global hawk and persistent awareness - northrop grumman

A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R P A P E R S

by

Michael Isherwood

August 2008

Global Hawk andPersistent AwarenessSIZING THE GLOBAL HAWK FLEET

GLOBAL HAWK AND PERSISTENT AWARENESS


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. DEMAND FOR PERSISTENT AWARENESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. ENABLING PERSISTENT AWARENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. SIZING THE FLEET (1): GLOBAL HAWK’S SUPPORT TOMAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AND GWOT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

IV. SIZING THE FLEET (2): GLOBAL HAWK’S SUPPORT TO MARITIME DOMAINAWARENESS, MISSILE DEFENSE AND BORDER SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

V. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19



CONTENTS


The current and forecasted security environment contains

multiple challenges to the United States: a major theater war

involving conventional armies, navies and air forces; irregular

warfare against trans-national terrorists and insurgents; hostile

states or non-state actors using weapons of mass destruction; and

an adversary fielding disruptive technologies. Uncertainty is a

common characteristic in this security environment. In order to

reduce the uncertainty, commanders must construct a layered

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) network to

provide persistent awareness of their theater.

Executive Summary

1


by

Michael Isherwood

August 2008

Global Hawk andPersistent AwarenessSIZING THE GLOBAL HAWK FLEET

“Persistent awareness” is the sustained ability to monitor or surveil a wide area while concur-rently obtaining detailed, precision target quality information on targets, forces or similar pointsof interest. In the past, Commanders have used ISR systems to improve their understandingof the battlespace, alerting them to potential hostile activities while using additional systemsto gain detailed information. In today’s security environment, the missions given to militarycommanders require them to have constant awareness of activities in their area of responsibil-ity (AOR).

In the past, commanders used layered ISR networks to gain battlespace awareness in conven-tional theater conflicts. The impending retirement of the U-2 and P-3 aircraft, however,necessitates a review of how follow-on systems will integrate or alter the existing architecture.In addition, the global war on terror has created requirements exceeding the current ISRforces’ availability. For example, the Air Force’s fleet of 14 RC-135s can sustain one deployedorbit continuously. Likewise, the U-2 fleet cannot sustain daily operations in the MiddleEast and Asia. These scarce resources must be matched against combatant commanderrequirements to monitor not only hot spots in Iraq and Korea, but also known terrorist loca-tions in the tri-border area of South America, the Pan-Sahel region of Africa, Chechnya, theMediterranean, the Strait of Malacca plus 27 other land and maritime areas that the NationalSecurity Strategy identifies as warranting persistent monitoring. The CombatantCommanders’ requirements exceed available resources.

The Global Hawk unmanned aerial system (UAS) is the next generation surveillance andreconnaissance system that complements theater ISR capabilities as part of a layered ISRnetwork. When its radar operates in the moving target mode or its signals intelligenceantenna searches for electronic emissions, Global Hawk provides the wide area surveillancerequired to alert US forces to activities of interest. When detailed target imagery is needed,Global Hawk’s electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR) and radar sensors can extract preciseimagery intelligence. When these sensors are combined on a high altitude, long enduranceaircraft, such as Global Hawk, commanders gain a tool to minimize shortfalls in theirexisting layered ISR network and meet their persistent awareness needs.

This paper examines the future security environment to describe why persistent awareness isrequired, what is needed, and how Global Hawk contributes to meeting these persistentawareness requirements. It also examines Global Hawk’s contribution to maritime domainawareness, ballistic missile defense and border security. In sizing the fleet to meet thesemissions, this paper postulates that 157 operational Global Hawks are required for theatercommanders and homeland security officials to accomplish their surveillance missions.The number of operational aircraft required will change as Global Hawk’s capabilities matureand become better understood. The analysis in this paper should frame the discussion.

2



Major Combat Ops

GWOT

Maritime DomainAwareness

DHS/CBP

Total

30

49

5

84

15

4

19

16

16

38

38

61

49

38

9

157

Block 20/30 Block 40 BMD BAMS Total

T

Summary of an illustrative Global Hawk fleet.

3



Today, the United States faces a demanding securi-ty environment. In its National Defense Strategyof March 2005 and again in the QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR) a year later, the U.S.Department of Defense (DoD) characterized thisenvironment as one of uncertainty. Uncertainty,however, does not relieve military planners fromdeveloping force structure requirements. Indeed,the most important force structure investmentsmay be those capabilities—intelligence, surveil-lance and reconnaissance (ISR) forces—that lowerthe level of uncertainty. Commanders must haveISR forces for a range of military operations—frompeace through crisis to war—to understand theirbattlespace and potential adversaries.

The National Defense Strategy and QDR articu-lated four challenges to help define the capabilitiesneeded by the nation’s armed forces. Reviewingthe scenarios used in these studies—traditional,irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges—provides insight into the ISR capabilities needed.

A traditional threat from countries employingmodern armies, navies and air forces in a theater

conflict is the first challenge to the U.S. In this sce-nario, U.S. forces must deter, and if that fails, defeata hostile state and its armed forces. U.S. forcesmust be capable of several tasks: ascertainingdetailed information about the adversary and theirforces, capabilities, operations and intent; deploy-ing and employing lethal firepower; commandingand controlling joint and allied forces to gain theright effects at the right time; and sustaining theseforces. DoD anticipates that U.S. forces must becapable of conducting multiple major combatoperations, if required.1

The Defense Department also articulated that U.S.forces need increased capabilities to confront thesecond challenge: irregular warfare. The Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen, hasstated that U.S. forces require more ISR to addresstime-sensitive targeting requirements associatedwith Irregular Warfare.2

Irregular warfare, however, is a singular term thatrepresents a variety of adversaries—from solitarytrans-national terrorist organizations to large-scaleinsurgencies. Terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda,are global in nature and act periodically to createtraumatic, media-centric events. In contrast, insur-gents concentrate their operations in one countryor region, have a larger number of active partici-pants and are more likely to engage in a continuouscampaign to pursue specific political objectives.

Despite their differences, trans-national terroristsand insurgents have common traits driving ISRrequirements. The irregular warfare challenge,regardless of the adversary, requires an ability tolocate and track hostile individuals or small groupsdispersed among non-combatant populations. U.S.military commanders will need ISR capabilities ori-ented on the protagonists’ plans, capabilities, loca-tions and support networks. These ISR capabilitiesmust penetrate a wide array of environments—from complex urban settings to desolate caves inremote mountains. Finally, ISR capabilities must

I. DEMAND FOR PERSISTENT AWARENESS

Irregular Challenges Catastrophic Challenges

Traditional Challenges Disruptive Challenges

Today’sCapabilityPortfolio

DefeatTerrorist

Networks DefendHomelandIn Depth

Shape Choices ofCountries at Strategic

Crossroads

Prevent Acquisitionor Use of WMD

Figure 1-1: Challenges facing U.S. military forces.

4



decipher adversaries’ communications across arange of media—from messages in the modernglobal telecommunications network to those com-municated by the ancient word-of-mouth method.

The QDR identified the proliferation or use ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the thirdchallenge facing the U.S. State and non-state actorsseek WMD devices to paralyze U.S. national powerthrough either intimidation or direct use with cata-clysmic results. TheQDR pointed to porous borders,weak international controls on technology transferand the availability of nuclear weapons informationon the internet as factors increasing the risk of suchweapons falling into an adversary’s hands.3

Preventing the acquisition and use of WMD pres-ents a daunting challenge to military commandersbecause hostile entities range from sovereign states,like Iran and North Korea, to non-state actors likeal Qaeda. To meet these challenges, military com-manders need many of the same ISR capabilitiesidentified for the first two challenges. Commandersrequire systems that can collect information onsophisticated research and manufacturing infra-structure used to produce WMD and sensors thatdetect how, when and where WMD are stored,transported and employed. Once aware of the hos-tile agents’ capabilities, military commanders needagile command and control tools, prompt globalstrike or force deployment options and precisionweapons to negate the WMD threat withoutplacing civilian populations at risk.

Finally, the U.S. will be challenged by an adversaryseeking disruptive capabilities—revolutionary tech-nology and innovative employment doctrine tonegate U.S. military superiority. The QDR postu-lated that such disruptive breakthroughs couldoccur in biotechnology, cyber operations, space ordirected-energy weapons.4 Again, commanderswill need ISR systems that can penetrate an adver-sary’s research infrastructure to ascertain technolo-gies, operational concepts and emerging threats.

DoD articulated these four challenges in order to“translate strategy into guidance to shape and sizemilitary forces.”5 As such, the challenges assist mil-itary commanders in defining their operationalrequirements to guide programmatic and budgetary

decisions. Of note, DoD specifically stated thatthe requirements of irregular warfare will deter-mine the size of the force as much as traditionalconflicts have in the past.6 This policy departsfrom previous programmatic guidance whereirregular warfare was a “lesser included” contin-gency of the conventional capabilities and thereforewas not accorded specific force or budgetarycommitment.

In reviewing the QDR’s four scenarios, ISR capabil-ities stand out as a salient common requirement.In fact, the QDR refers to intelligence capabilitiesmore frequently than it does to SOF, precisionstrike, mobility, combat forces, command andcontrol or any other operational capability.Furthermore, the document describes the need for“better fusion of intelligence and operations” as thecornerstone for meeting these challenges. This ref-erence to improved “intelligence and operations”reflects the need to go beyond the previousconcepts of “reconnaissance” and “surveillance.”Traditionally, military planners have viewed recon-naissance as a preplanned activity—allowing theintelligence community to analyze and exploit thedata gained from a discrete location. On the otherhand, surveillance has been a dynamic activity—monitoring a wide area and providing data directlyto operators so they can adjust forces in real time,such as when an AWACS directs F-15s to intercepthostile aircraft. Merging these distinct activitiesgives rise to the new concept: persistent awareness.

All four QDR scenarios suggest that military com-manders need persistent awareness to accomplishtheir missions and have a faster decision cycle thanpotential adversaries. The remainder of this paperaddresses how commanders gain persistent aware-ness from a layered ISR system and discusses specif-ically the size of the Global Hawk fleet required toprovide that capability.

PERSISTENT AWARENESS: The sustainedability to monitor or surveil a wide area whileconcurrently obtaining detailed, precisiontarget quality information on targets, forces

or similar points of interest.

In reviewing the QDR’s challenges, persistentawareness is a capability required in all four scenar-ios. This section reviews how commanders orches-trate ISR sensors into a layered network in pursuitof persistent awareness. Figure 2-1 summarizes keyISR platforms and their contributions in terms ofsensors, geography and time.

Layering Sensors in Search of PersistentAwareness

Commanders gain information about their battle-space from many sources. Airborne early warning(EW) radars, such as E-2C HAWKEYE surveil-lance radar, a E-8 Joint STARS ground surveillanceradar or an AEGIS cruiser AN/SPY-1D phasedarray radar, are tools that provide a wide area sur-veillance (WAS) capability. These sensors producemovement target intelligence (MTI)—detectingand tracking objects in motion.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors also provideWAS—where communications and electronicantennas scan to intercept transmissions. SIGINTsensors on the surface can operate indefinitely, suchas the Prophet Ground system; but, their range islimited. Placing the SIGINT sensor on an air-borne platform, such as the RC-135 RIVETJOINT or EP-3, increases the sensor’s coveragearea; however, these platforms have limitedendurance due to human performance constraints.Space assets provide wide area and long enduranceSIGINT collection, but their coverage area andtimeliness of collection depends on their orbitalrevisit rate.

Commanders gain detailed information with elec-tro-optical (EO), infrared (IR) and radar imageryintelligence (IMINT) sensors. The timeliness ofIMINT products varies. Space-based IMINTsatellites can access select locations over a period of

years; however, they often image one specific loca-tion only once each day for 15 minutes or less dueto orbital mechanics. Airborne systems, like theU-2, can provide near-real time images if they areequipped with the extended tether program trans-mitter.a Other airborne platforms, like the MQ-1Predator or P-3 Orion, provide near-real timestreaming video of a specific target location.Commanders can direct these systems to highpriority areas of interest, but U-2s, Predators andP-3s have limited on-station time.

No matter what platform they are on, each ISRsensor provides key data to commanders; however,linking the sensors in a network or architectureyields synergy far beyond the output of a singlesensor. By layering sensors—of the same and dif-ferent types—commanders exploit one sensor’scontributions while minimizing its shortfalls with asecond or third sensor. Multiple SIGINT sensorsoperating on different axes to an emitter can pin-point an emitter’s location faster. With sensors atdifferent altitudes, commanders can observe moresurface area as well. For example, a U-2 at 60,000’can “see” nearly three times the surface area in ver-tical terrain as a J-STARS at 30,000’. Cross-cueingbetween different sensor types, such as SIGINTsensors cuing IMINT sensors, permits command-ers to characterize or identify targets faster—accelerating the kill chain

Collectively, the persistent awareness gained fromlayered sensors does more than create a threedimensional picture of the battlespace. Multi-sensordata, collected in a sustained manner, increasescommanders’ understanding of the battlespace. Itcreates an information mosaic—reducing gaps ininformation and giving commanders the best insightinto an adversary’s capabilities, plans, operationsand intentions. The more detail the mosaic has—the better the commander’s persistent awareness is.

II. ENABLING PERSISTENT AWARENESS

5



a U-2s can also provide near-real time images when within 220 miles of a ground station.

6



OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—LAYEREDISR IN ACTION

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) provides arecent example of how an air commanderemployed a layered airborne ISR network to sup-port the joint warfight. Starting at the greatestheight, space forces provided continuous coverageby monitoring missile launches or enemy commu-nications. Space forces also provided detailed dataon where key Iraqi forces, such as armor brigades,were garrisoned.

Once an armor force moved out from a known gar-rison, JSTARS detected its movement. Space andairborne SIGINT sensors searched for any commu-nications that forewarned of the brigade’s destina-tion and mission. The intelligence section at theAir Operations Center (AOC) could task a numberof airborne assets, such as a Predator or P-3, to gainadditional information. Using the staring video,analysts confirmed the brigade’s location andmovement. AOC personnel passed the target coor-dinates and engagement instructions for AWACS todirect a strike with fighters or bombers.7

ISR air platforms comprised just 72 of the 1873total OIF aircraft and flew roughly 1,700 of the39,100 sorties—or 4% of the total aircraft andsorties.8 Operating in isolation, each system hadlimited value. By linking their information at keycommand nodes with robust communication net-works, the IRAQI FREEDOM air commanderemployed ISR assets as a “force multiplier” to focusthe efforts of the remaining 96% of his forces.The layered ISR constellation enabled the remain-der of the air component to conduct relevant andtimely operations.

The layered ISR network, however, had limitationsin OIF. First, while the degree of ISR integrationwith command and control and attack aircraft wasunprecedented, gaps in information existed. Theseshortfalls ranged from incomplete intelligenceupdates, to the U.S. Marine Corps supporting attackthrough eastern Iraq, to battle damage assessmentthat failed to keep pace with operations.9 In addition,

U.S. Navy carrier strike aircraft had inadequate infor-mation for integration with SOF units in northernIraq and conventional forces in southern Iraq.10ISR in OIF was selective and prioritized to meetthe Joint Force Commander’s intent, but inadequateto support the wide scope of operations.

Second, ISR forces surged to provide U.S. com-manders the number of sensors and orbitsemployed during OIF. This level of deploymentcan not be sustained continuously. As an exampleof the limited ISR forces, the USAF has 14 RC-135aircraft—enough to sustain a single orbit in onetheater with five deployed aircraft.b U.S. militaryforces require additional and more capable ISRforces if they are to improve their awareness andknowledge in hot spots around the globe.

Global Hawk’s contribution to Layered ISRand Persistent Awareness

The Global Hawk unmanned aerial system (UAS)is a new system providing commanders with multi-ple sensors capable of covering an area for 24 hoursor more. As such, it will integrate into the layeredISR network to enhance commanders’ persistentawareness requirements. Many warfighters arefamiliar with what Global Hawk has already pro-vided as a developmental aircraft supporting OIF.Among its contributions, Global Hawk providedover 17,000 images, contributed to 55% of all timecritical target engagements and found 40% of theIraqi armor formations.

The operational Global Hawk will provide greatercapabilities. The Block 20c will be equipped withan advanced EO/IR/radar sensor suite providingWAS and detailed, spot reconnaissance imageswith multiple sensors. The Block 20 syntheticaperture radar (SAR) range will be 50% greaterthan the developmental version. The radar alsohas a ground moving target indicator (GMTI)mode that detects objects as slow as 2.5 mph.The Block 30 will add a SIGINT sensor that willprovide a WAS capability out to at least 300 miles.The Block 40 aircraft will be equipped with the

b Current USAF planning factor often postulates 5 manned aircraft to sustain 1 orbit for a 24 hour period.c Global Hawk will be fielded in a series of “blocks.” Block 10 is the initial operational aircraft with limited EO/IR/Radar sensors. Block 20 has an improved EO/IR/radar.Block 30 will add a signals collection sensor. Block 40 will have an advanced electronically scanned array radar.

7



Multi-Platform Radar Technology InsertionProgram (or MP-RTIP) active electronicallyscanned array (AESA) radar. This radar will allowjoint forces to simultaneously detect and trackmoving ground targets while continuing to use itsSAR mode to produce detailed spot images. It willalso have the ability to track dismounted targetswith improved accuracy.

As a multi-sensor and long endurance platform,Global Hawk will assist commanders with sustainedcollection over a wide area while simultaneouslyproducing precise target data. Global Hawk’scontributions to the layered ISR network aresummarized in Figure 2-1. This chart reflects asnapshot of ISR capabilities in terms of orbits,WAS, discrete spot reconnaissance and precisiontarget quality data that each system can produce.

SIGINT

Space

Current Airbourne Systems

E-2

E-3

E-8

RJ

EP-3

P-3 AIP

U-2

MQ-1

Global Hawk

Block20/30

Block40

82

33

17

14

11

45

31

57

50+

5

2

1

1

1

2

2

4

TBD

TBD

Orbits Time WAS Spot Accuracy

IMINT

Time WAS Spot Accuracy

MTI/MOVINT

Time WAS Spot Accuracy#

GOOD MARGINAL POOR

Figure 2-1: Summary of ISR sensors and cababilities.d

d Notes on Figure1. Number assigned is derived fromMilitary Balance, 20062. “Orbits” = number that can be operationally sustained based

on the “one-third” rule: 1/3 of assets deployed, 1/3 preparingto deploy and 1/3 recovering from deployment.

3. “Time” = Mission durationGreen = 24 hours+Yellow = 12-24 hours

4. WAS =Wide area surveillanceGreen = CapableRed = Not Capable

GLOBAL HAWK AT A GLANCE

SPEED:310 – 340 KIAS

RANGE/ENDURANCE:Operates at 2,000 miles and on station 24 hours

PAYLOAD:EO/IR/Radar IMINT/SIGINT/MOVINT•Wide Area Surveillance– IMINT: 40,000 sq miles– SIGINT: 300+ mile range– MTI/MOVINT: 200 mile range overand 95 x 95 sq mile area per minute

• Spot reconnaissance– IMINT: 1,900 images per day with1 foot accuracy

– SIGINT: Yes– MTI/MOVINT: Yes

5. Spot = Monitor discrete location or objectGreen = CapableRed = Not capable

6. AccuracyGreen = Precision guided munitions (PGM) qualityYellow = less than PGM quality

Persistent awareness, gained from a layered ISRnetwork, is critical for U.S. military commanders toaccomplish their missions. The previous sectionargued that a layered ISR system is essential topersistent awareness. Within that system, GlobalHawk—with its long endurance, wide area coverageand robust sensor data—contributes significantlyto meeting commanders’ persistent awarenessneeds. This section illustrates Global Hawk’s capa-bilities to support operational requirements in thetwo most stressful scenarios: major combat opera-tions and the global war on terror. At the sametime, this section postulates a fleet size required bycommanders to fulfill their missions based on theQDR scenarios will define operational require-ments for budgetary and programmatic decisions.

To support the analysis, three Global Hawks areused as the planning factor to sustain a single,24-hour-a-day orbit at a range of 2,000 miles froman operating base. Figure 3-1 reflects a representa-tive flight-maintenance schedule for two aircraftwith a third aircraft as the available spare to supporta single, continuous orbit. By comparison, USAFforce planners often use a 5:1 ratio for mannedaircraft to maintain a single continuous orbit.

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Deterring and, if needed, fighting a traditionaltheater conflict will remain a high priority for

Combatant Commander. A hypothetical conflictwith Iran in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe willprovide a framework for discussion.

First, with the retirement of the U-2 startingaround 2010, the air component commander willemploy Global Hawk as its replacement. In thismanner, Global Hawk will be tasked to collectspecific and discrete images against a list of require-ments (or “deck”). During Operation IRAQIFREEDOM, 15 U-2 aircraft deployed and providedthat capability. On a number of days, the air taskorder (ATO) tasked six U-2s during a single24-hour period.11 No change is expected in thismission requirement.

Second, Global Hawk can be incorporated toextend the range and coverage of other sensors inthe layered ISR network. While the RC-135 col-lects SIGINT out to 150 miles, Global Hawk’sairborne signals intelligence payload (ASIP) canextend that coverage to 300 miles. OverlappingSIGINT sensors will also allow military analysts topinpoint an emitter’s location faster. The EO/IRsensor can image an emitter in addition to triangu-lating its location. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 reflect theRC-135 SIGINT coverage alone and expandedcoverage with Global Hawk ASIP as a supportingelement. To maximize the coverage, five Block 30orbits (15 aircraft) would be required.

8



III. Sizing the Fleet (1): Global Hawk’s Supportto Major Combat Operations and GWOT

Transit

6 Hours

On Station

24 Hours

On Station

24 Hours6 Hours

Transit Maintenance

6 Hours Transit

Transit

6 Hours

On Station

24 Hours 6 Hours

Transit Maintenance

6 Hours Transit

Figure 3-1: Global Hawk flight—maintenance schedule.

In a similar manner, the Block 40 Global Hawk withits advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA)GMTI radar can extend the area of the E-8 JointSTARS coverage. Current Joint STARS radar rangesto 150 miles. Operating higher, the Block 40 couldrange to 200 miles, but would have lesser quality

information at the farther range. When flown incombination with Joint STARS, the E-8/GlobalHawk pair can provide overlapping coverage to reducegaps, such as when one aircraft turned in the orbit.Given the size of a conflict area similar to Iran, 5Block 40 orbits (15 aircraft) would be warranted.

9



IRAN

Tehran

Herat

Ashgabat

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHA-NISTAN

OMAN

RC-135 CoverageGlobal Hawk Block 30/ASIP

Figure 3-2: RC-135 SIGINT coverage alone.

IRAN

Tehran

Herat

Ashgabat

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHA-NISTAN

OMAN

RC-135 CoverageGlobal Hawk Block 30/ASIP

Figure 3-3: RC-135 teamed with Global Hawk.

IRAN

Tehran

Herat

Ashgabat

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHA- NISTAN

OMAN

J-STARS CoverageGlobal Hawk Block 30/ASIP

Figure 3-4: J-STARS alone.

IRAN

Tehran

Herat

Ashgabat

IRAQ

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

TURKMENISTAN

AFGHA-NISTAN

OMAN

J-STARS CoverageGlobal Hawk

Figure 3-5: J-STARS with Global Hawk.

Based on current operational concepts, thirtyBlock 30 and fifteen Block 40 Global Hawkswould provide the commander with improved per-sistent awareness from the layered ISR network.

GWOT

Commanders’ requirements for persistent aware-ness extend to counter-terrorism campaigns—operations distinct from major combat operations.As outlined in the QDR, the war on terror willdrive additional force structure requirements.12Global Hawk’s multiple sensors, coupled with itsrange and endurance, make it an important toolfor commanders to gain persistent awareness incounterterrorism campaigns.

The Department of State’s annual report on terror-ism provides a starting point for understandingwhere theater commanders must collect informa-tion as part of the GWOT campaign. This listhighlights both known areas and ungovernedregions where terror networks can thrive. It isoffered as a springboard for discussion to helpdefine the combatant commanders’ requirements.

In U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility(AOR), the tri-border area between Argentina,Paraguay and Brazil is a concern as a terror haven.U.S. officials suspect $6 billion a year is launderedin this area, in addition to arms and drug traffick-ing.13 The region between Colombia, Venezuela,Ecuador, Peru, Panama and Brazil representsanother area where the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC) operate. In addition,President Chavez permits the FARC and othergroups to operate from Venezuela.14

In U.S. European Command’s AOR, multiple safehavens exist in Africa. In the Pan-Sahel area of theTrans-Sahara, the Salafist Group for Preaching andCombat (GSPC) recruits, raises funds, trains andconducts operations in the area around Mali andMauritania. The GSPC has pledged support to alQaeda and bin Laden. Further east, Somalia ishome to a number of al Qaeda associated groups,such as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) and al-Takfirwal-Hijra.15 Bin Laden gained refuge in these landsduring the 1990s. The harsh environs foster a

strong Islamic fundamentalism that has become apolitical force in the region, providing fertileground for Muslim extremists.16

Along Africa’s northern border, the MediterraneanSea is also a source of concern for USEUCOM.Since the Mediterranean Sea is a transit area forarms, money and personnel, NATO initiatedOperation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR to monitorand intercept suspect shipping. Cyprus has servedas a transit point for European and Middle Eastterror organizations. Further east, in the Caucasus,active terrorist organizations train and operate inplaces such as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ossetia.17

Problems in U.S. Central Command’s AOR arewell understood—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen,Iran, Afghanistan and its border with Pakistan.Further east in Asia, U.S. Pacific Command mustdeal with a significant number of ungovernedareas. The Sulawesi and Celebes Seas have been anarea of concern between the Philippines, Indonesiaand Malaysia. The Abu Sayyaf Group, MoroIslamic Liberation Front and Jemaah Islamiya ( JI)have planned and conducted operations in thePhilippines and Indonesia. Other areas, like Laos,Burma and Cambodia, are ripe for terrorist’sexploitation due to porous borders, limited policeforces and drug trafficking that can fuel terroractivities.18

The map in Figure 3-6 highlights the 22 areasdescribed above. If the U.S. intent is to keep terrorleaders off-balance in addition to gaining persistentawareness, air-breathing ISR platforms providetheater commanders with an unpredictable watchover to terrorists’ activities. A second order conse-quence of persistent awareness is the threat ofdetection can actually alter terrorists’ activities.This threat and corresponding terrorists’ attemptto avoid detection can be almost as profound asremoving terrorists from the international scene.

For persistent awareness, a theater commander willwant to execute a minimum of two Global Hawkorbits each day. Fifteen of the 22 orbits, however,warrant daily coverage due to their active terroractivities, resulting in a minimum deployedcapability of 49 operational aircraft.19

1 0



The analysis in this section offers a conservativecalculation based on the missions assigned to thecombatant commanders in two of the key chal-lenges confronting the U.S.: winning a traditional

1 1



conflict and defeating trans-national terrorists.It suggests that combatant commanders need atleast 94 Global Hawk aircraft.

US Southern Command: 4

US European Command: 6

US Pacific Command: 5

F

US Central Command: 7

Figure 3-6: GWOT hot spots.

1 2



Section 3 examined illustrative Global Hawk supportby reviewing two specific missions: major combatoperations and the GWOT campaign. Additionally,Global Hawk’s capabilities can contribute to otherpersistent awareness requirements—such as mar-itime domain awareness, missile defense and bordersecurity. This section explores Global Hawk’s roleand fleet size to support these critical missions.

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

Just as land forces require layered ISR to gainawareness of the battlespace, maritime forces have asimilar requirement for the open ocean and littoralareas. The evolving security challenges of the 21stcentury have prompted the U.S. Navy to improve itsmaritime persistent awareness for multiple reasons.First, it needs persistent awareness for its commonoperating picture to support fleet operations.Second, such awareness is critical for the fleet tofunction as a “trip wire” force for the theater acrossthe maritime commons. Third, it can supportfreedom of the seas activities while helping deterpiracy. Finally, persistent awareness is critical tointerdicting trans-national terrorists, including anyattempt at transporting of WMD.20

Denying terrorists access to maritime transporta-tion and preventing the movement of WMD hasbeen a U.S. priority for the past several years. InMay 2003, the U.S. launched the ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI) with a host of global part-ners to deter and intercept WMD componentsmoving along maritime routes. PSI’s centerpiecewas improved situational awareness and intelligenceof the maritime commons.21 In October 2005, theU.S. published its “National Plan to AchieveMaritime Domain Awareness” (MDA) to reinforcethe PSI effort. This MDA plan articulated an

ambitious goal to increase the ability to collect,fuse, analyze, disseminate and archive informationon oceangoing ships, cargoes, crews and passengers.The core of the program will be a near real-timemaritime common operating picture linking multi-ple sensors and databases to military commandcenters plus federal, state and local agencies.22

Given the nature of the maritime environment, asingle maritime ISR sortie can contribute data toall of these tasks—fleet protection, trip-wire, anti-piracy, GWOT and preventing WMD prolifera-tion. The U.S. Navy relies on its maritime patrolaircraft as critical to its ability to conduct suchoverlapping tasks. Since its P-3 and EP-3 aircrafthave decades of service, the Navy has launched aMaritime Patrol Reconnaissance ForceRecapitalization plan. The Navy anticipates thatits recapitalization plan will allow for open-oceanand littoral support 365 days a year.23

This recapitalization plan relies on a three-prongedstrategy. First, the new Multi-mission MaritimeAircraft (MMA) will provide the core future anti-submarine warfare sensors as well as being capableof anti-surface and ISR tasks. It will search, track andattack submarines in addition to detecting, track-ing and classifying surface vessels. Second, the Navyis developing requirements for a joint multi-intelli-gence aircraft to replace the EP-3. Finally, a broadarea maritime surveillance (BAMS) aircraft willprovide persistent surveillance and fill the gap betweenMMA and EP-3 capabilities. The BAMS platform’sendurance will allowmaritime commanders to detect,track and identify surface vessels and alert the fleet tospecific ships or areas of interest for more detailedreconnaissance. The Navy anticipates deployingBAMS to support five Joint Force MaritimeComponent Commander (JFMCC) headquarters.24

IV. Sizing the Fleet (2): Global Hawk’s Supportto Maritime Domain Awareness, MissileDefense and Border Security

1 3



A modified Global Hawk offers a solution for thisrequirement. The BAMS Global Hawk will bebased on experience gained from the existing GlobalHawk program and platform, but will be engineeredfor the maritime environment and mission. As such,Global Hawk is a low risk solution. It will allowfor operations at all flight altitudes with improvedcorrosion, fatigue and anti-icing capability.

The BAMS aircraft will provide the key sensorsnaval forces need to meet the national MDA objec-tive. With an operating radius of 3,000 miles, itwill provide wide area surveillance and specific,detailed data simultaneously. For surveillance, theLR-100 Electronic Support Measure (ESM) systemwill alert U.S. forces to key communications andother signals in a 360 degree circle out to 300miles—covering nearly 7 million square milesduring a 24 hour mission. The radar can search,detect, track and even classify vessels in all weatherconditions. While its EO/IR sensors can cover40,000 square miles each mission with 1 meter res-olution, they can also discriminate targets out to atleast 90 miles from the aircraft as shown in Figure4-1. Thus, like its Joint Force Air ComponentCommander ( JFACC) counter-part, the BAMS

Global Hawk will give the Joint Force MaritimeComponent Commander ( JFMCC) the dualability to monitor a wide area while providingdiscrete data on specific locations or forces.

The BAMS Global Hawk, however, will not oper-ate in isolation but will be fully integrated with thefleet’s network as part of a maritime layered ISRsystem. Its data can be transmitted via data link tothe MMA P-8 and the rest of the Navy’sFORCEnet, providing both wide-area surveillanceand the ability to extract specific reconnaissancedata. The Mission Control Station will exploitsome of the immediate data collected, but GlobalHawk’s primary value will be to feed informationto the Tactical Support Center with vital sensorfeeds for the common operating picture.

The Navy plans to deploy BAMS aircraft to fivefleets world-wide as depicted in Figure 4-2 in orderto support combatant commanders’ requirements.Within a fleet’s area of responsibility, multipleareas of concerns will exist within the range of asingle Global Hawk sortie, as Figure 4-3 indicates.Globally, there are at least 13 key shipping lanesand ports of concerns that warrant monitoring.

EO/IR Spot – NAS North Island/Pt. Loma

115 nm

Figure 4-1: Global Hawk EO images at 115 miles.

These include ports on the east and west coasts ofthe United States, the Strait of Malacca, Gibraltar,Suez, Hormuz and the Red Sea. These are crucialareas for both commercial seafaring traffic andpotential terror/WMD transit routes. Consideringthat two orbits were accounted for in the previoussection, 11 orbits are unique to the MDA missions.This would drive a force structure of at least 33Global Hawks and 5 operational spares for a totalof 38 Global Hawk aircraft.25 These aircraft are inaddition to the JFACC aircraft supporting GWOTand a major combat operation within a theater.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Over the past two decades, confronting the ballis-tic missile threat has emerged as a requirement forcombatant commanders. In this arena, detecting

and discriminating the warhead from decoys anddebris is critical to enabling mid-course intercepts.The sooner the warhead is detected, the sooner theintercept can begin. The Space TrackingSurveillance System (STSS) will ultimately providethis capability, but it is not planned to be opera-tional until 2019. As an interim capability, GlobalHawk with an airborne IR sensor (ABIRS) cansupport missile defense.

The Global Hawk requires modification to performthis mission. Elements of the Integrated SensorSuite (EO/IR/RADAR and ASIP payloads) wouldbe removed to make room for a unique IR sensorcapable of tracking a ballistic missile warhead.This sensor detects and tracks the ascendingwarhead post-boost phase, providing the forwardCommand and Control Battle Management node

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Figure 4-2: Potential BAMS basing locations and operating radii.

Figure 4-3: Key SLOCs, chokepoints and ports.

with critical data on the warhead’s path. For short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) like SCUDS, theGlobal Hawk will need to be within 600 miles ofthe launch site. For medium-range or longer, theplatform needs to be within 1,200 miles of thelaunch site.

Using the major theater war illustrative scenario forIran, three Global Hawk BMD orbits would benecessary, with seven to eight total aircraft beingrequired (assuming the aircraft are collocated at thesame operating base) to support orbits shown inFigure 4-4. TwoMission Control Elements (MCE)are required to support this number of aircraft andorbits. It might be possible for a traditional, Block20/30/40 Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) tolaunch the BMD Global Hawk, reducing the LRErequirement. Since more than one hostile nation isseeking ballistic missile capability with WMD andforce planning guidance requires anticipating mul-tiple, nearly simultaneous major combat operations,a second set of BMD Global Hawk would beprudent. This raises the missile defense fleet to atleast 16 operational aircraft.

BORDER SECURITY

In the fall of 2005, the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) announced the Secure BorderInitiative (SBI). This initiative followed a series of

efforts to improve the Customs and Border Patrol’s(CBP) ability to prevent terrorists andWMD fromentering the U.S., in addition to reducing illegalimmigration and interdicting criminal activity.26DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff outlined hisimproved border security strategy with a multi-stepcampaign that included:

• Deploying more agents for physical presenceand detailed investigations

• Expanding detention and removal capabilities

• Improving physical infrastructure along the border

• Increasing enforcement of immigration laws

• Employing advanced technologies (manned,unmanned, air and ground based) to help securethe border27

Surveying the borders is a difficult challenge. Sinceover 97% of illegal entry apprehensions occur alongthe southwest border, the CBP deploys over 90%of its agents to this area. The 4,000 mile U.S./Canada border, however, presents a unique set ofsurveillance issues. Given the border’s length, theremoteness of the terrain where individuals cancross in trucks, snowmobiles, boats or on foot, andCanada’s liberal immigration policies, terroristsnorth of the border enjoy sanctuary and a wealth ofborder crossing options. Ahmed Ressam, convictedof the Millennium bomb plot, and Abu Mezer,convicted of planning a suicide attack in New YorkCity, both used Canada as a base for their plannedattacks.28

DHS employs an integrated system of personnel,procedures and technology to accomplish its bor-der security mission. Technological solutions canprovide multiple tools—from wide area surveil-lance to detect where people, vehicles, or aircraftpenetrate U.S. territory—to high resolution spotimages that allow an agent to confirm an intrusion.29As a result, CBP has a requirement for persistentawareness similar to that of military commanders.

Ground-based sensors can provide a technologicalsolution; however, they have limitations.Previously, DHS placed more than 11,000 suchsensors along the northern and southern borders,but high false alarm rates and battery failures made

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Figure 4-4: Illustrative Global Hawk SRMB defense orbits.

Ashgabat

KUWAIT

SAUDI ARABIA

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

TURKMENISTAN

OMAN

GH SRBM Orbits

that network unreliable.30 Aerostat balloons canprovide the sensor a platform with endurancemeasured in months. High winds, however, reducetheir operating times by up to 40%. In addition,aerostats are not easily moved –shifting a sensorfifty miles or more is not practical.31

Global Hawk offers a solution for persistent aware-ness for border security. Its radar can detect mov-ing trucks, vehicles and possibly even personnelcrossing the border. Once an illegal entry isobserved by DHS personnel, Global Hawk’s EO orIR sensor can zoom on its location. In addition,the Block 40’s advanced radar supports coherentchange detection (CCD) processes, where theradar can pinpoint locations, paths, origins anddestinations of persons crossing open terrain.Given Global Hawk’s speed, it can cover theArizona/NewMexico border in 2 hours and 15minutes with the area coverage depicted in Figure4-5. Alternatively, it can cover the entire Arizona,New Mexico and Texas international land borderin just over 5 hours. Likewise, a Global Hawkoperating out of North Dakota could cover thenorthern border three times in a single mission.

Global Hawk’s flight characteristics (high altitude,speed, endurance and range) coupled with itssensor suite provide a versatile tool for persistentawareness and offer DHS officials a vital tool tohelp secure the nation’s borders.

Operationally, two Global Hawk missions per dayalong the northern border and one per day along

the southern border would provide balancedcoverage to complement DHS’ strategy of mixingpersonnel, procedures and technology. Thisrequirement would generate a total fleet of nineoperational aircraft, with a mix of Block 20/30 andBlock 40. Operated by the Air National Guard,the force could support DHS operations underTitle 32, while swinging to support militaryoperations under Title 10 in a contingency.

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Figure 4-5: Global Hawk’s illustrative coverage.Longitude (degrees)

31

33

35

37

32

-114 -113 -112 -111 -110 -109

34

36

Latt

itud

e(d

egre

es)

The contemporary security environment presents theU.S. with a range of diverse challenges—conductingmajor combat operations, defeating transnationalterrorists, preventing the spread of WMD andcountering disruptive breakthroughs. A commonfactor in confronting these challenges is persistentawareness. Commanders gain this awareness froma layered ISR network that monitors a wide areawhile concurrently extracting detailed, targetquality information. Global Hawk, with its longendurance and multiple sensors, provides com-manders with a flexible ISR tool. Fielding theright-sized Global Hawk fleet will allow its quali-ties to be relevant and will meet the DoD guidanceto have Combatant Commanders’ requirementscreate a more “demand-driven” acquisition process.32

Table 5-1 summarizes the distribution of 157 oper-ational Global Hawks needed to help commandersaccomplish their missions. These numbers do notinclude the maintenance or training aircraft needed.In addition, attrition reserve aircraft are a separaterequirement. DoD’s UAS reliability report postu-lates that mature medium and high altitude UAVsshould achieve a flying safety rate on par withmanned aircraft—1 or 2 aircraft accidents per100,000 flying hours.33 The GWOT and maritimemissions could total over 300,000 hours each year,resulting in 3-6 additional aircraft per year requiredfor attrition reserve.

Fiscal pressure will affect the size of the GlobalHawk fleet, but operational requirements should

bound it. Currently, the Air Force expects to pur-chase 54 aircraft and use those aircraft as a replace-ment for the U-2. A fleet of 54 Global Hawks,however, is roughly half the number required basedon the analysis in this paper.35 Procuring 50 percentof what the operational commanders requireinvites risk—where some missions are not accom-plished. To accurately assess the risk, military forceplanners must articulate what missions will not bedone. In the past, DoD managed risk by swingingISR forces to a higher priority mission when a newcontingency emerged. For example, weekly recon-naissance missions ceased and ISR forces re-deployedto support a major combat operation, such asOperation IRAQI FREEDOM. In the post-9/11era, trans-national terror organizations and risk ofWMD proliferation will continue as a nationalpriority while the U.S. is engaged in a traditionaltheater conflict. Thus, “swinging” forces may notalways be a prudent option.

Fielding insufficient forces will also perpetuate thestress to the ISR force structure. Since 1990, ISRforces have been continuously deployed to meetcombatant commanders’ needs. Due to their highpace of operations, DoD labeled them as “LD/DH”or “low density/high demand” assets. This termreflects both their critical value to theater com-manders and DoD’s under-investment. FormerSecretary of Defense Rumsfeld captured whatLD/HDmeant to him when he said: “We boughttoo many of the things we didn’t need and wedidn’t buy enough of the things we do need.”36

The U.S. faces a multitude ofunprecedented security challenges.U.S. leadership and military com-manders need persistent awareness inorder to focus the right elements ofnational power at the right time andthe right location. As the Air ForceChief of Staff declared, Global Hawk“is going to be, when we get them inthe numbers we need, worth itsweight in gold.”37

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Table 5-1: Summary of an illustrative Global Hawk fleet.34

V. SUMMARY

Major Combat Ops

GWOT

Maritime DomainAwareness

DHS/CBP

Total

30

49

5

84

15

4

19

16

16

38

38

61

49

38

9

157

Block 20/30 Block 40 BMD BAMS Total

T


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Endnotes1 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, March 2005, pp 2-3 and The Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense,February 2006, pp 4 and 19.

2 Fawzia Sheikh, “Mullen Urges Boosting ISR Capabilities To Hit Time-Sensitive Targets,” Inside the Pentagon, June 19, 2008.3 The National Defense Strategy, page 3.4 The National Defense Strategy, page 35 QDR 2006, pp 3-4.6 QDR 2006, page 36.7 Dr. Rebecca Grant, Gulf War II: Air and Space Power Led the Way, An Air Force Association Special Report, September 2003, page 26.8 Grant, pp 15-16, 22.9 Major General Ronald F. Sams, Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Testimony on Air Force Fiscal Year 2005 ISR Programs, before the Senate ArmedServices Committee, April 7, 2004, pp 12-13.

10 Lieutenant Commander Carl M. Bradley, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Naval War College, Newport RI, February 9,2004, pp 11-12.

11 Lt. Gen T. Michael Moseley, Commander U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers, April 30, 2003, page 7.12 QDR 2006, page 36.13 Lieutenant Colonel Philip Abbott, Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?, Military Review, September-October 2004.14 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2006, pp 22-23.15 Country Reports on Terrorism, pp 17-18.16 Stewart Powell, Swamp of Terror in the Sahara, Air Force Magazine, November 2004.17 Country Reports on Terrorism, pp 19-20.18 Country Reports on Terrorism, pp 18-19, 63-65 and 74.19 Locations justified for daily operations include all seven in CENTCOM’s AOR20 RADM Brian Prindle, “BAMS UAS Industry Day,” May 17, 2006, as accessed on October 10, 2006 from http://uav.navair.navy.mil/21 Frank G. Hoffman, Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs, Orbis, Summer 2006, pp 395-411.22 Loren Thompson,Maritime Security Policy Gains Money and Muscle, Lexington Institute Issue Brief, September 6, 2006, as accessed on October 10, 2006 fromhttp://lexingtoninstitude.org/985.shtlm

23 Prindle.24 Prindle. The five fleet headquarters are 2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, 5th Fleet, 6th Fleet and 7th Fleet.25 Operational requirement for 11 orbits with 5 fleets would be 3 aircraft per orbit with 1 spare per fleet, or 38 total. This operational number does not include additionalaircraft for training, test or maintenance actions.

26 Blas Nuñez-Neto, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Congressional Research Report to Congress, May 10, 2005, page 1.27 Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative, as accessed from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4922&print=trueon October 12, 2006

28 Fred Burton, “U.S. Border Security: Looking North,” as accessed on December 21, 2006 from http://www.nixatron.com/StratT-bordernorth.htm29 Dr. Peter Worch, Technologies for Border Security, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, September 13, 2006, page 2.30 Worch, page 4.31 Worch, page 4.32 QDR 2006, page 4.33 Office of Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study, February 2003, page 10.34 BMD = Ballistic Missile Defense and BAMS = Broad Area Maritime Surveillance.35 Of the 153-168 postulated in this paper, 100 would fill the “traditional” Air Force requirement; the other 53-68 aircraft support U.S. Navy and Missile Defense Agencyrequirements.

36 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,Meeting with Troops in Kyrgyzstan, April 26, 2002, as accessed on October 30, 2006 fromhttp://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t04272002_t0426tt.html

37 General T. Michael Moseley, The Adaptive and Flexible Air Force of the Future, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute, October 11, 2005, Washington, D.C.

MICHAEL W. ISHERWOOD

Michael Isherwood is a Senior Analyst in NorthropGrumman’s Analysis Center where he provides in-depthanalysis of military, political, and technological develop-ments affecting national security. He is a graduate of theU.S. Air Force Academy, holds an M.A. in History fromNorthwestern State University and an M.S. in StrategicStudies from the National War College. He served as acareer officer in the U.S. Air Force, retiring in 2006 withthe grade of Colonel. His Air Force service included oper-ational tours in Europe, Korea, Kuwait and Afghanistanand commanding at the squadron through wing level.He served as a Special Assistance to the Chairman JointChiefs of Staff and as the deputy Air ComponentCommand Element in Afghanistan. At NorthropGrumman, his work has included operational and strate-gic analyses to support the KC-45, Global Hawk, Long-Range Strike and future of Conventional and IrregularWarfare for the business sectors of the company.

About the Author

1 9



The NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION established the

Analysis Center in 1977 to conduct objective analyses of

strategic trends, defense policy, military doctrine, emerging

threats and operational concepts, and their implications for

the defense industry. The Analysis Center works on the

leading edge in shaping U.S. strategy and defining operational

requirements. The Analysis Center Papers present ongoing key

research and analysis conducted by the Center staff and its

associates.

Analysis Center Papers are available on-line at theNorthrop Grumman Analysis Center Web site atwww.analysiscenter.northropgrumman.com. For substantiveissues related to this paper, please contact Robert P. Haffa,at [email protected], or call him at 703-875-0002.For copies, please call 703-875-0054.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense company headquartered in Los Angeles,California. Northrop Grumman provides technologically advanced, innovative products, servicesand solutions in systems integration, defense electronics information technology, advancedaircraft, shipbuilding and space technology. With more than 125,000 employees, and operationsin all 50 states and 25 countries, Northrop Grumman serves U.S. and international military,government and commercial customers.

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