government 50: birth life and cold war

8/4/2019 Government 50: Birth Life and Cold War

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Birth, Life and Death of Cold War

I. What was Cold War?

A. Big time competition:

1. Bad:

a) US spends 5 trillion waging it...far more than expended inall ‘hot’ wars

b) High stress times.

c) Depresses saving rates: Murray and Russett

d) level of peacetime militirization not known before

e) UN not able to address problem of 1st world, reduced toorigination like UNICEF

f) much of 3rd world laid to waste developmentally

2. Europe and Japan get rebuilt at a pace they might no have been ableto anticipate in the absence of the competition.

a) Japan and Korea allowed to rebuild using export drivengrowth, exports which we buy

b) Europe receives 10 of billions in Marshal plan aid andpreferential trading terms for 40 years.

c) leads to NATO and other cooperative institutions

B.

More than just a conflict between great powersC. Had seen this before

D. What makes CW different is the all encompassing ideological gloss put onall aspects of the competition

E. Each side denies the very right to survival of the opposition

F. This is Different than previous struggles between states that led the system

1. Habs vs. Valois in 16th century

2. Bourbons v. Stuarts in 18th century

3. Napoleon v. England in 19th

4. Wilhelmian Germany v. BR, For, and Russia

G. Zero sum nature of competition very much like war, leads to situationwhere security dilemma operates

1. define security dilemma

H. US and Soviets come to compete in several ways, all 0-sum



1. Nuclear weapons

2. Indirectly over Europe

3. Indirectly over large expanses of 3rd world

I. In the historical lit a big debate: who’s responsible

1. traditionalists maintain that the Soviets were to blame

2. Revisionist blame the US

3. My view?

a) Some what inevitable, but that it comes down to situationlike the differences between strategic bombing and theholocaust.

(1) Look at intentions, guilt isn’t really the issue.

(2) competition was there, what were the intentions or

implication of a US that did nothing?(3) Implication of a Soviet union that did nothing?

(4) If you take the view that the form of communismpracticed by Soviet (Chinese for that matter) ispretty abhorrent, and the killing levels alone justifythat view, than the traditional view is moresatisfying.

(5) This does not answer the question though, whatactually caused it, my view only justifies theprosecution of it once it began.

II. What were the causes of the CW? Investigate using level of analysis rather than anhistorical approach

A. Systemic level

1. Bipolarity?...Not!

2. European BoP vacuum

3. Soviet Design on Western Europe

a) Soviet Aid t Italian and French Communist Parties

b) US non-acceptance of results of WWII (anger atRoosevelt’s dealing with Stalin)

c) US aid to rebels in Ukraine, Baltic's, and Eastern Europethroughout the period

d) Inadvertent, but inevitable given preferences for security



(1) As Soviets move into EE, any changes in theirdefensive posture results in the increased insecurityof WE, JPN, China, Iran and Turkey.

(2) Theses increased threats (although defensive on theSoviet’s part) in turn is matched by US response

(3) But due to Us being ½ a world away, we usemilitary instructors to mobilize locals, unlike Sovietswe are not close enough to use our own troops(among other reasons). This makes the Soviets evenmore insecure.

(4) We end up with Foreign military bases and a hugeBlue water Navy.

(5) Soviet Foreign and Military Policy provokes thekind of encirclement that Stalin had predicted would

occur.4. Offense-Defense Balance (Cult of the ‘O)

a) This cannot be construed as causing the cold war but we seeho it plays out in different level of competition

(1) Strategic level we see nuclear competition, O or Ddominant?

(2) Defense dominant at strategic level due to Nukes sowe see huge reluctance to have soldiers never meetetc.

(3) In areas not protected by nukes, a different matter:in the 3rd world.

(4) We see no real economic interest at outset of CW in3rd word (aside from ME oil) but very vigorouscompetition (driven by Cult ideology)

(5) There becomes a strategic belief that the war will bean ideological one, fought largely in the 3rd worldand that the much like the offensive strategies inWWI, the same kinds of strategic beliefs aboutideology take hold in US thinking about the 3 rd

world.(a) Domino theory

(b) Containment

(i) Misinterpretation of Kennen

B. State Level



1. Democracy vs. Authoritarianism

a) Yes this matters, but precise mechanism isn’t entirely clear(much like outset of WWI, this is a case which seemsoverdetermined).

(1)

US(a) Domestic Policy of red-baiting

(b) Émigré groups play a powerful role shapingpolicy

(2) USSR

(a) Stalin regime legitimacy flow form use of force domestically which is justified on thebasis of external foe.

(b) We (US) serve as his foil. In a way, without

the US serving as an enemy, Stalin might nothave been able to maintain his brutal regime(but that’s just rash speculation).

(c) Soviet leadership has absolute rule so who isit legitimizing itself for? (this I Kennen’spuzzle)

(3) US economic interests in WE/JPN/Mid East

(a) US has vested interest in these areas

(b) this is an interesting point to counter revision

arguments that the US penetrated these areaseconomically (particularly ones that had beenor might have been, under Soviet control).

C. Decision Making Level

1. US

a) Anti-red ideology (Ideology a big problem) enmity towardssoviet and communists going way back.

(1) Lessons of Munich: reasonable? given what theyhad just come through?

(a) confront aggressors

(b) deterrence theory

(2) lesson of history: big events

(a) Napoleon, WWI, WWII

(b) can’t trust BOP



(c) can’t give Soviets free reign in EE

(d) unless we manage Europe we’ll get suckedin anyway

2. Soviet

a) Lenin Trotsky views of imperialism3. Unrequited expectations and Misperceptions

a) SU expected EE to be its solely owned buffer zone as areward for helping in the defeat of Hitler and Japan

b) This had been largely agreed o at Tehran, Potsdam andYalta

(1) Here is a good point the revision make

(2) At conferences we say one thing to get the Sovietsto continue the good fight

(3) we also make statements like the Atlantic Charterbetween Churchill and Roosevelt which publiclycommit us to freedom of choice by peoples of EE

(4) This is a constant problem democracies face: theneed to generate public support for an idea, thenactually being held accountable for it in the \face of secret side deals which the mass publics would beoutraged at

(5) Side Bar:

(a) Covert use of force:

(b) During the cold war we see the enormousexpansion of the use o covert force:

(i) Over-throwing Guatemala

(ii) Iran

(iii) Chile

(iv) Nicaragua

(v) Rainbow warriors

(c) Who was the covert force being held secretfrom

(i) Targets?

(ii) Domestics in democracies



(d) More on this Wednesday when we talk aboutthe prosecution of the Cold War in the 3rd

world.

c) US had expected EE to be allied with Soviets but also tohave free elections.

(1) FDR comes up with the under pressure of domesticpolitics

(2) motivated bias to have all good things cometogether.

(3) Was this realistic?

(a) How could EE be free and be allied withSoviets?

(b) Impossible

III. Next: Life of the Cold war

1. Nuclear arms race was perhaps the most stable area

of cold war competition

a) with the exception of the Cuban missile crisis, chances of nuclear war were virtually nil thorough out the cold war.

2. Western Europe, Japan, and the Middle East

a) standoff in Europe is almost as stable and peaceful as thenuclear arms race after the cold war is well under way.

b) With the exception of WE communist parties which weretypically quite weak, or else reasonably independent of Moscow,

c) Soviets tend to push hard in EE, not too hard in

WE.

(1) US thinking:

(a) Hungary: 1947

(i) Russia imposes a communist

dominate govt., were relatively freeelection had been held in 1945.Many if the members of the USatomic weapons program have familystill in Hungary (Teller).

(b) Czech coup



(i) NSC-69 is similar to the X-article onsteroids.

(ii) View evolves that we should baseour polices not on what the Sovietswere likely to do, but rather what

they could do.

(iii) Drafters of NSC-68 estimates theSoviets have capacity to:

(a) Overrun Western Europe

(b) to move on the oil bearingareas of the mideast

(c) to consolidate communistgains in Far East

(d)

To launch air attack onBritish Isles and air and seasattack on western powerslines of communication inAtlantic and Pacific

(e) To attack selected targetswith nuclear weaponsincluding Alaska, Canada, andthe US

(iv) argues that the threats to freedom are

worldwide(v) that military spending should be

trebled

(vi) domino theory laid out: a defeat of afree institution anywhere is a defeatof free institutions everywhere

(2) But, congress still in isolationist mode...

(a) Truman puts NSC-68 on back burner,basically tells people to think it over.

(b) For the most part, other than VOAbroadcasts into EE we do little in Europe todirectly provoke or confront the Soviets untilthe late 1980’s

(c) US stands by while SU crushed resistance inHungary and Czech and did nothing (overt)



when martial law was imposed in Poland in1980.

3. Explanation for the stability in WE:

a) Balance of interests quite high.

b) Neither side willing to challenge the other (directly)

c) Both sides do little other than work to maintain a balance of power in the mid east.

4. Competition in the 3rd world.

a) Compared to competition in WE, Japan and in

the nuclear weapons arena, competition in the

3rd world was most unstable

(1) As a result of the policies laid out in NSC-68,

deterrence theory becomes the guiding strategy forUS policy.

(2) But strategy is not put into action immediately.

b) Prior to Korea, congress sanguine about ability

to contain defense spending.

(a) Attack on Korea changes everything.

(i) Korean war militarizes the cold war.

(ii) US defense spending rises from~30% of budget to 60%, from 5% of GDP to 18%.

(iii) Transforms NATO from an allianceinto an integrated military structure

(iv) Speeds decision to rearm Germany

(v) Plays into incorrect fears that Sovietsplan to use war as means to spreadcommunism throughout world

(vi) speeds decision to sign treaties withJapan (w/out Soviet Participation)

(vii) Leads to the finalization of processwhere old enemies become ournewest and strongest allies.

(b) Korea assumes a symbolic importance farbeyond the value of anything there.



(c) “We lost 30,000 dead in Korea to save facefor the United States, not to save SouthKorea for the South Koreans, and it wasundoubtedly worth it. Soviet expectationsabout the behavior of the United States are

one of the most valuable assets we possess inworld affairs.” Thomas Schelling.

(2) We’ll address strategy and the prosecution of Korean war next week.

c) Cold hostility breaks out by 1951.

(1) Examples: Kennen’s tenure as

ambassador to SU

(a) December 1951 Kennen is appointed to beUS ambassador to Soviet Union

(b) While Kennen would seem to be the idealman for the job, tension is so high thatdiplomacy is no longer possible. Kennenbecomes a something of a prisoner in theembassy.

(i) “The American Embassy has come toresemble a prison, a with floodlitwalls and fences on all sides,patrolled by armed guards.Plainclothes policemen followed

Kennen everywhere, discouragingcontacts with Soviet citizens. Theembassy was bugged, servants surly.

(ii) “Looking out the window, I couldsee the Soviet citizens piouslycrossing the street to avoid walkingin the dangerous proximity of ourfence. I could hear, night after nigh,the testing of jet engines somewhereoff across the Moscow river.

Sometimes I would wander aroundthe building without turning on thelights, go down into the great dimlylit white ballroom and play the grandpiano, or, having no one with whomto speak Russian, establish myself inone of the guilded chairs of theseveral living rooms and read Russian



aloud to myself just to indulge mylove of the language...So I wanderedsecurely in my guilded prison,comforting myself with the reflectionthat if this venerable building, with its

unhappy history, had a ghost, theghost was unquestionably I.

(iii) Kennen never saw Stalin. InSeptember 1952, while passingthrough Germany, Kennen comparedthe condition if diplomats in Moscowto those he had encountered whileinterned in Berlin for the first fewmonths of WWII. Stalin didn’t takekindly to comparison of his regime toHitler's and bared Kennen fromreturning to Soviet Union.

d) With WE stable, two types of competition

emerge, with their own types of strategy.

(1) Conventional deterrence in the 3rd world,

frequently with covert means...we’ll talk

about this on Wed.

(2) Strategic deterrence with nuclear

weapons.

(3) Next, the evolution of nuclear weapons

and the revolution in strategy: remember,

think Clausewitz.

IV. THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS

A. Nuclear weapons and strategic policy

1. How the nuclear weapons work

a) Fission bombs

(1) Two types of bombs dropped,(a) Uranium gun weapon (Little Boy) dropped

by Enola Gay

(i) The gun was a 3" anti-aircraft barrelsix feet long that had been bored outto 4" to accommodate the bullet.



(a) It weighed about 450 kg, andhad a breech block weighing34 kg. Cordite, aconventional artillerysmokeless powder, was used

as the propellant, and thevelocity achieved by the bulletwas 300 m/sec.

(ii) Little Boy was a terribly unsafeweapon design. Once the propellantwas loaded, anything that ignited itwould cause a full yield explosion.

(a) For this reason "Eke"Parsons, acting as weaponeer,decided (without

authorization) to place thecordite in the gun after take-off in case a crash and fireoccurred.

(iii) It is possible that a violent crash (oraccidental drop) could have driventhe bullet into the target even withoutthe propellant causing anything froma fizzle (a few tons yield) to a fullyield explosion.

(iv) Little Boy also presented a hazard if it fell into water. Since it containednearly three critical masses with onlyair space separating them, waterentering the weapon would haveacted as a moderator, possiblymaking the weapon critical.

(a) A high yield explosion wouldnot have occurred, but a rapidmelt-down or explosive fizzle

and possible violent dispersalof radioactive material couldhave resulted.

(b) Plutonium implosion (Fat Man)

(i) This was the gadget that had beendetonated in NM.



(ii) For use in combat, each Fatmanbomb required assembly almost fromscratch - a demanding and timeconsuming job. Assembly of aFatman bomb was (and may still be)

the most complex field preparationoperation for any weapon ever made.

(2) Want to see if, in practice, one work better than theother,

(a) plutonium will prove to be easier tomanufacture and you need less.

(i) 12 pounds of plutonium provided 22kt of explosions.

(ii) 141 pounds of uranium 235 provided

14 kt of explosions.b) 1.5.1 Boosted Fission Weapons: reaction to

danger and inefficiency of WWII weapons

(1) The earliest application of fusion to useful weaponswas the development of boosted fission weapons.

(a) In these weapons several grams of adeuterium/tritium gas mixture are included inthe center of the fissionable core.

(b) When the bomb core undergoes enough

fission, it becomes hot enough to ignite theD-T fusion reaction which proceeds swiftly.This reaction produces an intense burst of high-energy neutrons that causes acorrespondingly intense burst of fissions inthe core.

(c) This greatly accelerates the fission rate in thecore, thus allowing a much higher percentageof the material in the core to fission before itblows apart.

(2) Typically no more than about 20% of the material ina pure fission bomb will split before the reactionends (it can be much lower, the Hiroshima bombwas 1.4% efficient).

(a) By accelerating the fission process a boostedfission bomb can raise this to as much as



50% (an unboosted 20 Kt bomb can thusbecome a 40 Kt bomb).

(b) The actual amount of energy released by thefusion reaction is negligible, about 1% of thebomb's yield, making boosted bomb tests

difficult to distinguish from pure fission tests(detecting traces of tritium is about the onlyway).

(3) The first boosted weapon test was Greenhouse Item(45.5 Kt, 24 May 1954), an oralloy design explodedon island Janet at Enewetok.

(a) Due to the marked increase in yield todaymost fission bombs are boosted, includingthose used as triggers in true fission-fusionweapons.

(b) The boosting technique is most valuable insmall light-weight bombs that wouldotherwise have low efficiency.

(c) Tritium is a very expensive material to make,and it decays at a rate of 5.5% per year, butthe small amounts required for boostingmake its use economical.

c) Ivy Mike: First real Fusion bomb

(1) Detonated Nov. 1, ‘52 at ground level on Eniwetokatoll. Total yield: 10.4 megatons.

(a) This was the first test of the Teller-Ulam (orUlam-Teller) configuration. The Mikedevice used liquid deuterium as the fusionfuel.

(b) It was a massive laboratory apparatusconsisting of a cylinder about 20 feet high, 6ft 8 in wide, and weighing 164,000 lb.

(c) It was housed in an open hanger-like

structure 88 ft x 46 ft, and 61 ft high, whereassembly started in September of 1952.

(2) Not very practical.

d) 1.5.2 Staged Fission-Fusion and Fission-Fusion-

Fission Weapons: towards a practical “Super”.



(1) These weapons use fusion reactions involvingisotopes of light elements (e.g. hydrogen andlithium) to

(a) remove the yield limits of fission and boostedfission designs,

(b) to reduce weapon cost by reducing theamount of costly enriched uranium orplutonium required for a given yield, and toreduce the weight of the bomb.

(2) The fusion reactions occur in a package of fusionfuel ("the secondary") that is physically separatefrom the fission trigger ("the primary"), thus creatinga two-stage bomb (the fission trigger counting as thefirst stage).

(3) X-rays from the primary are used to compress thesecondary through a process known as radiationimplosion. The secondary is then ignited by a fission"spark plug" in its center.

(4) The energy produced by the fusion second stage canbe used to ignite an even larger fusion third stage.Multiple staging allows in principle the creation of bombs of virtually unlimited size.

(5) The fusion reactions are used to boost the yield intwo ways:

(a) 1) By directly releasing a large amount of energy in fusion reactions;

(b) 2) By using high-energy or "fast" neutronsgenerated by fusion to release energythrough fissioning of a fissionable jacketaround the fusion stage.

(6) This jacket is often made of natural or depleteduranium, so that energy is produced by fast fission of cheap U-238.

2. Why did we pursue the Hydrogen bomb?a) Bethe argues we never should have,

(1) that almost every technological breakthroughoccurred first in the US and was then copied by theSoviets.

b) How many fission bombs did we have?



(1) Reactors had been shut down during 1945-6 due todamage from poor initial design.

(2) Although Los Alamos had 60 Fat Man units on handin October 1945, the US arsenal after had only 9actual Fat Man type bombs in July 1946, with

initiators for only 7 of them.

(3) In July 1947 the arsenal had increased to 13 bombs.There was probably sufficient fissile material onhand for over 100 bombs though.

(4) Compare this to what we had done in Japan andGermany...clearly this is not enough to serve as adeterrent of an aggressive and expansionist enemy.

c) August 1949 Soviets demonstrate A-bomb:

(1) On August 29 the first Soviet atomic bomb, codenamed RDS-1 and called Joe 1 by US intelligence,was exploded breaking the US nuclear weaponmonopoly.

(2) Soviet demonstration of fission bomb makes usrealize that the nuclear advantage/monopoly wethought we had was fleeting.

3. Soviet Fusion bomb:

a) Soviet Test: Joe 4/ Test No. 5

(1) Detonated: 12 August 1953, on a tower atSemipalatinsk in Kazakhstan

(2) Total yield: 400 kilotons.

(a) This was the first Soviet test of a weaponwith substantial yield enhancement fromfusion reactions.

(b) This bomb did not employ the Teller-Ulamconfiguration, instead it used the "LayerCake" design invented by Andrei Sakharovand Vitalii Ginzburg.

(c) The design was first invented in the UnitedStates by Edward Teller (who called it"Alarm Clock") but it was not developedinto a weapon there.

B. THE TECHNICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR

REVOLUTION



1. The nuclear revolution has six cascading effects:

a) Effect #1: hydrogen bombs offer an increase of

six (6, count them six) orders of magnitude over

the power of the TNT explosives used in World

War II.(1) The atomic bomb = x 1,000 increase on TNT; the

hydrogen bomb = x 1,000 increase on atomicbombs.

(2) The detonation of Mike completely obliteratedElugelab, leaving an underwater crater a 6240 feetwide and 164 ft deep in the atoll where an island hadonce been. Mike created a fireball 3 miles wide; the"mushroom" cloud rose to 57,000 ft in 90 seconds,and topped out in 5 minutes at 135,000 ft - the top

of the stratosphere- with a stem eight miles across.The cloud eventually spread to 1000 miles wide,with a stem 30 miles across. 80 million tons of soilwere lifted into the air by the blast.

b) Effect #2: due to ‘a’ (the destructiveness of

nuclear weapons), the "cost exchange ratio"

vastly favors defenders (better termed

"retaliators") over attackers seeking to disarm

them.

(1) Nuclear weapons pack tremendous explosive powerin devices that are cheap, light, easily hidden,protected, and delivered

(2) Hence destroying them is very hard, protecting anddelivering them very easy.

c) Effect #3: due to ‘b’ (the cost-exchange ratio), a

relationship of MAD ("Mutual Assured

Destruction") develops between major powers.

(1) “Strategy” loses its Clausewitzian meaning in many

ways.(2) Both can destroy the other's society even after

absorbing an all-out counterforce attack by theother. In short, both have a "second strikecountervalue capability."

(3) In the Cold War, both the US and USSR sought toavert MAD, preferring instead to deny the other a



second-strike countervalue capability, but they couldnot escape it.

(4) Technology overrode their desires.

d) Effect #4: "flat of the curve" dynamics.

(1) One of MAD's special characteristics is the "flat of the curve": beyond a certain point, the capacity toinflict damage on the other society, or to preventdamage to one's own, is inelastic to the size andcapability of one's own force or one's opponent'sforce.

(2) Capabilities are absolute.

e) Effect #5: the "multiplier effect."

(1) The efficiency with which one side must strike the

other's forces in order to leave the other unable toinflict unacceptable damage in retaliation increasessharply as the arsenals on both sides grow.

(2) Even an inefficient strike (a substantial percentage of the attacked weapons survive) can reduce theretaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals arevery small;

(3) even a very efficient strike (e.g., 99 percenteffective) can fail to reduce retaliation to acceptablelevels if both arsenals are very large.

(4) Hence first strikes are least thinkable when arsenalsare large, suggesting the argument that "the moreweapons both sides have, the less the risk of theiruse."

f) Effect #6: "defense-dominance"?

(1) Some argue that due to ‘c’ (MAD) the nuclearrevolution strengthens defender-states and weakensaggressor-states.

(2) Are they right? (More on this below.)

C. ALTERNATE NUCLEAR STRATEGIES:

COUNTERVALUE V. COUNTERFORCE

1. Nuclear weapons present states with two basic nuclear

doctrines:



a) Countervalue: the enemy society is targeted. Politicalaims are achieved by threatening to punish the adversary bydestroying its population and industry.

(1) Capability required: a “second-strike countervaluecapability”

(a) the capacity to absorb an all-out first strikeand inflict unacceptable damage on theadversary in retaliation.

(2) This doctrine is normally easy to execute, forreasons noted above in Section I.

b) Counterforce: the enemy nuclear forces are targeted.Political aims are achieved by threatening to disarm theadversary-to remove its capacity to inflict punishment ononeself.

(1) Capability required: a “first-strike counterforcecapability”

(a) the capacity to launch a first strike thatremoves the adversary's capacity to inflictunacceptable damage on oneself inretaliation.

(2) This doctrine is normally very demanding orimpossible to execute, for reasons noted above inSection I.

D. THE IMPACT OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION ONTHE CAUSES OF WAR IF STATES ARE SANE &

CIVILIZED

1. Assume states have four attributes:

a) they are casualty-sensitive

b) they do not value conquest unduly

(1) they do not value it more than others value freedom;

c) their perceptions of their surroundings are not unduly

myopic(1) they have some capacity to assess their neighbors'

capabilities, and to correctly anticipate how theseneighbors will respond to their conduct

d) they have the industrial capacity to build large, securearsenals.



2. If so: Relationship with Causes we have ID’d

a) Offense v. defense balance? (Related to cult of

‘O)

(1) The defense dominates, since conflicts now devolve

to contests of will;(2) these are nearly always won by defenders, since

defenders value freedom more than aggressors valueconquests.

b) First-strike advantage?

(1) They disappear, due to flat-of-the-curve dynamics.

(2) Even if a country can shift the force ratio in its favorby striking first, it merely moves itself and its enemylaterally on the flat of the curve.

(3) The relative ability to bounce rubble changes, butnothing else.

c) Windows?

(1) windows disappear for similar flat-of-the curvereasons.

d) Cumulativity of resources (military)?

(1) Resources are less cumulative, again for flat-of-the-curve reasons; even large shifts in the control of

industrial resources, or in control of advantageousgeographic positions, won't move either power off the flat of the curve.

(2) Also, nuclear forces can be delivered over greatdistances, hence don't require proximity to function(so bases matter little.) (Though this was less trueearlier, e.g. in 1962.)

e) Optimistic miscalculation?

(1) nuclear weapons create very certain physical results,

eliminating miscalculations of relative capability.(2) They still leave room for miscalculations of relative

will, however.

V. THE IMPACT OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION ON THE

INTENSITY OF WAR IF STATES ARE SANE & CIVILIZED

A. Logic suggests:



1. If causes of war and intense war are similar, the nuclear revolutioncan (counter-intuitively) promote limited war,

2. as well as less major war. (Can this really be true?)

VI. THE IMPACT OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IF STATES

ARE NOT SANE & CIVILIZED

A. What if we relax the four assumptions outlined at the top of

Section III?

1. Casualty sensitive,

2. Do not value conquest unduly (risk neutral or averse

do not value gains differently than losses – not unusual

think of playing lottery),

3. Not myopic about new capabilities: information does

go back and forth with a minimum of distortion.

4. Capacity to produce large and safe arsenals.

B. If the first three assumptions are relaxed, the benefits of the

nuclear revolution are lost, even reversed.

1. Defenders no longer have the clear upper hand, hence the securitydilemma isn't eased.

2. Moreover a new danger appears: states now must face thepossibility of being physically destroyed (by a crazed, non-

deterrable adversary) even if they cannot be conquered.3. This may impel them to take drastic steps if a nuclear-armed

neighbor seems to be taking leave of its senses.

4. If the crazed neighbor seems certain to attack eventually, killinghundreds of millions, a preemptive strike against it becomessensible, even though the neighbor's retaliation will kill tens of millions.

C. If the fourth assumption (ability to produce large secure

arsenals) is relaxed,

1. MAD itself may be frail, or may never develop.

2. A first strike may be feasible by one or both sides.

3. Hence MAD between superpowers can be good, but nuclearproliferation to small states can be bad.

VII. NUCLEAR TRANSITIONS



A. MAD may be pacifying, but the road to MAD is dangerous.

1. The transition to MAD opens windows; other states are tempted tostrike emerging nuclear powers before they develop their forces,

2. Newly-emerged nuclear powers are tempted to strike neighbors

who are lagging in the race. (See, e.g., Israel's attack on Iraq'sOsiraq nuclear reactor, 1981.)

3. Note: this suggests that nuclear disarmament would raise thedanger of preventive war if that disarmament proved impermanent,and the disarmed states began a race back to nuclear capabilities.

government 50: birth life and cold war

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