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Global Production and Trade in the KnowledgeEconomy
Wolfgang KellerUniversity of Colorado, CEPR, and NBER
Stephen R. YeaplePenn State University and NBER
March 2009
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 1 / 33
General Motors sales in the US versus in Europe
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 2 / 33
GM and VW sales in Europe versus in the US
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 3 / 33
Multinational sales are declining with trade costs
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 4 / 33
Why is FDI o¤shoring easier to nearby locations?
Technology transfer between multinational parent and a¢ liate iscostly
I Case studies often nd a¢ liate productivity lower than parentsI Compare to usual assumption of no-cost transfer since Helpman 1984,Markusen 1984
Multinational compares costly technology transfer to a¢ liate withtrade costs of exporting that rise in distance
I A¢ liate production: disembodied tech transfer + employing hostcountry factors
I Parent exports: embodied tech transfer + using source country factors
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 5 / 33
This paper
Global production sharing is explained through the new mechanism oftrade versus technology transfer costs
We build a general equilibrium model where this determines the (1)export, (2) FDI, and (3) technology transfer decisions of individualrms
The models predictions are tested using rm-level data
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 6 / 33
Related work
Intermediate inputs trade and its determinantsI Feenstra; Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter; Yi
The extent and consequences of o¤shoringI Blinder; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg; Jensen and Kletzer; Levy andMurnane
Factor-cost versus market-access seeking FDII Brainard; Burstein and Monge-Naranjo
Gains from trade and FDI from multi-country GE modelsI Garetto; Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla; Ramondo andRodriguez-Clare
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 7 / 33
A three-country world
There are three countries, East, West, and South, each endowed witha single factor, L
East and West are two identical Northern (N) countries, where thewage is wN
In South (S), the wage is given by wS , where wS < wN
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 8 / 33
Consumer preferences
Preferences in the Northern countries are
U =I
∑i
χiαlnZ
ω2Ωixi (ω)αdω
+
1∑
iχi
!lnY ,
where α = 1 1/σ and σ > 1
Consumers in the South buy only good Y
The di¤erence between wS and wN arises from productivitydi¤erences in Y production
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 9 / 33
Final good production
Firm ω in industry i produces its variety according to
xi (ω) = ψi expZ ∞
0βi (z) ln (m(ω, z)) dz
,
where m (ω, z) is the quantity of a variety-ω specic intermediate oftechnological complexity z
whereβi (z) = φi exp (φiz)
is the cost share of intermediate zI Low φi means industry i is on average technologically complex
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 10 / 33
Firm heterogeneity in productivity
Firms in the North draw their productivity level ϕ by paying an entrycost (as in Melitz)
This ϕ determines how e¢ cient the rm can produce theintermediates that go into its nal good variety ω
A Northern rm can produce any intermediate in East, West, or South
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 11 / 33
Determinants of the optimal sourcing decision
Firm productivity, ϕ
Wages in the North and the South, wS and wN
Trade costs; iceberg-typce τS from South to North, τN betweenNorthern countries
Costs of transferring the technological knowledge pertaining to theproduction of intermediate z
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 12 / 33
Intermediate goods ("tasks") production cost choice set
Choice set of a rm entering in the East of productivity ϕ producingintermediate z
Location Part of MNE Technology Labor costsEast Parent (HQ) ϕ wNWest A¢ liate ϕ exp(λN z) wNSouth A¢ liate ϕ exp(λS z) wS
We assume λS > λN > 0 : technology transfer costs to South arehigher than to North
High-z intermediates are more di¢ cult to o¤shore in that technologytransfer costs are higher
I Microfoundations for an idea by Arrow
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 13 / 33
Optimal Intermediate Production: onshore and o¤shore
Firms simply buys intermediate z from the lowest cost location
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 14 / 33
Intermediate good sourcing summarized
1 A¢ liates buy a greater range from South than parent rms2 A¢ liates buy a smaller range from parent rm as τN increases; parentexports become on average more technologically complex
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 15 / 33
Intermediate sourcing decisions imply marginal costs
A parent rm with productivity ϕ in industry i has marginal costs of
CPi (ϕ) =1ϕ
Southern a¢ liate prodnz | (ΓSi wSτS )
θi(zPS )
Parent prodnz | (wN )
1θi (zPS )
A Northern a¢ liate rm has marginal costs
CAi (ϕ) =1ϕ
Southern a¢ liate prodnz | (ΓSi wSτS )
θi(zAS )
Northern a¢ liate prodnz | ΓNi wN
θi (zAN )θi (zAS )
Parent prodnz | (τNwN )
1θi (zAN )
and the log a¢ liates cost share of intermediates imported from theparent is
lnh1 θi (zAN )
i= φi
λNln τN
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 16 / 33
A¢ liate sourcing and marginal costs: the impact oftechnological complexity
As trade costs to the parent increase, the a¢ liate will rely less onimported intermediates from the parent
This occurs less in technologically complex industries (low φi )[Hypothesis 1]
I Reason: In those industries tech transfer is di¢ cult so its hard tosubstitute for imports from parent
The a¢ liates marginal costs are increasing in trade costs to theparent
This occurs more so in technologically complex industriesI Reason: In those industries the a¢ liate cannot substitute easily too¤shore a¢ liate production
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 17 / 33
Multinational entry and sales across countries
Conditional on serving country k, k 2 fa¢ liate country, parentcountryg, local sales are inversely related to marginal costs
Rki (ϕ) = AiC ki (ϕ)
1σ,
where Ai is the endogenous mark-up adjusted demand level
Prots in country k are equal to scaled sales minus xed costs
πki (ϕ) =1σRki (ϕ) wN f ,
which denes a cut-o¤ productivity level ϕki needed to operatewithout making a loss
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 18 / 33
Intensive and extensive margin predictions
For given demand level Ai ,
Conditional on entry, local a¢ liate sales are declining in trade costs tothe parent
This rate of decrease is faster in technologically complex industries[Hypothesis 2]
The probability that a rm opens an a¢ liate is decreasing in tradecosts to the parent
This rate of decrease is faster in technologically complex industries[Hypothesis 3]
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 19 / 33
Trade costs and global production
Closing the model with the free entry condition allows comparative staticson trade costs
Proposition: A decrease in either τS or τN results in a decrease in ϕAiand an increase in ϕPi .
Lower trade costs leads to an increase in the range of rms engagedin FDI
A¢ liates use a wider range of intermediate inputs imported from theSouth
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 20 / 33
Model predictions to be tested
Hypothesis 1 (trade vs FDI): As trade costs to the parent increase,the a¢ liate will rely less on imported intermediates from the parent,particularly in technologically non-complex industries
Hypothesis 2 (intensive margin): A¢ liate sales are declining intrade costs to the parent, especially in technologically complexindustries
Hypothesis 3 (extensive margin): The probability that a rmopens an a¢ liate is decreasing in trade costs to the parent, especiallyin technologically complex industries
Hypothesis 4 (parent exports): A¢ liates buy a smaller range fromparent rm as τN increases, and parent exports become on averagemore technologically complex
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 21 / 33
The range and complexity of parent exports
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 22 / 33
Empirical strategy
We employ two distinct datasets to test these predictions
Firm-level data from the BEA Benchmark Survey of 1994 onI locations of U.S. a¢ liates and their sales to local customersI intra-rm trade between U.S. parent and each of its a¢ liatesI parent rm sales in the U.S., its R&D expenditures, and its industry
F for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3
Product-level trade data from Census on the range and compositionof exports from parent to a¢ liate
I Combined with O*NET skill by occupation data andI Non-production versus production worker data
F for Hypothesis 4
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 23 / 33
Deriving the estimation equations
The log cost share of intermediates from the parent rm j to itsa¢ liate in country k is
ln1 θj (zAk )
=
φjλN
ln τk
where φj measures technological complexity, λN is the North techtransfer parameter, and τk are unit trade costs from US to country k
τk is measured by FCk , the cost of shipping between the US andcountry k
φj is specied as φj = δ0 + δ1RDj , where RDj is the R&D intensity ofrm j
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 24 / 33
Trade versus FDI equation
We estimate
lnMjk
TCjk= γj + κ lnXk +
δ0λN
+δ1λNRDj
lnFCk + εjk
The model implies that δ0/λN < 0 and δ1/λN > 0
FCk = ad-valorem measure of trade costs btw US and k (cif/fob)
RDj = Parent j [R&D expenditures/Sales]
Xk = GDP per capita, population, and corporate tax rate
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 25 / 33
A¢ liate activity at the intensive and extensive margin
Intensive margin: we estimate the following equation for local a¢ liatesales
lnRjk = ηj + ρ lnXk + (ς0 + ς1RDj ) lnFCk + εjk (1)
The model implies that ς0 < 0 and ς1 < 0
Extensive margin: linear probability model for the probability thatrm j opens an a¢ liate in country k, with the same regressors as inequation (1)
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 26 / 33
Summary statistics
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 27 / 33
Transport costs and the structure of US multinationals
Hypothesis 1Exports vs FDI
Hypothesis 2Intensive mg.
Hypothesis 3Extensive mg.
Dep. var.Import cost share
Dep. var.A¢ liate sales
Dep. var.A¢ liate y/n
FC -30.3 (2.34) -8.06 (1.17) -0.969 (0.060)RD FC 79.5 (24.4) -37.3 (13.1) -3.00 (0.472)GDPPC -0.798 (0.065) 0.903 (0.034) 0.062 (0.002)POP -0.197 (0.028) 0.495 (0.015) 0.027 (0.001)TAX -0.301 (0.124) -0.172 (0.064) 0.035 (0.030)# obs. 4,001 5,394 112,860Robust standard errors in parentheses
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 28 / 33
Robustness
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 29 / 33
Range and complexity of US parent exports
For the range, let SCOPEk be the share of the 500 six-digit NAICSindustries for which exports between US and their related foreignentities is positive
SCOPEk =1500
500
∑i=1(1jExik > 0)
We compute measures of average complexity of exports
TCPXk =1
SCOPEk
500
∑i=1TCPi (1jExik > 0)
where the complexity of the industry, TCPi , is measured based onI Occupations based (O*NET) data: importance of complex problemsolving skills
I Skill intensity based: ratio of non-production to production worker
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 30 / 33
Exports range and complexity results
Dep. var.SCOPE
Dep. var.TCPXk (Occptn)
Dep. var.TCPXk (SkillInt.)
FC3.65(1.38)
11.08(4.00)
0.75(0.26)
GDPPC0.03(0.03)
0.01(0.11)
0.01(0.01)
POP0.05(0.01)
0.13(0.05)
0.01(0.003)
TAX0.07(0.06)
0.48(0.18)
0.04(0.02)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; # of obs.: 39
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 31 / 33
Conclusions
Propose a mechanism in which technology transfer costs and tradecosts interact
Employ rm-level data to show that the model explainsI the choice of trade versus FDII intensive and extensive margin of a¢ liate operationI range and technological complexity of parent exports
remarkably well
Trends in o¤shoring should be understood in terms of changes oftrade versus technology transfer costs, together with wage di¤erences
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 32 / 33
Future work
Use US inward FDI data to test the models predictions on o¤shoringto the South
Quantify the models prediction on the geography of marginal costsarising from technology transfer costs
Empirical analysis of the gains from trade and FDI in a many-countryversion of the model
Incorporate the decision of integration (FDI) versus outsourcing toquantify the extent of international outsourcing
Keller and Yeaple () Costly Trade and Knowledge Transfer March 2009 33 / 33