Heritage and Nationalism in the Preah Vihear Dispute Draft Version

Volker Grabowsky

(pp. 1-25)

Voices from Cambodia: Discourses on the Preah Vihear Conflict Response paper by Sok Udom DETH

(pp. 26-30)

On 7 July 2008, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee announced at its 32nd Session held in Quebec its decision to put the temple complex of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage list as the property of Camboda. The nomination included only the actual temple buildings and their immediate surroundings, but not the whole area of the sacred site which is much larger and extends into an area disputed between Cambodia and Thailand, and even beyond into Thai territory. The decision was greeted with joy everywhere in Cambodia but met with strong opposition in Thailand. Only three days later, on 10 July 2008, Thai foreign Minster Nopphadon Patthama declared his resignation, after the opposition had been accusing of having betrayed the Thai position considering the temple complex also as a part of the cultural heritage of Thailand. One of the most concise descriptions of the unique site of Preah Vihear (Thai: Phra Wihan) is from a short essay on the legal implications of the 1962 judgment of the International Court of Justice to be discussed further below:

The Temple of Preah Vihear is an ancient shrine situated on the borders of Thailand and Cambodia. The temple and the grounds are of considerable artistic and archaeological interest, and are potentially important militarily. The natural boundary between the two countries in this region is formed by the high Dangrek Range, which, in the area of Preah Vihear, rises abruptly out of the Cambodian plain forming a cliff-like escarpment from which the land then descends to the north into Thailand. The temple is situated on a promontory at the edge of the escarpment overlooking the Cambodian Plain in the south (Duke Law Journal 1963, p. 307).

Built in several phases over a period of almost three centuries, probably starting in the late ninth century, the temple was originally dedicated to Shiva, the Hindu god of destruction, and known, according to extant stone inscriptions, as VikhareWvara, Summit of God Shiva (Skt Wikhara + iWvara) (Roveda 2000, p. 10). At least since the rise of Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia to the religion of the state at the end of the thirteenth century, was the Hindu temple transformed into a Buddhist monastery. The present-day name Prasat Preah Vihear probably derives from that time. This name is testified as Wihan Sawan (Heavenly vihra) in the 1877 version of

2

the Royal Chronicles of Cambodia, translated into Thai in 1917.1 When the still powerful Khmer empire began to reorientate itself towards the sea, the territories north of the Dangrek Mountains i.e., todays Isan got out of the direct control of the Cambodian royal court. The Preah Vihear temple has since then been merely of local importance for the Kui or Suai people inhabiting the Dangrek Mountains on both sides of the present-day Thai-Cambodian border. It seems that the temple was abandonned completely in later times and only visited by forest monks for medidation practices. Preah Vihear was unknown to the Bangkok elite until 1899 when Phracao Brommawongthoe Krom Luang Sanphasitthiprasong, the Siamese High Commissioner (kha luang thesaphiban) of Monthon Isan, visited the rough terrain south of Kantharalak and discovered by mere chance the temple ruins, overgrown by climbing plants.2 However, French explorer tienne Aymonier who visited the ruins only a few years earlier and to whom we owe the first description of the temple and its environments confirms that at that time the local people of Khukhan (old name for Sisaket), coming from places far away, were pouring in to the monuments of Preah Vihear to celebrate the Buddhist New Year at this place of pilgrimage.3

The late re-discovery of the temple more than a century ago indicates the geogaphical isolation of the frontier on both sides of the Dangrek (Thai: Dongrak) mountain range. The Siamese state which had conquered the whole region in the last quarter of the eighteenth century exercised only a nominal control over this border land by the end of the nineteenth century. With the introduction of a centralised system of administration, along the lines which the European colonial powers had implemented in their Southeast Asian possessions, Siam also took over the Western concept of a territorial state with cleary defined borders (Thongchai 1991). Not long after the very existence of Preah Vihear had come to the attention of both the Siamese elite and French colonial administrators in Cambodia, two border treaties were concluded between France and Siam in February 1904 and March 1907 stipulating that the new boundary between Siam and the French protectorate of Cambodia should follow the watershed line in the Dangrek mountain range. A map drawn by French cartographers based on a survey of the mixed Siamese-French border commission was added in late autumn 1907 as Appendix I to the 1907 border treaty. It shows the borderline slightly north of Prasat Preah Vihear thus leaving the entire temple within Cambodian territory. The divergence of this borderline running from the actual watershed line following the edge of the cliff-like escarpment at Preah Vihear has evolved into a dispute of ownership culminating in nationalist discourses about heritage.

1 Luang Rangdet Anan, Ratchaphongsawadan krung kamphucha [The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia], 2nd

edition. Bangkok 2007 (1917), p. 59. 2 The Siamese High Commissioner (kha luang thesaphiban) who discovered the temple was Phracao

Brommawongthoe Krom Luang Sanphasitthiprasong, one of the half-brothers of King Chulalongkorn. See Anucha Paephanwan, Exclusive kan mang rang khao phra wihan [Exklusive: The Politics of the Khao Phra Wihan Conflict]. Bangkok 2008, p. 28.

3 tienne Aymonier, Le Cambodge, Vol. II (Les Provinces Siamoises). Paris 1901, p. 207. [Ce monument de Preah Vihar, abondonn et loign de tout village, est rest de nos jours un lieu vnr, un lieu de plerinage o les Seigneurs et le peuple de Koukhan accourent de loin pour y clbrer les ftes du nouvel an.]

3

This paper examines first concepts of heritage and their significance for national identies in the light of the current Thai-Cambodian border dispute; then a short overview of the historical background of the Preah Vihear conflict is provided. Thereafter the ongoing public debate in Thailand over Preah Vihear as a symbol of national sovereignty and Thai cultural heritage is analysed while the corresponding debate in Cambodia will discussed separately by Sok Udom Deth. Finally, perspectives for a long-lasting solution of the management of Preah Vihear as World Heritage will be explored.

Heritage: definitions and concepts

The Oxford English Dictionary defines heritage as property that is or may be inherited an inheritance and, more concretely, as valued objects and qualities such as historic buildings and cultural traditions that have been passed down from previous generations.4 This definition evokes that heritage is something which can be passed from one person or group to another over the course of time. This passage of property may pertain both to physical objects and places of heritage as well as to practices of heritage. The UNSECO Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, adopted in Paris on 16 November 1972, provides in Article 1 a rather narrow definition of cultural heritage restricting it to monuments such as architectural works, groups of separate or connected buildings, and archaeological sites. Not included in this definition are the intangible and quite often invisible practices of cultural heritage, such as language, rites and beliefs, popular songs, oral traditions, literature, and festive events.5 With the start of the new millenium, however, UNSECO has broadened its scope of world cultural heritage by establishing a Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.

As Rodney Harrison observes, both kinds of cultural heritage are intertwined For every object of tangible heritage there is also an intangible heritage that wraps around it the language we use to describe it, for example, or its place in social practice and religion (Harrison 2010, p. 10). Emmon Hahn points out that there is an inherent relationship between heritage and issues of identity reflecting two questions which arise when defining the term 1.) Who inherits what from whom? and 2.) What rights does that process of inheritance give the inheritor?6 These questions, Hahn continues, require the explicit identification of present and past owners of inherited cultural property and of what property constitutes that inheritance. Serving as a link between the past and the present, heritage provides individuals as well as groups and larger communities the tool for the creation of identity narratives. Or, as R. Hewison has expressed it

4 See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/heritage (consulted on 9 September 2014). 5 UNSECO, Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage, adopted by the

General Conference at this seventeenth session, Paris, 16 November 1972, p. 2, in: http://whc.unesco.org/ archive/convention-en.pdf.

6 E. Emmons Hahn, UNESCOs Heritage Policies and World Heritage as a Middle Path between Imperialism and Nationalism, essay written in December 2011 for Professor Lor Khatchadourians seminar The Archaeology of Orientalism at Cornell University, in http://sustainableheritagetourism.com/heritage/essay-world-heritage-alternative-politics.

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/heritage

4

aptly, [the] past is the foundation of individual identity, objects from the past are the source of significance as cultural symbols.7 According to Graham et al., an authentic preservation and even restoration of things classified as heritage is untainable as all heritage is created in and by the present. Viewed in this light, heritage can be defined as that part of the past which we select in the present of contemporary purposes, be they economic, cultural, political or social (Graham et al. 2005, p. 28f.).

Heritage has a bearing for the present and should not be confused with the past, as Schouten stresses Heritage is not the same as history. Heritage is highly processed through methodology, ideology, nationalism, local pride, romantic ideas or just plain marketing into a commodity.8 Some authors even argue that besides its social and political dimensions heritage is used for economic purposes, heritage places being mananged as places of consumption.9 In other words, heritage can be understood as a resource of economic and cultural capital (Graham et al. 2005, p. 33). Thus there is a clear connection between heritage and tourism as highlighted in Hewisons book The Heritage Industry (1987). The relationship between heritage and travel, however, can be traced back deep into history. Herodotus list of the Seven Wonders of the World, reproduced in ancient Hellenic textbooks, might not be mentioned in this context. The Thai and Lao chronicle abouth Buddhas Travels around the World (Phracao liap lok) connecting famous religious pilgrimage sites in Southeast Asia with the historical Buddha is as another case in point. In contrast to pre-modern times, the UNESCO World Heritage List as a phenonmenon of the late twentieth century attests to the influences of global migrations and transnationalism. Its particular image of heritage is imbedded in a canon of heritage places which circulates freely around the globe and becomes widely available for the consumption of people throughout the world (Harrison 2005, p. 21).

The global dimension of heritage is recognized in the 1972 UNESCO Convention which deplores the insufficient and incomplete ability of nations to protect their material heritage from deterioration or disappearance and emphasizes that parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole.10 With all its humanistic ideals and cheritable goals the Convention was still inspired by an essentialist notion of culture, as something confining and static which hade been developed and maintained by certain societies and indigenous groups over a long time and, as such, was now threatened, as Hauser-Schublin aptly remarks (2011, p. 38). She emphasises that the idea of an authentic culture which can be ascribed to a certain group of people who can claim exclusive ownership has been challenged during the last couple of decades. [I]t has been illustrated how easily cultural phenomena, classified by UNESCO as

7 R. Hewison, The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline. London: Methuen, 1987, p. 47, quoted

from Harrison, What is heritage?, p. 17. 8 F. Schouten, Heritage as Historical Reality, in Heritage, Tourism and Society. London Mansell, p. 21

quoted from Tim Winter, Heritage and Nationalism, p. 1. 9 R.D. Sack, Place, Modernity and the Consumers World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.

158f., in Graham et al., The uses and abuses of heritage, p. 31. 10 Quoted from Hahn, UNESCOs Heritage Policies and World Heritage , p. 10.

5

Intangible Heritage, have transcended borders. The latter also applies to the cultural settings in which monumental heritage is located. They cannot be separated from the network of social relations in which such constructions are embedded (Ibid.). The temple complex of Preah Vihear, it may be argued, is an excellent case study to exemplify the transnational character of monumental heritage sites.

The French explorer and linguist tienne Aymonier, the first European on record who visited Preah Vihear, observed that the temple had a special cultural significance only for the Kui people, the original inhabitants in the southern section of the Khorat Plateau and in the upper part of the lowland plain of northern Cambodia. Though originally built by Khmer kings of the Angkorean Empire a millennium ago, there is no evidence for any strong connection of Preah Vihear with the political and cultural complex of the Cambodian lowlands, at least until French colonial rule. It was French scholars like Groslier and Parmentier who defined Preah Vihear as one of the most important monuments of the classical ancient Khmer art and part of the national cultural heritage of Cambodia. Like Angkor and other monument sites, Preah Vihear became a symbol of an ethnic-based Cambodian nation. In this vein, the nations geo-body (Thongchai Winichakul) would ideally be determined by the distribution of the ruins of ancient Khmer stone monuments. It is not without reason that the silhouette of Angkor Wat became the central symbol of the Cambodian national flag under successive royalist, militarist and Communist regimes (Anderson 1991, p. 183). In view of the fact that archaeological sites from the Angkorean period are scattered throughout northeastern and eastern Thailand, such identification of ancient Khmer architecture with Khmer ethnicity and Cambodian national identity inevitably collides with Thai nationalism. The Thais, on their part, developed a concept of Thainess which incorporates the monument sites of the ancient Khmer empire in present-day Thailand as part of their own cultural heritage. In the heydays of Thai nationalism, in the 1930s and 1940s, nationalist ideologues like Luang Vichitr Vadakarn claims that the Thai were the true heirs of Khmer (called Khm in Thai) civilization whereas present-day Cambodian were either not the same people of the ancient Khmers or only their degenerated descendants (Luang Vichitr Vadakarn 1941, p. 129; cf. Charnvit et al. 2013, p.6). It is gainst this background that the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the ownership of Preah Vihear in the late 1950s and early 1960s and its renewed outbreack in 2008 has to be judged.

The Historical background of the conflict

In the period from 1907 to 1929 there was no visible presence of state authority, neither from the French nor from the Siamese government. Visits of Cambodian or French officials from Kompong Thom province, to which the Dangrek sector near Preah Vihear belonged, are not documented. But also the Siamese side could only claim a few sporadic visits from the district seat of Kantharalak situated 15 kilometres north of the temple complex. It is reported that the inhabitants of a small village situated in the vicinity of Prasat Preah Vihear contined to pay taxes to the provincial authorities of Khukhan (later: Sisaket) province (ICJ 1962, pp. 94ff.).

6

During the whole period from 1907 to 1929 Prasat Preah Vihear was not given any remarkable publicity in Siamese, Cambodian or French media.

This situation changed in early 1930. On 29 January 1930, Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rachanuphap (a younger brother of King Chulalongkorn and former Minister of Interior) visited Prasat Preah Vihear together with one of his daughters and serveral Siamese officials from the nobility. The prince who was also a well-known expert in Thai and Southeast Asian archaeology was greeted in Preah Vihear by the French governor of Kompong Thom and by Henri Parmentier. The famous architect and art-historian Parmentier, member of the cole franaise dExtrme-Orient, led Prince Damrong personally through the temple complex and gave the Siamese guests some expert explanations. Several years later, Damrong published the impressions of his visit along with several photos in his book Report on a survey of archaeological sites in monthon Nakhn Ratchasima. Although he undertook his visit of Preah Vihear as a private person, Prince Damrong, who at that time held the position as Chief of the Supreme State Council, was welcome by his French hosts as a high-ranking state-guest. What is more, Damrong had to swallow a bitter pill when the French tricolore was hoisted for his welcome.11 As Damrongs daughter remarked many years later, her father did not dare to protest, given the arrogant and intrusive behaviour of the French and given the painful experiences of the past.12

In 1934/35 the Siamese government of Phot Phahonyothin sent a survey mission to investigate the border in the Dangrek mountain range and, in particular, to determine the precise borderline in the Preah Vihear area. It was discovered for the first time that the French map of 1907 (also called Annex 1 map) showed an erroneous borderline placing the temple on the wrong side. The real watershed was not running north of the temple but directly below the rock on which the main sanctuary of Preah Vihear is situated.13 It was evident that the French experts made a fundamental mistake in 1907 when mapping the creek OTasem. The creek was running slighly

11 Charnvit 2008, pp. 1424. In an excellent essay, written ten years before the outbreak of the latest Thai-

Cambodian dispute, the American anthropologist Peter Cuasay brilliantly explains why the majority of judges completely misinterpreted Prince Damrongs polite overlooking of the French Residents behavior as a political abandonment of sovereignty. According to Cuasay, the ICJ judges were largely ignorant of the colonial-imperialist context in mainland Southeast Asia which still prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s thus failing to understand the inconsistent attitude of the Siamese elite towards the use maps or the exercise of sovereignty. See Peter Cuasay, Borders on the Fantastic Mimesis Violence, and Landscape at the Temple of Preah Vihear, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, escpecially po. 855864.

12 Princess Phun Phitsamai Diskul is quoted by the Taiwanese judge Wellington Koo in his separate opinion as follows It was generally known at the time that we only give the French an excuse to seize more territory by protesting. Things had been like that since they came into the river Chao Phya with their gunboats and their seizure of Chanthaburi. Quoted from International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, pp. 91. See also ibid., pp. 122ff.

13 Anucha 2008, p. 84. See also International Court of Justice 1962, p. 86 (dissenting opinion of Taiwanese (National Chinese) judge Wellington Koo).

7

further south than determined in 1907.14 Immediately after this discovery the Siamese government printed a map which showed the actual watershed as the boundery line in the Dangrek sector placing the temple of Preah Vihear within Siamese territory. Besides this map which was distributed only for internal use the Siamese continued printing maps for various administrative and military purposes which were based on the Annex 1 map. Thus the Siamese demonstrated at least an inconsistent and careless usage of maps.15

In lasted until 1939 when Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, the then Director-General of the Department of Fine Arts (Krom Sinlapakn), objected to the Annex 1 map. The government of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram tried in vain to obtain a new agreement with the French authorities in Indochina. In a public declaration on 11 October 1940, the government in Bangkok unilaterally placed Prasat Preah Vihear and the territory north of the actual watershed under Thai protection. In the same year, the temple was inscribed by the Department of Fine Arts as an ancient archaeological monument of Thailand. Thereafter, a small group of soldiers was sent to hoist the Thai flag over Prasat Preah Vihear.16

After a short and victorious military campaign against the French colonial troops in Indochina, the Convention of Tokyo was concluded through the mediation of Japan on 28 January 1941. The Convention envisaged the retrocession to Thailand of all territories ceded to France in 1904 and 1907. Through this stipulation Preah Vihear was placed once again under Thai sovereignty.17 After the war, Thailand had to return all territories that she obtained during World War II and by end of 1946 the status quo ante was restored (Charnvit 2008, pp. 2533). But the Thai troops were not withdrawn from the Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding. The government in Bangkok always assumed that both the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904 and that of 1907 determined the watershed as the border line in the Dangrek region. The watershed that counted in the view of the Thai was the real one not the obviously mistaken one on which the Annex I map was based. Three years later, in 1949, France filed with the consent of the Cambodian colonial government an official complaint against Thailand. The complaint demanded the total withdrawel of the Thai civilian and military personal from Preah Vihear (Anucha 2008, p. 57). Thailand ignored this demand and clung to the status quo. There was no

14 These facts were confirmed by Dutch experts like Professor Willem Schermerhorn and analysed in detail by

the Australian judge Sir Percy Spender in his unusually long and haunting dissenting opinion. See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, pp. 122ff.

15 The inconsistent and contradictory use of maps by the Siamese/Thai side is deplored by many Thai nationalists as this was one decisive factor contributing to the ICJ decision of 1962 in favour of Cambodia. See Thamnong Pracharak, Nam yk ok thai-kampucha, Bangkok: Samnakphim r.s. 129, p. 159.

16 Duangthida, Prasat phra wihan khwam khatyaeng talt khng sng prathet? Bangkok 2008, pp. 118f. See also Phichet Saengtong (ed.) 2008. Phromdaen bon phaen kradat prasat khao phra wihan, p. 155.

17 In 1941, the Department of Fine Arts (Krom Sinlapakorn) published a book entitled Thai samai sang chat (Thailand in the age of nation-building) mentioning that the temple of Preah Vihear had been returned (klap khn ma) to Thailand. Prof. Bowornsak Uwanno concludes that this is an implicit acknowledgement from the Thai side that Preah Vihear had come under French (Cambodian) suzerainty after the treaties of 1904 and 1907. See Bowornsak Uwanno 2013, p. 42.

8

further official protest from the French side until the release of Cambodia into complete independence in November 1953.

Shortly thereafter the government in Phnom Penh sent three guardians to watch the Temple, but they were sent back by the Thai authorities. When the Cambodian ambassador in Bangkok informed the Thai government about his own governments intention to dispatch troops to Prasat Preah Vihear to take possession of the Temple, an armed police unit was immediately sent to the area to prevent such action of the Cambodian authorities. Inspite of strong Cambodian protests in January 1954, the status quo with Thai physical presence in the Preah Vihear area remained unchallenged during the next four years.18 It seemed that the influential governor of Siem Reap province, Dap Chhuon (Thai name: Chuan Khemphet), had turned a blind eye to the Thai presence in Preah Vihear for quite a while. Due to domestic political problems in Cambodia and fostered by the ascension to power of the authoritarian nationalist military regime of Marshal Sarit Thanarat in Bangkok, the smouldering conflict escalated in summer 1958 and culminated in the severance of relations in November of the same year.19 In the following year Dap Chhuon and several other right-wing Cambodian politicians were arrested as part of a Thai-supported international conspirancy the socalled Bangkok Plot to topple the government of Prince Sihanouk and finally executed. Thai-Cambodian relations had broken down (Sok Udom Deth 2014, p. 66f.). Very popular in Thailand at that time was a riddle based on a pun. To the question Thai people do not like what colour [si arai]? the following answer was given The do not like Sihanouk (quoted from Cuasay 1998, p. 880). In October 1959, the government in Phnom Penh appealed to the International Court of Justice in The Hague to make a final decision on the sovereignty of Prasat Preah Vihear (Leifer 1961/62, pp. 361374).

The Judgment of The Hague of 15 June 1962 and its Consequences

It took almost three more years until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a judgment. First of all, it should be emphasized that the Preah Vihear Case probably was one of the most complicated and most contested cases about which the ICJ had to render a judgment.20 The ICJ had to decide on the following five demands of the Cambodian government.

18 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear , p. 86 (dissenting opinion of

Judge Wellington Koo). See also Phichet Saengthong, Phromdaen bon phaen kradat, p. 158f. 19 Relations between Thailand and Cambodia 1959, p. 4. At the height of the conflict between Thailand and

Cambodia Dap Chuen was accused of being part of a Thai-US plot to assassinate Prince Sihanouk in a scheme to annex Cambodia. The pro-Thai governor was arrested and later executed. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1961, p. 6. Cf. Palmer 1977.

20 The competent jurisdiction of the ICJ to mediate in the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand resulted from the fact that on 20 May 1950 the Thai government had explicitely recognised the International Court of Justice in Geneva. Even though this Court had already ceased to exist sine 1946, the posterior Thai recognition had to be transferred to the Geneva Courts successor, namely the International Court of Justice in The Hague, established in 1945 by the UN Charta. This interpretation is confirmed by the Thai expert of international law,

9

1. the binding character of the French map of 1907 according to international law;

2. the fixation of the Thai-Cambodian border in the Dangrek sector according to the above mentioned map;

3. the sovereignty of Cambodia over Prasat Preah Vihear;

4. the obligation of Thailand to withdraw her miltary forces from the ruins of the Preah Vihear temple

5. the restitution of all objects of cultural value which Thailand had removed from the temple.

As to the first two demands of Cambodia namely, a) to determine that the French map of 1907 had binding character according to international law and b) to define the actual border between Cambodia and Thailand in correspondence to this map the ICJ made the decision that these two demands were beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. For the exact location of state borders have to be determined by bilateral negotiations between the concerned states. Yet, the ICJ evaluated the first two Cambodian demands indirectly, by using the validity of the French map as important evidence in its decision on the third through fifth demands of the Cambodian government.

The ICJ decided by nine to three votes in favour of Cambodia on her third and fourth demands. It stipulated that a) Preah Vihear was situated on territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia and b) that Thailand was obliged to withdraw from the temple and its vicinity all military and police forces as well as other security personnel. The ICJ decided by seven votes to five that Thailand was obliged to restore to Cambodia all artifacts which had been removed from the temple or its surroundings since 1954.

The courts majority based its arguments above all on the validity of the French map of autumn 1907 (scale 1:200,000) and also on the absence of protest on the part of the Thai authorities against this map. In the view of the majority of the judges the fact that Prince Damrong never complained against the hoisting of the French national flag during his visit of Preah Vihear in early 1930 was interpreted as tacit consent. Because of Damrongs high-ranking position in the Siamese state apparatus, the private character of his visit as emphasised by the Thai side was refuted. Damrongs archaeological fact-finding mission was seen as having had an at-least half-official character (ICJ 1962, pp. 24ff.). Therefore, according to the legal principal Qui tacit consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset (He who keeps silent is held to consent if he must and can speak), also called estoppel in international law, the ICJ ruled that Thailand was bound by the limitations of the frontier as fixed in the Annex I map.21

Professor Bowornsak Uvanno, Chae ekkasan lap thi sut prasat phra wihan ph.s. 25052551 [Disclosing top secret documents on Prasat Phra Wihan, AD 19622008]. Bangkok 2008. p. 29.

21 See Sven Miling, A Legal View of the Case of the Temple Preah Vihear, in World Heritage, Angkor and Beyond: Circumstances and Implications of UNESCO Listings in Cambodia, ed. by Brigitta Hauser-Schublin. Gttingen: Universittsverlag Gttingen, p. 61. Miling points out that the very broad notion of the term

10

The dissenting opinions focused on the circumstance that neither Siam nor France ever departed or intended to depart from the principle of the watershed as borderline in the Dangrek sector. The expert opinion of several internationally recognised geologists from the Netherlands had proven that the watershed between the Nam Mun and the Mekong ran directly below Prasat Preah Vihear, not only in 1962 but also at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, Sir Percy Spender argued that the French map was not binding according to international law as it did not bear the signatures of any high-ranking French government official (ICJ 1962, p. 118).

In spite of serious reservations expressed by the British judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Separate Opinion, the majority of judges arrived at the conclusion There is, however, no reason to think that the Parties attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared with the overriding importance, in the interests of finality, of adhering to the map line as eventually delimited and as accepted by them (Ibid., p. 33). At the same time the court declined to make any judgment on the treaty character of the Annex I Map or to declare that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thailand in the neighbourhood of Preah Vihear was the line marked on the Annex I Map. This refusal was partly grounded on the fact that these first two requests were enlargements of the original claim by the Cambodian government but the requests were also considered too vague to allow the Court or the Government of Thailand to appreciate what are the limits of the territory claimed (Ibid., pp. 13ff.). Limiting the subject of the dispute to the sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear, the ICJ decided only that the temple itself, a clearly defined small piece of land, and its vicinity were located on Cambodian territory.

The judgment of The Hague was greeted with storms of enthusiasm all over Cambodia. In Thailand, on the other hand, the judgment sparked off waves of protests. People were in shock and called the day when the ICJ announced its judgment the Shameful 15 June 1962 (15 mithuna wan appayot).

Whereas Phnom Penh claimed the whole overlapping area marked by the watershed line and the line of the Annex I Map as Cambodian territory, the government in Bangkok soon produced a map with a scale of 1:50,000 delineating the border in the Preah Vihear frontier region. The borderline marked on that map followed the actual watershed and left only the Preah Vihear temple and its immediate surroundings on the Cambodian side of the border.22 In this light it was of great symbolic importance that the Thais, when withdrawing from Preah Vihear, not only took down the national flag but carried with them the whole flagpole including its socket.

estoppel has often been criticized on the basis of a well-founded judicial argumentation, not only by the separate and dissenting opinions, but also by a number of scholars.

22 Bora Touch (2009, p. 222) stresses that this Thai map only appeared as an annex to the 1962 Note when it was later published in the Foreign Affairs Bulletin. This document was not published in UN official documents, nor does it exist in the UN databases.

11

As Shane Strate aptly remarks in his analysis of the Thai public discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s on the Preah Vihear dispute, the loss of the temple became a symbol of Thailands national humiliation by colonialist and neo-imperialist powers and institutions. The Thais clearly felt betrayed not only by their enemies Cambodia and France but also by their friends and allies, in particular the United States. Strate recalls that one major factor which contributed to the Cambodian legal victory in 1962 was the fact that former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, one of the chief architects of the Cold War, became highly influential as lead counsel for Cambodia in the Hague.23 In a way, the United States needed Cambodia more that it needed Thailand. Since Thailand under the Sarit regime was a US vassal without any alternative options, Sihanouks Cambodia, which had flirted with Beijing and Moscow since the late 1950s, was considered a much more strategically important keystone which needed to be kept in the anti-Communist camp at all costs. Without Achesons persuasiveness the balance of power at the ICJ might have been different.

In the years and decades following the ICJs ruling, the Thai and Cambodian governments failed to undertake through bilateral negotiations a final delineation of their 800-kilometre-long border, including the Preah Vihear section.24 This failure was basically related to political developments in Cambodia. In 1970, Cambodia became a sideshow in the second Indochina War. During two decades of civil war, foreign intervention and murderous revolution, several Cambodian regimes and resistance movements became dependent on Thai political, military, and humanitarian support. They accepted reluctantly a modus vivendi, which allowed the Thai largely unrestricted access to the temple complex. A new situation occurred in 1997 after the Khmer Rouge who held their Preah Vihear stronghold over many years, surrendered and full peace was restored in Cambodia.

Preah Vihear as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site

At the beginning of the last decade Cambodia and Thailand were seriously planning to inscribe the contested temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List. On 7 June 2000, the governments in Phnom Penh and Bangkokthe latter still under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the Democrat Partysigned a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary which sought to pave the way for a solution of the Preah Vihear dispute and other unresolved border problems. A Joint Boundary Commission was set up for that purpose. From 2002 until 2007 there was an ongoing discussion between the two

23 Strate, Shane, A pile of stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai symbol of National Humilation, South East Asia

Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2013, p. 66. Public resentment of Achesons brilliant services for Cambodia prompted the Foreign Affairs Bulletin of Thailand to ask how the American people [would] feel if someone of similar position in Thailand were to act for Mr. Fidel Castro in an international body and especially a judicial body? Quoted from Cuasay 1998, p. 865.

24 In 1966 there were 300 frontier incidents and 320 dead or wounded. Between 1422 April 1966, the relative peaceful situation along the Thai-Cambodian border in the Dangrek sector near Preah Vihear was severely disturbed by the intrusion of Thai armed forces into areas in the vicinity of the temple fortified by the Camboadian army. See Letter dated 17 May 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodian addressed to the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council, document no 8/7305, 18 May 1966. See also Cuasay 1998, p. 881.

12

sides on whether Thailand should give her consent to Cambodias decision to nominate Prasat Preah Vihear as a Cambodian World Heritage site or whether the temple should be jointly nominated by Thailand and Cambodia. At a meeting in Bangkok on 25 March 2004 a joint committee, headed by Cambodian deputy prime minister Sok Anh and Thai foreign minister Surakiat Sathirathai, agreed on a number of basic principles for the resolution of solve all major problems related to developing the temple of Preah Vihear as a world heritage for humanity (mradok lok khng manutsayachat). Both sides agreed at least implicitly on joint inscription of Preah Vihear on the UNESCO World Heritage List. A joint nomination made sense since parts of the wider temple complex, such as the Sa (Sra) Trao reservoir, are either situated inside the disputed border area or even north of the Annex I Map line (Puangthong 2013, pp. 47ff.).

Three years later, in talks held in 2007 and early 2008, the Cambodian government flatly rejected the idea of a joint nomination, arguing that the temple was under the sole sovereignty of Cambodia and that Thailand should make a separate nomination for archaeological sites in areas under Thai sovereignty. How can this sudden change of mind be interpreted? Why did Hun Sen and Sok Anh decide to pursue no longer the idea of Preah Vihear as transnational and trans-border joint heritage of Cambodian and Thailand? Puangthong speculates that Cambodias decision was clearly based on the fact that the temple legally belongs to Cambodia. Its legal ownership, however, had never been questioned, either by Chuan Leekpai or by Thaksin Shinawatra. She further surmises that the Cambodians feared a Thai desire for Cambodian territory, particularly for this cultural site (Ibid., p. 48f.). Such fears are only understandable if we take into consideration the maximalist Cambodian legal standpoint, as expressed in an article by Cambodian lawyer Bora Touch entitled Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple A Cambodian Position. This position claims that the ICJ had already determined the location of the boundary in 1962 and that any Thai move to negotiate a boundary line deviating from the line marked on the Annex I Map should be considered as an unjustified claim of Cambodian territory. One may sympathise, even as a Thai scholar, with such a maximalist position which perceives any negotiations with Thailand on the border issue as just an opportunity for the Thai side to accept reality, in other word, to surrender to the legal position of Cambodia. It is interesting to note that Bora Touch who of course speaks for himself and not for the Cambodian government interprets the MoU, signed still under the Democrat Party government on 7 June 2000, as a binding international agreement in which Thailand accepted the Annex I Map as the terms of reference and thus also the border line marked on that map.

The military-appointed Thai government of General Surayudh Chulanont tried to persuade the Cambodian side to accept a joint Cambodian-Thai inscription of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site. One of the main arguments was that the only practical access to the temple was from the Thai side of the border. Besides, several smaller temples and water reservoirs were situated in the contested zone claimed by both countries. At the thirty-first annual meeting of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2007 the Thai government insisted on that solution. This prompted UNESCO to postpone its decision to the thirty-second annual meeting in Quebec in July 2008. But in spring 2008 the Samak

13

Sundaravej government suddenly changed the Thai position and accepted the registration of Prasat Preah Vihear as an exclusively Cambodian World Heritage site (Anucha 2008, pp. 93ff.).

Samaks foreign minister, Noppadon Pattama, declared the MoU which he had negotiated with the Cambodian side an important diplomatic success, because the Cambodian government had pledged to restrict the registration of Prasat Preah Vihear to the territory immediately surrounding the temple, presenting a map to prove that no parts of the disputed zone were part of the deal. According to Noppadon, the Joint Thai-Cambodian Declaration did not imply an agreement on the border at the Preah Vihear sector. The then parliamentary opposition in Thailand nonetheless appealed to the Constitutional Court which decided that the Joint Declaration indeed had a legally binding character and therefore rquired parliamentary approval, according to Article 190 of the Thai constitution of 2007. As the government had failed to obtain parliamentary approval before signing the Joint Declaration, the government needed either to seek this approval or to revoke the Joint Declaration. Facing growing public pressure, especially from the Peoples Alliance for Democracy (the Yellow Shirts), the Samak government chose the second option. The government of Somchai Wongsawat, who succeeded Samak as prime minister in August 2008, even sent a letter to the president of the UN Security Council stating that Thailand does not recognize [the Annex I Map] under the Memorandum of Understanding in 2000 as the basis for demarcation (quoted from Bora Touch 2009, pp. 226ff.). In the view of Cambodian legal experts this was, however, a futile attempt to avoid eventual recognition of the Thai-Cambodian border on the basis of the French-drawn map of 1907, as the MoU of 2000 was a binding international agreement, as mentioned above (Ibid., p. 226).

The Preah Vihear debate in Thailand

In the following section it will be discussed how the conflict was perceived in Thai civil socierty and how it was exploited by the contending political factions for their respective political agenda. Numerous publications have appeared in Thailand since the escalation of the temple dispute in 2008. They mirror a controversial public debate in Thailand which has as much to do with Thai-Cambodian relations, concepts of national sovereignty and cultural heritage as with internal Thai politics. Some publications have an academic or half-academic background while others resemble pamphlets designed for political agitation. They may roughly be divided into three four groups reflecting four different approaches to a solution of the Preah Vihear dispute. The first approach adopts a hard-line attitude demanding that any Thai government should stick to an uncompromising stance in the defence of Thailands legal position which had been left unchanged since 1962. This approach has most strongly been advocated by the Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) the socalled Yellow Shirt movement and called ultra-nationalist by its enemies. It is supported by several other sectors of Thai civil society, such as the Thai Patriotic Network and the Buddhist sectarian movement Santi Asoke. The second, more flexible approach favours compromises with the Cambodian side to reach an end of the deadlock though, if feasible, not at the expense of Thai sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 large

14

disputed area. The second tendency is supported with variations by the main political parties, including the Democrats and the majority of the pro-Thaksin Pha Thai Party. A third approach is supported by radical, anti-nationalistic intellectuals and a small minority of the Thai public. It advocates Thai acceptance of the Cambodian legal position as an unavoidable price which the Thai people have to pay to live in peace with their eastern neighbour. Finally, a fourth approach argues that any long-lasting solution to the Preah Vihear dispute should, above all, take into account the legitimate interests of the local people on both sides of the border. This approach is anti-nationalistic as well but it is not pro-Cambodian as it refutes the exclusive ownership of any of the two nation-states Thailand and Cambodian over the temple complex.

Approach 1: Anti-Thaksin nationalists

Though all Thai governments after 2008, notwithstanding their political orientation, insisted that the MoU of June 2000 did not compromise Thai legal claims on the disputed area in the neighbourhood of the Preah Vihear temple, such a chain of arguments was grist for the mill of the nationalist forces in Thailand. One of the first major publications appeared only a few months after the first military clashes following the nomination of the Preah Vihear temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site of Cambodia. It was edited by the Editorial Board of Phuchatkan (Manager), a newspaper group founded by media-mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, one of the top leaders of the PAD. This publication takes a decidedly nationalist standpoint with regard to the sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear as is clearly visible at the book cover which shows the Thai national flag flying over the temple ruins instead of the Cambodian flag as is the reality.

The anonymous authors of this book accuse the Samak government of abandoning unilaterally Thailands claims on Prasat Preah Vihear, a claim to which all Thai governments since 1962 had abided. Furthermore, Cambodia, now encouraged by the decision of the UNESCO, would be tempted to enforce her sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 large disputed zone as well. If the Cambodian side started to build hotels, markets, police stations and customs facilities or even a casino in this zone, it could do so with the backing of the international community. Furthermore, the Samak government was accused of having secretly abandoned Thai sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear including the disputed area in exchange for a concession from the Hun Sen government to develop a large-scale casino complex in the coastal province of Koh Kong in southwestern Cambodia.25 This accusation was put forward by several insiders like Kasit Phirom, a former close aide to Thaksin and Thai ambassador to Berlin and Washington. After the demise of the Somchai government in December 2008, Kasit became foreign minister in Abhisit Vejjajivas Democrat-led coalition government. In his new position he pursued a more pragmatic policy vis--vis Cambodia, eventually becoming himself a target

25 Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.) 2008, p. 51. See also Puangthong, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand , p.

64. See also Sok Udom Deth 2014, pp. 24346.

15

of PAD propaganda which tried to force the Abhisit administration to revoke the MoU of 2000 as it would provide Phnom Penh with a pretext to intrude into the disputed zone.26

It has been reported that PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul urged in February 2011 the Thai military to occupy Angkor Wat and use it as security for obtaining the Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding area (Puangthong 2013, p. 77). Nevertheless, most other statements by Sondhi indicate that he criticizes Thai governments for their willingness to compromise with Cambodia but does not figure out the Cambodian people as targets of chauvinist propaganda. Revealing is the transcript of Sondhis famous speach of 9 May 2008, in which he explained for the first time what he called the Samak governments hidden agenda on the Preah Vihear issue. Sondhi appeals repeatedly to Thai patriotism, but he does so without insulting the Cambodian people and their culture. Even Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is not personally attacked, as Sondhis main target is the Thai government and its unwillingness to defend national interests.

I do not want our people, our descendants accuse him [Samak] of selling the nation only for getting advantages with regard to gas concessions, which a certain person [Thaksin] currently negotiates with Prime Minister Hun Sen. I do not accuse him, but I do not want this to happen. I want him, our Prime Minister, to be cautious. I am sure that he loves the nation, that he loves the country. But so far he has not taken any concrete action in any of the issues which I raised. He has not yet demonstated his love for the people He has allowed the Cambodians to nominate [Prasat Preah Vihear] unilaterally. This gives rise to the suspicion that he might be involved in the conspiracy to hand Prasat Preah Vihear over to Cambodia in exchange for gas concessions (Puangthong 2013, p. 103).

Other publications of the PAD network contain similar allegations of a political conspiracy of the pro-Thaksin forces to abandon Thai claims on Prasat Preah Vihear for economic benefits elsewhere. Most of these publications are of limited analytical value, when compared to the one presented above. Many of them are clearly not written for an academic audience but for providing arguments on the political battlefield. There are only very few voices which argue that Thailand might be able to reclaim ownership of the temple one day in the future. The argument that the 1962 ICJ decision placed only the temple buildings under Cambodian sovereignty but not the temple ground (phnthi sung phrasat phra wihan tang yu), as put forward by Prof. Dr. Sompong Sucharitkun, who in 1962 had been a member of the Thai defence council in The Hague,27 did not convince even most hardliners since 2009. Such kind of argument almost disappeared from public discourse. Given the effective Cambodian control of Preah Vihear and its vicinity since the decision of the ICJ provisional ruling of 2011 that both countries must withdraw their military forces from a relatively wide provisional demilitarized zone around the temple, the main concern seems to be the defence of Thai territorial claims on the contested zone (Ibid., p. 86). Given the fact that Cambodia considers the 4.6 square kilometres as an integral part of Cambodia, the Thai government and media

26 As an example for a PAD diatribe against Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democratic Party and Thai Prime

Minister (20082011), is Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.), D ta sai tham thai sia din daen [Obstinateness and Ignorance Caused Thailand to Lose her Land]. Bangkok: ASTV Phucatkan raiwan, 2011.

27 Sompong Sucharitkun, San lok kap khadi prasat phra wihan, unpublished paper.

16

should strictly refrain from using the term disputed area (khet thap sn), otherwise Thailand would lose all trump cards in future bilateral negotiations with Cambodia.28

Approach 2: The Realists and Pragmatics

One of the most prominent proponent of a realistic and pragmatic approach towards a solution of the temple dispute is Professor Bowornsak Uwanno, who is a member of the Thai Royal Insitute and one of the leading Thai law experts. From 1988 to 1990 Achan Bowornsak was part of the young advisor team of Prime Minister Chatichai Chunhawan; thereafter he worked for various governments as legal advisor, including the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra and of Surayudh Chulanont. Though he is not specialized in international law, he felt an obligation to inform the Thai public about the complex legal situation which resulted from the 1962 ICJ verdict as almost all Thai experts in international law remained silent.29 Already in July 2008 he published the volume Chae ekkasan lap thi sut prasat phra wihan ph.s. 25052551 [Disclosing Top Secret Documents on the Preah Vihear Temple, AD 19622008] which includes a collection of key sources, including a Thai translation of the 1962 ICJ judgment, and a comprehensive analysis by the editor. Bowornsaks political position is that of a Thai patriotism which is based on the recognition of the reality. The author states that the Thai people should accept the 1962 judgment though painful as this may be for many of them. Instead of dreaming to regain the Preah Vihear temple itself, Thai diplomacy should concentrate on defending Thailands claims on the disputed zone. Therefore the book cover does not show unlike the Phuchatkan publication presented above the national flag of Thailand flying over the ruins of Preah Vihear but the national flag of Cambodia as is the reality of today.

A similar line of arguments is adopted by Vichitvong na Pombejras more popular book Prasat phra wihan: mummng mai nai bribot khng prawattisat khwam kiaokhng rawang thai kap kamphucha [The Phra Wihan Temple: New Perspectives in the Context of Thai-Cambodian History. The author endorses a reconciliation of Thai and Cambodian national interests on the basis peace, friendship and brotherhood as the final chapter of his book is entitled. Vichitvong arrives at the final conclusion that at the same time the World Committee would be happy if both countries expressed their intention to adjust the status of Prasat Preah Vihear to become their joint World Heritage of which there are already examples in many places of the world (Vichitvong 2009, p. 136).

In a recent book with the telling title Ru cing ru lk mahakap phra wihan: cut cop r cut roem ton khwam khat yaeng [Knowing the truth knowing in-depth about the Preah Vihear saga: the

28 See, for example, Thaithai Sucharitkun, Wan nan thng wan ni, Bangkok 2013, p. 46f. A similar line of

arguments is put forward by Khammun Sitthisaman in his volume Cut yn cut plian cut cop prasat phra wihan (Bangkok 2013) which contains a collection of articles published between 2009 and 2013. The volume has a preface written by Prof. Dr. Somng Sucharitkun and Sonthi Limthongkul.

29 Interview of the author with Prof. Dr. Bowornsak Uwanno in Bangkok, 20 August 2014.

17

end or the beginning of a dispute], Bowornsak Uwanno offers an excellent analysis of the ICJ judgment of 11 November 2013 interpreting, at the request of Cambodia, the ICJ judgment of 15 June 1962. Bowornsak demonstrates how the Cambodian government manipulated the Annex I Map by adding the words Phnum Trap and Pagoda as legends of a map submitted to the ICJ along with its request of (re-)interpretation. This was done because Cambodia wanted to give the impression that in 1962 the Court had taken a special interest in these geographical locations as well instead of paying attention only to the temple of Preah Vihear (Bowornsak 2013, p. 126f.). As for the ICJ interpretation of the term vicinity of the temple, Bowornsak recommends to adopt a pragmatic approach as the Court had only defined the promontory of Preah a smaller part of the disputed area as territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia (Bowornsak 2013, pp. 152ff.).

Approach 3: Philo-Cambodian Anti-Nationalists

Charnvit Kasetsiri is one of the most influential Thai historians of today. The former rector of Thammasat University is a harsh critic of an ethnic Thai nationalism. For this reason he has been campaigning for quite a while to abandon the countrys official name Thailand and replace it by the old name Siam (Sayam). In the Preah Vihear debate Charnvit, together with a number of other Thai intellectuals adopts a decidedly anti-nationalistic perspective.

Charnvit claims that King Chulalongkorn had concluded the border treaties with England and Frankreich for reasons of state. This great monarch considered the loss of Malay, Lao, and Cambodian territories as necessary and even inevitable sacrifices to ensure the independence and sovereignty of Siam:

All this happened in order to live in peace with the colonial powers France and England. In particular, it was a guarantee to safeguard the independence and sovereinty (ekkarat lae athipatai) of the major part of the country. At the same time this meant that the Siamese nobility was able to maintain its own position of power. This indeed brought about the rise of the absolute monarchy (somburanayasithirat) (Charnvit 2008, p. 13).

Only the nationalist regime of Marshal Phibun Songkhram, which emerged not long after the abolition of the absolute monarchy and changed the countrys name to Thailand in 1939, initiated a discourse on socalled territorial losses of Siam in order to achieve acceptance of a chauvinstic and expansionist foreign policy. In the wake of this discourse even ancient Khmer temples such as Prasat Preah Vihear were discovered as Thai cultural heritage.30 The

30 Thus the British judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice remarks As to the Khmer origins of the Temple this factor

(put forward by Cambodia) operates in an equally neutral way, since it seems to be admitted that there are and were, in these regions, populations of Khmer race on both sides of the frontier. See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, p. 54. Taking a similar line of argumentation, one would also have to reject a (hypothetical) claim to sole representation of all archaelogical sites of ancient Greece in Anatolia by the present-day Greek nation-state or a likewise absurd claim by Italy with regard to ancient Roman sites in Spain, France or Germany.

18

campaign of the PAD and the Democrat Party, Charnvit underscores, is part of a dubious tradition of anti-Khmer Thai chauvinism.

In a later book publication (2009) Prasat khao phra wihan: lum dam latthi chatniyom prawattisat phlae kao prawattisat tat ton kap ban-mang khng rao [Siamese/Thai Nationalism and Cambodia: A Case Study of the Preah Vihear Temple] Charnvit expands his arguments outlined above. Special emphasis is given to Prince Damrongs friendly attitude towards the French. Charnvit argues that Damrong and many other princes of his generation had genuinely accepted Siams territorial losses in the 18931909 period. Damrongs friendly attitude towards his French hosts when visiting the Preah Vihear temple in January 1930 thus was not just oriental politeness but a reflection of honest feelings. As further evidence to substantiate this argument, Charnvit quotes from a book published in 1925 to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of King Vajiravudhs ascension to the throne. This volume states that Siam and France were getting closer and their relationship prospered Charnvit 2009, p. 76).31

Advocating a broad and open-minded new form of nationalism which he also calls pracha-chat niyom (popular nationalism), Charnvit proposes his solution of the deadlock in the Preah Vihear controvery. Among four possible scenarious he rejects two as either unrealistic or dangerous, namely a new appeal of Thailand to the ICJ to revoke its 1962 judgment; and the military occupation of Prasat Preah Vihear and the disputed area. A third alternative, namely negotiations on the basis of the Thai-Cambodian MOU of June 2000, would be more reasonable. The preferred solution, however, is the fourth alternative: the acceptance of a new way of thinking based on the relinquishing (plong) of all territorial claims in the Preah Vihear area. In other words, the Thai people should accept without reservation the Cambodian sovereignty over the temple and the disputed zone (Ibid. pp. 172ff.).

Approach 4: The perspective of the indigenous people

It should be stressed that a rejection of Thai nationalism in the Preah Vihear controversy does not necessarily mean a support of the Cambodian legal viewpoint. The respected Thai archaeologist Sisak Vallibhotama (Wanliphodom), whose pioneering role in the study of the Khmer and Lao dominated pre- and early history of northeast Thailand is widely acknowledged, emphasises that the ruling elites in Bangkok and Phnom Penh were never genuinly interested in Prasat Preah Vihear, but for the local Khmer and Kui people living on both sides of the Dangrek mountain range this sanctuary has always been of vital importance. Therefore, any

31 Though the more cautious and less vigorous position of Damrong and the royalist elite towards the French,

especially when compared to the more belligerent attitude of the anti-royalist nationalists of the post-1932 regime, shall not be disputed, it nevertheless seems that Charnvit overinterprets his sources. For me it is difficult to comprehend how Charnvit can interpret an acceptance of territorial losses out of the following statement made in the above mentioned commemoration volume In a deal with France in this treaty, Siam agreed to cede Battambang, which originally belonged to Cambodia and had been under Siamese ruler since 1809, to France (ibid., p. 77).

19

solution of the conflict should in the first place address the needs of the local population, not those of the national elites in Thailand and Cambodia.32 Sisak shares with the PAD his distaste of the Thaksin regime but disagrees with the latters defence of the nation state. He is a proponent of a decentralized Thailand which acknowledges the countrys variety of cultures, ethnic groups, religious traditions and historical experiences. In this respect he also shares some of Charnvits ideals but in contrast to Charnvit, Sisak seems more interested in the rediscovery of regional cultures, rather than favouring any deconstruction of Thainess.

When the public debate on the Preah Vihear dispute reached its first peak in 2008, Sisak published as a special volume of Sinlapa-watthanatham (Arts and Culture) his booklet Khao phra wihan: raboet wela cak yuk ananikhom [Khao Phra Wihan: A Time Bomb from the Colonial Period]. Sisaks point of departure is the polycentric structure of the pre-modern Mandala state system in Southeast Asia. In this theoretical framework he studies the relationship between the political and cultural centres of the Khmer and, later on, the Siamese empires and their vassal states in a vast area which is nowadays northeast Thailand, central and southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia. Sisak sees the significance of Preah Vihear the ancient temple as well as the community which once surrounded it in its social and cultural relationship with other communities in the Khorat plateau which had been for centuries no mans land (Sisak 2008, pp. 2733 and 5157).

As a member of the Thai Peoples Network (Khra khai prachachon chao thai) Sisak demanded in a petition to the Thai government, dated 26 January 2009, that Thailand should either hold back or withdraw its consent to the inscription of Prasat Preah Vihear on the UNESCO World Heritage List.33 Interestingly, many of Sisaks ideas are shared by Western scholars specialized in the ethno-history of the Khorat plateau. Peter Cuasay,34 for example, proposed as early as 1998, at a time when the temple has just again been opened for visitors and jointly managed by Cambodian and Thai officials, the management of Preah Vihear as a transnational cultural heritage. It should be given back to nature and the indigenous peoples, to be managed cooperatively between the two governments in equal partnership with local communities. He warns us against seeing the Temple of Preah Vihear as a picturesque ruin, a spectacle for tourists showcased as a world heritage site and exhibited as a poignant testimony to the grandeur of an ancient civilization.35

32 See the feature on Preah Vihear in Bangkok Post, 22 May 2008. 33 For this petition Sisak was heavily criticised by Charnvit Kasetsiri as being allied to the pro-PAD nationalist

movement of formerly progressive intellectuals. See Charnvit 2009, p. 159. 34 Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology, University of Washington (2002). Disseration entitled Time

borders and elephant margins among the Kuay of South Isan, Thailand. 35 Cuasay, Borders on the Fantastic, p. 888.

20

Perspectives of a solution of the Preah Vihear problem

What are the prospects for solving the conflict on Preah Vihear, or Phra Wihan? When the conflict started to become violent three years ago, I predicted that the Cambodian government would be tempted to use the registration of Preah Vihear as UNSESCO World Heritage Site to internationalise the conflict with Thailand and thus put pressure on the Thai government to yield to the Cambodian legal viewpoint. Exactly this happened in 2011, when Phnom Penh asked the ICJ in the Hague to make a final and binding decision on the border in the vicinity of Preah Vihear sector. But for what reason should the ICJ depart from the principle that border disputes among states should be solved exclusively through bilateral negotiations? Why should the ICJ make a judgment on Cambodian demands with which it refused to deal in the operative clause of its judgment half a century ago? As Virachai Plasai, Thai representative at the ICJ hearing on 30 May 2011, aptly remarked, reversing the logical order, Cambodia is asking the Court to interpret the reasoning in its 1962 Judgment in light of the operative part.36

The Cambodian government is pushing vigorously for a quick solution. Tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of visitors are expected to visit Preah Vihear each year.37 Before the escalation of the conflict in summer 2008, more than 60,000 tourists visited Preah Vihear from the Thai side of the border, as against fewer than 4,000 who reached the temple from the Cambodian side. That is not astonishing, given the present-day infrastructure and the natural environment. Hotels and other facilities shall be built in the wider vicinity of the temple, which comprises large parts of the zone claimed by both countries. The Cambodian side has already created such faits accomplis by building a Buddhist temple (Wat Kaeo Sikkhakhirisawara) and several residential buildings in the disputed zone. It has even been reported that in the years following the MoU of 2000 three hamlets with 500600 settlers from central Cambodia were built by the Cambodian government close to the temple of Preah Vihear and, following attacks by the Thai military in July 2008 transferred further away from the borderline but still in territory claimed by Thailand. These faits accomplis would most probably be used by any future ruling of the ICJ as a proof of effective Cambodian control of the 4.6-square-kilometre disputed zone, as Thai historian Suwit Thirasasawat predicted in 2010 (Suwit 2010, p. 370).

Puangthong Pawakapan who finished her study shortly before the ICJ had ruled on the interpretation of the 1962 judgment at the request of the Cambodian government made the reasonable prediction that a decision in favour of Cambodia, i.e. assigning the whole disputed area of 4.6 square kilometres to Cambodia, would certainly cause a public uproar in Thailand and result in serious border clashes (Puangthong 2013, p. 87). Therefore, the courts final decision, announced on 11 November 2013, came to the relief of both Cambodia and Thailand,

36 ICJ proceedings, Monday, 30 May 2011, uncorrected translation. 37 Phiphop Udon, Krani prasat phra wihan rawang thai-kampucha: rian khon la dan khng ngoen khon la sakun

[The Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia on Prasat Phra Wihan: Two Sides of a Coin of Different Currency]. Bangkok 2008, p. 19.

21

as it did not leave a clear winner. The ICJ defined the whole promontory of Preah Vihear as the vicinity of the Preah Vihear temple which the 1962 verdict had declared as territory under Cambodian sovereignty. Cambodia can now safely claim roughly one quarter of the disputed area as her territory. The pagoda, a market and the three hamlets mentioned above are all situated in this realtively small zone immediately to the west of the temple. The serpentine road which the Cambodian built in 2010 with Chinese help to link the temple with Cambodian territory also cuts across the promontory and has to be respected by Bangkok as territory under Cambodian sovereignty as well. This certainly satisfies Phnom Penh. However, the larger part of the disputed zone, lying further to the west and including the neighbouring hill of Phnom Trap, was ruled by the ICJ as lying outside the disputed area.38 Therefore, the Thai government is now entitled to claim almost three quarters of the 4.6 square kilometres as territory under Thai sovereignty in any future bilateral negotiations on the delimitation of the border in the neighbourhood of Preah Vihear.

It is not yet too late to have Prasat Preah Vihear inscribed as a joint Thai-Cambodian World Heritage Site. The UNESCO decision of June 2008 still leaves this option open, as it recognizes that Thailand has repeatedly expressed a desire to participate in a joint nomination of the Temple of Preah Vihear and its surrounding areas and by considering further that archaeological research is underway which could result in new significant discoveries that might enable consideration of a possible new transboundary nominatione, that would require the consent of both Cambodia and Thailand.39 The American anthropologist Helaine Silverman, an expert on heritage management and museum theory and practice, strongly supports the idea of a joint Cambodian-Thai management of Preah Vihear as a transborder World Heritage Site. She stresses that, given the history of the conflict, UNESCO was adding fuel to the fire by allowing the temple be inscribed as the heritage of only one nation-state It is UNESCOs own decision to list Preah Vihear that provoked the recent violence that has damaged the site, in contravention of the explicit goal of the World Heritage List and World Heritage Convention to promote site protection (Silverman 2011, p. 15). A solution acceptable to both countries in the long run would presuppose that the temple were conferred a borderless status, assisting the two countries to prepare dual access routes to the site with appropriate passport control. The UNESCO flag and the flag of both countries would fly over the site (Ibid.). Given the temples architecture, which shows a clear natural orientation towards the north, and given the fact that the easiest and most convenient access to the temple is from the Thai side, joint management of Preah Vihear still seems the best solution. Several Thai scholars also point at the UNESCO rules calling for a sufficiently large management area of World Heritage sites. In the case of Preah Vihear such a management area would have to include an areas comprising not only parts of the disputed zone of 4.6 square kilometres but also some areas within Thailand, such as Sa Trao, Sathup Khu (Twin Stupa), and the pre-historic pictorial engraving at the M-I-Daeng cliff (Watcharin 2011, p.81).

38 ICJ, Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the temple of Preah

Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 11 November 2013, section 98. 39 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage

Committee, Quebec City, Canada, 210 July 2008.

22

The German laywer Dr Ren Gralla has come forward with an ingenious idea proposing an Andorra-style solution for Preah Vihear. The whole disputed area of slightly less than five square kilometres would be proclaimed as the independent state of Preah Vihear-Phra Wihan ruled by two diarchs, namely the King of Cambodia and the King of Thailand, harbouring a population of monks and local villagers from both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border, mostly ethnic Kui and Khmer, apart from some Lao and Thai. Such a mini-state could promote tourism, attract foreign investors, and finally become the symbol of eternal friendship beween Thailand and Cambodia.40 A dream? Perhaps, but one that should be tried.

40 Ren Gralla and Volker Grabowsky, Andorra-stlye solution beckons in Preah Vihear row, in Bangkok Post,

24 September 2013.

23

References

A. In Thai

Anucha 2008. Anucha Paephannawan, Exclusive kan mang khao phra wihan [Exclusive: The politics of conflict on Khao Phra Wihan]. Bangkok: Khln aksn, 2008.

Bowornsak Uwanno 2008. Chae ekkasan lap thi sut prasat phra wihan ph.s. 25052551 [Disclosing Top Secret Documents on the Preah Vihear Temple, AD 19622008]. Bangkok: Matichon.

Bowornsak Uwanno 2013. Bowornsak Uwanno, Ru cing ru lk mahakap phra wihan: cut cop r cut roem ton khwam khat yaeng [Knowing the truth knowing in-depth about the Preah Vihear saga: the end or the beginning of a dispute]. Bangkok: Daily News, 2013.

Charnvit 2008. Charnvit Kasetsiri, Prasat khao phra wihan: lum dam latthi chatniyom prawattisat phlae kao prawattisat tat ton kap ban-mang khng rao [Preah Vihear Temple: A Black Hole-Nationalism-Wounded History and Our Country: Siam-Thailand]. Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 2008.

Charnvit 2009. Charnvit Kasetsiri. Latthi chatniyom thai / sayam kap kamphucha: lae krani sksa prasat khao phra wihan [Siamese/Thai Nationalism and Cambodia. A Case Study of the Preah Vihear Temple]. Bangkok: Toyota Thailand Foundation and The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project.

Cotmaihet kan sadet truat borannawatthu sathan monthon nakhn ratchasima khng somdet phracao bromwongthoe krom phraya damrong rachahuphap ph.s. 2472 [Report on a survey of archaeological sites in monthon Nakhn Ratchasima by Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, AD 1929]. Bangkok: Prince Damrong Rachanuphap Foundation, 1988.

Duangthida Ramet 2009. Prasat phra wihan: khwam khatyaeng taltkan khng sng prathet [Prasat Phra Wihan: A permanent conflict between two countries?]. Bangkok: Magic Press.

ICJ 2008. Kham phiphaksa san yutthitham rawang prathet khadi prasat phra wihan ph.s. 2505. [The Judgment of the International Court of Justice over the Case of Prasat Phra Wihan, AD 1962]. Bangkok: Khlet Thai.

Krasuang kan tang prathet 2008. Krani khn thabian prasat phra wihan pen mradok lok [The Case of Registering the Preah Vihear Temple as World Heritage]. Bangkok.

Luang Rangdet Anan 2007. Ratchaphongsawadan krung kampucha [The Royal Chronicles of Cambodia], 2nd edition, Bangkok.

Phichet Saengtong (ed.) 2008. Phromdaen bon phaen kradat prasat khao phra wihan [Border on a Sheet of Paper: The Phra Wihan Temple]. Bangkok: Khlet Thai.

Phiphop Udon 2008. Krani prasat phra wihan rawang thai-kampucha: rian khon la dan khng ngoen khon la sakun [The Preah Vihear Case between Thailand and Cambodia: two different sides of a coin with two different currencies]. Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project.

Phucatkan Editorial Board 2008. Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.), Prasat phra wihan khwam cing thi khon thai tng ru [Prasat Phra Wihan: The truth which the Thai should know]. Bangkok: ASTV Phucatkan raiwan, 2008.

Phucatkan Editorial Board 2011. Phucatkan Editorial Board (ed.), D ta sai tham thai sia din daen [Obstinateness and Ignorance Caused Thailand to Lose her Land]. Bangkok: ASTV Phucatkan raiwan, 2011.

Puangthong Pawakapan 2009. Kham phiphaksa khadi prasat phra wihan: manothat t phnthi chaidaen khp lae kh sia priap khng thai [The Preah Vihear Verdict: Thai Perception on the Border Area and Legal Disadvantages]. Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project.

Sisak 2008. Sisak Vallibhodama, Khao phra wihan: raboet wela cak yuk ananikhom [Khao Phra Wihan: A Time Bomb from the Colonial Period]. Bangkok: Sinlapa-watthanatham.

24

Sok Udom Deth 2014. Factional Politics and Foreign Policy Choices in Cambodia-Thailand Diplomatic Relations, 19502014. PhD dissertation, Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin.

Suwat Kikhunthot, Songrit Phonngoen and Sulak Kancanakhundi 2008. Khamae thai mit r sattru [Khmer-Thai: Friends or Foes?]. Bangkok: Indochina Publishing.

Suwit 2010. Suwit Thirasatsawat, Bang lk kan sia dindaen lae panha prasat phra wihan cak r.s. 112 thng patcuban [The deep background of the territorial losses and the Prasat Phra Wihan problem from AD 1893 until present-day]. Bangkok: The Historical Society under the Patronage of HRH Princes Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, 2010.

Thaithao Sucharitkun 2013. Wan nan thng wan ni: khmun phnthan phra wihan kap san lok cak kh khian s. dr. sompng sucaritkun [From that day to the present: Basic facts on Preah Vihear and the International Court of Justice based on writings of Prof. Dr. Sompong Sucharitkun]. Bangkok 2013.

Vichitvong na Pombejra 2009. Prasat phra wihan: mummng mai nai bribot khng prawattisat khwam kiaokhng rawang thai kap kamphucha [The Phra Wihan Temple: New Perspectives in the Context of Thai-Cambodian History]. Bangkok: Vasira.

Wacharin Yongsiri 2011. Mng na lae lang wikrit khwam samphan thai-kamphucha [Looking Forward Looking Backward towards the Crisis of Thai-Cambodian Relations]. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

B. In Western Languages

Anderson 1991. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1991.

Bora Touch 2009. Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Cambodian Position, Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 205227.

Charnvit Kasetsiri 2003. Thailand-Cambodia: A Love-Hate Relationship. Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol. 3, March.

Charnvit Kasetsiri, Pou Sothirak and Pavin Chachavalpongpun 2013. Preah Vihear: A Guide to the Thai-Cambodian Conflict and Its Solutions. Bangkok: White Lotus.

Council of Ministers 2011, Kingdom of Cambodia 2008. The Temple of Preah Vihear: Proposed for the inscription on the World Heritage List (UNESCO). Phnom Penh.

Cuasay, Peter 1998. Borders on the Fantastic Mimesis, Violence, and Landscape at the Temple of Preah Vihear, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1998, pp. 849890.

Duke Law Journal 1963. Case concerning the temple of Preah Vihear Cambodia v. Thailand, in Duke Law Journal, 1963, pp. 307309.

Graham et al. 2005. Graham, Brian et al., The uses and abuses of heritage, in Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An introductory reader. London and New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 2637.

Harrison 2010. Harrison, Rodney, What is heritage?, in Understanding the politics of heritage, edited by R. Harrison. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010, pp. 542.

Hauser-Schublin 2011. Hauser-Schublin, Brigitta, From Object of Colonial Desire to a Contested World Heritage Site, in World Heritage Angkor and Beyond: Circumstances and Implications of UNESCO Listings in Cambodia. Gttingen: Universittsverlag Gttingen, 2011, pp. 3356.

Hahn 2011. Hahn, E. Emmons, UNSESCOs Heritage Policies and World Heritage as a Middle Path between Imperialism and Nationalism, in httpsustainablehritagetourism.com/heritage/essay-world-heritage-alternative-politics [retrieved on 1 September 2014].

Hinton, Alexander 2006. Khmerness and the Thai Other Violence, Discourse and Symbolism in the 2003 Anti-Thai Riots in Cambodia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 445468.

ICJ 1962. International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 1962 (http://www.icj-

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=46&case=45&code=ct&p3=4

25

cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=46&case=45&code=ct&p3=4, consulted on 25 January 2013).

Palmer, Larry 1977. Thailands Kampuchea Incidents Territorial Disputes and Armed Confrontation along the Thai-Kampuchea Frontier. News from Kampuchea, Vol. 1, No. 4.

Relations between Thailand and Cambodia 1959. Bangkok: Prachandra Press.

Roveda, Vittorio 2000. Preah Vihear (Prasat Khao Phra Wihan). Bangkok: River Books.

Leifer 1961/62. Michael Leifer, Cambodia and Her Neigbours, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1961/62, pp. 361374.

Luang Vichitr Vadakarn 1941. Thailands Case. Bangkok.

Monthicha Pakdeekong 2009. Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Thai Position. Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 229237.

Miling 2011. Sven Miling, A Legal View of the Case of the Temple Preah Vihear, in World Heritage Angkor and Beyond: Circumstances and Implications of UNESCO Listings in Cambodia, ed. by Brigitta Hauser-Schublin. Gttingen: Universittsverlag Gttingen, pp. 5767.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1961. Facts about the Relations between Thailand and Cambodia. Bangkok.

Puangthong 2013. Puangthong R. Pawakapan, State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Silverman, Helaine 2011. Border Wars The Ongoing Temple Dispute between Thailand and Cambodia and UNESCOs World Heritage List, International Journal of Heritage Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121.

Strate, Shane, 2013. A pile of stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai symbol of National Humilation, South East Asia Research, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 4168.

Thongchai Winichakul 1994. Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation. Honolulu: Hawaii University Press.

Winter, Tim 2012. Heritage and Nationalim: An Unbreachable Couple?, ICS Occasional Papers, Vol. 3, No. 4, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney.

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=46&case=45&code=ct&p3=4

26

Response paper by Sok Udom DETH (Zaman University, Cambodia)

Voices from Cambodia: Discourses on the Preah Vihear Conflict

As Prof. Grabowsky suggested, The decision [by UNESCO to inscribe Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage Site] was greeted with joy everywhere in Cambodia but met with strong opposition in Thailand. Yet, unlike in Thailand where plural voices and different propositions existed over the issue of the Preah Vihear conflict, in Cambodia, there has been a relatively more unanimous discourse on the Preah Vihear conflict: that Preah Vihear temple and the roughly 4.6 sq. km. disputed area undoubtedly belong to Cambodia, and Thailand should once and for all renounce its claim over the temple and the disputed territory. Nonetheless, certain nuanced differences/emphases do exist among different political factions and various social groups in Cambodia, depending on their political background, affiliation and/or interests. This section of the paper discusses such differences and proposes an alternative solution to the conflict.

Views from Cambodia

To the majority of (if not all) Cambodians, Preah Vihear temple has always been a Khmer temple, built by several Khmer kings at different times during the Khmer Empire era between the 9th and the 13th centuries (there is even a Khmer rap song describing the chronology of the temple construction during the different reigns of Khmer kings). The fact that the Western parts of Cambodia (including where Preah Vihear temple is located) had fallen under Siamese (old name for Thailand) control between the 18th and mid-20th centuries became less pronounced as a historical point of reference. More importantly, the International Court of Justices (ICJ) 1962 verdict declaring the temple and its vicinity area under Cambodias sovereign demonstrated to Cambodians that Cambodia had always been the rightful owner of the temple and over the disputed territory. Such a view is supported by notable Khmer scholars, including Touch Bora (lawyer based in Australia), Sorn Samnang (President of Cambodian Historians Association), and Sok Touch (Rector of Khemarak University). Technicality and any possible legality related to the watershed line which deviates from the boundary line as shown in the Appendix I to the 1907 border treaty (that would have possibly put the temple under Thailands sovereignty) has not appeared in any public discussion in Cambodia. To the Cambodian government and the Cambodian public in general, any Thai claim contrary to such an understanding is viewed as an invasionist position and would confirm many Cambodians suspicion of Thailands unending ambition to steal Cambodian land.

27

During the climax of the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand under PM Abhisit between late 2008 and 2011, nationalist rhetoric intensified in both countries. Diplomatic press releases, the media, and comments expressed by users on social-networking sites reflected mutual dislike and distrust between the two nations. News and analyses about the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand dominated the media in both countries with varying degrees of bias on both sides. During this period, one could be forgiven for thinking that Cambodia and Thailand had always been enemies since time immemorial.

Different groups in Cambodia have used to Preah Vihear issue to highlight their own positions and, as much as possible, advance their own interests. The Cambodian government led by PM Hun Sens Cambodian Peoples Party, for instance, did not forgo the opportunity in giving itself the credit of successfully enlisting the temple as a World Heritage Site, and as the protector of Cambodian territory and sovereignty after conflict with Thailand ensued. For example, the Cambodian government erected a sign at the entrance to the Preah Vihear temple that reads I have pride to be born as Khmer. As John D. Ciociari pointed out:

The Cambodian government also seized on the issue for political gain. Stoking resentment of Thailand is not difficult in Cambodia, where many people resent what they perceive as a Thai sense of superiority [] Hun Sen and other members of his Cambodian People's Party used the Preah Vihear dispute to rally nationalist support in the run-up to national elections in late July.

Not wanting to lose out politically from the Preah Vihear conflict, opposition leader Kem Sokha travelled to the temple region in late January 2009 and brought donations to the soldiers stationing along the border, but was denied access to the temple. The highest-ranking field commander in Preah Vihear, Srey Deuk, then remarked: "It is their right to distribute gifts, but, in any case, the soldiers do not want gifts from HRP [Human Rights Party]. They know it is the opposition party (Phnom Penh Post, 5/11/09). For his part, Sokha reckoned that This kind of political discrimination is regrettable. The soldiers belong to the nation, not one political party.

Likewise, PM Hun Sens strong posturing against Thailand also came under fire among his critics, for his supposed hypocrisy about his close relationship with Vietnam. For instance, a commentator on a Youtube video of the Premiers speech wrote

Why Hun Sen is so strong a leader to fight the Thais while he is a pup