Valérie BELOIN

Global Justice

Graduate Seminar in Ethics and Public Policy

2005-2006

Collective agency and the question of motivation in Onora O’Neill’s work

Essay presented to

Toon Vandevelde & Philippe Van Parijs

February 17, 2006

Among the numerous discourses on economic justice and poverty problems we

are given the occasion to hear or read, not many seem to possess the (even if only

potential) power of making things change. Facing this situation, the solution proposed by

Onora O’Neill is to modify the common conception according to which the paradigmatic

agent is the individual agent, and after doing so to develop a better theorization of

collective agents’ actions. She wishes to reach the agents really having the power to

change the rules of the game in the global economic order. The last sentence of Faces of

Hunger illustrates this preoccupation: “Practical reasoning about hunger has an audience

only when it reaches those with the power to bring that change”.1 In the first section of

this essay, I wish to present and explore the conception of agency of Onora O’Neill. This

goal will be achieved through an analysis of the concept of “realist cosmopolitism”.

Through this process, we should be able to understand which audience O’Neill is

addressing to. In other words, why, in this author’s view, collective agents other than

states, such as transnational corporations and NGOs, should be considered the primary

agents of justice. In section two of this essay, I will seek to answer the question of

O’Neill’s real success in trying to reach those agents; that is to say, I will consider the

possibility of her under-estimating the difficulties of getting the powerful Wal-Mart and

GAP of this world to modify their categories and behaviour.

1. A « REALIST » COSMOPOLITISM

1.1 State as the primary agent of justice

While adopting a position that considers states and international institutions the

bearers of the primary obligations of justice, is it still possible, without contradiction, to

describe ourselves as defenders of cosmopolitism? Indeed, this is a common

interpretation of what cosmopolitism means. Several international normative documents

are directly indebted to this interpretation for their content, among which the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes

the existence of fundamental and universal human rights, and it is precisely to the states

1 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, p. 163. I underline.

1

that are attributed the obligations representing the counterpart of those rights. On the

philosophical side, Rawls also seems to consider such an interpretation to be possible. In

fact, reflecting about Rawls’s conception of global justice, many commentators say that it

remains, above all, a conception of international justice. This is mainly because the states

keep, in such a scheme, the full control on matters of justice, as a consequence of being

viewed as the primary agents of justice.2 Because they both consider the states to be the

primary agents of justice, O’Neill judges that the form of cosmopolitism defended by

Rawls and the form of cosmopolitism accepted by international institutions, are both

unsatisfying when it comes to thinking about global economic justice. She criticizes the

current tendency, which she describes as agreeing on principles of justice having a

pleasant cosmopolitan flavour, and at the same time hesitating to get rid of a package of

realist principles:

These approaches to justice are cosmopolitan in assuming that justice is owed to all human beings, wherever they live and whatever their citizenship, yet anti-cosmopolitan in assuming that many significant obligations stop or vary at state or other boundaries. There are tensions, and perhaps incoherencies, in thinking that anti-cosmopolitan institutions such as bounded states and their subordinate institutions can shoulder primary obligations of cosmopolitan justice.3

It is a questionable choice to attribute the greater part of the responsibilities

regarding global justice to the sates and international institutions. As a matter of fact, in a

historical perspective, states have always considered their main responsibilities to be

oriented in direction of their own citizens. Obviously, some states – above all imperialist

states – may have had some preoccupations concerning beyond-boundaries justice, but as

O’Neill is concerned it does not invalidate the preceding remark, because in such cases

the notion of “boundaries” was pretty vague. For example, when the Roman Empire, the

British Empire or the Americans proceeded to off-borders interventions, it was generally

directed towards countries where the intervening side already enjoyed relative power or

countries with whom borders had obliterated.4

However, beyond these historical observations, which we can judge more or less

convincing, the main argument advanced by O’Neill in order to question the position of

2 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 2-3. 3 Ibid., p. 1. 4 Ibid., p. 1.

2

many cosmopolitans – a position she views as too much tinged with realism – consists in

underlining how much it is difficult for their choice to fit with the existing context of

globalization. In the present circumstances, to assign the responsibility of creating the

conditions of justice mainly to the states and to international institutions is in O’Neill’s

opinion nothing but heading for an inevitable failure. Many international institutions have

very limited powers when it comes to making a decision, and the range of available

actions is often for them very limited. They often have access to limited resources.

Turning our attention to states, three reasons can explain their poor efficacy as agents of

justice.5 First of all, an obvious remark consist in saying that some states are unjust and

simply do not show the will to create the circumstances of justice, even though their

capacities would make such an objective realistically achievable. The behaviour of

dictatorships and “rogue states” cannot be transformed easily, even when it is the case

that the international community shows a genuine will to do so. The range of sanctions

available and which it is possible to impose is in fact limited, and such sanctions rarely

produce the hoped for result, as they often harm the populations they were supposed to

relieve. The second reason explaining why states do not constitute efficient agents in

achieving the goal of ensuring economic justice is that an important number of them,

while taking their obligations seriously, lack the capacity to meet those obligations. In

those states, as it is the case in rogue states, citizens’ rights – political rights as well as

economical rights – are not respected, but the violations of those rights can in this second

case be attributed to a different cause. The problem is not that citizens are living under

unjust laws; it resides in the fact that the state is incapable to guarantee a general

compliance to the existing legislation. The state also finds itself incapable of ending

corruption and organized crime activities, and do not have at its disposal the resources

necessary to build up the infrastructures that would ensure a greater economic justice (for

example, schools and hospitals). Finally, as a third reason, states are not serious

candidates to the position of the primary agents of justice, because even those showing

capacities superior to those possessed by the previously described quasi-states see their

powers lessened by the progression of the globalization process. New agents, such as

powerful transnational corporations, acquire the power to influence the situation

5 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 4.

3

prevailing beyond the borders of the states, eroding as a result the states’ sovereignty and

limiting the range of actions available to them when wishing to adopt policies favourable

to a greater economic justice. O’Neill concludes by claiming that a cosmopolitism that

views the states as the primary agents of justice is not one capable of promoting global

economic justice. Such a form of cosmopolitism reveals a refusal to think beyond anti-

cosmopolite institutions such as the state and draws near, from this viewpoint, to realism

(in the political-philosophical meaning of the term). As a result, she is led to say that for

the three reasons above-mentioned, and when fully taking the context of globalisation

into account, defending what we could name a “realist” form of cosmopolitism (in the

political-philosophical meaning of “realist”) is incompatible with reality. We could then

say that it corresponds to a perfectly unrealistic attitude (in the common meaning of

“realist(ic)”), that is to say an attitude that does not take reality seriously.

1.2 An increased role for some collective agencies other than states

As we have seen, O’Neill is seeking to define what we will refer to in the

following sections of this essay as “realist cosmopolitism” (understood as a form of

cosmopolitism that takes reality into account, not as a cosmopolitism that would be

incapable of getting rid of some premises of realist theories in political philosophy). Yet

she admits that when, motivated by a concern for efficiency and the taking of reality into

account, we withdraw from the states the status of the main agents of economic justice,

we must avoid to create a situation of indeterminacy, where the obligations to create

justice would in fact be attributed to no one. The above-criticised interpretation of

cosmopolitism had, at least, the advantage of generating a precise (if inefficient)

attribution of obligations.

According to O’Neill, the problem of indeterminacy in the attribution of

obligations must be taken seriously; moreover, in her opinion, indeterminacy makes it

possible to criticize, for example, the discourse on the “right to food”. Some liberal

thinkers, for example Henry Shue, question the distinction between on one side negative

rights (liberty rights) and on the other side positive or socio-economical rights (welfare

rights), and defend the idea of a right to subsistence, implying among others a right to

4

food. Amartya Sen defends something very similar, that is, an entitlement to food.6 To

such discourses, O’Neill answers with the following analysis:7 she asserts that respect for

rights can be demanded of everyone (universal obligations are thus corresponding to

those rights) or be demanded of specific agents (to whom we thus attribute special

obligations). For example, one can require of all respect for his property right. A

universal obligation thus corresponds to such a right. This is possible provided each agent

can respect the property right of all others. One can also require of someone with whom

he entered into an agreement respect for the terms of this contract, by virtue of a special

obligation created at the moment it was signed. As far as the alleged right to food is

concerned, there is no corresponding universal obligation, since no one can feed all

starving people of this world. More over, in most of the cases, no special relationship

binds those who would call for respect of their right to food and those who should

allegedly feed them. Therefore this is saying that a right to food is nothing more than a

“manifesto” right, a right with no corresponding obligations, more precisely no

obligations that could be attributed to specific agents. Rights discourse, when going

beyond the sphere of institutionalized rights, is thus incapable of guiding action. This is

the case precisely because of the indeterminacy in the attribution of obligations that

characterises such a discourse. O’Neill also underlines this difficulty in Bounds of

Justice: “When we extend « social justice » theories beyond states, we discover that the

implications of economic rights whose counterpart obligations are not allocated are

radically indeterminate”.8

A realist cosmopolitism should thus not only take away the status of the main

agents of justice from states; it should also avoid indeterminacy in the attribution of

obligations. Indeed, the preceding discussion has permitted to underline how a discourse

to which O’Neill nevertheless recognizes important qualities in terms of accessibility and

critical power can loose most of its value from the moment it is generating non attributed

obligations of action. Indeed, from this moment it is no longer suited to serve as a guide

for action.

6 O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, p. 125. 7 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, p. 97-120. 8 O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, p. 135.

5

If the primary obligations of justice are no longer attributed to states, which

criteria should we refer to when determining to whom they will? According to O’Neill,

capacity to meet the obligations, that is to say to contribute to create the conditions of

economic justice, is the main criteria we should take account of. At least this capacity

stands as a necessary condition to the attribution of obligations to an agent.

The thought that obligations presuppose capabilities for their discharge, so lapse when agents and agencies do not have and cannot acquire capacities required for their discharge needs a lot of further explication. Nevertheless, I think there are robust links between obligations and capabilities for action: in particular lack of capability always counts against an ascription of obligations, except where the lack is chosen. Individuals cannot be obliged to resolve the problems of world hunger, or to grow wings and fly; institutions cannot have obligations to perform tasks for which they lack capabilities.9

It is for that reason, as we also discussed the point above, that in the case of many states,

it has become impossible to identify them as the primary agents of justice. Taking the

capacity to meet the obligations as an important criterion, it then turns out to be natural to

take more seriously the possibility of considering institutional agents other than states as

important agents of justice. Many of these non-territorial institutional agents might be

thought of as “networking institutions”, which link dispersed persons, officials, and

institutions. Familiar examples of networking institutions are banking system,

transnational corporations, research and educational networks, communications networks

(including transnational communications organizations such as satellite broadcasting or

the Internet). Transnational non governmental organisations such as Amnesty, Caritas,

Oxfam, and Médecins sans Frontières are also examples of networking institutions.

Finally, corporate bodies, such as substatal political units, businesses, international and

governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, communities, and professional

organizations are other non-state actors with power to bring some change towards

justice.10 Transnational corporations and NGOs, for example, are collective agencies

benefiting from surprisingly wide-ranging capacities. They are numerous, influential, are

actors in the quasi-states whose situation we described above, and their activities have

real incidence on global justice.11 These collective agencies are able to make a difference

9 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 7. 10 O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, p. 115, 118, 142, 154. 11 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 8.

6

in the issue of human rights’ respect.12 Considering them merely as secondary agents of

justice is judging that their obligations of creating and supporting conditions of economic

justice are defined by the states and that states are responsible for ensuring that they meet

their obligations. If this was the case, “networking institutions”, in order to fulfill their

duty of justice, would only have to conform to the rules prescribed by states, who are the

primary agents of justice. This is precisely what O’Neill wants to question; she proposes

to attribute to collective agents other than states some of the obligations conventionally

ascribed to states. That is to say, if it is true that in strong states, respect, by networking

institutions, of the rules prescribed by the state may be sufficient to create the conditions

of economic justice (however, we should recall that the non-state actors or networking

institutions are often non-territorial institutions, whose influence is not confined within

any bounded territory, and for this reason they cannot easily be controlled by states –

even strong states), the situation is totally different in “rogue states”, dictatorships and

quasi-states. In such contexts, O’Neill holds that networking institutions have the

obligation of going beyond the observance of the rules that have been institutionalized,

and by so doing of going beyond their status of secondary agents of justice:

Where power is dispersed and in part privatised, in the sense that it is in a large part non-statal, so the distinction between primary and secondary agents of justice falters. Non-state actors who in other contexts would be secondary agents of justice may find themselves with the obligations of justice that hold for all agents and agencies, but without specific assigned roles. Their contribution to justice can and ought then to take advantage of opportunities before them.13

Institutional agents other than states such as for example NGOs and transnational

corporations have the possibility to apply employment policies, or economic, social and

environmental measures that will produce beneficial effects as regards to the general goal

of a greater economic justice. It is up to the transnational corporations to respect stricter

environmental norms than those imposed by the state, to fight corruption by publicizing

the cases that are known to them, to create working conditions surpassing the standards

of the country where they act as employers. NGOs can make up for the state in particular

12 Even if, according to O’Neill, the fundamental ethical category is not rights but rather obligations, she holds that to institutionalize certain rights (and their respect) contributes in an obvious way to justice. On this subject, see Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, especially p. 106. 13 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 9.

7

domains and assume the responsibility of constructing infrastructures that will improve

the country’s transport, health and education systems.14 Of course, it is necessary to

improve political institutions, but a realist cosmopolitism has to take the slowness of such

reforms into account: « lives, indeed generations, may pass before that transformation is

achieved ».15 Meanwhile, O’Neill thus suggests that collective agents other than states

(networking institutions) take over a larger share of the obligations of justice,

independently of the importance of the obligations attributed to them by the states.

We see that a realist cosmopolitism necessitates and leads to a different

conception of agency. In O’Neill’s opinion, the paradigmatic agent is not the individual

but rather the collective agent. She takes notice of the fact that collective agents’

possibilities of action are often more extended than those of individual agents (no

individual could, for example, devaluate a currency). Collective agents can also

assimilate and process more information and are often better equipped to resist external

pressure.16 This first component of her philosophical standpoint underlines the distinction

between the realist cosmopolitism she defends and a consequentialist cosmopolitism such

as Peter Singer’s. As for the second element of her position, it shows the separation of her

views from a statist cosmopolitism17 such as the one defended by John Rawls (who at

first sight is close to O’Neill by also recognizing the collective agents’ role); in the

present context, collective agents with the greater capacities of action in order to create

the circumstances of economic justice are not states but rather collective agents other

than states, agents she calls networking institutions. The latter could, with great benefit,

take the place of states in the role of the primary agents of economic justice. In this way

we would avoid ascribing obligations to agents lacking the capacity to meet them, and

would make sure that the attribution of those obligations is not left in indeterminacy.

Thus, a realist cosmopolitism is really in a position to guide the agents’ actions.

1.3 The possibility for collective agencies other than states to modify their categories

14 O. O’Neill, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 8-9. 15 Ibid., p. 9. 16 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, p. 37-38. 17 O’Neill’s expression, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, p. 9.

8

For O’Neill’s cosmopolitism to really be regarded as realist, we should be able to

show that collective agents other than states - such as transnational corporations and

NGOs- can understand the new attribution of obligations this cosmopolitism implies. If

this could not be demonstrated, we would find ourselves in a situation similar to the one

where the primary obligations were attributed to the states, while knowing that many of

them are unjust or simply powerless when trying to meet them. In such a situation reality

was not taken into account, and progress towards a greater economic justice was all the

less assured. Realist cosmopolitism won’t produce better results if it attributes obligations

to agents from whom it is impossible to expect an understanding of those obligations and

a will to meet them. Realist cosmopolitism must be in a position to reach networking

institutions, and eventually to modify their behaviour. Nevertheless it appears that these

agents, especially transnational corporations, speak a totally different language than

realist cosmopolitism does. Here we will examine closely the case of transnational

corporations, since it appears to be the most challenging. Indeed, those agencies are

apparently limited to the costs and benefits language, and can seem totally unable to hear

the language of justice and obligations. In this perspective, the language of obligations

and the conception of agency that it implies would be too abstract to be in a position to

filter through the initial categories of transnational corporations.

1.3.1 Abstraction and idealization

As a starting point, the conceptual distinction between abstraction and idealization

as developped by O’Neill in Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism will make it

possible to shed some light on the question. Following O’Neill’s analysis, abstraction is

the condition of many forms of practical reasoning; not only ethical reasoning, but also

businessmen and women’ reasoning, wishing to take the best decision from a strictly

commercial point of view: « Abstraction, taken literally, is a matter of selective omission,

of leaving out some predicates from descriptions and theories. Selective omission can

hardly be objected to. It is unavoidable ».18 It is even possible to say that abstraction is

what makes it possible for persons with diverging opinions to discuss. Indeed, if there is

not some degree of abstraction in the factual description which is the starting point of our

18 O. O’Neill, Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism, p. 711.

9

reasoning, the probability is high that our opponents in the discussion will disagree with

us on the premises of the reasoning, thus all the more on its conclusions. Following this

analysis, the abstract character of the language of obligation and the conception of agency

it implies is not an obstacle (on the contrary) to its understanding by agents such as

transnational corporations, even though their present categories are very different.

As for idealization, it is defined in the following manner: “An idealized account or

theory not merely omits certain predicates that are true of the matter to be considered but

adds predicates that are false of the matter to be considered. Idealization requires

abstraction, but they are not the same thing.”19 Idealization, as opposed to abstraction, is

an obstacle to dialogue. Indeed, considering that the added characteristics are false, an

agent cannot understand the reasoning carried out by another agent if the argumentation

of the latter rests on an idealization. So if the conception of agency that characterizes

realist cosmopolitism is idealized, transnational corporations won’t be able to understand

the language of obligation, to modify their categories and recognize that new obligations

are attributed to them. Now, with the several observations we have already offered, it is

possible to assert that O’Neill’s conception of agency is not an idealization, but on the

contrary is a more realistic response to two philosophical conceptions where idealization

is striking. O’Neill identifies some elements that we can find in an idealized conception

of agency:

Typically idealized models of human agency assume various superhuman capacities, such as complete transitively ordered preferences, complete knowledge of the options available and their outcomes, and unwavering powers of calculation; […].20

Even if not explicitly mentioned, it seems clear that these examples of idealization are

directly inspired from a criticism of consequentialist cosmopolitism, which is thus

characterized by an idealized conception of agency. On the contrary, O’Neill’s realist

cosmopolitism does not idealize the capacities of the individual agent, and that is why the

obligations are rather attributed to collective agencies. O’Neill’s realist cosmopolitism

should also be viewed as a response to the idealized conception of agency we can find in

Rawls’ statist cosmopolitism. In Rawls (as in many international normative documents),

19 O. O’Neill, Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism, p. 712. 20 Ibidem

10

states – as agents – are idealized to some degree because their will to make justice

progress and their capacity to reach this goal are overestimated. Realist cosmopolitism,

on the contrary, avoids idealizing states as agents and rather chooses to assign obligations

of justice to the agents showing greater capacities, that is to say collective agents such as

transnational corporations and NGOs. Thus O’Neill’ realist cosmopolitism could also be

called a non-idealized cosmopolitism.

Since O’Neill’s realist cosmopolitism rests on an abstract however not idealized

conception of agency, it is not impossible to believe transnational corporations will be

able to understand such a language, even though their original categories are quite

different (lets say for example “costs”, “benefits” and “profits”).

But is it enough to know that it is not impossible for transnational corporations to

understand the categories and language of realist cosmopolitism? Wouldn’t we rather

wish that the primary agents of justice modify their categories, come to think of

themselves in a different manner, and adapt their behaviour to make it in step with the

new obligations attributed to them? If realist cosmopolitism is really taking reality into

account, it must attribute the primary obligations of justice to agents who not only

understand the language of obligations, but are also liable to modify their behaviour to

make it in step with the requirements of such a language. If it is not the case, realist

cosmopolitism will turn out to be as impotent as statist cosmopolitism, which attributed

obligations of justice to unjust states (moreover, it seems quite plausible to suppose that

unjust states understand the discourse on human rights, but in so far as they understand it

they do not modify their categories and their conception of their own obligations).

O’Neill succeeds in explaining in a convincing manner that to presuppose a

conceptual incommensurablity between individuals is contrary to our everyday

experience of moral reasoning. 21 I agree with this point without great difficulties.

Individuals sometimes really do modify their categories: « Nothing is more central to

human reasoning than shifting between different possible descriptions of situations. »22

O’Neill then adds:

21 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, section 3.4, p. 38-42. 22 Ibid., p. 40-42.

11

Nor is it only the categorial framework of individual agents which has an open and porous character. Collectivities can also acquire new ways of seeing the world. The widespread transformation of attitudes towards slavery and racism and democracy during the last century, and the incomplete changes in perception of ethnocentrism and gender chauvinism in our own, are clear examples of changes which go far beyond individual changes of view. 23

This quotation could lead us to think that the modification of the agents’ categories

happens without great difficulties, and that it simply follows from listening to and

understanding the discourse of the anti-slavery militants, the democrats, the feminists, or

those pleading for more tolerance. However, O’Neill forgets about emphasizing the fact

that these changes happened following constant activity from pressure groups, gigantic

manifestations, various demonstrations set up by convinced activists, or even revolutions.

In a while I will explain how I interpret this omission. For the moment I am submitting

two remarks. First of all, it is easy to agree with the idea proposed by O’Neill, and accept

that an individual often understands others’ categories and modify its own when

confronted to a diverging discourse (provided that this discourse does not rests upon an

idealized conception of agency). Secondly, it is more difficult, when taking the above

discussion into account, to subscribe to the idea according to which collective agencies

who understand a discourse punctuated by categories different than their own modify so

easily their own categories and later on adapt their behaviour. Thus we can assert that in

order to pretend that realist cosmopolitism is taking reality into account and is more

efficient in bringing about the circumstances of economic justice, it is still necessary to

explain by which process collective agents’ categories can be modified. I will discuss this

question in the second section of this essay.

1.3.2 Public and private uses of reason

Before approaching directly the question of the modification of the categories and

behaviour of collective agents other than states, it seems to me judicious to sketch the

main lines of a second conceptual distinction, the distinction between private and public

uses of reason. First, because I will have recourse to this distinction in the demonstration

taking place in the second section of this essay. Second because the distinction makes it

23 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, p. 47.

12

possible to show that O’Neill recognizes to a certain extent the trouble there is in

explaining the transition from understanding a diverging discourse to the modification of

one’s own categories and behaviour.

According to the Kantian distinction as interpreted by O’Neill: “A private use of

reason is that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office. Here the

audience is restricted.”24 Kant gives the example of a priest who would address the

members of his community; in so doing he would make a private use of reason. Indeed,

he would be addressing a restricted audience, who stands out of the general population by

recognizing the existence of a particular authority (divine authority, or the authority of

the religious leader). His discourse will succeed in reaching this restricted audience, but

won’t succeed in reaching reasonable people as a whole, since they do not share all the

assertions necessary to a full understanding of this discourse (given that they do not

necessarily recognize the authority in question). A private use of reason could also be

called an “insiders’ reasoning”.25 The same priest would make a public use of reason

when speaking to all reasonable persons, that is to say when speaking not as the priest of

a specific community. The public use of reason does not make it impossible to express

personal opinions, but as soon as the priest is making a public use of reason, his discourse

is now understandable to all, even to those who do not recognize divine authority.

This distinction is relevant in the case we are analysing since I believe it is

possible to widen its practical implications by drawing up a parallel between the private

use of reason made by the priest and the private use of reason made by, for example,

members of the board of directors of a transnational corporation. When the board of

directors is deliberating, its members are making a private use of reason, because a

specific assertion is added to their reasoning structure. This assertion would not be

present if they were not deliberating as members of a board of directors but rather as

simple individuals. I am of course talking about the assertion that priority should be given

to profitableness considerations. It is added when individuals are addressing the restricted

audience consisting of administrators. It is completely valid around the conference table,

24 O. O’Neill, The Public Use of Reason, p. 528. 25 O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, p. 25.

13

but we have to recognize that as soon as the transnational corporation wishes to expose

its views to the general population – who does not recognize profit authority– the

corporation must make a public use of reason. It implies giving up such an assertion.

As it was the case for the analysis of the concepts of abstraction and idealization, I

believe the Kantian distinction between private and public uses of reason makes it

possible to explain how dialogue is possible between on one side realist cosmopolitists

and on the other side transnational corporations and other networking institutions. That is

to say, as soon as collective agents other than states are willing to make a public use of

reason, discussion becomes possible, and those agents are really able to understand

various demands in relation to economic justice, since from this moment everyone shares

the same assertions.

It would be possible here to formulate a remark identical to the one I made after

the discussion on the distinction between abstraction and idealization. Indeed, once again

is demonstrated the idea that collective agents other than states can understand the

language of realist cosmopolitism. But once again, we cannot know how this

understanding is liable to modify their behaviour and can ensure they will meet the

obligations this new language attributes them. Thus, we do not know how much

O’Neill’s realist cosmopolitism is really taking reality into account, and how much it can

produce results. Moreover, in another article discussing the distinction between private

and public uses of reason, O’Neill gives details on her thought, and this precision seems

to support the preceding observation:

Kantian public reason is no more than the modal requirement that underlying principles and standards of thought, communication, and action be accessible to any audience, so be something to which they can agree, even when it is not something to which they will agree. 26

I am interpreting this distinction between “can agree” and “will agree” by putting it side

by side with the distinction between the possibility of understanding a discourse and the

fact of being convinced by a discourse (that is to say to modify one’s categories, describe

the world in a different manner, and as a result modify one’s behaviour). Understood this

26 O. O’Neill, Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 427 (O’Neill underlines).

14

way, the quotation from O’Neill reveals in my opinion that in her work, the process by

which collective agents’ categories (and eventually their behaviour) are modified is still

in need of clarification, even though she succeeds in explaining in a convincing manner

how the understanding of a diverging discourse is made possible.

2. THE QUESTION OF MOTIVATION 2.1 A missing element in the theorization of the collective agent’s action

Elucidating the process by which the modification of the categories of collective

agents such as transnational corporations and NGOs takes place, and explaining then how

a change in their behaviour is possible, is not an easy enterprise. All the more as O’Neill

is well aware of the ferocious competition context in which transnational corporations

find themselves:

Of course, commitments not to take advantage of others’ weakness are invariably frail. The strong are easily tempted: after all, they are not that strong, and most of them live amid many competitors and stronger powers. It can seem unrealistic to demand that institutions and agents who will be squeezed by others unless they pursue their own advantage must not lean on the weak.27

From a competition point of view, respecting the new obligations of justice attributed by

O’Neill to transnational corporations can be regarded as a handicap. In this way, when

taking reality into account, everything seems to converge in showing that it is not in the

transnational corporations’ interest to assume the role of the primary agents of justice

attributed to them by realist cosmopolitism. So far, following my interpretation, O’Neill’s

argument makes it possible to show 1) that transnational corporations and other

networking institutions should be considered as the primary agents of justice 2) that they

are in a position to understand the discourse that assign them such a role, but 3) that they

have no motivation (either moral or resting on egoistic interest) to meet their new

obligations.

Rawls, as an example, presupposes a sense of justice in individuals, and he

explains, following three steps, how this sense develops. He never claims that his theory 27 O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice, p. 141.

15

could alone make someone act morally or in a just way, would this sense of justice be

absent in this person. He thus presupposes a certain altruism (who is however enclosed in

certain limits):

He [Rawls] wants to rely on nothing more than limited altruism (or self-interest extending over, perhaps, a larger “self ” equivalent to a family), and this is the weakest motivational assumption he can make.28

This makes it possible for him to explain how individuals can choose to accept some

theory of justice, without this choice being completely arbitrary. Thus a minimal degree

of presuppositions concerning the individuals’ motivation must come with his theory. I

would like to find in O’Neill some presuppositions analogous to those we can find in

Rawls concerning motivation, this time, of collective agents (rather than individual

agents). Now, I have been incapable of finding any trace of such presuppositions. It is in

my opinion an important gap in her theorization of collective agency, and it is sufficient

to question the realistic character of her “realist cosmopolitism”. Indeed, it appears to me

impossible to assert that the attribution of greater obligations to collective agents is taking

reality into account, when all that concerns the motivation of collective agents is

evacuated from the discussion. It would be fairer to say that what we could awkwardly

call the “motivational context” should also be taken into account in order for O’Neill’s

cosmopolitism to be described as realistic and effective. If O’Neill does no specify that

she is presupposing a certain form of altruism or some sense of justice in collective

agents, we have no choice but to have recourse to the motivations resting on egoistic

interest, and as a consequence it appears totally unrealistic to believe that transnational

corporations will modify their categories and their behaviour as a result of their

understanding of the cosmopolitans’ discourse. As I mentioned above, the motives

resting on egoistic interest are not likely to lead transnational corporations into the

direction of an undertaking of greater responsibilities.

The development of a better theorization of collective agents’ actions is a central

element in O’Neill’s work. It is a preoccupation that is always present, even when her

reflections are heading not to economic justice but to quite different issues. It is

interesting to note that in the article Informed Consent and Genetic Information,

28 S. Bates, The Motivation to be Just, p. 9.

16

published in 2001, she underlines the fact that this theorization is still incomplete. To her

relief, we could also emphasize the fact that the question of moral motivation is a

metaethical one, and that for this reason we should not expect a direct discussion of it by

O’Neill, who after all does not devote her energies to this philosophical domain.

However, I persist in thinking that in face of this question, O’Neill cannot steal away,

since all her argumentation takes roots in the search for a realist form of cosmopolitism.

Now, as I have expounded above, it would be unrealistic to believe that collective agents

other than states will meet their new obligations, if we are not even capable of explaining

how this could happen.

2.2 A solution to the problem of collective agents’ motivation

We have seen that the theorization of collective agents’ actions attempted by

O’Neill was not satisfying because it did not make it possible to explain how a

modification of their categories was possible. This impossibility was created by the

refusal to approach the issue of those agents’ motivation. Consequently, I doubt that

realist cosmopolitism can really be said to take account of reality.

However, I intend in this last section to present the outline of a possible answer to

the problem of collective agents’ motivation. This solution is an original one since it is

not approached by O’Neill (of whom we could moreover say she ignores the issue) but as

we will see, all its constituting elements can already be found in its writings on economic

justice, particularly in Faces of Hunger, or at least in the interpretation I offer of this

book.

Before presenting the solution itself, I wish here to put forward my interpretation

of the requirements of O’Neill’s conception of justice on the individual agent. Indeed, the

individual agent has an important role in the proposed solution. As O’Neill herself

explains, she is proposing a modified version of Kantian ethical reasoning. 29 From Kant,

this modified version borrows particularly the evaluation of the maxims in regard of the

categorical imperative. If an action has, as a fundamental principle, a maxim that could

not be universalized (when taking the context into account, that is to say when

considering that individuals are vulnerable, especially when their material needs are not

29 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, chapters 7 and 8.

17

satisfied) then this action is done contrary to duty. An action involving coercion or

deception is a failure to our perfect obligations of justice. To those perfect obligations of

justice are added the imperfect obligations of justice (respect, help in the development of

capacities and talents, and beneficence towards the deprived). Here I will particularly

linger over perfect obligations of justice.

In the case we are discussing –that is, the case of individual agents– if we try to

determine more precisely what perfect obligations of justice do mean from a practical

point of view, we first note that O’Neill thinks everyone can contribute to bring to an end

the various unjust modes of economic organisation (that is to say those implying some

form of coercion or deception, thereby taking advantage of some persons’

vulnerability).30 She then adds that not doing what is in one’s power to support a more

just social order “would be a matter of not making a principle of justice fundamental to

our lives, policies and practices”31. This precision of her thoughts justifies, in my opinion,

a quite demanding interpretation of the obligations of justice of individuals. An

individual has the obligation of encouraging a more just social order. The concrete

actions it will lead to depends on how the individual evaluates the efficiency of the

different proposed “ways to help”. We can think that examples of concrete actions

towards this end could be habits of responsible consumption, or active implication in a

project the individual thinks it could contribute to a more just global order (be it for

example a political party, a volunteer organisation, a pressure or activism group of many

kinds). However, O’Neill goes further in explicating her thoughts, as we can see in this

second quotation, which in my opinion opens the door to a much more demanding

interpretation of the individual obligations of justice: “if these agents and agencies

support or buttress a world political and economic system which is an obstacle to material

justice, they fail in justice”.32 So not only has the individual a perfect obligation to

support modes of organisation reinforcing justice, but he does also have the obligation of

not contributing to the maintenance of an unjust economic order. He must support firms

that do not take advantage of the vulnerability of the persons with whom they come to

interact, but he must also manifest actively his disapproval of companies whose actions

30 O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, p. 152. 31 Ibid., p. 162. 32 Ibidem

18

involve coercion or deception. If not doing the latter, he fails to his perfect obligations of

justice by indirectly supporting an unjust economic order. Thanks to such a demanding

interpretation of the individual agents’ obligations of justice, a solution to the problem of

collective agents’ motivation is possible.

As we have seen at the end of section 1.3.1, the modification of their categories,

and so of their way of describing the world, in the case of individual agents, is not

producing important problems (contrary to the case of collective agents). Our everyday

experience of moral reasoning demonstrates it; we can suppose, without great difficulties,

that it is possible for individuals not only to understand the discourse of cosmopolitists,

but also to accept the task of meeting their obligations of justice, after having modified

their categories. The motivation to be just is less problematic in the case of individuals

than in the case of collective agents. Now, as we have demonstrated, individuals’

obligations of justice are very demanding, at least in accordance to the interpretation I

made of some parts of Faces of Hunger. Individuals bear the obligation of actively

manifesting their disapproval to the companies (among which powerful transnational

corporations) that do not promote progress towards economic justice. This is precisely

what makes it possible to provide a solution to the problem of the motivation to be just of

collective agents other than states. Or we could rather say that the demanding

interpretation of individual obligations of justice makes it possible to avoid

conceptualising the way a modification of the categories of collective agents happens.

Such a modification of categories is, we could say, not necessary any more. We have

good reasons to believe that individual agents will meet their obligations of justice, and

those involve putting pressure on transnational corporations in order to bring them to

promote progress towards a greater economic justice. Thus we succeed in explaining how

realist cosmopolitism is really taking reality into account and how it can be effective; the

motivation to be just of transnational corporations will find its origins (at least in a first

time) in the pressures put on them by individual agents. A modification of the behaviour

of transnational corporations becomes completely possible even without a modification

of their categories and ways of describing the world.

19

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the demanding interpretation of the

obligations of individual agents makes it possible to reach transnational corporations in

the private use of reason which is familiar to them (and in which one of the premises is

the priority granted to profitability). When individuals will show their disapproval and for

example will threaten to boycott the products of a transnational corporation, this language

will easily be translated in a costs-benefits language, and it is likely to be understood by

the executives. We can also underline the fact that this interpretation does give some

importance to the individuals’ actions, while nevertheless avoiding making the same

mistakes as those pointed out by O’Neill in Singer. That is to say, the responsibility of the

progression towards a greater economic justice is beard by agents with the corresponding

capacities (that is, collective agents other than states), and not to individuals. The latter

rather have the role of bringing the collective agents to act as if their categories had been

modified as a result of their understanding of the cosmopolites’ discourse.

I underlined above an omission from O’Neill. I said she was silent about the fact

that it is the demonstrations and vigorous protestations of activists that have permitted a

modification in collective mentalities. We can now explicate this omission. It is explained

by the fact that O’Neill does not recognizes in a sufficiently explicit manner the

importance of individual action – as complementary to collective action – even though in

my opinion all the elements making it possible to develop the idea of such a

complementarity can be found in her work.

The history of our reflection was thus the following: first, we explored the concept

of realist cosmopolitism in O’Neill. This first step made it possible for us to understand

that for O’Neill, it is unrealistic in the context of globalization in which we find

ourselves, to attribute to the states the primary obligations of justice. We then reported

her analysis according to which collective agents other than states – more precisely

networking institutions– had, much more than states, the capacities to meet those

obligations. Making collective agents the primary agents of justice had as well the

advantage of not leaving obligations unattributed. By explaining the distinctions between

abstraction and idealization as well as between private and public uses of reason, we put

20

forward what made it possible for O’Neill to assert that even transnational corporations

can understand the language of realist cosmopolitism. Second, we questioned the

possibility for collective agents of not only understanding how come obligations such as

these could be attributed to them, but also of modifying their categories as a result of this

understanding – and consequently their behaviour. This call in question had its roots in

the observation that O’Neill does not elaborate explicitly on the issue of the motivation to

be just of collective agents. Now, if we do not presuppose some sense of justice or some

degree of altruism in collective agents, we cannot assert that the allegedly “realist”

cosmopolitism really is, since we don’t have any reason to believe transnational

corporations, for example, will modify their categories. Facing this problem found in

O’Neill, we offered a solution that makes it possible to avoid having to develop further

the question of the motivation to be just of collective agents. This solution turned a

demanding interpretation of individual obligations of justice to account. I considered it

reasonable to read O’Neill in this manner. This solution makes it possible to assert that

realist cosmopolitism is taking reality into account, and is likely to be efficient.

Of course, I regard it as an imperfect solution, since it by-passes the question of

the motivation to be just of collective agents, instead of trying to develop and improve the

theorization of collective agents’ action. However, it makes it possible for the moment to

avoid having to remove the epithet “realist” from O’Neill’s “realist cosmopolitism”.

21

22

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bates Stanley, The Motivation to be Just, in Ethics, 85; 1 (1974), p. 1-17. O’Neill Onora, Bounds of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. O’Neill Onora, Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism, in Ethics, 98; 4 (1988), p.

705-722. O’Neill Onora, Faces of Hunger. An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development, Unwin

Hyman, 1986. O’Neill Onora, Global Justice: Whose Obligations?, Centre for the Study of Global

Ethics, University of Birmingham, may 23, 2002, http://www.globalethics.bham.ac.uk/ONeill.htm.

O’Neill Onora, Informed Consent and Genetic Information, in Studies in History and

Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 32; 4 (2001), p 689-704. O’Neill Onora, Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls,

Political Liberalism, in The Philosophical Review, 106; 3 (1997), p. 411-428. O’Neill Onora, The Public Use of Reason, in Political Theory, 14; 4 (1986), p. 523-551.