hall and hobson 2010 liberal international theory.pdf

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International Theory (2010), 2:2, 210245 & European Consortium for Political Research, 2010

doi:10.1017/S1752971909990261

Liberal International theory: Eurocentric

but not always Imperialist?

M A R T I N H A L L1

* and J O H N M . H O B S O N2

1Department of Political Science, PO Box 52, Lund University, 221 00 Lund, Sweden2Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK

This article has two core objectives: first to challenge the conventionalunderstanding of liberal international theory (which we do by focussing specificallyon classical liberalism) and second, to develop much further postcolonialisms

conception of Eurocentrism. These twin objectives come together insofar as weargue that classical liberalism does not always stand for anti-imperialism/non-

interventionism given that significant parts of it were Eurocentric and pro-imperialist. But we also argue that in those cases where liberals rejected

imperialism they did so not out of a commitment to cultural pluralism, as we areconventionally told, but as a function of either a specific Eurocentric or a scientific

racist stance. This, in turn, means that Eurocentrism can be reduced neither to

scientific racism nor to imperialism. Thus while we draw on postcolonialism andits critique of liberalism as Eurocentric, we find its conception of Eurocentrism

(and hence its vision of liberalism) to be overly reductive. Instead we differentiatefour variants of polymorphous Eurocentrism while revealing how two of these

rejected imperialism and two supported it. And by revealing how classicalliberalism was embedded within these variants of Eurocentrism so we recast the

conventional interpretation. In doing so, we bring to light the protean career ofpolymorphous liberalism as it crystallizes in either imperialist or anti-imperialistforms as a function of the different variants of Eurocentrism within which it is

embedded. Finally, because two of these variants underpin modern liberalism(as discussed in the Conclusions) so we challenge international relations scholars to

rethink their conventional understanding of both classical- and modern-liberalism,as much as we challenge postcolonialists to rethink their conception of Eurocentrism.

Keywords: liberalism; postcolonialism; Eurocentrism/Orientalism;racism; imperialism/anti-imperialism; interventionism/non-interventionism

International Relations (IR) scholars conventionally perceive often as an

article of received wisdom that liberal international theory stands for inter-state cooperation, peaceful interdependence, national self-determination and,

* E-mails: [email protected], [email protected]

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above all, a non-interventionist anti-imperialist posture, all of which stemsfrom an essential liberal commitment to cultural pluralism. In this article we

challenge this standard view by revealing the imperialist and anti-imperialistfaces of liberalism. Moreover, rather than assume that the anti-imperialistface emanates from a pure liberal essence and the imperialist strand from acontingent, ad hoc illiberal influence, we argue that these two political facesderive from a consistent commitment to Eurocentrism and cultural monism.While the emphasis on the Eurocentric foundations of liberalism is clearlyreminiscent of postcolonial critiques, nevertheless we make two revisions topostcolonialism. First, we argue that liberalism and Eurocentrism can beimperialist or anti-imperialist. That is, the relationship between Eurocentr-

ism and empire is much more contingent than postcolonialists have recog-nized. Second, and inter-relatedly, we seek to go beyond the monochromaticor reductive postcolonial conception of Eurocentrism, specifying not onebut four variants that existed in the c. 17601914 period.

We choose this period to rethink liberalism in general by honing in onclassical liberalism as an illustrative example. Thus because the figures wefocus upon including Kant, Smith and Cobden form the bases ofvarious modern liberal IR theories such as cosmopolitanism/democraticpeace theory, interdependence theory, liberal internationalism/liberalglobalization theory, so a detailed analysis of classical liberalism neces-sarily has ramifications for our understanding ofmodern liberalism. Morespecifically in the Conclusions we note how two of the Eurocentric var-iants discussed in this article continue to underpin liberalism today,thereby revealing post-1989 liberalism as a move back to the future of lateeighteenth and nineteenth century Eurocentric liberalism. Accordingly,this article seeks to do much more than simply fill in the missing detailsof the historiography of liberalism, even though we also seek to contribute

to the revisionist historiography of IR that has been pioneered by the likesof Brian Schmidt (1998: esp. Ch. 4), Long and Schmidt (2005), andRobert Vitalis (2000, 2005, 2008).

Overall, our key claim is that revealing liberalism to be grounded in anumber of variants of Eurocentrism necessarily yields a unique view thatchallenges IR scholars in general to rethink entirely their conventionalunderstanding of liberalism, as much as it challenges postcolonialists torethink their understanding of Eurocentrism. Nevertheless, it is importantto acknowledge that not all non-postcolonial IR scholars adhere to this

conventional reading, with some recognizing liberalism as having the twofaces that we reveal in this article (e.g. Waltz, 1959: 95123; Doyle,1983b: esp. 324337; Doyle, 1986: Ch. 11).

Specifically, we reveal liberalism as a promiscuous/polymorphoustheory, crystallizing in radically different forms over time in line with the

Eurocentrism and liberal international theory 211


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changing discourses of Eurocentrism within which it is embedded. Ofcourse, the conventional view of liberalism within IR is precisely that it is

a changing discourse with a long lineage. Indeed, the typical textbookdiscussion seeks to describe liberalism precisely by tracing its lineages,beginning with classical liberal internationalism (c. 17601914), pro-gressing onto new liberalism and classical liberal institutionalism(c. 19191970), before proceeding to cosmopolitanism via interdependencetheory and neoliberal institutionalism (c. 19702010). But, we argue, thisconventional vision of liberalisms variants rests on a thin reading,revealing only surface type differences in form rather than substance,given that all of them rest on a shared commitment to individualism,

interdependence, anti-imperialism/self-determination, and cultural plur-alism. That is, peace and inter-state cooperation can be achieved eitherthrough national laissez-faire (classical liberal internationalism) orthrough international institutional forms of intervention (new liberalism,liberal/neoliberal institutionalism, and global cosmopolitanism). Thus theend always remains the same, with differences apparent only in terms ofthe prescribed means to achieve them.

Our alternative narrative of the protean career of liberalism is a muchthicker one, revealing radically different approaches wherein each isfounded on a specific Eurocentric/Orientalist base that in turn yieldseither an imperialist or anti-imperialist vision. It is for this reason that wecharacterize the received understanding of liberalism as inherentlymonochromatic, as much as we see postcolonialisms interpretation ofEurocentrism as overly monolithic and reductive. Relating the entwinedprotean careers of polymorphous Eurocentrism and liberalism constitutesthe core of this article. More specifically, we argue that classical liberalismwas grounded in four variants of Eurocentrism, two of which were

imperialist and two anti-imperialist though in the interests of space weshall reveal three of these here. While adding the fourth Eurocentricdimension of liberalism would enhance our case, nevertheless we believethat we can establish our claim sufficiently by revealing three of the fourEurocentric bases of classical liberalism (but for the fourth dimension seeHobson, 2009: Ch. 4).

Finally, we introduce and engage with two related literatures that havenot been sufficiently taken on board by mainstream IR understandingsof liberalism. These comprise postcolonialism and its representation of

liberalism as a form of Eurocentric/racist imperialism and, in turn, theresponse to this as articulated most forcefully by Sankar Muthu andJennifer Pitts. They argue that some of the key liberal Enlightenmentfigures were anti-imperialist and culturally pluralist, though they concedethat by the mid-nineteenth century classical liberalism had congealed

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within a Eurocentric imperialist mould. Engaging critically as well assympathetically with these two literatures enables us to carve out our own

alternative understanding of liberalism that goes beyond the standoff thatcurrently exists between them.The article proceeds in five stages. Section one relates the monochro-

matic reading of Eurocentrism within postcolonial IR before proceedingto examine how this reading underpins the postcolonial-inspired critiquesof classical liberalism. The second section then presents our own re-reading of Eurocentrism by outlining the four key variants that existedduring the era of classical liberalism (c. 17601914), while the remainingthree sections deal in turn with three of the Eurocentric/Orientalist var-

iants of classical liberalism.

Problematizing Eurocentrism and the postcolonial critique of

classical liberalism

In the wake of the publication of Edward Saids Orientalism (1978) post-colonialism emerged, claiming that Western Social Science is Orientalist/Eurocentric/racist and is, therefore, inherently imperialist. It is precisely this

conflation of Eurocentrism with racism as well as Eurocentric racism withimperialism that marks the monochromatic or reductive interpretation ofEurocentrism (though a tiny minority of postcolonialists have registereddissatisfaction with this monolithic reading for example Moore-Gilbert,1997: Ch. 2). Having begun in cultural studies, postcolonialisms and non-Eurocentrisms critique of Eurocentrism entered the discipline of IR in thelate-1990s (e.g. Doty, 1996; Grovogui, 1996; Paolini, 1999; Barkawi andLaffey, 2002; Chowdhry and Nair, 2002; Ling, 2002; Inayatullah andBlaney, 2004; Gruffydd-Jones, 2006a).1 Many postcolonial-inspired IR

scholars seek to reveal how IR in its theoretical and empirical gaze isEurocentric/racist, such that it naturalizes and obscures the imperialdimension of world politics, past, and present. Thus, it is usually assumedthat the antidote to Eurocentric IR is to reveal or resuscitate this sublimatedracist-imperial dimension. As one authority summarizes it, a key step

toward decolonizing knowledge isy to reveal the imperial and racia-lized constitution of international relations. This entails movingimperialism from its bracketed location in specialist studies and the

1 Note that not all scholars who are critical of Eurocentrism are postcolonial but embrace a

more generic non-Eurocentrism insofar as they do not subscribe to all aspects of the post-

modern base of postcolonialism (cf. Paolini, 1999; Jahn, 2000; Barkawi and Laffey, 2002;Hobson, 2004; Gruffydd-Jones, 2006b).



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distant chronological past and demonstrating the unbroken centrality ofimperialism to international relations from the fifteenth century to the

twenty-first (Gruffydd-Jones, 2006b: 9).

How does all this relate to the postcolonial-inspired/non-Eurocentriccritique of classical liberalism? Despite the many inroads that postcolonial/non-Eurocentric IR scholars have made, the fact remains that with a fewnotable exceptions (e.g. Grovogui, 1996; Jahn, 2000, 2005, 2006; Inaya-tullah and Blaney, 2004; Anghie, 2005; Bowden, 2009), the majority ofsuch critiques of classical liberalism are made by non-Eurocentric andpostcolonial-inspired political theorists who include Tully (1995), Parekh

(1997), Pagden (1998), Tuck (1999), Hindess (2001), Pateman and Mills(2007) and, most prominently of all, Uday Singh Mehta (1999). In essence,this critique of classical liberalism seeks to reveal its Eurocentric/racistnature in order to uncover its imperialist/colonialist normative stance.Typical of this genre is the claim that Mehta makes: that what at first sightappears to be a contradiction, whereby the nineteenth century witnessedthe triumph of Western liberalism at the very time that British imperialismexpanded, turns out to be entirely consistent given his belief that liber-alisms Eurocentrism renders it inherently colonialist. Paraphrasing E.P.Thompson, he asks rhetorically: how did ideas of equality, liberty andfraternity lead to empire, liberticide and fratricide? (Mehta, 1999: 190).The answer is that liberalisms commitment to Eurocentrism/paternalismnecessitates a colonialist posture (Mehta, 1999: esp. 190201). How,then, does this play out?

The argument of Mehta and others begins with the claim that whileliberalism stands for democracy, human rights, a tolerant cultural plur-alism, and non-intervention/self-determination based on the belief that

these are universal norms or principles, nevertheless it turns out that forEurocentric liberalism these apply only to particular societies whereindividuals allegedly attain full rationality (i.e. in civilized Europe).Accordingly, these principles cannot apply to non-European polities/societies given that they comprise irrational individuals and institutions.This means first, that within the Eurocentric liberal vision these societieswould inevitably stagnate under barbarism/savagery as they were unableto self-generate and second, that the principles of sovereign recognitionand national self-determination/non-interventionism could legitimately

apply only to relations between civilized (i.e. European) states given thatnon-European polities were deemed to be irrational and hence unciv-ilized. Importantly, this latter point is symptomatic of what we shall call aschizophrenic/bipolar conception of the international, wherein European/non-European relations are characterized by imperial interventionism while



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intra-European state relations are marked by the principles of mutualrecognition and non-interventionism. This denial of sovereignty to non-

European polities is, however, not an illiberal moment but is entirelyconsistent with a liberal paternalist-Eurocentrism since only throughWestern imperial interventionism (or the civilizing mission) could theirrational East be rescued or uplifted through the delivery of rationalWestern institutions. The final effect would be the universalization ofthe West into the global empire of uniformity (Tully, 1995), as non-European societies and polities are transformed into rational/civilizedWestern entities to the benefit of all peoples.

This is reinforced, postcolonialist-inspired writers argue, by classical

liberalisms emphasis on the social efficiency argument, which assertsthat where peoples fail to develop their lands productively so these ter-ritories are proclaimed to be terra nullius (i.e. vacant- or waste-space). Insuch conditions liberalism prescribes that Europeans have the right totake-over their lands and develop them in the allegedly productiveinterests of global humanity. This argument is traced back to Vitoria,2 andthen forwards via Gentili, Grotius, Locke, Vattel, and Kant (e.g. Tully,1995; Grovogui, 1996; Tuck, 1999; Pateman and Mills, 2007; Bowden,2009).

All in all, the postcolonial-inspired critique posits an indissolublerelationship between Eurocentric classical liberalism and empire, therebyreflecting the monochromatic reading of Eurocentrism. While there ismuch in this argument that we draw on, nevertheless the problem is that ifwe were to follow this reductive logic then we would be forced to squeezeall liberal international theory into a single Eurocentric/racist imperialistmould thereby obscuring the different Eurocentric variants that underpinliberalism and which, in turn, generate its dual-faced imperialist and anti-

imperialist visions. It therefore makes sense to proceed to outline the fourvariants of Eurocentrism that existed in the c. 17601914 period beforeturning to our reinterpretation of classical liberalism.

Outlining four variants of Eurocentrism

In this section we unpack the monolithic reading of Eurocentrism tounearth its two generic variants that existed in the c. 17601914 period

Eurocentric institutionalism and scientific racism. Given that eachgenre contains two sub-sets, imperialist and anti-imperialist, so we derivea 232 matrix (see Table 1). These four variants have been obscured by

2 Though the idea was first mooted in Thomas Mores, Utopia (Tuck, 1999: 49).



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the headlining postcolonial umbrella term of Orientalism/Eurocentrism,

which in turn presents a single imperialist discourse that obscures not onlythe anti-imperialist variants but also smooths the imperialist variants into acoherent seamless whole. And to the extent that postcolonial-inspiredscholars on occasion implicitly recognize different variants paternalist-Eurocentrism (e.g. Mill) and social Darwinism (e.g. Spencer) nevertheless

Table 1. Taxonomy of the different ideal-typical forms of Eurocentrism/Orientalism racism their relations to imperialism

Pro-imperialist Anti-imperialist

Eurocentric A Paternalism B Anti-paternalism

Institutionalism While all societies are capable of

self-development, only the West

has reached civilization via its

rational institutions. The

irrational non-European

institutions block development,

which can only be unblocked,

and development kick-started, by

the Western paternalist civilizing

mission.

While all societies are capable of self-

development, only the West has

reached civilization (though not

necessarily in its final perfect form)

via its rational institutions. The non-

European societies, though on a

lower barbaric or savage rung, will

naturally self-evolve in time to reach

the idealized Western terminus of

civilization, thereby negating the

need for a Western paternalist

civilizing mission.

Scientific racism C Offensive scientific racism D Defensive scientific racism

The white race is genetically the

fittest and white civilization the

most culturally adaptive.

Although the non-white races areincapable of autonomously

reaching civilization, they are

nevertheless viewed as posing a

threat to the white races. Thus

the white races must colonize and

defeat the yellow and black races

in order to preserve civilization

and white supremacy. However,

some believed that the non-white

societies could benefit from a

Western civilizing mission and be

uplifted into civilization (e.g.

Reinsch, Wilson).

Race development is based partly on

genetic and partly culture/social

function. The universaliststrand

argues that in the long run all non-white societies will evolve naturally/

spontaneously into the idealized

form of Western civilization (e.g.

Sumner, Spencer), negating the need

for a civilizing mission. The relativist

strand views non-white races as

irredeemably backward such that a

civilizing mission would be

unproductive (e.g. Blair, Jordan). All

agree that racial inter-breeding

(miscegenation) and tropical climate

lead to the degeneration of the white

race/Western civilization and a

regression/containment of non-white

societies, thereby negating the

rationale for colonialism.



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they tend to see the latter as but a more extreme imperialist expression ofthe former. As we shall see shortly, however, scientific racism of which

social Darwinism was only one strand could be anti-imperialist (e.g.Spencer) as well as imperialist (e.g. Ward).We begin by considering Eurocentric institutionalism, which emerged

forcefully during the Enlightenment even if its latent principles emergedinitially after the discovery of America (Tully, 1995; Pagden, 1998; Jahn,2000; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Anghie, 2005; Bowden, 2009). Thepostcolonial position is that Enlightenment Eurocentrism was inherentlyimperialist and for some such scholars there was little real differencebetween it and scientific racism. Certainly, this generic approach con-

ceived a world hierarchy that placed civilized white society at the top,yellow barbarian societies down a stage and black/red savages societiesat the bottom of the global hierarchy. But critically, this ethnography wasbased purely on institutional/cultural, rather than biological/genetic dif-ferences. Moreover, Enlightenment Eurocentric institutionalists believedthat allhumans and allsocieties had recourse to universal reason and thatallwere capable of progressing from savagery/barbarism into civilization.However, Western societies were deemed superior and more advancedbecause they had full recourse to reason, whereas reason was only latentwithin non-Western societies. Thus the West is thought to have developedrational institutions and norms: rational (Weberian) bureaucracies andrational liberal-democratic states, rational individualism, rational scienceand religion etc. Overall, such a framework presupposes a full separationof the private and public realms. By contrast, non-European societies arethought to be governed only by irrational norms and institutions, wherethe private and public realms are thoroughly confused. They are char-acterized by collectivist social structures, regressive/mystical religions as

well as either patrimonial bureaucracies/barbaric Oriental despotic states(yellow societies) or a savage state of nature (red and black societies).This, in turn, gives rise to the familiar binary, logocentric distinctions thatprivilege the West over East: democracy/despotism or state/state of nat-ure, individualism/collectivism, science/mysticism, etc.

However, at this point we encounter two sub-divisions; a strong and aweak version. The strong version, found in the paternalist wing, believesthat latent reason in non-Western societies could be brought to full reali-zation but only through the imperial intervention of Western societies (e.g.

Mill, Cobden, Hobson, and Angell). That is, the civilizing mission wouldact as a signal trigger or catalytic impulse, launching the East onto thetrack, or high tide, of progress towards civilization by delivering rationalWestern norms/institutions. This variant presupposes a paternalist West anda feminized/infantilized East that needs rescuing. That is, it is the paternalist



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side of the West that leads it to embark on the civilizing mission or thewhite mans burden in order to emancipate the helpless East.

This paternalist imperial variant is differentiated from the weak versionfound in the anti-paternalist wing, which asserts that non-Europeanpeoples would evolve naturally and spontaneously into civilization,thereby dispensing with the need to civilize them through imperialism(e.g. Smith and Kant). Moreover, the anti-paternalist variant was highlycritical of Western imperialism and saw it as a hindrance, rather than aspur, to non-European progress (as well as to Western development).Nevertheless, both positions embraced Eurocentrism. For the paternalistsawarded the West the status of sole agent or subject of global progress

while the East was marginalized as the passive object/beneficiary ofWestern largesse. And the anti-paternalists assumed that the non-Eur-opean peoples were destined to follow not only a path into moderncivilization which had been achieved though not yet perfected by theWest, but one that would and should culminate in an idealized Westerncivilizational terminus.

The postcolonial conflation of Eurocentric institutionalism and scientificracism is problematic because while there are certain, albeit highly complex,overlaps there are also some key differences. It is important to recognize thatscientific racism is a considerably more complex body of thought than isEurocentric institutionalism and categorizing it is not straightforward. Thekey body of thought of relevance here is that of social Darwinism (ofteninfused with Lamarckianism) and, though less prominently at that time,Eugenics. While racial/biological properties are important in this ethnology,nevertheless the Lamarckian influence which often goes unnoticed alsoinfused culture and social behavior into the mix. Here we differentiate twoideal-type streams of scientific racism what we call defensive and

offensive scientific racism and we shall discuss each in turn.The defensive variant draws on a variety of discourses that were

blended together in a number of ways. A key body of thinkers drew onlaissez-faire social Darwinism that was often blended with Lamarckian-ism (e.g. Spencer and Sumner). This invokes a progressive historicaluniversalistic evolutionary framework that echoes the liberal anti-paternalist Eurocentrism of Kant and Smith. These thinkers developed arigorous theory of the minimalist state on the grounds that societiesoperate according to the evolutionary laws of natural selection. Thus to

interfere in these in any way would produce only negative outcomes. Thiswas, in effect, an extreme form of Smithian political economy. A furtherinter-related similarity with Smith and Kant lay in the belief that societiesof all kinds will naturally evolve in time from savagery to barbarism andfinally to civilization so long as they are free of political interference,



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either domestically or externally. Accordingly, this means that it ispointless to engage in an imperial civilizing mission since this would only

disturb the natural and autonomous laws of evolution and development.Thus both parts of the framework came together in the anti-imperialistposture, insofar as imperialism would burden the state and undermineprogress within the civilized countries on the one hand what HerbertSpencer (1902) called the rebarbarization of civilization while simul-taneously leading to the regression or containment of colonial societies onthe other. The laissez-faire social Darwinists such as Spencer and Sumneralso emphasized the twin threats that miscegenation and tropical climateposed for the white races, the effects of both leading to the inevitable

degeneration of the white race and of civilization more generally.It is also important to note that Herbert Spencer, who is typically

treated as a founding voice of social Darwinism, was also a leading neo-Lamarckian (Stocking, 1982). This is significant because Lamarckianismplaces equal weighting on culture/social behavior and genetics, insofar asthe social function of individuals (or animals) necessarily modifies theirphysiognomy and mental processes or characteristics, which are thenpassed on through the blood to the subsequent generation. Thus, forexample, just as a workman through manual labor develops large andstrong hands that then become an acquired hereditary characteristic of hisson, so giraffes have long necks because their predecessors had to reach upfor their food. This has two significant ramifications. First, it means thatmany social Darwinists/Lamarckians did not elevate genetics above allelse; and second, it avoids the pessimistic assumption of extreme socialDarwinism and Eugenics, which assumed that non-white races weresimply incapable of auto-developing into civilization. Thus the splicingtogether of laissez-faire social Darwinism and Lamarckianism enabled a

seemingly progressive universalism insofar as it issued an anti-imperialistposture and granted some developmental agency to the non-white races.

Another group of thinkers within this category created a relativisticapproach, viewing the non-European races and societies as inherentlybackward and inferior such that they were unlikely to develop into civi-lization (e.g. Blair and Jordan). But they agreed with the laissez-fairesocial Darwinists insofar as miscegenation and white residence in tropicalclimates must at all costs be avoided and that non-European societiesshould be left alone to their own devices, free from white contact. Overall,

they sought to distance the West from the contaminating influence of thenon-European races through what amounted to a strategy of civiliza-tional/racial-apartheid. Accordingly, it was for this racist reason ratherthan any inherent liberal commitment to cultural pluralism that theyargued strongly against Western imperialism.



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The second generic variant, offensive scientific racism, could be foundprincipally in interventionist social Darwinism and Lamarckianism and,though to a lesser extent at this time, in the science of Eugenics. Notably,however, these were blended together in different ways by different scholars,leading to a complex range of positions. The interventionist social Dar-winists explicitly rejected the laissez-faire variant of Spencerean socialDarwinism and denied the non-white races the capacity to auto-develop.They argued that the white race must engage in race war and destructive/exploitative imperialism as in social liberalism (e.g. Ward, 1903/2002) andgeopolitical realism (e.g. Mahan, 1897; Mackinder, 1904). AlternativelyLamarckian liberal racists embraced the idea of a Western civilizing missionon the grounds that this could bring rationality and development to the non-European societies (e.g. Wilson, 1902; Reinsch, 1905).

Thus, in sum, we differentiate two sub-categories of scientific racism

where the offensive variant advocates the colonization of the East in orderto maintain Western civilization or white supremacy, while the defensivevariant seeks to defend Western/white supremacy by avoiding contactwith the contaminating influence of the non-European races throughstrong immigration controls and the avoidance of colonialism. All in all,then, we identify four major positions that are contained within thegeneric categories of scientific racism and Eurocentric institutionalism.Nevertheless, we emphasize the point that these four positions should berecognized as something of a simplification of what is an extremely

complex and often contradictory literature, even though we have allowedfor considerable nuances within each of the categories. The issue nowbecomes that of ascertaining how these various discourses becameembodied within the writings of classical liberal international thinkers.Table 2 provides the summary position and in what follows we take three

Table 2. Taxonomy of the ideal-typical relations of Eurocentrism/scientific racism to imperialism in classical liberal international theory

Pro-imperialist Anti-imperialist

Eurocentric A Paternalists B Anti-Paternalists

Institutionalists Cobden, Angell, Mill, Hobson Kant, Smith

Scientific racists C Offensive racists D Defensive racists

Liberals: Ward, Reinsch, Wilson Spencer, Sumner, Blair,

Jordan

(Geopolitical realists: Mahan,

Mackinder)



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of these categories in turn (omitting Box C offensive scientific racism)in order to make our case.

Paternalist Eurocentric institutionalism: liberal imperialism (Box A)

This discourse emerged fully by the mid-nineteenth century in the periodof the Wests triumphalist moment, perhaps no better illustrated than theGreat Exhibition held in Hyde Park, London (1851), through whichBritain proclaimed itself to be superior to the non-European world. Thiscontext was crucial in shaping the paternalist/imperialist wing of Euro-centric institutional universalism. Significantly, it is precisely this category

that postcolonial-inspired critics have in mind when they think of Euro-centrism. Nevertheless, even within this particular variant we find a sig-nificant range of positions. At one extreme lies John Stuart Mill, whoargued not only for the necessity of the civilizing mission but that it couldbe achieved through despotic colonial government intervention (seeDoyle, 1983b: 331; Mehta, 1999; Jahn, 2005; Pitts, 2005: 133162). Atthe other extreme lies John A. Hobson, who argued that a civilizingmission to develop the non-European societies was necessary but only

under the guidance/tutelage of an independent international institution specifically the League of Nations (Long, 2005; Hobson, 2009: Ch. 2).And exactly the same argument/discourse was deployed by inter-war IRliberals and progressives such as Alfred Zimmern, Norman Angell andLeonard Woolf (Hobson, 2009: Ch. 7). The majority of paternalist lib-erals in the pre-1914 era, however, occupied the middle ground, whichentailed individual Western countries civilizing the East through imperi-alism. Here we shall take Richard Cobden as our example.

Richard Cobden: for peaceful universal interdependence orEnglish nationalism and liberal imperialism?

Cobden is, of course, best-known for his fervent promotion of free trade.The conventional reading emphasizes his normative prescription of lais-sez-faire at home and free trade abroad on the grounds that this wouldpromote peace, interdependence and international cooperation. More-over, Cobdens liberalism extended to his critique of the realist conceptionof the balance of power on the grounds that its defense requires an

unacceptable pro-war posture. The secondary IR literature assumes thathis commitment to international non-interventionism and cultural plur-alism, coupled with his passionate aversion to war, rendered him a naturalliberal critic of empire and all things colonial (e.g. Burchill, 1996: 3537,3940). Indeed this is thought to be axiomatic given his classical liberal



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critique of big government, where increased military expendituresassociated with imperialism lead to higher taxes and a higher national

debt, all of which serves to divert resources away from productive tounproductive spending in the imperial country (as in Smith and Kant).But, we argue that, while elements of this picture are undoubtedly

pertinent, the problem is that Cobden has been read out of the paternalistEurocentric context in which he wrote. Crucially, by revealing this weshow how it led him to advocate war and imperialism in certain contexts.Cobden subscribed to a schizophrenic conception of the international,which undermined or contradicted the tolerant cultural pluralism forwhich he is famous. In revealing this alternative reading we draw from the

major two-volume set that brings together his letters and pamphlets(Cobden, 1868). Certainly this is not to say that the arguments for whichhe is famous are not included in them. For there we encounter all mannerof quotations that resonate with the conventional reading including theBritish statesmans idiom, that

Men of war to conquer colonies, to yield to us a monopoly of theirtrade must now be dismissed, like many other glittering but false adagesof our forefathers, and in its place we must substitute the more homely

but enduring maxim Cheapness, which will command commerce; andwhatever else is needful will follow in its train (1836/1868: 290, hisemphasis).

Nevertheless, what really stands out throughout these pamphlets is a pro-imperial posture that rests on a paternalist Eurocentric institutionalistbase, which is in turn wrapped up within a fervent sense of Englishnationalism. Indeed one does not have to scour the texts to unearth thisfor it is sustained across no less than 443 pages out of a total of 991.

This pro-imperialist stance emerges in two key pamphlets that, interalia, discuss the future possibility of a Russian war with Turkey. Cobdenscritique of the pro-war position of David Urquhart (former Secretary ofthe English Embassy at Constantinople), who sought British support ofTurkey for fear that a stronger Russia could only enhance Russias handagainst Britain, is based not on pacifist non-interventionism but colonialtake-over of Turkey by Russia. Cobdens Eurocentric response proceeds instages. First, he insists that Britains interests lie more with Russia thanTurkey not just because Britains trade with Russia vastly outweighs its

commerce with Turkey, but mainly because Russia is a civilized ChristianWestern power while the Ottoman Empire is a barbaric Islamic Orientaldespotism. His Eurocentric analysis emphasizes the barbaric twin-effectsof the Turkish Oriental despotic state and its repressive Islamic religion, towit: although Turkeys lands are highly fertile, nevertheless, despotic



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violence has triumphed over nature such that this country has by theoppressive exactions of successive pachas, become little better than a

deserted waste (1835/1868: 19). In essence, he argues that a once greatcountry has been reduced to a desolate place of tombs by a rapaciousdespotism given that it privileges war and militarism over peace andcommerce (1836/1868: 1734).

He then engages in a thought experiment, asking what would happen ifthe population of the United States was substituted for the Turkish peopleand transplanted into Turkey. He responds by painting an image of theravaged hell of barbaric Turkey being transformed into an earthly civi-lized paradise, on the grounds that the Americans would create a vibrant

commercial and prosperous economy. This then culminates in a full pro-imperial posture. For not only does Cobden dismiss the claim that Rus-sian acquisition of Turkey would harm British interests but, he argues:

On the contrary, we have no hesitation in avowing it as our deliberateconviction that not merely Great Britain, but the entire civilized [i.e.Western] world, will have reason to congratulate itself, the moment when[Turkey] again falls beneath the sceptre of any other European powerwhatever. Ages must elapse before its favoured region will becomey theseat and centre of commerce, civilization, and true religion; but the firststep towards this consummation must be to convert Constantinople againinto that which every lover of humanity and peace longs to behold it thecapital of a Christian [civilized] people (1835/1868: 33).

Thus Cobden positively endorses a Russian colonial take-over of Turkeyon the grounds that this Western civilizing mission would yield con-siderable benefits not just to Turkey but also to Europe and Britain inparticular (1835/1868: 3437; 1836/1868: 18991). Speaking of thisimperial mission of civilizing Turkey, he argues that it will

put into a peoples hands the bible in lieu of the Koran let the religionof Mohamet give place to that of Jesus Christ; and human reason, aidedby the printing press and the commerce of the world, will not fail toerase the errors which time, barbarism, or the cunning of its priesthood,may have engrafted upon it (1835/1868: 3334).

This argument underpins his general claim that Turkish society was, in theclassic Eurocentric institutionalist position, unchanging and stationarywhereas Russian society was progressing (1836/1868: 187188).

Of course, if we left it here, we might conclude that Cobden wasprepared to countenance imperialism so long as it was undertaken byWestern countries other than England. Certainly his critique of Britishimperialism that was articulated in his many speeches and letters wouldseem to support this. But his discussion of Britains relations with Ireland



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certainly qualify this view. In his 1835 pamphlet chapter on Ireland heargues that the Irish are savages and that their Catholic form of perse-

cution has enabled [Ireland] to resist, not only unscathed, but actuallywith augmented power, the shock of a free press, and the liberalizinginfluence of the freest constitutional government in Europe (1835/1868:63). And the rest of the chapter is given over to an argument that advo-cates an English colonial civilizing mission in Ireland that is wrapped upwithin a fervent English nationalism. It is vital to raise Ireland upthrough a civilizing mission, Cobden argues, for failure to do so willinevitably depress [England] to a level with [the Irish] (1835/1868: 69).Precisely because Irish savage habits are contaminating England through

Irish immigration a kind of Irish Peril type-argument so it isimperative that Irish savagery be eradicated (see esp. 1835/1868: 70).

Cobden insists that a [p]arliament in Dublin [self-determination] wouldnot remedy the ills of Ireland. That has been tried, and found unsuccessful;for all may learn in her history, that a more corrupt, base, and selfish publicbody than the domestic legislature of Ireland never existed (1835/1868: 82).Thus it was to the English parliament that Ireland must look for salvation.In particular, an English civilizing mission would entail building infra-structure (e.g. roads and railroads) and the exporting of English capital andcivilization. We confess we see no hope for the eventual prosperity [ofIreland]y except [through]y the instrumentality of English capital, in thepursuit of manufactures or commerce (1835/1868: 90). And Cobden con-cludes that where England has gone wrong vis-a-vis the problem of Irelandis not in colonizing it but in neglecting to submit Ireland to a full colonialcivilizing mission. Ultimately, however, it is the serving of the Englishnational interest that underpins his calling for colonialism, given his beliefthat Ireland remains to this hour an appalling monument of our neglect and

misgovernmenty

The spectacle of Ireland operat[es] like a cancer in theside of England (1835/1868: 95).

To close, it is possible that in pressing home his various political mes-sages Cobden tended towards hyperbole. And one might suspect that hisconstant appeals to the English national interest are at least made in partto blunt the criticisms of him as a utopian idealist. Nevertheless, it seemsfair to conclude that much of Cobdens writings are founded on apaternalist, pro-imperialist Eurocentric institutionalism, which in turnproblematizes our conventional picture of him as a liberal internationalist

who is committed to pacifism, non-interventionism, cultural pluralismand anti-imperialism. Even so, it might be objected that Cobdens stancetowards Islam and Catholicism was an ad hoc illiberal argument that doesnot reflect, or stem from, his general liberal credentials but emanatesrather from an ad hoc Protestant prejudice. But his criticism of these



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countries (Turkey and Ireland) reflects a liberal predisposition whereinthose societies that were founded on irrational institutions of which

religion was only one expression did not qualify for self-determinationand could only do so once rational institutions had been set up courtesy ofa European imperial civilizing mission. Paternalist liberal prescriptions ofnon-intervention and tolerance can only apply once the Other has beenremoulded along rational European lines. Cobden, then, conforms perfectlyto the postcolonial reading of Eurocentrism, invoking a schizophrenicconception of the international wherein Western double standards werepart and parcel of paternalist Eurocentric liberalism.

Anti-paternalist Eurocentric institutionalism: liberal

anti-imperialism (Box B)

For postcolonialists the discussion thus far will appear intuitive, giventhat they conflate Eurocentrism with imperialism while associating clas-sical liberalism with a Eurocentric-colonialist politics. But here we seek todeepen our understanding of liberal Eurocentrism by revealing its twoanti-imperialist variants in turn, beginning with the anti-paternalist

Eurocentric institutionalist variant that rejects all forms of paternalismand thus imperialism. Chronologically, this category emerged before thepaternalist strand reached its heights of expression, being located within thelate-eighteenth century Enlightenment. Its clearest representatives areImmanuel Kant and Adam Smith. Unlike their paternalist cousins, theyadopted a universal cosmopolitanism albeit one that was an expression ofa European particularism or provincialism but in contrast to the post-colonial critique of cosmopolitanism as inherently imperialist, Kant andSmith articulated their theories in large part as a critique of imperialism.

Immanuel Kant: anti-paternalist Eurocentrism and the critique ofimperialism

To make our case we shall enter into a dialogue with Sankar Muthusanalysis of Kant in his pioneering book, Enlightenment Against Empire(Muthu, 2003: Chs. 45). In essence, we shall agree with his anti-imperialist reading but will present Kant as a Eurocentric culturalmonist rather than as a tolerant cultural pluralist as Muthu claims. In

doing so, we seek to reveal the key ingredients of anti-paternalist Euro-centric institutionalism. We shall deal with Kants critique of imperialismfirst and then proceed to reveal his particular brand of Eurocentrism. Andbecause we have to deal with both these dimensions so the discussion willnecessarily be extended.



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As indicated earlier, many so-called liberal critics of empire ended upby embracing imperialism, often because they subscribed to the social

efficiency/terra nullius argument. Indeed, it is here where James Tullyspostcolonial-inspired argument intervenes, claiming that this imperialistcue is endorsed by Kant in his third definitive article for a perpetual peace.Tully claims that for Kant (as with Locke in particular), the Aboriginalsmust be punished if they resist those Europeans who take their land, sincethe latter have a right to hospitality and settlement in the formers lands(Tully, 1995: 8889). But in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant assertsunequivocally that the right to establish community with such nativesdoes not, however, amount to the right to settle on another nations

territoryy

for the latter would require a special contract (1970c: 172,his emphasis). Moreover, he goes on to say that where Europeans seek tosettle on non-European lands occupied by shepherds or hunters who relyupon large tracts of wasteland for their sustenance, settlements should notbe established by violence, but only by treaty [i.e. indigenous consent];and even then, there must be no attempt to exploit the ignorance of thenatives in persuading them to give up their territories (1970c: 173).Significant too is that in Perpetual Peace, Kant approves of the Japaneseand Chinese practice of placing heavy restrictions on the entry ofEuropean traders since the latter had failed to act peaceably and fairly(1970b: 1067). Ironically, Jacques Derrida (2000) reinforces our claimhere when he critiques Kant for precisely the opposite reason to that ofTully: that Kant contradicts his own commitment to cosmopolitanismprecisely because of his insistence that visitors (specifically asylum-seekersin todays context) who seek to settle abroad can only do so once consenthas been given through the signing of a contract by the receiving society.But equally, as one Kantian expert rightly notes, Derridas critique of

Kants arguments misunderstands the historical context, wherein Kantsmajor concern was to protect non-European peoples from maraudingEuropean imperialists; hence the laws of hospitality were framed verymuch with the critique of imperialism in mind (Brown, 2009: 5966).

Muthu, then, is surely correct to note that Kants conception of cos-mopolitan right is formulated precisely so as to critique imperialism(Muthu, 2003: 1878). As Kant put it, [y]et these [European imperial]visits to foreign shores and even more so, attempts to settle on them witha view to linking them with the motherland, can also occasion evil and

violence in one part of the globe with ensuing repercussions which arefelt everywhere else (Kant, 1970c: 172; also Kant, 1970b: 1078). InPerpetual Peace Kant unequivocally condemns European imperialists foroffending this fundamental cosmopolitan right. In the discussion of thethird definitive article, which Tully sees as providing the imperialist cue,



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Kant takes precisely the opposite stance by taking European imperialiststo task for their inhospitable conduct abroad, emphasizing the point that

the injustice which they display in visiting foreign countries and peoples(which in their case is the same as conquering them) seems appallinglygreat (1970b: 106, his emphases). Combining this with a critique of thesocial efficiency/terra nullius argument, Kant asserts on the same pagethat America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc. werelooked upon at the time of their discovery as ownerless territories [terranullius]; for the natives were counted as nothing. But far from justifyingthe imperial mission, Kant then argues that under the pretext of spreadingtrade (to India), the natives were oppressed through widespread wars,

famine and the whole litany of evils which can afflict the human race(1970b: 106). For Kant, such intolerable cruelty is the trade-mark ofEuropean imperialism and, in a well-directed jibe against the concept ofthe imperial civilizing mission, he concludes that all this is the workof powers who make endless ado about their piety, and who wish to beconsidered as chosen believers while they live on the fruits of their ini-quity (1970b: 107). He then immediately reiterates the point that suchbehavior violates cosmopolitan right, so that as long as this continues noprogress towards a perpetual peace is possible (1970b: 108). In sum, then,it seems fair to conclude that the social efficiency trap-door that leadsback into the pro-imperialist chamber typified by Locke and others islocked tight in Kants schema.

The one possible caveat to this robust anti-imperial position thatpostcolonial-inspired critics might offer up here lies in the point that Kantwould positively support the extension of trading relations as an informalcivilizing influence in the East. Interestingly, Kant partially pre-empts thischarge when he insists that such commercial relations must not involve

unequal or exploitative exchange and that the entering into tradingrelations can only be done through the consent of the non-Europeancountries. As Muthu recognizes, Kants category of cosmopolitan rightattempts to articulate an ideal, which can both condemn Europeanimperialism and encourage nonexploitative and peaceful transnationalrelations (Muthu, 2003: 192). Nevertheless, postcolonialists mightrespond by arguing that for Kant, extending nonexploitative tradingrelations promotes Western norms insofar as it pacifies states by propel-ling them into an economically interdependent relationship, which in turn

propels them into a more commercial society such that the benefits ofdoing so exceed the costs of breaking such links through warfare. Indeed,as Kant put it: the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of everypeople, and it cannot exist side by side with war (1970b: 114). Crucialhere is the claim that trade has an informal civilizing impact, insofar as it



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helps push all societies towards capitalism and republicanism, which inturn constitute crucial preconditions for a future perpetual peace.

Here it is critical to appreciate that for Kant this civilizing push factorshould not be conflated with the signal trigger or catalytic effect thatthe formal-imperial civilizing mission entails within the paternalistEurocentric institutionalist variant, not least because Kant seeks toexorcize all notions of Western compulsion. This in part derives from hisbelief that all societies will spontaneously evolve or auto-develop anargument which fundamentally differentiates this genre from that of itspaternalist Eurocentric institutionalist cousin and in part on the basisthat states do not have the right to impose trading relations or trading

obligations on others because the receiving societies have the right torefuse consent, as we have already noted (see also Doyle, 1983a: 227;1983b: 325, 331; Muthu, 2003: 155162; Jahn, 2006: 187188). Thus,unlike his paternalist ideological cousins, Kant (and Smith) advocated aconsistent or universalist conception of negative freedom/minimalist stateinterventionism that would apply equally at home and in the treatment ofnon-European societies abroad. The key question now becomes: was thisanti-paternalist universalist stance a function of an anti-Eurocentriccultural pluralist ethos, as Muthu argues?

Muthu believes that Kants ethnology, which was developed in his poli-tical writings, stood outside of the common scientific racist markers ofparts of eighteenth century European thought. This is significant given thatpostcolonial-inspired critics sometimes denounce Kant precisely for hisscientific racism (e.g. Eze, 1997; Bernasconi, 2001; Tully, 2002: 342343;Bowden, 2009: 146). Noteworthy here is that Kant certainly relied heavilyon scientific racism in his anthropological writings and lectures (e.g. Kant,1997a, b, c, 2001a). However, we agree with Muthu (2003: 181184) in

that such racism played no part in his political writings on internationalrelations. Nevertheless, it is this rejection of scientific racism that leadsMuthu to mistakenly conclude that Kant advocated a cultural pluralism;one that was premised on what Muthu calls cultural agency. This pre-sumes a respect for the equality of all peoples and, therefore, by implication,a tolerance of non-European societies. He also claims that Kant did notprivilege civilized societies over uncivilized ones. And because all were heldon an egalitarian, non-hierarchical normative footing, so Kant allegedlyrejected judging non-European societies against a universal Western norm.

To this end Muthu emphasizes the consistent claim made by Kant thatcivilized European societies were far from perfect and were shot throughwith all manner of injustices and conflicts between individuals in their questfor gratification through power and prestige both at home and in relation tothe non-European world abroad.



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The key argument that Muthu makes against the Eurocentric charge isthat while Kant envisaged a moral duty on each individual to self-

improve, nevertheless Muthu insists that Kant saw no corresponding dutyfor whole peoples to improve or perfect themselves and to thereby movetowards an idealized Western terminus. He claims that it is possible thatKant saw no inevitability in the transition from a non-settled [pre-civil] tosettled society [ie. civil states], offering up Kants claim in The Anthro-pology: that it is unusual for peoples to move from a non-settled/pre-civilto a settled/civil society (Muthu, 2003: 204), thereby suggesting that Kantwas tolerant of non-European societies.

But Muthus position is problematized by two inter-related Eurocentric

arguments that form the basis of Kants normative politics as well as hisstadial model of historical development. First, Kant views it as a cate-gorical imperative that people in a state of nature enter a social contract,thereby undergoing a transition from non-settled to settled societies (orfrom hunter-gatherer/pastoral societies to sedentary agricultural/com-mercial ones) so that they can later join the pacific federation of repub-lican states. And second, Kant insists that history is marked by progress,whereby societies progress through stages, beginning with the savage stateof nature, before evolving into barbaric states only to culminate in capi-talist/republican civilization. So fundamental are these claims to Kantswork that Muthu is forced into something of a high-wire balancing actrequiring all sorts of precarious intellectual acrobatics in order to sustainhis argument. For while he concedes the categorical imperative argument,he seeks to subvert the conclusion to which it necessarily gives rise byinsisting that there is no imperative for whole peoples or societies toprogress and thereby acquire ideal Western civilizational properties. Ourreply will look at each of these claims in reverse order.

In his famous essay, Idea for a Universal History with a CosmopolitanPurpose, Kant ascribes a progressive teleology to the unfolding of humansocieties through history. At the very outset he asserts that while recog-nizing that the laws of human history are very difficult to detect, never-theless we may hope that what strikes us in the actions of individuals asconfused and fortuitous may be recognized, in the history of the entirespecies, as a steadily advancing but slow development of mans originalcapacities (1970a: 41). Nature intends, almost behind the backs ofindividuals, an advance in human societies. Interestingly, Kant effectively

deploys an argument that is almost identical to the role played by AdamSmiths invisible hand. Thus while society develops according to theinvisible hand of selfish individual competition for Smith (1776/1937: 14,421, 423), so in the discussion of his fourth proposition, Kant sees in theselfish and egoistic intentions of individuals and their resulting antagonisms



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(their unsocial sociability) a necessary evil that propels societies forwardtowards the terminus of human history the pacific federation of republican

capitalist states.Here Muthu confuses Kants emphasis on evil and selfish antagonismswithin civilized societies with a critique of such societies. But these evilsfunction in a progressive rather than regressive way in Kants schema.Thus, he argues that facing up to these antagonisms comprises

the first true steps [being] taken from barbarism to culture [civilization],which in fact consists in the social worthiness of man. All mans talentsare now gradually developed, his taste cultivated, and by a continuedprocess of enlightenment, a beginning is made towards establishing a

way of thinking which cany

transform the primitive natural capacityfor moral discrimination into definite practical principles, and thus apathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole(1970a: 4445).

This culminates in the unequivocal claim that civilized societies are indeedsuperior to non-civil ones and that mankind has a duty to proceed out ofbarbarism and savagery into civilized society; the very inverse claim tothat ascribed by Muthu. Thus, Kant asserts:

Without these asocial qualities (far from admirable in themselves),which cause the resistance inevitably encountered by each individual ashe furthers his self-seeking pretensions, man would live an Arcadian,pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love(1970a: 45).

Such qualities are interpreted by Muthu as a positive endorsement ofpastoral societies by Kant. But Kant claims just the opposite by sayingthat within pastoral societies

[A]ll human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state, andmen, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would scarcely rendertheir existence more valuable than that of their animals. The end forwhich they were created, their rational nature, would be an unfilled void(1970a: 45).

Kant then concludes that nature should be thanked for fostering thisunsocial sociability since without it all mans excellent natural capacitieswould never be roused to develop. Man wishes concord [i.e. pre-civil

social existence], but nature, knowing better what is good for his specieswishes discord. In such ways, Kant argues, we can envisage the design ofa wise creator rather than a malicious spirit. Thus, reminiscent of Smith,individual selfishness or even maliciousness is the motor that driveshistorical development towards civilization (1970b: 108114).



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The anti-teleological stance that Muthu attributes to Kant in order tosupport the conclusion that Kant saw no duty of peoples to self-improve runs

up against a second major inter-related problem which concerns his callingfor a pacific federation of republican states. In essence, if there is nomechanism for progress from pre-civil societies to civilized states either onethat is imposed from without via European imperialism (as indeed there isnot in Kants schema) or through some kind of endogenous motor operatingwithin pre-civil societies including the role of human agency then the veryidea of movement towards a pacific federation becomes logically unattain-able. This is so not least because such a federation cannot come about untilall societies undertake a social contract and proceed onto civilization. Thus a

key pillar of Kants politics the creation of the pacific federation islogically, albeit unwittingly, removed by Muthu thereby undermining theedifice of Kants cosmopolitan politics. This point might be reinforced byposing a rhetorical question: was it really Kants objective to render thepacific federation of republican states wholly utopian? For this is the logicalupshot of exorcizing the progressive dynamic of history from Kants schema.

Kants insistence that all peoples must leave the state of nature is a run-ning theme of his most famous work, Perpetual Peace. There he insists thata perpetual peace will be violated if just one party remains in a separate stateof nature, which would result in a risk of war (1970b: 99). Moreover, indiscussing his second definitive article he asserts that each nation, for thesake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the others that theyshould enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, withinwhich the rights of each could be secured. This would mean establishing afederation of peoples (1970b: 102). He is also contemptuous of savage/barbaric societies asserting that we look with profound contempt upon theway in which savages cling to their lawless freedomy [and] prefer the

freedom of folly to the freedom of reason. We regard this as barbarism,coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity (1970b: 102). And in ararely discussed footnote Kant goes so far as to assert that:

It is usually assumed that one cannot take hostile action against anyoneunless one has already been injured by them. This is perfectly correct ifboth parties are living in a legal civil state. For the fact that the one hasentered such a state gives the required guarantee to the other, since bothare subject to the same authority. But man (or an individual people) in amere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures me by

virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not haveinjured me activelyy but he does injure me by the very lawlessness ofhis state [or condition]y for he is a permanent threat to me, and I canrequire him either to enter into a common lawful state along with me orto move away from my vicinity (1970b: 98, his emphases).



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There are two ways of reading this quote. First it might be claimed that,unlike Locke and Hobbes, Kant never equated the state of nature with

specific societies such as pre-1492 America since it was merely an abstracthypothetical concept that applied only to the anarchic system of inter-state relations. But a second reading is possible; one which suggests thatWestern states can require individual savage societies living in a state ofnature to acquire civilization and subsequently enter into a federation ofrepublican capitalist states, thereby offering an imperial trigger. For thefact is that Kants usage of the state of nature was not an abstract oneconfined to IR but was indeed applied to actual individual societies. As heput it in The Metaphysics, there can only be a few in a state of nature, as

in the wilds of America (1970c: 166). Thus Kant echoed Hobbes andLocke in equating the state of nature with the condition of Amerindiansociety. Moreover, within the long quote posted above, he seems to beimplying that an individual people can live in a separate domestic stateof nature.

The upshot of this second reading suggests that for Kant, peace cannotbe achieved so long as individual pre-civil societies exist, given that theycomprise a permanent threat to civilized states on the one hand and thatthey are incapable of entering into a lawful relationship with such stateson the other. Indeed, with respect to the latter point Kant prefaces this bysaying that unless one neighbor gives a guarantee to the other at hisrequest (which can only happen in a lawful state), the latter may treat himas an enemy (Kant, 1970b: 98). Moreover, the quote also suggests thatcivil states might compel non-civil societies to undergo a social contract(implying a possible civilizing mandate). And while Muthu mightemphasize Kants claim that savage societies can always move away fromthe vicinity of civil states (as the final part of the quote indeed suggests)

and thereby avoid undertaking a social contract, against this is the verypoint that Muthu also highlights elsewhere with respect to Kants argu-ment about globalization: that because humans live in a sphere [so] theycannot dispense infinitely but must finally put up with being near oneanother (Kant cited in Muthu, 2003: 192). This effectively means, interms of the quote above, that there is no longer any hiding place wheresavage societies can be reproduced, so that civil states might indeedcompel savage societies to enter a social contract. Regardless of apotential imperialist cue (Bowden, 2009: 147148), the key upshot here is

that Kant was intolerant of uncivilized non-European societies.Thus for Kant, those individual societies that live within a domestic

state of nature must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adaptthemselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an international state[i.e. a pacific federation of republican states] (1970b: 104). That is, they



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must move towards a capitalist republican form as a pre-requisite for thecreation of a future pacific international federation. This is reinforced by

the eighth proposition outlined in his essay Idea for a Universal Historywhere he asserts that the history of the human race as a whole can beregarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature one which beginswith the internal construction of a political constitution and culminatesin a pacific federation of republican states (1970a: 50). Accordingly,Muthus defensive claim that Kant believed that non-European societiesshould avoid the civilizing process seems unsustainable.

However, the implications of this final point, one that expresses a tel-eological historical schema, might be challenged by a number of Kantian

scholars. Defenders of Kant insist that his progressive theory of history isnot teleological. More specifically, they argue that such a teleologicalreading obscures Kants vision of the role of human agency and choice inthe making of historical progress (e.g. Apel, 1997; Wood, 2006; Brown,2009: 3744). From here they might jump to the conclusion that ourreading of Kants theory of history as teleological is not only problematicin itself but more importantly, that it also undermines the Eurocentriccharge, not least because European societies had not reached the height ofcivilization (thereby negating our assumption that for Kant civilization isconflated with Europe at that time). But what such defenders really seemto be concerned with is less Kants teleology and more the imputation of adeterministic historical schema. It would seem entirely fair to suggest thatKant ascribed a clear role for human agency. Indeed, men make their owndestiny, but not simply from constraints laid down by the past (as Marxargued), but also from the future: men act freely, to whom, it is true,what they ought to do may be dictated in advance (Kant, 2001b: 141).The similarities here with Marxs conception of agency are striking and

yet, of course, few would deny that Marxs theory of history was tele-ological. Adding in the role of human agency, then, does not immunizeKant from the teleological charge though it certainly qualifies the deter-minist charge.

Nevertheless, Kant very much had a normative telos in mind thefederation of advanced capitalist republican states (as opposed to Marxsfuture federation of stateless societies) and this was a projection of howhe wished European history would progress given that it had clearly notyet arrived at this terminus, though he was also clear that this end-point

could only be realized through human agency girded with cosmopolitanintent. And yet his ultimate stage of human destiny was an extrapolationforward of the stages model that he had derived from reading Europeshistorical past as it progressed through savagery and barbarism (seeespecially Kant, 1970a: 52). Note that almost all stages theorists of the



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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries adopted teleological schemas on thebasis that the final stage had not yet been reached, including Marx, Smith

and even Spencer (where for the latter, British imperialism had led to arebarbarization of British society). Indeed the whole point of their the-oretical interventions was precisely to advocate the political meansnecessary to reach the end of history. But that does not immunize themfrom the Eurocentric charge because their normative prescriptions were in all cases derived from their understanding of the European experi-ence, past and present.

In sum, then, Kants approach exemplifies a Eurocentric stadial model ofdevelopment while defending an idealized conception of European civili-

zation to which all non-European states should and would eventuallyconform (see also Tully, 2002). But in the light of Muthus argument, theirony is that the underlying rationale for Kants anti-imperialist posture liesin his anti-paternalist Eurocentric cultural monism, which asserts that non-European societies did not require imperial intervention precisely becausethey would auto-develop, one way or another, through the various stages toarrive at the terminus of an idealized European civilization.

Adam Smith: anti-paternalist Eurocentric foundations ofanti-imperial cosmopolitical-economy

A second exemplar of this category is Adam Smith who, in so manyrespects, pre-empts Kant. However, given limited space, we shall confineour discussion to the issue of Eurocentrism in Smiths work. In engagingwith Jennifer Pitts, and contra postcolonialism, we agree that Smith wasanti-imperialist (1776/1937: 523607). This was motivated in part by hisrevulsion of the repressive imperial policies of the Europeans (e.g. 1776/

1937: 555, 590), though for the most part it was a function of hisanti-mercantilist posture, given that colonialism was founded on stateinterventionism, monopoly commercial relations, and predatory tradingcorporations (Muthu, 2008; Hobson, 2009: Ch. 3). For Smith, colonial-ism was detrimental both to the colonies and the imperial power. But thecritical issue is whether his rejection of imperialism was a product ofcultural pluralism or (an anti-paternalist) Eurocentrism.

In A Turn to Empire Pitts accepts that Smith was a universalist who wascommitted to the stadial model of development, and that he also

approved of commercial society over pre-modern ones (as did Kant). But,she argues, his approach to non-European societies was very different tothat found in the writings of liberals such as J.S. Mill. According to Pitts,in Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith displayed considerable cross-culturalmoral empathy, or tolerant impartiality, for the cultural practices of



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non-European peoples; something that, she argues, stands in markedcontrast to the vitriolic Western triumphalism and dismissive contempt

of non-European peoples that characterizes mid-nineteenth century(paternalist) liberalism (Pitts, 2005: 25, 26, 4352). She also claims thatSmith saw all societies as equally rational and equally able. We agree fullythat Smiths approach did not denigrate non-Western peoples and nor didit celebrate the white race.

But contra Pitts, in the first instance Smith was critical of the institu-tions of non-European societies something that was apparent in a rarelydiscussed passage found in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (Smith, 17623/1982: 143171). There he begins with a discussion of polygamy and

concludes that all the institutions of certain societies, including the EastIndies, Persia, Turkey and Egypt, were irrational and regressive. Never-theless, our key point lies elsewhere: that Pitts is looking in the wrongplace for signs of Smiths Eurocentrism, conflating it with a vitriolicWestern triumphalism rather than an anti-paternalist Eurocentric dis-course that, we argue, underpins his whole cosmopolitical economictheory (as much as postcolonialists look in the wrong place for signs of hisEurocentric discourse).

The cue for this alternative reading lies in the point made by RonaldMeek: that stadial model theorists such as Smith interpret development inthe pre-commercial stages in terms of the economic categories appropriateto contemporary [Western] capitalism (Meek, 1976: 222). He rightlynotes a shift in Smiths analysis. Thus the 17623 Lectures present auniversalist account of development, where each stage corresponds to acertain demographic threshold. But this analysis is subsequently replacedin The Wealth of Nations by a Western-provincialist framework. Thus,rather than levels of population density determining the shift from one

stage to the next, in 1776 Smith emphasizes specifically European insti-tutional properties, which are then extrapolated back in time to create auniversalist stagist developmental model. That is, wealth is explained bythe extension of the division of labor, the level of commodity exchangeand the accumulation of capital, rather than in terms of demographicshifts and modes of subsistence (Meek 1976: 220222). These threefactors reach their most concentrated form within European commercialsociety. But the key point here is that Smith then reasons backwards,explaining the lower stages of subsistence through the absence or limited

presence of these three factors. In this way, the non-European world isread through the attributes of extant European society and is foundvariously wanting. The discourse of presences within the West and theirabsence in the East is one of the leitmotifs of Eurocentric developmenttheory.



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The critical point is that in The Wealth of Nations the non-Europeanworld is judged according to a European standard; and it is judged to be

consistently inferior in socio-economic and institutional terms. No lessimportantly, each society is assumed to auto-develop and to generatethrough endogenous developments. Accordingly, Europe self-generated orauto-developed through all four stages and the final breakthrough toindustrial modernity is assumed to have been achieved single-handedly bythe Europeans. Crucially, this trajectory becomes naturalized and is heldup to be the single path along which all societies will inevitably tread inthe fullness of time, thereby issuing a universal model of development towhich Eastern societies will eventually conform. Or, put differently, Smith

read non-European societies against a universalized Western norm. Toborrow Karl Marxs famous aphorism: for Smith, advanced Europeansociety only reveals to the non-Europeans the image of their own future.In this way, what appears to be a purely universal model of developmentturns out to be based on a parochial European model writ large.

Once again, this reading might be challenged by the claim that Smith,like Kant, was at times critical of European capitalism (e.g. his critique ofalienation) and that Smiths conception of the final stage was based not onwhat Europe looked like at the time given its preference for mercantilism.But again, as with Kant, the political purpose of his work was aspira-tional: to urge European governments to consolidate their position withincommercial-industrial civilization by adopting laissez-faire; a trend whichwas discernible, but certainly not clearly apparent, within British societyat the time. But this does not detract from his assumption that Europeansociety was closest in this regard and that the properties actual andaspirational were founded on a European conception of civilization.

All in all, like Kant, Smith believed that all societies and peoples would

traverse the different stages of development of their own accord, therebyimplicitly negating the need for a civilizing mission that is deemed to be soimportant for paternalist Eurocentric liberals. Moreover, when harnessedto an explicit critique of colonialism, so this anti-paternalist variantestablishes its credentials as an anti-imperialist theory, though one foun-ded on a particular brand of Eurocentric institutionalism as opposedto one founded on a cultural pluralism. Thus when Meek suggests that[m]en like Turgot and Smith were apt to ascribe the superiority of con-temporary European society (in so far as they did in fact recognize

its superiority)3 to the existence of certain important socio-economic

3 This should not be read as an implicit critique of European society in Smiths work given

that Meek is referring to the point that Smith did not see contemporary European capitalism as

perfect in every regard.



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institutions and phenomena (Meek 1976: 129), he was in fact describingthe essential properties of (anti-paternalist) Eurocentric institutionalism.

Defensive scientific racism: liberal anti-imperialism (Box D)

Finally, we identify a third group of liberal international thinkers, which wasindeed anti-imperialist as the received wisdom suggests and contra post-colonialism, but was so on scientific racist grounds rather than as a functionof any inherent liberal predisposition towards cultural pluralism. This dis-cussion will also necessarily problematize the postcolonial assumption thatracist social Darwinism represents the pinnacle of imperialist thinking.

Moreover, as we explained in Table 1, although we treat defensive scientificracism as a single category, nevertheless it comprises a universalist and arelativist strand. We shall take each briefly in turn.

Herbert Spencer (and William Graham Sumner): anti-paternalistracist universalism at home and abroad

The general understanding of Spencer is subject to considerable confusion,with many postcolonialists and others assuming that social Darwinism wasthe highest expression of imperialist racism. But social Darwinism wasinternally divided between a laissez-faire variant (as in Spencer and Sumner)and an interventionist one (as in Ward), where the former was strongly anti-imperialist as opposed to the latters pro-imperialist posture. And, as notedearlier, Spencer was notin fact a pure social Darwinist but drew considerablyon Lamarckian racism. Indeed, Spencer rejected Darwins belief thatorganisms and humans change through accidental variation in the strugglefor survival, and instead adopted Lamarcks claim that acquired character-

istics are inherited (Gossett, 1997: 1512; Stocking, 1982; Bell and Sylvest,2006: 224). As noted earlier, Lamarcks key insight was to combine geneticproperties with social behavior, which in turn undermines the popular beliefthat Spencer focussed only on genetics and race struggle as determining thedevelopment or non-development of societies. His Lamarckianism alsoallowed room for the role of human agency, thereby undermining the pop-ular belief that Spencers schema was rigidly deterministic. Note too thateven Lamarckian influence was schizophrenic insofar as it could yield ananti-imperialism (Spencer) or a pro-imperialism (Reinsch, Wilson). More-

over, Gossett points out that Spencers racism was far more malleable andallowed for race modification that was absent in the harsher variants. Indeedit was precisely his Lamarckian conception of anti-imperialism that fre-quently annoyed racists who favored imperialist domination of the primitiveraces (Gossett, 1997: 152).



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Reminiscent of the stages model of Kant and Smith, Spencers theory ofsocial evolution envisaged above all a universal developmental process,

whereby all societies naturally evolve over time from primitive savagerythrough barbarism (militant society) and into civilization (industrialsociety). Crucially for Spencer, social evolution towards civilization is notthe monopolistic preserve of the white race but is a universal feature ofallraces and societies. In particular, the process of social evolution is gov-erned by the telos of human perfection (which awaits all societies andraces). The ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain ascertain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; forinstance that all men will diey Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but

a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature [andis therefore open to all races] (1851/1864: 7980).

But equally, Spencer was clear that the white race was the superior oneand that it had pioneered the breakthrough into industrial modernityall by itself. In Principles of Sociology, I, Spencer argues that the non-European races are physically smaller and weaker (Ch. 5), and that theinferior races are given over to wholly irrational behavior governed bypassion and impulsiveness, leading him to conclude that the mind ofprimitive savages is equivalent to the childhood of civilized men (1896/2004: 5960). Indeed primitive minds are incapable of gasping abstractideas derived through higher generalization and are therefore incapable ofattaining truth and causality (1896/2004: Ch. 6). Nevertheless, despite themany limitations of non-European races they are destined, albeit in thevery long run, to reach civilization.

The key point is that the universal progress of all non-Europeansocieties can only be attained in the absence of Western intervention. Toimperially intervene would serve only to disturb their natural evolu-

tionary trajectory (Spencer, 1881, 1902; Sumner, 1883/2007). Equally,imperialism serves only to reverse the progress of Western civilized societythrough what he terms the rebarbarization of civilization (1902:157200), which converts subjects into virtual slaves, where each indi-vidual is forced to perform compulsory service to the state in ways thatare reminiscent of coercive feudalism or militant society.

The final part of his argument against imperialism returns us to one ofthe common themes of much, though not all, of racist thinking (for anexception see Ward 1903/2002: 203241). This concerns the degenerative

effect of miscegenation upon the white race. Inter-breeding betweensuperior and inferior races was categorically wrong (though he wasextremely positive about mixing the allied varieties of the Aryan race).When asked in 1892 by a Japanese political leader concerning whetherthe inter-marriage of foreigners with Japanese people was a good idea,



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he replied by saying that it should be positively forbidden. For as hewent onto explain:

The physiological basisy

appears to be that any one variety of creaturein [the] course of many generations acquires a certain constitutionaladaptation to its particular form of lifey [Thus] if you mix the con-stitutions of two widely divergent varieties which have severally becomeadapted to widely divergent modes of life, you get a constitution whichis adapted to the mode of life of neither a constitution which will notwork properly, because it is not fitted for any set of conditions whatever(Spencer cited in Gossett, 1997: 151).

Or as Sumner put it, [n]o one has yet found any way in which tworaces, far apart in blood and culture, can be amalgamated into onesociety with satisfaction to both (1903/1911: 35). And as Sumner alsoargued, the problem with imperialism is that it allows non-white racesinto the United States, which would then subvert the democratic idealsof the country. For this reason, Sumner concludes, better to give non-white races independence and to let them work out their own salvationor go without it (1898/1911: 312). Thus imperialism should also beavoided for the degenerative impact that it would have on the white

race, and for white civilization at large, as much as for the harmfuleffects it would impose on the backward colonized societies. Overall,then, the belief that non-European societies should be left alone todetermine themselves, turns out to emanate not from cultural pluralismbut from a particular brand of scientific racism.

Blair and Jordan: anti-paternalist racist relativism and thecritique of empire

The relativist strand shared with its universalist cousin a rejection ofimperialism on defensive racist grounds, though it differed insofar asit assumed that non-European races were largely incapable of auto-developing. Two key representative

hall and hobson 2010 liberal international theory.pdf

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