god returns to europe the demographic revival of religion in europe?
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God Returns to Europe
The Demographic Revival of Religion in Europe?
Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007
Religious Fertility vs. Religious Decline
"One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious." (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)
Hypothesis: a combination of higher religious fertility and immigration will lead to a growth in the religious population (defined in terms of belief) that exceeds the net loss of communicants through religious apostasy.
USA: Denominational Projections to 2050
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052
Protestants Fund.
Protestants Mod.
Catholics
Hindus Buddhists
Jews
Muslims
Other Religions
None
Zero Immigration Scenario
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052
Protestants Fund.
Protestants Mod.
Catholics
Hindus Buddhists
Jews
Muslims
Other Religions
None
Fertility Differences, Austria
ROMAN CATHOLIC
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1981
1991
2001
WITHOUT
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1981
1991
2001
MUSLIM
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1981
1991
2001
Results: Proportion Without Religion
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
PercentAssuming:
Low secularization trend
Constant secularization trend
High secularization trend
Austria, TFR 2001
Roman Catholics 1.32
Protestants 1.21
Muslims 2.34
Others 1.44
Without 0.86
Total 1.33
Methods
• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic minority surveys
• Cohort Component Projection Parameters: Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline or revival) by age and sex, plus current Age/Sex Structure of Religious and Secular 'Populations'
• Mortality Rates assumed as standard
EVS Definition of Religiosity
• 'Are you a religious person'?
1. Yes2. Not religious3. Atheist
• A measure of belief, rather than affiliation or attendance
• Majority (50-60%) of W. Europeans believe, though few attend, i.e. Davie (1994) Believing Without Belonging
Weekly Attendance by Cohort, 1981-2004, Ten W. European Countries
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Early Secularising Societies
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Fig. 3 Religiosity by Cohort, 'Early Secularising' Societies
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Religious-Nonreligious Fertility Differences
• In multivariate analysis, TFR difference of 15-20% across 10 W European countries, 10-15% across 6 'early secularising' countries
• Female preponderance in childbearing age range
Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
2004
2009
2014
2019
2024
2029
2034
2039
2044
2049
2054
2059
2064
2069
2074
2079
2084
2089
2094
2099
2104
1816-E6
1816-E10
1818-E6
Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3 (Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9
1
2001Attend Worship*
2003Retain Religious Practice*
UK BP Muslims
Foreign BP Muslims
UK Afro Christians
Foreign Afro Christians
UK White Christians
Foreign White Christians
Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001 Census
34
25
18
3739
22
25
32
41
4 4
19
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Muslim No religion Christian
% in
Ag
e B
an
d
0 - 15
16 - 34
35 - 64
65 and over
'5 Minutes of Fame……'
Conclusion
• Northwest Europe (and probably all of western Europe) will likely be more religious in 2050 than in 2000 on current trends because:– Secularisation rates have slowed dramatically, to the
point of stalling– Religious women have 10-20% higher fertility, all else
equal– Immigrants are more religious than natives– Muslim immigrants in particular retain their religiosity
into the second generation
Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree
Ch
ildre
n E
ve
r B
orn
city > 100k
town < 10k
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.
coun
try
relig
tot fertility rate1.4048 7.1
.592294
.98574
Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.
Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000
Tanzania
Jordan
Egypt
Algeria
Bosnia
Iran
Azerbaijan
'95-97
Bangladesh
Albania 2000
Turkey
Indonesia
Pakistan
Morocco
Nigeria
Uganda
Albania '95-97