gnss vulnerability issues in korea - unoosa · gnss vulnerability issues in korea may 14, 2013 ......

GNSS Vulnerability Issues in Korea

May 14, 2013

Sang Jeong Lee

National GNSS Research Center

Chungnam National University

[email protected]

National GNSS Research Center, CNU May 14. 2013.

Contents

GPS jamming in Korea

GoK policy

GBAS deployment plan

JLOC as a National Agenda Program

2


GNSS Vulnerability

Critical issue especially for infrastructure, e.g. airport, wireless communications network

GPS jamming in Korea

GPS disruptions for the past three years due to North Korean jamming(reported by the Central Radio Management Office of South Korea)

GPS Jamming in Korea

3

Dates

Aug 23–26,

2010

(4 days)

Mar 4–14,

2011

(11 days)

Apr 28 – May 13, 2012

(16 days)

Jammer

locations Kaesong

Kaesong, Mountain Kumgang

Kaesong

Affected

areas Gimpo, Paju,

etc. Gimpo, Paju,

Gangwon, etc. Gimpo, Paju,

etc.

GPS

disruptions

181 cell

towers,

15 airplanes,

1 battle ship

145 cell

towers,

106 airplanes,

10 ships

1,016 airplanes,

254 ships

Jammer 50~100Km area

jamming (Maximum

400Km)

Effected the communication

and some of military

equipment South Korea

North Korea

GaeSeong

Seoul Incheon

International Airport

GPS jamming

HaeJu


4

GNSS vulnerability issues in civil applications

GBAS deployment plans

Widely deployed wireless communications network

Governmental policy

International cooperation

• ICAO, ITU

Development of countermeasures

• Field manuals in case of jamming

• Jammer location technology

GoK Policy


International Cooperation

ITU(2012.05.11) the problem about ‘whether the North Korea jamming violate

or obey the international regulation’

ICAO(2012.07.05) Expressed serious concern about North Korea's GPS jamming

and urged to prevent recurrence of similar incidents

ITU and ICAO will conduct joint research about the impact of GPS jamming in the international civil aviation

Notice the decision of the board of directors for all 191 ICAO member states


National Countermeasures

Ministry of Security and Public Administration (2012.12, 2013.02)

prepare the field manual in case of GPS jamming

Korea Communications Commission (2013.02.18)

operate the warning system and GPS emergency response team

Development of Countermeasure for Safety of Life application

GBAS Development plans (2010~2014)

JLOC as National Agenda Program (2010~2015)

• To protect integrity, ground facilities must quickly detect the presence of any hazardous interference falling within the restricted band used by GNSS

• To protect availability, ground personnel must be able to quickly locate and deactivate the interference source


* MOA : Military Operating Area

Issues and Needs in Korea

Amount of the Air traffic increases 5% per year in Korea

Mountainous terrain over 70%, Airspace & Route are restricted due to MOA

Difficult to implement two-way ILS service in some airports

Demand for new green technologies for the aircraft operation

7

GBAS Deployment Plans


GBAS Operational Technology Development

Purpose

Establish the GBAS Approval Process for Korea

Build up the National Research Infrastructure and the GBAS Demo. Airport

Develop the Research Capability for GBAS Technology

Schedule

2010. 10. ~ 2014. 8. (3 Years and 11 Months)

Supported by MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime

Affairs)

Scope

Establish the FAA Certified System at the GBAS Demonstration Airport

Develop the T&E Equipment and System for Approval Activities; SDA, FA, OA

Build up the Government Approval Process and TDP

Establish the Korean Ionosphere Threat Model

Improve the Integrity S/W with Field Data Verification

GBAS CAT-I Operational Technology Development Program


GBAS Operational Technology Development

Milestone of GBAS

4th Year (2013. 9 – 2014. 8)

3rd Year (2012. 9 – 2013. 8)

2nd Year (2011. 9 – 2012. 8)

KO

M (P

MP

, TE

MP

)

GB

AS

Co

ntra

ct

Site

Su

rve

y

Co

ns

tructio

n P

lan

Tes

t Airp

ort

Se

lec

tion

GB

AS

KA

RI

Ac

ce

pta

nce

Airport

Civil Work

9-11 12-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-2 3-5 6-8 10-11 12-2 3-5 6-8

MS

D, S

tab

ility

Tes

t

Civ

il Wo

rk

Pe

rmis

sio

n

SA

T

Procedure

development

GB

AS

Se

lec

tion

Fin

al re

po

rt

FR

R

TR

R

GB

AS

FA

T

Tes

t Airp

ort

Site

Su

rve

y

Tes

t Eq

uip

me

nt

Gro

un

d T

es

t

Flig

ht te

st &

ins

pec

tion

PMP : Project Management Plan TEMP : T&E Master Plan FAT : Factory Acceptance Test TRR : Test Readiness Review

MSD : Measured Site Data SAT : Site Acceptance Test FRR : Flight Readiness Review

Approval process

Study

T&

E D

es

ign

1st Year (2010. 9 – 2010. 8)


Finished Site Survey/Site selection and started civil work for installing

GBAS Ground system at Gimpo Airport.

Developed Test Equipment and decided Testing/Inspection

Requirements for Ground/Flight testing and inspection of GBAS

Designed GBAS Flight Procedure(ILS-like) for GLS

GBAS Ground system will be installed into Gimpo Airport by the 2nd

Quarter of this year.

Summary


11

Funded by Korea Research Council of Fundamental Science Technology in 2010~2015

Development of Jammer location technologies for GBAS operation

Jammer Location Technology as a National Agenda Program


12

System configuration for field test .

Control Station

Jamming Signal

Monitoring Station

HTTP

Wireless Network

TCP/IP,

HTTP

IF Snapshot

Sampling Data

(4xTDOA, 2xAOA) Jammer

Location

result

Data Collection

TDOA, AOA

Algorithm

Wireless Network

Google Map

Jamming Signal Receiving Station

Jammer Location

Algorithm

Antenna

Power supply

RF/IF signal processor

Time synchronization processor

Monitor

Server, algorithm processor

IF data storage

Jamming Signal

Receiver (TDOA,AOA)

Jamming Signal

Receiver (TDOA,AOA)

Jamming Signal

Receiver (TDOA)

Jamming Signal

Receiver (TDOA)

Control Station H/W

Receiving Station H/W CW, DSSS Jamming Signal


13

Antenna

TDOA Antenna

AOA Antenna

TDOA Data Receiver

AOA Data Receiver

REF/Time Syn. Supply

Controller

Power Supply

Data trans. SW

Sever/HDD

Data receive S/W

Web Server

PC

Google Map

Hardware

Software

Novatel

5 element array antenna

AOA/TDOA Data Receiver

REF Clock/Time Sync.

Power Supply

Novatel, DL V3 Receiver


14

Field test environment.

System operation confirmation GPS receiver operation confirmed Wireless Network confirmed

Jamming signal transmission(A site) Jammer location

operation confirmed

Jamming signal shutdown(A site) GPS receiver reoperation confirmed

Experimental field


Location : a radio test site of a national research center

15

2ed signal receiving station

1st signal receiving station

Reference station(for TDOA)

3rd signal receiving station

4th signal receiving station

Experimental environment

Control Station

Field test environment


Field test results.

TDOA algorithm

0 50 100 150 200 250 3001.075

1.08

1.085

1.09

1.095

1.1

1.105

1.11

1.115

1.12x 10

7 correlation function(Rcv1-Rcv1), peak = 151

Sample

Corr

ela

tion v

alu

e

0 50 100 150 200 250 3001.454

1.456

1.458

1.46

1.462

1.464

1.466

1.468x 10


Sample

Corr

ela

tion v

alu

e

0 50 100 150 200 250 3001.15

1.155

1.16

1.165

1.17

1.175x 10


Sample

Corr

ela

tion v

alu

e

0 50 100 150 200 250 3001.075

1.08

1.085

1.09x 10


Sample

Corr

ela

tion v

alu

e

Correlation result

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160198

200

202

204

206

208

210

212

214

216

218TDOA measurement(Rcv1-Rcv4), var = 3.2477

time[s]

TD

OA

measure

ment

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

450

452

454

456

458

460

462

464

466

468

TDOA measurement(Rcv1-Rcv3), var = 3.4968

time[s]

TD

OA

measure

ment

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

-132

-130

-128

-126

-124

-122

-120

-118

-116

-114

TDOA measurement(Rcv1-Rcv2), var = 7.3011

time[s]

TD

OA

measure

ment

TDOA measurement

Reference

station

2ed signal

receiving station

3rd signal

receiving station

4th signal

receiving station

TDOA meas. 1

TDOA meas. 2

TDOA meas. 3

10m

Variance = 7.3m

Variance = 3.5m

Variance = 3.3m

10m

10m

16 600 650 700 750 800

150

200

250

300

350

NE plot, varN = 72.1007 var

E = 968.9204

East

Nort

h

TDOA measurement

True position

150m

50m

CEP = 23.9m


AOA algorithm

17

1st signal

receiving station

2ed signal

receiving station

AOA measurement

Field test results.

Improvement is being

done


Future work

18

modification

(Multi, Dynamic

Jammer)

Implementation

at Airport

Jammer

Location

test bed

Operation

Improvement of AOA technique

Considering dynamic jammer using FDOA,

TDOA/FDOA algorithm

Considering multiple jammers

Other jammer type

CW, DSSS, Swept, Pulse

Synchronization

GPS sync. Atomic clock sync.

Implementation at an airport


Milestone of NAP

19

4th Year 2013

3rd Year 2012

2nd Year 2011

1st Year 2010

1-6 7-12

Pre

limin

ary

for J

LO

C

5th Year 2014

6th Year 2015

1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12

Fea

sib

ility te

st(S

/W)

Fea

sib

ility te

st(H

/W)

Sp

ec

ifica

tion

for

field

tes

t

H/W

& S

/W

rec

on

figu

ratio

n

Fie

ld te

st e

nviro

nm

en

t

co

ns

truc

tion

Fie

ld te

st

Alg

orith

m c

om

ple

me

nta

tion

for m

ulti-ja

mm

er

Tim

e s

yn

ch

ron

iza

tion

(GP

S c

loc

k →

Ato

mic

clo

ck

)

Fin

al fie

ld te

st

Ja

mm

er L

oca

liza

tion

Sys

tem

Tes

t-op

era

tion

Co

mp

on

en

t tes

t

Deve

lop

me

nt o

f

jam

me

r loc

aliz

atio

n te

ch

no

log

ies

Imp

lem

en

tatio

n a

t the

inte

rnatio

na

l airp

ort


20

Thank you for your attention

gnss vulnerability issues in korea - unoosa · gnss vulnerability issues in korea may 14, 2013 ......

Documents