WEEK 7

Group Presentation

ajmal sultany

kulvir randhawa

michael kelly

sebastian mroczko

denise worland

tony liu corrine anderson

The need to understand the underpinnings of our methods

Philosophy

Methodology

Method

Critical Realism

Positivism Post-Positivism

Empiricism

Objectivity Subjective

Constructivism

Deductive Inductive

Quantitative Qualitative

Hammersley argues:

Critical Realism Fails to Justify Critical Social Research

Lets breakdown the argument

Critical Realism Fails to Justify Critical Social Research

Critical RealismCritical Social Research

Roy Bhaskar

Martyn Hammersley

Introduction

CRITICAL REALISM

Does not disagree with the concept of realism

Agrees that research should be critical

SOCIETY PHENOMENA

Subjected to Criticism

“Very often, the relationship between the political value judgements underpinning this commitment and the values intrinsic to inquiry, as

a distinct form of activity have been left obscure”

“Researchers fail to explicate the basis for their critical orientation”

RATIONAL BEHIND CRITICAL REALISM

Marx and Hegel believed that value conclusions should be drawn from factual evidence

Teleological account of the world

Subjectivist position Contemporary climate, subjectivist positions are encouraged and value judgments do not have to be rationally justified Critical realism offers both an objective but non teleological rationale for ‘critical’ orientation

‘CRITICAL’ TRADITION IN THE PAST...

Hammersley argues that critical realism cannot justify critical social research

Cognitive argument: draw value conclusions from factual evidence

Non cognitive argument: concerns other aspects of human life, draw

conclusions about what is wrong and what ought to be done

He talks about two type of arguments which are at the core of critical realism

HAMMERSELY’S DISCUSSION

Cognitive argument

2If you establish a fact – it’s a truth that other people should believe

If institutions are generating beliefs which are incompatible - these should be criticized or changed1

BUT

Is not logical...

• You can never have ‘absolute’ knowledge

• Can’t assume social science produces ‘true’ facts

• People’s beliefs – in ‘true’ and ‘false’ things – aren’t generated differently

SO

You can’t use your ‘facts’ to criticise institutions

• Do institutions generate beliefs anyway?

• Could they generate both true AND false beliefs?

• How can you tell what is true or false?

For these reasons, Hammersley argues that the cognitive argument is not a secure basis for arguing that social science and realism can and should be ‘critical’

Non-Cognitive argument

If we establish that someone suffers from an unmet need, such as the absence of food, then it follows automatically, other things being equal, that action should be taken to meet this need

Frustration of a need is not only generated by some institution but is necessary for the reproduction of that institution, then the conclusion follows (other things being equal) that the institution should be changed

Factual statement – a person does not have food and is likely to die as a result

Value assumption – no human being should starve to death

Evaluation – this is an undesirable situation

Need is a problematic concept that involves a value assumption...

Denying someone food may be a desirable situation

Many needs involve more than one value assumption

• Literacy and numeracy are basic needs in society

• Elementary or other levels

• Example: Minimum requirement GCSE A-C

• Other things being equal - is not helpful

• Disagreement with multiple values

• What is good or bad?

• What should or should not be done?

• Change in circumstances

• No expertise or authority to make the decision.

Multiple Value

There is no justification for claiming that social scientists can conclusively determine what counts as a need that should be met on any particular occasion.

Since this is a matter for practical value judgement, here too social science cannot claim any distinctive authority.

Conclusion

Critical realism offers a rationale for being critical

However neither of the two arguments making up this rationale is convincing

Reason

Commitment to the principle that researchers should strive to be value-neutral or objective.

Social scientists should not imply that value conclusions can be validated through their work.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

LIMITS