god and evi

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G o d and EviA n introduction t o the I s s ~ e s

Michael L. Peterson

A S B U RY C O L L E G E

- A Member o f t l ~ e ersseus Books Group


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NI rights reserveci, Pril~tecin the U nited Statesof Amefica, N o Tart ofthis yublica-ticjn may be rcprodueed ur ~ra~lsrnit tcdn any fcxm mo by any means, electronic ormechanicai, in c l~ ~ d in g110tocop~; ec ~ rd jll g, r any Information starage and retrievalsystem, w ith t~ ~x termission in writillg from the publisher.

Copyright-8 998 by Wcswicw Prcss,A i2ilember of Pcrseus Books: Group

Pubiished in 1998 in the United States ofAnlericaby Wesmietv Press, 5500 CentralAvenue, I-lnutcter,Colorado 250303-2877, and is1 the iiilited Ecrgdom Ity KTesrciie\vPress, 12 Hici's Copse ltoa d, G u~ ~l r? lo rill, Oxford OX2 9J

I i brary of C:ongress CZatalog~ l g - i n -uI>tiea.tlic>~~atab3ererson, h4iclraelI,. 1950-

Grrd and cvil : an introd-ctcfict~~o the issues / by Michael L,,b3ererson.

p, cm,Ir~ctudesi bliographicaf referencesand index.lSRN 0-8X 33-28 48 -9 (hc ),- SBN 0-81 33-2849-7 (pb)1. G oo d and cvit. 2. Reli@c>il-Philosog>11y. I. 'I'irfc.

BJl4QX P47 19 982 E4 - d ~ 2 1 98- 18429

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'The paper used iit th i s publ ica~onmeets the requirements o f he American N a&onalStandard for P erm anence o f 13agterf i r Printed 1,ibrary MaterialsZ39.48-198.1.


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For my sons,Aar~Pz aPzd Adam


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Contents

11 The Problem of Evil and Its Placein Philosophy of ReligionEvil in H u l ~ ~ a nxistence, IEvil and Rcligio ~ls elicf,6The Philosophical Difficulty,8The Classificationof Evil, 10Notes, 14Suggested Readings, 15

2 The Logical Problem of EvilSta ten ~e nt f the Problem, 17The Structu re and Strategyof the k g u m e n t , 19Versions of the Logical Argument,23The Burden of Proof, 27Notes, 5S~lggcstcdReadings, 3 1

3 T l ~ e unction of DefenseThe Free Will Defense, 53The Colllpatibilist Position,35T h e Incompatibilist Rejoinder,37

The f:urrcnt Stateo f the Debate, 4 1Notes, 43Suggested Readings,45

4 The Probabilistic Problem af EvilAn Initial Skirmish,47A Modified Pro bab iliy Argument,49


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Three Probabilistic Argumelltsfro~n vil, 52Reformed Epistemolog!? and Evil,56Notes, 61.Suggested Readings,64

5 The Problem a f Gramitous Evil 67

Can There Be an Evidential Argument from Evil?67Versions of the Evidential Argu m m t,69Analy zing the Evidential Argum entfrom

G r a t u i ~ u s vil, 73

T he Appearanceof Evil, 74Notes, 79Suggested Readings,8 1

6 The Task of Theodicy

T he Prospects for Thcodicy,8 5Augustine's Free Will Theodich 89

Lribniz's Best 130ssiblrWorld T he od ic~ ~?2Hick's Soul-M aking Theodic): 94Whitehead's Process Theodicj: 99Theodicy and the Assessmento f Theism, 103Notes, 105Strggested Readings, 108

7 The Existential Problem of Evil

T he Experienceo f Gratuitous Evil, 1 1 1Evil and Personal Idencirp, 114T he Logic of Rcgrct, 117Existential Authcnt iciq and Evil,119T hc Defeat of Horren&,us Evil, 12 4Notes, 127Suggested Readings, 130

Index


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Preface

This jrolumc is an introduction t o th e p roblem of evil asi t is currentlydiscussed in professional philosophy.I have designed the book for use

in an academic setting, with hopes tha t both studen t an d scholarmayfind many points interesting and provocative.I also trust that th e scri-ous and thoughtful person outside academia may benefit frommytreatm ent of this perennially important subject.

No project of this sort is a purely priirate undertaking. Over theyears, I have benefited fro111 hclpful discussions o n th e proble i~ l f evil~ 6 t h vin Hantinga, Edwarcf Madden, Peter Ham, Wilfiam Idasker,

David Basingrr, Bruce R eich mbach , and Jerry Walls.I have appreci-ated the m co ura ge m cn t of th e Asbury College administration duringmy urit ing. I am also thankful t o Pew C haritable T rusts for fulldillgmy research during the 1992-1993 acadelnic pear.

I am not completely sure why I continue to be fascinated by theproblem of evil in all of its permutations. In part, I am astonished bythe great profusion o f suffering and evil around us and am driven topon der it on behalf of those who ask, "Why?" And, in pa rt,I am stag-gered at the cap aciv for evil ~vi th in sand am thercbp dra~v1-1o theissues concerlling God and evil. Although I am conscious of thestrange m ixture of good and evil in o u r bvorld,I am m ore mindful ofhow im po rtant it is t o or ien t oileself properly toward these realities.

I dedicate this book to my sons, Aaron and Adam, in ~ v h o mtakegreat pleasure and delight. They are cer tail~ lp w o immeasurablegoods in my life tha t show me just how much value the reis in a ~vor ldtha t contains evil. Their goodness evenmakes me a better person, Myfatherly hope for them is that thcy will resist evil in all its forms andthat thcy will love and seek the good in all things.


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The Prob ern o f Evil andIts Place in Philosophy o f Ke

Something is dreadfully wrong with our ~vorld.An earthquake killshulldrcds in Peru. A pancreatic cancer patient suffers prolonged, ex-cruciadng pain and d ies. A pit bull attacks a m o-ye ar -o ld child, an -

grily ripping his flesh and killing him. C oun tless lnultitudes suffer theravages of war in Somalia.A crazed cult leader pushes eighq-five peo-ple to their deaths in WBco, Texas. Millions starve and diein Nor thKorea as famine ravages the land. Horrib le things o f all kinds happenin our world-and that has been the story since the dawnof civiliza-tion. Today's news media thrive on things that are wrongin the~v orld , n bad things that h a p p n t o people every day. Rlevision pa-rades vivid imagesof war, ixurdcr, devastation, and suffering beforeo u r eyes. Newspapers rep or t rape, abuse, maylncm, and disaster.

an Existence

In June 199 1, Time magazine asked the question, "Why?"-"Whydoes evil happen?"' In the cover essay, journalist Lance Morrojv re-views the rz~ultitudeof eviils that haunt our cox~scioust~ess-fromHitler's Auschwitz t o Saddanl Husscin" invasion of K ~ ~ w a i t ,romKKK hangings of black m en in prc-civil righ ts Mississippi t o theAIDS epidemic. Kight the re in a pok3ular ixagazinc, M r~ rro w aisesage-o ld questions in an article starkly titled "Evil." Is evil an entity!O r is evil th e immoral and inhulnane actionsof persons? W hat a bo utbad and hurtful things that are outof our control, such as disease,floods, and mental illness?Is nature responsible? Why does evil seem


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2 12robigm oj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophynfRel@Zon

so fascinating and alluring to the hulnan lnilld whilegood seems souninterestiilg and boring! Does evil serve som e purpose, o r doesi tjust happen! Why has the hum an race no t seemed able t o understandevil, to conque r it , to shut i t out!

ThoughtFul people raise penetrating questions about evil and seek tonnderstand what it reveals about the hun2an condition.In a feafi~re rti-cle in the Tork Times M a ~ a z i n c ,Ken Koscnbaul-n seeks to probethe m eaning of evil. The cover of the magazine reads "Evil's Back," andRosenbaum's article inside carries the title "Staring into the Heart ofthe H eart of Darkness." Koxnbaum's piece sets the stageby recounting

how Susail Smith of Buffalo, South Carolina, murdered her mro youngsoxls, He reheal-ses the f'acts that a whole tlation now knows aXI too well:Susan Smith drowned her two little boys by strapping them into thechild safety seats in herMazda and sending the car rolling down an em-bankment into Jobn D. Long Lakc. She then manufactllrcd an "ordeal"to deflect attention fro111 her crime. Playing on racial prejudice, shcclaimed that an AFrican American car jackcr had kidnapped hcrtwo chil-

d r m , and she pled desperately on television for a search for the carjacker a i d the children. Yet, kzithin nine days, she confessed to killingthree-)rear-old M ichael a i d f o u r t e e n - m o - dAlex.

Itosenbaurn observes tha t on e Local tabtoid called Sxnith" action an"evil deed." W hat is imyressive ab ou t this pr on ou nc em m t is tha t thesecular rze\\rs media would make it.In a day when electronic andbxintcd media typically prefer to assume a"relativity of valuesm----avoiding difficult issues about i x o r a l i t ~hcolog>r, the ixeaning of life,and ou r place in th e cosmos-it: was blurtedout. There it was. Sol-ne-thing was actually declared "evilv--pure, unadultera ted , ullmistak-able evil-by th e press. No141 all the hard questio ils are laid o n thetabie and have to be faced: W hat is evil? Why d o hum ans have theseemingly vast capacity to harm others?If there is a go od God, whydoes he permit innocent people t o suffer!2

There is something about the Susan Smith case that evokes our

harshest moral judglnents andgets us asking all of thosc hard ques-tions. K o se n b a m cannily observes tha t "the great tabloid stories arcthe ones that raise thco log iml que stion s.'Y ct he quiclcly aclcnowl-edges that we canilot talk ab ou t evil-)r ab ou t good , for that mat-ter-~rit ho ut solne definitions. Th ose definitioils lead us t o largertheories ab ou t the origin an d existeilce of evil in our midst, an d thosetheories lead us t o even larger conceptions of the meaning o f life and

the nature o f ~vh ateve r upreme Being might exist."


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Although our age is acutely conscious of the bnidespread existenceof evil in humall life, past ages have certainly been akvare of its pro-found significance. AImost no other theme recurs in great literaturemore often than that of humanity's capability for evil.I n ancientGreek tragedy? for example, the tragic he ro is a person of noble statusand lofty aspirations w ho is eventually un do ne bccausc of a profoundcharacter flaw, k n o w ashztbrts (pride). All of the tragic hero's othe rvirtucs become disjointed as hisflaw subtly ruins his life. Russian au-th or Ftrodor Dostoejrsky treats scornfully the c om forting llotion thathumans are always rational and good.In a famous passage from 7 % ~

Broth~rs K a r a ~ ~ a z u v,ostoevskp protests such wild optimism abouthum ankind: "I can't endu re tha t a man o f lofty rnind and hea rtbe-gins with th e ideal of the M adonna and en ds with the ideal of So do m .What" still more awful is that a man with the ideal ofSodorn in hissoul does no t rcnouncc th e ideal of the M adonna, and his heart maybe on firc with that ideal, genuinely on firc, just as in the days ofyouth and innocencc,"4 Our hui-nan inaibifiq to 1ivcup t o o u r owvn

high ideals is a perpetual puzzlem ent.The paradoxical depravity and perversity of hulnalliry are treatedquite poignantly in Dr. Jebyll n ~ z dMr. Hyde. R ob rrt Louis Strvmson 'sfrightening fable records how the decent Dr. Jekyll came under thepower of a transforming drug: "It severed in me those provinces ofgood and i ll which divide and compound mall's dual nature.I \ras inn o sense a hypocrite; both sides of me wcrc in dead eamest;I was nomorc ixyself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, thanwhen I laborcd, in the eye of day, at the f ~ ~ rt h e ra n c ef knowledge o rthe relief of s o r r o ~ rnd sufkring."j

As time %rent on , the th ought of evil represented in th e person o fMr. Hyde no longer filled Jekpll with terror:"I sat in the sun on abench; the animal within melicking the chops of memory; th e spiri-tual side a little drokmed, promising subsequent penitence, but notpet moved to begin. I began to be aware of the telnper ofmy

thoughts, a grcatcr boldness, a contem pt of danger, a solution o f thebonds o f obligation.""

The apelike creature had diabolically gained control o f Jekyll:

This was the s i~ockl~ lgiling; that the slime of thepit seemed to ~t tt erriesand voiecs; that the amorphous dust gesricl.rlatedand 811ncd; that whatwas dead, and had no shape, sho~xldusurp the offices of life And this

again, that tile i i~surgent orror was knit t o him closer than a wife, closer


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tl-ran an eye; lay caged in l-ris flesh, where l-re l-reard it rrittxtter and felt itstruggle to be born; and at every hour oft.rreakness,and in the corlfidenceof sltlmber prevailed againsthim, and deposed him O L X ~ f ife.7

Dr. Jekyll confesses the terrible truth that he is radically both natures:"It was the curse of mankind that . . . in the agonizcd womb of con-sciousness these polar wins should be continuously struggling."g

Paul, tlzc early C.:hl-istian evangdist, recognizes the war ~vitbin im-self: "I do slot understand my own actions. For I d o slot do what Iwant, but I do the very thillg I hate. . . . I can will what is right, but Icannot do it. For I do not d o the good I want, but the evil I do notwant is what X do."Vn a sirnlfar vein, St. Augustine recounts his un-happy predicament in his Confcssio~zs:I was bound, not with an-other's irons, but by my own iron will. My will the enelny held, andthence had made a chain for me, and bound ixe."l@ This personal as-pect of cvil most closcly coincides with what the Judeo-ChristianScr-ipturcs descri be as "sin. "

Once we recogilize the existence of something that can reasonablybe called persollal evil, we must then also recognize that it has collec-tive as well as illdividual dimensions. Organized crime syndicates, mili-tant emerging nations, oppressive social structures, and profit-crazedmultinational corporations are, in a real sense, the social extensions ofpersonal evil. On both individual and corporate levels, one of the sad-dest features of hulxan evil is its strangc adrnixtllrc with good or appar-ent good. Marriages are wrccked for lack of mutual understanding, ed-ucafiond col-nmtlmitics arc m k n n i n e d by disagreement about how topursue colnmosl ideals, political parties are throknn into disarray by ex-cessive ambition, and nations are ripped apart by struggles for power.

Although we are perplexed by humanin's capaciq for evil, even thebest of us are someti~ues urt and even crushed by the ilupersonalforces of the universe. These forces know nothing of human agendas orpurposes and tend to thwart all that we hold dear. Herlnan Melville

deals 144th this thcrnc in Moly Dick.


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whale is white, a color often taken to symbolize whatis sacred andholy; but the whale is fearsomeand hostile to hulnall values and, in theend, triumphant. Ishmael, the ship's only survi\rol; claims that in losinghis life Ahab discovered its meaning." The mod em world knows alltoo well that this disturbing picture of life-life being ruined and finallysnuffcd ou t by forces bcyond its control---is a realistic onc.

There is no denying that persons often fall victiln to psychologicaland physical forces beyond their control. Rut quite apart from howthese forces affect hum all interests, they cr rtai~ lly ause much painand death ~ r i th inlature itself. A% Alered Lord Tellllpson reminds us,

nature is ""rd in to o th an d claw." "rvival of th e fittest is btiilt in toth e mechanism of anilllate nature. Few anir~aX s re .Free from attackby stronger animals o r from suffering and d eath due to shiftsin theirenv ironm ent. Althou gh animals d o no t possess the higher self-consciousness of hulllans, they still obviously feel pain and cndurcsu ffe r ing . Though t f~~ leople tind it very puzzling that the worldshorrld work in such away as t o maim, torture, and d estrr~yarge p m -

portiolls of these subhumall creatures.At the end of any catalog of ills that plague the world comes death .All thillgs ekrentually die. But death is a particularly acute probleln forthe human species because we humans sense that our existence hasvalue and worth, tha t our agendashave merit, that we deserve to g o onliving and building our lives. And yet death stands as the final enem);the last evil wc illust face; it puts an en d n ot only to o ur doing and un-dergoing further evils but also to our pursuing our most cherisheddreams. Thus, death is radically fore iw to all that is within us. LudwigWittge~lsteill bserves: "Death is llotan event in life: we d o n o t livetoexperieilce death."" Death is the end of life.H. F. Lovell Cock5 uritesthat the termination of one's omrn personal existcllce is the "great hu -man repression, the univenal 'complex.'Dying is the reality that [per-sons] dare no t face, and to escape which [they] sum mon all [their] re-sources."lVhose who have thoughtlong and hard abou t the human

condition know that death is arguably thc most fearsome of all evils.After pondering evil in the ~vorld,wc may be tempted t o echo thc

sentiment in the choru s of T. S, Eliot's Mg~drpi"n the CTallhedg~al:

Here i s no continuing city, hereis no nbidin~ gay.Iil $he ~~i ; tzd ,ll the zcz"me, g1.ztrergainthe

plpufit, ccrtai~zhe da~wer.


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O l a t g l a t g I&& is $he fime,mo h 4 ~ dongn ithe jfega";Evil $he windJ an& Itz't&;er he .re&, grid

.qrgy the skj5 ky,greycqreygrcy.1"

Unfortunately, this profo ~und nd inconsolable pessimism appears t obe natural and warranted when th e troubles of hu ~lla nity rc taken sc-rio usly.

All of the bad things that happen-horrors that we humall beingscommit toward one another, awful evellts that occur in nature, and

terrifving kvays in bnhich nature threatens human interestcfall ullderthe rubric of evil. Simply put: There is evil in the world. It is in thenekvs. I t is in ou r co mmon experience. I'opular periodicals even grap-ple with i t . Q ui te apart from any precornm itment t o a specific theoryof cvil and how evil fits in to a larger interpretation of lifc, thcrc is avirtual consensus that something is deeply wrongwith ou r ~vt?r ld ,that things d o not always seem t o g o as they shou ld, and th at much

too often evellts happen that are utterly dreadful. It is in this broadsense that we sap,"Evil exists."

Evil and Religious BeliefAs people through the centuries have reflected on the m eaning of life,fhcy have had t o come to grips with the pcrsisknt and pervasive prcs-ence of evil. It is not surprising, then, that every major religion ad-drcsscs cvil ~c it h ints ullique kam c o frc fc re nc c. jV or B uddhism, evil isillherent in huinall existence, lnalung ilonexistence(~zirvnnn) he goal.For Hinduism , evil belollgsto the world of illusion ( m a p ) nd cyclicalrebirth (snmsam) k o m which we must seek tofind release. For Zoroas-trianism, e\ril is an eternal cosmic principle that opposes the goo d.

In T h e Sacgped Calzopy, sociologist Peter Kerger ~vrites ha t on e func-tion of eilrry religion is to provide away of understanding life, of fitting

the events of life in to a meaning&[pattern. H e explains tha t religionimposes order and lahlness on cxperienccs that sec113 to be chaoticand destructi1.e---rnost notably? thephenomena of suffering and death.Thus, religion imposes a numos, or la~llful xplanation, on other\\iseanolnic features of existence. Berger is worth quo tillg on this point:

The anomic gl-renorritenamLlst not only be lived tl-rrough, they n ~ u s tlso

be explained-to wit, expla i~~edn tcrmsof

the nornos established in the


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soc ieq in question.AI expla~lat ion f these p l -r e ~ ~ o m e ~ ~ an terms of reti-gious Xegi tim atio~ls, f whatever degree of theoretical sophistication, maybe called a theodicqr. I t is i rn porta~lt o stress I-rere particularly (a lttlo~xpb

tl-re sanle point has already bee11 made generally with respect to religiouslegitimations) tttat s~ tc h n. exp la~ra tior~eed not ex~rail complex theo-retical sysrexn. The ilititerate peasant who com menB q m n th e death ofachild by referring to the will of Go d is e~ lg ag i~ lgn tbeodicy as much asthe icarxred ttteologian who writesa treatise t o demtsr~stratehat the suf-fering of rhc innocent does no t negatc the conceltGorr,of a G od both ail-good and all-po\"iierf~~l,ll tl-re same, it is possible t o differentiate tl~ eo di -cies in terms of their degree of rationalir~i,ttat is , the degree to ~~hicl t .ttlcy exlrtdl a theory tha t col~cren tly nd consistently explaixrs the pbe-llonlella in question in ternls of a1 over-all vie\v of the unitrerse. Such atheory? of cotrrse, once i t is sociall~~.stablished, may be refracted or1 dif-ferent lcr,rels of sapt~isricatiun tlrougho c~t he socieqf. P h ~ s , he peasa~ lt,when he speaks abo~xt:he will of God, may hill~selfntend, however inar-ticulatel~p, he m ajestic theodicy corlstructedby the tttec~tc>gial~.lb

So,what a religious system sa)Ts about evil reveals a great deal aboutwhat it takes ultimate reality and humanity's relationto it to be.

Hence, the credibility of a re lig io~l s closely linked t o its abilitytogive its adherents categories for thinking ab ou t the presenceof evil.

Although evil poses a challenge that every major religion must ad-dress, the challenge to Christianity is particularlyformidable. Thereseems to be a scrious tcnsion bcfi4rcen what Christian theolog). affim3sabout thc unrivaled power, nnlimited kn o d cdg c , and unrelentingIr>wof Cod, o n the one hand, and what it adm ia about cvil in G od 's cce-ated order, on the other. Many persolls think that the Christia lGod-if H e really exists a ~ ds the source a ~ duaral to r of value-\wuld no tdtow the world to be as it is. This is the crux of the issue for C hristianbeliet:, it has traditionally been knowrn as the problem of cvil. Thro ugh-out historj: Christian theologians and philosophers have ~vrestledwiththis problem. Thoughtfill and sensitivelaity have also felt the need for

at least a gcncral explanation ofhow to relate God and evil. The co-nun drum seems unavoidable.Aficr rc\?iewing all the evils that haunto u r contenlpr>rary consciousness, Lance M orrow raises this prcciscproblem at the end of hisTirne magazine article.17

S o n ~ e hinkers believe that unless Christian believers have anac-ceptable solution to the problem of evil, they have110 right t o holdtheir distinctive theological positionor to ask others to adopt it.18

Philosopher T. W. Settle argues that grappling with the problem of


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evil is a "proleg om enon t o intellectually hon est theology."" T h orHall p roposes th at the ability or illability to generate an allswerto thevexing problem of evil is the lionus test of the "reasonableness of thc-ology." Hall says that Christian thinkers must "he capable of handlinghonestly the actualities of human existence (realities which we allknow) while at th e same time providing a fralxework for explicatingresponsibly the essential affirmations of the faith (a ffir~n ationswhicharc given \niithin th e historical traditian)."zo

The positioll that is put under direct pressureby the presence ofevil is known as "theism." Theism ~ na in ta in s ha t the re exists a

Suprelne Being w ho is omnipoten t, omniscient, an d perfectly good.William Rowe calls this position "restricted theism."2l Theism as suchis no t itself living religion bu t forms what we might call the basic con-ceptual foundation for several living religions: Christianity, Judaism,and Islam. Thc total bclicf fraixeworks of these actual religions in-volve adding certain other signiticantreligious beliefs to restrictedtheism. Restricted heism conjoined with other rcligio~~slaims co n-

stitutes what Kowe calls "expanded theism."The presellt study treats Inally of th e i~ nport al lt iscussions relatedt o the basic theistic foundation of Chrisrian belief (i.e., restricred the-ism). After all, insofar as evil presents a challenge to theism,i t pre-sents a challenge to any version of expanded theism. Howriver, thisstudy also considers some issues related t o larger sets of Christian be-liefs ( i c., various


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po~verfu l, ll-kilo~ving, ll-good deity w ith the belief tha t there is e\ilin the bnorld. But exactly what kind ofa problem is this? Speakingmore precisely, the difficult}! for theism lies in rebu tting an a rgumen tthat alleges some kind of conflict between beliefs abo ut G od and be-liefs about evil. An argument from e\5l---or, really, any one of severalargum ents from evil---has astructure, pre~l~ises ,nd conclusion. It isactually the conclusion of any given argkllnent from evil and the rca-sons for that conclusion that are a "problem" for theism.In the fol-lokning pages, I will use the term problem ofev i l simply as a synonymfor nvgz~me~ztfronz v i l . 2 2 h d here is no t just o ne problem o r argu-

lnent from evil; there are actually Inany different argum ents. Scholarshave identified se\reral major types of arguments 6orn evil, notingtheir key strategies as well as characteristic theistic responses.

These argum ents have various roots. For on e thing, the problem ofevil expresses a kind of moral protest and so involves categories ofgo od and evil. For ano ther thing, theproblem involves religious bc-licfs abo ut th e existencc and natu rc o f Go d, giving it a distinct thc o-

logical aspect. Yet the problem of evil is best understood as a philo-sophical problem. In its traditional role, philosophy clarifies andailalyzes o u r beliefs, exalnilles them for logical consistency an d coher-ence, and evaluates their adequacy for explaining iluportant humanphenomena. These philosophical features make th e discipline of phi-losophy the natural home field for the problem of evil.

Th ere arc, of course, illany areas of philosophical concern, and eachis determined by the exact sct of ideas and issues that arc exalxined:philosophy of science, philosophyo f illind, philosophy o f language,philosophy of a rt, and so forth. Eachof these areas seeks t o brillg th ekey insights and interests of philosophyto bear upon the relevanttopics. This mealls that typical philosophical yurstiolls about reality(metaphysics), knojvledge (epistemology), and value (moral theoryand axiology) are appropriate. A nd questions abou t the structure andacceptability of relevant arguments (logic) are always in order. Th e

s~ lb ject t hand, the problem of evil, falls within w hat is traditionallyk n o w as the philosophy ofreligion. It is the task of philosophyo f rc-ligion, then , t o bring thcsc characteristic questions t o bear o n signifi-cant religious concepts and belieE5, such as those related to G od, mir-acle, prayer, and faith.

Philosophers of religioll have always been deeply interested in thequestion of whether there are rational grounds for either belief in

God or disbelief in God. Impressive arguments have been con-structed t o show that G od exists-such as the ontological, cosmolog-


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it0 12robigm oj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophynfRel@Zon

ical, and teleological argumellts.23 Likeivise, a number of serious ar-guments have been adiranced t o show that God does slot exist.Among those arguments against God's existence, noile has beenmore prominent than the problem of evil. In the experience of eviland reflection upon i t , humanity reaches the extreme limit-con-fronting the decisive question of the ixeaning of life, of the sense andnonsense of reality. Hans Kiing states that thc problem of evil is "thcrock of athcismm24 because so Exany pcoplc bclievc it t o be in-tractable. This accounts for the lively and ongoing discussion of theprobleln in philosophy of religion.

But \vhh one might ask, should this philosophical problem be rele-vant to faith? Faith is personal commitment, deep abiding trust, firmconviction. Faith is much more than abstract reasoning. Why shouldthe intricate arguments and counterarguments of philosophers affectreligious faith at all? A sensible answr, it would secln, runs along thefollowing lines. Athough, granted, faith is morc than Exere intcllec-tual assent t o a set of beliefs, i t is at least intellectual assent. Athough

faith is a personal trust in God, that trust is based on a slumber of im-portant beliefs about what God is like and how persons Inay have a re-lationship t o him. These beliefs are subject to philosophical scrutin!:critique, and defense. Thus, there really is no responsible way to insu-late religious faith from philosophical reflection. And there is certainlyn o jvaj. to insulate i t h m he philosophical problem of evil.

The Cllassif car-ion of EvilRecognizislg the probleln of evil as a serious challeilge to Christiail the-ism, it might seem advisable to begin our i~lvestigation with a precisedefinition of evil. Homrever, the attempt to offer a specific defillitiosl atthis point frequently ladens the meaning of evil with preconceived ideasand thus hinders objcccive discussion. Some thinkers, for example, de-fine "evil" in theological terms as "sin" and consider the problem only

in this light, reducing all evils to spiritual xbellion again^ God and itsconsequences. Other thinkers definc "evil" as "finialdew and thcn treat

ven human pcrversiv----as the inevitable results of creatllrclplimitation. Defislitions of "evil" could be proposed and debated indefi-nitely. Therefore, it is advisable for present purposes to leave open thequestioil of definition a ~ d roceed with a broad, cornmollsense slotionof evil evoked by the things we typically call "eiril."

lxegardless of how we define it, we are all aware of the existenceand profusion of evil. It is entirely possible to identify a whole spec-


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trum of evellts and experiences as "evil." T he set of comlnoillp recog-nized evils includes, at the j7ery least, such things as extreme pain andsuffering, physical deformities, psychological abnormalities, the pros-perity o f bad people, th e demise of good people, disrup ted social rela-tions, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and naturalcatastrophes. Th is list specifics the sorts o f things thatarc colxmonlyconsidered evil ~v it h o u t rejudicing later discussions.In yhilosophialparlance, this list indicates thc c.~tension f th e term "evil" (i.e., allthillgs t o which the term applies) bnithout speci@ ing its exacti n t en -sion (i.e., all that the term implies). T he eloquent eig hte en th- ce ntu r~ ~

skeptic David H u m e fo llo ~v ed his approach w hen 11e listed a sam-pling of th e world's ills: "a hospital full of diseases, a prison crolvdedwith malefactors and debto rs, a field of battle strewed with carcasses,a Reet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under ryrannj:faixine, [a nd ] pestilence.

Evil indeed has many faces, faces with ~ vhic hwe arc all to o falniliar.Since the wide range of evils can be vcrp conf~~sing,ost philoso-

phers make a helpful distinction beweenmoral

evil andnatzlral

evil.111 lnarking o u t the difference be m een thet\jro broad kinds of evil,Alvin Plantinga writes that "\\re must distinguish beweenmofpaleviland n&t-gg.nl ~z ' l . h e form er is evil wl-rich results f?om free hurnan ac-tivity; natural evil is any oth er kind ofev i l . "2"s Plantinga admits, thedistinctioll is not very precise. Yet this salnr point is made by JohnHick: "Moral evil is evil what we hulxan beings originate: crrrd, un-just, vicious, and perverse thou ghts arid deeds. Natural evil is thc evilthat originates independently of human actions: in discasc bacilli,earthquakes, stonns, droughts, tornadoes, etc."27

Edw ard M addell and Pete r H are provide a sinlilar classification:

Phj~ical! ~z ' l ,we shall say, Cle11~1tes the terrible pain, suffering, a~ld n-timely death caused by evetlts like fire, Rood, la~~dslide,tirricarle,earttlquake, tidal wave, and fainine and by discaseslike cancer, leprosy,and tetanus-as well as the cripp li~lg efects and defor~ltibesike bIind-ness, deah~ess, timbness, shrivefedlimbs, and illsanity by which SOrnany scl~rtenr eings are cl~eatedof the full benefits of Iife. . . . Mo~-salevil . . . d e ~ ~ o t e soth rritoral wrong-doing such as lying, cheating, steal-ing, torturillg, and murderilIg and character defects like greed, deceit,cruelty , gi,wantar~ness,owardice, and selCshx7iess.2"

O the r authors d o n ot depart far from this same general approach.

Althoughw e

could debate the exact boundaries bet\\reen naturaland moral evil, the basic distinction performs a helpful classificatory


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it2 12robigm oj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophynfRel@Zon

fu~lctio~l. t 110t only helps clarifp our thinking about evil but also al-lows us to divide the general problem of evil into subsidiary problemsrelated to moral and to natural evil and thus guides further stages ofinquiry. I n his penetrating treatment of the problem of evil, DavidHulne shows he is alvare of this iznportant distinction. Hume ob-serves that, in naturc, "the stronger prey upon the wcaker" m d ""thcwcaker, too, in their turn, oftcn prey upon the stronger, and vex andmolest thcm \\;icbout relaxation." Achowlcdging that brr111aniq canorganize into societies and thus avoid some of the harm zlature mightdo, he insists that humalls morally mistreat each other: "Oppression,

injustice, contempt, . . . ~riolence, edition, war, . . . treacherh fraud-by these they mutually torment each other, and they would soon dis-solve char society which they had formed were it not for the dread ofstill greater ills which must attend their separation."29

Quite apart from technical philosoph!~, the distinction behvecn nat-nral and moral evil rkzns through most great literature. "The "f"yger'"by William Blakc is a powerful poetic expression of the problcill of

natural evil. The poem forcefully raises the issue of whether a certaininstance of natural evil (e.g., the threat of being attacked by strongermimals) could have been created by the Gr>d of the C:hristian faith.

Ty&er! Twer!burni~g right1% he forests of' the n&bt,W ~ L Z Lm~.e.lo~$ala;l.cd or eyleG"og/d@gme [email protected]!pf-ll ~ y r n ~ ~ e ~ ' r y ?

In tvhat distant d e e p or skiesBurrzed the ir6 ofthifze eyes?On 117hatwings dafpe he aspigee?Whnt the hand dar~ eize the ir&?

Whar I J ~ C ~ P % z ~ c I ?hat t-hg ~ h a i ~ zIn tvhatp6mace was thy brainWhnt the anvil? what dreadgrasp

I h v eits

dead& termrs clnsp?


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Whg~z h ~tars threa~ olv~zheir spears,And 137~~.tergde l ; t ~ e ~ ~7Ztb h~iar ggrs,])id he smz'lg his wofpk t o .re&?])id he $@ad&he Lg$.%zb.%zake e e ?

q g e ~ ! ~ger! tgrvtia8 b~$&ht:I B the for^gs~'sf the %&h$,W ~ & Gmmor~al a ~ d r eyleDarg @me thy fearful s y r n metry l.3"

We also find the problem of moral evil in great noirels. Dosto-evsky's classic The Rruthcr.r I


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Notes

X . Lance Morro\;c;"Evil," Time, June X0, X991, pp.48-53.2. 'l'he use of the masctxline gcnder pronocln here docs no t imply that G od

is rritale,HistoricalJudeo-C hnstiar~ iews of God have affirmed that sexuatiq isa creattrrely reality no t reflectedin God. My use ofmascrrline gcnder proxlotrnswbex~ eferring toGod tbraughot~this book, then, ;follows the tradition tliatrequires us to use i~~lperfectarthly terms and i~~lageso talk about God, Ia ~ x ~ i dsing any new? revised God-language here, which wotrld raise som e veryinteresting but also very sophisticated contro~rcrsies. retain traditional usagesimply for the sakeof econclmy and getting on with the issl-~est hand.

3, Roil XXosexlba-itm, "&faring into the Heartof the Heart of l>arkl~ess?"New T0a.k ?Z 'YM.~S 'M ~ ~ ~ S Z F Z ~f t ~ n e, 1995): 36-44, 50-58,61, 72.

4, Fjmodor Dc~stoelirskj?~he B~.ot;t-Jersararnazo~~ rans. C ollsta~ lceGar i~e t t(N ew York: No rton,X9761, p. 97.

5. Itobert Lauiis Srevcnsan, Y79e Stra~tqe Cnse of 131.:JgkyII and HjtcZe(LR~ndon: olio Societ!r, 19481, p , 124 ,

6, Ibid., p. 127.7. Ibid., p. 146.S, Ibid., pp, 1 2 4 1 2 5 ,9. Rt~rn, :15 , 18b-li 9 New Xteviscd Standard Versiotl. Paul7$ famerltatior~

should be read in context: See Ram,7:15--20,10 . Arlgt~stine,Confessions, 8.5.11).X X .Herman hlelvtl'le, fJz"ck,eds. H, Hayford and H. Parker (New

York: W, W. Nortor-1,1'367). For a. cfisctxssio~l f thisvision of life, see H en ryA, Myers, T g * g ~ ~ d y :View~f-'Lfc It l~ aca : :ori~eil University Press,l BSd),pp. 57-77, and Echard Sewall,The Visiunof T$#g~edyNew Haven: YaleIZniversiq3X959), pp. 92-1 05.

12 . l i~Ct~r ig ittgenstein, ?kactnt$isLo~z'cn-l-"hz'lmopk~z'c~s, rails. D, F.Pears and R . F, McGrtix~nessLondon: Rcjudecige8. Kegaxl PauX,X97X),prol1oskion6.43 l , p. 147'.

13. H. F, Lovelf C:ocks, ByEgi&ljAhlalze ( h n d o n : Tame?CCkarke,1943), p. 55.X4, T. S . Eliot-, ,Wu$edepc Z'Y~ Ca$bedfp~l: Oc Chf%plet:~oems (N ew Yc~rk:

Harco~rrr,Brace, 19521, p. 180.15 . Such rritatters are d is c~ ~ ssedn John Itoliiker,Probie~~s f SzgJir~i~2.~P%

RlirIi~Zons~ - 8 h cWofeld (Cambridge: Cambridge U ~~ ivers iryress, X970) .16. Peter Berger, lfhe Snc~vd Canopy(N ew liorlc: D oublcda);X967), pp,

53-54.X7 . hiorrow, ""Evil," p 551.18, In response, same Christians hold that believers may instead argtle

that theydo lo t need a theobicy.A ~ ~ t ~ t - r l b e rf approaches are possible here,For examplle, a believer may argue thatS~IICCthe problem of evil does notco~~clusivclyisprove her position, she neednor answer it. O r a believer mayargue that she has c ~ n v i ~ l c i l ~ gro c~ f f Gc)Cf7s existence o n othe r grounds


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and l-rence that sheknows the problem of evil must have some answer. Shemay even say that t ~ e r eliefin God is so basic that it supersedes efforts toprove o r disprove i t. Tlzls lineof tho~xghts discussed in Chapter4.

However, it is fair t o say that there are differing opinions abou t whetherany way of avoiding the problem of evil can be cornhrtabfy accepted. Afterall, Christian theis111 p ~ ~ r p o r t so explain relevant feattlrcs of huxnall exis-tence, brrt evil does slot seem tofit well into the expfanation. Therefore,there is at feast a prima facie case that the Christian theistmust make goodher clairn by addressing the prablcrn of evil.

19, T. W, Settle, ""A P rc ~lcg om en on o Intellectudly H o ne st ~ ~ l ~ e c ~ ~ cPhz'lnsr,phicalFo~*zrlm ( 1978): X36-1 40.

20. Tf'hor Hall, """Theadicy s a Test of the XZeasonablc17tess of rrhealog3'?R~iz8icrf.l. ;rz L f e4 3 (1974): 204.

21. FViltiam Rowe, ""Evil and the 'Theistic Hypothesis:*ALR ~ S P O I I S ~okvjrksrra," h8gf*nat iuv2at ~~uap~atbr 12bilnsophy nfRel@Zonit 6 (1984): 95.

22. Da~lielHoward-Snyder distinguishes bet't.\reen the ""poblem of evil"and the ""argurnexlt: from evil" hi1.1 is edited vofrrmeT%a E~idertt.z"all~ume~t .8j?om Epil (Ufooxnington: Indiana. Ux-rivcrsiy Xzrcss,X996), pp. XI-XIX.

23 , For a disc~-rssion f most of th e major issues related t o jiihether the reare rational grounds fbr beiievixlgin God, see Michaet Petersoxl, FViIliamEIasker, Uruce Reict~cx~bach,nd David Basingcr, IZeaso~i!n d ReIigioz6sBe-Ziefi I a ~ r o d % c t i u ~ tt-o ithe Pi?z'lusnpk3yc?f"Relvicrfz, 2nd ed , ( N e wYork: OxfordUniversity Press, 1998) .

24. Hans KGng, 61*t B P ~ B ~Cjhri~tz'g~z, rans. Edward Qrrinn (GardenCity> N.Y.: Doublednj?, 19 74 ), p,432.

25. David Hurne, Dialr~ailicsC u n c e r n i ~ i ~g ~ u r a lReli~z 'or t ,cited inMichael L. Xzetcrson, ed., 279~ 2g#oblemof Evil: Selected Readin:&$ ( N o t r cDarrite, In d, : University of Not re Dame Press,1992), p. 42.

26. AfvinPlanti~lga,G d , F ff i g ~ d o m ~lzd E ~ i lGrand k~pids, ich,: Eerd-mans, 1977)),p. SO.

2 7 , J o h ~ l ick, E ~ z ' lnd $he Chd @'Love,re\: ed. (Xew k r k : Harper &Rtxv, 1975), p. 12 ,

28. Edward Maddell and 13cerer Hare,Evilnlizd ithe C o ~ c e p tf'CT"od(Spring-Geld, Ilt.: CharlesC, Tltomas, 196 8), p.6.

29 . Hrrrne quote d inpeters or^, ed., " I e Paeoktbmo Evil, p, 4 130. W illam Blakcc, ""'l'lze Tyger," lfhefirtable B l ~ k e ,d. AIkcd k z i n

(N ew York: Viki11g Press, 19681, p, 109 ,3 l . IDostoevsky, B~~oghefpsC&3fiamk7t2~)27, p, 224-225,

Suggested Readings


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16 Yl2e12robigm oj'Evbland 12hilnsophy ofRel@Zon

Davis, Stepbeill 'I". "Why Did This Happen t o h%eZ-The Patieilt as aP I I ~ ~ O S O ~ ~ C T, ' 'atz"~~~e$o~%)ncrnip.~na.j) Z . E ~ ~ ~ L I : $ ~5 ( 1972): 6 1 67.

FIiek, lot11-t. "The 1%roblemof E-\7il." 1x7 Y%eE~zcyclopediaoj'12hilosop13j~.Edited

by Paul Edivards, New York: M aen ~il lan nd Free Press, 1967, pp .X36-1 41.

Hume , L3avid. L>z'ala~$~esI loncer~zk~z~gt.zza.nl Reli8ion.Parts 1 0 and l l .Edited by H. IT, Aiken. New York: Hafner P~xblisbing,1955.

Lcwis, 6 , S, "E58 atoktleutz c$'P~ain,New Vc>rk:Macmittan, X962.M ack tsh , Arct~ibald .1. . Boston: FIougbton Miffliin,1986.h%elville,Hermarr, ~ W ~ b y - D i c h ,dited by H, Hayford and Hershet Parker,

New York: W, W, Norton, 1967.

13cctersan, M ichael L,, e b . If79e 13~coblemf Evil : Selecgcd Readi?;~~,otrcD ai~ le, nd,: Universityof Notre Dat-rite Press, 1992.

Pike, Nelson, ed. CTIOd ~ a l ~ n !PZI:R~ndZplt~sIE t h& 29;JeolrgicalP~~oblemf-E~zlt,E n g j c ~ ~ o o dlttffs, N l : X%rei?tlce-Hall,1964.

Wiesel, Elie. N@b$. lI"rarrslatedby Stella Rodi+?a~r.ew Uork: Bailtarn Books,X960.

. Y79e 2k i d o f God.Trmnslatcd by Marian Wicsel . Ncw York: Schoclccl~Books, 1979,


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The Logical Problem o f Evi

The problem of evil has both theoretical and existential dimensions.The theoretical problerns deal with logical and epistcmic reladonshipsbc m ee n propositions ab ou t G od and evil. T he existential dimensionof thc problcm pertains t o one's deeply personal response t o evil and

overall sellse of th e \north of hum an existence. Leavillg discussioil ofthe existential probleln until Chapter7, I devote the interveilingchapters to three important statelnents of the theoretical problem.During the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 ~ ~hilosophers calnr to make a distinc-tion between tw o broad b~ersions f the theoretical prob lem. T h e log-ical problem revolves around the question of consistency alnong keytheistic propositions. The evidential problcm involves evaluatingpropositions about God in terms of the factsof evil. I discuss twoways of advancing the evidential pro ble ~ll n Chapters4 and 5. Here Ifocus on the classic logical probleln of evil.

Statement of the Problem

The logical problem of evil (also called the a priori problem and thedeductive prob lem ) arises on the basis of an alleged inconsistencjr be-m e e n certain cla i~xs bo ut God and certain clailns abo ut evil.1 His-torically, thc discussion of this problem has developed as critics at-tempt to expose an inconsistenc)~ mong theistic beliefs and theisticphilosophers attem pt t o showj4rh.hy there is n o inconsistency.

Oxford philosopher J . L. Mackie sums up the atheistic challmge:"H ere it can be shobnn, no t th a t religious beliefs lack ratioilal suppor t,bu t th at they are positively irrational, th at several parts of the essential


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theological doctrine are illconsistent with one allother."2 Si~lce eillglogically consistent is necessary for a set of beliefs to be rational,Mackie's charge is very serious. Mackie clearly and forcefully statesthe logical problem: "In its simplest form the problem is this: God isomnipotent; God is ~vholly ood; and yet evil exists. There serlns tobe some contradiction bemecn thesc thrcc propositions, so that ifany hvo of them wcrc true the third would be false. But at thc salllctime all thrcc arc essential parts of ixost theological positions; thc thc-olo@an, i t seems, at once 1 ~ ~ l s tdhere and calznot cufzsirtentlyadhereto all three."3

If Mackie and other critics are right, then the dilemma facing thetheist is whether to retain his theistic position and the propositionsthat constitute it (and thus be saddled with a contradiction) or m re-lincluish one or more of the relevallt yroyositions (and thereby escapethe contradiction). To el-nbracc a contradiction is irrational, but t osurrender any kcy theistic bclicf is to abandon standard thcism.

Two centuries ago, David H t m c (following Epicurus) poscd the

difficulty with stark clarity: "Is [God] \villiilg to prevellt evil, but notable? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not uilling! Then he ismalevolmt. Is he both able and willing? Whellce then is evil?"")rconsider H . J. McCloskry's succinct statement: "The problem of evilis a very simple one t o state. There is evil in the ~vorld; et the ~vorldis said to be the creation of a good and omnipotent God . How is thispossible? Surely a good omnipotent God would have made a world&cc of evil of any kind."Vilnilar expressions of the logical problemarc abtxndant in the philosophical literature.

If we isolate for closer inspection the propositions that critics com-monly have in mind, we get the following list of propositions:

( 1 ) G od exis&;(2) God is all-powerful;(3) God is all-good;

(4) God is all-knoiving;(5) Evil exists.

The set of beliefs ( 1 -(4) is what Kowe calls "restricted theism," a po-sitioil that the theist, by jrirtue of being a theist, lnust accept. How-ever, the ypical theist also accepts (5) as an element in his overall po-sition. The critic, then, maintains that the set (1)-(5) is logically

ir1consistetlt.


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The Structure and Strategy of the entBefore embarking on a complete discussion of the logical argumentfrom evil, i t is helpful t o review the general concept ofinconsistencyo rcontvadictiun.6 Actually, there are seveml types of contradiction toconsider. O n e type is a certain kind of proposition---a conjunctiveproposition in ~vhich ne conjunct is the denial or negation of theoth er co njunc t. Consider the following proposition:

( 6 ) Socrates is mortal, and i t is false that Socrates is morta l.

The first con junct (Socrates is mortal) and the second conjunct( i t isfalse tha t Socrates is m t~ rt a l)ar111ot both be true. WI-tat we have hereis an explicit contmdiction.

Thc bwoblclll, of course, is that one who assertsa contradictioncannot be advancing a position that is cornblletcly truceBy mct l~odsfound in any elesnentary text on logic,wc can know that a contra-

diction is a proposition that is necessarily false. Interestingly, k~lo \vingthe actual tru th o r falsity of the conjuncts in a con tradictory proposi-t ion is not required in order to know that i t suffers from incon-sistencjc Presumably> ew people com mit such flagrant errors in th ink-ing,

Mackit: speaks of aset of theistic propositions being inconsistent o rcontaining a contradiction. Rut what does it illcan fora set t o be in-consistent or contradictory? WC may say that a set of propositions isexplicitly contradictory if one o f the mcillbers is the denial or ncga-tion of allother member. For example, consider the f o l l o ~ i n get:

(7) Socrates is mortal( 8 ) i t is false that Socrates is m ortal.

By conjoining these two propositions, we get: the familiar contradic-

tion (6). A sct from which such a contradiction can bc gcncratcd isexplicitly contradictory in th e scnsc in. qtrestion,

In Illany cases, howc\rcr, a sct of propositions is contradictory butthe colltradiction is no t obvious, n o t explicit. In these m ore difficultinstances, the charge of inconsistency can stillbe made to stick if ordi-nary rules of formal logic can be used to deduce a contradictioll.7Let us develop an example to show how this works. Call the follo\\~-

ing set:A:


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(9) If ali snen are mortal, then Socrates is mortal( 1 0) All men are mortal(8) Tt is hlse th at Socrates is morta l.

Using the logical rule morlgs punens (if p, then q; p; therefore g), wecan deduce

(7) Socrates is mortal

from (9) and (10). Proposition ( 7 ) s logically inconsistent with (8).

Since it is no t possible for propositions(7) and (8) both t o be true atthe salnr time; the setfrom which they are drawn is con tradic tory.Weshall say th at setA is fbrmally contmdictorybecause we can deduce anexplicit contradiction from its member propositions by the laws offormal logic.

Admittedly, this cxamplc of an inconsistent set of propositions is asimplified one; seldom do such easy cascs occur in ordinary lifc. In

fact, the propositions that form an inconsistency in an opponent's po-sition are sometimes no t s tated at a l , So, the critic is faced witl-1 thedouble task of first produc ing all of the rrlrvallt uns tated propositionsand then d ra w i~ jg ut the con tradiction from the fully articulated po-sition. In such cases, the sets of propositions in question areimplicit4contradictory.

For a third cxamplc, le t us reflect o n the following propositions asforming an implicitly con tradic tory set:

( 1 1) Socrates is older than Plato( 1 2) 131ato is older than Aristotle( 15) Socrates is no t older than Aristotle.

This set-jvhich I will designate s no t explicitly contradic tory ;i tis also not forlnallp contradictory. We cannot use thelaws of logic t o

deducc thc denial of any of these propositions fr o ~ xhe others. Yetthere is an im portan t sensc in which setB is inconsisrcnt o r contradic-tory. That is, it is not possiltle tha t its three m embers arc all true.

Now, i t is ~ e c e s s ~ ~ r i [ yrpzte hat

( 1 4) If Socrates is older than Plato, and Pfato is older than Aris-totle, then Socratesis older than Aristotle.


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If we add (1 4 ) toB, \W get a set that is formally coimadictory Employ-ing th e laws of formal logic, (1I), (12), and (14) yield the denial of (13).Now we have succeeded in lnaking the i~np licit ontradiction explicit.

WC were able to deduce the cotltradiction in this set becauseweemployed an additional proposition that isnecessari!y truc. Th ere areactually different varieties of necessary truth. The truth of solxebwopositions----such as (15) below----can be established by the laws oflogic alone.

( 1 5 ) If all men are mortal and Socrates is aman, then Socrates

is mortal.

This expresses a tru th of logic. Yet the tru ths of arithmetic and math-ematics generally are also necessarily true , such as

Furthermore, there are Inany propositiolls that are neither truths oflogic nor truths of lnathematics but are noiletheless llecessarily true,such as (14). A few more examples of this type of necessary truthwould be

( 17) Bachelors arc unmarf-lcd males( 1X ) Blue is a color( 1 9 ) N o numbers are horses.

Let us call the type of necessity with whichwe are dealing herebt~oadlyogical necessity. There is a correlative kisld of possibility aswell: A proposition p is possibly true (in the broadly logical sense) justin case its negation or denial is not necessarily true (in that samebroadly logical sense).

Necessity and possibilityin the broadly logical sense lnust be distin-

guished from another scnse of necessity and possibility. That othersense is cngml! or ~agggffial ecessiq?and possibiliq. Fur instance,

(20) Michael Jordan has lcapt over the Sears Tow er.

is a propositiosl that is possibly true in our sense of broadly logicalpossibility. Yet in the sense of causal or natural possibility,it is not


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possible at all. Human beings-ejren great a th le tes jus t d o no t havethe physical endo\\rments required for such a feat. There are a numberof propositions, furthermore, about which it is difficult to saywhether they are or are not possible in the broadly logical sense, thusgiving rise t o philosophical controversy. For example, is i t possible fora person to exist in a disembodied state?

Without attempting to S C M ~ hc more subtle philosophical yrob-lcins lurking in this area, w e now arc in a good position to definewhat it mealls for a set of propositio~ls o be ivnplicitly cuntlpadictory:A set S of propositions is implicitly contradictory if there is a neces-

sary proposition p such that the conjunction of p with S is a formallycontradictory set. Alternatively, we might say: S i s implicitly contra-dictory if there is some necessarily true proposition p such that by us-ing just the laws of logic, we can deduce an explicit contradictionfroix p together with the mcmbcrs of S.

Now that wc have defined thc concept of implicit contradiction, wearc in a position to understand how Mackic frames up the logical ar-

gumellt from evil. His atheistic challenge is esselltiallp that theism is asystem of inconsistent beliet5-hat is, that a coiltradiction can be de-rived from central theistic propositions about God and evil. Hobnever,the contradiction is not an explicit one. In addition, i t does not ap-pear that a formal contradiction can be deduced from basic theisticpropositions. So, Mackir and other critics who make this argumentarc faccd with the task of supplementing the basic propositions oftheism with one or more necessary truths in order t o deduce thc fjtalcontradiction. In fact, Mackie's strategy is t o speci5 additionalpropositions that relate to the meanings of key terlns used in the orig-inal set of theistic propositions:

The contradiction does not arise immediately; t oS ~ O L Vt we 12eed someadditional premises, o r perhaps some quasi-logical rules ctzrlnecting theterms ""gad," "evil," and ""oxnnipotel~t." l'lze additional principles arcthat good is opposed to evil, in ssrch a way that a good thing alwaysetimir~at-es vil as far as it can, and that there arcn o fixnits to \%?hat:nolnl liyatcnt th ing can d o , Froxn thesei t follows that a go ad olnlliyatcntthing elim i~lates vil completely>and then the propositions thata goodom nipotent- ttting exists, and tha t evil exists, are ir~com patib te,"

Here we have Mackie's %.ay of generating the contradiction.In the vigorous debate that surrounded the logical problem, critics

tppically used supplemental propositions from the following list:


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(1') God is a real being independent from the world(2') An omnipotent being can bring about any logically possi-

ble state. of affairs

(3') A wholly good being is opposed to evil and tries to elimi-nate it as far as it can.

(4') An omniscient being knows everything that i t is logicallypossible t o know

(5') The existence of evil is not logically necessary.

One can readily see how each proposition here defines or extends the

meanings of cemal theistic claims. The atheistic critic maintains thatpropositions such as these, together with the original set of theisticpropositions, generate a conaadiction. Other supplemental proposi-tions become relevmt as we consider the se-verd dilslfinct versions ofthe logical problem.

Versions of he Logical entThe atheistic critic's basic suategy is to demonsuate how the essenrialtheistic claims are implicitly conuadictory. And these critics have notdiffered significantly over the set of theistic claims that contains theconuadiction. As we saw above, the following set is gequently cited:

(1 ) God exists;(2) God is omnipotent;(3) God is omniscient;(4) God is wholly good.(5) Evil exists.

For brevity and clarity, let us abbreviate the theistic position expressedby propositions (1 )-(4) n one complex proposition:

(G ) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.

Any question about (G) is equivalent, then, to a question about oneor more of the propositions that are incotporated into it. Our subse-quent analysis will focus on the issue between those atheists who ad-vance the charge of inconsistency and those theists who refuse t o giveup (G) or any of its constituent propositions in order to escape the

charge. Such defenders qualify as true the is^, whereas those who re-


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linquish or modiQ ( G ) are actually quasi-theists' whom we shall dis-cuss in Chapter 6 .

Actualllr, there are three distinct versions of the logical problem ofevil, with each version being determined bp exactly which propositionabout evil i t employs. As we have srm, man!, critics (Hume, Mackie,McCloskcy, and others) takc the belief in the existence of evil---ex-pressed in proposition (5) above---to form an inconsistent set whenconjoincd with set (1 )-(4). And clearly, this formulation of the prob-lem has been the most ~ridely iscussed. Hobnever, other critics donot believe that the incoilsistency arises \vhen some proposition about

the sheer existence of evil is added to the set of propositions (1)-(4).Instead, they hold that the Inore ilnportant logical problem of e v i l isformed by adding to (1 )-(4) some proposition about the great extentand prohsion of evil. Plantinga recognizes that this second formula-tion of the problem is open t o the critic who ~vould ay that "God'sexistence is not consistmt with thc vast naguz-zRt and an.ie$y of moralevil the universe actually contains."'Q A tllird version of the logical

problem, a version that does not focus either on the sheer existence ofevil or on its profusion, has been raised by a few critics. TerencePenelhum, for example, insists that "it is logically i~lconsiste~l t or atheist to adrnit the existence of a pointless evil."" The critic raisingthis version of the logical argument assumes that the theist believesboth that God exists and that pointless evil exists.

WC may now distinguish threc versions of the logical argumentfro111 cvil, depending on ~vhich roblelnatic belief about evil the criticattributes t o theism. The critic can fommulate an argument t o the ef-fect that (G ) is inconsistent with any one of the three propositioils be-low:

( E I ) Evil exists;(Ez) argc amounts, cxtrcmc kinds, and perplexing distfihrx-

tions of evil exist;

(E3) Gratuitrstrs or pointless evil exists.

When conjoined with (G), each of the prcccding propositions detcr-lnilles a different forsnulatioil or jrersion of the logical problem.

Let us develop a helpful taroilolnp of the logical problem, as pre-sented in Figure 2.1. All three versions of this argtlsnrnt here are ex-actly the same in having a purely deductive structure and a strategy of

deriving an implicit contradiction.


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FIGIJW 2.1 Versions of the Logical Argtlmel-tt koxn Evil

I I1 111

Since Versioll I is clearly the most influential a ~ d ost btidely discussed

formulation, we shall treat it as the paradiglnatic jrersion of the logicalproblem of evil and give it close attention. Besides, most of the analysisof Version I applies mutatis rnutandis to Versions II and III.

The esserlce of Version X is that the theist believes in the existex~ceand relevant perfections of God, on the one hand, and that therc isevil, on the other. Tbc atheistic critic ~ ~n dcn tan ds his set of beliefs tobe implicitly contradictory. Casting the diffic~~lty n tcrllls of the prc-

cise propositions in\rol\red,w e

have the follobving logical situation.The theist is officially committed t o

(G ) h mnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists

as well as to

(E , ) Evil exists.

Ho~lrever, t appears t o the atheistic critic that propositioll ( G ) , whensupplemented by the appropriate necessary propositions, entails

(- E L ) Evil does not exist.

Now i f ( G ) does entail ( -EL) , then the theist is unwittingly commit-ted to both ( E l ) and (-El) . This means that his beliefs arc inconsis-tent because both ( E l ) and (-El) figurc into his theological position.In order t o vindicate himself rationally> he theist must clarify and rcc-ollcilr the propositio~ls hat supposedly generate the contradiction.

It is comlnonlp ag eed that the alleged contradiction is not immc-diately forthcolning from propositions ( G ) and (E,). So, the criticmust invoke the strategy previously explained for exposing ilnplicit

contradictions-that is, she mustadd

certain propositions to ( G ) and


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26 The Logical Problem of Evil

(El). Let us review a representative selection of auxiliary propositionsoften cited by the atheistic critic:

( 1.1) God is a real being transcendent from the world(2.1) God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs,

including the elimination of evil(3.1) God kno\vs everything that i t is possible to know, includ-

ing how to eliminate evil(4.1) God always seeks to promote good and eliminate evil(5.1) The existence of evil is not a logically necessary state of

affairs.

Now, from (G), together with (1.1 -(5.1), it follows that

(-El) Evil does not exist,

a conclusion that clearly contradicts (El). At this point, the atheist

seems to have made good her charge of inconsistency by derivingfiom the theist's position two logically incompatible propositions:(El) and (-El) . Obviously, by the law of noncontradiction, these nvopropositions cannot both be true at the same time and in the samesense. Hence, anyone holding both propositions is irrational.

The reasoning behind this indictment is not hard to grasp and re-sembles the third example above, in which unstated belief (14) had t obe supplied in order to set up the contradiction. Theists say that Godexists and has a definite character. I t is natural t o presume that God'scharacter can be used as a basis for explaining (and perhaps predict-ing) his actions, even actions related to evil in the world. For presentpurposes, this means that the terms in proposition (G) have specifi-able meanings that can be delineated in additional propositions suchas (1 l)-(4.1). Furthermore, there is no logical necessity that evil ex-ist, as indicated by (5.1). From (G) together with (1.1 )-(5. l) , it is a

fairly elementary exercise in deductive logic t o derive

(-El) Evil does not exist.

Yet evil does exist, and its existence is recognized by the typical theist:

(El) Evil exists.


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The classical logical problem as rrpresellted by Version I is thusforged. This is the kind of case that Macke and many other atheisticcritics articulate.

Other propositions would have to be stated in order to forge Ver-sions II and III. For instance, a proposition much like the folloiving~vould e needed in Version 11:

(4.2) God" ggodness wodd scck t o prcvent or eliminate largeamounts, extrelne kinds, and perplexing distributions ofevil.

Something like

(4.3) God's goodness would no t allow gratuitous or pointlessevil to exist.

would be needed to articulate f~ ~ l l y crsion III. But wc need not pur-

sue discussion of these versions here. The strategy is the same for alljrersions of the logical problem of evil. The atheistic critic derives acontradiction from a set of propositions that the theist allegedly ac-cepts. How shall the theist respond?

The Burden of Proof

In assessing the state of thc debate bemecn the theist and the atheis-tic critic, it is helpful t o rcvicw how the logical problem of evil devel-ops. The theist holds a set of beliefs, and the critic claims that they areinconsistent. This places the initial burden on the critic to state theinconsistency, to drakv it out, to make it obirious. The critic's stratemthen, is to attempt to generate a contradiction h m designated setof the theist's own beliefs. Otherwise, i t ~vould ot be possible tomake the accusation that the theist" belie& are incot~sisterlt tick,

Once the critic has made the opening fora): thc theist illust respondby showing what is wrong with thc critic's case.

Consider Version I of the logical problem of evil, which we havechosen as a no del. Here the critic maintains that the theist holds con-tradictory beliefs, ( G ) and (E , ) . In order to bring this contradictionto light, the critic lnust show that (G ) ultimately entails (-E,) . If thecritic can do this, she will thereby show that the theist's position in-


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volves both ( E l ) and (--h), he belief that e ~ i l xists as well as the be-lief that evil does not exist. This is a plaill contradiction. For VersionII, the critic's strategy would be similar. She ~vould eed to deducetwo propositions from theistic commitments: one stating that thereare amountc, kinds, and clistributions of ez5l that God \;vould not al-low and onc indicating that those amounts, kinds, and distt-ib~ltionsexist. This ~vould onstitutc a contradiction, For Version 111, thc re-quired atheistic strategy is now quite familiar. It must be proved thatthe theist is commitred to the belief that God bvould not a11014 rratu-itous e ~ i l nd t o the belief that gratuitous evil exists-again, n ~ oon-

tradictory beliefq.The significance of the charge of logical inconsistency is not diffi-

cult to comprehend. Two propositions that are inconsistent cannotboth be true at the sarne tixl~e nd in the sarne sense, such as

(2 ) &nt is a grcat philosopher

and

(22) It is not the case that Kant is a great philosopher.

Any position involving such a contradiction, then, cannot be ~vhollptrue, In the issue over God and evil, the critic decZares that it is notpossible for both (G) and some (E)-like proposition to bc true andyet that, on sorne grounds or other, the theist is committed t o both.

Although the burden of deducing a contradiction from thcistic be-liefs rests squarely on the shoulders of the atheistic critic, Alvin Planti-nga has correctly stated the coilditions that any critic lnust meet: "Tolnake good his claim the atheologian must proiride some propositionwhich is either necessarily true, or essential to theism, or a logicalconsequences of such propositions."'z Clearly, there is no logicalproblem for the theist if he is not committed to each proposition in

the set or if the set does not rrrally entail a contradiczion. If the criticuses an additional proposition. that is necessarily true, then the theistmust accept it because it ixust be accepted by all rational people. Ifthe additional propositioll is esse~ltial o any theistic position, thenthe theist must accept it by virtue of beillg a theist. And of course, thetheist lnust accept any logical callsequence of his propositions as well.

The critic's aim is t o show that i t is no t possible that both ( G ) and

(E l) be true. If she can come up with an additional proposition


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set of p ro p o si ti o il st h at the theist must accept and derij~e contra-diction froin it toge ther w ith the o ther relevant theistic propositions,the theist is in serious trouble. Theistic defenders, such as Plantinga,maintain that i t is enormously difficult t o come up w ith a propositionthat meets the conditions of being necessarily true, essential to the-ism, o r a logicalconsequence of such propositions.On these groundsalone, theists illay argklc thatit is far from clcar that it is not possiblefor both ( G ) nd ( E I ) o be truc.

Exteilding the theistic respoilse further, Plailtinga pioileered amethod for showing that it is possible for both( G ) and (E,) to be

true-a m ethod that can presumably be used against the charge of in-consistency aimed at ( G ) and any (E)-lik e proposition. Succeeding atthis task is equivalent to d enpil~ghe claim made by Mackie and oth-ers tha t i t is n o t possible for bo th ( G ) and ( E l ) t o be true . Accordingto Plantinga, the theist need not show that both propositions are infact true in order t o rebut th e critic's charge.Rebutting the charge ofinconsistency relies on m aking som e fine distinctions in the meanings

of key theistic terlns (e.g ., omnipotenc e) and the n o n supplying addi-tioilal propositions that reflect a possible ullderstal~dil~gf a theisticworldview. These maneuvers directly challenge the critic's auxiliarydefinitions and thus block her ability to deduce a contradiction fromtheistic beliefs.

In Chapter 3, I elnbark on a hll-scale discussioll of what l'lantingaand other theists have done to defend against VersionI of the logicalproblem of cvil. I particularly focus on a conteinporary theistic rc-span" "own as thc Frce Will Dcfense, which has already become clas-sic, Ho~ ve\ier,1 will first bliefly rehearse some of the basic mows thattheists can make to defend against Versions11 and 111, although theseversions, ulllike Versioll I, have not attracted widespread interest.

In addressing the challenge posed bp VersionII, theists have lnain-tained tha t critics have n o t successfully shown beliefin Go d to implythat he would limit the evil in the world to manageable amounts,

kinds, and distributions. Theists can construe divine goodness,power, and knowrlcdgc. as ablc to allow very large ai-nounts, extremekinds, and perplexing distributions of evil. God~xight o this for anumber o f different reasons: for example, t o preserj7ea wide range o ffree humall choices or to allow the regular operation of impersoilalnatural objects. Theists taking this line in effect argue that they needn o t accept some o f the additional propositions that critics use to de-

duce a contradiction from key theistic beliefs.So, i t is not clear that


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critics can establish tha t theists ho ld beliefs that imply bo th thatGodlimits the amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil and tha t those lim-its have bee11 exceeded.

Theists who respond t o Version I II grapple with the charge tha tthey are comm itted to the yroposition thatGod would no t allow gra-tui tou s evil, as ~ve11 s the proposition that gratu itous evil exists. Th eworking assumption of the atheistic critic here is that theism recog-nizes the existence o f very sc\lerc evils as lon g as they havc som e po intor meaning. Ho~vejrer,certain stock responses suffice t o refute th ecritic's formulation for Versioil 111. Thc theist can take a wry tradi-

tioilal approach and argue that he is no t really c om ~ n it te d o(E,)-that is, tha t he does no t belieire th at g ratuitous o r pointless evils exist.He can argue that his position necessitates that all evils, no matterhow severe, must be meaningful or justified.Many theists understandthe ir position in prcciseIy thiswily The theist wh o has this orientation~ ll ig h t v m venture some explanation o r range of explanations d c-signed t o cover paidctxlarly troublesom e evils. Som e theists, however,

coilstrue their position differently and actually accept(E3). These the-ists must take a different tack,then, in defellding agaillst Version IIIof the logical problem. T hey can seek to point o u t tha t the additionalassumptiolls tha t the critic emplojrs t o derive the contradiction-suchas (4.3)-are neither essential t o theism nor necessariljr tru e. Sincethis line of discussion is very rare in the philosophical literature o n thelogical problem of evil,I will wait to analyze it fully ulltil Chapter5,where it surfaces in relation t o the evidential problem .

We can now see that tbc issrzc before us turlls on th e ab iIiq o f crit-ics, on the one hand, to show that theists lnust accept all of thepropositions they use to d r d ~ l c r contradiction and on the ability oftheists, on the other hand, to show that they need not accept all ofthem. Th e only appropriate grou nd s for insisting tha t theists must ac-cept the propositions are that they are either necessarily true, essentialto theism, o r a consequence of such propositions. Habring framed the

deba te in this manner, I m ust no te tha t an impressive number of crit-ics have been convinced that serious logicaldifficulties exist for thc-ism, and thcy havc labrlrcd vigorously tobring them t o light. Like-wise, there are a ll~zmber f theists who have taken seriously thelnatter of logical inconsistency and have kvorked diligentlyto defelldagainst such attacks. At present, the re is a large consensus th at theisticmaneuklers have been very effective and that the burden still rests on

the shoulders of the critic to produce the contradiction. In the next


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chapter, I \\.ill turn t o the line of debate in the philosophical literaturethat is \%idelphought t o support this sentiment.

Notes

X . 'The following works employ tttese differctlt labels for the problem:Wlllialn XXmve, PhZ'10~0phy f R e l i ~ i o n :An Ipztf*p.odzactionEncino and BeI-mont, Caiif.: nickenson, 1978),pp. 80-86; Micl-raelL. Peterson, ""ChristianTheism a11d rite Problem ofI:xri.il,'"fozjs~nnl @'$be E ~ n ~ g e f i c g lf b c o l f ~ i c g l~ c k -eo!2 1 ( 1 9 7 8) : 3 5 4 6 ; a ndNvin Plantia-tga,God and OtIi"ef# tli~cds:A St$641!ofithe Rat zo nn l J%sr~ific~c.zlonf' Belzefin C7'0d

(Ithaca: Gi~rnellU~liversirjrPress,X967), p * 128.2.1. L. Markie, ""Eil ilalld Oxnnipotexlrce,"M i n d 6 4 (1955) : 200.3 , Ibid.4. David Hurne, Dialoggggs Cr~nce~~i.tz'~g8atzgral Rel&Z'on,ed. Henry ID.

Aike1-t(New York: Hafner, l04S>,p. 66.5, H. J. McGloskey, "The Probient. of Evil,"fizitr~~znlBible n~zd e l z ~ b l r ~ ~

30 (1962): 187,

6. I will follow Xzlantinga3 discussion through out this exposition. Seehis


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The Function o f Defense

Ju st as we have classified the twomajor versions of the problem of evilinto the logical and cvidentini formulations, wc Exay also classi@ th cWO illain responses to th e problcill asdgf~.fenseand theodicy. Th e aim ofdefense is to show th at antithcistic arguments from evil----either logi-

cal o r evidential-are no t successfulon their own terms. T he gelleralaim of theo dicb by contrast, is to give positive, plausible reasons forthe cx iste~ lce f evil ina theistic universe. Defensc has come t o be tbctheistic strategy most closely associated with discussionso f the logicalformulation of the problem of evil, ~vh ere asheodicp has come to beassociated with the evidential formulation. Much controversy hasarisen over the rclativc nced for defensc and thcodicp, andwc shalllatcr scc how thcsc differences play o u t in the litcraturc o n G odandevii.

The Free Will Defense

The present task is to review and e~~aluatevery fascinating and in-struc tii~ e art o f the deba te over the logical problem . Taking VersionI of the logical problem of evil as a point of departure, Akin Plan-tinga developed a response that has now come to be known as theFrec Will Dcfensc. Plantinga's famous Frcc Will Dcfensewas pro-duced in both 1967 and 1974 rcnditions.Wincc the latcr renditionexploits the most curreilt and sophisticated ideasin forlnal logic, Iuil l use it as the basis for the present discussion.

As w e have seen, philosophers such asJ. L. Macke have chargedthat i t is logically inconsistentfor a theist t o believe tha t


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(G ) h mnipo tent, omniscient, wholly go od G od exists

and that

(E$) Evil exists.

This accusation is tantamount to claiming that it is not possible forboth propositions to be true together----that thc conjunction of (G)and (E,) is necessarily false.The critics' s t r a t e g isto try to produce aproposition that is at least plausibly thought t o be llecessarily true an d

whose con junc tion wit11 o ur original tw o propositions formally yieldsa contradiction. Defenders insist that criticshave never produced aplausible candida te for this role.

In fact, many theists th ro ug h the centuries-perhaps inspired mostnotably bp Augustine---have th ought tha t thc theme of free will pro-vides a basis for rejecting th e critics' charge th at G od and evilarc in-compatible. Although full discussion ofSt. Augustine's view of evil

appears in Chapter6, 1

lnust note here his emphasis o n di~rinely re-ated ti-ee \till: "If man is a good , and can no t act rightly uilless he willsto do so, then he must have free will, j4rithout which he can not actrightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that wemight sin, just because sin is committed through free \vil1."2Thepoint is that o ur hum anity is of grea t value and that free will is neces-sary to ou r humanity. H ulx an beings have moral sig~~ ifica nc eccausc\VC have the ability t o m ake choices that arc. morally right o r Fvrong.Yct God cannot give us the power tomake morally right choisxsu it h ou t givillg us the power t o make m orally wrong olles as well. So,in order to have the good of humanity itself as well as the goodchoices that hum anity might make,God lnust perlnit evil. Many the-ists through the centurieshave found St. Augustine's reasoning onthis lnatter very compelling.

Alvin 131ar>tinga s well know n for applying this lineof reasoning in

a very specific manner t o th e preciseway in which the charge of in-consistency was formulated. Against the logical problem, he crafls adefense. Unlike Augustine's discussion, ~ vh ic h ffirms th e reality ofcreaturelp free will, Plantinga's discussion turns on the pure logicalpossibiliv of such.As Plantinga recognizes, the success of the defensehinges on a certain understandillgof what is meant by a persolz's bei~zgf k e with respect to alz acgion. For the Free Will Defender, ifa person is

free with respect t o an action, then he is free either t o perform o r to


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refrain ~ o m he action. N o causal laws and alltecedent conditions de-termine that he -will perform or not perform the action. In otherwords, at the time in question, i t is ~vithin he person's power to per-form the action and within his power to refrain from performing theaction. What i t means for a person t o g o ,uroncQ ,pith respcct t o a morallyrignz$cant action is for it to be wrong for him to perform it and hedoes or Fvrong for him not to and he does not.

According to Plantinga, a preliminary stateincnt of thc Frcc Will De-feilse bvould go as follo~vs: A bvorld contailling significailtlp free crea-tures (\\rho can freely choose benveen good a ~ d vil) is more Iraluable,

all other things being equal, than a world containing no free creatureswhatsoever, God, of course, can create free creatures, but then he can-not caase or dctermilze that they only pelfor~u ight actions. Doing thiswould preempt their significant freedom. Hence, there is no way forGod to creatc creatures capable of moral good without thereby crcat-ing crcaturcs capable of moral evil. Conversely, God cannot eliminatethc possibility of moral evil without eliminating the possibiliw of moral

good. The fact, then, that some creatures have gone kzrong in the exer-cise of their freedom since the dawn of creation does not count againstGod's oln~lipotence r goodness. Having gained a sellse of this per-spcccive, we may now state the central claim of the Free Will Defensc:I t is possible that God could not have created a universe containingmoral good (o r a5 much moral good as this one contains) without cre-al-ing onc containing moral cvil.

The Compati bilis t PositionCritics, of course, are not ullfalniliar with the recurrillg theme of freeuill in ~nuch heistic thought. h t o n y Flew and J. L. Mackie raised avery important objection to the Free Will Dcfense that had to be metbefore the defrnse could be totally effective. The objection rests onthe claim that it is logically possible that there could be a world con-

taining significantly frcc beings who always do what is right. Sinccthere is no contradiction or inconsistency in this claim, it lneans thatthere arc possible worlds containing moral good but no moral evil.Since God is omnipotent-and thus can briilg about any logicallypossible state of a f fa i r sGo d lnust be able t o create a bvorld contain-ing moral good but no lnoral evil. 111 other kvords, God lnight havemade people so that they always freely do the right thing. As Flew e x-

presses i t, "If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might


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have made a bnorld inhabited by bnhollp ~rirtuous cople."3 If this issr], then, as Flew says, ""the Free Will Defense is brokell-backed," and"\\re are back again with the original intractable al~tinomy.""

Flew i s not alone in voicing this line of reasoning. Mackie puts itforthrightly:

If God has made men such that in their kee choices they sometii-ritesprefer wlitat. is good an d som etimes \%?hats evil, why co uld he 110t havernade rnen such that they alwaysfreely choose the goad? If tliere is n ological i~npossibilitytit a mail's se el y choo sing th e good on one, o r onscverat occasions, there catlIlot be a logical impossibility in his freelychoosing the go od on every occasion. God was not, then, hc ed with achoice between nitakiilg innocent autoi-ritata and making beingswho, inactirlg freejy, \%rouIcisometimes go wr o~lg : here \%?as pen to ltirn theobviously bctrcr possibiliy of making bei~lgsw ho would act k e l y b t ~ talways g o right. Clearly, his failure t o avail l~ im se tf f this possibility isinconsistent- with his beillg both omnipotent and ~7hoXlygood."

The positio~l chalnpioncd here is known as compntibilism. It is theview that keedonl and determinisnl-even divine detern~inism-arecompatible.

Put another Ivaj; the compatibilists' point i s that the propositioll

( 2 3 ) God brings i t about that human beings always choose whatis right

is logicaly consistent with the proposition

(24) humall beillgs have free choice.

This position directly opposes the Free Will Defense, which, as Ivrhave already seen, relies on an i~zcvnzpatibilistositioll: the view that( 2 3 )and (24) are logically inconsistent.

As wc would expect, the controversy behvccn Frce Will Defendersand critics historically rcvolved aro~und he issuc of how key conceptssuch as omnipotence and free will should be understood. Althoughthe Free Will Defellder may agree with critics that a world in whichall persoils freely choose to do what is right is indeed a possible bnorld,he seeks to qualifp our understandings of free will and omnipotencein a Ivap that avoids the dilelnma presented bp the critic. Obviousll:

the critic here believes that an omnipotmt deity can create just any


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logically possible ~ r o r l d e selects.A ~rhol lygood deity kvould selectth e bvorld that is best on the whole, a j4rc1rld th atwe bvould surelydeem to be one in which everyone freely does what is right. At thispoint, we have come to the hotly contested claim that God couldhave created any possible world he pleased.6The defender countersthat G od , tho ugh om nipotent, could n ot b m e created just any possi-ble world. At this point, WC must pause to consider how Frcc WillDefenders have co ~ ll co frame th e issue of free will and omnipotcnccin terms o f contem porarjl ideas abou t possible \vorlds.

The Incompatibilist RejoinderSince Plantinga is cred ited with first pu tting the Free Will D efense int c m s o f thc logic of possible w orlds,WC will consider his vindicationof incompatibilism.7 We may say tha t a possible world is away thingscould have been, a total possible state of affairs. Among states of af-

fairs, some are actual, and some are not. For example,the iCentz$clzyWildcats' bctei~w the c c ~ a i n z z i n ~ "asketball teal@ n NC:AA history is astate of affairs, as isAbtpaham Li~zculn's bctei~zg he firrt presidcfzt o theU ~ h dtntcs. However, the form er is actual, whereas the latter is no t.Although the latter is not actual,i t is still a possible state of affairs.Possible states of affairs must be distinguished kom impossible ones,and impossible ones ixust be further distinguished.Both Reth's hnv-ing climbed Mt. E~crcst n five minutes i g t and John ir hnving squa~qdthg circle arc im possible states of affdirs. The foriller is causally o r nat-urally impossible; the latter is impossible in th e broadly logical sense.

A possible world, then, is a possible state of affairs in the sense that itis possible in the broadly logical sense. Although a possible world is astate of affairs, not every state of aftBirs is a possible world.To have thestatus o f a possible world, a state of affairs mustbe cvmplctcor maximdl.Socgpatcs' having been executed by dnilzkilzg hemlock is a possible state of

affairs, but it is not complete or inclusive enough to be a possible world.Cornplctcness must nowbc defined. A statc o f affairsS includes state ofaffairs S' if is not possible that S obtain and S' fail to obtain. Like\yiselsc,the colljunctive state of affairs Sbat not S' is not possible. A state of af-fairs Sprecl~des ~ o t h e rtate of affairs S' if it is no t possible thatboth ob-tain. 111 other w ords, S precl~4des S' if the colljul~ctive tate of affairsSand S' is impossible.N o w, a complete o r maximal state o f affairs-that

is, a possible ~vorld-is one th at either includes o r precludes every other


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state of affairs. It should be obvious that exactly one possible world isactual alld that at ~nos t ne possible world is actual.

Corresponding to each possible world W" there is a set of proposi-tions that we may call the ltvob on W . A propositioll is in the boob on Wjust in case that state of affairs to which it corresponds is included inW. Wc ~ xight xprcss this idea alternatively as follo~rs: propositionP is trup in a v o r l d W if and only if P a?o%ld h n v ~ een trup if W adbeen actzlal---if and only if it is not possible that W is actual and P isfalse. The book on W then, is the set of propositions true in W : Books,like bnorlds, are ~naximal r complete. A book on a world is a maximal

consistent set of propositions. The additioll of just one propositio~l oi t al\\raps yields an explicitly inconsistellt set. There is exactly one bookfor each possible world.

Possible worlds possess some interesting features. For example, abwoposition p is possible if it is true in at lcast one world and impossi-ble if truc in none. A proposition p is necessary if it is truc in all possi-blc worlds. Another feature of possible tvorlds is that persons as wcll

as other thillgsexist

in them. Clearls each of us exists in the actual~ror ld , ut we also exist in a great man)! ~rorlds istillct froln the ac-tual twrld. These other twrlds are simply possible but unactual.8 Tosay that something exists in a possible world means that it ~vould aveexisted had that world been actuail,

As we begin to turn our thoughts back toward God's relation to pos-sible ~vodds, vc must notc that it \i\?orsld not be technically propcr tosay that God clpenter any possible tvorlds or states of afiairs. What Godcrcatcs are the heavens, the earth, and so forth. In performing such ac-tions as creati~ig he heavens a ~ d he earth and all that they contain,God brings about a multitude of states of affairs. For example, G odcreated Socrates, but he did not create the state of affairs colxisting inSocrates' existence. Strictly speaking, we must say that God nctgnlizps astate of affairs, such a5 the state of affairs consisting in Socrates' exis-tence. Accuracy, then, demands that we speak of God as actgallzi~gpossible tvorld, which is of coursc a total state of affairs."

After this brief explanation of key ideas rclatcd to the logic of possi-bfc worlds, wc can now rcturn to our original q~lcscion: C;otrld Cudhave actualized just any possible ~ ro r l d e chos

god and evi

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