with the aim of presenting the similarities and

differences between the profiles of the protesters and the profile of society in Turkey.

The second section is the theme report titled “Perception and Evaluation of the Gezi Protests”,

that was included in the KONDA Barometer for July 2013. This theme report provides

an in-depth analysis of how the Gezi Protests were perceived and evaluated by the

general public in Turkey.

The third section provides an evaluation of the Gezi Protests, and features analyses and

commentary on “Generation Y” and the use of social media, which were widely

discussed in relation to the Gezi Protests. We hope that this report and the analyses

provided will make a positive contribution towards an accurate and objective

evaluation of the Gezi Protests, which we believe will make up a significant chapter in

our social history.

1 KONDA Research & Consultancy has been conducting monthly field surveys since 2010, on a sample

population that is representative of society in Turkey in general. As part of this project, the Konda Barometer, a

monthly research report which provides an overall analysis of trends in public perception of political and social

issues, is shared with the subscribers of the Barometer reports. In addition to questions directed to

respondents on a regular basis, a specific topic is analyzed thoroughly in each month's report. Reports are

available for public access at www.konda.com.tr, and updates are posted at

https://twitter.com/kondaarastirma. 2 The presentation is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zP6TnfALQU.

http://www.konda.com.tr/

https://twitter.com/kondaarastirma

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zP6TnfALQU


2. PROTESTERS IN GEZİ PARK

The Gezi Protests started during the last week of May 2013 and peaked on May 30th

and 31st. Groups of protesters, who clashed with the police to reach Taksim square

from various routes, occupied the square in the afternoon on June 1st, 2013. Over the

next 15 days, the police were completely absent from the Gezi Park. During this period,

the park turned into a center of assembly, governed by the initiative of civil society.

Since then, various terms have been in circulation to refer to ‘the people in Gezi Park’.

We know that the Gezi protests were not confined to the park, as Taksim Square and

İstiklal Street reflected similar characteristics during the protests. We are also aware

that Gezi protests grew in scale as a social movement, spreading into other cities from

İstanbul. However, the fact that the park was both the starting point and the center of

the protests leads the conclusion that the people could be representative of society at

large.

As KONDA, we concluded that the best method to identify the people in Gezi Park and

to understand their demands was to talk to the people in Gezi Park. Furthermore, we

wished to publish a survey which would provide a scientific explanation to the

arguments revolving around “Gezi Park” and help to eradicate biased statements

about the protest and the protesters. The findings and analyses of the survey are

presented below for your review.

2.1. How was the Field Survey Conducted?

As KONDA, we organized a field survey, only 6 days after

the park was occupied by civilians, with the

purpose of revealing the profile of the people in

Gezi Park during that period.

4411 respondents were interviewed during a non-stop

shift which lasted from 4 p.m. on June 6, Thursday

until 10 p.m. on June 8, Saturday. The interviews

were conducted only within the confines of Gezi

Park. As the map on the right shows, the park was

virtually split into 10 different zones. In each zone,

one poll taker conducted a maximum of 40

surveys within a 2-hour interval. The work

continued until 3 a.m. and recommenced at 8

a.m. in the next morning.

Respondents, who were interviewed in person or asked

to fill out the survey under the supervision of the

poll taker, were not requested to provide their


personal details. Our purpose was to capture a high-resolution snapshot of the people

who were in Gezi Park on those days for different reasons.

The section of the report you will read below presents the multi-dimensional demographic

profile of the people who were in Gezi Park, and provides an analysis of their overall

attitude towards the Gezi protests.

2.2. Profile of the Protesters in Gezi Park

We will first evaluate the respondents on the basis of gender, age and level of political

organization, and then compare their profile to the average profile for Turkey.

2.2.1. Gender distribution

According to the findings of the research, 50.8 percent of the protesters were female and

49.2 percent were male. Therefore, the gender distribution of the protesters in Gezi

Park was more or less in parallel to the population of Turkey on average. (It is worth

noting here that, according to KONDA datasets, 48.8 percent of the population in

Turkey is female and 51.2 percent male, while the gender distribution in İstanbul is

51.5 percent female and 48.5 percent male). Although we do not have data on the

gender distribution of the people who participated in the protests throughout Turkey,

the gender distribution of the protesters in the park certainly reflected the gender

distribution in İstanbul and in Turkey. In other words, those who came to Gezi Park

represented society in Turkey in terms of gender distribution.


It is unfortunately not possible to deduce whether the participation of women in the Gezi

protests was higher or lower in comparison to their participation in other social

movements. Nevertheless, we were still able to observe that the corresponding rates

of political or organizational affiliation for women and men who participated in the

protests were different the Turkey average. 20.2 percent of the women and 22.1

percent of the men who participated in the protests were affiliated with 'a political

party, formation or a non-governmental organization, such as an association or

platform'. This data confirms once again that the gender distribution for political or

organizational affiliation is balanced.

Female; 48.8

51.5

Female; 50.8

Male; 51.2

Male; 48.5

Male; 49.2

0 % 50 % 100 %

Turkey

İstanbul

Gezi

Gender distribution


2.2.2. Age

According to our Gezi Park survey, the average age of the respondents was 28. We observe

once again that the protesters are representative of society in Turkey in terms of

average age. It should also be reminded that, according to KONDA datasets, the

average age is 30.3 in Turkey and 30.1 in İstanbul. Based on this data, it is possible

to assert that the Gezi Park protesters represented society in Turkey in terms of age

distribution.

Average age in Gezi Park was 28

However, a detailed comparison of distribution by age groups reveals deviations from the

overall distribution in society in Turkey. Accordingly, the age groups of below 20 and

above 36 were represented to a lesser extent in Gezi Park, in comparison the general

population of Turkey and İstanbul. In other words, the ratio of the number of protesters

from these age groups to the total number of protesters is lower than the ratio of the

same age group to the overall population of Turkey. On the other hand, the age groups

of 21-25, 26-30 and 31-35 were represented at a higher rate than the country-wide

distribution for these groups. This means that the percentage of protesters in these

age groups in the total number of protesters in the park was higher than the share of

the same age group in the overall population of Turkey.

5.5 16.5 21-25; 30.8 26-30; 20.3 10.8 16.1

0 % 50 % 100 %

Gezi

Age Distribution

17 or below 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36 or above

18–28 ; 27.9

28.6

29–43 ; 37.9

35.3

44 +; 34.2

36.0

0 % 50 % 100 %

İstanbul

Turkey

18–28 29–43 44 +


33 percent of the population in Turkey is 20 years old or younger, while only 22 percent of the

Gezi Park protesters were 20 years old or younger, as revealed by the survey findings.

Thus, we can question to what extent the Gezi protests can be labelled as a “youth

movement”, in contrary to the overriding public perception. The data reveals that the

majority of the protesters who were 20 years old or younger were between the ages of

18-20. Only 5.5 percent of the protesters in Gezi Park were 17 years old or younger,

while 16.5 percent of the protesters were between the ages of 18-20. Therefore, we

can deduce that the majority of protesters in the park did not comprise of high school

students or college students in their freshman or sophomore year.

Does this mean that the young people did not come to the park? When we carefully analyze

participation by the age groups of 21-25 and 26-30, we can observe that the majority

of the protesters in Gezi Park fall within these two groups. 30.8 percent of the

protesters were between the ages of 21-25, and 20.3 percent were between the ages

of 26-30. In short, one out of every two people in the park was between the ages of

21-30. Although these two groups constitute 13 percent (21-25 year olds) and 9.1

percent (26-30 year olds) of the population in Turkey, they were represented at a much

higher rate in the park. It should be underlined that the age group of 26-30 is smaller

than the age group of 21-25 among the overall population in Turkey.

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

17

-

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

+

Age distribution of the protesters in the park

Protesters in Gezi Park İstanbul


*For example, 12 percent of those in the park were both between the ages of 21-25 and employed at the same

time.

As seen on the graph above, 30 percent of the protesters in the park were between the ages

of 21-30 and employed.

In other words, although the participation rate for those between the ages of 26-30 is lower

than the rate for those between the ages of 21-25, the ratio of the 26-30 age group to

the overall population Turkey is also lower. Therefore, both groups were actually

represented ‘equally/at the same ratio’ among the protesters.

Thus, we can arrive at the following conclusion: It is true that the majority of those who

participated in the Gezi protests were younger than 30; however, this is a broad

generalization which does not offer any detailed insight on the characteristics of the

young people who were in the park. The majority of the young people who came to the

park were not high school students or college students in their junior or sophomore

year; on the contrary, they were college students in their final years, recent college

graduates or young professionals (high school graduates who were employed are also

included).

Finally, we can observe the most significant difference in terms of representation in the group

of people who are above the age of 36. Although 37 percent of the population in Turkey

is 36 years old or older, only 16.1 percent of protesters were as old.

2.2.3. Educational attainment level and employment status

Educational background and employment status are the two main characteristics where the

protesters and the overall population of Turkey (and İstanbul's) are the most different

from each other. While 6 percent of Turkey's population and 4.7 percent of İstanbul's

4

7

9

17

12

3

2

16

13

5

4

1

1

2

0 20 40

45 or above

36-44

31-35

26-30

21-25

18-20

17 or below

Employment status by age groups

(distribution by age groups)*

Employed Student Non-employed / Unemployed

0 % 20 % 40 %


population are illiterate, only 0.3 percent of those who came to the park were illiterate.

Primary-school graduates make up the vast majority of those with formal education,

both in Turkey and İstanbul (two out of every five people); however, only 2.7 percent of

the protesters in the park were primary-school graduates.

One tenth of Turkey, but half of Gezi protesters are college graduates

In addition, the rate of those who are currently pursuing high school or college/university

education among the population of Turkey and İstanbul are 12 percent and 13.9,

respectively; but only one out of every five people in the park pursued

college/university education after graduating from high school (42.8 percent college

graduate, 12.9 percent master's/PhD student or graduate).

In terms of employment status, we have observed that the rate of students in the park was

much higher than the rate of students among the overall population in Turkey, whereas

the retired and housewives were represented at lower rates. In Turkey, students

comprise 7.4 percent of the population, while one out of every three people (36.6

percent) who participated in the Gezi protests was a student. 13.8 percent of the total

population is retired, while only 3.5 percent of the protesters in the park were retired.

Likewise, housewives make up 32.2 percent of the population of Turkey, while only 2

percent of the protesters in the park were housewives. If we were to compare the data

on the employment status of the protesters in relation to their demographic

characteristics, it would not be surprising to encounter a higher rate of students and a

lower rate of the retired among the protesters in comparison to their respective

country-wide rates.

6.0

4.7

2.8

2.1

37.9

39.5

2.7

14.3

14.4

5.7

26.8

25.4

34.5

11.1

12.5

42.8

0.9

1.4

12.9

0 % 50 % 100 %

Turkey

İstanbul

Gezi

Educational attainment level (the highest degree attained)

Illıterate Literate without degree Primary school

Junior school High school College

Masters


According to KONDA datasets, the rate of the employed in Turkey and İstanbul are 40.8 and

40.3, respectively; however, slightly more than half (51.8 percent) of those who came

to the park were employed. Observing the employment data further, we can see that

among the employed protesters, 15.4 percent worked in the private sector, which is

much higher than the rate of private sector employees in Turkey (4.8 percent) and

İstanbul (7.8 percent). Likewise, the self-employed (including doctors and architects)

were represented at higher rates than the Turkey average. While only 1.3 percent of

the population in Turkey is self-employed, the rate of the self-employed among the

protesters in the park reached 5.5 percent.

40.3

40.8

51.8

7.4

6.8

36.6

13.8

14.4

3.5

32.2

32.9

2.0

6.2

5.0

6.2

0 % 50 % 100 %

Turkey

İstanbul

Gezi

Employment status

Employed Student Retired Housewife Unemployed


The figures for workers and farmers among the protesters in the park also reveal striking

findings. Workers comprise 15 percent of the population of Turkey and 11 percent of

İstanbul's population; however, they made up only 6 percent of the people in the park.

Similarly, farmers were represented at a much lower percentage than the Turkey

average (5.4 percent), and only 0.2 percent of the protesters in the park were farmers.

Naturally, this is related to the fact that the share of the agriculture sector in İstanbul

is quite low, where only 0.3 percent of the city's population lives on farming. Therefore,

although the rate of farmers in the park was below the Turkey average, it was quite

close to that in İstanbul.

4

7

33

14

8

1

5

15

8

3

5

37

2

3

17

5

2

6

15

4

0 20 40

Unemployed, seeking

employment

Student

Housewife

Retired

Employed, other

Self employed

Small retailer

Worker

White collar

Public officer

Employment status

Gezi

İstanbul

0 % 20 % 40 %


2.2.4. Where did the protesters come from?

Three districts stand out when we investigate which parts of İstanbul the protesters come

from. Protesters who came from Kadıköy, Beşiktaş and Şişli comprised one third of the

park protesters. This is not a very high rate when we consider that there are about 40

districts in İstanbul. 70 percent of the protesters in the park came to the park from the

other districts of İstanbul.

District Percentage

Kadıköy 13.4

Şişli 11.4

Beşiktaş 7.3

Üsküdar 5.8

Fatih 5.4

Beyoğlu 5.1

Sarıyer 4.6

Bakırköy 4.1

Bahçelievler 3.7

Ataşehir 3.5

Maltepe 3.4

Kağıthane 2.6

Küçükçekmece 2.3

Avcılar 2.2

Kartal 2.2

Eyüp 2.0

Beylikdüzü 1.9

Ümraniye 1.6

Başakşehir 1.6

Gaziosmanpaşa 1.5

Bağcılar 1.3

Güngören 1.3

Pendik 1.3

Beykoz 1.1

Çekmeköy 1.1

Sultangazi 1.0

Bayrampaşa .8

Büyükçekmece .8

Esenler .7

Esenyurt .6

Sancaktepe .4

Tuzla .3

Sultanbeyli .3

Şile .1

Adalar .1

Silivri .1

Arnavutköy .0


As presented in the map below, the number of districts which are lighter in color - i.e. the

districts from where a lower rate of respondents came to the park - increase when we

move away from Taksim. In summary, protesters who were in Gezi Park on June 6-8

came from all quarters of İstanbul.

Which districts of İstanbul did the protesters come from?


2.3. Affiliation

21.1 percent of the protesters who participated in the Gezi protests were affiliated with 'a

political party, formation or a non-governmental organization, such as an association

or platform'. According to KONDA's Lifestyles Survey in 2008, 15 percent of the

population in Turkey is affiliated with a political party. The same survey also revealed

that 7.5 percent of the respondents were affiliated with an association other than a

professional organization. Juxtaposing these two datasets, we can argue that the level

of political or organizational affiliation among the protesters in Gezi Park - i.e. the rate

of affiliation with a political party or association/formation among the protesters -

presents similarities to country-wide figures for Turkey in general.

However, the data are not sufficient to identify to what extent political parties, associations

and formations were represented at the protests or to what extent they formally

participated in the protests. In other words, the data do not enable us to draw any

conclusions on whether the protesters came to the park in order to participate in the

activities of a political party, association or formation or not. Therefore, when the

respondents of the research were asked if 'they came to the park in order to represent

an organization or institution', the vast majority (93.6 percent) identified themselves

as 'ordinary citizens'. Therefore, we can claim that although one out of every five

protesters in the park was affiliated with a political party, association or formation, the

protesters came to the park at their sole discretion in general.

Affiliated; 21.1Not affiliated;

78.9

0 % 50 % 100 %

Are you affiliated with a political party, formation or a non-

governmental organization, such as an association or a

platform?

Ordinary citizen

93.6

Representing a

certain group 6.4

50 % 100 %

Did you come to Gezi Park as an ordinary citizen or in order

to represent a certain group, formation etc.?


Four out of every five protesters in the park were not affiliated with a political party, association

or formation; however, half of those who were not affiliated (i.e. 40 percent of

protesters) stated that they had participated in protests prior to the Gezi protests.

When the respondents were asked if they had ever participated in a protest, march or sit-in

before, 44.4 percent replied 'yes' and 55.6 replied 'no'. In other words, almost one out

of every two people in the park had participated in a protest before. Thus, we can

assume that two out of every five protesters actively participate in social

demonstrations despite being unaffiliated with any political organization or civil society

movement.

In other words, when we group the 40 percent of protesters who had previous experience with

social activism, but identified themselves as “ordinary citizens” and the 6.7 percent of

protesters who came to the park in order to represent a political party, association or

formation, we can draw the conclusion that one out of every two protesters in the park

were directly involved in social protests.

Yes 55.6 No 44.4

0 % 50 % 100 %

Have you ever participated in any protests, marches or sit-

ins prior to last week?

40 39 16 5

0 % 50 % 100 %

Political affiliation and previous participation in protests

No affiliation, participated No affiliation, did not participate

Affiliated, participated Affiliated, did not participae


Nine out of every ten protesters in Gezi Park think that they are subject to human rights

violations

At this point, we may reflect on what made the people who had never attended a protest

before participate in the protests. First of all, 62 percent of the protesters stated that

they see themselves ‘as a member of a group subject to human rights violations’. 25

percent of the protesters stated that they ‘sometimes’ feel this way. In short, 87

percent of the protesters in the park identified themselves as a member of a group

that has been directly or indirectly subject to human rights violations or unlawful

treatment. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that the vast majority of the

protesters participated in the Gezi protests at their sole discretion with this in mind

and did not represent any particular organization.

At this point, although this concerns a small group of protesters, another significant finding is

the existence of a direct proportion between the frequency of respondent participation

in the Gezi protests and the rate of affiliation with a political party, association or

formation.

For example, out of the 20.3 percent who stated that they went to the park once or twice, 18

percent were affiliated with a party, association or formation; but the rate of affiliation

reaches 26 percent among the 31 percent of protesters who had participated in the

Yes 61.9 Sometimes 24.6 No 13.5

0 % 50 % 100 %

Do you see yourself as a member of a group subject to

human rights violations?

31.0 35.6 20.3 13.0

0 % 50 % 100 %

How long have you been in the park?

I have been here since they pulled out the trees.

I stop by everyday.

I stopped by several times.

This is my first time.


protests regularly after the trees were pulled out. Finally, within the limited time frame

when the field survey was conducted, 13 percent of the protesters expressed that it

was their first time in the park. 87 percent of the protesters who came to the park for

the first time were not affiliated with any organization.

‘Politically affiliated’ individuals do not make up the majority of the protesters

Although there is no direct relation between affiliation with a political party, association or

formation and coming to the park, the rate of 'politically affiliated' protesters was higher

among those who participated in the Gezi Park protests frequently and had previous

experience with political demonstrations, but they definitely did not constitute the

majority of the protesters.

2.4. Motivation for Coming to the Park

According to the findings published in the KONDA Barometer survey dated September 2012,

14.4 percent of the respondents stated that they participate in boycotts, protests,

petitions and marches and similar political demonstrations, while 28.4 percent

responded that they would participate if necessary, and 57.2 percent said that they

would never participate in such activities. These results also do not reflect a direct

relation between affiliation with a political party, association or formation, and

participation in protests.

According to KONDA's Lifestyles Survey in 2008, 15.4 percent of society in Turkey is affiliated

with a political party. The same survey shows that 7.5 percent is affiliated with an

association, excluding professional chambers. With a rough estimate based on the

Barometer of September 2012, the percentage of respondents who had participated

or who might participate in protests among the total population is 42.2 percent.

Therefore, we can conclude that society in Turkey is polarized in terms of participation

in protests, and affiliation with a political party, association or formation would not be

Affiliated 26

21

Affiliated 18

Affiliated 13

Not affiliated 74

Not affiliated 79

Not affiliated 82

Not affiliated 87

0 % 50 % 100 %

Constantly, since

the first day

Stop by everyday

Several times

First time

Political affiliation by the frequency of coming to the park


sufficient alone to make sense of the majority of respondents' behavior who affirmed

participation in protests.

One out of every two Gezi Park protesters has prior experience with protests

As noted earlier, 44.4 percent of the protesters stated that they had participated in other

protests prior to the Gezi Park protests, while 55.6 percent said that they had no prior

participation in protests. In other words, although the vast majority (93.6 percent) of

the protesters in the park identified themselves as “ordinary citizens”, almost one out

of every two protesters in the park had participated in protests before. However, we

should not rush into establishing a direct relation between previous participation in

other protests and participation in the Gezi Park protests.

Police brutality was the turning point for half of the protesters

49.1 percent (i.e. one out of every two protesters) decided to participate in the protests after

seeing police brutality. On the same note, 73 percent of the protesters who identify

themselves as ordinary citizens decided to participate in the protests after police

brutality. So, police brutality proved to be the turning point for the majority of

protesters.

When we observe the demands of the protesters, we can see that 58.1 percent of the

protesters decided to participate in the protests due to restrictions on freedom, 37.2

of the protesters decided to participate in order to protest AK Parti and its policies, and

30.3 percent of the protesters went to the park to voice their indignation with Erdoğan's

statements and attitude. As indicated by these rates, a protester may have more than

one reason to participate in the protests. For example, 20.5 percent of the protesters

10.2 19.0 49.1 14.2 4.3 3.2

0 % 50 % 100 %

At what point did you decide to participate in the protests?

When the Taksim Project was announced

When they began removing the trees

After seeing police brutality

Upon the statements of the PM

After seeing the atmosphere in Taksim

Other


went to the park in order to protest restrictions on freedom and to express their

indignation with Erdoğan's statements and attitude.

Nine tenth of the protesters oppose the government's policies

When protesters were requested to provide a single answer to the question of what they

demanded, 34.1 percent said freedom, while 18.4 percent stated that they came to

Gezi Park to protest the violation of human rights and to demand for their rights. It

appears that the demand for “freedom” was the primary motivation for one out of every

three protesters.

The “demand for rights” was the primary motivation for one out of every five protesters.

Moreover, excluding the protesters who came to the park to stand against the removal

of trees and the construction of the replica barrack and those who came to park just

for support, almost nine out of every ten protesters participated in the Gezi Park

protests for a reason directly related to the policies of the government (freedom, rights,

oppression, resignation, democracy and police brutality).

As noted in the preceding paragraphs, 87 percent of the protesters in the park identified

themselves as a member of a group whose rights are violated or who suffer from

injustice. The most striking finding of the survey is that nine out of every ten protesters

in the park considered their rights and freedom to be under threat, and nine out of

every ten protesters had demands in relation to the policies of the state and the

government.

2.5

3.2

4.6

6.1

6.2

8.0

9.5

9.7

18.4

34.1

0 25 50

To have our voice heard

To stand against the system/revolution

To stand against the removal of trees and the

replica barrack

For solidarity

To stand against police brutality

For democracy and peace

To demand for the government to resign

Against distatorship and opression

To demand for rights

For freedom

Why are you here and what do you demand?

0 % 25 % 50 %


3. KONDA JULY’13 BAROMETER: Theme Report on ‘Perception

and Evaluation of the Gezi Park Protests’

KONDA Research & Consultancy has been conducting monthly field surveys since

2010, on a sample population that is representative of society in Turkey in general. As

part of this project, the monthly Konda Barometer research report provides an overall

analysis of trends in public perception of political and social issues and is shared with

the subscribers of the Barometer. In addition to questions which are directed to

respondents on a regular basis, a specific topic is analyzed thoroughly in each month's

report. The first Barometer field survey on the Gezi protests was conducted on July 6-

7, 2013. The survey aimed to observe how respondents perceived and evaluated this

movement from several aspects. The report you will read below presents the findings

and analyses of this research.

Conflicting opinions on ‘Gezi’

In the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests, which began with protests against the removal of

trees from Gezi Park and escalated following the heavy-handed use of tear gas by the

police, we can argue that the protests can be placed on an axis of conflicting lifestyles

shaped by differences in age, educational attainment level, level of income and degree

of piety, indicating a deep polarization in society. It appears that the Gezi protests

amplified these differences and exacerbated conflicting opinions.

Consensus: The protests escalated due to police brutality

54 percent of the general public support the opinion that Gezi protests were a plot against

Turkey and the protesters fell victim to provocation. On the other hand, two out of every

five respondents think that the protesters demanded for their rights and freedom in a

democratic manner. The majority of society thinks that the protests escalated and the

course of the protests took a different turn when the police resorted to violence. When

we also take into consideration those who believe that the Prime Minister's statements

added fuel to fire, we can conclude that half of society thinks that the protests

escalated due to these two reasons. However, respondents who support AK Parti and

who are religious3, religious conservative4 in lifestyle or comparatively less educated

are inclined to place less emphasis on these two factors.

TV is the primary news source, but social media plays an important role as well

As the news source from which 70 percent of respondents first heard about the protests, TV

was the primary source of information on the Gezi protests. However, social media also

played a significant role during the protests and was influential on a significant

segment of society. One out of every five respondents learned about the protests on

3 Level of piety is based on respondents’ own definition. Those who select “I am a believer but I do not practice” are labeled

as ‘believers’; those who select “I am a religious person striving to practice” are labeled ‘religious’; and those who select “I

am a devout person who practices fully” are labeled “devout.” 4 Religious conservative is a lifestyle label used by KONDA. We ask respondents which of the following three lifestyles they

identify most with: Modern, traditional conservative and religious conservative.


social media, and one out of every six respondents shared at least one post about the

protests during the one month period. Primary news source and social media use

present striking differences with respect to age, educational attainment level, level of

income, lifestyle and degree of piety.

It is notable that Alevis are in a sensitive position regarding the protests. There also are

divergences of opinion in defining the protesters. Respondents who support the

protests tend to identify the protesters as ‘people who demand for their rights’ or

‘environmentalists’, whereas respondents who oppose the protests are inclined to

identify the protesters as ‘pawns of foreign conspirators’ and ‘members of marginal

organizations’.

People who support the protests side with the protesters, while those who oppose the protests

stand behind the Prime Minister and the police

It is possible to identify three main parties which played key roles during the Gezi protests. On

the one hand, the protesters, and on the other, the police and the Prime Minister were

the main actors steering the course of events. The most frequently provided opinions

about the protesters included the statements that 'they should have ended the

protests at one point' and that 'they were not at fault at any point', while the opinions

about the police included the statement that 'the police response was extremely

violent' and that 'they followed the orders'. One fourth of society expressed that the

Prime Minister was not at fault, while one fifth stated that the Prime Minister was at

fault since the beginning.

Overall, we can see that the respondents who support the protests side with the protesters,

while those who oppose the protests stand behind the Prime Minister and the police.

Despite this picture, the harsh attitude and statements of the Prime Minister were not

reciprocated to the same extent among society; and it is notable that even Ak Parti

voters took a more moderate attitude towards the protesters than the Prime Minister

himself.

Not everyone believes the allegations about the Gezi protests

After the Gezi protests, both parties of the protests raised allegations on traditional media and

social media. We endeavored to understand the extent to which the respondents who

side with the protesters and the government believed these allegations. In summary:

None of the parties could convince the entire society. Moreover, none of the parties or the

voter groups entirely believed the claims of their leader or fellows.

The allegation that the protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque received the least credit,

and the involvement of foreign conspirators in the protests was the allegation most

believed by the respondents.

One third does not know what 'foreign conspirators' mean


One third of the general public does not know what the expression ‘foreign conspirators’

means, although the Prime Minister frequently refers to it. Respondents who provided

their own definition of 'foreign conspirators' provided such a wide range of responses

that it is not possible to speak of a clear and agreed upon definition.


3.1. News Source and Use of Social Media

3.1.1. Initial news source

The first topic we inquired about was the source from which respondents heard about the Gezi

protests for the first time.

From which source did you FIRST hear about the protests? Percentage

Friends, acquaintances 5.3

Social media 15.9

Online news sites 6.4

TV 71.3

Do not know 1.2

Total 100.0

Everyone in society has heard about the Gezi Park protests

A significant majority, i.e. 71 percent of society first heard about the protests on television.

However, it is striking that almost one out of every five people in Turkey received the

first news about the protests on social media or online news sites and 5 percent of the

population (i.e. about 2.5 million people) first heard about the protests from a friend

or acquaintance. The fact that only 1.2 percent of the respondents stated that they do

not know about the protests indicates that the entire society has heard about the

protests which broke out in Gezi Park and then spread to the other parts of İstanbul

and other cities.

When we compare the responses provided to this question with the responses we received in

the survey conducted in Gezi Park on June 6-7, with the participation of 4411

respondents, significant differences stand out. Protesters in Gezi Park first heard about

the events from their friends or on social media. Only 7 out of every 100 protesters in

the park first heard about the events on television. However, the rate of respondents

in Turkey who first heard about the protests on television is ten times greater. In this

case, it is worth noting that the overall rate of respondents who first heard about the

events from a friend or an acquaintance in Turkey is one third less than the

corresponding rate among the protesters in Gezi Park.


As the educational attainment level goes down, the rate of learning the news from TV goes up

As discussed in detail in the May'13 Barometer, internet use and social media activity are

greatly influenced by age, educational attainment level, level of income and lifestyle.

Thus, the source from which the first news of the protests were received varies in

relation to these characteristics. On the graph provided on the next page presenting

the distribution of responses by demographic and political parameters, The following

details are noteworthy:

Among the young respondents, 34 percent first heard about the events on social media

and 11 percent learned about the protests from online news sites. However, out of

those above the age of 44, the rates for social media and online news sites are 5

percent and 2 percent, respectively; while 88 percent of the respondents first heard

about the protests on television.

53 percent of students and 35 percent of those employed in the private sector learned

about the protests on social media. Less than one third of students first heard about

the events on television. On the other hand, TV was the primary news source for more

than 85 percent of the retired and housewives.

32 percent of college graduates and 4 percent of those with an educational attainment

level below high school, 32 percent of moderns, 6 percent of religious conservatives

and 28 percent of believers, and 7 percent of the pious first heard about the protests

on social media. Level of income has a similar impact.

The majority of respondents who live in rural areas (82.5 percent) first heard about the

protests on television, while 12 percent learned about the protests on social media

and the Internet.

One fourth of Alevis received the first news on social media.

5.3

15.4

15.9

Social media 69

6.4

8.6

Television 71.3

7.0

1.2

0 % 50 % 100 %

Turkey

Protesters in

Gezi Park

From which source did you first hear about the Gezi Park

protests?

Friend, acquaintance Social media Online news sites Television Did not hear


23

18

31

15

22

26

8

29

26

18

10

6

7

7

11

28

6

11

32

44

31

29

9

3

2

5

12

34

16

8

8

3

11

9

9

3

12

9

6

5

3

1

4

5

10

2

7

10

4

16

9

5

2

2

7

11

6

11

6

4

4

8

4

4

6

6

6

5

3

4

6

5

6

5

6

5

11

5

6

6

5

5

3

6

7

5

58

64

61

71

61

60

84

53

59

70

78

85

85

81

78

56

85

76

53

41

47

56

80

89

84

92

88

73

48

71

0 % 50 % 100 %

Non-voter

Swing voter

Other

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

TRY3001 or above

TRY2001 - 3000

TRY1201 - 2000

TRY701 - 1200

TRY301 - 700

TRY300 TL or below

Pious

Religious

Believer

Religious cons.

Trad. cons.

Modern

Masters

College

High school

Junior school

Primary school

Literate w/o degree

Illiterate

44 or above

29 - 43

18 - 28

TURKEY

Initial news source

Social media Online news Friend, acquaintance Television


The profile of respondents who received the first news on social media reflects the findings

below:

63 percent are below the age of 28.

30 percent are college graduates.

34 percent are students, 6 percent are housewives.

63 percent identify themselves as modern.

73 percent do not wear head cover.

49 percent identify themselves as believers.

36 percent have more than TRY2000 income per month.

31 percent are CHP voters.

On the other hand, the profile of respondents who first heard the news on television is quite

different:

20 percent are below the age of 28, 45 percent are above the age of 44.

66 percent have an educational attainment level below high school.

35 percent are housewives, 4 percent are students.

70 percent cover their heads.

67 percent identify themselves as religious.

In addition, it is also remarkable that 70 percent of the respondents who first heard about the

events from a friend or an acquaintance live in metropolitan areas, while two thirds of

those who learned the news from online news sites are male and it is more likely for

women to first hear about the news on television.

Although the news source from which the respondents f irst heard about

the Gezi protests appears to indicate differences between l ifestyles, the

news source is also very inf luential in shaping people's opinions and

overall perceptions on recent events, as evaluated in the following

sections of this report.

3.1.2. Social media use

Social media use during the protests was one of the hot discussion topics throughout the

month that the Gezi protests continued. Social media has gained greater significance

not only because protesters mainly communicated through social media tools such as

Twitter and Facebook since traditional media such as television channels and

newspapers failed to provide a proper coverage of the protests, but also because Prime

Minister Erdoğan stated that “There is now a menace which is called Twitter” in his

evaluation of the protests.

30 percent of social media users posted information or opinions on the Gezi protests

When inquired whether they shared any messages on social media or not, 18 percent of

respondents answered positively. Therefore, we can assert that one out of every five


adults shared information or opinions on the Internet. Three out of every 10 Internet

users and 4 out of every 10 social media users shared posts about the protests.

Over the past month, did you post any messages, photographs,

information etc. about the protests? Percentage

Yes, I did. 18.3

No, I use social media tools, but I did not share anything about the

protests. 27.0

No, I am not on any social networking sites. 54.7

Total 100

85 percent of the protesters we interviewed between June 6th and 8th in Gezi Park expressed

that they posted messages on social networking sites, and excluding 8 percent of the

people who did not use social media, everyone had a membership for a social

networking site.

As anticipated, those who posted frequently on social networking sites were groups which are

already known to use the Internet more intensively, such as younger respondents,

students, college graduates, private-sector employees, high-income earners. However,

a deeper analysis reveals that the rates for active social media use are quite different

among different demographic groups.

40 percent of social media users across all groups posted their opinions

For example, 34 percent of the respondents below the age of 28, 6 percent of the respondents

above the age of 44, 40 percent of college graduates, 5 percent of the respondents

with an educational attainment level below high school, 53 percent of students, 36

percent of private-sector employees, 5 percent of housewives, and 7 percent of the

retired posted messages on social networking sites. However, these rates are affected

by the overall rate of social media membership in each group. For example,

respondents below the age of 28 posted messages most actively, but three thirds of

this group are already members to social networking sites to begin with. However,

84.6

18.3

8.0

27.0

7.5

54.7

0 % 50 % 100 %

Gezi

Turkey

Over the past month, did you post any messages about the

protests?

Yes, I did No, I did not I do not use social media


respondents above the age of 44 posted the least messages, but only 20 percent of

this group are on social networking sites. The rate of posting a message does not

change significantly among those who are members of a social networking site.

Similarly, although a greater proportion of men appear to have posted messages, the

rates of posting messages for men and for women who are members of social

networking sites are the same. One third of the respondents who wear the turban are

members of social networking sites, and the rate of posting messages among the

respondents who wear the turban and among those who do not cover their head is

more or less the same.

However, the same does not hold true with respect to educational attainment level; as

educational attainment level improves, both the rate of membership to social

networking sites and the rate of posting messages increase significantly.

5

7

16

17

32

37

53

41

30

5

6

18

34

21

15

18

17

11

40

30

39

38

39

38

41

16

12

30

42

31

22

27

78

83

44

53

29

25

8

22

29

78

82

52

24

48

62

55

0 % 50 % 100 %

Housewife

Retired

Worker

Smalle retailer

Public officer

Private sector

Student

College

High school

Below high school

44 or above

29 - 43

18 - 28

Male

Female

TURKEY


protests?



28

17

12

19

9

6

29

5

13

36

25

21

29

14

23

34

8

18

26

27

24

28

23

20

31

19

30

31

36

26

31

28

39

24

24

27

47

56

64

53

68

74

41

76

57

33

39

53

40

58

38

42

67

55

0 % 50 % 100 %

Alevi Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Kurdish

Turkish

Turban

Head cover

No cover

Religious cons.

Traditional cons.

Modern

Non-voter

Swing voter

Other

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

TURKEY


protests?



Why students stand out

The relationship of students with social networking sites and the role they played in spreading

the news about the protests is clear: 92 percent of students are on social networking

sites and half of them posted messages about the protests.

28 percent of Alevis posted messages about the Gezi protests on social media.

Although the rates of voters who post messages on social media are shaped primarily by the

demographic profiles of voter groups, the details below are noteworthy:

The rate of respondents among Ak Parti voters who posted messages is quite low at 8

percent.

33 percent of CHP voters are active on social media, making CHP the most active voter

group.

The rate of membership on social networking sites is the highest among MHP voters;

however, the rate of posting messages is at average levels. The rate of respondents

who posted messages on the Gezi protests among the voters of other small parties

and non-voters is above the Turkey average.

Social media spreads the news directly and facilitates others to spread the news

The graph above demonstrates the rate of posting messages on social networking sites in

relation to the source from which respondents heard about the protests.

Its two-way nature is the main characteristic that sets social media apart from traditional

media; on social media one does not only receive, but can also spread information. It

is illustrative of the two-way nature of social media that while 16 percent of society first

heard about the protests on social media, 18 percent of society posted messages on

17

55

50

8

18

32

38

37

24

27

51

7

13

69

55

0 % 50 % 100 %

Friend, acquaintance

Social media

Online news

Television

TURKEY


protests? /News source the protests were first heard from



social networking sites over the following month. 54 percent of the respondents who

first heard about the protests on social media also posted messages about the

protests.

48 percent of the respondents who posted messages about the protests heard about the

protests on social media. With the addition of the 18 percent who first heard about the

protests on online news sites, it can be stated that two thirds of the respondents who

use social media to spread information, also use it as a news source. Among the

respondents who first heard about the protests on television, only 8 percent posted a

message on social networking sites.

3.2. Change in the Course of Events

In the field survey we conducted in Gezi Park, we asked respondents at what point

they decided to participate in the protests. Similarly, in the July'13 Barometer, we had

asked respondents at what point they thought the course of events changed and

escalated, and we included other important events of the past month among the

choices.

When do you think that the events escalated/the course of events

changed? Percentage

When the Taksim Project was announced 15.0

When they began to remove the trees 14.7

After the brutal police intervention 33.7

After the statements of the Prime Minister 17.6

When others saw the atmosphere in Taksim 6.1

After protests spread to other cities 5.5

When the protesters took refuge in the Dolmabahçe mosque 2.4

After the fatalities 4.9

Total 100.0

15 percent of the respondents think that the events escalated upon the announcement of the

Taksim Project, which included the construction of the replica barrack, the

pedestrianization project, and relocation of the vehicle traffic underground, i.e. long

before the protests which broke out in May 2013. Similarly, 15 percent of the

respondents think that the removal of trees was critical in the escalation of the events.

However, the most frequent responses are the brutal police intervention (34 percent)

and the statements of the Prime Minister (18 percent). Therefore, the protesters taking

refuge in the Bezmialem Valide Sultan Mosque in Dolmabahçe, the break out of

protests in other cities in support of the Gezi protests and the fatalities due to the

clashes were not perceived as critical incidents which influenced the course of events.

In other words, one out of every two people in Turkey thinks that the Gezi protests

broke out due to ‘the brutal police intervention’ and the ‘Prime Minister's statements’.


Consensus on the reasons which triggered the protests

When compared with the findings of the survey conducted with the protesters in Gezi Park,

these findings present similarities in the perceptions of respondents. The protesters in

Gezi Park also pointed out police brutality and the statements of the Prime Minister as

the main reasons for coming to the park.

Prime Minister's statements and police brutality were decisive

The groups with different demographic characteristics diverge from each other the most on

the extent to which police brutality and the statements of the Prime Minister influenced

the course of events. Opinions also differentiated on the response, ‘when Taksim

Project was announced’.

Let's take a closer look at the groups with the most striking differences in their responses.

Significant differences are observed in the educational attainment level. As the

educational attainment level rises, the rate of respondents who state that the Prime

Minister's statements caused the protests to escalate increases, while the rate of

respondents who state that the protests escalated after the attempt to remove the trees

from the park and partially after the announcement of the Taksim Project decreases.

The influence of lifestyle clusters is also quite apparent. 70 percent of the moderns

attribute the cause of the protests to police brutality and the statements of the Prime

Minister. However, 49 percent of the traditional conservatives and 32 percent of the

10

15

19

15

49

34

14

18

4

6 5 2 5

3

0 % 50 % 100 %

Gezi Park

Turkey

When do you think that the events escalated/the course of

events changed? (In the Gezi survey: At what point did you

decide to participate in the protests?)

When Taksim Project was announcedWhen they began to remove the treesAfter the brutal police interventionUpon the statements of the PMWhen others saw the atmosphere in TaksimAfter protests spread to other cities


religious conservatives share the same opinion. A similar trend is visible in relation to head

cover and the degree of piety.

The divergence between younger and elder respondents is relatively lower. It is notable

that younger respondents stated police brutality 8 points higher than the elder.

The opinions of Alevis and Sunnis also differ from each other: Three thirds of Alevis point

out police brutality and the statements of the Prime Minister, in comparison to half of

Sunnis who do so.

As the income level rises, emphasis police brutality increases, and the preference for the

options of the removal of trees and the announcement of the Taksim Project decreases;

however the rate of respondents who attribute the cause of the protests to the statements

of the Prime Minister remains the same.


13

17

17

9

15

13

17

19

21

12

18

13

14

16

12

10

17

10

13

18

16

14

15

15

12

16

19

7

9

14

19

17

20

13

17

14

17

16

20

10

9

8

13

17

16

15

14

15

40

32

22

52

40

36

28

24

23

46

29

30

14

29

33

47

37

49

36

28

30

34

38

34

18

18

18

17

20

17

18

17

16

15

15

24

25

16

17

18

18

20

19

16

19

18

16

18

6

5

7

6

6

7

6

4

2

6

6

7

9

6

5

7

8

5

7

6

6

6

6

6

5

5

7

4

5

6

5

7

5

3

6

5

7

7

5

5

6

5

6

5

5

7

5

5

1

3

5

3

2

2

2

4

7

1

2

3

8

4

3

1

3

1

2

3

3

3

1

2

6

4

4

2

3

6

5

7

7

4

7

3

6

6

5

2

2

2

4

6

6

4

5

5

0 % 50 % 100 %

Metropolitans

Urban

Rural

TRY3001 or more

TRY2001 - 3000

TRY1201 - 2000

TRY701 - 1200

TRY301 - 700

TRY300 or less

Student

Housewife

Retired

Farmer

Small retailer

Worker

Private sector

Public officer

College

High school

Below high school

44 or above

29 - 43

18 - 28

TURKEY


events changed?

When Taksim Project was announcedWhen they began to remove the treesAfter the brutal police interventionUpon the statements of the PMWhen others saw the atmosphere in TaksimAfter protests spread to other cities


11

16

20

16

12

26

17

12

21

15

11

10

15

6

21

9

7

21

15

10

15

13

17

11

15

18

11

16

17

10

9

15

15

9

17

11

17

15

46

32

22

30

43

17

26

44

21

31

46

44

39

47

42

32

45

22

34

28

17

19

15

22

11

15

23

11

18

23

26

17

25

11

24

29

10

18

7

7

7

4

11

8

3

11

6

2

4

5

1

2

5

2

10

6

2

6

7

6

3

7

7

4

6

7

3

2

4

4

4

5

9

5

3

4

3

1

7

4

6

2

1

1

1

5

2

5

9

5

3

6

7

3

8

4

4

5

4

10

6

3

6

5

0 % 50 % 100 %

Alevi Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Pious

Religious

Believer

Turban

Head cover

No cover

Religious cons.

Traditional cons.

Modern

Non-voter

Swing voter

Other

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

TURKEY


events changed?

When Taksim Project was announcedWhen they began to remove the treesAfter the brutal police interventionUpon the statements of the PMWhen others saw the atmosphere in TaksimAfter protests spread to other citiesWhen the protesters took refuge in the Dolmabahçe Mosque


The rate of respondents who state that the events escalated after the protesters took

refuge in the mosque in Dolmabahçe is quite low; however, it rises steadily as the place

of residence changes from metropolitan areas to urban areas, and from urban areas

to rural areas. Respondents who live in rural areas also point to police brutality at lower

rates.

Respondents who first heard about the protests on social media and posted messages

about the protests express that the protests escalated due to police brutality at a much

higher rate.

In the survey conducted in Gezi Park, the response, “when Taksim Project was

announced”, is intended to mean that the events escalated long before the protests,

when the urban design project, which included the pedestrianization of Taksim Square

and the construction of the replica barrack, was first announced to the general public.

Findings from back then indicate that this response was more or less understood in

the same way by the respondents. However, we can observe that the same response

may have been understood differently in the July'13 Barometer that was conducted

throughout Turkey. It is also possible that the respondents who did not prefer the

responses of the removal of trees, police brutality and the statements of the Prime

Minister may have gravitated towards this response.


3.3. Opinion on the Gezi Protests

What people think about the Gezi protests carries more weight in terms of politics and

the public opinion, than how they first heard about the protests. In the survey, a

question with two choices was first directed to respondents in order to find out about

their opinions on the protests, before proceeding to a more comprehensive

assessment. The same question has also been directed to respondents regularly in

the Barometer field surveys that have been carried out since then.

In July, 57 percent of the respondents thought that the Gezi protests were a plot against

Turkey and the protesters were subject to provocation, whereas 43 percent of the

respondents stated that the protesters demanded for their rights and freedom in a

democratic manner.

As the case usually is when we ask respondents questions on polarized issues such as the

Ergenekon trial, 4+4+4 education system or the government-judiciary relationship,

when we steered them towards one of the two opposite responses, 6 percent of

respondents did not respond to this question in the July'13 Barometer.

As presented in the graph, three months after the protests, the public opinion turned slightly

against the protesters; however, in the January'14 Barometer, which was conducted in

a volatile atmosphere due to the December 17th operations and the allegations of

corruption and bribery, the rates recovered back to their levels in July'13.

The findings below are derived from the dataset of the field study conducted in July'13.

Although opinions are influenced by demographic characteristics, how voters of different

political parties perceive the protests is one of the most important issues. The graph

42

38

43

58

62

57

0 % 50 % 100 %

Jan'14

Sep'13

Jul'13

Which statement best explains your opinion on the Gezi

Park protests?

Protesters demanded for their rights and freedom in a democratic manner.

All these are part of a plot against Turkey, the protesters were subject to provocation.


below demonstrates the influence of political preferences on the opinions on the Gezi

protests clearly:

82 percent of Ak Parti voters believe that the Gezi protests were a plot against Turkey,

whereas 87 percent of CHP voters think that the protesters demanded for their rights

and freedom in a democratic manner.

MHP voters are closer to Ak Parti voters on the issue of ‘foreign conspirators’, as 58

percent of MHP voters believe that the protests were ‘a plot against Turkey’.

63 percent of the BDP voters and 59 percent of the voters of other small parties think

that the protests were ‘a democratic demand for rights and freedom’, in parallel to

CHP voters.

The opinion that the protests were ‘a democratic demand for rights and freedom’ is

also prevalent among swing voters and non-voters, with 47 percent of swing voters

and 53 percent of non-voters opting for this response.

It is also illustrative to evaluate the opinions on the protests in relation to political preferences.

The graph below presents the distribution of voter groups for the two different

responses. 63 percent, i.e. two thirds, of the respondents who think that the protests

were “a plot against Turkey”, are Ak Parti voters. The rate of MHP voters who share the

same opinion is not much different than the Turkey average.

The rate of CHP, BDP and other parties' voters who think “Protesters demanded for their rights

and freedom in a democratic manner” are above the Turkey average. In addition, it is

53

47

59

63

39

87

11

40

40

44

39

31

58

10

82

54

7

9

1

6

3

2

7

6

0 % 50 % 100 %

Non-voter

Swing voter

Diğer

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

Turkey

Opinion on the Gezi protests by political preference

Demand for rights and freedom in a democratic manner

Plot set up against Turkey


worth noting that two out of every five people who share this opinion are CHP voters,

and the other three have different political preferences. It is also noteworthy that the

rate of MHP voters who favored this option is again more or less the same as the Turkey

average.

3.4. Opinion on the Actors Involved in the Gezi Protests

There were 3 major actors involved in the Gezi Park protests which broke out at the

end of May 2013: Protesters on the one side, and the police and the Prime Minister

on the other. With this in mind, in the July'13 Barometer, we asked respondents what

they thought about each actor and whether they were at fault at any point or not. In

general, respondents who support the protests favor the protesters, and respondents

who are against the protests side with police and the Prime Minister.

3.4.1. Opinion on the attitude of the protesters

When we asked the question, “Do you think the protesters were at fault at any point over the

past month? If yes, at what point do you think they were at fault?”, 20 percent of the

respondents stated that ‘The protesters were at fault from the beginning’, 10 percent

stated that ‘The protesters should not have resisted the government’, 12 percent

stated that ‘The protests should have ended when meetings with the Prime Minister

and other authorities were held’, 3 percent stated that ‘The protesters should not have

marched to the government offices and ministries in İstanbul and Ankara’, 31 percent

stated that 'The protests should have ended at a one point’, and 24 percent stated

that ‘The protesters were not at fault at any point’.


The protesters were most criticized for ‘not ending the protests at one point, but instead

prolonging the protests’. This criticism may have arisen from the fact that the peaceful

atmosphere in the early days of the protests could not be sustained and the protests

escalated into clashes throughout the country. In other words, respondents who chose

this response may have vocalized their disturbance with the transformation of the

protests into ongoing clashes between the protesters and the government.

One fourth of the respondents expressed that they do not think the protesters were at fault at

any point and that they supported the protesters. On the other hand, one fifth of the

respondent expressed that the protesters were at fault from the beginning, and that

they did not support the protests. The argument frequently expressed by the

government officials that the protesters marched to public offices did not find a

significant reflection among society.

3.4.1.1. Opinion on the attitude of the protesters by demographic clusters

When we further study the research findings, we can observe that age, educational attainment

level and news sources are the factors that influence the attitude of respondents

towards the protesters.

The rate of the respondents who think that the protesters were at fault from the

beginning increases among older respondents. Respondents between the ages of 18-

28 support the protesters the most, and while those between the ages of 29-43 state

that the protests should have ended at one point, at the highest rate.

20 10 12 3 31 24

0 % 50 % 100 %

Do you think the protesters were at fault at any point over the

past month?

If yes, at what point do you think they were at fault?

The protesters were at fault since the beginning.

They should not have resisted the government.

The protests should have ended when meetings were held.

The protesters should not have marched to the government offices and ministries.

The protests should have ended at a one point.

The protesters were not at fault at any point.


As the educational attainment level of respondents improves, the rate of respondents

who support the protesters and their resistance against the government increases.

The protesters are supported the most among students and private-sector employees,

while farmers, the retired and small retailers state that the protesters were at fault, at

the highest rates.

Support for the protesters rises with increasing income and with residence in

metropolitan areas in comparison to rural areas.

Alevis think that the protesters were justified in their resistance at a higher rate than

Sunnis.

The rate of respondents who find the protesters at fault increases, as their lifestyle

shifts from modern to conservative, and as the degree of piety and the rate of wearing

head cover increases. It is remarkable that 69 percent of the believers and half of the

religious side with the protesters.

The attitude of the Kurdish is almost the same as that of the Turkish; however, 35

percent of the Kurdish stated that the protesters should have ended at one point.


18

20

26

16

20

17

23

25

26

15

11

21

26

29

24

23

11

17

11

16

25

24

20

16

20

7

12

14

5

6

11

10

11

17

14

8

13

7

14

13

10

4

3

4

9

12

11

10

9

10

12

13

11

14

12

10

13

16

11

12

11

12

10

10

11

11

16

14

11

11

12

11

12

13

12

3

3

4

5

3

3

2

2

5

5

5

2

3

2

2

3

3

7

6

3

2

3

3

4

3

31

30

32

30

30

32

30

28

26

26

30

33

25

29

34

29

33

32

30

31

31

28

34

30

30

30

23

13

30

28

27

21

18

15

28

36

19

30

17

18

23

33

27

38

30

18

23

22

29

25

0 % 50 % 100 %

Metropolitan

Urban

Rural

TRY3001 or more

TRY2001 - 3000

TRY1201 - 2000

TRY701 - 1200

TRY301 - 700

TRY300 TL or less

Unemployed

Student

Housewife

Retired

Farmer, breeder

Small retailer

Fworker

Private sector

Public officer

College

High school

Below high school

44 or above

29 - 43

18 - 28

Turkey

Pla

ce

of

resid

en

ce

Mo

nth

ly h

ou

se

ho

ld in

co

me

Em

plo

yme

nt

sta

tus

Ed

uca

tio

na

l

att

ain

me

nt

leve

lA

ge

Opinion on the attitude of the protesters by demographic

clusters

The protesters were at fault since the beginning.They should not have resisted the government.The protests should have ended when meetings were held.The protesters should not have marched to the government offices and ministries.The protests should have ended at a one point.


During the Gezi Park protests, protesters highly criticized media institutions and how

they covered the protests. ‘Opposition and partisan media’ became widely used

expressions. In such cases, news sources are the primary factor in shaping the public

opinion. Therefore, we also analyzed the relation between the news sources followed

by the respondents and their perspective on the protesters.

Among the respondents who follow the news on partisan channels such as Samanyolu, TRT

and Kanal 7, the rate of those who think that ‘the protesters were at fault from the

beginning’ and ‘they should not have resisted the government’ is higher. NTV and ATV

audiences stated that ‘the protests should have ended at one point’ at the highest

rate. The audiences of Halk TV and Ulusal Kanal, which we started to feature in the

Barometer due to their increased popularity and significance with the break out of the

Gezi protests, support the protesters at the highest rates.

19

21

18

39

27

8

30

23

11

5

4

22

33

21

8

20

6

11

7

11

15

4

15

11

6

5

1

11

15

12

3

10

13

12

12

11

13

10

13

13

10

3

10

12

15

12

8

12

3

3

5

1

3

3

3

2

4

4

3

2

3

4

3

35

30

31

32

31

30

24

33

29

10

20

32

26

34

29

31

24

24

28

6

11

45

14

17

40

78

61

21

8

17

48

24

0 % 50 % 100 %

Kurdish

Turkish

Single male

Turban

Head cover

No cover

Pious

Religious

Believer

Non-believer

Alevi Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Religious cons.

Traditional cons.

Modern

Turkey

Eth

nic

ity

He

ad

co

ver

De

gre

e o

f p

iety

Re

ligio

n/

Se

ct

Lif

esty

leOpinion on the attitude of the protesters by demographic

clusters

The protesters were at fault since the beginning.They should not have resisted the government.The protests should have ended when meetings were held.The protesters should not have marched to the government offices and ministries.


Although ‘television’ was the primary news source among different segments of respondents,

the rate of those who followed the news on the protests on television is higher among

the respondents who think that the protesters were at fault and lower among the

respondents who support the protesters. The rate of respondents who followed the

news on the protests on social media is the highest among those who criticize the

respondents for marching to public offices.

3

36

9

17

40

11

17

36

3

18

24

15

25

20

11

8

15

20

10

12

17

2

10

6

10

13

16

11

18

11

13

13

3

16

14

2

14

12

3

2

2

3

2

4

2

1

3

5

3

11

3

3

29

32

33

40

17

44

32

28

23

28

30

31

40

31

63

5

32

14

3

20

23

6

67

23

24

41

10

24

0 % 50 % 100 %

Ulusal

TRT

Star

Show TV

Samanyolu

NTV

Kanal D

Kanal 7

Halk TV

Habertürk

Fox TV

CNNTürk

ATV

Turkey

Ch

an

ne

l p

refe

rre

d t

o w

atc

h t

he

ne

ws

Perspective on the protesters by TV channel preferred to

watch the news

The protesters were at fault since the beginning.They should not have resisted the government.The protests should have ended when meetings were held.The protesters should not have marched to the government offices and ministries.


3.4.1.2. Opinion on the attitude of the protesters by perspective on the Gezi

protests

As anticipated, the respondents who consider the Gezi protests as a democratic demand for

rights and freedom are in favor of the protesters; half of these respondents stated that

the protesters were not at fault, and 32 percent stated that the protests should have

ended at one point.

One third of the respondents who consider the protests as a plot against Turkey state that the

protesters were at fault from the beginning, and 30 percent stated that the protests

should have ended at one point. Accordingly, the opinion that the protesters were at

fault from the beginning was not prevalent even among the respondents who consider

the protests as a plot against Turkey.

Respondents who think that the events escalated when the protests spread to other cities

criticize that the protests were prolonged

It is worth noting that more than half of the respondents who find the protesters at fault state

that the protests escalated after ‘the protesters took refuge in Dolmabahçe Mosque’,

an argument the Prime Minister emphasized frequently in his political rallies, while the

majority of the respondents who support the protesters express that the protests

escalated due to the statements of the Prime Minister and police brutality.

It is also significant that half of the respondents who think that the course of the protests

changed after the demonstrations spread to other cities stated that the protests

84

82

74

58

73

Television 57

4

5

7

8

5

9

7

9

13

30

16

Social media

27

3

3

5

3

6

6

0 % 50 % 100 %



The protests should have ended when meetings

were held.

The protesters should not have marched to the

government offices and ministries.



Attitude towards the protesters/Initial news source

Television Online news sites Social media Friend, acquaintance


should have ended at one point; in other words, they voiced their disturbance with the

expansion of the protests.

3.4.2. Opinion on the police attitude

After inquiring about the opinions of the respondents on the attitude of the Gezi Park

protesters, we also asked them to evaluate the attitude of the police, another primary

actor of the protests.

When asked the question, "Do you think the police were at fault at any point over the past

month? If yes, at what point do you think they were at fault?" 32 percent of the

respondents stated that 'the police response was extremely violent', 29 percent stated

that ‘the police followed the orders’, 15 percent stated that ‘the police were not at fault

at any point’, 13 percent stated that ‘some police officers may have made mistakes

due to fatigue and stress’ and 11 percent stated that ‘police were at fault from the

beginning’.

We can compare these findings with those of the June'13 Barometer, where we asked

respondents about their opinions on police intervention to the May 1st protests in

2013. Although the rate of respondents who found police intervention to the May 1st

protests justified is 28 percent, the rate of respondents who stated that ‘the police

were not at fault’ during the Gezi protests is 15 percent. We can also observe that the

rate of respondents who are undecided about the police attitude has increased.

11 32 29 13 15

0 % 50 % 100 %

Do you think the police were at fault at any point over the past

month? If yes, at what point do you think they were at fault?

The police were at fault from the beginning.

Police response was extremely violent.

The police followed the orders.

Some police officers made mistakes due to fatigue and stress.

The police were not at fault at any point.


3.4.2.1. Opinion on the attitude of the police by demographic clusters

Age, educational attainment level, lifestyle, political preference and news source are

the factors which greatly influence the opinion of society. However, we need to take

into account the extent to which Ak Parti opposition and partisanship is influential.

Respondents between the ages of 18-28 stated that police were wrong and their

response was extremely violent, at the highest rate.

The rate of respondents who think that the police were at fault and their response was

extremely violent increases with improved educational attainment level.

The police are most criticized by students, private-sector employees and public

officers, while farmers and workers, while small retailers stand in favor of the police.

Moreover, the retired, small retailers and housewives state at the highest rate that the

police followed the orders, in other words, they are more moderate towards the attitude

of police.

The impact of level of income, place of residence, degree of piety, head cover and

lifestyle on responses are in line with expectations. Among the respondents who have

lower income, who live in rural areas or who are more religious, the rates of those who

believe that the police followed the orders and that some police officers may have

made mistakes due to fatigue and stress increase, while the rates of those who think

that the police were at fault and their response was extremely violent decrease.

Opinions of the Kurdish and Turkish are most polarized on the question of police

brutality; 42 percent of the Kurdish stated that the police response was extremely

violent.

20.4 33.7 18.3 24.03.6

0 % 50 % 100 %

Police intervention to the May 1st demonstrators was

justified and appropriate (June'13).

Absolutely wrong Wrong Neither right nor wrong Right Absolutely right


13

11

6

17

13

11

10

6

6

9

17

8

13

9

7

10

17

15

17

13

8

10

12

12

11

35

31

26

37

35

32

29

33

26

44

42

30

25

20

29

29

37

35

39

33

29

27

31

38

32

28

29

33

20

27

30

31

28

37

28

19

32

36

30

34

29

24

21

22

27

33

34

30

24

29

12

14

15

13

15

14

13

8

6

8

13

15

13

16

12

12

15

18

14

14

12

12

14

14

13

12

15

20

13

10

12

17

24

25

11

9

16

14

25

18

19

8

11

8

12

18

17

14

12

15

0 % 50 % 100 %

Metropolitan

Urban

Rural

TRY3001 or above

TRY2001 - 3000

TRY1201 - 2000

TRY701 - 1200

TRY301 - 700

TRY300 or below

Unemployed

Student

Housewife

Retired

Farmer, breeder

Small retailer

Worker

Private sector

Public officer

College

High school

Below high school

44 or above

29 - 43

18 - 28

Turkey

Pla

ce

of

resid

en

ce

Mo

nth

ly h

ou

se

ho

ld in

co

me

Em

plo

yme

nt

sta

tus

Ed

uca

tio

na

l

att

ain

me

nt

leve

lA

ge

Opinion on the attitude of police by demographic clusters







An evaluation of respondents' opinions on the police attitude reveals once again that news

sources are important in shaping the public opinion. The respondents who follow the

news on channels which are in rapport with the government take a stand in favor of

the police, whereas the respondents who follow the news on TV channels that support

the protesters and provided a comprehensive coverage of the protests take a stand in

opposition to the police. Furthermore, their opinions are almost polarized.

The vast majority of Halk TV and Ulusal Kanal audiences stated that police were at

fault from the beginning and that their response was extremely violent.

On the other hand, Kanal 7, TRT and Samanyolu audiences stated that the police were

justified at the highest rates, which are nevertheless below 30 percent.

In addition, among TRT, ATV and Samanyolu audiences, there are moderate

respondents who stated that ‘some police officers may have made mistakes due to

fatigue and stress’.

The audiences of Kanal 7, Samanyolu and Show TV agree with the statement, 'police

followed the orders' at the highest rate.

In general, the respondents who followed the news on the Gezi protests on television take a

stand in favor of the police. However, the respondents who followed the news on social

media and online news sites are critical of the police attitude; 44 of these respondents

agree that the police response was extremely violent, while 18 percent state that police

were at fault from the beginning.


Swing voters are inclined towards the protesters

When we observe the responses to this question in relation to political preferences, the most

notable finding strikes the eye among the swing voters. Swing voters and non-voters

state that the police response was extremely violent and that the police followed the

orders, at higher rates than the average rates for Turkey.

9

18

19

13

33

1

12

4

14

27

8

5

24

5

11

28

44

44

35

39

20

34

28

17

33

38

11

56

33

27

43

22

32

33

19

18

31

19

33

26

39

41

32

30

44

11

32

38

22

32

29

14

11

14

11

7

20

18

16

18

14

10

17

4

16

12

7

18

13

17

8

5

11

3

26

11

13

23

7

11

27

2

10

18

4

23

15

0 % 50 % 100 %

Television

Online news sites

Social media

Friend, acquaintance

Ulusal

TRT

Star

Show TV

Samanyolu

NTV

Kanal D

Kanal 7

Halk TV

Habertürk

Fox TV

CNNTürk

ATV

Turkey

Fro

m w

hic

h s

ou

rce

did

yo

u F

IRS

T h

ea

r

ab

ou

t th

e p

rote

sts

?C

ha

nn

el p

refe

rre

d t

o w

atc

h t

he

ne

ws

Opinion on the police attitude by news source







3.4.2.2. Opinion on the police attitude by opinion on the Gezi protests

37 percent of the respondents who consider the Gezi protests as a plot against Turkey

stated that the police followed the orders, while 24 percent stated that the police were

not at fault during the protests.

A higher rate of the respondents who identify the protesters as 'traitors' stated that the

police were not at fault; a higher rate of those who consider protesters as 'citizens who

demanded for their rights' stated that the police response was extremely violent; a

higher rate of those who identify the protesters as 'foreign conspirators' and 'opposition

parties' stated that police followed the orders; and a higher rate of those who identify

the protesters as 'members of marginal groups' and 'Ak Parti opponents' stated that

'some police officers may have made mistakes due to fatigue and stress'.

A higher rate of the respondents who believe that the course of the Gezi protests

changed due to the statements of the Prime Minister and police brutality stated that

the police were at fault and their response was extremely violent. However, those who

believe that the course of the protests changed after the protesters took refuge in

Dolmabahçe Mosque stated that the police were not at fault, at higher rates.

In general, a higher rate of respondents who support the protesters or

whose support for the protesters we can infer stated that the pol ice

response was extremely violent and the police were at fault from the

beginning.

Those who think that the police were not at fault are observed at the

highest rates among the groups whose members label the protesters

with hosti le statements and identify them as ‘traitors’ or state that

‘protests were triggered when the protesters took refuge in Dolmabahçe

Mosque’. The first definit ion points to an enemy of the state, while the

second embodies ‘religious hosti l ity’ .

3.4.3. The attitude of the Prime Minister

During the Gezi protests, it was claimed that the Prime Minister's attitude and

discourse were very harsh, and this antagonism played a significant role in shaping

the reactions to the protests. His remarks caused the ongoing polarization among

society to be projected on reactions to the Gezi protests and the way individuals

perceived the events and the actors involved. However, in addition to the ongoing

polarization, it is significant that the Prime Minister's attitude towards the protests did

not resonate fully even within his own electoral base. In general, even the voters of the

ruling party demand a more restrained attitude from both the Prime Minister and the

police.


As we did for the other actors, we directed respondents the question, 'Do you think that the

Prime Minister was at fault at any point over the past month? If yes, at what point do

you think he was at fault?' and asked them for their evaluation. One fourth of the

respondents stated that 'the Prime Minister was not at fault at any point'; one fifth

stated that 'the Prime Minister was at fault from the beginning', one fifth stated that

'the Prime Minister should not have accused the protesters with the epithets of çapulcu

(riffraff) and terrorists, and he should not have used a polarizing discourse', one fifth

stated that 'he could have handled the protests with a milder attitude', and 11 percent

stated that 'he could have made an effort to listen to the protesters and to understand

their demands'.

In general, the rate of those who stated that the Prime Minister was not at fault is slightly

higher; however, none of the responses reflected the majority opinion.

Similar to the case with the other actors, factors such as educational attainment level,

employment status, lifestyle cluster, political preference and news source influence

the respondents' opinions on the attitude of the Prime Minister.

Lifestyle is yet again the parameter where polarization is the most pronounced; and

the rate of respondents who support the Prime Minister increases significantly as the

lifestyle cluster shifts from modern to conservative. However, it is notable that with 45

percent, less than majority of religious conservatives stated that the Prime Minister

was justified from the beginning of the protests.

Improved educational attainment level leads to a decrease in the rate of respondents

who support the Prime Minister or who think that the Prime Minister could have made

an effort to listen or to understand the protesters, and to an increase in the rate of

20.7 2.2 20.1 20.3 11.2 25.5

0 % 50 % 100 %

Do you think the Prime Minister was at fault at any point over

the past month? If yes, at what point do you think he was at

fault?

The PM was at fault from the beginning.

If he had taught several hundred people their lessons, they would have not gathered again.

He should not have used a polarizing discourse.

He could have handled the protests with a milder attitude.

He could have made an effort to listen to the protesters.

The PM was not at fault at any point.


those who think that he should not have used a polarizing discourse or he was at fault

from the beginning.

Support for the Prime Minister decreases among segments of society who have higher

income and who live in metropolitan areas.

The Prime Minister receives more support from the more religious and those who cover

their heads; however, almost half of the religious and the pious are critical of the Prime

Minister and do not agree with him completely.

The respondents who followed the news on social media and online news sites are

more inclined to think that the Prime Minister was at fault, while a higher rate of the

respondents who followed the news on television believe more strongly that the Prime

16

21

4

11

36

12

15

33

55

55

17

21

20

20

16

14

27

14

19

25

30

29

20

20

19

21

24

24

15

18

23

17

3

7

21

20

15

11

11

12

11

9

11

12

13

6

12

11

28

25

44

37

9

45

31

10

2

28

25

0 % 50 % 100 %

Kurdish

Turkish

Turban

Head cover

No cover

Pious

Religious

Believer

Non-believer

Alevi Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Turkey

Eth

nic

ity

He

ad

co

ver

De

gre

e o

f p

iety

Re

ligio

n/se

ct

Opinion on the attitude of the Prime Minister by

demographic clusters

The PM was at fault from the beginning.

If he had taught several hundred people their lessons, they would have not gathered again.

He should not have used a polarizing discourse.

He could have handled the protests with a milder attitude.

He could have made an effort to listen to the protesters.

The PM was not at fault at any point.


Minister was not at fault and that he could have handled the protests with a milder

attitude.

In parallel to our findings on opinions about the protesters and the police, the

audiences of Samanyolu, Kanal 7, ATV and TRT find the Prime Minister justified at

higher rates, while the audiences of Halk TV and Ulusal TV find the Prime Minister

unjustified at higher rates. NTV and CNNTürk audiences showed the strongest

preference for the response, 'the Prime Minister should not have used a polarizing

discourse', and Show TV audience opted for the response that he could have handled

the protests with a milder attitude, at the highest rate.

50 percent of Ak Parti voters believe that the Prime Minister is justified. One fourth of

Ak Parti voters present a more moderate outlook by stating that ‘he could have handled

the protests with a milder attitude’. It is worth noting that half of Ak Parti voters do not

think that the Prime Minister is justified.

As usual, CHP voters expressed their discontent with the Prime Minister Erdoğan; 52

percent of CHP voters think that the Prime Minister was at fault from the beginning,

and 28 percent of CHP voters think that 'the Prime Minister should not have used a

polarizing discourse'.

The fact that half of Ak Parti and CHP voters in their respective voter groups hold

contrasting opinions on the Prime Minister's attitude is significant in manifesting the

polarization.

While 30 percent of MHP voters believe that the Prime Minister was at fault from the

beginning, 27 percent present a moderate outlook by stating that the Prime Minister

could have handled the protests with a milder attitude.

3.4.3.1. Opinion on the attitude of the Prime Minister by demographic clusters

40 percent of the respondents, who identify the Gezi protests as a democratic demand for

rights and freedom, stated that the Prime Minister was at fault from the beginning,

while 40 percent of those who perceive the protests as a plot against Turkey believe

that the Prime Minister was not at fault at any point. These contrasting opinions on the

Gezi protests clearly illustrate the polarization among society.

Half of the respondents who think that the protesters are ‘traitors’ find the attitude of

the Prime Minister justified, while almost half of the respondents who identify the

protesters as ‘people demanding their rights’ think that the Prime Minister is

unjustified.


3.5. Allegations about the Protests

From the very first day of the protests, the majority of communication channels

including social media and TV channels were divided into two camps. One camp

sympathized and sided with the protests, while the other was clearly against the

protests. Each of the camps raised allegations or covered allegations raised by the

political actors. Within the scope of this research, we picked the most important

allegations and asked the respondents to what extent they believed in them. We

included the following allegations in the survey:

Allegations raised by the protesters and their supporters

Some Ak Parti proponents attacked the protesters with clubs, knives and machetes in

hand.*

The water sprayed on the protesters contained chemicals which inflict chemical burns.

The police took personal initiative and resorted to an extremely violent response.

Allegations raised by the Prime Minister and Ak Parti proponents

The protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque.

The protesters burnt the Turkish flag.

The protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators which resent Turkey's

development.

*When the field survey was conducted, news on the small retailer who attacked protesters with a machete in

Taksim/Talimhane was not yet covered by all of the media organizations. Therefore, at the time when the

respondents took the survey, this was yet an allegation that was shared on social media, accompanied by some

blurred footage.

The allegations listed above were provided to the respondents, and they were asked

to indicate to what the extent they believed in each allegation, on a five-point Likert-

scale.

The general public is not entirely convinced of any of the allegations

We will present various analyses; however, we should first note that none of the sides was

able to convince the entire society of any allegation. Moreover, the respondents do not

entirely believe the statements of the leaders they support. We find this to be a very

positive finding in terms of social structure.


3.5.1. To what extent do people believe the allegations?

The graph below demonstrates the extent to which respondents believe each of the

allegations. However, as mentioned before, the extent to which different groups are

convinced of the allegations is more important than the extent to which the entire

society is convinced.

‘Alcohol was consumed in the mosque’ was the least and 'the protests were a plot set up by

foreign conspirators' was the most believed allegation

The allegation on police brutality received the highest rate of affirmation from the respondents

out of the allegations raised by the protesters. Less than 35 percent of the respondents

disagree with this statement. On the other hand, the allegation that the protesters

consumed alcohol in the mosque was the least believed allegation that was raised by

the Prime Minister and Ak Parti proponents. Less than one fourth of the respondents

believe this allegation which was reiterated by the Prime Minister in many of his

speeches, on the days following the break out of protests. More than half of the

respondents expressed that they do not believe the protesters consumed alcohol in

the mosque, while on fourth refrained from expressing their opinions.

10.4

12.5

15.5

5.9

6.8

8.3

16.3

32.8

34.6

28.4

24.0

34.9

16.1

28.4

25.9

15.8

23.6

21.6

38.9

23.4

19.4

38.6

34.6

26.6

18.5

2.8

4.5

11.2

11.0

8.5

0% 50% 100%

The protests were a plot.


Alcohol was consumed in the mosque.

The police resorted to excessive violence.

The water sprayed on the protesters contained

chemicals.

Ak Parti proponents attacked the protesters.

Allegations raised about the protests

Absolutely wrong Wrong Neither right nor wrong Right Absolutely right


Let's take a closer look at these rates. The graph below, where 'absolutely wrong' is 1, and

'absolutely right' is 5, shows the average response rates for each of the statements.

The graph demonstrates that the respondents credit the allegations raised by Ak Parti

proponents less than the allegations put forth by the protesters.

Conspiracy theories are popular among society

‘The protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators’ was the most supported allegation on

average by the respondents. It is interesting that the allegation of a plot, which was

frequently expressed by the Prime Minister and Ak Parti proponents, received a higher

average rate than the other allegations raised by Ak Parti proponents. We can explain

this trend with the finding presented in the 'Belief in science and conspiracy theories'

section of the January'13 Barometer report: society in Turkey takes a rational

perspective on issues related to their personal lives, while they seem 'to believe

anything they are told' on issues of national relevance.

Nevertheless, this finding does not necessarily mean that the government's allegation, 'the

protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators', is perceived to be completely

irrational. We can draw the conclusion that society is inclined to believe allegations

that particularly portray Turkey as an aggrieved party.

3.4

2.7

2.6

3.2

3.2

2.9

1 2 3 4 5






chemicals.


Allegations raised about the protests

Abs. Wrong Wrong Right Abs. Right


The extent to which allegations are affirmed by different segments of society is important

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the extent to which these allegations are

welcomed by different segments of society is more important than the extent to which

they are accepted by the general public. First and foremost, separating the response

rates by voter groups will reveal significant findings.

An observation of voter groups and the extent to which they believe the three allegations

raised by the protesters presents that 10 to 20 percent of Ak Parti voters believe these

allegations. On the other hand, the rate of CHP voters who do not believe the

allegations raised by the protesters is generally under 10 percent. MHP voters also

affirm the allegations on average, but not as strongly as CHP voters.

BDP voters believe the allegations on police brutality and the use of tear gas that causes

chemical burns more than they believe the other allegations. Such a reaction from BDP

voters towards the police is in line with expectations, as BDP voters are more frequently

in conflict with the police than the other voter groups.

‘Swing voters’ are inclined towards the protesters rather than following the mainstream trend

Swing voters stand out once again, as noted in different sections of the report. The

respondents who stated that they are 'undecided' in response to the question, "Which

political party will you vote for?" do not present an attitude in line with the Turkey

average, but they incline in favor of the protesters. This divergence becomes

particularly important when we consider that the behavior of swing voters is usually

parallel to the Turkey average. For example, while 43 percent of the general public

does not believe that ‘Ak Parti proponents attacked the protesters’, this rate drops to

33 percent among swing voters.

The same trend prevails when we observe the attitudes of voter groups towards the

allegations put forth by the government and the Prime Minister.

When inquired about the allegations of alcohol consumption in the mosque and desecration

of the flag, approximately 30 percent of Ak Parti voters state that they do not believe

these statements put forth by their leader. Only 40 percent of Ak Parti voters believe

that the protesters consumed alcohol in the Dolmabahçe mosque. Although their

profile is usually closer to the Turkey average, only 17 percent of swing voters affirm

this statement.

Surprisingly, BDP voters believe this allegation, which the Prime Minister reiterated in many

occasions, at a higher rate than the Turkey average. This may be explained by religious

sentiments of BDP voters who are known to be more pious than the other voter groups

on average.

Among BDP voters, the rate of respondents who believe that the protestors consumed alcohol

in the mosque is higher on average than other voter groups except for Ak Parti's.


Belief in the allegation that ‘the protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque’ is related to

being an Ak Parti voter

As shown in the graph above, Ak Parti voters respond to the statement that 'the protesters

consumed alcohol in the mosque' around the 'neither right nor wrong' option on

average. We observe that other voter groups of all opposition parties are located on

the 'negative' side of the axis.

The rate of respondents who believe that the protesters burned the Turkish flag is 27 percent

for the country overall, while this reaches 37 percent among Ak Parti voters. However,

31 percent of Ak Parti voters do not believe this allegation, and one third is skeptical.

We draw the conclusion that out of all the allegations raised by Ak Parti, ‘the Gezi protests are

a plot set up foreign conspirators’ received the highest rate of affirmation among

society. Even 20 percent of CHP voters believe that the Gezi protests are a plot set up

against Turkey, while 18 percent prefer to respond as 'neither right nor wrong'. On the

other hand, the attitude of swing voters is closer to that of CHP than Ak Parti.

MHP voters support the ‘foreign conspirators’ allegation

The attitude of MHP voters towards the 'foreign conspirators' allegation of the ruling party is

notable. While MHP voters take an anti-Ak Parti stance in their responses to other

questions, they seem to believe AK Parti's claim that the protests are a plot against

Turkey at a higher percentage. 59 percent of the respondents who expressed that they

would vote for MHP believe AK Parti's 'foreign conspirators' claim. Even 47 percent of

the swing voters seem to support the allegation.

2.4

2.5

2.7

2.5

1.9

3.1

2.6

1 2 3 4 5

Non-voter

Swing voter

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

Turkey


Absolutely Wrong Wrong Neither Right Nor Wrong Right Absolutely Right


Swing voters

As mentioned before in different sections of this report, one of the findings of the

survey is particularly remarkable. KONDA Barometer reports reveal that the behavior

of swing voters is in parallel to the overall behavior of voters in Turkey. However, the

opinions of swing voters on the Gezi Park protests are in favor of the protesters rather

than being in line with the Turkey average. Swing voters believe the allegations raised

by the ruling party at rates below the Turkey average, while they seem to be more

convinced of the allegations raised by the protesters.

We can also interpret this data differently from another perspective: the rate of swing

voters who might vote for Ak Parti might have decreased. The respondents who are

potential Ak Parti voters, but express that they are 'swing voters' when inquired about

their political preferences, might have distanced themselves from the discourse of the

ruling party in terms of their outlook on current politics.

Various reasons trigger belief in the allegations

The correlation analyses reveal that political preference is not the sole parameter that

influences the response to the allegations.

Even when political preference is pegged, in other words, when we assume that the

respondents have the same political preference, educational attainment level and

degree of piety influence respondents' outlook on the allegations. However, as

presented in the graph below, differences in these parameters do not trigger significant

3.1

3.2

3.0

3.4

2.3

4.1

3.4

1 2 3 4 5

Non-voter

Swing voter

BDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

Turkey

The protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators



divergences in opinion. When we pay attention to the different demographic

characteristics among each voter group, we encounter important findings.

Educational attainment level and degree of piety influence the outlook on the allegation that

the protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque to a greater extent than other

allegations raised about the protests.

The distribution presented by the two graphs above may be tied to Ak Parti voters, who are

less educated and more religious than others. By applying a detailed crosstabulation,

we can determine that this presumption is at least partially correct.

2.12

2.32

2.58

2.78

2.7

2.94

2.63

1 2 3 4 5

Masters

College

High school

Junior school

Primary school

Illiterate

Turkey


3.78

3.56

3.31

3.1

3.03

2.98

3.21

1 2 3 4 5

The police response was extremely violent.

3.1

2.74

2.33

1.65

2.64

1 2 3 4 5

Pious

Religious

Believer

Non-believer

Turkey


2.86

3.05

3.59

4.05

3.2

1 2 3 4 5

The police response was extremely violent.

Abs. Wrong Abs. Right Abs. Wrong Abs. Right

Abs. Wrong Abs. Right Abs. Wrong Abs. Right


In other words, the rate of respondents who believe Ak Parti's allegations decreases with

higher educational attainment level. This is indeed caused by the inverse relationship

between Ak Parti voters and educational attainment level.

The analysis on the allegation that the protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque reveal the

most striking and surprising findings.

We mentioned above that the rate of respondents who believe these allegations vary with

respect to educational attainment level. However, when we examine AK Parti voters,

in terms of the extent to which voters in different educational attainment clusters are

in favor of this discourse, we reach the remarkable conclusion presented in the graph

below.

For example, in response to the allegation that 'the protesters consumed alcohol in

the mosque', the average response rate among Ak Parti voters with an educational

attainment level below high school is 3.3 (slightly closer to 'right' than 'neither right nor

wrong'), while that of the Ak Parti voters who are college graduates is 3.2, which is

more or less the same as the former.

The protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque

3.4

3.2

3.2

3.3

3.0

3.0

3.1

1 2 3 4 5

Masters

College

High school

Junior school

Primary school

Illiterate

Overall

Ak Parti voters

2.2

2.4

2.5

2.5

2.6

2.8

2.5

1 2 3 4 5

Swing voters

1.7

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.0

2.0

1.9

1 2 3 4 5

Masters

College

High school

Junior school

Primary school

Illiterate

Overall

CHP voters

1.7

2.2

2.8

2.6

2.2

2.8

2.5

1 2 3 4 5

MHP seçmenleri


Consequently, if we disregard the slight differences between the figures, there is no significant

difference between Ak Parti voters with different educational attainment levels

regarding the allegation that protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque.

The attitude of swing voters is similar to the overall findings of the survey. The rate of swing

voters who believe that the protesters consumed alcohol in the mosque decreases as

the educational attainment level increases, as also reflected by the overall distribution

for Turkey.

CHP voters’ belief in the allegations of alcohol consumption in the mosque decreases slightly

with increased educational attainment. On the other hand, it is quite difficult to state

that such an impact is observed among MHP voters.

As mentioned earlier, the allegation that the protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators

was the most believed allegation by the general public. When we analyze how the

intensity of belief in this allegation varies by educational attainment level within each

voter group, we can observe that Ak Parti voters present a homogeneous attitude,

similar to their response to the allegation of alcohol consumption in the mosque.

However, among CHP voters, disagreement with this statement decreases in parallel

to lower educational attainment level.

The protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators which resent Turkey's

development.

The data shows that how seriously respondents take these allegations seriously or not vary

by various parameters. However, political preference and then educational attainment

3.8

4.1

4.2

4.1

4.1

3.7

4.1

1 2 3 4 5

Masters

College

High school

Junior school

Primary school

Illiterate

Overall

Ak Parti voters

1.6

2.0

2.3

2.5

2.6

2.5

2.3

1 2 3 4 5

CHP voters


level are the two most influential parameters in order. The influence of other

parameters, such as degree of piety, level of income and lifestyle, are based on these

two parameters. However, several nuances may also prove to be important findings.

For example, there are important differences between the opinions of the Kurdish and

the Turkish.

Out of the six allegations inquired about, the most significant divergence of opinion between

the Kurdish and the Turkish is observed in statements about the police forces. We

reported similar findings for BDP voters earlier in this report. The Kurdish believe the

allegations about police brutality at considerably higher rates than the average. We

may relate this finding to the long-term conflict between the Kurdish political

movement with the police forces and its reflection on the streets.

3.4

3.0

3.5

2.9

2.8

3.3

3.2

2.9

3.1

2.7

2.6

3.4

1 2 3 4 5




chemicals.




Opinion on the allegations by ethnicity

Turkish

Kurdish

Abs. Wrong Wrong Right Abs. Right


3.6. TV Channel Preferences and Opinions on the Allegations

The majority of society heard about the allegations that we have analyzed with respect to

various parameters, on TV news during the Gezi protests. Consequently, analyzing the

opinions in relation to the TV channels preferred for watching the news will reveal quite

important results.

However, before proceeding with such an analysis, it is necessary to investigate how TV

channel preference rates changed over the last 5 months. The Gezi Park protests

affected TV preference rates so much that TV channels in opposition to the

government, such as Ulusal Kanal and Halk TV became visible in Barometer figures.

For the purposes of the research, we divided TV channels into four groups: partisan channels

which advocate the government in their discourse and news coverage, opposition

channels which criticize the government, mainstream channels, and news channels.

However, it could be argued that ATV and TRT are mainstream channels or Ulusal Kanal

is a news channel. Nevertheless, we believe that classification of channels by news

content will provide a more accurate analysis.

Ulusal

Halk TV

Samanyolu

Kanal 7

ATV

TRT

The change in the preference rates of the opposing channels

March

April

Mayıs

June

July

May

0 % 5 % 10 % 15 % 20 %


The preference rates of opposition channels increased significantly

As presented on the graph above, in previous months, Halk TV was grouped under 'other

channels' because its preference rate remained below 2 percent. However, 8 percent

of the respondents in July stated that they watch the news on Halk TV.

The surge in the preference rate of Ulusal Kanal over the past 5 months is also outstanding.

We may relate the rise in these rates to the overall increase in the preference rates of

news channels. Even so, the upward trend of Ulusal Kanal's preference rate over the

2 months before the Gezi protests is remarkable.

It would be appropriate to refrain from establishing a relation between these figures and 'TV

ratings'. Nevertheless, the responses expressed in the field survey not only represent

an actual preference, but also reflect an opinion.

Kanal D

Show TV

Star

Fox TV

NTV

Haber Türk

CNN Türk

The change in the preference rates of the news channels and

the mainstream channels

March

April

Mayıs

June

July

0 % 5 % 10 % 15 % 20 %

May


As mentioned above, the preference rates of news channels increased while the preference

rates of mainstream channels decreased over the past 5 months, regardless of the

Gezi Park protests.

According to Barometer data, NTV and Habertürk lost 20 percent of their audience as a result

of the Gezi protests. It could be erroneous to comment on the 5-month course

CNNTürk's preference rate, as its variance remains within the margin of error of the

research.

The TV channel on which the respondents prefer to watch the news proves to be the primary

parameter to evaluate in order to understand the opinions of respondents on the

allegations raised during the month the Gezi protests continued.

When we analyze the channels located at both ends of the polarization axis together, we reach

anticipated results.


Audiences of the opposition channels have more fixed opinions

The two groups of channels reflect significantly different behavioral patterns. Halk TV and

Ulusal TV audiences demonstrate a fixed behavioral pattern regardless of which side

raises an allegation. For example, it can be seen in the graph below that the average

rate of respondents who believe that ‘the protests are a plot set up by foreign

conspirators’ is higher than the others. However, the respondents who prefer the two

opposition channels reject this allegation as strongly as the reject the others. The same

holds true for responses to the allegations raised by the protesters, as reflected on the

graph above. However, we cannot argue that the audiences of partisan TV channels

have opinions that are fixed to the same extent.

4.0

4.2

2.6

2.6

2.9

2.8

3.2

3.8

4.1

2.2

2.2

2.5

2.4

2.9

4.1

4.1

2.5

2.5

2.9

2.7

3.2

1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

Ulusal

Halk TV

Samanyolu

Kanal 7

ATV

TRT

Turkey

Opposing channels / Allegations raised by the protesters

The water sprayed on

the protesters contained

chemicals.

Ak Parti proponents

attacked the protesters.

The police resorted to

excessive violence.



When we analyze other TV channels which can be assumed to remain outside this scope of

this polarization, we can observe that the opinions of the respondents who watch the

news on mainstream channels are cumulated around the center.

It is surprising that the audience of CNNTürk, which was highly criticized for broadcasting a

documentary on 'penguins' instead of covering the news on the protests, believe the

allegations raised by the protesters at quite high rates.

2.2

1.8

3.3

3.1

2.9

3.2

2.7

1.9

1.7

3.3

3.3

2.9

3.1

2.7

2.3

2.0

4.2

4.0

3.9

4.0

3.4

1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

Ulusal

Halk TV

Samanyolu

Kanal 7

ATV

TRT

Turkey

Opposing channels / Allegations raised by the government

The protests are

a plot.

Alcohol was

consumed in the

mosque.

The protesters

burnt the Turkish

flag.



3.3

3.0

3.5

3.1

3.3

3.0

3.7

3.2

3.0

2.7

3.1

2.9

2.9

2.7

3.6

2.9

3.3

3.0

3.3

3.1

3.4

2.9

3.7

3.2

1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

Kanal D

Show TV

Star

Fox TV

NTV

Habertürk

CNNTürk

Turkey

Other channels / Allegations raised by the protesters

The water sprayed on

the protesters

contained chemicals.

Ak Parti proponents

attacked the protesters.

The police resorted to

excessive violence.



2.6

2.8

2.7

2.8

2.6

2.9

2.2

2.7

2.5

2.7

2.7

2.5

2.6

2.8

2.1

2.7

3.4

3.5

3.3

3.6

3.3

3.5

2.9

3.4

1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0

Kanal D

Show TV

Star

Fox TV

NTV

Habertürk

CNNTürk

Turkey

Other channels / Allegations raised by the government

The protests are a plot.

Alcohol was consumed in

the mosque.

The protesters burnt the

Turkish flag.



3.7. Identifying the protesters

In addition to inquiring the opinions of the respondents on the protests, we also asked them

about their opinions about the protesters and requested them to identify the adjective

which they think best describes the protesters out of the list provided.

Which of the below do you think best identifies the majority of the

Gezi Park protesters? Which of the below was the most critical group

among the protesters?

Percentage

Members of marginal groups 11.6

Ak Parti opponents 22.4

Minorities 0.4

Traitors 4.2

Foreign conspirators 14.7

Environmentalists 5.4

Opposition parties 3.6

Citizens demanding for their rights 30.6

Young people in their 20s 7.1

Total 100

Out of the responses, 'citizens demanding for their rights' (30.6 percent), 'Ak Parti opponents'

(22.4 percent), 'foreign conspirators' (14.7 percent), and 'members of marginal groups'

(11.6) stand out. Three out of every ten people in Turkey identify the protesters as

'citizens demanding for their rights', and it is the response which received the highest

preference rate.

Some of these expressions are in favor of the protesters, some are neutral, and some define

the protesters negatively. However, instead of grouping the expressions as positive and

negative based on our subjective assessments, we grouped them according to the

respondents’ opinions on the protests on average. This method not only identifies

which expressions are positive or negative, but also provides insight on which

expression is preferred by which segment of society.


* The response, 'minorities' was not included in the graph due to its low preference rate.

As presented in the graph above, the respondents who identify the protesters as ‘citizens

demanding for their rights’ and ‘environmentalists’ support the protests in general,

while those who identify the protesters as ‘young people in their 20s’ are undecided

between the two, with a slight inclination towards the protests. Therefore, it is possible

to characterize these three expressions as 'positive'.

On the other hand, 73 to 93 percent of the respondents who are against the protests or think

that the protests are a plot set up by foreign conspirators prefer to identify the

protesters with expressions other than the three listed above. Therefore, these can be

characterized as 'negative' expressions. However, the analysis proves that the

expression 'Ak Parti opposition' is perceived slightly different than others.

When we sort the expressions as shown in the graph above and analyze the response rates

by demographic groups and in comparison to the other questions on the Gezi Park

protests, the polarization can be observed clearly.

Educational attainment level leads to significant differences in preferences. For

example the rate of respondents who identify the protesters as 'citizens who demand

for their rights' among the respondents who have the highest level of educational

attainment is twice the rate for respondents with the lowest educational attainment

level.

5

7

10

13

22

50

74

87

40

93

92

86

86

73

44

20

10

54

1

1

5

1

5

7

6

3

6

0 % 50 % 100 %

Foreign powers

Members of marginal groups

Traitors

Opposition parties

Ak Parti opponents

Young people in their 20s

Environmentalists

People demanding for their rights

Turkey

Opinion on the Gezi protests by identification of the

protesters*


All these are part of a plot against Turkey, the protesters were subject to

provocation.


The attitude of Alevis is clear, with 74 percent identifying the protesters as 'citizens

who demand for their rights'.

It is not surprising that students and private sector employees prefer to identify the

protesters by positive expressions. However, the high rate (26 percent) of the

housewives who emphasize the anti-Ak Parti stance of the protesters is notable: 53

percent of the housewives are Ak Parti voters and they constitute the demographic

group in which Ak Parti is the most prevalent. It would not be incorrect to state that the

housewives 'took the protests personally'.

54 percent of moderns think that the protesters 'demand for their rights' and 70

percent have a positive outlook on the protests. 75 percent of the religious

conservatives identify the protesters with negative expressions, however 26 percent,

i.e. one third, of the respondents in this group prefers to use more neutral expressions,

such as 'Ak Parti opponents'. Head cover and degree of piety also lead to a similar

divergence.

The difference between how the Kurdish and the Turkish identify the protesters is not

similar to other polarized differences. The Kurdish preferred the expression 'members

of marginal groups' less frequently, while they preferred the expression

'environmentalists' more frequently. Except for these, the polarization between

‘citizens demanding for their rights’ / ‘foreign conspirators’ is not observed among the

Kurdish. Moreover, preference rates for all other expressions, including 'Ak Parti

opponents', are the same.

Men are inclined to prefer negative expressions.

The middle-aged tend to prefer negative expressions, whereas younger respondents

are inclined to prefer positive expressions. However, there are no pronounced

differences between the preference rates. It is worth nothing that although there are

major differences between the rates of social media usage between different age

groups, there are no major differences between how younger and older respondents

identify the protesters.

A higher rate of the respondents who live in rural areas think that the protesters are

'Ak Parti opponents'.

Given the polarized nature of opinions on the Gezi protests, it should be expected from

respective party voters to use such contrasting expressions to identify the protesters.

Thus, 72 percent of CHP voters think that the protesters were 'citizens demanding for

their rights' and 80 percent of CHP voters support the protests, whereas 81 percent of

Ak Parti voters prefer to use negative expressions to identify the Gezi Park protesters

and 34 percent of Ak Parti voters believe that the protesters were 'Ak Parti opponents’.

This outlook highlights the severity of the polarization in addition to providing insight

on the opinions of the voter groups.

The expressions with which respondents preferred to identify the protesters are closely related

with the responses they gave to the questions on the Gezi protests. Therefore, we can


draw the conclusion that these expressions were quite critical in shaping the public

opinion.

Respondents who think that the protesters were ‘environmentalists’ were not happy that the

protests persisted

The allegations and statements expressed by the Prime Minister divided society in Turkey

towards opposite poles in their evaluation of the Gezi Park protesters. The direct

relation between how the respondents identify the protesters and how they evaluate

the protests clearly exhibits the polarized status of society.

The respondents who identify the respondents as 'traitors', 'members of marginal

groups' and 'foreign conspirators' also think that the respondents were at fault and

should not have resisted the government.

58 percent of the respondents who think that the protesters were 'demanding for their

rights' believe that the protesters were justified.

57 percent of the respondents who identified the protesters as 'environmentalists'

stated that they should have ended the protests at one point. This rate is important as

it reveals that the respondents who believe that the Gezi protests began with the

purpose to protect the environment are not happy that the peaceful atmosphere of the

protests was disintegrated into an ongoing conflict.


10

3

26

1

32

44

27

28

40

6

2

15

5

16

19

14

15

14

6

17

13

15

10

9

14

17

7

3

7

2

1

3

3

2

36

28

26

57

32

16

36

31

23

26

58

9

23

4

9

27

10

4

0 % 50 % 100 %

Young people in their 20s

People demanding for their

rights

Opposition parties

Environmentalists

Foreign powers

Traitors

Minorities

Ak Parti opponents

Members of marginal groups

Opinion on the attitude of the protesters by how the

protesters are identified



The protests should have ended when meetings were held.

The protesters should not have marched to the government offices.




3.8. Who are ‘the foreign conspirators’?

'Foreign conspirators' has been a frequently used expression in discussion on the Gezi Park

protests. The Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the protests were part of a plot set

up by foreign conspirators. The findings of the research, which reveal that more than

half of society thinks that the protests 'were a plot set up by foreign conspirators' and

15 percent of society identifies the protesters as 'pawns of foreign conspirators',

indicate that society in Turkey affirms these statements to a certain extent. The

respondents were asked an open-ended question on how they would define the

'foreign conspirators' and what this expression exactly means in order to understand

what the general public understands from this expression.

As the responses ranged to a considerable degree, they were grouped under various

categories. For example, when the respondents defined this expression as 'the

European countries', 'the European Union' or named any European country, these

responses were grouped under the category, 'European countries'. Likewise,

responses in which a combination of various countries, such as 'foreign countries', 'EU,

U.S., Israel, Iran', 'Iran, Iraq, Israel', 'Russia, China', 'U.S., Germany, Italy' were listed,

were grouped under the category of 'foreign countries'. Moreover, the category of

'domestic powers' was formed to include responses such as 'CHP', 'the Prime Minister',

'separatists', 'Ak Parti opponents', 'the protesters', 'opposition parties'.

Since the beginning of the Gezi protests, the government and the Prime

Minister have been using the expression 'foreign conspirators'. Who do

you think the 'foreign conspirators' are? Who are included in this group?

Can you briefly identify?

Percentage

U.S. 7.8

U.S., Israel 3.5

Israel 3.7

European countries 3.8

Foreign countries 14.1

Foreign conspirators 6.6

Domestic powers 11.6

Opponents/enemies of Turkey 1.9

Other 5.2

There is no such thing as foreign conspirators 6.6

I do not know 8.6

No answer 26.6

Total 100


One third does not know what 'foreign conspirators' mean

First of all, it is notable that 26.6 percent of the respondents did not reply to this question,

and 8.6 percent expressed that they do not know who the 'foreign conspirators' are.

Therefore, one third of society does not have an idea as to who the foreign conspirators

are. Moreover, 6.6 percent of the respondents think that there is no such thing as

'foreign conspirators' or the expression is made up, or do not believe in it at all. Among

the respondents who replied the question, 20.7 percent responded as 'foreign

countries' and 'foreign conspirators', and 11.6 percent defined foreign conspirators as

'domestic conspirators'. The respondents who provided a specific name of a country

for foreign conspirators preferred the U.S. and Israel at the highest rates.

Analyzing the responses by demographic groups and the opinions on the protests does not

provide reliable findings due to the wide range of responses. However, the graph below

presents the rates of respondents who provided a definition of 'foreign conspirators',

who do not believe that foreign conspirators exist and who did not respond to the

question with respect to their opinions on the Gezi protests.

42

38

87

30

40

45

55

11

66

54

13

7

2

6

0 % 50 % 100 %

No answer

Does not know

There are no foreign powers

Those who defined foreign powers

Turkey

Opinion on the Gezi protests by definition of foreign

conspirators


All these are part of a plot against Turkey, the protesters were subject to provocation.

No answer


3.9. Research ID of the KONDA July’13 Barometer

3.9.1. Overall description of the survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy

Limited (KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.). for the subscribers of KONDA

Barometers.

The field survey was conducted on July 6-7, 2013. This report presents the political trends,

preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey within

the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose of determining and monitoring trends

and changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population in

Turkey.

The margin of error of the survey is +/- 2 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.6 at 99

percent confidence level.

3.9.2. The sample

The sample was selected through stratification of the population data and education level

data of neighborhoods and villages based on the Address-Based Population

Registration System (ADNKS), and the results of the June 12, 2011 General Elections

in neighborhoods and villages.

First, the administrative units were grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, and then the

sample was created based on the 12 regions.

Within the scope of the survey, 2629 respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 150

neighborhoods and villages of 98 districts -including central districts- of 28 provinces.

Provinces visited 28

Districts visited 98

Neighborhoods/villages visited 150

Number of respondents 2629

Among the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood, quotas in terms of age and gender

were enforced.

Age group Female Male

Between 18-28 3 respondents 3 respondents

Between 29-44 3 respondents 3 respondents

44 and above 3 respondents 3 respondents


Provinces where surveys were conducted are listed in the table below, and the distribution

of respondents by regions and place of residence are presented in the latter table.

Level 1 (12 regions) Provinces visited

1 İstanbul İstanbul

2 Western Marmara Balıkesir, Tekirdağ

3 Aegean İzmir, Denizli, Kütahya, Uşak

4 Eastern Marmara Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli

5 Western Anatolia Ankara, Konya

6 Mediterranean Antalya, Adana, Hatay, Mersin

7 Central Anatolia Kayseri, Sivas

8 Western Black Sea Samsun, Bartın

9 Eastern Black Sea Trabzon

10 Northeastern Anatolia Kars

11 Middle Eastern Anatolia Malatya, Van

12 South Eastern Anatolia Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Mardin, Şanlıurfa

Region where the survey

was conducted Rural Urban Metropolitan Total

1 İstanbul

19.4 19.4

2 Western Marmara 1.9 3.4

5.3

3 Aegean 3.9 6.0 5.2 15.1

4 Eastern Marmara 1.4 2.7 4.8 8.9

5 Western Anatolia 0.7

9.6 10.3

6 Mediterranean 3.4 2.7 6.2 12.3

7 Central Anatolia 1.4 2.1 1.4 4.8

8 Western Black Sea 2.6 3.4

6.0

9 Eastern Black Sea 1.4 2.1

3.4

10 Northeastern Anatolia 1.4

1.4

11 Middle Eastern Anatolia 1.4 2.1

3.5

12 South Eastern Anatolia 2.1 3.4 4.1 9.6

Turkey 21.5 27.9 50.6 100.0


4. EVALUATIONS

4.1. On the use of communication technologies

In this section of the report, our purpose is to suggest presumptions in light of the Gezi

Park survey and July'13 Barometer, instead of drawing concrete conclusions. These

deductions may inspire future research and studies, and lead us to new questions we

can direct to respondents for evaluating social movements such as the Gezi Park

protests. It seems like the use of social media, 'establishing intimacy' and the

conception of 'us' are interrelated. The deduction below seems to be the right point to

start thinking about the protests.

At 69 percent, the vast majority of the protesters who came to the park received the first news

on the protests on social media. Only 7 percent of the protesters first heard about the

protests on television. However, 71 percent of society in Turkey first heard about the

protests on television. Analyzing this difference will help us to understand the

perceptions of both the protesters and society at large on the social structure in Turkey.

Keeping in mind that 'mutual mistrust' is prevalent among society regardless of gender, age,

and ethnic, cultural and class. We will first reflect on the impact of social differences

on how feelings of mistrust are expressed. While the 'mutual mistrust' widely felt across

different segments of society indicates to a general characteristic of society, how does

social differences shape the way feelings of mutual mistrust are expressed? The data

on the use of social media and traditional media by the protesters in the park and by

the general public can be illuminating in this context.

Importance of individualized networks

At this point, we should speculate on an alternative method of comparison instead of referring

to a mere comparison of internet-television use. It would be useful to remind that social

media use is predominantly shaped by personal friends/networks, at least initially. In

other words, news are spread through 'individualized' networks (i.e. the networks of

5.3

15.4

15.9

Social media 69

6.4

8.6

Television 71.3

7.0

1.2

0 % 50 % 100 %

Turkey

Protesters in

Gezi Park

On which source did you follow the news on the Gezi

protests?

Friend, acquaintance Social media Online news sites Television Did not hear


friends and acquaintances). For this reason, it may be helpful to evaluate the use of

social media in reference to the people who first heard about the protests 'directly'

from their families or friends.

In this light, a comparison of personal networks of friends/acquaintances (in short, social

networks) to traditional media (TV channels, newspapers and online news sites) could

further illuminate our assessment. We can presume that the majority of the protesters

in the park were skeptical of the news they heard on traditional media channels. This

presumption helps explain why the protesters preferred to communicate through their

'individualized' news networks. Moreover, taking into consideration the 69 percent of

the protesters who first heard about the protests on social media and the 15 percent

who first heard about the protests from their family members or friends, we can draw

the conclusion that 84 percent of the protesters possess individualized networks

outside traditional media networks.

The number of protesters who first heard about the protests on online news sites and

television also supports this presumption. Only 8.6 percent of the protesters in the

park followed the news from online news sites, while only 7 percent of the protesters

followed the news on TV. However, as mentioned above, 71 percent of the general

public first heard about the protests on television.

This is in stark contrast with the corresponding rate for the protesters in the park. The

difference – or separation – may indicate whether people first heard about the protests

from individuals they personally know (or persons on an infinite chain of personal

relations connected through various degrees of separation) or from third parties.

Therefore, the 'primary' difference in media use in Turkey is not based on whether the

moderns or the conservatives use social media or not. The fundamental difference is

observed between the rural and urban parts of the country regarding whether people

first heard about the Gezi Park protests - and any other social protest or political

demonstration for that matter - through individualized and personal networks or not.

At this point, it is illustrative to remind that 70 percent of those who first heard about

the protests from a friend or acquaintance already live in metropolitan areas. This may

be explained by the fact that the protests took place in major urban areas in Turkey.

The protests did not happen in 'far away' places. On the contrary, people who live in

big cities witnessed or were affected by the protests on a first hand basis. The protests

took place right where they live and affected their daily lives.

The protests and police brutality affected the daily transportation of people between home,

work or school. Therefore, first-hand information becomes very significant in this

context. Another finding of the research supports our hypothesis: the majority (82.5

percent) of those who live in rural areas first heard about the protests on television,

while communication through social media or personal contacts in rural areas was

limited in comparison to urban areas.

This is why we would like to address the issue of both physical and ideological distance-

intimacy. We may explain the distance-intimacy duality with one of the findings in the


'Belief in science and conspiracy theories' section of the January'13 Barometer.

According to this report, ‘society in Turkey takes a rational perspective on issues

related to their personal lives, while they seem 'to believe anything they are told' on

issues of national relevance.’ This implies that society develops a skeptical and critical

attitude towards events which can be observed at first hand. However, society fails to

take a critical approach towards events which cannot be observed at first hand.

At this point, it is necessary to speculate on the possibility that the differentiation of

information and communication channels may serve as significant indicators for

making sense of the new social dynamics in Turkey. In Turkey, the categories of 'us vs.

them', 'domestic vs. foreign' and 'intimate vs. distant' constantly evolve, and the

boundaries between these categories are re-formulated on a continuous basis. Such

conceptualizations in daily life may impact social relations on different levels

simultaneously: on the one hand, these conceptualizations shape how individuals

differentiate the people they are intimate with from those they are distant to, in other

words, the people they know and do not know, and on the other hand, they determine

the people or the things individuals perceive as a threat to their lifestyles.

It seems impossible - at least for the moment - to reach a decisive conclusion on how social

media use generates new social relations. Even so, the findings that imply increased

social media use in Turkey and the fact that the vast majority of the protesters

communicated via social media during the Gezi protests bring up a critical question

about the impact of new communication technologies on the conceptualizations of 'us

vs. them', 'domestic vs. foreign' and 'intimate vs. distant'. How does social media

reformulate 'us' in the broadest sense possible? However, as emphasized above, the

contrast is not between individuals with different lifestyles - or people who perceive

these styles as different - because both categories are not homogeneous, but instead

reflect a certain degree of diversity. Therefore the finding that one out of every five

people in Turkey first heard about the protests on social media or online news sites,

which played a critical role during the protests, is significant.

The contrast may emerge due to the intimacy established on social media and the

conceptualization of 'us' established through television. It should be emphasized once

again that this contrast does not coincide with the differentiation between the

individuals who identify their lifestyles as modern and conservative. It seems that the

major difference here lies between individuals who do and who do not need

information obtained through personal relations, and this difference is in parallel to

the same difference for the overall population of Turkey provided below and for those

above the age of 30 (thus, not necessarily for educational attainment level of

undergraduate or above), for individuals who live and who do not live in metropolitan

areas, and for those who perceive and do not perceive themselves to be

aggrieved/under threat in relation to the feelings of mistrust.

As indicated in the July'13 Barometer, although the differences between the news sources

from where the respondents heard about the protests can indicate differences in

lifestyles, the significant divergence of opinions arising from the news content

delivered by these news sources supports this presumption.


Consequently, the general atmosphere of mutual mistrust in Turkey, as embodied by

conspiracy theories, may have led to the individualization of communication. The

inclination towards individualized communication may be reinforced by the overall

distrust in media, as observed acutely during the Gezi Park protests. Therefore, these

findings and presumptions we observed during the Gezi Park protests may have

unveiled social trends which had already gained momentum in Turkey prior to the

protests. However, while individualized networks reproduce the duality of 'intimacy vs.

distance' in new forms, it is also highly probable that it will destroy the existing forms.

That is why, with the individualization of information, new networks and new definitions

of 'us' and 'intimacies' are reconstructed; however, the impossibility of observing the

truth/confirming the accuracy of information may be keeping the conspiracy theories

intact.


4.2. What we can learn from Gezi Park

When we observe the Gezi protests in isolation from the political polarization, we can see

many significant lessons to be learnt from the protests for understanding political

dynamics, as well as daily and social life.

Let's start by reiterating when and under which psychological conditions the Gezi protests

began. The protests broke out at a time when critical political developments were in

progress. The discussions on the new constitution were on the agenda, despite

ambivalent attitudes on the issue, and the Kurdish initiative and the peace process

still held promises. Successful resolution of these issues holds the potential to

transform the established political mindset irreversibly.

On the other hand, society in Turkey simultaneously experienced the political polarization of

Ak Parti proponents and opponents, the cultural polarization of the Turkish-Kurdish

and Sunnis-Alevis, and the lifestyle-based polarization of the concerned moderns and

the politicized conservatives. This, of course, does not mean that the polarized clusters

will blindly follow whichever group they belong to. Each individual experiences

polarization at different intensities.

In such an atmosphere, the Gezi protests were explained with reference to the existing social

tension, polarization and psychological conditions. However, the initial spark of the

Gezi protests did not arise from these tensions and psychological conditions. The

protests broke out as a consequence of the new pace of daily life and the sensitivities

of citizens. However, within a week, the protests were encapsulated by polarization

and other pre-existing tensions.

Even so, the new pace of life, new citizens and new politics, which were the actual motives

behind the protests, should not go unnoticed.

4.2.1. Dynamic issues

Various dynamics played a role in the transformation of the protests. The removal of trees in

Gezi Park was what brought people together on the first day of the protests. The

protests intensified when, on the second day, persons dressed in plain clothes, who

were understood to be public officers, burnt the tents of the protesters in Gezi Park.

From the third day onwards, the protests escalated due to the indignation against

excessive use of police force. Hence, according to the Gezi survey, 49 percent of the

protesters in the park participated in the protests upon seeing police brutality. On the

fifth day, the statements of officials and the government representatives shifted the

protests to the well-known political grounds.

Erdoğan’s discourse on the events and the protesters changed the course of the protests. On

the sixth day, the protests transformed into a struggle of citizens who wished to protect

their lifestyles and freedom. The attitude of the Prime Minister enflamed other groups

of opposition. From then onwards, the protests turned into a problem much different

than what it was on the first day.


One of the lessons we should learn from the Gezi Park protests is that nothing can maintain

its initial character under the quick, complex, multidimensional and multi-actor

conditions of the contemporary daily life. Issues of national relevance, developments

pertaining to one’s workplace can change very quickly due to their own dynamics and

to the specific actions individuals decide to or not to take. Sometimes what seems like

a solution on the first day becomes a problem itself on the second day.

Plans and budgets out, scenarios in

Neither political actors nor governing authorities could predict that a social movement like the

Gezi protests would emerge, especially at such a time, when social morale and

expectations were on the positive side with the ongoing Kurdish initiative that has been

in progress since early 2013.

Uncertainty is the most significant characteristic of the contemporary daily life which has a

very fast pace, various dimensions and multiple actors. Therefore, supervision of

operations with traditional plans and budgets is no longer possible on any platform.

The best option is to keep scenarios, which are well-worked out for various

presumptions, ready at all times. Of course, the organization and staff should be

capable of executing the best fit scenario quickly. Otherwise, when conditions once

thought to be static begin changing, the problems/issues cannot be controlled and

they start to steer the course of the events.

Actor-based politics instead of issue-based politics

One issue is overlooked within the premises of the current political tensions, polarization and

historical turning points which we mentioned earlier. At this last turn from the old to

the new mindset, we all insist on categorizing both public and private institutions and

actors as those siding with and those opposing the ‘the new'. For example, we identify

a bureaucratic institution as being open to the new altogether or we label a political

party as completely being against the new.

In reality, however, actors who are 'on the side of the new' or 'against the new' exist within

each institution. Therefore, it is not the right approach to label and align institutions

and issues in categories during this critical period. The artificial tensions caused by

this faulty categorization are among the psychological thresholds which Turkey should

quickly overcome to conclude the new constitution or the Kurdish initiative. However,

a new alignment, based on mindsets instead of actors, will enable us to take rapid and

successful steps on problems such as environmental protection, the status of women,

the new constitution, the Kurdish initiative.

The Gezi Park protests is the first time when groups with such different identities, political

opinions and traditions came together for a common cause. Thus, the fundamental

impact of the Gezi protests will be to energize those who stand 'for the new' in any

political, public or private institution.


4.2.2. How valid is the Generation Y classification?

In recent years, institutions, academics and the media have been showing extensive interest

in research and studies on the youth. The Gezi Park protests and the following

discussions are also focused on the young people. Among the conceptual models

formulated around these discussions, the concept of 'Generation Y' has become one

of the most widely discussed topics. At this point, some problems arise, because

'locality' and 'the prominence of the cultural', which are the most important

characteristics of the new way of life, are explained through out-of-date 'global' and

'demographic' codes and statements.

The term 'Generation Y' is used for people born between 1981-2000, and it implies a series

of behavioral patterns from business life to consumption. According to the definition

of the term, social responsibility, self-confidence, achievement-oriented and tolerance

to differences are the most important values of Generation Y. The most tech-savvy

cohort in business life, this generation enjoys making a difference, craves for attention

and is open to change. Members of Generation Y are not as workaholic as their

predecessors and they try to achieve a balance between their work and private life.

They are ambitious and seek motivation, but endeavor to establish a meaningful

balance in their lives.

Such theories may be illustrative to a certain extent. However, keeping in mind that out of the

75 million people in Turkey, 37 million are below the age of 29 and 17 million are

between the ages of 18-28, the shortcomings of explaining such a large cohort with a

concept developed in the West should not be overlooked. Therefore, analyzing the

young population in Turkey in its entirety and tackling the phenomenon of 'Generation

Y' will provide better results towards understanding the Gezi protests or Generation Y.

According to the data available in the “KONDA Data Repository”,5 out of the young people

between the ages of 18-28, 37 percent are educated below high school, 46 percent

have high school degrees, and only 17 percent have a college degree or higher.

Slightly more than half (56 percent) of the 17-percent segment of young people who have a

college degree or higher are employed. Only 9 percent of the 18-28 age cohort both

have a college degree or higher and are employed. Therefore, it should be kept in mind

that Generation Y, which includes young people who have college education and are

employed, constitutes a very small segment of the youth in Turkey.

5 This section employs and reinterprets a selection of the findings and impressions available in the monthly KONDA

Barometers and the "Turkish Youth Research" which were carried out between 2011-2013. Reports are available for

public and can be accessed at www.konda.com.tr.

http://www.konda.com.tr/


Educational attainment level and employment status among the youth

Below

high

school

High

school

graduate

University

graduate Total

Employed 14 15 9 38

Unemployed 25 30 7 62

Total population between

the ages of 18-28 38 46 16 100

14 percent of young women have a college degree or higher and 40 percent have a high

school degree. Among young men, the respective rates are 18 percent and 51 percent.

When the distributions by gender, educational attainment level and employment status

are analysed together, the primary problem areas for the young people are clearly

visible. Almost half (48 percent) of young women are housewives. The rate of

housewives among young women who have a college degree is 13 percent. Almost one

tenth is unemployed or cannot work. The inclusion of young women in the work force

is directly correlated with educational attainment level. Uneducated young men are

often employed as workers, farmers and small retailers.

To conclude, as we mentioned in the beginning, it will be inaccurate to identify the entire youth

in Turkey as Generation Y. According to KONDA findings, , when we run the analyses

based on educational attainment level and employment status and keep behavioral

patterns aside as only 10 percent of the young people in Turkey can be identified with

the concept of Generation Y.

They hold the same values as their elders

While the daily life practices of young people reveal a completely different pattern, their values

prove to be quite traditional. Four out of every five young people think that traditions

should be preserved and that individuals should follow traditions in their daily lives. 80

percent of young people agree that traditions should be conveyed as is into the future,

while 9 percent think otherwise. 54 percent of young people express that they “strictly

follow the social rules” in their daily lives, while 20 percent state otherwise, and 26

percent remain in between.

Young people are attached to their families and they are the carriers of their parents'

dreams

The greatest fear of the individuals in society is the possibility that they or their son/daughter

might not be able to receive the education they desire (81 percent of society, 84

percent of the 18-28 age group). 72 percent of society and 73 percent of young people

fear any restrictions on their freedom. The most significant fear of society is drifting

away from the traditions (81 percent of society, 84 percent among the young people

between the ages 18-28).

Migration and affording the education of their children are the matters where households

struggle the most and show the highest determination. While the average years of

education in Turkey is 7.8 years, the same figure for the fathers of young people is 4


years. Parents expect that children who are better educated will respect the traditions

and their elders, so they will provide a better future for themselves and their families.

Families convey such dreams to their children as the purpose of life, and these are

multiplied within each generation.

The youth is pessimistic and concerned

Expectations of young people about their own future are more optimistic than their prospects

for the country. 58 percent of young people are optimistic in response to the statement,

“My living conditions will be better in 5 years”, while 44 percent are optimistic in

response to the statement, “Living conditions in Turkey will be better in 5 years.” As

their age increases, people become less hopeful and become more pessimistic; in

other words, their personalities change as they go through more in life. Although this

does not necessarily turn into fatalism among young people, it turns their aspirations

into negative.

We can also observe that young people are not fatalistic in general; on the other hand, they

display a particularly fatalistic behavior regarding a specific issue, i.e. gender equality

in marriage. 69 percent of young people do not agree with the statement, “there is not

much I can do to change the course of my life.”

When inquired about what is necessary in order to achieve goals such as having a higher

social status, being influential, being successful in career, materializing dreams and

being very knowledgeable, the majority of young people choose 'working hard' and

'being educated' among the option of having a friend at high places, being lucky, having

a family with the necessary resources, being educated and working hard. However, this

particular finding is worth noting: 35 percent of young people believe that a factor

outside their own effort, such as luck, friends at high places and family with resources,

is necessary to materialize their dreams, while 33 percent think that such a factor is

necessary for being powerful, and 27 percent see such a factor as a prerequisite for

professional success, and 26 percent see it indispensable for social mobility.

4.2.3. Did the generation change, or the pace and paradigms of daily life?

The new age, new life, post-modern life or information society; no matter how we name it, life

today is quite different than what it used to be.

When we consider the last thirty years, we can see that we are in the process of stepping in a

new age. The emergence of the new age in all spheres of life continues at full pace.

Our lives are taking a leap forward. Nothing we know proceeds, functions as it did

before. The quality of life changes along with its pace. In order to understand the extent

of change, it is sufficient to look at three aspects:

1) Changes in economic infrastructure and technology: Changes which emerge in the

modes of production and the management of economics which are triggered by these

are also important.


2) Changes in infrastructure: And the changes they trigger in the way we think, in our mind

maps and science.

3) Changes in politics, law, social life and consequent changes.

Our values, knowledge, behavior patterns, in short everything is going under change. Daily life,

work, production, relations, politics became 'independent from time and place'. Instead

of the hierarchical structures put forth for the industrial society, network systems and

organization models, unclassifiable under any category and which organize themselves

on their own, are now prevalent in many areas. Paradoxes, dichotomies, and dilemmas

define the present day and expose us to multidimensional problems and

predicaments.

We witness how quickly singular events, which steer daily life, can exert an incredible impact.

Therefore, each actor, institution, government or system is required to be perfectionist

perpetually. ‘Total quality’ is now an inseparable component of daily life, and at

national level, it corresponds to the demand for 'democracy'. Within the chaos,

concepts such as transparency, auditability, sustainability, total quality gain

importance as attempts and requirements which are necessary to accurately define

the processes.

The life we endeavor to understand is something brand-new. People born in the last thirty

years were born into this life. Thus, there is no such life that they can identify as 'new',

because for them it already 'exists'. We find it easier to explain this new life through

younger generations. However, we are actually referring to something very different

and quite impossible to be defined through the new generations.

Over the last thirty years, Turkey has changed incredibly due to social and internal dynamics.

The change which Turkey went through has distinctive aspects as well as differences

from and similarities to the rest of the world:

1) The period from 1983 to 2002 was - or could not be - managed by governments which

lasted 10.5 months on average.

2) From electricity infrastructure to industrialization, from car ownership to export

volume, from transportation to communication, the economic infrastructure and

volume of the country grew despite problems.

3) Half of the adult population in Turkey migrated over the last thirty years. Thirty years

ago, 60 percent of the adult population lived in rural areas. However, today, 50 percent

lives in the 11 metropolitan areas and 30 percent lives in urban areas.


4) Migration not only spoiled cities, traditions and habits, but also produced new values,

new lifestyles, new attachments along with new cultural identities and new relations

based on solidarity.

The transformation experienced without the necessary political vision and judicial

infrastructure, lead to chaotic lives and cities as well as distrust in politics, the

government and justice. In addition, the Kurdish issue, which turned into conflict in

time, was another cultural and political issue in Turkey. In search of a better life, society

experienced a transformation from within; and this transformation created a society

whose members are hopeful and passionate about their individual lives, but concerned

and marginalized on issues of national relevance. In the end, any natural or political

difference leads to tension and polarization because there is no national vision based

on public consensus.

Therefore, the lessons we learned from the Gezi protests should assist us in understanding

and decoding the new life and human behavior patterns within the limits of the existing

conditions and social psychology of the country, which we are a part of, but which also

directly aims at forcing us to change.

gezİ report - konda · 2017-03-26 · konda gezi report / june 5, 2014 page 6 / 94 personal...

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