handshake protocols coen 350. simple protocol alice: hi, i am alice. my password is...
TRANSCRIPT
Handshake Protocols
COEN 350
Simple Protocol
Alice: Hi, I am Alice. My password is “fiddlesticks”.
Bob: Welcome, Alice.
Simple Protocol
Vulnerable to sniffing and replay attack.
Alice: Hi, I am Alice. My password is “fiddlesticks”.
Bob: Welcome, Alice....Mallory: Hi, I am Alice. My password
is “fiddlesticks”.Bob: Welcome, Alice.
Shared Secret
Alice and Bob share a secret key K.Alice: I am Alice.Bob: Encrypt R.Alice: EK(R)
Bob (calculates EK(R) as well.):
Welcome Alice.
Shared Secret
Vulnerable to DOS attack.while(1) {Mallory: I am Alice.Bob: Encrypt R.Mallory: X.Bob (EK(R) != X): Access denied.
}
Shared Secret
Vulnerable to sniffing and replay attack if R is not random or if R is repeated.
Shared Secret, use of clock
Alice: I am Alice, EK(clock).
Bob calculates clock, compares with his value: Welcome Alice.
Shared secret, use of clock
Man in the Middle + replay attack:Mallory to Bob: KILL, KILL, KILL, KILL.Alice: Hi, I’m Alice. EK(clock).
Mallory to Alice: KILL, KILL, KILL, KILL.Mallory to Bob: Hi, I’m Alice. EK(clock).
Bob: Hi, Alice.
Public Key
Alice: “I’m Alice.”Bob: “R”.Alice: “EAlice(R)”.
Bob calculates “DAliceEAlice(R) == R: Hi Alice.
Public Key
Alice: “I’m Alice.”Bob creates random challenge R:
“EAlice(R)”.
Alice: “R”.Bob checks R == R: Hi Alice.
Public Key: DOS attack
Trudy: “I’m Alice.”Bob: “R”.Trudy: “X”Bob calculates “DAliceEAlice(X) != R:
Access Denied.
Bob spends much more time computing than Trudy!
Mutual Authentication: Shared Secret
Alice: “I am Alice”Bob: “RB”
Alice: EK(RB). RA.
Bob calculates EK(RB) himself: EK(RA). Hi Alice.
Alice calculates EK(RA) herself: Hi Bob.
Mutual Authentication with less messages?
Alice: I am Alice. RA
Bob: RB. EK(RA).
Alice: Hi Bob. EK(RB).
Bob: Hi Alice.
Mutual Authentication with less steps is vulnerable to the replay attack
Session 1 Trudy: I am Alice. RA.
Session 1 Bob: RB. EK(RA).
Session 2 Trudy: I am Alice. RB.
Session 2 Bob: RB’. EK(RB).
Session 1 Trudy: Hi Bob. EK(RB).
Session 1 Bob: Hi Alice.
Warning Signals
Requestor should authenticate herself first.
Don’t have requestor and requestee do exactly the same thing. (E.g. use different key pairs.)
If you provide encryption service, you set yourself up for a key guessing attack.
Public Key: Simple Mutual Authentication
Alice: “I am Alice. RA”
Bob: “EBob(RA). RB”
Alice DBobEBob (RA)=RA: Hello Bob. EAlice(RB).
Bob: DAliceEAlice(RB) = RB: Hello Alice.
Key Distribution Centers
Maintains a shared secret for each registered user.
To set-up a connection requires the KDC to set up a session key.
Key Distribution CenterOriginal Algorithm
Alice to KDC: Alice wants Bob. KDC to Alice: Here is your session
key. KDC to Bob: Here is your session
key.
This needs to be modified.
Key Distribution Center:Needham Schroeder Protocol
Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob.KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket),
where Ticket=KB(KS,Alice).
Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2).
Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1,N3).Alice to Bob: K(N3-1).
N1, N2, N3 are nonces to prevent replay attacks.
Key Distribution Center:Needham Schroeder Protocol Variant
Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob.KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket),
where Ticket=KB(KS,Alice).
Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2).
Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1),KS(N3).Alice to Bob: K(N3-1).
N1, N2, N3 are nonces to prevent replay attacks.
Replay attack on modified NS
Alice to KDC: N1, Alice wants Bob.KDC to Alice: KA(N1,KS,Bob,Ticket), where
Ticket=KB(KS,Alice).
Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2).
Bob to Alice: KS(N2-1),KS(N3).
Alice to Bob: KS(N3-1).
Trudy as Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N2)
Bob to Alice, but intercepted by Trudy: KS(N2-1), KS(N4)
Trudy as Alice to Bob: Ticket, KS(N4).
Bob to Alice, but intercepted by Trudy. KS(N4-1), KS(N5).
Trudy as Alice to Bob: KS(N4-1).
Key Distribution Center
Assume that Alice’s key has become compromised.
Trudy can now present herself as Alice to Bob with an old ticket.
Tickets need to have an expiration date!!!!!!!!!!!
