ghazali, ibn e rushd and islam sojourn into modernity by dr basit

7/22/2019 Ghazali, Ibn e Rushd and Islam Sojourn Into Modernity by Dr Basit

1/19

Islamic Studies 43:2 (2004) pp. 207225 207

Ghazzl!, Ibn Rushd and Islams Sojourn intoModernity: A Comparative Analysis1

BASIT BILAL KOSHUL

Some modern Muslim thinkers, like Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri [Mu "ammad

#bid al-Jbir!], argue that Ibn Rushds thought provides a better frameworkfor Islams sojourn into modernity than Ghazzl!s. According to these critics,Ghazzl! (d. 555/1111) undermines the value of reason and rationality as ameans of attaining knowledge. In its place he advocates the spiritual andmystical path to inner enlightenment. Because reason and rationality havefundamentally shaped the contours of modern culture, these critics argue that

Ibn Rushds exposition of the scope and nature of reason is a more adequateappreciation of the subject matter and therefore a better starting point forIslams engagement with modernity.

This critique of Ghazzl!, in my view, is mistaken on two differentaccounts: (a) it is a misreading of Ghazz l!s position on the scope and nature

of reason/rationality, and (b) it is a misreading of the modern appreciation ofreason/rationality and the needs of contemporary culture. It is also my viewthat while Ghazzl!s thought offers a better alternative than Ibn Rushds, itdoes contain some shortcomings. These shortcomings have been noted bysome traditional Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) as wellas modern Muslim scholars such as Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). But in spite ofthese problems Ghazzl!s thought still provides a better framework forIslams sojourn into modernity than Ibn Rushds.

Al-Jabris Critique of Ghazzl!and Advocacy of Ibn Rushd

Al-Jabri sees Islamic history as a stage on which two fundamentally opposedintellectual forces have been struggling for pre-eminence a dynamic,scientific rationalism pitted against a reactionary, obscurantist gnosticism. The

1 I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to Professor Ebrahim Moosa (DukeUniversity), Professor Peter Ochs (University of Virginia) and Mohammed Hozein for theirassistance in the preparation of this article.


2/19


3/19

GHAZZ#L$, IBN RUSHD AND ISLAMS SOJOURN INTO MODERNITY 209

though qiys is not un-Islamic in the same sense as is gnosticism, its use ishighly problematic because an investigative method based on qiys cannot

possibly attain the rigor of the demonstrative method and becomes as a resultunfit for membership by scholars and philosophers. 7After noting that IbnS!n (d. 428/1037) abandons the demonstrative method of the genuinephilosophers, al-Jabri notes that he,

limited himself to the theologians method, i.e., the two-term analogicalreasoning [qiys], a process which amounts to equating two totally heterogeneousworlds, the visible and the invisible. 8

Al-Jabri argues that the use of qiyswas pioneered by the fuqahin orderto link the principal/foundation (a!l) to the case in point (far) and it was

adopted by the mutakallim"nand philosophers to link the known (shhid) tothe unknown (ghib).9He goes on to note that the theologians analogicalreasoning (qiys)is no less futile [than that of the fuqah] because the natureof the known (the world of man) being other than that of the unknown (thedivine world), there can be no analogy between them. 10 Consequently, anyuse of qiys in the attempt to reconcile religious and philosophical notionsmust be rejected on purely methodological grounds, 11because it obfuscates thedistinction between two entirely different realms the known human worldand the unknown divine world. For al-Jabri, gnosticism represents the spirit

of Ibn S!ns oriental philosophy and qiysrepresents its method the twocombined embody the Avicennian moment in Islamic history. The

continuation of the Avicennian moment in Islamic history and itsimplications are summed up by al-Jabri in these words:

post-Averroes Arabs, have lived on the margin of history (in inertia anddecline), because we kept clinging to the Avicennian moment after Ghazaligranted it currency within Islam.12

In sum, there are two major shortcomings in Ghazz l!s thought,according to al-Jabri. Firstly, Ghazz l!s Sufism is based on an un-Islamic,pagan-based metaphysics. Secondly, his theoretical thinking is based on theunsound methodology of analogical reasoning (qiys) of the fuqah and

7Ibid., 101.8Ibid., 89.9Ibid., 74.10Ibid., 75.11Ibid., 89.12Ibid., 124.


4/19

BASIT BILAL KOSHUL210

mutakallim"n. Ghazzl!s Sufism is a departure from the spirit of the Qur nbecause the discourse of the Koran was one of reason not one of gnosticism

or illuminism.13

Moreover, Ghazzl!s use of qiys,along with other Muslimtheologians, leads to distorting reality and obstructing the activity ofreason.14

Al-Jabri posits that Ibn Rushds philosophy offers a better alternative toGhazzl!s thought on both these accounts. In contrast to Ghazz l!sgnosticism, Ibn Rushds philosophy is a mathematically minded approachthat investigates all issues from the perspective of mathematics and logic. Thisrationalist approach is far from the polemics of theologians [ mutakallim"n]and the problematics of conciliating reason and transmission [the majorconcern of the fuqah].15 And in place of Ghazz l!s dependence on theinadequate tool of qiys (analogical reasoning), Ibn Rushd uses the more

rational and dependable tool of taw#l (interpretation). Al-Jabri argues thatwhile the use of qiysinevitably obscures the distinction between the religiousand philosophical domains and contorts the meaning of the religious texts, theuse of taw#l maintains the distinct identity of the two realms but posits arelationship between them. Ibn Rushds understanding of taw#l seeks tomaintain the apparent meaning of the religious texts and in case the meaning isnot clear or appears to be in conflict with a philosophical position, to resortto the inductive examination of all the revealed text. 16 Al-Jabri goes on tonote:

Following this methodology, Averroes succeeds in establishing the truths that are

attested through the indicational way of the revelation and those that areproven through the philosophers demonstrative method are in agreement and inharmony.17

While religion and philosophy may differ from each other in terms ofpremises, principles and methods of argumentation, they both converge on theall-important goals of attaining the truth and acquiring virtue. 18A proper anddisciplined use of reason, based on the principles of mathematics and logic,allows the religious and philosophical domains to maintain their individualautonomy but sees them as pursuing the same goals. For al-Jabri the gloomand oriental thinking of Ibn S !n, which was given an Islamic coating by

13Ibid., 125.14Ibid.15Ibid., 86.16Ibid., 102.17Ibid.18Ibid., 1034.


5/19


Ghazzl!, condemns Muslims to live at the margins of modern history andmodern civilization. In stark contrast, the Averroist spirit is adaptable to our

era because it agrees with it on more than one point: rationalism, realism,axiomatic method and critical approach. 19

Ghazzl!on the Scope and Limitations of Philosohy

A look at Ghazzl!s corpus reveals that al-Jabris valuation of Ghazz l! isbased on a flawed reading of Ghazz l!s corpus. While Ghazzl!does critiquephilosophy rather harshly at times, his critique is very focused and specific. Inthe words of M.E. Marmura, Ghazzl!s ultimate purpose is to refute theIslamic philosophers metaphysical theories and not their natural science. 20Acloser look at Ghazzl!s critique reveals that a key point on which hecastigates the philosophers is precisely the same point that is of so muchconcern to Ibn Rushd (and al-Jabri) the illegitimate use of qiys.Furthermore, any analysis of Ghazzl!s critique of philosophy has to bebalanced by an appreciation of his approval of various disciplines withinphilosophy. The final judgment on Ghazz l!s attitude towards philosophyhas to take into account the points on which he speaks approvingly ofphilosophy something that al-Jabri fails to do.

In his work al-Munqidh min al-$all, Ghazzl!notes that philosophy canbe reduced to six divisions: mathematical, logical, physical, metaphysical,political, and moral.21With respect to mathematics, Ghazzl!notes:

The mathematical sciences deal with arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Butnothing in them entails denial or affirmation of religious methods. On thecontrary, they concern rigorously demonstrated facts which can in no wise bedenied once they are known and understood.22

If someone attacks the validity of the mathematical sciences for the sakeof defending religion, Ghazzl! notes: Great indeed is the crime againstreligion committed by anyone who supposes that Islam is to be championedby the denial of these mathematical sciences. 23 Ghazzl!s appraisal of thephysical sciences is similar to his appraisal of the mathematical sciences: he

19Ibid., 128.20 Michael E. Marmura, Ghazzali and Demonstrative Science, Journal of the History ofPhilosophy,no. 3 (1965), 188.21Richard Joseph McCarthy,Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazl#sal-Munqidh min al-$all and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazl# (Boston, MA: TwaynePublishers, 1980), 7222Ibid., 73.23Ibid., 74.


6/19


appreciates the analytical tools that science offers and critiques theunwarranted religious criticism/ condemnation of science:

The physical sciences are a study of the world of the heavens and their stars andthe sublunar worlds simple bodies, such as water, air, earth, and fire, andcomposite bodies such as animals, plants and minerals. They also study the causesof their changing and being transformed and mixedAnd just as religion doesnot require the repudiation of the science of medicine, so also it does not requirerepudiation of the science of physics 24

After mentioning the natural phenomena of eclipses and the scientifictheory explaining these phenomena, Ghazz l!cautions:

Whoever thinks that to engage in a disputation for refuting such a theory is areligious duty harms religion and weakens it. For these matters rest ondemonstrations geometrical and arithmetical that leave no room for doubt. 25

As for those exponents of religion who engage in the reckless practice ofdisputing demonstrable scientific truths, Ghazzl!has some very harsh words:

The greatest thing in which the atheists rejoice is for the defender of religion todeclare these [astronomical demonstrations] and their like are contrary toreligion. Thus, the [atheists] path for refuting religion becomes easy if the likes[of the above argument for defending religion] are rendered a condition [for itstruth].26

Turning from the scientific to the political aspects of philosophy,Ghazzl! notes that all that the philosophers have to say comes down toadministrative maxims concerned with secular affairs and the government of

rules.27The moral sciences come down to listing the qualities and habits ofthe soul, and recording their generic and specific kinds, and the way tocultivate the good ones and combat the bad. 28In both cases the philosophersmerely plagiarize from different religious sources and present the ideas as theirown. In the case of their writings on politics: They simply took these overfrom the scriptures revealed to the prophets by God Most High and from the

24Ibid., 75ff.25 Ghazzl!, Tahfut al-Falsifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, tr. Michael E. Marmura(Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 6.26Ibid., 7.27R. J. McCarthy,Freedom and Fulfillment,7728Ibid.


7/19


maxims handed down from the predecessors of the prophets. 29In the case oftheir teachings on ethics, the philosophers simply took [these] over from the

sayings of the Sufis.30

Consequently, anything of genuine worth in politicsand ethics is already found in the religious sources, and there is no need toconcern oneself with the mixed bag of truth, speculation and falsehood offeredby the philosophers. But even here Ghazz l!goes on to remark:

However, assuming that [certain ideas] are found only in the writings of thephilosophers, if what is said is reasonable in itself and corroborated by apodeicticproof and not contrary to the Quran and Sunna, then why should it be shunnedand rejected? If we were to open this door and aim at foregoing every truthwhich had been first formulated by the mind of one in error, we would have toforgo much of what is true.31

As far as the science of logic is concerned, Ghazz l!notes that this sciencedoes not have anything to do with religion by way of negation oraffirmation.32While logic may not have any explicit religious content, it is avaluable tool that scholars can use to sharpen their intellect so that they arebetter equipped to attain and evaluate knowledge:

Knowledge is either a concept, and the way to know it is the definition or it is anassent (ta!d#q) and the way to know it is the apodeictic demonstration. There isnothing in this that must be rejected. On the contrary, it is the sort of thingmentioned by the mutakallim"n and the partisans of reasoning in connectionwith the proofs they use. The philosophers differ from them only in the modesof expression and technical terms and in a greater refinement in definitions and

subdivisions.33

In this passage Ghazzl!is alluding to and refuting the claim of some ofthe leading proponents of philosophy that logic is the exclusive property ofthe philosophers. Ghazzl! notes that this is one of the claims that theproponents of philosophy use to mislead people. He makes the point thatlogic is not limited to the domain of philosophy because it has always been a

part of religious discourse, though under a different name. Commenting onthe assertion of the philosophers that logical sciences must be mastered,Ghazzl!states:

Yes, when they say that the logical sciences must be mastered, this is true. But

logic is not confined to them. This is the principle in the discipline of theology

29Ibid.30Ibid.31Ibid., 79.32Ibid., 74.33Ibid., 75.


8/19


we name The Book of Reflection. They changed its expression to logic tomagnify itBut when the one seeking to be clever, who is weak, hears the name

logic, he thinks it is an unfamiliar art, unknown to the theologians, knownonly to the philosophers. 34

Ghazzl! the theologian posits that logic is an integral part of theologythat goes by a different name (na%ar). The philosophers try to trick the peopleby playing language games the fact that the term logic (man&iq) is not usedin theology, is provided as proof of the claim that theology is devoid of logic.Ghazzl!argues that the absence of the term does not imply the absence of thescience. In the areas of theology (kalm) and jurisprudence (fiqh), the science oflogic appears under a different name. It is not only theology that containslogic. Ghazzl!the jurist knows (and states) that while the religious commands

that are the subject matter of juridical inquiry are of Divine origin, theprinciples of jurisprudence are actually based on logic. 35

Ghazzl!goes on to note that if linguistic differences are accounted for, itcan be easily demonstrated that theology and jurisprudence contain all thelogic that the work of the philosophers contains. Consequently, any defenceor exposition of religion that is based on the rejection of logic can only becounterproductive. In light of what Ghazzl! has said about unwarrantedreligious criticism of the natural and mathematical sciences, the followingvaluation offered by Ghazzl!of the religious criticism of logic has a familiarring to it:

When [logic] is rejected, the only effect of such a rejection in the minds oflogicians is a low opinion of the rejecters intelligence, and, what is worse, of hisreligion, which, he claims, rests on such rejection.36

For Ghazzl! the difference between philosophy and religion is not thatone employs logic and the other does not; for, in fact, both disciplines employ

logic. Theology and jurisprudence employ logic in a disciplined manner,whereas the branch of philosophy called metaphysics employs logic in anunrestricted (and therefore) illegitimate manner. Ghazz l!notes:

To be sure, the philosophers themselves are guilty of a kind of injustice in the

case of this science of logic. This is that in logic they bring together for apodeictic

34Ghazzl!, Tahfut al-Falsifah: The Incoherence of Philosophers,9.35For citations of Ghazzl!s works that explicitly mention the place of logic and rationality intheology (kalm) and jurisprudence (fiqh), see Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazl#and the AshariteSchool(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 811.36McCarthy,Freedom and Fulfillment,75.


9/19


demonstration, conditions known to be undoubtedly sure and certainknowledge. But when in metaphysics they finally come to discuss questions

touching on religion, they cannot satisfy those conditions but rather areextremely slipshod in applying them.37

Consequently,

[i]t is in the metaphysical sciencesthat most of the philosophers errors are found.Owing to the fact that they could not carry out apodeictic demonstrationaccording to the conditions they had postulated in logic, they differed a great dealabout metaphysical questions. 38

More specifically it is on three particular issues that the philosophers fail

to live up to the standards that they have set for themselves. As a result notonly do they commit an injustice against the science of logic, this injusticeleads them to make metaphysical claims that are contradictory to religiousteachings. Using their knowledge of philosophy the philosophers: (a) deny thepossibility of bodily resurrection, (b) deny Gods knowledge of particulars andclaim that he only knows universals, and (c) assert the co-eternity of God and

the world. On a very basic level Ghazz l!argues that these three positions areat odds with the plain sense meaning of the Qur n and the teachings of theProphet(peace be on him). Speaking of the religious warrant for the claim thatthere will be bodily resurrection, Ghazz l! cites a passage from the Qurn(3: 163) and a number of a'd#thabout the present condition of righteous souls

and the encounter with Munkir and Nak !r in the grave and then goes on tonote:

[this] indicates the revival and resurrection thereafter namely theresurrection of the body. This is possible by returning [the soul] to the body,whatever body this may be, whether [composed] of matter from the first body[or from that] of another or from matter whose creation commences anewThis

lies within Gods power and would be a [true] return of that soul. 39

The claim that God only knows universals but not particulars is out andout unbelief. On the contrary the truth is that there does not escape Him theweight of an atom in the heavens or in the earth (Qur n: 34: 3 and 10: 61).40

37Ibid.38Ibid., 76.39Ghazzl!, Tahfut al-Falasifah; The Incoherence of the Philosophers,219.40McCarthy,Freedom and Fulfillment, 76ff.


10/19


As for the philosophers claim that the world and God are co-eternal, Ghazz l!argues that by taking this position:

They have rendered His state approximating that of a dead person who has noinformation of what takes place in the world, differing from the dead however,only in His self-awareness. This is what God does with those who are deviatorsfrom His path and destroyers of the way of guidance; who deny His saying, Idid not make them witness the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor thecreation of themselves (Qurn: 18: 51).41

In addition to being in clear contradiction with the plain sense meaning ofthe Qurnic narrative, the positions of the philosophers on these three issuesare filled with inner contradictions. In his Tahfut al-Falsifah, Ghazzl!

devotes the [First] Discussion to demonstrating the inner contradictions ofthe claim that the world and God are co-eternal, the [Thirteenth] Discussionto refuting the claim that God does not know particulars, and the[Twentieth] Discussion to refuting the claim that there will be no bodilyresurrection. The fact that there are inner contradictions on these points isamply evidenced by the fact that there is a great deal of disagreement amongthe philosophers on the specifics of their arguments and there is also a palpableshame that is discernible in the way that they present their arguments. Eventhough he is talking about one of the three aforementioned issues, Ghazz l!svaluation holds just as well for the other two. Speaking of Ibn S !nsdisagreement with his fellow philosophers on the issue of God only knowing

Himself this is what the philosophers assert but agreeing with them thatGod cannot know plurality and multiplicity, Ghazz l!notes:

How, then, does he [Avicenna] share with them their denial of plurality butdisagree with them in affirming [Gods] knowledge of other [things]? When hewas ashamed that it should be said that God does not know anything at all in thisworld and the next, but knows only Himself, whereas another knows Him andalso knows Himself and others, thereby becoming nobler than Him in

knowledge [Avicenna] forsook this [position], being embarrassed and repelled bythis doctrine. But he was not ashamed in insisting on the denial of plurality in allrespects, claming that [Gods] knowledge of Himself and of others indeed, ofall things constitutes His essence without any addition. This is the very

contradiction of which the rest of the philosophers were ashamed because of themanifest contradiction [in Avicennas doctrine] at first reflection. Hence no partyamong them is free from shame as regards this doctrine.42

41Ghazzl!, Tahfut al-Falsifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers,70ff.42Ibid., 103ff.


11/19


For Ghazzl!the fundamental problem with the philosophers position isthat they think that the inner nature of divine matters is grasped by reflection

and imagination43

in the same way that human reflection and imagination canbe used to understand mathematics, logic, astronomy, medicine, etc. 44

Evaluating Ghazzl!s Legacy

Ibn Khald%n notes that prior to Ghazzl!, the mutakallim"nhad advanced anumber of arguments offering a rational defence of religious teachings tocounter the heretical claims of a variety of sects. But many of these argumentswere based on elementary and unsound reasoning. Ibn Khald %n creditsGhazzl! and Imm Lisn al-D!n Ibn al-Kha&!b Mu"ammad b. Abd Allh(d. 776/1375) for being among the first Muslim thinkers to utilize the science

of logic to offer a coherent exposition and rational defence of religious faith. 45He goes on to note that while the use of logic and reason is of great value, itsmisuse by the philosophers leads to deviation from the religious teachings.Speaking of the scope of philosophical metaphysics and religious law, IbnKhald%n notes:

There is a great difference between the two positions. The perceptions of whichthe Master of the religious law (Mu"ammad) had are wider (than those of thephilosophers), because they go beyond rational views. They are above them andinclude them, because they derive their support from divine light. 46

In a very approving tone Ibn Khald%n notes that Ghazzl!refuted a goodmany of the (opinions of the metaphysicians) 47that were in vogue during hisday. With respect to the relationship between logic, reason, philosophy andreligion, Ibn Khald%n is much closer to Ghazzl!s position than that of IbnRushd. Charles Issawi and Oliver Leaman note that while Ibn Khaldun rarelyagrees with Ibn Rushd, he considers Ghazz l! as the surer guide to the

43Ibid., 104.44Speaking of Ghazzl!s argument in the Tahfut, Adamson notes:

al-Ghazl!does not reject scientific or philosophical knowledge altogether. What he doesdo is to show that it does not measure up to the rather high standard that the philosophershave set for themselves, namely that knowledge be of relationships which are logically

necessaryThe al-Ghazl!of the Tahfutshould be classed not with the anti-rationalists,but with those concerned to keep philosophy in its proper place. Peter Adamson, Al-Ghazali, Causality, and Knowledge, A paper presented at the 20th World Congress ofPhilosophy. Available on-line at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/papers/medi/MediAdam.htm

45 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1967), 3: 1436.46Ibid., 3: 154.47Ibid., 3: 153.


12/19


truth48 than Ibn Rushd. On the whole, Ibn Khald%n tends to follow al-Ghazali in reconciling mysticism [sufism] with theology. 49 With specific

reference to the relationship of logic and intellect to religious issues, Issawi andLeaman summarize Ibn Khald%ns position thus:

He refers to the intellect as like a balance which is meant for gold, but which issometimes inappropriately used for weighing mountains. Logic cannot be appliedto this area of inquiry, and must be restricted to non-theological topics. 50

In sum, not only does Ibn Khald%n offer a very positive valuation ofGhazzl!s contribution to the history of Islamic thought, but thisappreciation is also juxtaposed with a critique of Ibn Rushd.

Ibn Tamiyyah, another leading medieval Muslim thinker, offers a more

critical evaluation of Ghazzal ! than Ibn Khald%n. While he agrees withGhazzl!s critique of the philosophers in general, Ibn Taymiyyah argues thatthe critique does not go far enough. According to Kamali:

Ibn Taymiyah believes that Ghazali misrepresents Islam in recognizing itsopposition to Philosophy on three points only viz. the eternity of the world,the contentless universality of Gods knowledge, and (skepticism with regard to)the resurrection of the dead.51

Furthermore,

It is not only Ghazalis omissions, but also some positive aspects of his teachingsthat appear (to Ibn Taymiyah) to be coloured by his persistent philosophicalinterests. To be specific, Ibn Taymiyah charges him with initiating the practice ofpresenting Fiqh in terms or concepts borrowed from Greek philosophy. 52

Among modern Muslim thinkers, Iqbal echoes Ibn Taymiyyahs critiqueof Ghazzl! by noting that, Ghazali, on the whole remained a follower ofAristotle in Logic.53In spite of this shortcoming, Iqbal sees striking parallels

48Charles Issawi, and Oliver Leaman Ibn Khaldun, Abd al-Rahman in Routledge Encyclopediaof Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998) 4: 623-27, especially.

49Ibid., 625.50Ibid., 626.51Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Types of Islamic Thought in Criticism and Reconstruction: A ComparativeStudy of Ghazl#s Thahfut and I'y, Ibn Tamiyyahs Radd and Shh Wal#y Allhs (ujjat(Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1963), 54.52Ibid., 55.53 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Institute ofIslamic Culture, 1999), 102.


13/19


between the mission of Ghazzl! and Kant in that Ghazalis mission wasalmost apostolic like that of Kant in Germany in the eighteenth century. 54

The challenge facing both thinkers in their respective historical situations wasto demonstrate the limits of human reason and thereby preserve the integrityof religious teachings that were not capable of rational demonstration. On thispoint, Ghazzl! succeeded where Kant failed. It is worth quoting Iqbal atlength on this point:

[Kants] Critique of Pure Reason revealed the limitations of human reason andreduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins. And justly he hasbeen described as Gods greatest gift to his country. Ghazalis philosophicalskepticism which, however, went a little too far, virtually did the same kind ofwork in the world of Islam in breaking the back of that proud but shallow

rationalism which moved in the same direction as pre-Kantian rationalism inGermany. There is, however, one important difference between Ghazali andKant. Kant, consistent with his principles, could not affirm the possibility of theknowledge of God. Ghazali, finding no hope in analytic thought, moved tomystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion. In thisway he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independent of scienceand metaphysics.55

While Ghazzl!s philosophical skepticism is a rather unsafe basis forreligion and not wholly justified by the spirit of the Quran, 56his response tothe challenge of philosophical rationalism succeeded in securing for religion

the right to exist in a way that Kants philosophy could not do.

While Ghazzl!s accomplishment is noteworthy on this account, forIqbal it comes at a heavy price. There appears to be a vague awareness onGhazzl!s part that the rational/scientific study of the world has some type ofreligious significance. The study of the natural world has the potential ofopening an individuals eyes/heart to the wonders of God. Using the exampleof anatomy to illustrate a more general point about the natural world as awhole, Ghazzl!states:

Indeed no one can study the science of anatomy and the marvelous use of organs

without acquiring this compelling knowledge of the perfect governance of HimWho shaped the structures of animals, and especially that of man. 57

54Ibid., 4.55Ibid., 4.56Ibid., 3.57McCarthy,Freedom and Fulfillment, 71.


14/19


But in the final analysis Ghazz l!comes down on the side of skepticism,in terms of the religious significance of philosophical reflection. After

describing the salient features of the six branches of philosophy and theirrelationship to religious teachings, the final judgment that Ghazz l!offers is:But to all of them, despite the multiplicity of their categories, cleaves thestigma of unbelief and godlessness. 58 The implications of this skepticism arequite far reaching when looking at the fundamentals of religious teachings inthe context of the explosion of scientific knowledge in the modern era. IfGhazzl! is correct in his assessment of philosophy (or natural philosophy,another name for modern science) then there is no religious significancewhatsoever of all the knowledge about the natural world that has resultedfrom (and will continue to result from) the scientific exploration of the naturalworld. Speaking of the value of a rational inquiry into the nature of the world,

and the value of such an inquiry, Ghazz l!states:

Once its [the worlds] temporal existence is established, it makes no differencewhether it is a sphere, a simple body, a hexagon; no difference whether thehighest heaven and what is beneath them are thirteen layers, as they say, or lesseror greater. For the relation of the inquiry into [these matters] to the inquiry intodivine [matters] is similar to the relation of looking at the number of layers of anonion [or] the number of seeds in a pomegranate. What is intended here is only[the worlds] being Gods act, whatever mode it has. 59

Besides the general fact that the world is Gods act, there is no religioussignificance of the particular mode of the worlds being. For Ghazz l! thescientific judgment whether the world is a sphere, simple body or hexagon isreligiously irrelevant. In short, the specifics of the empirical world and theirstudy is a spiritually irrelevant matter. This philosophically skeptical attitudetowards scientific exploration of the empirical world opens the door forspeculative mysticism. When viewed with the aid of historical hindsight and

an awareness of the modern cultural condition, Ghazz l!s philosophicalskepticism is very problematic, because of the significance that modern cultureinvests in scientific truth.

While Iqbal sees Ghazzl!s philosophical skepticism as seriously

problematic, Leor Halevi, a contemporary historian of ideas, argues that atempered interpretation of this skepticism invests it with a significance thatmakes this skepticism of great value for modern rational, philosophicalinquiry. Halevi notes that if this skepticism is interpreted as a functional

58Ibid., 70.59Ghazzl!, Tahfut al-Falsifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers,7.


15/19


skepticism rather than a type of Cartesian doubt, then Ghazz l!s use ofGreek philosophy and logic can be explained differently. Halevi makes his

point by comparing Ghazzl!s critique of philosophy at the turn of 11thcentury with the critique of philosophy offered by Wittgenstein at the turn onthe 20th century. Halevi notes:

In the unusual sections where Ghazali applies Aristotelian language to a worldnot following the ordinary laws of physics, some have found Ghazali slippingunconsciously perhaps, into an Aristotelian frame of mind. I will show that, as askeptical theologian with a dialogic imagination, he was rather deconstructingAristotelian discourse while playing a Wittgensteinian sort of language game. 60

Halevi goes on to point out that while there are obvious differences

between Ghazzl!and Wittgenstein both theological and historical thereare structural similarities between them that elucidate the skepticism of oneand the other.61Detailing these similarities, Halevi states:

Wittgensteins pronouncements on Darwinian and Newtonian believers bear allthe marks of Ghazalis attacks on Aristotelian believers. Indeed, more generally,his view of philosophys role vis--vis natural science corresponds deeply toGhazalis view of theologys role vis--vis natural philosophy. 62

Wittgenstein argues that one must be skeptical of the way that people uselanguage, because more often than not they are actually abusing it.

Wittgenstein was both fascinated and disturbed by the language of psychoanalysisbecause of its claims upon the reality of dreams, and its causal psychologicalreference, violated the rules of the language-game by blurring the lines betweenlogical facts, natural things, and interpretation of outlying senses. 63

Similarly:

Ghazzaliwas not opposed to a neutered causal theory upholding the possibilityof divine agency. But what drove him mad about natural philosophy was itslanguage, which like psychoanalysis obscured the difference between causation

and reasoning. By inferring future situations from a causal nexus established

60 Leor Halevi, The Theologians Doubts: Natural Philosophy and the Skeptical Games ofGhazali, Journal of the History of Ideas,63: 1 (2002) 1939, especially, 20.61Ibid., 34.62Ibid.63Ibid., 35.


16/19


imperfectly by habitual observation and without clearly distinguishing logicfrom reality, natural philosophy violated the rules of the language game. 64

While Ghazzl!does not state the issue in such terms, the fundamentalmistake made by the philosophers is that they conflate the results of logicalreasoning with empirical reality. Centuries before Wittgenstein, Ghazz l!argues that in doing so philosophy violates its own rules and trespasses on adomain over which it has no jurisdiction. Well before Ibn Rushds critique ofthe improper use of qiysby the mutakallim"n, Ghazzl!had traced the rootcause of the inner contradictions of philosophical doctrines to thephilosophers inability to maintain the distinction between the religious andphilosophical domains. The philosophers used the same intellectual apparatusto pass judgment on religious issues related to the divine and hereafter that

they used to pass judgment on philosophical issues related to the naturalworld,65thereby violating the rules of both the religious and the philosophicallanguage games. On this count Ghazz l!s skepticism is more suited to themodern condition not only because this skepticism is critical of taql#din thereligious domain but also because it is critical of the trespasses of reason in thereligious and philosophical domains. While Ibn Rushds thought offers asafeguard against taql#din the religious domain, there is no recognition of thelimits of reason and rationality in either the religious or the philosophicaldomains. By comparing the position of the philosophers on three key pointswith the plain sense reading of the Qur n, Ghazzl!demonstrates that it is thetaw#l of the philosophers (and Ibn Rushd) that is stretching the meaning of

the Qurn beyond recognition.66 In other words, it is Ghazzl!s reading ofthe Qurn that remains true to plain sense meaning, not that of thephilosophers. Consequently, if rationalism, realism, axiomatic method and

64Ibid.65 On one level this could be the summary of Ghazzl!s critique of philosophy that heformulates in Tahfut al-Falsifah. Because they employ the same intellectual apparatus they useto study the natural world to pass judgment on the origin of the universe, the nature of Godsknowledge and the reality of resurrection, the philosophers inevitably and invariably makeegregious mistakes.66Bello notes that Ibn Rushds attempt to defend the philosophers from Ghazz l!s charge of

deviating from Islamic teaching on the three issues of the eternity of the world, denial of bodilyresurrection and the nature of Gods knowledge fails because it is Ibn Rushds taw#lof Qurnicpassages that stretches the meaning beyond rational limits. Bello notes:With the aid of quotations from the Qurn, Ibn Rushd claims that the opinion of theAristotelians conforms to the apparent meaning of the Scripture while that of the theologians ismerely an interpretation of it. In fact, however, Ibn Rushds quotations are out of contextIysa A. Bello, The Medieval Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijm and Taw#l inthe Conflict Between Al-Ghazzl#and Ibn Rushd(Leiden and New York: E.J. Bril, 1989), 149.


17/19


critical approach 67combined with maintaining the integrity of the religiousand philosophical domains is necessary for Islams successful sojourn into

modernity, then Ghazzl!offers a more promising start than Ibn Rushd.A brief survey of modern thought in the 19th and 20th centuries reveals

that it is not so much a lack of reason and rationality in modern universal

contemporary thought that is problematic, but rather its over-abundance.This fact has been commented upon by not just the Romantic critics ofEnlightenment thought (i.e. William Blake, Goethe, Friedrich Nietzsche) butalso by rationalists such as Max Weber, Edmund Husserl , Sigmund Freud,Emile Durkheim, etc. For all of these rationalists, the greatest danger facingmodern culture was not so much the lack of rationalism but rather thepenetration of rationalism into all domains and spheres of modern life. For

Weber rationalization was leading to the demise of culture itself. For Husserlthe Cartesian-Kantian philosophical project was threatening the very existenceof Western civilization, because moderns had lost the ability to live inwardly.For Durkheim the collective effervescence, that is, the very glue of humansociety was being corroded by rationalism. And for Freud the health and well-being of the modern human personality was being undermined by a particulartype of rationalism. Building on the work of these great modernist thinkers,post-modern philosophy has further detailed the corrosive and destructiveaspects of undisciplined rationalism that comes to dominate and colonize allspheres of human culture. Michel Foucault, Ferdinand Baudrillard, JeanFrancois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, to name a few, have documented the

limitations and shortcomings of human reason and rationality. For the post-modern thinkers, these limitations have to be acknowledged and theshortcomings overcome if modern universal culture is to regain any sense of

meaning, coherence and vitality.

For Paul Ricoeur human reason and rationality, unaware of its ownlimitations and shortcomings, inevitably leads to the emergence of adegenerate sacred and a scientific-technological ideology. He describes theresultant cultural condition in these words:

I think it is the fact that the degenerate sacred and the scientific-technological

ideology constitute a single cultural configuration. And this culturalconfiguration is that of nihilism. The scientistic illusion and the retreat of thesacred into its own particular phantoms together belong to the forgetfulness ofour roots. In two different yet convergent manners the desert is spreading. Andwhat we are in the midst of discovering, contrary to the scientific-technological

67Al-Jabri,Arab-Islamic Philosophy,128.


18/19


ideology, which is also the military-industrial ideology, is that humanity issimply not possible without the sacred. 68

For Ricoeur, the most pressing challenge facing contemporary culture isto rein in the excesses of human reason and rationality and recover anauthentic sense of the sacred that is not delimited by the human intellect. Heposits that there can be no hope of affirming the humanity of the human beingwithout the sacred a sacred that simultaneously lies beyond the domainsof human intellect and at its very roots. Given the fruits of Enlightenmentreason and a critical evaluation of its historical development, from a post-modern perspective modernity is neither a fact nor our destiny. It ishenceforth an open question. 69

Those most well informed about the characteristics, problematics and

challenges facing universal contemporary thought are exploring thehorizons that lie beyond (or at the very roots of) reason, rationality andintellect. In his advocacy of Ibn Rushd, al-Jabri appears to be oblivious of thehistorical condition in which he is living. While his advocacy might have hadsome merit in the pre-Nietzschean period, it carries practically no weight inthe aftermath of Nietzsches devastating critique of the Enlightenment project.The most pressing challenge facing universal contemporary thought is torecognize the limitations of human reason/rationality, its grounding in asupra-rational domain that lies beyond the intellect and the relationshipbetween the two. Ibn Rushds corpus offers virtually nothing of value thatcould make a meaningful contribution to delineating the scope and limits of

human rationality and its relationship to the supra-rational domain the verytasks that post-modern thinkers have identified as a critical need ofcontemporary universal culture.

If modern Islamic thought is to make a positive contribution to universalcontemporary thought it can make a much needed contribution to modernphilosophical discourse by describing and identifying the limits of rationalthoughtas this is one of most pressing needs of the day. On this particularissue, Ghazzl!s corpus contains a great deal more resource than Ibn Rushds.But contemporary Islamic thought will have to go beyond Ghazz l! inestablishing and describing the relationship between the rational and supra-

rational domains. On this count there is a significant degree of similaritybetween Ghazzl!and Ibn Rushd in that both of them consider these to becompletely differentiated and autonomous domains. Modern developments in

68Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination, tr. David Pellawar, ed.Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 64.69Ibid., 63.


19/19


the areas of semiotics (especially the work of C.S. Peirce), philosophy ofscience (the work of Gerald Holton and John Polkinghorne) and hermeneutics

(George Hans Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur) offer interesting possibilities ofestablishing a bridge between the two domains. These modern developmentsopen up options that were not possible in previous centuries. While modernMuslim thought will have to go beyond Ghazz l!on this particular point, hestill offers a better starting than Ibn Rushd. In conclusion an adequate readingof Ghazzalis views on reason and nationality and an adequate understandingof the contemporary cultural condition shows Ghazzali to be a better startingpoint for Islams sojourn into modernity than Ibn Rushd.

* * *

ghazali, ibn e rushd and islam sojourn into modernity by dr basit

Documents