gideon rosen's modal fictionalism: counterparts, fictional counterparts, and fidelity...
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An exploration of two specific incarnations of theories about "possible worlds", and an exploration of how counterpart theory might break fidelity constraintsTRANSCRIPT
Gideon Rosen's Modal Fictionalism: Counterparts, Fictional Counterparts, and Fidelity ConstraintsRobert R. Wadholm, Missouri University, 2012
It was the best of times, it was also the best of times, it was the age of foolishness, it was
also the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was also the epoch of belief… This
is a tale of two possible worlds, an exploration of two specific incarnations of theories about
"possible worlds" (one of which is unambiguously parasitic), and an exploration of how
counterpart theory might break fidelity constraints. And this is not fiction.
Modal Realism & Fictionalism
David Lewis' modal realism (elucidated in his A Philosopher's Paradise and other writings)
proposes that talk of possibilities, like "I could have eaten a hamburger for breakfast this
morning," are truly just talk of possible worlds that really exist in some concrete way. What
the proposition means is that I (actually, my counterpart in a possible world, not me) did
eat a hamburger for breakfast this morning in some possible world. And there are perhaps
infinite possible worlds, where every thing or event that was possible in our world actually
occurred in theirs. Perhaps I ate a unicorn hamburger for breakfast in one of them. In this
form of realism, modal language ("possibly","necessarily," etc.) is about other worlds, not
our own.
Second, Gideon Rosen's modal fictionalism (expounded upon in the clearly titled
Modal Fictionalism) points out that philosophers (and even normal people) are a bit
incredulous concerning the concrete existence of all of those possible worlds. They are too
messy ontologically, and more profoundly, they are just too hard to believe in. Rosen
suggests a seemingly more palatable (yet parasitic) mutation of Lewis' realism, by positing
that possible worlds, and modal language about them, is actually about stories/fictions
concerning possible worlds. Rosen gently wraps most of Lewis' realism inside of a book
Robert R. Wadholm, Modal Fictionalism
jacket, and declares the piece "fiction". As long as the worlds are merely in fictional stories,
we may be more likely to buy them. All the suggested benefits of realism, without the
greatest weakness--unbelievability. Sure to be a bestseller.
The Argument from Concern
In Modal Fictionalism, Rosen presents a powerful argument against both kinds of possible
world talk: what he calls the argument from concern, built from Kripke's objection to
Lewis' counterpart theory. The argument goes something like this:
- In realism, when I say "I could have eaten a hamburger for breakfast," I really mean
"My counterpart in a possible world did eat a hamburger for breakfast."
- This counterpart to me is never identical to me.
- Someone else ate the hamburger, not me.
- I couldn't care less if someone else ate a hamburger, no matter how much like me
they are. I'm still hungry.
Rosen admits that this objection applies to both realism and fictionalism. In realism, why
should I be concerned about my counterpart, and in fictionalism, why should I be
concerned about my fictional counterpart? Here, Rosen points out that fidelity constraints
may be broken or mangled: my speech (and caring) about myself in modal language seems
to be incompatible with the ideas that I am just talking (or caring about) my counterpart in
another world. Fidelity to my original modal beliefs is gone.
Rosen responds to Kripke's objection by pointing out that maybe if we accept
realism (or his more charming and elegant fictionalism) we will start to care about our
counterparts in other worlds and the fidelity will reemerge (whether in the form of realism
or fictionalism). Rosen admits that Kripke's objection is a strong one, though perhaps not
undefeatable. I will suggest what in my mind seems to be a stronger argument based on
the beginning of Kripke's objection.
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The Argument of Identity in Modal Language
The central thesis of counterpart theory seems to be that counterparts are not
identical to the objects or people in this world of which they are counterparts (as opposed
to the idea of trans-world individuals). I think that is the argument. When I say "I could
have," I don't mean "My counterpart did." I and my counterpart are not identical. If we
were identical, I would have a hamburger in my stomach. I would live in a possible world
other than this one. I would have higher cholesterol levels than I do right now. If we say
that my proposition "I could have" really means "my counterpart did," there is no fidelity to
the subject of the sentence, namely me. The only reason I don’t care about the breakfast of
my counterpart (following Kripke) is because it was not my breakfast, it was that of a
stranger. The not caring is important, but the identity of who I am not caring for is more so.
If I say “Socrates was bald,” I do not mean a stranger to Socrates was bald. This
non-modal proposition is about Socrates, not a stranger to Socrates. Similarly, if I say
(using modal language) “I could have eaten a hamburger for breakfast,” I do not mean “A
stranger to me ate a hamburger for breakfast.” If I exist, and at least one other thing
besides me exists as well, when I say “I am”, I do not mean “That other thing is.” I am me,
that thing is that thing. Both realism and fictionalism (if tied to counterpart theory) seem to
have snuck in someone else into my proposition about me (and left me out of it entirely!).
No wonder I don’t care: it wasn’t me that the proposition was about. Realism and
fictionalism have broken fundamental fidelity constraints: propositions about one thing
(me) are changed to mean propositions about a completely different thing (not-me). This is
not merely a “substantial revision” of modal belief, as Rosen suggests. It is a substantial
revision of the original proposition.
When I say “I could have eaten a hamburger for breakfast” is true, I say it is true
about me. If we change who the proposition is about, we must reevaluate whether the new
proposition is true (because it is a new proposition, not the same one). In realism and
fictionalism, we would change the proposition to “My counterpart (or my fictional
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counterpart, or fictionally my counterpart) ate a hamburger for breakfast.” This is a
different proposition. Because we cannot verify that my counterpart even exists (we have
no way of knowing about him for sure), we can’t say whether this is a true or false
statement. On the other hand, my fictional counterpart does exist (I just made him up), and
he did eat the fictional hamburger for breakfast (and it was fictionally delicious). However,
the two propositions “I could have” and “My (fictional) counterpart did” are fundamentally
different propositions, and other than similarities concerning details, don’t say anything
about the other (or depend on the truth of the other, or constitute the truth-maker for the
other). It is my belief that part of the utility of realism is undone by Lewis’ counterpart
theory, if not by other objections (like unbelievability). Fictionalism may still stand (and
truthfully, I think it is a beautiful idea), but if counterpart theory is applied, it says nothing
about me or propositions about me, and thus fails to address modal language about persons
or specified individuals (like I, Socrates, that horse, the Pacific Ocean, and my hamburger).
That kind of modal language seems to be out of bounds (as far as applying analyses go) as
long as counterpart theory is held.
Rosen (or Lewis) might respond to such a critique with a simple assertion:
counterparts, while not identical, are equivalent to individuals and are not merely
comparative. Equivalence may be construed to mean that two things or persons may be
interchangeable now (or in the past), but at some point may diverge. I could have been
substituted for my counterpart before breakfast (and that fateful hamburger) and no one
would be the wiser (even me or him). So my counterpart would not have the same identity
as me (we are not the same person), but would be equivalent to me in the past though not
in the present. So we could swap “I could have” in my proposition with “My counterpart
did” since the two are equivalent.
This assertion of equivalence, however, suffers the same problems as identity: the
person we are talking about is still not me. Even if x+2=5, and thus x=3, we cannot always
say in every equation that x=3 (x does not equal 3 in many equations—just this particular x
equals 3). We mean this x equals three (in this context). Similarly, if x=3 and y=3, we
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cannot always say that in every equation x=y (in some equations x=10 and y=2x). In
general, two individual things may be equivalent at some point, but they might not be
identical, and if we speak about specific things in specific contexts they are not necessarily
equivalent outside of those contexts. If we specify this thing or person, equivalence just will
not do. Specific things and individuals are not equivalent indexically. The realist’s
proposition about my counterpart and his hamburger is not equivalent to me and my
hamburger. I am in this world, and I am referencing myself and my own hamburger. A
possible hamburger just will not do for breakfast.
(And Bob and his hamburger lived happily ever after…)
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